Human Genetic Modification

This article argues that embryo selection for intelligence (ESFI) offers a promising and ethically defensible strategy for eliminating extreme poverty. Drawing on evidence that national cognitive ability is a major driver of economic prosperity, I contend that enhancing intelligence through polygenic embryo selection could yield substantial and enduring gains that surpass the modest and often transient effects of traditional educational and nutritional interventions, while also being heritable and resilient to economic and political disruption. I further argue that advances in genomic (...) prediction, declining sequencing costs, and emerging reproductive technologies are making ESFI increasingly feasible and cost-effective. The article addresses several objections, including concerns about eugenics, social inequality, and stigmatization. Although these concerns have some force, I argue that they are ultimately outweighed by ESFI’s potential to break cycles of deprivation in the world’s most disadvantaged populations. The article concludes by outlining policy and technological developments necessary to support the responsible and widespread adoption of this approach, including legal reform, public subsidies, and the expansion of genomic databases. (shrink)

What are the ethical implications of our use of new methods and tools for reading and recoding our genetic information? What is the state of our knowledge of the human genome, including the connection between certain genes and diseases? What are some possible moral guidelines for fiddling around with the immense genetic archive within each of us? Do we - as individuals and as a species - have the right to do so? With Peter Keating and Rhoda Perozzi.

Neste artigo, originalmente escrito em 2019, abordamos o conceito de identidade pessoal, de Derek Parfit, por meio do experimento mental do teletransporte aplicado à edição genética de embriões com síndrome de Down. Parfit propõe que o teletransporte, no momento em que destrói o original e produz uma duplicata, não preserva a identidade numérica. Similarmente, sugerimos que a terapia gênica através da edição genética ao substituir o material deficiente de um embrião, geraria um novo indivíduo. Desse modo, elaboramos uma situação hipotética (...) para sustentar que essa intervenção romperia com a continuidade física e psicológica do indivíduo original, i.e., haveria duas pessoas, uma antes e outra após a “morte” da primeira. Em contrapartida, analisamos a ideia de que a edição genética não causaria danos ao indivíduo, pois os zigotos não possuem identidade numérica no início. A partir disso, discutimos as implicações éticas e morais. Concluímos favoravelmente à hipótese de descontinuidade pessoal em contextos análogos ao da terapia gênica em embriões com trissomia 21. (shrink)

Genetic enhancement technologies are rapidly evolving, but discussions about their use for human enhancement are largely abstract and removed from the socioeconomic environments in which they would be administered. While some scholars engage in discussions about the fairness of distributing genetic enhancements, I argue that the oppressive social structures in which genetic enhancements will be administered categorically undermine our capacities to autonomously value and pursue such technologies. I will draw on long-standing feminist debates around the oppressive and empowering uses of (...) cosmetic enhancements by women to argue that the oppressive nature of patriarchal beauty norms creates a social environment in which women are generally not free to autonomously evaluate their desires for and values of cosmetic enhancements. I then address the concern that declaring such a proposition is itself an unethical restriction on women’s autonomy and that cosmetic enhancements are generally, or presumptively, empowering. I conclude that, like cosmetic enhancements, genetic enhancements are morally harmful insofar as they are not categorically autonomously valued by people. (shrink)

Genome editing in human embryos could raise new ethical issues by changing future people's narrative and numerical identity. Most philosophers agree that some genetic modifications would have larger effects on identity than others, but they disagree on what criteria might explain these differences and have not supported their claims experimentally. We recruited 416 Americans through the crowdsourcing website Mechanical Turk. Participants were presented with 30 genetic modifications commonly discussed in bioethics and completed a questionnaire about how each modification might affect (...) future people's narrative identity and social treatment. Perceived effects of genome editing on narrative identity correlate moderately with effects on social treatment, suggesting a large role for social construction. The largest changes to identity were associated with changing biological sex, enhancing intelligence, adding abilities from other species and introducing or preventing deafness. The smallest changes to identity were from making people right‐handed, lowering the need for sleep, preventing dementia and changing eye or hair colour. Modifications of the same characteristic in opposite directions, such as making someone more or less aggressive, generally had significantly different effects on societal treatment but not on narrative identity. Specifying gender by describing the genetically modified person as a ‘son’ or ‘daughter’ did not have significant effects. These findings offer a new direction for research on genome editing and the identity of genetically modified people. (shrink)

In this article published in the site The Conversation Brasil, I develop my argument concerning Parfit’s Limit in the context of genetic editing, arguing that, in cases of fetuses with trisomy 21, the removal of a certain amount x of genetic material may lead to the elimination of the original person, thereby replacing them with a different one. Neste artigo publicado no site The Conversation Brasil, desenvolvo meu argumento sobre o Limite de Parfit no contexto da edição genética, sustentando que, (...) em casos de fetos com trissomia 21, a remoção de uma certa quantidade x de material genético pode levar à eliminação da pessoa original, substituindo-a por outra. (shrink)

For over fifty years, Stelarc has radically explored the fusion of human biology and technology through his provocative artistic practice. This paper draws on a 2024 interview with the artist and examines how his work challenges our fundamental assumptions about human identity and capability. Through analysis of his pioneering projects—from the iconic Third Hand to the Ear on Arm and his internet-enabled performances— we see how Stelarc’s art embodies emerging posthumanist and transhumanist philosophies. His artistic work addresses the idea that (...) humanity has moved beyond natural selection into an era where technological engineering drives our development. The research traces his artistic evolution from early body suspensions to recent explorations of distributed embodiment and AI integration, including insights from our 2024 conversation. By merging art, philosophy, and technological innovation, Stelarc creates not just theoretical frameworks but visceral demonstrations of possible human futures. His bold experiments spark crucial dialogue about consciousness, embodiment and identity in our world, which gets to become more and more technological // На протяжении половины столетия художник Стеларк проводит радикальные художественные эксперименты, разнообразными способами совмещая аспекты человеческой биологии с технологическими системами. Данная работа, в основе которой лежат материалы эксклюзивного интервью с художником, взятого в сентябре 2024 года, а также результаты анализа его творчества, представляет собой попытку систематизировать художественные практики Стеларка с точки зрения динамики определения человеческой идентичности и возможностей человека. Путем детального исследования его различных проектов и перформансов показывается, как работы Стеларка воплощают развитие постгуманистической и трансгуманистической философии. Радикальный взгляд художника направлен на то, что человечество уже вступило в постэволюционную фазу, в которой развитие человека обусловлено в большей степени технологическим проектированием, нежели естественным отбором. В рамках исследования сделан обзор художественного пути Стеларка, его творчество представлено в хронологическом порядке: от ранних перформансов с подвешиванием тела до современных роботизированных инсталляций, что позволило наглядно показать последовательность исследовательских проектов художника в части изучения разных аспектов интеграции человека и машины. При этом отдельное внимание уделяется недавним работам Стеларка, посвященным проблематике распределенной телесности и интеграции искусственного интеллекта в общественную жизнь и природу человека. В статье показано, что творчество Стеларка объединяет искусство, философию и технологические инновации беспрецедентным образом, в результате чего новые концепции сопровождаются осязаемой и нередко провокационной демонстрацией возможных перспектив «человеческого». Делается вывод, что посредством смелых перформансов и физических модификаций Стеларк вносит вклад в междисциплинарную дискуссию о сознании, телесности и идентичности человека в ми ре, становящемся все более технологизированным. (shrink)

In this chapter, three types of basic philosophical approaches to moral analyses are outlined to provide context and analytical tools for the subsequent analysis of and discussion about the arguments for or against human germline editing. According to the first approach, moral rightness is determined by the value of the consequences (value maximization). In the second approach, it is not only the consequences that determine the moral rightness of an action, but moral boundaries, principles, and norms that regulate what is (...) permissible or not (moral permissibility). The third approach is about the pursuit of ideals, which deals with arguments about the desirability of various futures and to what extent our actions prevent or enable such futures. The chapter argues that even though these approaches are typically associated with specific moral theories they can be understood as distinct modes of reasoning in their own right. The chapter argues that when it comes to addressing the ethics of new and potentially disruptive technologies it becomes more important to include also the kinds of moral considerations raised by third kind of approach. (shrink)

Is there something particularly morally problematic about human germline gene editing, to the extent that it would warrant another moral approach than weighing the pros against the cons, or asking whether it violates any moral principles or norms? In this chapter the ethical arguments discussed in the previous chapters is revisited via the perspective of risk. The relevant risks are divided into three different kinds—technical, social, and moral and metaphysical risks—and it is also discussed what the “most severe kind of (...) risks” would be. Are there things that we could not live with having permanently lost? If so, are any such losses that we could bring about through some practices of germline gene editing? What would that be and is it a realistic risk? (shrink)

Is there a moral line to be drawn at the human germline? For a long time, the dominant view on gene technology was that there is a moral line drawn at the human germline such that somatic gene editing as part of therapy is morally permissible, but heritable gene editing of early embryos or germline cells is not. The germline has been interchangeably referred to as a “boundary,” a “barrier,” and a “red line.” This previously dominant position has slowly weakened (...) over the past decade. Has the germline as a moral boundary lost its relevance? The aim of the book The Risks and Ethics of Human Gene Editing is to provide a philosophical guide to these arguments, both old and new. This first chapter introduces the book and its main research questions: Is there, after all, something particularly morally problematic about editing the human germline? Is there something unique about such germline editing, and, if so, does this suggest that we ought not to edit the human germline, or only in particular circumstances or for particular purposes? What would be a wise and responsible approach to editing the human germline from a moral perspective? (shrink)

The chapter explores the matter of a sufficiently cautious boundary and where that could be drawn based on the three distinctions from the second chapter and the various ethical considerations discussed throughout the book. It is argued that a sufficiently precautionary approach would need to take all three dimensions of risk into account: risk of harm, epistemic risk, and risk of making irreparable moral mistakes. Until these risks have been sufficiently addressed, human germline editing should be treated with great caution. (...) In conclusion, the germline could thus, for now, be regarded as a kind of locum tenens moral principle. (shrink)

The chapter takes a closer look at arguments for and against germline gene editing for human enhancement, including radical human enhancement. On the one hand, there are hopes of taking control of evolution, dreams of perfecting humankind and reaching a posthuman Utopia, and visions of saving humanity from natural disasters, while on the other hand, there are fears about jeopardizing the existence of humanity itself. Even though these arguments are indeed speculative, it is stressed in the chapter that they raise (...) some difficult questions about the kind of future we value, who we might want to be in that future, and who would and would not truly benefit from such interventions. (shrink)

This Open Access book is about the risks and the ethics of human germline gene editing, i.e., the possibility to make heritable changes to the DNA of early human embryos or germ cells. Is there something particularly morally problematic about editing the human germline? Is there something unique about germline editing, and, if so, does this suggest that we ought not to edit the human germline, or only in particular circumstances or for particular purposes? What would be a wise and (...) responsible approach to editing the human germline from a moral perspective? The book has three broad aims. First, to present an inclusive map over the current scholarly debate on the ethics of human germline gene editing. Second, to provide a philosophical and critical guide to the various ideas and arguments in this debate. Third, to apply an ethics of risk perspective and defend a morally cautious position on human germline gene editing. (shrink)

This chapter takes a closer look at so-called categorical objections to human germline gene editing. Categorical objections played an important part in some of the earlier debate and has informed some of the legal and regulatory frameworks on germline gene editing. The chapter explores different categorical objections as well as various objections to these. Are there convincing reasons to presume that germline gene editing interventions violates fundamental moral norms? The chapter explores different versions of such arguments based on deontological concepts (...) such as human dignity, individual and collective rights, autonomy, and informal consent. Could germline gene editing, if adopted on broad scale, lead to disastrous outcomes such as eugenics, injustice, and loss of values? Is there a risk for an unavoidable slippery slope? Or is there something inherently wrong in the use of this technology (such as “humans playing God”)? The chapter concludes that these kinds of objections fail to make a convincing case that it is categorically wrong to edit the human germline. They nevertheless highlight ethical concerns that need to be taken seriously. (shrink)

The chapter identifies and explores three distinct moral outlooks found in the gene editing debate with different implications on what the relevant moral questions and answers are with regard to germline gene editing. The Technical View equates ethical questions with questions about the direct risks of the intervention itself, that is if it is sufficiently safe and precise. The Democratic View stress that ethical questions are not only technical questions, but also pertain to values and must find solutions that all (...) affected parties can agree upon. Finally, the Moral View treats the ethical questions from a moral philosophy perspective. It takes safety and democratic legitimacy seriously but asks further questions: Does the technology promote what is genuinely good, or is there an aspect of it that violates fundamental moral norms or principles? (shrink)

This chapter explores various consequence-based arguments on the ethics of germline gene editing. First, the chapter distinguishes between descriptive and normative consequence arguments. Second, it takes a deep dive into arguments related to risks and safety, on the one hand, and into arguments related to prospective benefits, on the other. Both arguments for and against germline gene editing appeal to different kinds of consequence-arguments. The chapter highlight various questions raised by a focus on the potential consequences. This includes the question (...) of who the beneficiary of germline gene editing is, whether germline gene editing can be considered to be a therapeutic, and how germline gene editing compares to embryo selection. The chapter distinguishes between descriptive and normative consequence arguments and between weak and strong normative consequence arguments. A key take away is how different techno-optimists and techno-pessimists assess the expected outcomes of germline gene editing. (shrink)

The chapter gives a short background to the ethical debates surrounding the gene editing tool CRISPR. It discusses the early worries and alarm bells when the first studies came out that demonstrated that heritable germline editing on humans was realistically possible as well as the subsequent calls for ethics. Three key distinctions that has done a lot of moral boundary work in this debate are presented: between somatic and germline interventions; between research and clinical application; and between therapy and enhancement.

The chapter provides an overview over various ethical positions in relation to the ethical challenges associated to human genome editing: a categorical position against, a cautious intermediate position, and a more liberal position in favour of germline editing. While the first position advocates a ban on moral grounds, and the second argues for some kind of moratorium until scientific and other questions have been resolved, the third emphasizes the medical potential and the importance of taking advantage of scientific progress as (...) soon as it is sufficiently safe to do so. The chapter also presents the current broad lines of ethical consensus in the scientific community. (shrink)

The analysis of citation flow from a collection of scholarly articles might provide valuable insights into their thematic focus and the genealogy of their main concepts. In this study, we employ a topic model to delineate a subcorpus of 1,360 papers representative of bioethical discussions on enhancing human life. We subsequently conduct an analysis of almost 11,000 references cited in that subcorpus to examine quantitatively, from a bird’s-eye view, the degree of openness of this part of scholarship to the specialized (...) knowledge produced in biosciences. Although almost half of the analyzed references point to journals classified as Natural Science and Engineering (NSE), we do not find strong evidence of the intellectual influence of recent discoveries in biosciences on discussions on human enhancement. We conclude that a large part of the discourse surrounding human enhancement is inflected with “science-fictional habits of mind.” Our findings point to the need for a more science-informed approach in discussions on enhancing human life. (shrink)

When considering human settlements on the Moon, Mars and further afield, much attention is given to the travel times, food and radiation risk. We’ll undoubtedly face a harsh environment in deep space and some thinkers have been pointing to genome editing as a way to ensure that humans can tolerate the severe conditions as they venture further into the solar system.

Recently, Brummett and Crutchfield advanced two critiques of theists who object to moral enhancement. First, a conceptual critique: theists who oppose moral enhancement commonly do so because virtue is thought to be acquired only via a special kind of process. Enhancement does not involve such processes. Hence, enhancement cannot produce virtue. Yet theists also commonly claim that God is perfectly virtuous and not subject to processes. If virtue requires a process and God is perfectly virtuous without a process, however, then (...) theists contradict themselves. Second, a moral critique: theists who reject moral enhancement are selfish, because accepting moral enhancement would (allegedly) reduce widespread suffering. Theists often condemn selfishness, however. By condemning selfishness and (simultaneously) rejecting enhancement, therefore, theists contradict themselves yet again. We argue that both critiques fail. Both substantially misrepresent their target. First, Brummett and Crutchfield confuse metaphysical enhancement (attempts to alter human nature) with moral enhancement (attempts to become better human beings). Authors that Brummett and Crutchfield cite object to the former, not the latter. Second, both conceptual and moral critiques overlook the many resources within theistic traditions that can quickly resolve relevant (alleged) contradictions. The conceptual critique, for example, misrepresents both common views held among theists (regarding God's virtue) and the ways in which virtue may be acquired. Similarly, the moral critique mischaracterizes the relationship commonly posited by theists between enhancement and agency. By attending to what theists actually claim—rather than relying on caricatures—it becomes clear that each of Brummett and Crutchfield's critiques fail. (shrink)

The use of genome embryo editing tools in reproduction is often touted as a way to ensure the birth of healthy and genetically related children. Many would agree that this is a worthy goal. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, if we are concerned with justice, accepting such goal as morally appropriate commits one to rejecting the development of embryo editing for reproductive purposes. This is so because safer and more effective means exist that can allow many (...) more prospective parents to achieve the same valued goal and that offer additional benefits. (shrink)

Purpose/Background. The present research focuses on the debate on transhumanism/bioconservatism from the perspective of empirical bioethics, that is, making use of em-pirical evidence in the process of moral reasoning. Its objective is to propose a metho-dological guide for the approach and resolution of moral problems concerning human enhancement. Methodology/Approach. The method Step-wise Ethical Human Enhancemet (SWEH) is proposed. It is a guide consisting of 11 questions that are the result of the adaptation of the guidelines for identifying a human enhancement (...) procedure as ethical developed by Julian Savulescu to the method of Step-wise Empirical Contributions elaborated by Pascal Borry. An applicative example on the morality of biohacking RFID implants is provided. Results/Findings. SWEH proposes that human enhancement procedures might be approached as specific problems and that the identified moral norm might be rewritten as a descriptive proposition that serves as a hypothesis that will be evaluated in the light of empirical evidence. The evaluation of the proposition, and thus of moral reasoning, will be done with the help of the information gathered by the 11 questions. Discussion/Conclusions/Contributions. SWEH can serve to provide a first answer on the morality of a specific human enhancement procedure, but not an absolute one, as the result may vary depending on the information obtained in the future. It also highli-ghts gaps in empirical research related to the procedure it addresses. The method is a first methodological guide that could be revised and improved. (shrink)

Recent developments in genomic technology, especially those enabling gene editing, promise to put an end to hitherto intractable medical problems and to usher us into the age of personalized medicine. These technologies, however, raise a number of serious ethical challenges. Given the global impact of this technology, recent international regulations emphasize the need for intercultural dialogue on these ethical issues. This paper concentrates on Islamic perspectives on human genetic modification. It examines Islamic juristic discourses on the issue of genetic modification (...) and highlights the different layers within these discourses. The paper identifies the main positions regarding human genetic modification along with the underlying arguments for each of them. In general, these positions are articulated in light of the nature as well as the intended objectives of the different procedures. The paper devotes special attention to the treatment-enhancement distinction and argues that within Islamic discourses this distinction is quite nuanced. The paper points out important substantive and methodological gaps and emphasizes the evolving nature of Islamic discourses on this issue. (shrink)

Is it possible, ethically speaking, to create posthuman and transhuman persons from a religious perspective? Who is responsible for post and transhuman creation? Can post and transhuman persons be morally accountable? Addressing such pressing ethical questions around post and transhuman creation, this volume considers the philosophical and theological arguments that define and stimulate contemporary debate. Contributors consider the full implications of creating post and transhuman beings by highlighting the role of new technologies in shaping new forms of consciousness, as well (...) as the role the generators of post and transhuman beings play in such creation. They ask, what the relative power of such generators is, both in terms of society and in terms of their relationship to their creations. Appreciating how the lived realities of such beings will be constructed and legitimised in contemporary society adds further breadth to the wide-ranging consequences of post and transhuman creation explored. The collection's interdisciplinary approach traverses the philosophical writings of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, alongside theological considerations from the Christian, Islamic and Jewish traditions, inviting academics, faith leaders, policy makers, and practitioners to think through the ethical gamut of generating post and transhuman beings. (shrink)

Deriving ethical conclusions from arguments that rely heavily on metaphysical foundations, as Parfit (1984) does in generating his Nonidentity Problem, is an approach fraught with problems. Sparrow...

In this commentary paper, we are taking one step further in questioning the central assumptions in the bioethical debates about reproductive technologies. We argue that the very distinction between “person affecting” and “identity affecting” interventions is based on a questionable form of material-origin essentialism. Questioning of this form of essentialist approach to human identity allows treating genome editing and genetic selection as more similar than they are taken to be in the standard approaches. It would also challenge the idea that (...) normative reasons we have in these two types of cases markedly differ in strength. (shrink)

This article responds to several liberal bioethicists’ criticisms of Jürgen Habermas’s The Future of Human Nature by placing it in the context of his intellectual influences and career-spanning theorization of communicative rationality. In particular, I argue that Habermas’s critics have not grasped his interpretation of Hannah Arendt’s concept of natality. Far from merely ventriloquizing his friend and teacher, Habermas distinguishes his construal of that concept from Arendt’s, which he presents as a naturalistic foil to his concerns about the potential ethical (...) impact of preimplantation genetic interventions. Whereas, according to Habermas, Arendt reasons directly from the biological fact of birth to the capacity for political action, he himself construes natality as implying a “divide between nature and culture” at the level of the “lifeworld.” Identifying Habermas’s interpretation of Arendt in this way explains why Habermas claims not to be a biological determinist and why the bioethicists’ criticism, according to which he is, fails. (shrink)

Although legal personality has slowly begun to be granted to non-human entities that have a direct impact on the natural functioning of human societies (given their cultural significance), the same cannot be said for computer-based intelligence systems. While this notion has not had a significantly negative impact on humanity to this point in time that only remains the case because advanced computerised intelligence systems (ACIS) have not been acknowledged as reaching human-like levels. With the integration of ACIS in medical assistive (...) technologies such as companion robots and bionics, our legal treatment of ACIS must also adapt—least society faces legal challenges that may potentially lead to legally sanctioned discriminatory treatment. For this reason, this article exposes the complexity of normalizing definitions of “natural” human subjects, clarifies how current bioethical discourse has been unable to effectively guide ACIS integration into implanted and external artefacts, and argues for the establishment of legal delineations between various ACIS-human mergers in reference to legal protections and obligations internationally. (shrink)

Since its advent in the 20th century, informed consent has become a cornerstone of ethical healthcare, and obtaining it a core obligation in medical contexts. In my dissertation, I aim to examine the theoretical underpinnings of informed consent and identify what values it is taken to protect. I will suggest that the fundamental motivation behind informed consent rests in something I’ll call bodily self-sovereignty, which I argue involves a coupling of two groups of values: autonomy and non-domination on the one (...) hand, and self-ownership and personal integrity on the other. I will then go on to consider two 'case studies' I take to shed light on what is at stake in securing informed consent - consent in psychiatrically ill populations, and consent to interventions that involve the modification of the genetic germline. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 5, Page 556-568, June 2022.

Anticipatory policy for gene editing requires assessing public opinion about this new technology. Although previous surveys have examined respondents’ views on the moral acceptability of various hypothetical uses of CRISPR, they have not considered whether these scenarios are perceived as plausible. Research in construal level theory indicates that participants make different moral judgments about scenarios seen as likely or near and those seen as unlikely or distant. Therefore, we surveyed a representative sample of 400 Americans and Canadians about both the (...) likelihood and the permissibility of 23 commonly discussed uses of gene editing. Respondents with more knowledge of gene editing generally thought these applications would be more likely within the next 20 years. There was a strong positive relationship between the perceived likelihood and permissibility of most CRISPR applications. Our results suggest that ongoing public engagement efforts for gene editing could be improved by taking its perceived time-frames into account. (shrink)

In a study drawing from both evolutionary biology and the social sciences, evidence and argument is assembled in support of the comprehensive appli- cation of selfish gene theory to the human population. With a focus on genes giving rise to characteristically-human cooperation (“cooperative genes”) in- volving language and theory of mind, one may situate a whole range of pat- terned behaviour—including celibacy and even slavery—otherwise seeming to present insuperable difficulties. Crucially, the behaviour which tends to propa- gate the cooperative genes (...) may be “at cost” to the genes of some who may be party to the cooperation itself. Explanatory insights are provided by Trivers’ parent-offspring conflict theory, Lack’s principle, and Hamilton’s kin selec- tion mechanism. A primary observation is that cooperation using language and theory of mind is itself interdependent with full human conceptualization of a world of objects and of themselves as embodied beings. Human capaci- ties inhering in, or arising out of, the ability to cooperate are also responsible for a vitally important long-term process, the domestication of animals and p- lants. The approach illuminates the difference between animal and human sexual behaviour, and the emergence of kinship systems. Again, recent pat- terns of population growth become much more explicable. It is argued that the gene is the single controlling replicator; the notion of the meme as a sec- ond independent replicator is flawed. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

Humanity's toolkit for altering the world we live in now includes CRISPR. Through an evolutionary process, bacteria acquired a way to protect themselves from an invading virus, making their immediate future more secure. In human hands, this powerful genome‐editing tool offers the potential to impact, at a breathtaking rate, not only our own evolutionary future, but the future of other life on this planet. Ethical concerns about altering genomes are not new, but the birth of two CRISPR gene‐edited babies last (...) year created a renewed urgency around navigating the future and the lack of an agreed‐upon map to guide us is distressing. The goal of this article is not to provide that map but to suggest two essential questions, drawn from the context of events surrounding CRISPR to date, that should guide its drafting—“Who do we trust?” and “When is it time to act?”—and to consider what Unitarian Universalism might contribute to answering those questions. (shrink)

Review of Francoise Baylis, Altered Inheritance: CRISPR and the Ethics of Human Genome Editing (2019).

For most theologians, theology should ultimately be used by the laity and/or the public. However, the religion and science debate has not focused on the divide between theologians and the laity. In this case study I examine the debate among theologians about human enhancement. I focus on the extent to which the structure of the debate in a “mediating organization” between the theologians and the public coincides with the structure of the debate among the theologians. I conduct a survey of (...) participants in the organization, and find that the basic divides among the theologians are largely replicated. These results, when combined with studies of the theologians themselves and the laity, provide a more holistic understanding of the future debate about human enhancement. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that reproductive genetic manipulation technologies like mitochondrial replacement and germline CRISPR modifications cannot be said to save anyone’s life because, counterfactually, no one would suffer more or die sooner absent the intervention. The present article argues that, on the contrary, reproductive genetic manipulations may be life-saving (and, from this, have therapeutic value) under an appropriate population health perspective. As such, popular reports of reproductive genetic manipulations potentially saving lives or preventing disease are not necessarily mistaken, (...) though such terminology still requires further empirical validation. (shrink)

Questa è un'eccellente revisione delle interazioni gene/ambiente sul comportamento e, nonostante sia un po' datata, è una lettura facile e utile. Iniziano con studi gemelli che mostrano l'impatto travolgente della genetica sul comportamento. Notano gli studi sempre più noti di Judith Harris che estendono e riassumono i fatti che l'ambiente domestico condiviso non ha quasi alcun effetto sul comportamento e che i bambini adottati crescono fino ad essere diversi dai loro fratellastri e sorelle come le persone scelte a caso. Un (...) punto fondamentale che loro (e quasi tutti coloro che discutono di genetica comportamentale) non riescono a notare è che le centinaia (migliaia a seconda del tuo punto di vista) degli universali comportamentali umani, comprese tutte le basi delle nostre personalità, sono determinate al 100% dai nostri geni, senza variazioni nella normalità. Tutti vedono un albero come un albero e non come una pietra, cercano e mangiano cibo, si arrabbiano e geloso ecc. Quindi, quello di cui stanno parlando per lo più qui è quanto ambiente (cultura) può influenzare il grado in cui vengono mostrati i vari tratti, piuttosto che il loro aspetto. Infine, discutono di eugenetica nel solito modo politicamente corretto, non riuscendo a notare che noi e tutti gli organismi siamo i prodotti dell'eugenetica della natura e che i tentativi di sconfiggere la selezione naturale con la medicina, l'agricoltura e la civiltà nel suo complesso sono disastrosi per qualsiasi società che persiste nel farlo. Fino al 50% di tutte le concezioni, o circa 100 milioni/anno, finiscono in un aborto spontaneo precoce, quasi tutti senza che la madre ne sia a conoscenza. Questo abbattimento naturale dei geni difettosi guida l'evoluzione, ci mantiene relativamente geneticamente sani e rende possibile la società. La disgenica è sufficiente a distruggere la civiltà, ma la sovrappopolazione sarà doprima. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019). (shrink)

Dies ist eine ausgezeichnete Überprüfung der Gen-/Umgebungsinteraktionen auf das Verhalten und ist, obwohl sie etwas veraltet ist, eine einfache und lohnende Lektüre. Sie beginnen mit Zwillingsstudien, die den überwältigenden Einfluss der Genetik auf das Verhalten zeigen. Sie stellen die immer bekannter werdenden Studien von Judith Harris fest, die die Fakten erweitern und zusammenfassen, dass die gemeinsame häusliche Umgebung fast keinen Einfluss auf das Verhalten hat und dass adoptierte Kinder so anders wachsen als ihre Stiefbrüder und -schwestern wie zufällig ausgewählte Menschen. (...) Ein grundlegender Punkt, den sie (und fast alle, die über Verhaltensgenetik diskutieren) nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen, ist, dass die Hunderte (Tausende je nach Standpunkt) menschlicher Verhaltensuniversalen, einschließlich aller Grundlagen unserer Persönlichkeiten, zu 100% von unseren Genen bestimmt werden, ohne Variation in normalen Werten. Jeder sieht einen Baum als Baum und nicht als Stein, sucht und isst Nahrung, wird wütend und eifersüchtig usw. Worüber sie hier also meistens sprechen, ist, wie viel Umwelt (Kultur) das Ausmaß beeinflussen kann, in dem verschiedene Merkmale gezeigt werden, und nicht ihr Aussehen. Schließlich diskutieren sie die Eugenik in der üblichen politisch korrekten Weise, ohne festzustellen, dass wir und alle Organismen die Produkte der Eugenik der Natur sind und dass Versuche, die natürliche Selektion mit Medizin, Landwirtschaft und Zivilisation als Ganzes zu besiegen, für jede Gesellschaft, die dies weiterhin tut,katastrophalsind. Bis zu 50 % aller Empfängnisse oder etwa 100 Millionen pro Jahr enden in einer frühen spontanen Abtreibung, fast alle ohne Dassmund die Mutter. Diese natürliche Keulung defekter Gene treibt die Evolution an, hält uns relativ genetisch gesund und macht die Gesellschaft möglich. Dysgenös ist ausreichend, um die Zivilisation zu zerstören, aber Überbevölkerung wirdd o eszuerst. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

This open peer commentary critiques Cwik's approach to categorizing germline gene editing interventions. The authors argue that Cwik's framework, which prioritizes technical categories and dimensions to map the "ethical terrain," is fundamentally flawed by putting the technical aspects before ethical considerations. They identify four key problems with his approach: it is arbitrary in its categorizations, relies on dynamic membership that changes with scientific knowledge, requires extensive technical expertise that many bioethicists lack, and most importantly, approaches the analysis "back-to-front" by starting (...) with technical rather than ethical distinctions. The authors argue that ethical assessment should begin with examining the goals and justifications of an intervention, rather than its technical specifications. They use the example of mitochondrial replacement therapy to illustrate how classification should proceed from ethical considerations to technical ones, not vice versa. The commentary concludes that while Cwik offers a complex framework, it is both incorrectly structured and impractical to use consistently. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present the empirical version of the slippery slope argument (SSA) in the field of genome editing. According to the SSA, if we adopt germline manipulation of embryos we will eventually end up performing or allowing something morally reprehensible, such as new coercive eugenics. I will investigate the actual possibility of sliding towards eugenics: thus, I will examine enhancement and eugenics both in the classical and liberal versions, through the lens of SSA. In the first part, (...) I will discuss the classical eugenics from a historical perspective and conclude that classical eugenics is morally deplorable; but by currently accepting genome editing I argue that it is not possible to ‘slip’ into classical eugenics. Then, I will analyze liberal eugenics: I will consider Habermas’ and Sandel’s objections to liberal eugenics and genetic human enhancement. Subsequently, I will reply to these arguments affirming that, although it is not possible to refuse any form of genetic enhancement, liberal eugenics would not consider the principles of justice, non-maleficence, and non-instrumentalization; hence, it should be considered not morally acceptable. In addition, I will support the thesis according to which the possibility of relapsing into liberal eugenics is more likely than relapsing into classical eugenics. Then, I will present a strategy that, while avoiding falling into the undesirable scenarios related to SSA, still accepts some application of germline genome editing of embryos and gametes. In such a way, I will show that even if we accept the plausibility of a certain slip into an undesirable scenario, SSA does not offer conclusive reasons to forbid any use of germline genome editing technique in both therapeutic and enhancement fields. (shrink)

The article by Conrad et al. (AJOB Neuroscience, 2019, 10:1) does not take into account another, still hypothetical, procedure for cognitive enhancement (CE) which would be appropriate to consider in the surveys, i.e. the possibility to genetically enhance the cognitive abilities of a future individual using genome editing techniques. In this case, the conclusions of the article in the context of the “self-others difference” and “safety/naturalness” would be questioned. In fact, the results of the hypothetical surveys with the variant “genome (...) editing” could be significantly different from those obtained in the survey proposed by the authors: an individual would decide not for himself, but for the CE in a future child. In light of these considerations, we hold that the article highlights just the attitudes toward the principle of autonomy and redistributive justice; however, by introducing the new hypothetical scenario of CE with genome editing the attitudes toward the principles of beneficence and non-instrumentalisation could also be appreciated. Special attention to future generations is necessary to inform potential CE public policy, though using genome editing to enhance cognition abilities is just a future hypothetical perspective. (shrink)