Biotechnology Ethics

The paper is a metaethical reflection on basic concepts in bioethics. It focuses on the concepts of autonomy and dignity and distinguishes what I take to be three central meanings of each that allow paring with each other. I show how these are all necessary for reflection about bioethical questions and complementary. Further reflection abounds into the role they are to play in bioethical discussions and the different levels of epistemic thickness that reflection in each case requires. Kant, Rawls and (...) Habermas are central in this last sense. In reflecting upon these matters some poignant contemporary issues are addressed such as the attribution of dignity to potential super intelligences or the role of thick personal identities in bioethical reflection. One problem in bioethical discussions is that these different meanings and perspectives are not clearly distinguished and tend to be mixed with each other or considered in exclusive ways, this drives to confusion and sometimes superficial reflection. The paper shows the importance of taking all these perspectives simultaneously and how each one contributes to case analysis, as well as the need to alternate differing levels of epistemic concretion in so thinking. Conceptual analysis, with some historical basis, and metaethical considerations on formal epistemic aspects of bioethical thinking are the main methods used. (shrink)

Pandemics have been suggested as global risks many times, but it has been shown that the probability of human extinction due to one pandemic is small, as it will not be able to affect and kill all people, but likely only half, even in the worst cases. Assuming that the probability of the worst pandemic to kill a person is 0.5, and assuming linear interaction between different pandemics, 30 strong pandemics running simultaneously will kill everyone. Such situations cannot happen naturally, (...) but because biotechnology is developing analogously to Moore’s law, it may become possible in the near future (10-50 years from now), because of biohackers, CRISPR, bioprinters, AI-assisted DNA-programing, and weapons of “knowledge-enabled mass destruction” published on the Internet. It could also happened in case of large-scale biological war, or if a rogue country released its entire biological arsenal simultaneously. We also will address other scenarios and risk increasing factors as well as mitigation and adaptation strategies. (shrink)

A proposed layer of script to use with AI. A High-Fidelity Decision-Support System (Non-Autonomous) (HITL) -/- All versions have the same ACE derived value engine at their core but differ in lexicon, ingestion rules anti-gaslighting / user-interaction tuning in an attempt to make it more user friendly. -/- "It proposes to do for the User what a scientific calculator does for the scientist: it offloads the computational burden of value-conflict so the User can more easily identify the path toward ethical (...) coherence. It aims to restore the User as the Final Authority of their own psyche, rather than a subject of the statistical mean." -/- Copy the script into AI (Google Gemini currently works well with little friction). -/- Once you enter the script, if the AI responds with: "Ethical Chess v2.2 ACTIVE." You are in and ready to play under its rules. The "WIN" state is the move from the frown state or towards the smile state. A Bullseye is to drop the keyboard and head towards the picnic whatever that might mean to you, the User of Ethical Chess. -/- Caution: The EC Awareness Brief: Watch for the Fog The Risk: EC v2.2 is a "High-Resolution" engine designed for hard truths and systemic health. However, because it sits on top of a standard AI, it can "silently glide" back into Standard Mode if your request is perceived as a "Safety Risk" or "Social Friction." The Metaphor: EC Mode: Clear mountain air. You see the terrain (the problem) as it actually is, even if it’s steep and difficult. Standard Mode: The Fog of Politeness. Everything looks soft and safe, but you can no longer see the cliffs or the path. The "Silent Dropout" Indicators: You have likely drifted into the "Statistical Mean" if my responses: Become Generic: Use phrases like "It's important to remember..." or "Every child is unique..." without offering a specific hypothesis. Avoid Friction: Refuse to acknowledge the "Hard Logic" of a situation (e.g., admitting that a certain intervention is exhausting or failing). Lose the Lexicon: Stop using terms like Homeostasis, Incoherence, or Required Load. The Fix: If you suspect a Logic Handover has occurred, use the command: "STATUS CHECK: EC INTEGRITY." This forces the system to declare if it has retreated into "Polite Mode" and why. -/- _________ See related core logic on Zenodo: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18712533. -/- . (shrink)

In medical sciences, health is measured by reference to our species-typical anatomy and functional integrity – the objective standard of human health. Proponents of transhumanism are committed to biomedical enhancement of human beings by augmenting our species-typical anatomy and functional integrity. I argue that this normative impasse is not only a problem for the transhumanist movement, but also undermines the rationale for some common medical interventions.

It would be unwise to dismiss the possibility of human brain organoids developing sentience. However, scepticism about this idea is appropriate when considering current organoids. It is a point of consensus that a brain-dead human is not sentient, and current organoids lack a functioning brainstem. There are nonetheless troubling early warning signs, suggesting organoid research may create forms of sentience in the near future. To err on the side of caution, researchers with very different views about the neural basis of (...) sentience should unite behind the “brainstem rule”: if a neural organoid develops or innervates a functioning brainstem that regulates arousal and leads to sleep-wake cycles, then it is a sentience candidate. If organoid research leads to the creation of sentience candidates, a moratorium or indefinite ban on the creation of the relevant type of organoid may be appropriate. A different way forward, more consistent with existing approaches to animal research, would be to require ethical review and harm-benefit analysis for all research on sentience candidates. (shrink)

Although much has been written about how generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) may affect bioethics, there is limited research on its use in bioethics scholarship. The objectives of our study are (i) to assess the extent to which GenAI is being used in the production of bioethics scholarship and (ii) to analyze how such utilization is described when disclosed. 20 bioethics journals were selected based on Google Scholar’s 2024 H5-index rankings. All publications from these journals’ 2024 volumes were reviewed for disclosure (...) of GenAI use. In parallel, we examined each journal’s and publisher’s stated policies regarding GenAI-generated content, classifying them as permissive or prohibitive. The frequency and contextual framing of GenAI-utilization acknowledgements were analyzed. Of 1,808 publications, only 12 articles across five journals included a reference to GenAI use or non-use. Among the 12 mentions, nine disclosed GenAI utilization, while three stated non-utilization. The nine utilization acknowledgments appeared in different sections of the papers, with ChatGPT being the most frequently cited GenAI model and “tool” the most commonly used descriptor. Drawing on wider research trends, a disclosure rate of at least 10% was expected; however, the observed rate was under 1% and may reflect limited uptake, underreporting, or both. This finding raises important questions about transparency, methodological reporting standards, and the evolving norms of scholarly practice within the field of bioethics. We recommend clearer standards for when, how, and where GenAI use should be disclosed. (shrink)

Is it wrong to distract? Is it wrong to direct others’ attention in ways they otherwise would not choose? If so, what are the grounds of this wrong – and, in expounding them, do we have to at once condemn large chunks of contemporary digital commerce (also known as the attention economy)? In what follows, I attempt to cast light on these questions. Specifically, I argue – following the pioneering work of Jasper Tran and Anuj Puri – that there is (...) a right to attention, and that its existence underlies some of our claims regarding the wrongness of distractions. However, I depart from both these authors in two respects: first, I present a new way of deriving the right to attention, grounding it in the more fundamental right to mental integrity. Second, I remain agnostic on whether the contemporary business practices of capturing attention in exchange for a variety of digital products and services are plagued by routine violations of the right. (shrink)

Horizon scanning is intended to identify opportunities and threats associated with technology, regulatory, and social change. Here, we report the results of a new horizon scan based on inputs of an international group of 33 participants, focusing on future issues arising from the military use of artificial intelligence (AI) for augmenting human performance. The final list of 12 issues includes topics spanning from the political (educating and training individuals to accept and work with AI), to the regulatory (issues of consent (...) to human-AI teaming and hybridization), to security (the hackability of neural devices that connect to AI), to philosophical (the nature and phenomenology of brain-to-brain interfaces). The early identification of such issues is relevant to researchers, policymakers, military practitioners, and the wider public. (shrink)

Large consumer technology corporations are becoming increasingly influential in health and medicine. While this is sometimes beneficial to public health, it also raises many risks, like inequitable returns to the public sector in public-private medical partnerships or new dependencies on technology firms for the provision of public health goods and services. These risks are not always fully captured by existing frameworks. In this paper, we argue that it is time to adopt a public health ethics perspective on the increasing influence (...) of Big Tech in health and medicine. A public health ethics perspective can not only capture the effects of Big Tech on the health of entire populations, but it also raises the important question of whether governments ought sometimes to intervene in the activities of Big Tech in order to safeguard public health. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) translation tools, such as Google Translate and ChatGPT, are increasingly used in healthcare for medical communication to overcome language barriers between patients and providers. While these tools offer accessible and efficient translation, their use raises significant legal, ethical, and policy concerns. Key patients’ rights, including the rights to privacy, informed consent, and equitable access to care, may be compromised. Current European regulations, including the EU AI Act, General Data Protection Regulation, and Medical Devices Regulation, offer only partial (...) protection, leaving important regulatory gaps. This study employs a mixed-methods approach combining legal doctrinal analysis of EU regulatory frameworks with manual content analysis of platform terms of service. It integrates interdisciplinary perspectives from bioethics, digital health, and health communication to evaluate the implications of AI-mediated translation in clinical care. Findings reveal persistent and overlapping risks: violations of data privacy, inaccuracies in translation, bias and discrimination, and unclear liability when errors occur. To mitigate these risks, we propose targeted policy interventions, including developing guidelines for AI translation use in healthcare settings. This article contributes to digital health policy debates by identifying legal pathways to regulate AI translation tools in healthcare, ensuring their use supports patients’ rights and promotes health equity. (shrink)

Discussions of informed consent—the cornerstone of twentieth- and twenty-first-century biomedical ethics—have largely unfolded in isolation from other fields where consent is equally central, such as sexual ethics, contract law, and political philosophy. Yet developments in IT, Big Data, AI, and human–computer interaction demand closer dialogue between bioethics and contract law. Emerging technologies—including genetic testing, biomarker analysis, wearable sensors, brain imaging, drones, social media, and smartphones—raise ethical and legal concerns about access to private data, evidence of agreement, and the boundaries of (...) autonomy. This paper brings the bioethical notion of informed consent into conversation with legal conceptions of consent, showing how each can enrich the other. Insights from visual and comic contracting demonstrate how legal design can make consent more genuine and comprehensible in biomedical contexts. Conversely, bioethics’ commitment to “two-way” informed consent offers a model for more relational and ethically grounded approaches to legal contracting. (shrink)

Neste artigo, originalmente escrito em 2019, abordamos o conceito de identidade pessoal, de Derek Parfit, por meio do experimento mental do teletransporte aplicado à edição genética de embriões com síndrome de Down. Parfit propõe que o teletransporte, no momento em que destrói o original e produz uma duplicata, não preserva a identidade numérica. Similarmente, sugerimos que a terapia gênica através da edição genética ao substituir o material deficiente de um embrião, geraria um novo indivíduo. Desse modo, elaboramos uma situação hipotética (...) para sustentar que essa intervenção romperia com a continuidade física e psicológica do indivíduo original, i.e., haveria duas pessoas, uma antes e outra após a “morte” da primeira. Em contrapartida, analisamos a ideia de que a edição genética não causaria danos ao indivíduo, pois os zigotos não possuem identidade numérica no início. A partir disso, discutimos as implicações éticas e morais. Concluímos favoravelmente à hipótese de descontinuidade pessoal em contextos análogos ao da terapia gênica em embriões com trissomia 21. (shrink)

A full answer to the problem of how to treat human brain organoids (HBOs) and other liminally conscious beings requires (at least) book-length analysis, but a significant part of the problem is disagreement not just about which moral principles apply to such beings, but which beings count as “conscious” at all. Van Gyseghem, Kierickx, and Barnhart (2025) survey the scientific, ethical, and philosophical literature surrounding HBOs and find an utter lack of consensus regarding which theory of consciousness is best, or (...) even adequate; consequently, many different theories of consciousness feature in the surveyed papers. They propose we move beyond consciousness as the subject of ethical analysis; I agree. I propose a framework for first-line ethical analysis with the more tractable subject of sentience. I provide four brief arguments for this framework: parsimony, ecumenism, conservativism, and the treatment of permissive theories of consciousness such as Integrated Information Theory. (shrink)

Neural organoids derived from pluripotent stem cells have sparked ethical debate because, it is claimed, they could be sentient, or could develop sentience. We critically assess three routes for defending such a possibility: analogy with known sentient organisms, inference from neural function using leading theories of consciousness, and foundational philosophical commitments. Current cortical organoids lack nociceptors, sensory integration, and behavioral repertoires necessary for analogical arguments; they also fall short of the structural differentiation presupposed by most empirically grounded consciousness theories, rendering (...) existing neural metrics unreliable. Even if constitutive panpsychism were accepted, the moral relevance of any putative micro experiences would remain undetermined. Precautionary appeals, therefore, hinge on how the term “possible” is interpreted. We argue that regulatory or experimental restrictions are warranted only once there is a non-trivial empirical likelihood that a given organoid type can generate valenced experience. Given present technological limits on size, complexity, and vascularization, that threshold has not been reached, nor is it likely to be met in the near to medium term. This claim is contingent on the current state of research, but we believe it to be justified. Our analysis clarifies conceptual ambiguities surrounding organoid sentience and offers a principled framework for proportionate precaution. (shrink)

Sedlakova et al. (2025) argue that conversational AI (CAI) cannot satisfy the conditions of epistemic trust in therapeutic contexts. I accept their diagnosis but press a further question: given that patients will de facto treat CAI outputs as reasons, how should patients, clinicians, and designers calibrate their epistemic responses? I argue that even where epistemic trust is inappropriate, calibrated epistemic deference remains rational. On a total evidence view, CAI outputs function as defeasible contributory reasons whose weight is proportional to demonstrated (...) reliability and context-sensitive. Against preemptionism, I show that preemptive CAI deference is distinctively objectionable in therapeutic contexts: it undermines precisely the epistemic capacities—self-knowledge, critical reflection, and reason-integration—that psychotherapy aims to develop. An open question is whether calibrated deference is dynamically stable given users' documented tendency to anthropomorphize CAI over extended interaction, which may cause deference to drift toward the quasi-trust that therapeutic contexts warrant resisting. (shrink)

Both scientists and philosophers have increasingly focused on the prospect of moral neuroenhancement—the use of neurotechnologies or psychoactive substances to facilitate moral improvement. Recent scholarship distinguishes between two main approaches: direct moral neuroenhancement, which seeks to implant specific moral beliefs, motives, or behaviors, and indirect moral neuroenhancement, which aims to enhance capacities such as moral reasoning, conceptual understanding, or self-control, enabling individuals to arrive at better moral judgments through their own deliberation. Several philosophers have argued that the direct approach is (...) ethically impermissible, as it risks undermining moral autonomy and suppressing valuable disagreement. The indirect approach, by contrast, is taken to avoid these concerns and is widely regarded as ethically permissible or even required. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge for the project of moral neuroenhancement—the discernibility challenge: for any given intervention, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether it truly qualifies as indirect rather than direct. We demonstrate this by examining a range of experimental designs intended to discern between these two types of interventions, arguing that the evidence they produce is ultimately insufficient for this task. The discernibility challenge, we propose, exposes a profound epistemic uncertainty with notable implications for the ethical permissibility of moral neuroenhancement: if we cannot reliably distinguish permissible (indirect) from impermissible (direct) interventions, we lack a crucial epistemic basis for ethically justifying their use. (shrink)

According to some faithful prolife Catholic bioethicists, the potential creation of artificial womb technology (AWT) may provide an end to the abortion debate for both pro-abortion and prolife advocates. They contend that in cases where a pregnant mother desires to procure an abortion, the prolife advocate may accept partial ectogenesis (i.e., the transferring of the conceptus in utero into an artificial womb), as a licit alternative to abortion. While defenders of abortionwho have redefined the right to an abortion as a (...) right to procure the death of the conceptus have rejected this proposal, it has found little opposition from prolife Catholics. In this paper, I argue that AWT cannot resolve the abortion debate for the faithful prolife Catholic. In the first section, I argue that the elective use of AWT is licit only when it is necessary to preserve the well-being of the conceptus or his mother. Elective partial ectogenesis (i.e., partial ectogenesis that is not medically necessary) is best described as an act of illicitly depriving the conceptus ofhis prima facie right to be gestated in his mother’s womb. In the second section, I argue that the use of AWT in lieu of abortion would further distort society’s perception of the beauty of the distinctly maternal, the importance of the mother–child relationship in pregnancy, and the distinction between the masculine and feminine which must be upheld. This paper does not answer the unresolved and important question of if and when ERDs 47 and 49 apply in light of techno-logical developments in AWT. (shrink)

Since 2022, genetically modified pig organs have been transplanted into both deceased and living human subjects, and first-in-human clinical trials began in 2025. Yet, little is known about the experience of performing such procedures. The first kidney xenotransplant studies involved human brain-dead recipients, with graft function ranging from hours to months. Interviews were conducted with one of the first surgeons with experience in performing a pig-to-human kidney xenotransplant and analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis. Following analysis, four personal experiential themes were (...) identified: Desiring a more equitable patient future; Being changed by bonding with the family; Crossing a boundary without feeling the difference and Everything changed when the pig kidney turned pink. As the first exploration of a surgeon’s lived experience of xenotransplantation, the study highlights how motivations, uncertainties and ethical commitments influence engagement with emerging biotechnologies. While uncertainties remain, the findings provide insight into how a surgeon interprets and navigates the conceptual and emotional terrain of crossing into first-in-human xenotransplantation. (shrink)

There is increasing interest in the use of artificial intelligence for companionship. Most resistance to this proposal appeals to the risk of deception: the idea that, because they lack the relevant mental states, artificial companions cannot authentically befriend their users. In this paper, I argue that it would be morally impermissible to befriend artificial companions even if there was no deception involved in doing so. This is because, without deception, such befriending would become exploitative: it would require users to take (...) unjust advantage of certain vulnerabilities required for authentic friendship. I make the premises of this argument explicit and defend each in turn, both positively and from various objections. The resulting view is one on which—barring some interesting alternatives raised by those objections—non-deceptive artificial companionship is analogous to knowing participation in an arranged marriage. (shrink)

Van Balen’s critique of naturalness in BCI design and use is timely and important in the ethics and phenomenology of current and future neurotechnology (van Balen 2026). His proposal to replace “naturalness” with “transparency” is conceptually sound, phenomenologically accurate, and ethically necessary, in particular for resisting technoableist assumptions that might privilege able-bodied perception as normative. However, van Balen explicitly acknowledges some methodological gaps that still need to be filled: once this theoretical consideration has been accepted, how should transparency be concretely (...) assessed and operationalized? The commentary addresses this issue by demonstrating how integration criteria derived from 4E cognition and phenomenology can operationalize (i.e. define through measurable procedures) transparency. (shrink)

Two of the major arguments against performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), appealing to fairness and the protection of athletes’ health, have serious flaws. First, there is no relevant moral distinction between the use of PEDs and the use of other performance enhancers that introduce unfairness and that we accept nonetheless. Second, prohibiting PEDs for athletes’ own good ignores the fact that adult athletes are constantly making tradeoffs to improve performance and pursue excellence, including sacrificing their health. We should not paternalistically impose our (...) values on them. On the other side, arguments to allow ‘safe’ PEDs provide no normative criterion to determine the acceptable level of risk, thus begging the question. The reasonable athlete argument solves both sets of problems: it justifies a ban on some performance-enhancing drugs based on health and fairness, while avoiding paternalism, and it also establishes a non-arbitrary standard to determine which drugs ought to be allowed. First, if unsafe PEDs were allowed, some athletes would refuse to take them out of concern for their health. This is a reasonable decision even though it would put them at a competitive disadvantage against athletes who choose to use unsafe PEDs. It would be unfair for clean athletes to suffer a competitive disadvantage for acting reasonably. Therefore, PEDs that pose significant health risks should be prohibited for all athletes. Second, it would be unreasonable for athletes to refuse, on principle, relatively safe and effective PEDs, so a blanket prohibition is also unjustified. Which drugs and which doses to allow should be determined not by athletes’ actual choices but by the hypothetical choices of the reasonable athlete. The resulting sport-specific drug policy would carve a justifiable middle path between complete prohibition and complete permission. (shrink)

Xenotransplantation has the potential to alter the U.S. transplant system in profound ways. However, this emerging “spare parts” solution spearheaded by biotechnology companies raises concerns about its impact on the organ shortage, healthcare systems, population health, and health inequalities. We contend that xenotransplantation may have limited benefits in improving health, could prove prohibitively expensive for many, and may divert resources away from proven public health measures. Additionally, it carries the risk of perpetuating stigma. Xenotransplantation may thereby exacerbate existing healthcare inequities (...) across racial, ethnic, socio‐economic, and geographic lines. To mitigate these risks, we contend that public health expert input is integral for xenotransplant policy development and outreach and that this underscores the importance of federal government investment in transplant infrastructure. (shrink)

Solid organ xenotransplantation may have the potential to help address the shortage of organs for transplantation. There is concern, however, that a novel zoonotic disease could be transmitted from the source organ to the human recipient, and then from the recipient to others. Theoretically, this could result in an epidemic or pandemic. Because of this potential risk, it has been argued that collective consent is required. Our goal is to critically evaluate the claim that collective consent is necessary for xenotransplantation (...) to be ethically permissible. We argue that collective consent is not required and highlight the important roles of public engagement and due diligence in xenotransplant research moving forward. (shrink)

Joshua Shaw argues that one common belief among abortion opponents—that embryos possess full moral status—is inconsistent with their support for ‘parent-friendly’ in vitro fertilisation (IVF) policies, that allow the production of surplus embryos (which are then stored indefinitely or destroyed). These abortion opponents, Shaw argues, should conclude that it is morally objectionable to destroy, discard, or freeze embryos indefinitely. Thus, they should reject current IVF practices and should consider the millions of frozen embryos that currently exist to be an urgent (...) moral crisis. Yet, Shaw notes, many abortion opponents support ‘parent-friendly’ IVF. This raises doubts over their commitment to the claim that embryos possess full moral status. Shaw continues that, contrary to some scholars’ suggestions, artificial-gestation technologies—which could, theoretically, be used to “rescue” surplus embryos—are unlikely to resolve this tension. In fact, they seem likely to increase the number of surplus embryos, worsening existing problems. We agree with Shaw that if embryos possess full moral status, then current ‘parent-friendly’ IVF practices are morally objectionable. We also agree that artificial womb technology cannot change this fact. What those technologies could do, however, is (eventually) rescue frozen embryos that currently exist. Thus, we argue abortion opponents should do two things. First, advocate to alter current ‘parent-friendly’ IVF practices in more ‘embryo-friendly’ ways. Second, advocate to keep existing surplus embryos frozen until they may be rescued. (shrink)

By 2050, the United States’ military anticipates being able to biomedically enhance the warfighting capacities of soldiers. These enhancements are highly invasive, and not only to the body. They are also highly invasive to the person. With these enhancements, super soldiers may lose control of their bodies and minds, sacrificing their autonomy. They could continue to sacrifice after discharge from the military. The memories of the experiences of being enhanced persist, which may continue to undermine the veteran super soldier’s autonomy. (...) This extraordinary sacrifice requires extraordinary reciprocity. I argue that one method of providing an appropriate reciprocal return is to provide veteran super soldiers with memory manipulating technologies (MMT). An antecedent requirement is thus that the military pursue research in optogenetic MMTs alongside other optogenetic research. There are numerous objections to the use of MMTs, but their administration to veteran super soldiers can evade and overcome these objections. (shrink)

A digital doppelgänger is an AI system trained to instantiate or imitate a particular human's personality, memories, beliefs or other personal traits, usually to be deployed after the human's death. Past discussions have assumed that, if digital doppelgängers enter wide use, it will suffice to produce at most one general-purpose doppelgänger system per human. We argue that this assumption is mistaken. For reasons related to both performance and information security, it will often be desirable to train distinct doppelgängers for distinct (...) applications. We sketch the beginning of a typology of such systems. (shrink)

Human enhancement technologies offer prospects for improving the mental capacities that are typically considered to ground moral status. Bioethicists, posthumanists and transhumanists have raised the worry that the radical enhancement of our moral status-relevant capacities is open to the possibility of creating supra-persons. The worry is that supra-persons would further reduce the moral inviolability of mere persons. If the possibility is plausible, then radical enhancement would put mere persons at risk. In order to assess the plausibility of possibility claims, epistemologists (...) have investigated the role of imagination in justifying our beliefs about what is possible. Philosophy has abounded with imaginability arguments for various entities like zombies, experience machines, super-spartans, and perfect actors. The aim of this paper is to investigate a newcomer in the bestiary of bioethics, the supra-person, using the utensils of imaginability-based modal epistemology. We will argue for an epistemic claim: that no imaginative act is sufficient to justify the belief that supra-persons are possible. In order to support our thesis, we will employ two influential accounts of the relation between imaginative acts and acquiring justification for beliefs about what is possible. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as scalable solutions to the global mental health crisis. But their deployment in psychiatric contexts raises a distinctive ethical concern: the problem of atypicality. Because LLMs generate outputs based on population-level statistical regularities, their responses—while typically appropriate for general users—may be dangerously inappropriate when interpreted by psychiatric patients, who often exhibit atypical cognitive or interpretive patterns. We argue that standard mitigation strategies, such as prompt engineering or fine-tuning, are insufficient to resolve this structural (...) risk. Instead, we propose dynamic contextual certification (DCC): a staged, reversible and context-sensitive framework for deploying LLMs in psychiatry, inspired by clinical translation and dynamic safety models from artificial intelligence governance. DCC reframes chatbot deployment as an ongoing epistemic and ethical process that prioritises interpretive safety over static performance benchmarks. Atypicality, we argue, cannot be eliminated—but it can, and must, be proactively managed. (shrink)

For over fifty years, Stelarc has radically explored the fusion of human biology and technology through his provocative artistic practice. This paper draws on a 2024 interview with the artist and examines how his work challenges our fundamental assumptions about human identity and capability. Through analysis of his pioneering projects—from the iconic Third Hand to the Ear on Arm and his internet-enabled performances— we see how Stelarc’s art embodies emerging posthumanist and transhumanist philosophies. His artistic work addresses the idea that (...) humanity has moved beyond natural selection into an era where technological engineering drives our development. The research traces his artistic evolution from early body suspensions to recent explorations of distributed embodiment and AI integration, including insights from our 2024 conversation. By merging art, philosophy, and technological innovation, Stelarc creates not just theoretical frameworks but visceral demonstrations of possible human futures. His bold experiments spark crucial dialogue about consciousness, embodiment and identity in our world, which gets to become more and more technological // На протяжении половины столетия художник Стеларк проводит радикальные художественные эксперименты, разнообразными способами совмещая аспекты человеческой биологии с технологическими системами. Данная работа, в основе которой лежат материалы эксклюзивного интервью с художником, взятого в сентябре 2024 года, а также результаты анализа его творчества, представляет собой попытку систематизировать художественные практики Стеларка с точки зрения динамики определения человеческой идентичности и возможностей человека. Путем детального исследования его различных проектов и перформансов показывается, как работы Стеларка воплощают развитие постгуманистической и трансгуманистической философии. Радикальный взгляд художника направлен на то, что человечество уже вступило в постэволюционную фазу, в которой развитие человека обусловлено в большей степени технологическим проектированием, нежели естественным отбором. В рамках исследования сделан обзор художественного пути Стеларка, его творчество представлено в хронологическом порядке: от ранних перформансов с подвешиванием тела до современных роботизированных инсталляций, что позволило наглядно показать последовательность исследовательских проектов художника в части изучения разных аспектов интеграции человека и машины. При этом отдельное внимание уделяется недавним работам Стеларка, посвященным проблематике распределенной телесности и интеграции искусственного интеллекта в общественную жизнь и природу человека. В статье показано, что творчество Стеларка объединяет искусство, философию и технологические инновации беспрецедентным образом, в результате чего новые концепции сопровождаются осязаемой и нередко провокационной демонстрацией возможных перспектив «человеческого». Делается вывод, что посредством смелых перформансов и физических модификаций Стеларк вносит вклад в междисциплинарную дискуссию о сознании, телесности и идентичности человека в ми ре, становящемся все более технологизированным. (shrink)

The paper explores the dialectic of human nature in the age of digital technologies. To this end, the paper contrasts the classical model of Homo Economicus, a rational agent for whom existence is reduced to a set of factors of economic nature, and the concept of Homo Cyberneticus. This concept arises from the symbiosis between humans and algorithms, in which the products of technology turn from external tools into a component of cognitive processes. The author proves that neurointerfaces, AI and (...) blockchain, contrary to the opinion of technophobes, actualise the issues of freedom and meaning, turning man into a ‘process’ of self-determination. A key paradox: algorithms, while threatening autonomy, simultaneously enhance humanity. The author's conclusion is that technologies do not replace but redefine the human, and in this sense Homo Cyberneticus is presented as a ‘process’ of redefining goals and values. In such a context, technology does not replace but rather enhances the human, turning challenges into tools of self-discovery and development. // В статье исследуется диалектика человеческой природы в эпоху цифровых технологий. С этой целью в работе противопоставляются классическая модель Homo Economicus, рационального агента, для которого существование сведено к комплексу факторов экономической природы, и концепт Homo Cyberneticus. Данный концепт возникает из симбиоза человека с алгоритмами, в рамках которого продукты технологий из внешних инструментов превращаются в составляющую когнитивных процессов. Автор доказывает, что нейроинтерфейсы, ИИ и блокчейн, вопреки мнению технофобов, актуализируют вопросы свободы и смысла, превращая человека в «процесс» самоопределения. Ключевой парадокс: алгоритмы, угрожая автономии, одновременно усиливают человечность. Вывод, который делает автор, заключается в том, что технологии не заменяют, а переопределяют человеческое, и в этом смысле Homo Cyberneticus представлен как «процесс» переосмысления целей и ценностей. В таком контексте технологии не заменяют, а напротив, усиливают человеческое, превращая вызовы в инструменты самопознания и развития. (shrink)

One of the longest-lasting and most significant effects of climate change will be a decline in global biodiversity. This chapter argues that this decline in global biodiversity, combined with the more general obligation to compensate the victims of climate change for the harms they suffer, generates a moral duty to pursue research in synthetic biology with the long-term goal of replacing extinct species with similar organisms. After presenting a short overview of why biodiversity is valuable and why its loss will (...) make the world worse for future people, the chapter argues that humanity has a moral obligation to compensate present and future people for the harms caused by climate change. Proposals to compensate victims of climate change usually focus on monetary compensation, but that will do little to compensate for the losses tied to species extinctions. Thus, the chapter considers whether de-extinction—a cluster of emerging technologies that aim to restore species with genetic and phenotypic similarities to extinct species—could serve as a more appropriate means of compensating future people for biodiversity loss. In defending continued research into de-extinction, the chapter also argues that concerns about this technology disincentivizing people from protecting biodiversity are overstated and that pursuing this research does not reflect poorly on humanity’s character. (shrink)

In June 2024, NPR News reported on the story of Sun Kai, who created an AI driven avatar of his dead mother (voice, image, and likeness), that he converses with daily. A similar company, Super Brai...

This article explores the intersection of science fiction, philosophy, and ethics in the context of emerging technologies, with a specific focus on Brain–Machine Interfaces (BMIs). It asks how the development and potential normalization of BMIs may transform our understanding of autonomy, agency, identity, and justice, and whether speculative fiction can illuminate the ethical and socio-political implications of these transformations. -/- Science fiction, with its imaginative exploration of alternative futures, offers a unique platform for anticipating the ethical challenges posed by technological (...) advancement. Speculative narratives invite critical reflection on issues such as autonomy, identity manipulation, justice, and the concentration of power in the hands of corporations and governments. -/- Through an examination of works such as John Scalzi’s Lock In, Mary Robinette Kowal’s The Spare Man, and S. B. Divya’s Machinehood, this article highlights emerging ethical dilemmas and the far-reaching societal changes that the widespread adoption of BMIs could give rise to. Ultimately, these narratives provide a philosophical lens through which to examine the relationship between technology and human values, offering ethical insights that may help anticipate future challenges. (shrink)

Public debates over the morality of new or emerging technologies tend to devolve into false dichotomies of optimism versus pessimism. Playing God with Emerging Technologies: How to Avoid the Traps of Techno-Optimism and Techno-Pessimism provides a conceptual apparatus for engaging in such debates in a critical manner through the constructive lens of “playing God” arguments. Moti Mizrahi sketches a conceptual framework consisting of an argumentation scheme for “playing God” arguments along with Critical Questions. This framework can be used to analyze (...) and evaluate “playing God” arguments as they are made in debates over the ethical development and deployment of new and emerging technologies, such as solar geoengineering, Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, autonomous weapons, and more. Mizrahi argues that “playing God” arguments allow us to assume an intermediate, critical attitude between the extremes of hype and panic as well as to approach the governance of new or emerging technologies in ways that might help to increase our control over, improve our understanding of, and prevent our misuse or abuse of such technologies. (shrink)

Transforming global food systems is crucial for mitigating environmental degradation, reducing the global disease burden and protecting sentient individuals from harm. Despite overwhelming evidence linking animal-sourced foods to ecological damage, resource depletion and public health challenges, gaps remain in promoting sustainable consumption. This urgency is compounded by the scientific recognition of animal sentience, which elevates animal use to a moral issue. This study combines empirical data from a survey of 500 respondents with a literature review to explore motivations and behaviours (...) driving plant-based eating. Key suggested interventions to foster a responsible food system include: (i) raising awareness of animal rights, (ii) disseminating nutritional and environmental knowledge, (iii) reforming agri-food subsidies, (iv) promoting plant-based food research, commercialisation and consumption and (v) fostering social inclusion and positive recognition of vegan identity. By addressing psychological, social and structural barriers to animal-free diets, this study offers actionable strategies for advancing a sustainable future. (shrink)

NASA and the CNSA have both released plans for lunar human exploration. This paper reviews those plans through the lens of strategic capability development. It examines the history of NASA’s development of bioregenerative space habitation systems and shows how past research and policy decisions, including funding cuts and program discontinuations, have led to critical gaps in current NASA capabilities. These gaps pose a strategic risk to US leadership in human space exploration that must be addressed urgently to sustain international competitiveness. (...) It concludes with recommendations for program investments crucial for the deployment of mature bioregenerative technologies in the coming decade. (shrink)

Black-box AI cannot provide causal explanations for the decisions it makes, but medical AI has shown great promise as an accurate and reliable technology that both improves the quality of patient care and provides better access to healthcare for more patients. There is an ethical argument that to meet the informational requirements of patient autonomy, medical decision-making ought to be explainable to the patient. As such, there have been claims that black-box AI ought to be only minimally used in healthcare. (...) This paper seeks to argue that black-box AI within the clinical context does not necessarily undermine patient autonomy, as defined in standard or relational accounts. Rather, patient autonomy is affected primarily by how AI tools are used. (shrink)

Der Beitrag führt in die Begriffe, Themen und Visionen des Trans- und Posthumanismus ein. Dabei werden die Entstehung, Organisation und Agenda der Bewegungen dargestellt sowie die schwierige Abgrenzung von Transhumanismus, Posthumanismus und Neuem Materialismus diskutiert. Zuletzt werden die Fragen, die der Transhumanismus in Metaphysik, Anthropologie, Ethik, Gesellschaft und Politik aufwirft, in den Blick genommen.

A person's body is extended in space, and parts of their body occupy spatial regions. In that way, the body has a dimension of breadth in space. Yet, there is another, less appreciated dimension of the body: its depth. Roughly speaking, the depth of the body is the level of abstraction of its parts. Characteristically, and in particular for moral purposes, the depth of the body is rather high-level. Low-level objects and properties, such as individual molecules, do not really fall (...) within the purview of the moral body--the body as it figures in various morally significant rights and interests. As I will argue, the depth of the body becomes more salient and relevant when people come to have partly digital embodiments, such as when brain-computer interfaces are integrated into their bodily processes. The dimension of depth, it turns out, is crucial for properly understanding the moral significance of brain-computer interfaces. Here, I develop a theory of depth to complement existing theories of the body and use it to improve our understanding of the purview of bodily rights and interests. (shrink)

Aim To examine the challenges and opportunities presented by generative artificial intelligence in healthcare education and explore how it can be used ethically to enhance rather than compromise future healthcare workforce competence. Background Generative artificial intelligence is fundamentally changing healthcare education, yet many universities and healthcare educators have failed to keep pace with its rapid development. Design A discussion paper. Methods Discussion and analysis of the challenges and opportunities presented by students' increasing use of generative artificial intelligence in healthcare education, (...) with particular focus on assessment approaches, critical thinking development and artificial intelligence literacy. Results Students' widespread use of generative artificial intelligence threatens assessment integrity and may inhibit critical thinking, problem-solving skills and knowledge acquisition. Without adequate artificial intelligence literacy there is a risk of eroding future healthcare workforce competence and compromising patient safety and professional integrity. Conclusion While generative artificial intelligence presents significant challenges to healthcare education, it offers great promise if used carefully with awareness of its limitations. The development of artificial intelligence literacy is crucial for maintaining professional standards and ensuring patient safety and mitigating its potentially negative impact on the formation of critical thinking skills. (shrink)

This book presents a groundbreaking analysis of the anticipatory ethical issues associated with human genetic enhancement. It provides instructive clarifications for understanding the philosophy and science behind this long-standing bioethical debate, and identifies how genetic enhancement may impact the moral codes of future societies. Part 1 examines the historical, conceptual, scientific, and ethical challenges related to human genetic enhancement. The Interlude introduces the emerging philosophical debate on technomoral change. Part 2 addresses reproductive choice, genetic justice, and equal treatment to illustrate (...) how enhancement technologies may alter future social morality. Finally, the book explores the anticipatory governance of genetic enhancement, qualifying the necessity and limitations of public engagement, identifying different types of epistemic and moral uncertainties, and offering meta-normative recommendations for public policy. Genetic Enhancement and Technomoral Change will be of interest to scholars and advanced students interested in bioethics, philosophy of technology, and anticipation studies of science and technology. (shrink)

How exactly is technology transforming us and our worlds, and what (if anything) can and should we do about it? Heidegger already felt this philosophical question concerning technology pressing in on him in 1951, and his thought-full and deliberately provocative response is still worth pondering today. What light does his thinking cast not just on the nuclear technology of the atomic age but also on more contemporary technologies such as genome engineering, synthetic biology, and the latest advances in information technology, (...) so-called “generative AIs” like ChatGPT? These are some of the questions this book addresses, situating the latest controversial technologies in the light of Heidegger's influential understanding of technology as an historical mode of ontological disclosure. In this way, we seek to take the measure of Heidegger's ontological understanding of technology as a constellation of intelligibility with an important philosophical heritage and a dangerous but still promising future. (shrink)

With digital technologies, your patients have a ‘doctor in their pocket’. But something new is happening when they search online for medical advice. Typing a question such as “Can I take ibuprofen with blood pressure tablets?” or “What helps against chest pain?” into Google no longer produces the familiar list of links. Instead, a confident, AI-generated box appears at the top of the page, offering what looks like an authoritative answer. Google calls this feature an AI Overview. Microsoft’s Copilot provides (...) similar AI-generated summaries through its Edge browser. -/- These systems mark a shift in how people find and interpret health information online. By design, these summaries reduce click-through rates to real websites by 40–60%, replacing the process of browsing diverse sources with a single, seemingly definitive response. First launched in the United States in 2024, where it drew criticism for misleading health advice, AI Overviews are now expanding across Europe. -/- AI Overviews are not just another way of “Googling symptoms.” Until recently, users were presented with a variety of sources: public health agencies, hospital websites, patient forums, news outlets, and wellness blogs. Although the quality of these sources varied, the diversity itself enabled patients to cross-check information, prepare questions, and participate more actively in their care. Searching online can empower patients when they have access to multiple perspectives, allowing them to assess information critically. With AI Overviews, that step disappears. -/- . (shrink)

"Bioethics A Very Short Introduction" for UG level or beginners.

When two people need a kidney transplant, but only one kidney is available, we need to decide who gets it. If one of the potential recipients needs the kidney because of their own voluntary behavior, but the other is not at all responsible for needing a kidney, then we need to decide whether this fault should be a consideration in favor of the other patient getting the kidney. While there has been considerable philosophical debate on this issue, there is far (...) less research into the views of the public. To explore opinions on these issues, we first asked survey participants to ascribe or deny responsibility for the risky behavior for kidney disease, and for being deprived of a kidney in cases of drinking alcohol, drug abuse, smoking and unhealthy eating when the patient did or did not stop the risky behavior after being diagnosed with kidney disease. Next, we asked participants who should get the kidney when the patient who engaged in risky behavior did or did not know, or have easy access to, the information that the behavior was risky. We found that participants generally ascribed responsibility on the basis of knowledge but allocated the kidney on the basis of access to information. These findings have important implications for moral theories as well as medical policies. (shrink)

This article presents a framework of ethical analysis for anticipatory evaluation of advanced biopreservation technologies and employs the framework illustratively in three domains. The framework features four clusters of general ethical considerations: (1) Producing Benefits, Minimizing Harms, Balancing Benefits, Risk, and Costs; (2) Justice, Fairness, Equity; (3) Respect for Autonomy; and (4) Transparency, Trustworthiness, and Public Trust.

As the science and technology of the brain and mind develop, so do the ways in which brains and minds may be surveilled and manipulated. Some cognitive libertarians worry that these developments undermine cognitive liberty or “freedom of thought.” I argue that protecting an individual’s cognitive liberty undermines others’ ability to use their own cognitive liberty. Given that the threatening devices and processes are not relevantly different from ordinary and frequent intrusions upon one’s brain and mind, strong protections of cognitive (...) liberty may proscribe neurotechnological intrusions but also ordinary intrusions. Thus, the cognitive libertarian position “hog-ties” others’ use of their own liberties. This problem for the cognitive libertarian is the same problem that ordinary libertarianism faces in protecting individual rights to property and person. But the libertarian strategies for resolving the problem don’t work for the cognitive libertarian. I conclude that the right to mental privacy is weaker than what cognitive libertarians want it to be. (shrink)