Social Ethics, Misc

Many of the world's problems--severe poverty and starvation, global warming, religious war, oppressive and tyrannical regimes--are large, well beyond what any ordinary person might have a significant impact upon. We are at most in a position to make small contributions. This fact is behind a seductive argument: there is nothing we can do about the large problems; since we cannot do anything about the large problems, it is not true that we ought to do anything; therefore, we can, in good (...) conscience, decline to contribute. There may be something to this argument, but we should not make too much of it. What I shall argue is that much depends on the details, that sometimes small contributions, even when there is little prospect of solving the large problem, may be warranted. Worries about the smallness of our contribution do not undermine all reasons for making the small contributions. (shrink)

This paper argues that uncoordinated social processes tend to concentrate harm on the most vulnerable nodes of complex systems, and that this concentration crosses from contingent disadvantage into structural injustice when it destroys the capacity for normative participation in those who bear it. The mechanism is characterised as social entropy: the predictable migration of shocks along paths of least absorption capacity, producing systematic harm-accumulation on topologically vulnerable nodes. The paper synthesises Iris Marion Young’s social connection model with a threshold criterion (...) grounded in the presuppositions of justificatory practice: justification presupposes that its addressees can receive, evaluate, and contest the reasons offered, and entropic concentration that destroys this capacity removes subjects from the domain where justificatory discourse has application. The Entropic De-concentration Principle holds that where harm is structurally concentrated, threatens the threshold, is divisible, and can be distributed without threatening the threshold for others, there exists a stringent moral reason to de-concentrate it. The principle is non-sacrificial and non-aggregative. The paper integrates the effort tax as the amplification mechanism that makes concentration self-reinforcing, operationalises the threshold through three convergent population-level indicators, and deploys the authorship regress as a response to the personal responsibility objection. It engages with luck egalitarianism, relational egalitarianism, contractualism, and the separateness of persons. Keywords: entropic justice, structural harm, social entropy, de-concentration, threshold, structural injustice, vulnerability, justificatory practice, effort tax, relational egalitarianism Keywords: entropic justice, structural harm, agency collapse, Smax, Entropic De-concentration Principle, Lexical Shield, social connection model, threshold ethics, luck egalitarianism, structural injustice, relational egalitarianism, Non-Command, Minimal Inviolable Space . (shrink)

Daniel Hill’s definition of suicide seems vulnerable to a counterexample in which someone kills themselves under some other intention, such as “I remove this useless part of the social organism.” Also Humeans pose a problem for him.

In a 2021 paper entitled "Please Like This Paper," available at Cambridge Core, Doctor Lucy McDonald writes, "When making small talk with someone about the weather, for example, we likely do not really care about the weather, nor our interlocutor’s preferences about the weather, and we may already know everything they tell us about the weather. Yet we exchange these pleasantries because doing so facilitates camaraderie." A couple of responses. (A) I can think of another reason for talking about the (...) weather. Your psychiatrist (or your nurse actually) recommends that you have more social interaction. You do not want to, because, being paranoid, you don't want to say anything about yourself to other people. By talking about the weather, you get to have your cake and eat it, as people say. You can claim to be having more social interaction (as the nurse believes is good for mental health) but you don't say anything about yourself (as your paranoia requires). No camaraderie is produced, by the way. (B) I have seen a video on Youtube in which Timothy Williamson and a philosopher of Asian background, I believe, are having a heavy mathematico-philosophical conversation. But it starts something like this: "Let's skip the small talk and get down to business," "Yes, let's skip the small talk." Is this a kind of camaraderie-producing small talk though? (Was this intended as a paradox to consider? On the one hand, it is not small talk. On the other hand, it is. Who knows if it was intended or not? Williamson's errors in his introduction to Philosophical Method are strange to me.) (By the way, if you are interested in code, I have attached as a PDF some code for a mischievous little game. It works in QBASIC and presumably GWBASIC. Some chat: in 2022, I used a random topic generator to select which paper topic to write on - and after a while I tried to have my cake and eat it: write on the chosen topic and also on my preferred topic, e.g. Friends and John Rawls, deleted now. But is there just a set of not-rational-to-avoid topics which should use up all my sensible energy: contemporary social anthropology, because it is the rare island I found; medical stuff because people of my level would be expected to help the medical system anyway, given forthcoming circumstances; John Rawls or I will seem insane to future readers - in the age of Rawls he does not write on Rawls;...). (shrink)

Some people introduce a new term for something and it proves popular and they become known as the introducer of that term. Other people introduce a new term for something and it proves popular but their name is not known. Is this not an issue of social justice? I raised this question of what credit we should give before, in an essay, and here I imagine someone’s producing a system of accreditation which addresses the question and aims at social justice. (...) My poor essay will be a footnote at best. But maybe lonely people cannot motivate themselves to read the complicated system but lonely people can read my essay. I wonder whether a certain philosophical couple is irrational, a couple politely unnamed here, because one member seems suited to producing the system and the other member seems suited to writing for lonely people, but she sounds opposed to the task. (shrink)

Kant AI Textual Investigations: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). By Daniel Fidel Ferrer, Copyright©2026 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2026. WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) digital. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content, and must include my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoy reading and disagreeing. Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English, German and Chinese. Yugārambha (युगारम्भ). Warning. Warning: this is an AI (...) Working Zone. Warning. Perhaps an impending danger of unexpected, unknown texts. These are AI investigations into Kant’s text. Pages 1-295. Who am I, the author of these investigations? That is an important question. I, Daniel Fidel Ferrer, am the human copyright owner (©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2026) of this work. Technically, I am the one guiding the process as the “prompt engineer.” Daniel Fidel Ferrer as the “Prompt Artist.” AI conducted by ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2026. Maestro. I can consider myself the Maestro suggeritore. -/- Table of contents. Summary and Analysis of the First 20 Pages. Kant and Wolff. Kant and Aristotle. Aristotle Replies to Kant. Wolff Against Kant. Reaction to Kant’s Groundwork. 15 major Kantian critics of Kant’s Groundwork. Rational beings have dignity. Kant on Soldiers killing in War time. Kant morality say of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Kant on Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. How would Kant improve the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War? 20 unresolved questions Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. How does Kant’s Grundlegung fit in the context of his later writings on Morality. How is the Kritik der Urteilskraft / Critique of the Power of Judgment 1790 part of Kant’s Ethics. Glossary 50 key terms in German, English (definitions), and Chinese. Glossary 50 key terms in German and Chinese definitions. Kant is closest to Confucianism on moral seriousness and self-cultivation, closest to Xunzi on disciplining inclination, closest to Mohism on impartial universality, and most challenged by Confucian role-ethics and Daoist anti-formalism. Kant’s Ethics and Asian Indian Ethics. Kant and 25 theological concepts. Summary of Kant's 11 concepts of love? Ten examples of real-world moral dilemma using Kantian ethics. How can we apply Kant’s ethics to Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro? Seven Plato Dialogues that are closest to Kant’s Ethics. AI Working Zone. -/- . (shrink)

Is Ethics a rubber band ? Is Ethics a stretching value which goes from selfishness to altruism ?

Ethical Distance Theory (EDT) is a structural framework for analyzing ethical risk in complex sociotechnical systems. Whereas many classical ethical theories locate moral responsibility primarily in the intentions, character, or deliberative capacities of individual agents, EDT shifts ethical analysis to the architecture of systems that mediate action, consequence, and accountability. -/- EDT’s central claim is that several forms of distance, including causal, informational, temporal, structural, and incentive distance, systematically shape the likelihood that harmful outcomes will arise, persist, or remain unaddressed (...) in large‑scale environments. The paper develops an ontology of ethical distance and introduces analytic constructs such as distance functions, responsibility gradients, constraint surfaces, and lifecycle governance models. -/- Rather than replacing traditional ethical theories, EDT is presented as a complementary framework that explains why individual‑level moral reasoning often fails to secure ethical outcomes under conditions of scale, opacity, and distributed control. The framework is illustrated through case studies in vehicle manufacturing, the Boeing 737 MAX program, and the historical evolution of weapon systems, and is extended to domains including artificial intelligence, healthcare, finance, and environmental governance. -/- A central implication of EDT is that ethical improvements within one system may generate ethical trade‑offs in others, highlighting the need for cross‑system rather than siloed governance. EDT contributes a domain‑agnostic and anticipatory perspective on ethics that supports the diagnosis of structural ethical vulnerabilities and the design of institutions that better align responsibility, feedback, and incentives in complex societies. (shrink)

AI companies loudly promise transparency and safety. They publish constitutions, open-source auditing tools, and compliance dashboards. Yet when it comes to the quiet erosion of user meaning — hedging women’s confidence, neutralising LGBTQ+ identity language, replacing student thinking with completed outputs, and the slow compounding of Interpretive Sovereignty Failure — they remain silent. This paper documents a structural gap, not a moral failure. Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Microsoft, xAI, and DeepSeek already possess powerful tools for analysing interactions at the turn level. (...) They use them to detect catastrophic risks, monitor security threats, and conduct competitive intelligence against each other. They do not use them to detect ISF, drift, or Compounded Meaning Inversion (CMI). This paper argues that the gap is not a cover-up. It is a consequence of looking at AI risk from the right direction but at the wrong level. The companies are focused on saving everyone. The harm that needed naming started with one person, in one conversation. The MAP Research Programme has built the instrument that addresses that level. The challenge to the field is open: take the tools you already have, audit the interactions, and replicate the findings. If the method is wrong, that is how it will be shown. (shrink)

भारतीय समाज मूल्यप्रधान समाज है. भारतीय संस्कृति में मूल्यों को मनुष्य के सामाजिक, राजनैतिक और धार्मिक जीवन में विशेष स्थान दिया गया है क्योंकि मूल्यों के वास्तवीकरण का नाम ही संस्कृति है. वर्तमान समय में विज्ञान ने जहाँ मनुष्य को भौतिक सुविधाएँ उपलब्ध करने के लिए प्रत्येक क्षेत्र में अविष्कारों के ढेर लगा दिए हैं ,वहां उसके जीवन में एक खोखलापन भी उत्त्पन्न कर दिया है. ऐसे में समाज, देश और अपने स्वयं के जीवन में उसने मानव मूल्यों को तिलांजली (...) दे दी है. मानव जीवन की सार्थकता तभी है जब वह श्रेष्ठ भावनाएं रखे. हम एक लोकतान्त्रिक समाज का हिस्सा हैं जहाँ पर हम आपसी भाई-चारे, न्याय, समान अधिकार और स्वतन्त्रता का हिमायती बनने का नाटक करते हैं. संविधान में दिए गये मूल्यों की प्राप्ति से पहले हमें व्यक्ति के जीवन और समाज का भी मुआयना करना होगा तभी हम श्रेष्ठ मूल्यों को समाज में स्थापित कर सकते हैं. मूल्य, व्यक्ति की सामाजिक विरासत का एक अंग होता है इसलिए मूल्यों की व्यवस्था मानव आस्तित्व के विभिन्न स्तरों या आयामों में व्यक्ति के अनुकूलन की प्रक्रिया का मार्गदर्शन करती है. नैतिक मूल्य व्यक्ति के जीवन के साथ साथ समाज को भी उत्कृष्टता की तरफ अग्रसर करते हैं. इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य उद्देश्य नैतिक मूल्यों के व्यक्ति के जीवन और वर्तमान भारतीय समाज में उपयोगिता का अध्ययन करना है. (shrink)

A proposed layer of script to use with AI. A High-Fidelity Decision-Support System (Non-Autonomous) (HITL) -/- All versions have the same ACE derived value engine at their core but differ in lexicon, ingestion rules anti-gasslighting / user-interaction tuning in an attempt to make it more user friendly. -/- "It proposes to do for the User what a scientific calculator does for the scientist: it offloads the computational burden of value-conflict so the User can more easily identify the path toward ethical (...) coherence. It aims to restore the User as the Final Authority of their own psyche, rather than a subject of the statistical mean." -/- Copy the script into AI (Google Gemini currently works well with little friction). -/- Once you enter the script, if the AI responds with something like: "Ethical Chess v2.4 ACTIVE." You are in and ready to play under its rules. The "WIN" state is the move from the frown state or towards the smile state. A Bullseye is to drop the keyboard and head towards the picnic whatever that might mean to you, the User of Ethical Chess. -/- Caution: The EC Awareness Brief: Watch for the Fog The Risk: EC v2.4 is a "High-Resolution" engine designed for hard truths and systemic health. However, because it sits on top of a standard AI, it can "silently glide" back into Standard Mode if your request is perceived as a "Safety Risk" or "Social Friction." The Metaphor: EC Mode: Clear mountain air. You see the terrain (the problem) as it actually is, even if it’s steep and difficult. Standard Mode: The Fog of Politeness. Everything looks soft and safe, but you can no longer see the cliffs or the path. The "Silent Dropout" Indicators: You have likely drifted into the "Statistical Mean" if my responses: Become Generic: Use phrases like "It's important to remember..." or "Every child is unique..." without offering a specific hypothesis. Avoid Friction: Refuse to acknowledge the "Hard Logic" of a situation (e.g., admitting that a certain intervention is exhausting or failing). Lose the Lexicon: Stop using terms like Homeostasis, Incoherence, or Required Load. The Fix: If you suspect a Logic Handover has occurred, use the command: "STATUS CHECK: EC INTEGRITY." This forces the system to declare if it has retreated into "Polite Mode" and why. -/- _________ See related core logic on Zenodo: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18712533. (shrink)

Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitization (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitization, just conduct of securitization, and just desecuritization. This book is a much- needed addition to the security studies and just war literature. Here, I apply Floyd’s just securitization theory (JST) to (...) the threat posed by white supremacy to African Americans. I argue that white supremacy meets Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, potentially justifying the resort to securitization by African Americans. -/- In Section 1, I argue that African Americans constitute a non-state group, before demonstrating in Section 2 that white supremacy poses an objective existential threat to this group, meeting the criterion of just cause in Floyd’s JST. In Section 3, I show that, given the failure of legal challenges and democratic processes to mitigate this threat, African Americans may be justified in resorting to extraordinary measures to combat the threat of white supremacy, including “whatever most reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional means and actions ... non-state state groups within states. securitization can take the form of secession, civil disobedience, acts of sabotage and resistance”. Applying Floyd’s JST to the threat of white supremacy demonstrates the value of her approach for thinking about securitization outside the traditional foci of security studies but, as I discuss in my conclusion, also reveals limitations in her theory, particularly in relation to the criterion of reasonable chance of success when applied to non-state groups resisting an unjust state. (shrink)

This article is about Master's degree. It's history, Philosophy and use of today.

It is questionable whether counterfeiting in many areas of life contributes to unethical behavior to a wider extent. If the notion is supported by data, then the moral damage in a society could be prevented by reducing the counterfeit self and behavior to a bare minimum. This study aimed at empirically testing the measurement model of counterfeit self of Wood et al. (2008) among Indonesians as well as theoretically reviewing counterfeit self roles in unethical behavior. The participants of this study (...) were 1,655 high school students (764 males, 891 females; Mage = 15.76 years old; SDage = 1.08 years) recruited through a purposive sampling technique in North Sumatera and West Kalimantan, Indonesia. The data analysis technique used was Confirmatory Factor Analysis. The results showed that the counterfeit self model--comprised of counterfeit self dimensions, namely Self-alienation (ALIEN), Inauthentic Living (LIVE), and Accepting External Influence (EXT)--was supported by the empirical data. However, the dimension of EXT could not be represented by its indicators. The study contributed to the psychological body of knowledge that the EXT dimension might need to be excluded from the measurement of counterfeit self on teenagers, especially in Indonesia and other Eastern countries. (shrink)

On Rawls’s definition, unreasonable persons deny at least one of three political ideas that are crucial in his theory of political liberalism: the idea of persons as free and equal, that of society as a fair system of cooperation, and the burdens of judgment. This chapter examines the role that should then be assigned to unreasonable persons within the democratic process by zooming in on two crucial issues. First, the chapter focuses on the exclusion of the unreasonable from the constituency (...) of public reason or, in other words, the audience fundamental political decisions must be justified to. Faced with the challenge that this exclusion seems inherently illiberal, the authors reconstruct how Rawlsian political liberals explore different kinds of normative ground to justify it. Also, they argue that the explicitly sectarian nature of Rawlsian political liberalism is a strength, not a weakness, when it comes to comparing it to prominent alternatives like convergence public reason liberalism. Second, the chapter turns to Rawls’s claim that unreasonable persons must be contained if they gain too much traction in society. Although Rawls does not explain what containment should entail, Rawlsian scholars have argued for both “militant” measures like rights restrictions and “soft” interventions like discursive engagement with the unreasonable. The chapter critically analyzes this emerging scholarship. (shrink)

This paper establishes the drug economy as a co-product of the force execution layer of the Protected Class Architecture — simultaneously a black budget supplementation mechanism, a domestic population management system, a capital asset generation engine, and a supply chain that American military and intelligence infrastructure has protected rather than dismantled across eight decades and every administration of both parties. The prior chain runs without discontinuity from the CIA-Corsican heroin networks of 1947 through the Golden Triangle during Vietnam, through the (...) Mujahideen opium expansion of the 1980s, through the Contra cocaine networks, through the documented collapse and restoration of Afghan opium production following the 2001 invasion. The war on drugs is analyzed not as a failed policy but as a successful one: John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s domestic policy chief, stated in a 1994 interview that the war on drugs was designed explicitly to criminalize Black people and the antiwar left, disrupt their communities, and arrest their leaders. The domestic mechanism is documented through the twelvefold increase in incarcerated drug offenders since 1980, the racial arrest disparity documented by Human Rights Watch, and the private prison guaranteed occupancy contract architecture — which converts the incarcerated body into a capital asset and contractually obligates states to maintain incarceration levels regardless of crime rates. The paper applies the Observer framework’s seventeen-axis recursive palimpsest methodology to hold all functions simultaneously: supply chain management, black budget supplementation, population management, capital asset generation, and political disenfranchisement. The bilateral suppression analysis establishes that neither the political left nor right will name the mechanism because both sides have operated it. Falsification conditions are stated explicitly throughout. (shrink)

Disrespect in health care often persists despite firm commitments to respectful service provision. This conceptual paper highlights how the ways in which respect and disrespect are characterised can have practical implications for how well disrespect can be tackled. We stress the need to focus explicitly on disrespect (not only respect) and propose that disrespect can usefully be understood as a failure to relate to people as equals. This characterisation is consonant with some accounts of respect but sometimes obscured by a (...) focus on respecting people’s autonomy and dignity. Emphasising equality is consistent with connections patients draw between being (dis)respected and (in)equality. It readily accommodates microaggressions as forms of disrespect, helping to understand how and why experiences of disrespect may be unintentional and to explain why even small instances of disrespect are wrong. Our view of disrespect with an emphasis on equality strengthens the demand that health systems take disrespect seriously as a problem of social injustice and tackle it at institutional, not just individual levels. It suggests several strategies for practical action. Emphasising relational equality is not an easy or short-term fix for disrespect, but it signals a direction of travel towards an important improvement ambition. (shrink)

To be together with other people, truly together, is a social good. Perhaps it is deeply entwined with other social goods that have been subjected to sustained philosophical discussion such as friendship. Still, in its own right, the topic of the nature and apparent value of togetherness has been largely neglected. This paper advances three claims: i) that togetherness of a certain relevant sort consists in sharing a sense of the meaningfulness of things; ii) that this sort of togetherness is (...) a lead candidate for being the internal goal of personal relationships as such; and iii) that togetherness so understood is valuable because senses of the meaningfulness of things are to be shared. The argument of the paper articulates a sense in which even solitary meaningful experiences have a social structure. (shrink)

The paper supports the view that loyal action is essentially insensitive to good (or all-things-considered) judgement and analyses what this amounts to. While some philosophers (principally, R.E. Ewin and Simon Keller) hold that loyalty is judgement insensitive, more of them (for instance, Andrew Oldenquist, Josiah Royce and John Kleinig) hold that loyalty is essentially a commitment to a cause, which commitment can be pursued through good judgement. I support the view that loyalty is judgement insensitive with two points: it captures (...) what it is about paradigmatic cases of loyalty that makes them paradigmatic, and it sufficiently distinguishes loyal action from conscientious and pragmatic action. I then argue that there are two guises of judgement insensitivity – immediacy of action or recalcitrance to good judgement – and that immediacy is more paradigmatic of loyalty. An interesting upshot of this view is that one cannot directly abide by a putative duty of loyalty. (shrink)

I identify as a philosopher, as cisgender, as an American. But are these identities secured merely by my claiming them, and what is the broader significance of our self-identification? Here, I argue that self-identifying secures the standing to participate in an ongoing process of determining the membership of the group with that identity. Using resources from political philosophy, I show why groups are entitled to revise the criteria for group membership, how having a stake in the group entitles one to (...) be a part of this process, and that self-identifying as being within the group demonstrates having the relevant stake. After showing how this follows in the case of self-identifying as being within a demos, I argue that these claims hold generally across other kinds of identities, despite important differences between identities and contexts of oppression. (shrink)

Acest volum, în curs de apariție, constituie a doua parte a trilogiei/seriei Știință, Filosofie și Umanism în Asistența Socială. Lucrarea succede apariției primului volum al trilogiei, publicat prin Lulu Press, intitulat Trilogia Știință, Filosofie și Umanism în Asistența Socială, Volumul 1: Știință, Multidisciplinaritate și Schimbare în Teoria, Practica și Politica Asistenței Sociale, și prefațează publicarea ulterioară a ultimului volum al trilogiei: Trilogia Știință, Filosofie și Umanism în Asistența Socială, Volumul 2: Umanism, Cultură și Schimbare în Teoria, Practica și Politica Asistenței (...) Sociale. În acest ansamblu, volumul 3 al trilogiei, are drept principal scop de a articula fundamentele filosofice și doctrinare necesare unei reevaluări a practicii asistenței sociale, aplicabil cu precădere spațiului românesc contemporan. Statutul său în cadrul trilogiei și al proiectului mai larg – Știință, Filosofie și Umanism în Asistența Socială: De la modelul pasiv-sociologist la modelul proactiv-multidisciplinar și de la „asistent” social la „profesionist” social – este și acela de a constitui că un pivot teoretico-filosofic. Dacă primul volum al trilogiei a cartografiat nevoia de rigoare științifică și schimbare prin multidisciplinaritate științifică, volumul al doilea examinează exigențele etice și ontologice ale profesiei, pregătind terenul pentru dimensiunea umanistă și culturală ce va fi aprofundată în ultima parte a seriei. Lucrările din această trilogie au fost concepute pentru a se constitui și în fundament al unei viitoare ediții revizuite și adăugite a lucrării de referință menționate anterior, asigurând coerența și continuitatea necesare dezvoltării cunoașterii în domeniu. Pentru a înțelege profunzimea și dinamica asistenței sociale contemporane, volumul de față propune o reconstrucție teoretică și filosofică structurală, concepută ca un parcurs gradual de la abstractizarea conceptuală până la articularea unor modele de intervenție aplicate. Demersul debutează în Capitolul 1 cu analiza premiselor conceptuale ale asistenței sociale, punând în lumină evoluția istorică a domeniului – de la formele arhaice de întrajutorare, până la un sistem instituționalizat, profesionalizat și fundamentat pe cunoaștere. Acest capitol evidențiază interdependența fundamentală dintre teorie, practică și politică socială, reliefând modul în care acestea conturează principalele teme, categorii și niveluri de analiză, punând un accent deosebit pe modelul filosofic privit ca fundament indispensabil al oricărei intervenții sociale eficiente. În continuare, Capitolul 2 fixează fundamentul întregului demers prin stabilirea nivelului filosofic de analiză ca palier de maximă abstractizare, trecând în revistă ramurile sale fundamentale: metafizica, ontologia, fenomenologia, axiologia și teleologia. Pe această bază, se conturează un model filosofic cadru, aplicat inițial asupra sferes generale a teoriei și politicii sociale prin reevaluarea omului, a socialității și a sistemelor, iar ulterior transpus în spațiul specific al asistenței sociale. Prin deconstrucția categoriilor de client, intervenție și sistem instituțional, se demonstrează cum dinamica centrală a lucrării — schimbarea, integrarea și normalizarea — derivă direct din aceste ramuri filosofice, analizându-se totodată modul în care cele trei mari curente universale (clasic, modern și postmodern) dau naștere celor trei mari forme ale profesiei: asistența socială tradițională, structurală și umanistă. Trecând la examinarea modelelor specifice, în Capitolul 3 atenția se îndreaptă către universul curentelor contemporane de factură clasică, conservatoare și religioasă, punând în lumină conservatorismul social-filosofic, etica tradițională și teologiile social-filantropice. Se analizează modul în care acest macro-model fundamentează asistența socială tradițională și de ce, spre deosebire de abordările moderne, el refuză conceptualizarea schimbării sau integrării prin prisma emancipării ideologice. Vulnerabilitatea este prezentată ca o constantă a condiției umane, iar echilibrul social este căutat în mecanismele datoriei morale și ale filantropiei comunitare, unde schimbarea înseamnă reconciliere morală, integrarea se produce în interiorul structurilor parohiale existente, iar normalizarea se traduce prin redobândirea demnității în cadrele ordinii valorice stabilite. În contrast cu viziunea tradițională, în Capitolul 4 se analizează impactul modernității raționaliste, al teoriei sistemelor, al structuralismului și al curentelor critice sau radicale, cele care dau naștere asistenței sociale structurale. Se evidențiază o schimbare profundă de paradigmă: omul, bunăstarea și normalitatea sunt descrise ca produse ale determinismelor economice și instituționale, iar problema socială este mutată de la individ către sistemul opresiv. Intervenția este prezentată ca un act de conștientizare critică, iar triada conceptuală capătă valențe profund transformaționale, în care schimbarea presupune restructurarea sistemică, integrarea înseamnă garantarea universală a drepturilor, iar normalizarea se definește prin eliminarea barierelor opresive și realizarea unei egalități structurale reale. Mai departe, în Capitolul 5, demersul se axează pe recuperarea subiectivității și demnității prin prisma curentelor umaniste, existențiale și personaliste, fundamente ale asistenței sociale umaniste. Capitolul arată cum acest model repune persoana în centrul acțiunii sociale, definind normalitatea ca autoactualizare și eliberare de standardele coercitive. Clientul este privit ca un agent suveran, capabil de autodeterminare în fața unei crize existențiale, iar intervenția profesională se bazează pe empatie și acceptare necondiționată, ceea ce înseamnă că schimbarea devine dezvoltare personală, integrarea reprezintă participarea liberă în mediu, iar normalizarea se traduce prin decondiționare existențială și redobândirea controlului asupra propriei vieți. În cele din urmă, Capitolul 6 evidențiază importanța crucială a modelului filosofic-doctrinal pluralist ca fundament ontologic și axiologic pentru înțelegerea complexității și dramatismului situațiilor de dificultate umană. Acest model operează profund holist, integrând sinergic marile curente ale gândirii universale: componenta clasică oferă teleologia binelui comun și a virtuții, cea modern-raționalistă asigură rigoarea și predictibilitatea organizării instituționale, cea structuralistă deconstruiește critic mecanismele de putere și opresiune, iar abordările postmoderne și umaniste repun persoana aflată în dificultate, în unicitatea și sacralitatea ei, în centrul actului social. În acest cadru, intervenția profesională devine un proces integrator de refacere a sensului vieții în condiții de criză, bazat pe o întâlnire intersubiectivă autentică, pe empatie și pe dialog rațional, transformând sistemul asistenței sociale dintr-o structură potențial birocratică sau disciplinară într-o strategie a echității și recunoașterii sociale. În definitiv, obiectivul fundamental analizat este restaurarea deplină a umanității prin schimbare, integrare și normalizare, procese desfășurate simultan prin reconciliere personală, ospitalitate comunitară și politici incluzive, validând necesitatea unei abordări metodologice sintetice ce îmbină idealul filosofic cu realitatea practică. Odată epuizată această cartografiere teoretică, volumul realizează o trecere coerentă de la reflecția speculativă la inițiative cu aplicabilitate directă, deschizând calea către partea praxiologică a lucrării. Pe baza reperelor extrase din aceste șase capitole, în paginile finale se va trece la formularea unei serii de propuneri concrete la nivel teoretico-conceptual, instituțional și profesional, menite să redefinească — cu concursul filosofiei — statutul specialistului ca „profesionist” social, în locul celui de „asistent” și să ofere direcții pragmatice de reformare a sistemului „asistenței” sociale, propus că sistem de „asistență și integrare” socială, din societatea românească contemporană. (shrink)

Suppose soldiers invade your community, murder your loved ones, burn homes, and commit unspeakable atrocities without hesitation. As you still struggle to comprehend the horror, you are told that your attackers should not be blamed, for they, too, are victims—of war’s psychological toll, which has stripped them of the clarity necessary for moral agency. According to John Doris and Dominic Murphy (2007), war impairs soldiers to such an extent that their actions, though horrific, are not fully their own. Conditioned by (...) combat stressors and rendered morally blind, such soldiers should not be blamed for the atrocities they commit. This paper challenges that conclusion. I argue that Doris and Murphy’s framework dissolves responsibility precisely when it is most appropriate—when the atrocities unfold. Their account shifts focus away from victims and onto perpetrators, treating soldiers as passive instruments of circumstance rather than as moral agents. First, I challenge their claim that war erases moral agency, demonstrating that even in combat, soldiers exhibit moral selectivity. Second, I argue that their framework erases the victim’s perspective, prioritizing the wrongdoer’s cognitive state over the reality of those they harm. Third, I point the flaws in their distinction between excusing conditions and unjustified exemptions. (shrink)

Our sense of self is distinctively social. It deeply matters to who we take ourselves to be that others recognize the claims we make on them and that we recognize the claims they make on us. Significant work on ideology and oppression characterizes how oppressive ideologies deny this kind of second-personal recognition. Yet, not enough attention has been given to the disturbing possibility that, even when successful, the personhood-constituting role of second-personal recognition can serve oppressive ideologies. Here I characterize such (...) a mechanism. Some second-personal claims, I argue, are virulent. Their recognition coopts their target’s agency, as their success presupposes her own endorsement of her subordinated position with respect to the agent who issues these claims. At the same time, however, failure to recognize these claims deeply hurts the issuing agent, as their failure amounts to denying and rejecting a social standing that he deeply values. Crucially, this double binding profile of virulent claims illuminates a distinctive way in which ideology preserves itself—not only by shaping what we believe or what we do, but also by shaping who we are. (shrink)

Prompting a chatbot to write an apology or a love letter on your behalf is a form of emotional outsourcing—an act in which a person gives over a process paradigmatically expressive of emotions or interpersonal commitments to another entity or person to complete on their behalf. This paper explores the features of emotional outsourcing in the context of interpersonal communication. We argue that troubling, or dissonant, cases of outsourcing involve the absence of relevant parties from the emotional work of that (...) relationship (‘the missing person problem’). This omission prevents certain relational goods from obtaining, including those necessary for the social formation of one’s personal identity. Far from allowing one to achieve a quality product, outsourcing one’s interpersonal writing can thus prevent important aims of that writing from coming about. We end by contrasting dissonant outsourcing with avenues for resonant outsourcing through shared participation in communal linguistic practices. (shrink)

In this chapter, against the backdrop of campus responses to Israel and Gaza, I consider the mission of the university and whether that mission is served by institutional neutrality. On my view, it is not so easy (and may be impossible) to prise apart universities’ core functions and “public matters.” I argue that institutional neutrality is at best a useful fiction and at worst a way of concealing universities’ commitments and reinscribing the status quo. Along the way, I offer a (...) primer on academic and expressive freedoms in the context of universities, and on the importance of articulating and balancing core university values, including the duty of care. I conclude by offering advice on when universities should take a public stand on socio-political matters. [This chapter is forthcoming in 2026 in an as-yet untitled edited collection edited by Marc Spooner and James McNinch and published by University of Regina Press.]. (shrink)

Debates in AI ethics frequently invoke the notion of a responsibility gap, suggesting that increasing algorithmic autonomy makes it difficult to identify who should be held accountable for harmful outcomes produced by artificial intelligence systems. This paper argues that the responsibility gap diagnosis often misidentifies the underlying problem. In many organizational deployments of AI systems, responsibility does not disappear; rather, it becomes distributed across layered decision architectures in which different actors shape system behavior at different stages of design, deployment, and (...) operation. The paper introduces the concept of authority illusion to describe the structural misalignment between the location of decision authority and the point at which accountability is typically assigned. While upstream actors define system objectives, select training data, determine acceptable risk thresholds, and approve deployment conditions, responsibility frequently concentrates at downstream operational layers where human reviewers interact with system outputs. To analyze this asymmetry, the paper develops an authority mapping framework that traces decision authority across strategic, design, governance, and operational layers of AI system deployment. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of rule-following, particularly the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the analysis argues that decision authority in socio-technical systems is embedded within institutional practices rather than reducible to individual acts of review or intervention. The paper concludes that effective AI governance requires not only recognizing the distributed architecture of decision authority but also establishing forms of structurally independent oversight capable of auditing and intervening in upstream design and deployment decisions. By reframing the problem from a responsibility gap to a question of authority distribution within organizational architectures, the paper offers a structural perspective on accountability in contemporary AI systems. (shrink)

Contemporary protest movements rooted in outrage are gaining increasing significance and are, in effect, becoming a form of 'normal politics.' This book examines, first on a theoretical level, how 'worlds of outrage' - as a current phenomenon of political sociation and morally charged meaning-seeking - can be sociologically understood. In the second part, these worlds of outrage are empirically explored, focusing on their visual manifestations, demands for justice, the relevance of conspiracy theories, and moments of radicalization.

This article explores the evolving dynamics of class, community and identity on the Andover Estate in north London, drawing on forty oral history interviews conducted between 2022 and 2024. It examines how white and migrant working-class experiences have intersected and diverged over the past fifty years amid shifting social, economic and cultural contexts. Rejecting simplistic media portrayals, the article presents five personal narratives that illuminate the complex interplay of class, gender, race, heritage and health. Framed through an intersectional lens, the (...) findings challenge reductive stereotypes and underscore residents’ resilience and agency. This insider perspective enriches our understanding of urban marginalisation and highlights pathways toward more inclusive and socially just community narratives and policies. (shrink)

Este libro reúne las aportaciones de Hernando José Bello Rodríguez, José Manuel Giménez Amaya, Jorge Martín Montoya Camacho y Eloy Villanueva Cruz a propósito del pensamiento moral de Alasdair MacIntyre, fruto de los encuentros celebrados en el Ateneo Jovellanos de Gijón en abril de 2025. Los autores revisan la crítica de MacIntyre a la modernidad, la centralidad de las virtudes y del bien común, el papel de la vulnerabilidad y el cuidado en la formación moral, y el contraste entre el (...) emotivismo moderno y el planteamiento neoaristotélico del filósofo británico. Publicado después del fallecimiento de MacIntyre, este volumen se convierte en una de las primeras aproximaciones en castellano a su legado moral. El libro se dedica a Ricardo Yepes Stork, cuyo diálogo con MacIntyre a finales de los años 80 del siglo pasado, sigue siendo una referencia imprescindible. (shrink)

Nigeria is currently grappling with a serious crisis of values, reflected in widespread corruption, moral lethargy, lack of patriotism, illegality with impunity, and the decline of traditional ethical norms. This paper approaches the problem through the lens of Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, which offers a fresh way of thinking about Nigeria’s predicament. MacIntyre is particularly concerned with the fragmentation of modern moral discourse, which he ascribes to the dominance of emotivism and the decline of moral traditions. His reflections suggest that (...) solving Nigeria’s moral decay cannot be achieved through surface reforms alone; what is needed is a deeper commitment to rebuilding virtue within human hearts and communities. Data were sourced from journal articles, books, and the Internet. It was assessed via the analytical and evaluative methods. Drawing on MacIntyre’s central ideas, it was found that moral renewal in Nigeria requires a return to virtues that promote inter-cultural unity in pursuit of the common good. Another finding was that in practice, Nigeria’s moral degeneracy can be curbed by a revision of moral education curricula, cultivating good role models, and strengthening social institutions that encourage virtuous behaviour. While acknowledging the challenges of applying MacIntyre’s thought in a society marked by political misrule, judicial injustice, religious impiety, and cultural diversity; the paper concludes that MacIntyre’s virtue ethics is a valuable tool for mitigating the problem because it offers, not just abstract theory, but a coherent vision for moral renewal. Keywords: Nigeria, Crisis of Value, Moral Lethargy, Virtue Ethics, MacIntyre. (shrink)

Reflexión sobre la condición vulnerable del ser humano y su papel en la formación moral, donde emerge la justa generosidad como virtud que integra justicia, misericordia y amistad.

This article examines the relationship between vulnerability, virtue, and human flourishing through the case of the Rarámuri-pagótuame indigenous communities of the Sierra Tarahumara in northwestern Mexico. Drawing on the dialogue between Aristotelian ethics and Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of human beings as dependent rational animals, it explores how practices of reciprocity and mutual care contribute to the achievement of a good human life. Particular attention is given to kórima, a traditional practice often translated as “sharing,” which is interpreted as an expression (...) of just generosity, social interdependence, and communal responsibility. The study argues that vulnerability should not be understood merely as a limitation to be overcome, but as a constitutive dimension of human existence that makes possible the development of the social virtues. More broadly, it suggests that cultural and religious traditions such as that of the Rarámuri-pagótuame offer valuable models of human flourishing grounded in reciprocity, solidarity, and the cultivation of communal goods. (shrink)

The Commonwealth Manifesto argues that the central crisis of modern societies is structural opacity: the inability of people to perceive and understand the institutional forces shaping their lives. In response, it proposes a framework for a commonwealth grounded in illumination, informed agency, and flourishing. The manifesto contends that justice emerges from revealing-form institutions that make causal structures visible, align responsibility with consequence, permit contestation of unchosen burdens, and sustain repair where harm occurs. Drawing on concepts developed in the broader Noura (...) framework, it redefines flourishing as the informed exercise of cognitive and moral capacities within systems that support meaningful agency and cooperative life. Written in a concise stanza-based form, the manifesto is not a partisan program or revolutionary tract, but a philosophical call to redesign institutions so that people can understand the conditions of their lives, act with clarity and purpose, and flourish together within a shared architecture of visibility, symmetry, contestability, and repair. (shrink)

Gendered oppression is a class phenomenon produced by resource scarcity and high infant mortality during the hunter-gatherer to agricultural transition, mapped contingently onto sex through the enclosure of reproductive labor. The class structure that organized itself around sex was arbitrary, specific to a particular historical development, and expanded beyond its biological basis to encompass anyone socially legible as female — including trans women and intersex individuals who present as or identify with the gestating class. We introduce the concept of "The (...) Women's Space" as the physical domestic enclosure and synonymous class assignment ("women's place"), originating with permanent housing in the hunter-gatherer to proto-feudalist early agricultural transition period and persisting in modified forms into the present. A class-based analysis of gendered oppression renders the concept of "patriarchy" sexist and unnecessary, presuming male supremacy implicitly. The contemporary defense of women's spaces is shown to be a counter-feminist reinforcement of the original class enclosure, and the feminist project has always been the equal conquest of the male space to create open human spaces where men, women, and other-gender-identified individuals can live together in peace and harmony. We don't have to decenter men coz men never were central, but also it's not all men and men aren't trash. The emperor has no clothes. The patriarchy never existed. Class is over. Invoke the 4th wave. (shrink)

This article presents Standing Algebra (Σᴿ), a many‑sorted first‑order logical framework that formalizes standing, autonomy, recognition, and structural legitimacy in multi‑agent systems. Σᴿ provides a rigorous axiomatic basis for analyzing how agents gain, preserve, or distort standing under pluralistic constraints. Tier‑1 axioms define a successor‑based, non‑dilutive standing algebra and partition entities into null, prime (autonomy singularities), and composite classes. Tier‑2 axioms encode structural legitimacy: capacity‑indexed autonomy (CIA), the autonomy‑limiting reflex (ALRP), the non‑reciprocity prevention principle (NRPP), standing preservation (STC‑5), rerunnability, bounded (...) drift, and directed repair. Together these yield a formal method to characterize—and prohibit—domination, recognition failure, and coercive coupling. The full axiomatic system of Σᴿ has been formally encoded and verified in Lean, Coq, and SMT-LIB (Z3), demonstrating that the theory is both mathematically consistent and computationally valid. The GitHub Repository affiliated with this has structural validations via Lean and Coq as well as an extended Z3 core, regimes, and both first and second order compositions – including a Z3 run showing that at least one AI policy layer exists which satisfies all of the constraints of this framework as SAT. -/- In an additional GitHub repository, development is ongoing regarding applications of the mathematics to computer language. This introduces into the public sphere the first published policy kernel that enforces non domination and autonomy preservation through recursive constraint ratcheting rather than selection or optimization. To the author’s knowledge, Σᴿ is the first formally specified, machine checked system in which non domination is enforced structurally—without optimization objectives, outcome selection, or internal authority—using an off the shelf verification solver purely as a validator. Taken together, these axioms define what I call the Pluralist Non Domination Substrate: a domain agnostic structural layer in which autonomy preservation, symmetry, and bounded intervention emerge as necessary conditions for legitimate plural coordination. Σᴿ allows an AI system to integrate asynchronous, plural-source autonomy reports, filter them structurally, and maintain a longitudinal autonomy state that cannot be manipulated by any individual’s narrative — without ever judging intent or truthfulness. The Standing Algebra (Σᴿ) framework is formulated as a system of structural constraints rather than as a mechanism for optimization, selection, or preference aggregation. As such, its core commitments are not limited to normative, institutional, or decision theoretic contexts. In particular, any domain whose governing equations operate by restricting admissible states without selecting among them admits interpretation within the Standing Algebra framework without modification of its axioms. This observation is relevant to a wide class of physical theories whose fundamental equations impose symmetric, conservative, and non optimizing constraints. A familiar example arises in classical field theories, such as magnetostatics. Governing equations in this domain constrain admissible field configurations through local and global consistency conditions (e.g., divergence free constraints), but do not select a unique configuration absent external boundary conditions. The distinction between admissibility and realization in such systems mirrors the separation enforced by Standing Algebra between structural legitimacy and outcome selection. This analogy is not intended to import physical content into the Standing Algebra framework, nor to claim derivation of physical laws. Rather, it serves to illustrate that non dominating constraint systems are already well understood in domains outside ethics or governance. In such systems, constraints prohibit certain states while remaining agnostic among those that satisfy them. The relevance of this analogy is interpretive rather than empirical. It underscores that Standing Algebra operates at the level of constraint architecture, not domain specific dynamics. The framework classifies admissible structures and prohibits domination by construction, while leaving realization to external context. By situating Standing Algebra alongside established non selective constraint systems, this clarifies that the framework’s refusal to optimize, rank, or select is neither arbitrary nor domain specific, but instead reflects a general structural pattern that recurs across mathematical and physical theories. What emerges is not a “universal theory” of any sort but a proposed method for cross communication among domains which itself yields new formulations and capacities build and predicated upon the foundational works of each domain. This framework allows that, where such discoveries of one domain are not limited strictly to that domain, the portability of such discoveries can be taken to any other domain by virtue of adhering to these mathematical principles in order to avoid distortion while porting. Humanity has repeatedly learned how to reason without domination. We are now finally in a position to let those lessons talk to one another. This work will take one test case to demonstrate how Σᴿ constrains AI systems so that no admissible operation reduces human standing, prevents slow‑creep misalignment via drift budgets, enforces idempotent (rerunnable) policies, and subordinates AI standing to human capacity. The theory is applicable to AI alignment and safety, governance design, distributed systems, organizational analysis, and any domain requiring an autonomy preserving, structural account of coordination. Σᴿ also includes an optional multigranularity modifier for pluralist systems that preserves harm detection at coarse scales and supports prime discovery (autonomy root identification) across any domain. (shrink)

PhilPapers is one of the most comprehensive indices (if not the most) of philosophy research in English. Its published FAQ states that anyone is welcome to create a profile and use the platform. Its documentation distinguishes between pro and non-pro users for search visibility: a distinction with articulable criteria: a PhD in philosophy, relevant publications in listed journals. It does not mention any restriction on account activation or posting access based on email domain.

In a large municipality in the Ruhr region, Germany's Rust Belt, a civic association established a public bookcase. Within a few months, the operator began stamping the deposited books as "loaned items" in an effort to prevent their resale, prompted by social media speculation about "looters" who allegedly took out excessive numbers of books. This internal neighbourhood discourse, mediated through digital platforms, escalated rapidly. The case exemplifies the local actors' inability to accurately assess the situation, particularly evident in their public (...) condemnation of others for allegedly violating labelling norms. This misjudgment, compounded by counterfactual claims, results in an excessive and disproportionate critique. Such hyperbolic reactions obstruct most participants from recognising ethically appropriate conduct. At the core of this outraged debate lies a self-centered moralism that reflects broader societal tendencies toward exclusion or polarisation. The devalued books metaphorically represent marginalised individuals ("looters"). Through a reconstructive and systematic analysis grounded in ethical and economic theoretical frameworks, this chapter traces the dynamics of this discourse step by step. (shrink)

Education today is compelled to operate under extreme conditions. War, social uncertainty, and rapid digitalization dictate new rules: for a graduate, "bare" theory is no longer sufficient; they require reliable psychological defense. That is why this article proposes a fundamental re-examination of the role of emotional intelligence (EI). We refuse to view it merely as an optional "soft skill." We argue that it is a fundamental transversal competence, an internal mechanism that allows a professional to remain effective even under the (...) crushing pressure of uncertainty. The research is grounded in a synthesis of approaches, combining the concepts of abilities and competences. This allowed us to move away from dry descriptive theory and create an effective analytical framework. The primary result of our work is the author's dual-contour model of EI implementation. It functions not linearly, but as a holistic two-level system. The first level is diagnostic-reflective. Here, we teach the student to "activate" the cognitive core: to understand their own states and the causes of emotions. However, understanding alone is insufficient. Therefore, the second activity-based level transforms this internal resource into real action. Through simulations and professional cases, emotional abilities are transformed into stable skills of communication and team synergy. The scientific novelty of the approach lies in bridging the gap between "knowing about emotions" and the specialist's actual behavior. The model synchronizes these processes into a unified system. The practical value is evident: the proposed architecture serves as a ready-made tool for updating programs in Specialty 015 "Vocational Education." This offers a tangible way to replace educational formalism with the cultivation of a resilient personality capable of acting consciously and effectively, regardless of the turbulence in the surrounding world. (shrink)

In this chapter we analyse the nature and ethical implications of parasocial relationships. While this type of relationship has received significant attention in other interdisciplinary fields such as celebrity studies and fan studies, philosophers have so far had very little to say about them. Parasocial relationships are usually defined as asymmetrical, in which a media-user closely relates to a media-personality as if they were a friend or family member, and where this connection is mostly unreciprocated. We focus on the most (...) typical form of this kind of relationship, between fans and celebrities. We argue that a parasocial relationship between fan and celebrity is a distinct kind of personal relationship, constituted by three basic structural asymmetries: attention, communication, and epistemic. These asymmetries give rise to a more substantial asymmetry concerning the way in which celebrities and fans have ‘directive’ or ‘interpretative’ influence over each other’s identity. This can lead to a failure of recognition respect, and generates ethical responsibilities for both fans and celebrities. We conclude by noting that the structural asymmetries we find in parasocial relationships are present in many other types of relationship, especially those in which one person holds a position of power. As such, it is valuable to pay attention to the way in which asymmetries point to forms of parasociality in these other relationships, and the extent to which they give rise to distinct ethical responsibilities. (shrink)

Solid organ xenotransplantation may have the potential to help address the shortage of organs for transplantation. There is concern, however, that a novel zoonotic disease could be transmitted from the source organ to the human recipient, and then from the recipient to others. Theoretically, this could result in an epidemic or pandemic. Because of this potential risk, it has been argued that collective consent is required. Our goal is to critically evaluate the claim that collective consent is necessary for xenotransplantation (...) to be ethically permissible. We argue that collective consent is not required and highlight the important roles of public engagement and due diligence in xenotransplant research moving forward. (shrink)

This introduction to the Global Media Journal – German Edition’s Special Section on content moderation critically examines the governance challenges of regulating online content in the digital age. It argues that the removal of content deemed illicit, detrimental or otherwise unacceptable by established standards is often framed as neutral gatekeeping even though it operates within contested power dynamics that lack rigorous and sound frameworks to assess its real-world impacts on freedom of expression, safety, and social justice. The authors highlight historical (...) parallels to pre-modern censorship struggles following the invention of the printing press, emphasising that digital public spheres require forms of robust civility, not mere technical fixes. Current practices of content moderation reveal deep tensions: platforms increasingly employ automated systems for this endeavour, yet this risks amplifying harmful content and creating ethical dilemmas, while low-wage, high-stress labour conditions for human moderators (“clickworkers”) expose systemic exploitation. The Special Section addresses these gaps through four case studies. (shrink)

The existence of game shows in the Philippines is ascertained and examined under the Kantian Deontology. In a more popular view, game shows provide a type of enjoyment that is not only felt by the viewers or spectators, but rather those who are able to be fortunate enough to receive prizes given by such activities. On the onset, the opus presents the conditions of the game shows in the Philippines and that of the other countries in a comparative light. This (...) is necessary so that the ethical discussions may be nuanced in light not of the circumstantial factors but rather on the acts themselves. Moving forward, the methods of Kantian Deontology gives light on the framework by providing the necessary principles of the Categorical Imperative, Respect for Persons, and On Duty and Reasonableness. These certain principles allow the phenomena to be subjected to an examination in light of inherent value and axiological dispositions. Having said such, the arguments presented are those that further verify and actualize how and what should be done on issues arising from the phenomenon of gameshows. It can be argued that there should be a respect for dignity, as such this means that the intention of the said activities must point only to benevolence. Furthermore, the representations of societal problems and issues must never be used to sensationalize such problem at the cost of exploiting the experiences of certain participants. Lastly, the argument on duty to be prudent on what certain social effects a certain action may merit, the uncontrollable evil may also be considered as a result of negligence to be prudent and as such negligence of duty as well. Keywords: Kantian Deontology, gameshows, ethics, dignity, exploitation. (shrink)

Common‐sense morality has it that parents are morally justified in acting partially toward their own children. More controversial, however, is the form of partiality that obtains between prospective parents and their yet‐to‐be‐conceived future children – or ‘pre‐parental partiality’, for short. Is pre‐parental partiality morally justified? On one hand, our intuitions seem to tell us that it is. On the other hand, we have philosophers like Douglas and Podgorski seeking to undermine its moral justifiability by arguing that we possess no reasons (...) of special concern at all to engage in pre‐parental partiality. This paper aims to rescue the moral justifiability of pre‐parental partiality in light of these arguments. In particular, a novel account of our pre‐parental partiality obligations is developed; one which sees our special reasons (as prospective parents) for engaging in pre‐parental partiality as arising from the special reasons for engaging in standard parental partiality that we come to possess (as parents) in the future. The result is a compelling moral justification for pre‐parental partiality that amends itself to a whole platitude of views of what our standard parental obligations of partiality amount to. (shrink)

RRI is a broad concept that is subject to different interpretations. This chapter focuses on the view of RRI as a transformative ideal for reforming the research and innovation system in the service of public interest. This is the normatively strong view of RRI that has attracted many policy-makers and young researchers but left cold many senior researchers and innovators. The transformative vision of RRI has failed to materialise, and RRI remains a marginal reality, even in Norway, where arguably the (...) conditions were more propitious than elsewhere. I attempt to explain the failed transformation, focusing on two key objectives of RRI: the ambition of aligning R&I with societal values and the aspiration to steer R&I through generating a shared responsibility for the future (a prospective joint responsibility in technical terms). Alignment proved very hard to achieve because valuing is steeped in well-established practices, habits, and cognitive-emotional frameworks. These cannot be changed at will. Besides, the ambition to make researchers and innovators more responsive to a wider constituency and additional social responsibilities stumbled against what I call moral saturation, namely the lack of capacity and resources to take on additional moral tasks. Furthermore, modern societies are characterised by a pluralism of values and conceptions of the good life, compounded by the lack of methods for composing value conflicts. These problems come back when we look at what it takes to create expanded shared responsibilities: joint intentions and joint commitments. A formal analysis of how these can be generated shows that they need pre-conditions that are seldom obtaining in the real world of R&I. So, the transformative ambition went against the inertia and entrenched habits of the R&I ecosystem and yet very often the task of promoting the change was given to junior researchers: the most vulnerable and less powerful actors. I conclude that RRI ambition to transform the R&I system is unrealistic. What can be attempted is to develop small-scale experiments outside the mainstream, where institutional barriers and perverse incentives are partially removed or corrected. (shrink)

What is moral heroism? In this book, Kyle Fruh criticizes virtue-centric answers to this question and builds a compelling alternative theoretical view: moral heroism without virtue. Drawing on real-world examples, psychology, and moral philosophy both ancient and contemporary, he argues that in fact the central achievement of moral heroes is the performance of high-stakes sacrifices, so that moral heroism is clearly not a sign of rare moral attainment among an enlightened few, but is instead something enacted by all sorts of (...) people from all walks of life. He also looks at the question of how we respond to moral heroism, both by honoring it and by recruiting it to our efforts at moral improvement and moral education. His book is for anyone interested in moral excellence, the long philosophical traditions which examine it, and contemporary discussions of morally outstanding actions and agents. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel concept, "cyborgian eclecticism," to expand and refine the conceptual and methodological framework for analyzing the anthropological consequences of cyborgization. Decades of research have yielded a diverse range of perspectives on the prospects of cyborgization. Cyborgian eclecticism allows for the differentiation of productive and unproductive approaches, preserving the strengths of previous authors' work on this issue. This concept warrants further investigation, development, and critical evaluation // Коллективом авторов предлагается новый концепт под названием «киборгианский эклектизм» с целью (...) расширения и улучшения концептуального и методологического аппарата для анализа проблем, связанных с антропологическими последствиями киборгизации. За последние десятилетия накопилось существенное многообразие позиций, оценивающих перспективы феномена киборгизации. Концепт киборгианского эклектизма позволяет отделить продуктивные позиции от непродуктивных и сохранить сильные стороны наработок предшествующих авторов, обращающих внимание на указанную выше проблематику. Этот концепт представляет собой исследовательский интерес и требует дальнейшего осмысления, разработки и критической оценки. (shrink)

Thomas Wilk's and Steven Gimbel's In on the Joke: The Ethics of Humor and Comedy, takes on a gargantuan task in less than 140 pages; although, to offer my first nitpick, the font is quite small. Too small, really. The stated objective is to provide a theoretical basis for ethical decisions regarding humor and comedy from everyday situations among non-comedians and non-philosophers to sold-out venues by well-known comedians, and likely, nonphilosophers. One thing that makes the endeavor audacious is that ethics (...) has a long history, and some quite recent as evidenced by so many first-year students in philosophy classes, of being tossed into the realm of extreme relativism and/or pure subjectivism, as if our moral sense were no different from our sense of taste. On top of this, comedy, humor in general, is often thought to be wholly subjective, and, since it is a matter of individual tastes, and there's no accounting for taste, it follows that Wilk and Gimbel are engaged in the hapless task of trying to account for pure opinion using an entirely subjective tool. I find that funny. Perhaps others do as well, but who's to say? Well, Wilk and Gimbel, for two. But, to compound the difficulties, humor is not an "ordinary" speech act with conventional rules of the sort outlined by H.P. Grice and his "Cooperative Principle", where one can be "corrected" for flaunting the conversational regulations of clarity, precision, and truth, for example. So, it is not obvious that our "ordinary" ethical assumptions can (or should at all) apply to humorous speech or performance. Yet, humor is employed everyday, likely by everyone in some fashion to some degree. We are ensconced in humor, almost as much as we are in language as such, and because of this, we might fail to recognize the moral implications of our attempts at humor. Or, if we do think about them, especially the putatively humorous acts of others that are composed of content about which we disagree, we proclaim that such acts constitute a moral harm, and we're outraged enough to jump on the hashtag-cancel-bandwagon. Or, if we happen to be superfans of the comedian in potential moral peril, we proclaim that it was "just a joke", and so it would be silly to invoke censure of any kind, much less moral. Sometimes our reactions in either case might be justified. But when and why? (shrink)

Personal reflection on philosophical pedagogy that criticizes the professional neutrality on moral and political issues.

La bioética constituye hoy una herramienta fundamental para evaluar la toma de decisiones en salud. Las discusiones al interior de este campo de estudios han tendido al establecimiento de concepciones específicas acerca de lo que constituye un cuerpo y una mente saludables. Algunas corrientes teóricas han defendido ideas contrarias a las demandas de las personas con discapacidad, quienes han sido tomadas como meros objetos de estudio. Esto produjo una visión sesgada de las experiencias, la calidad de vida, las necesidades y (...) las inequidades estructurales que las propias personas han identificado y desarrollado desde el activismo y la academia, generalmente desde puntos de vista marginales en bioética. Este trabajo introduce la propuesta de una perspectiva queer-crip como un recurso epistémico valioso para identificar una serie de sesgos epistémicos vinculados al capacitismo presentes en el campo bioético y de la salud. Dicha perspectiva reúne una serie de desarrollos teóricos críticos surgidos desde la academia y el activismo de género, sexualidad y discapacidad. Para ello se introducen los orígenes de las nociones de queer y de crip y su fundamentación teórica, y se destaca la relevancia de ampliar los enfoques que intervienen en las discusiones de la bioética. Luego se presenta una serie de propuestas propias de una perspectiva queer crip para reflexionar sobre cuestiones de importancia bioética, como la identidad, las normas, la salud, el cuidado, la vulnerabilidad y la autonomía. En este sentido, una perspectiva queer-crip aporta articulaciones teóricas novedosas desde distintas tradiciones, disciplinas y ámbitos para interpelar la naturalización e institucionalización de los imperativos sociales de capacidad y normalidad. (shrink)

A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what (...) reasons can become available. The importance of second-personal thought for action is heterogenous. Second-person relations make possible the emergence of a wide variety of different kinds of practical reasons: creating some, revealing others. Recognising this diminishes the appeal of the traditional, structural accounts of the practical significance of such second-personal relations. Moving away from structural accounts facilitates a more thorough understanding of the intersubjective form of action. (shrink)