Neuroethics, Misc

It would be unwise to dismiss the possibility of human brain organoids developing sentience. However, scepticism about this idea is appropriate when considering current organoids. It is a point of consensus that a brain-dead human is not sentient, and current organoids lack a functioning brainstem. There are nonetheless troubling early warning signs, suggesting organoid research may create forms of sentience in the near future. To err on the side of caution, researchers with very different views about the neural basis of (...) sentience should unite behind the “brainstem rule”: if a neural organoid develops or innervates a functioning brainstem that regulates arousal and leads to sleep-wake cycles, then it is a sentience candidate. If organoid research leads to the creation of sentience candidates, a moratorium or indefinite ban on the creation of the relevant type of organoid may be appropriate. A different way forward, more consistent with existing approaches to animal research, would be to require ethical review and harm-benefit analysis for all research on sentience candidates. (shrink)

Kanaan and McGuire elegantly describe three challenges facing the use of fMRI to uncover cognitive mechanisms. They shows how these challenges ramify in the case of identifying the mechanisms responsible for psychiatric disorders. In this commentary, I would like to raise another difficulty for fMRI that also appears to ramify in similar cases. This is that there are good reasons for doubting one of the assumptions on which many fMRI studies are based: that neural mechanisms are always and everywhere sufficient (...) for cognition. I suggest that in the case of the mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders, this assumption should be doubted. I do not dispute that a malfunctioning neural mechanism is likely to be a necessary component of a psychiatric disorder—as Kanaan and McGuire say, the experimental evidence from cognitive neuropsychiatry gives us excellent reasons to think that this is so. My question is whether a story only in terms of these neural mechanisms is sufficient to explain the mechanism of a psychiatric disorder. Is the reduction, projected by cognitive neuropsychiatry, of psychiatric disorders to disorders in neural functioning even in principle possible? Drawing on recent concerns about the location of mental states, I argue that such a reduction is likely to fail. Even if the considerable problems raised by Kanaan and McGuire for fMRI could be addressed, we have no reason to think that the mechanisms involved in psychiatric disorders are entirely neural, and that fMRI, or even a perfect science-fiction brain-scanner, would be capable of uncovering them. Psychiatric disorders, like numerous other cognitive processes, are liable to cross the brain–world boundary in such a promiscuous way as to be resistant to neural reduction. (shrink)

Some medical interventions have the potential to interfere with patients’ future healthcare decision-making. We identify two types of such influences: affecting whether a patient has decision-making capacity in the first place; and influencing which treatment option a patient ends up selecting. Using the example of deep brain stimulation, we argue that one should utilise this effect to obtain more authentic treatment preferences. In patients with implanted deep brain stimulators who do not meet the capacity threshold, the device state should be (...) reverted as there is a chance that doing so has a positive effect on their capacity. In patients who are already deemed decision-competent, the same approach can reveal on/off-discrepancies in the selection of treatment choices. We propose five cross-checking strategies to deal with such discrepancies and call for a revision of current procedures for obtaining consent following any interventions whose psychotropic influences can be reversed within clinically reasonable time frames. (shrink)

Van Balen’s critique of naturalness in BCI design and use is timely and important in the ethics and phenomenology of current and future neurotechnology (van Balen 2026). His proposal to replace “naturalness” with “transparency” is conceptually sound, phenomenologically accurate, and ethically necessary, in particular for resisting technoableist assumptions that might privilege able-bodied perception as normative. However, van Balen explicitly acknowledges some methodological gaps that still need to be filled: once this theoretical consideration has been accepted, how should transparency be concretely (...) assessed and operationalized? The commentary addresses this issue by demonstrating how integration criteria derived from 4E cognition and phenomenology can operationalize (i.e. define through measurable procedures) transparency. (shrink)

This study aims to provide a comprehensive review of the ethical, legal and social issues in human brain organoid research, with a view to different types of research and applications: in vitro research, transplantation into non-human animals, and biocomputing. Despite the academic and societal attention on the possibility that human brain organoids may be conscious, we have identified diverse issues in human brain organoid research and applications. To guide the complex terrain of human brain organoid research and applications, a multidisciplinary (...) approach that integrates ethical, legal, and social perspectives is essential. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that by using methods of encouragement, derived from the fields of social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral economics, healthcare workers can potentially provide their patients with tools for increasing adherence to their treatment plans. I claim that the shared decision-making model can, and should, be enriched to include a component that encourages patients to follow through with their plans. It is commonsense that it is one thing to decide on a plan, and quite another to (...) stick to it. Even if a plan is one’s own, people often backslide with respect to their prior commitments. I appeal to the extensive literatures on decision-making, delay discounting, and willpower to provide some empirically verified tools for motivating patients. Importantly, I argue that contrary to appearances, motivating others to act with respect to their commitments expresses a respect for autonomy and is non-paternalistic. (shrink)

This paper examines the implications of brain–machine interfaces (BMIs) from a libertarian perspective, arguing that their widespread use necessitates careful scrutiny due to potential risks to individual autonomy, freedom, privacy, and dignity. BMIs, while offering significant technological advancements, pose severe threats by potentially undermining fundamental libertarian values. The paper discusses how BMIs could enable invasive surveillance, thought manipulation, and emotional control, drawing parallels to Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment. Unlike the hypothetical machine, which offers simulated experiences, BMIs could facilitate (...) real-time control over individuals’ thoughts and emotions, leading to unprecedented forms of government overreach and coercion. The paper concludes that although libertarians advocate for minimal state intervention, the profound impact of BMIs on personal freedom and autonomy warrants a cautious approach, including potential restrictions on their use to safeguard against their misuse and to preserve individual self-ownership and dignity. (shrink)

In this reply, I address questions and concerns about Neuroethics raised by a formidable cast of commentators: Amanda Evans, Tyler Fagan, Jonathan Pugh, Daniel Moseley, and Adina Roskies. Their insightful commentaries cover most, if not all, topics within the book, namely: neuroscientific challenges to free will, motivated reasoning and the replication crisis, the brain disease model of addiction, moral responsibility and autonomy in mental disorder, valid consent for brain interventions, and enhancement of moral and cognitive capacities through neurotechnologies.

The main message of Neuroethics is that neuroscience forces us to reconceptualize human agency as marvelously diverse and flexible. Free will can arise from unconscious brain processes. Individuals with mental disorders, including addiction and psychopathy, exhibit more agency than is often recognized. Brain interventions should be embraced with cautious optimism. Our moral intuitions, which arise from entangled reason and emotion, can generally be trusted. Nevertheless, we can and should safely enhance our brain chemistry, partly because motivated reasoning crops up in (...) everyday life and in the practice of neuroscience itself. Despite serious limitations, brain science can be useful in the courtroom and marketplace. Recognizing all this nuance leaves little room for anxious alarmism or overhype and urges an emphasis on neurodiversity. The result is a highly opinionated tour of neuroethics as an exciting field full of implications for philosophy, science, medicine, law, and public policy. (shrink)

The neurodiversity movement grew out of the autism community but is now being applied to many neurological types, from dyslexia to schizophrenia. The resulting neurodiversity paradigm maintains that these neurological differences are normal variations in the human species, like race and sexual orientation, which should be valued and accommodated, not “fixed” or eliminated. Yet some clear-eyed individuals view their brain differences as deficits and would continue to seek treatment in the absence of discrimination or lack of accommodation. I argue that (...) fully appreciating cognitive diversity requires more nuanced normative claims that respect individual differences and fluid circumstances. Although analogies to minority statuses can be useful, variations in personality traits provide a more flexible and inclusive model for neurodivergence. Despite ultimately rejecting the biodiversity metaphor, a more nuanced neurodiversity paradigm emphasizing our shared humanity can promote compassion, respect, and support for all. (shrink)

¿Qué estudia la neuroética y por qué podemos considerarla una disciplina tan científica como filosófica? ¿Cómo puede la neurociencia ayudarnos a repensar la ética? ¿Es un problema que nuestros cerebros sean controlados algorítmicamente por la neurotecnología? ¿Podríamos desarrollarnos moralmente a partir de la alteración tecnológica de nuestros procesos cerebrales? ¿Cómo transformaría la sociedad una tecnología que permita acceder a la profundidad de cada experiencia y registrarla para la posteridad? ¿Deberíamos resistirnos a que la neurotecnología altere nuestra identidad? -/- El filósofo (...) Abel Wajnerman Paz comparte los fundamentos de la neuroética y abre una serie de preguntas asombrosas e incómodas respecto de la comprensión e intervención de nuestros cerebros. Dirigido a todo público, Pensamiento a la intemperie en un ensayo ágil y profundo que nos explica cómo el desarrollo de la neurociencia y la neurotecnología podrá desnudar nuestra mente, sacar los pensamientos del castillo del cerebro y exponerlos al mundo de una manera sin precedentes: una situación compleja, sin duda, pero que al mismo tiempo podría darnos una oportunidad para empujar la mente, reinventarnos y abrirnos a nuevas maneras de pensar y de ser. (shrink)

This paper investigates how metaphysical theories of personhood carry significant ethical implications regarding attitudes towards patients with disorders of consciousness. After providing conceptual clarifications on key terms such as moral status, vegetative state, metaphysical and moral personhood, and sortals, the paper analyzes five main approaches to theories of personhood: personism, animalism, the disjunctive/hybrid view, the constitution view, and ontological personalism. Related bioethical implications are presented for each theory: the intermittent person (personism, constitution view); personhood as accidental (animalism, disjunctivism); the indefinite (...) substratum (disjunctivism); the dual human-person subject (constitution view); the non-rational person (ontological personalism). Ontological personalism appears preferable in dealing with liminal cases, anchoring criteria for identity in a corporeal entity of a rational nature, while recognizing radical changes in the manifestation of psychological characteristics. From a pragmatic perspective addressing uncertainties of vegetative state diagnoses. (shrink)

This paper critiques the scope of neurotechnologies in significantly expanding the epistemological field of tourism and warns of their potential to undermine the cognitive capacity of tourists to act responsibly and responsively.

Neurotechnologies are rapidly advancing in the past few years, such that neural prostheses and brain-computer interfaces are no longer things that only appear in science fiction movies. As interactions with neurotechnologies deepen, users have reported feeling that these tools are becoming part of their own selves and minds. The hypothesis of extended cognition can accommodate this intuition, as it maintains that artifacts can become a part of their users’ minds. However, there have also been some stark examples where users have (...) abruptly lost access to their sophisticated tools, demonstrating the sometimes vulnerable and precarious nature of certain advanced technologies. These features seem to challenge the idea that users can stand in the right relation to their tools to meet the criteria of parity that support the extended cognition theorists’ arguments. Notably, these technologies seem to violate a condition of ownership that has been appealed to on various occasions over the past two decades of literature on extended cognition. In addition to arguing that neuroprosthetics can be a part of one’s extended cognitive system, despites apparent challenges to an ownership condition, we will also review the disparate history and evaluate the current status of the ownership criterion in the literature on extended cognition. To proceed, we first review the reasons for the origin of the proposed “ownership” criterion and, second, introduce new challenges arising from emerging technologies such as neuroprosthetics. We argue that the ownership condition has at least three shortcomings: (i) ambiguity of meaning, (ii) ethical pitfalls, and (iii) it fails to capture people’s intuitions about the cognitive status of emerging neurotechnologies. Ultimately, we argue that introducing the concept of co-ownership is a necessary distinction and is better suited to explain how advanced cognitive technologies function. (shrink)

We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with “locked-in” syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral (...) decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the “risk asymmetry argument,” which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human–AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take. (shrink)

The use of brain technology that contributes to psychological changes has spurred a debate about personal identity. Some argue that neurotechnology does not undermine personal continuity (Levy, 2011) while others argue that it does (Kreitmair, 2019; Schechtman, 2010). To make these assessments, commentators fail to identify psychological changes that cause personal discontinuity. In this paper, I present a view that identifies personal continuity with the maintenance of a self-concept. I argue that a concept of self requires the ability to self-ascribe (...) physical and psychological features and that the diachronic self emerges with self-ascriptions of features that require endurance over time. I maintain that an adequate concept of self does not depend on the maintenance of any particular combination of self-ascriptions and that it can be maintained despite even significant changes in psychological or physical traits. Finally, I apply the self-concept view to identify changes that can result in discontinuity of self. (shrink)

Background: Newer “closed-loop” neurostimulation devices in development could, in theory, induce changes to patients’ personalities and self-perceptions. Empirically, however, only limited data of patient and family experiences exist. Responsive neurostimulation (RNS) as a treatment for refractory epilepsy is the first approved and commercially available closed-loop brain stimulation system in clinical practice, presenting an opportunity to observe how conceptual neuroethical concerns manifest in clinical treatment. Methods: We conducted ethnographic research at a single academic medical center with an active RNS treatment program (...) and collected data via direct observation of clinic visits and in-depth interviews with 12 patients and their caregivers. We used deductive and inductive analyses to identify the relationship between these devices and patient changes in personality and self-perception. Results: Participants generally did not attribute changes in patients’ personalities or self-perception to implantation of or stimulation using RNS. They did report that RNS affected patients’ experiences and conceptions of illness. In particular, the capacity to store and display electrophysiological data produced a common frame of reference and a shared vocabulary among patients and clinicians .Discussion: Empirical experiences of a clinical population being treated with closed-loop neuromodulation do not corroborate theoretical concerns about RNS devices described by neuroethicists and technology developers. However, closed-loop devices demonstrated an ability to change illness experiences. Even without altering identify and self-perception, they provided new cultural tools and metaphors for conceiving of epilepsy as an illness and of the process of diagnosis and treatment. These findings call attention to the need to situate neuroethical concerns in the broader contexts of patients’ illness experiences and social circumstances. (shrink)

The possibility of employing human enhancement interventions to aid in future space missions has been gaining attention lately. These possibilities have included one of the more controversial kinds of enhancements: biomedical moral enhancement. However, the discussion has thus far remained on a rather abstract level. In this paper we further this conversation by looking more closely at what type of interventions with what sort of effects we should expect when we are talking about biomedical moral enhancements. We suggest that a (...) more grounded way to picture moral enhancement, at least in the near term, is to envision a form of cognitive enhancement that also provides some moral benefits by heightening the enhanced person's capability for acting according to their own subjective moral code. While this concept of moral adherence enhancement also has relevance for the moral enhancement discussion more widely, in this paper we apply it specifically in the context of space missions. We argue that there are weighty reasons to consider making biomedical enhancements of the proposed kind a mandatory feature of early-phase long-distance space travel because these missions are high-stakes in nature and take place in an environment where the enhancement could be seen as conferring important advantages while negating many of the traditional arguments weighed against it. (shrink)

Human brain organoids (HCOs) are laboratory-grown biological entities that have been added to the catalog of living entities for just over a decade. How they are formed and may continue to develop for some time is not irrelevant, given their peculiarity, which is that they mimic the human brain with a high degree of similarity. Revolving around this key issue is the discussion on our target article (Zilio and Lavazza 2023), for which we are grateful to all the commentators.

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at (...) a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind. (shrink)

Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointerventions; if Schmidt’s and (...) Levy’s defences succeed, then some nonconsensual neurointerventions neither harness irrationality, nor subvert rationality, nor fail to give reasons. This, I claim, poses a challenge both to opponents of nonconsensual neurointerventions, and to defenders of nudging. (shrink)

Animal models have long been used to investigate human mental disorders, including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. This practice is usually justified in terms of the benefits (to humans) outweighing the costs (to the animals). I argue on utility maximization grounds that we should phase out animal models in neuropsychiatric research. Our leading theories of how human minds and behavior evolved invoke sociocultural factors whose relation to nonhuman minds, societies, and behavior has not been homologized. Thus it is not at all (...) clear that we are gaining the epistemic or clinical benefits we want from this animal-based research. (shrink)

Recent research in neurochemistry has shown there to be a number of chemical compounds that are implicated in the patterns of lust, attraction, and attachment that undergird romantic love. For example, there is evidence that the phenomenon of attachment is associated with the action of oxytocin and vasopressin. There is therefore some reason to suppose that patterns of lust, attraction, and attachment could be regulated via manipulation of these substances in the brain: in other words, by their use as 'love (...) drugs'. A growing bioethical literature asks searching questions about this prospect, and especially about the use of such drugs to enhance or reignite attachment in flagging relationships. This Element examines some of the central arguments on the topic, and sounds a note of caution. It urges that there are reasons to think the states of attachment produced or facilitated by the use of such drugs would not be desirable. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human organoid biobanking, the locus of donor autonomy has been identified in processes of consent. The problem is that, by focusing on consent, biobanking processes preclude adequate engagement with donor autonomy because they are unable to adequately recognise or respond to factors that determine authentic choice. This is particularly problematic in biobanking contexts associated with organoid research or the clinical application of organoids because, given the probability of unforeseen and varying purposes for which (...) a donor’s organoids could be employed and given the different ways in which a donor can relate to her biospecimens, a donor can value her organoids differently in different contexts and her reasons for autonomously permitting use of her cells and tissues in one case may not support an autonomous decision in another. In response, this paper has three aims: firstly, to make the case for why organoid biobanks ought to respect donor autonomy conceived as authentic choice; secondly, to explore the autonomy-respecting limits of established and widely prevalent models of biobank consent; and thirdly, to propose certain conditions that organoid biobanks ought to support or facilitate in order to respect donor autonomy. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the definition and application of the sliding scale of capacity. We show that the current interpretations of the sliding scale confound distinct features of the medical decision, such as its urgency, its severity, or its complexity, that do not always covary.We propose that the threshold for assessing capacity should be adjusted based solely on the cognitive complexity of the decision at hand. We further suggest that the complexity of a decision should be identified based (...) on a patient’s particular cognitive deficits. We utilize the current research on the types of deficits that characterize amnestic dementias and examine which types of medical decisions might be most complex for patients with that type of dementia. We conclude that applying the sliding scale based on individualized judgments of cognitive complexity will improve accuracy of assessment of capacity and enable capable patients to participate in medical decision making. (shrink)

Alongside the rapid global advances in neuroscientific research, neuroethics has been one of the fastest growing sub-fields within bioethics. With this rapid expansion, bioethicists struggle to kee...

Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? My conclusion is that these conditions are rare. The reason stems from considerations of autonomy. When compared with other interventions, MMTs do a particularly poor job at promoting the autonomy of their users. If this conclusion is true, moreover, it provides (...) a fresh perspective on debates about the permissibility of MMTs. On the one hand, for those who would limit the use of MMTs to a narrow range of circumstances, the conclusion that MMTs are rarely preferable gives them further reason to eye MMTs with suspicion. On the other hand, for those who view MMTs as permissible in a wide range of circumstances, the conclusion may deflate their endorsement. (shrink)

For nearly two decades, ethicists have expressed concerns that the further development and use of memory modification technologies (MMTs)—techniques allowing to intentionally and selectively alter memories—may threaten the very foundations of who we are, our personal identity, and thus pose a threat to our well-being, or even undermine our “humaneness.” This paper examines the potential ramifications of memory-modifying interventions such as changing the valence of targeted memories and selective deactivation of a particular memory as these interventions appear to be at (...) the same time potentially both most promising clinically as well as menacing to identity. However, unlike previous works discussing the potential consequences of MMTs, this article analyzes them in the context of the narrative relational approach to personal identity and potential issues related to autonomy. I argue that such a perspective brings to light the ethical aspects and moral issues arising from the use of MMTs that have been hidden from previously adopted approaches. In particular, this perspective demonstrates how important the social context in which an individual lives is for the ethical evaluation of a given memory-modifying intervention. I conclude by suggesting that undertaking memory modifications without taking into account the social dimension of a person’s life creates the risk that she will not be able to meet one of the basic human needs—the autonomous construction and maintenance of personal identity. Based on this conclusion, I offer some reflections on the permissibility and advisability of MMTs and what these considerations suggest for the future. (shrink)

This article focuses on justified responses to “immoral” behavior and crimes committed by patients undergoing neuromodulation therapies. Such patients could be held morally responsible in the basic desert sense—the one that serves as a justification of severe practices such as backward‐looking moral outrage, condemnation, and legal punishment—as long as they possess certain compatibilist capabilities that have traditionally served as the quintessence of free will, that is, reasons‐responsiveness; attributability; answerability; the abilities to act in accordance with moral reasons, second‐order volitions, or (...) Deep Self. Recently leading compatibilist neuroethicists added the condition of not feeling alienated from desires motivating a person's action. This article argues against such attempts to determine conditions under which patients undergoing neuromodulation should be subject to negative reactive attitudes and legal punishment. Compatibilism should not be used to justify basic desert moral responsibility and legal punishment. Instead, a new way of thinking about the function of moral responsibility attribution is proposed for patients with neuromodulation. Their compatibilist capabilities should serve as important indicators for determining appropriate, forward‐looking courses of action, such as quarantining and restorative treatment, to ensure the public safety and well‐being of the patients. (shrink)

This chapter assesses the use of technology to solve social problems such as crime. Starting with a type of education programme that few would find problematic, it details step-by-step a range of interventions that might be offered to rehabilitate offenders. These interventions include a device that not only gives a signal when it detects a precursor of the urge for criminal behaviour, but also releases a drug that is reliably effective at neutralizing these urges. The chapter then presents a view (...) according to which, if we accept the education programme, then we ought to accept all of the other technological interventions. This would mean accepting a greatly expanded role for technology in our criminal justice systems, compared to what we see at present. (shrink)

Dubljević and company’s proposed approach for incorporating a socio-political perspective into neuroethics has clear potential to help mitigate the effects of research ‘hype’ relating to neuroethics. Their approach serves as a social regulation meant to improve the realizability of neuroethics research. Drawing on Dubljević et al. s suggestion, we consider how incorporating a socio-political perspective in other scientific disciplines could help the scientific community as a whole move beyond the infamous ‘reproducibility crisis’ in science. The reproducibility crisis is a concern (...) in science stemming from the revelation that most scientific results are difficult, or impossible, to replicate (Frias-Navarro et al., 2020). By applying the four principles proposed by Dubljević et al., the scientific community can avoid many of the pitfalls that have led to the reproducibility crisis, such as the file drawer effect, a publication bias preventing negative results from being published, or the publish-or-perish culture - the pressure for scientists to publish highly influential papers in high impact journals in order to keep their funding (Rosenthal, 1979; Begley & Ioannidis, 2015). As such, we argue that, in its final form, this socio-political framework begs for true open science, wherein systematically sharing data would enable enlightened policymaking by showing a picture closer to the ground-level realities of scientific research. (shrink)

Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if (...) we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity. (shrink)

Open Peer Commentary on P. Zawadzki and A. K. Adamczyk's target article in AJOB Neuroscience on the potential of optogenetics for memory modification. I argue for a radically pluralistic understanding of the notion of authenticity, and highlight the need to further clarify the specific nature of the authors' concern about authenticity, as well as its policy implications.

Loss of personal identity in dementia can raise a number of ethical considerations, including the applicability of advance directives and the validity of patient preferences that seem incongruous with a previous history of values. In this chapter, we first endorse the self-concept view as the most appropriate approach to personal continuity in healthcare. We briefly describe two different types of dementia, Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD). We identify elements considered important for the continuation of a self-concept, including (...) continuation of memories, consistency in personality traits and personal preferences, and continued endorsement of certain moral tenets. We show that, depending on which element is considered most important for personal identity, continuity of a self-concept for individuals with distinct types of dementia will be affected and assessed differently. Utilizing a variety of empirical evidence, we argue that persistence of memory, personality traits, and preferences are not the most important for the maintenance of personal identity. Instead, as studies aimed to capture the folk-psychological view of personal continuity demonstrate, judgements about continuity depend primarily on the persistent commitment to widely shared moral beliefs. Because of that, we argue that individuals with bv-FTD are more likely to lose their sense of self than individuals whose dementia primarily affects memory, such as Alzheimer’s disease. We end the chapter by showing how the importance of moral beliefs for continuity of self can be used to provide guidance to health-care professionals when considering changes in preference by individuals with dementia. (shrink)

With the shortage of physicians and surgeons and increase in demand worldwide due to situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing interest in finding solutions to help address the problem. A solution to this problem would be to use neurotechnology to provide them augmented cognition, senses and action for optimal diagnosis and treatment. Consequently, doing so can negatively impact them and others. We argue that applying neurotechnology for human enhancement in physicians and surgeons can cause injustices, and (...) harm to them and patients. In this paper, we will first describe the augmentations and neurotechnologies that can be used to achieve the relevant augmentations for physicians and surgeons. We will then review selected ethical concerns discussed within literature, discuss the neuroengineering behind using neurotechnology for augmentation purposes, then conclude with an analysis on outcomes and ethical issues of implementing human augmentation via neurotechnology in medical and surgical practice. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only to avoid autonomy-based bioconservative objections, but to argue that cognition-enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more importantly, to develop (...) a more complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to cognitive enhancement. By drawing a distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the exercise and achievement of autonomy and by exploring the possible effects of cognitive enhancement on both competence and authenticity conditions for autonomy, the paper identifies and explains which dimensions of autonomy can and cannot, in principle, be enhanced via direct cognitive interventions. This allows us to draw conclusions regarding the limits of cognitive enhancement as a means for enhancing autonomy. (shrink)

The current debate on closed-loop brain devices (CBDs) focuses on their use in a medical context; possible criminal justice applications have not received scholarly attention. Unlike in medicine, in criminal justice, CBDs might be offered on behalf of the State and for the purpose of protecting security, rather than realising healthcare aims. It would be possible to deploy CBDs in the rehabilitation of convicted offenders, similarly to the much-debated possibility of employing other brain interventions in this context. Although such use (...) of CBDs could in principle be consensual, there are significant differences between the choice faced by a criminal offender offered a CBD in the context of criminal justice, and that faced by a patient offered a CBD in an ordinary healthcare context. Employment of CBDs in criminal justice thus raises ethical and legal intricacies not raised by healthcare applications. This paper examines some of these issues under three heads: autonomy, human rights, and accountability. (shrink)

There are some distinct methodological challenges, and possible pitfalls, for neuroethics when it evaluates neuroscientific results and links them to issues such as moral or legal responsibility. Some problems emerge in determining the requirements for responsibility. We will show how philosophical proposals in this area need to interact with legal doctrine and practice. Problems can occur when inferring normative implications from neuroscientific results. Other problems arise when it is not recognized that data about brain anatomy or physiology are relevant to (...) the ascription of responsibility only when they are significantly correlated with the psychological capacities contemplated by the legal formulations of responsibility. We will demonstrate this by considering two significant cases concerning psychopathy. Some paradigms that aim at measuring higher-order capacities, such as moral understanding, have limited validity. More robust paradigms for the study of learning in restricted controlled conditions, on the other hand, have limited ecological validity across individuals and context to be of any use for the law. (shrink)

Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are devices primarily intended to allow agents to use prosthetic body parts, wheelchairs, and other mechanisms by forming intentions or performing certain mental actions. In this paper I illustrate how the use of BCIs leads to two unique and unrecognized problems of moral luck. In short, it seems that agents who depend upon BCIs for bodily movement or the use of other mechanisms (henceforth “BCI-agents”) may end up deserving of blame and legal punishment more so than standard (...) counterparts simply due to factors beyond their control. My aim is to explore whether we can avoid the implication that BCI-agents are subject to these unique sources of moral luck. In doing so I offer a number of possible solutions and then defend one of these solutions as the best. As it turns out, the solution I defend addresses both problems of moral luck at once and has broader implications for theorizing about moral luck as well as the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. (shrink)

Growing awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience in the early years of the 21st century led to the emergence of the new academic field of “neuroethics,” which studies the ethical implications of developments in the neurosciences. However, despite the acceleration and evolution of neuroscience research on nonhuman animals, the unique ethical issues connected with neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals remain underdiscussed. This is a significant oversight given the central place of animal models in neuroscience. To respond to these concerns, (...) the Center for Neuroscience and Society and the Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a workshop on the “Neuroethics of Animal Research” in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the workshop, expert speakers and attendees discussed ethical issues arising from neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals, including the use of animal models in the study of pain and psychiatric conditions, animal brain-machine interfaces, animal–animal chimeras, cerebral organoids, and the relevance of neuroscience to debates about personhood. This paper highlights important emerging ethical issues based on the discussions at the workshop. This paper includes recommendations for research in the United States from the authors based on the discussions at the workshop, loosely following the format of the 2 Gray Matters reports on neuroethics published by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. (shrink)

The development of novel neurotechnologies, such as brain-computer interface (BCI) and deep-brain stimulation (DBS), are very promising in improving the welfare and life prospects many people. These include life-changing therapies for medical conditions and enhancements of cognitive, emotional, and moral capacities. Yet there are also numerous moral risks and uncertainties involved in developing novel neurotechnologies. For this reason, the progress of novel neurotechnology research requires that diverse publics place trust in researchers to develop neural interfaces in ways that are overall (...) beneficial to society and responsive to ethical values and concerns. In this article, we argue that researchers and research institutions have a moral responsibility to foster and demonstrate trustworthiness with respect to broader publics whose lives will be affected by their research. Using Annette Baier’s conceptual analysis of trust, which takes competence and good will to be its central components, we propose that practices of ethical reflexivity could play a valuable role in fostering the trustworthiness of individual researchers and research institutions through building and exhibiting their moral competence and good will. By ethical reflexivity, we mean the reflective and discursive activity of articulating, analyzing, and assessing the assumptions and values that might be underlying their ethical actions and projects. Here, we share an ethics dialog tool—called the Scientific Perspectives and Ethics Commitments Survey (or SPECS)—developed by the University of Washington’s Center of Neurotechnology (CNT) Neuroethics Thrust. Ultimately, the aim is to show the promise of ethical reflexivity practices, like SPECS, as a method of enhancing trustworthiness in researchers and their institutions that seek to develop novel neurotechnologies for the overall benefit of society. (shrink)

There has been a growing interest in research concerning memory modification technologies (MMTs) in recent years. Neuroscientists and psychologists are beginning to explore the prospect of controllable and intentional modification of human memory. One of the technologies with the greatest potential to this end is optogenetics—an invasive neuromodulation technique involving the use of light to control the activity of individual brain cells. It has recently shown the potential to modify specific long-term memories in animal models in ways not yet possible (...) with other MMTs. As the therapeutic potential of optogenetics has already prompted approval of the first human trials, it is especially important and timely to consider the opportunities and dangers this technology may entail. In this article, we focus on possible consequences of optogenetics as an MMT by analyzing fundamental threats potentially associated with memory modifications: the potential disruption of personality and authenticity. (shrink)

Optogenetics is an invasive neuromodulation technology involving the use of light to control the activity of individual neurons. Even though optogenetics is a relatively new neuromodulation tool whose various implications have not yet been scrutinized, it has already been approved for its first clinical trials in humans. As optogenetics is being intensively investigated in animal models with the aim of developing novel brain stimulation treatments for various neurological and psychiatric disorders, it appears crucial to consider both the opportunities and dangers (...) such therapies may offer. In this review, we focus on the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics, investigating what it is capable of and how it differs from other memory modification technologies. We then outline the safety challenges that need to be addressed before optogenetics can be used in humans. Finally, we re-examine crucial neuroethical concerns expressed in regard to other MMTs in the light of optogenetics and address those that appear to be unique to the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic technology. (shrink)

Innovative practice involves medical interventions that deviate from standard practice in significant ways. For many patients, innovative practice offers the best chance of successful treatment. Because little is known about most innovative treatments, clinicians who engage in innovative practice might consider including extra procedures, such as scans or blood draws, to gather information about the innovation. Such information-gathering interventions can yield valuable information for modifying the innovation to benefit future patients and for designing scientific studies of the innovation. However, existing (...) guidelines do not say when or whether it is appropriate to add potentially risky information-gathering interventions for these purposes. As a result, clinicians may assume that information-gathering interventions are ethically inappropriate and should not be used in innovative practice. This assumption can lead to seriously negative consequences, such as increasing the likelihood that harmful or ineffective innovations will be adopted and creating new barriers to the development of genuinely beneficial treatments. We argue that health care institutions need to promote the responsible use of information-gathering interventions as an adjunct to innovative practice, and that these interventions are not clinical research and should not be subject to research oversight. (shrink)