Moral Uncertainty

Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...) brand of non-cognitivism that has even a chance of solving the Frege–Geach Problem and some related problems involving probabilistic consistency can also thereby solve Smith’s problem. Because only versions of non-cognitivism that can solve the Frege–Geach Problem are otherwise plausible, all otherwise plausible versions of noncognitivism can meet Smith’s challenge. (shrink)

Chapter 5 of Principia Ethica considers how we should act and what general moral rules are justifiable given the considerable uncertainty we face regarding the consequences of our actions. This account has some decidedly conservative elements and has been read as simply upholding conventional morality. Moore argues that no proposed general rule that is not currently observed is likely to be capable of being shown to be justified, and that in many cases even a bad rule that is generally followed (...) should continue be followed by individuals. For all other moral actions not linked to these rules, individuals should act on act-consequentialist grounds. However, even here Moore urges individuals to act egoistically. Moore’s system presents a problem for a progressive who thinks a new moral rule should be instituted in society and who believe this moral rule is justifiable. I show that, contra Moore, such a justification is, in fact, possible, using a moral rule of veganism as paradigmatic example. I show also that individuals can justify acting on this rule in the absence of it being generally followed and reflect on whether protest action, another kind of action for which there is no general rule, can be justified. I conclude that protest can be justified, but that our level of confidence in this justification may not match the convictions generally considered required for effective protest. (shrink)

An animal’s life is net-positive, or worth living, if the positive elements in its life outweigh the negatives. First, I argue that questions about net-welfare in animals are coherent and ethically important, the latter because they are crucial for assessing decisions which might affect how many animals will come to exist. Then, I draw on axiological theories that give more weight to negatives than to positives to support the view that, given high uncertainty about net-welfare and with respect to many (...) non-human animals, it is likely bad that they come into existence. Finally, I provide an evolutionary argument supporting the view that many animals have net-positive lives because positive mood may be a genetic adaptation. The upshot is that, currently and with respect to most animals, we cannot tell whether it is, in expectation, good if they come into existence. Instead, further empirical and axiological research is necessary. (shrink)

Some of the most influential moral philosophers in the English-speaking world say or suggest that we should only pay attention to moral judgments made in certain states of mind, where these states exclude anxious states. In this paper, I argue that this position faces at least two major problems.

Everyone agrees, I think, that there is something fishy about moral deference and expertise, but that's where consensus ends. This paper has two aims – the first is to mount a defense of moral deference, and the second is to offer a (non-debunking) diagnosis of its fishiness. I defend moral deference by connecting the discussion of moral deference to the recent discussion of the appropriate response to uncertainty. It is, I argue, morally obligatory to minimize the risk of one's wrongdoing (...) (at least when all other things are held equal), and this moral requirement entails that deferring to a moral expert is sometimes not just morally permissible but also admirable, and indeed morally required. If moral deference is often justified, why is it fishy? I offer an explanation in terms of the emotions moral judgments are often related to, and their nature (roughly speaking) as directed at the good or bad, right or wrong, de re rather than de dicto. The combination of this vindication of moral deference and diagnosis of its fishiness nicely accommodates, I argue, some related phenomena, like the (neglected) fact that our uneasiness with moral deference is actually a particular instance of uneasiness with opaque evidence in general when it comes to morality, and the (familiar) fact that the scope of this uneasiness is wider than the moral as it includes other normative domains. (shrink)

What action-guiding judgments should we rely on in cases of moral uncertainty, when we divide our credence among competing moral views and assign credences between 0 and 1 to propositions such as “action x is better than action y”? We show that the problem of “moral uncertainty resolution” can be viewed as a “belief binarization” problem: how to arrive at all-out (“accept/reject”) judgments on some propositions based on our credences in them. Looking at moral uncertainty through this lens yields a (...) diagnostically useful impossibility result, which identifies a tradeoff between four initially plausible conditions on a moral uncertainty resolution rule. (shrink)

What would it take for AI systems to have moral standing, and what kind of obligations might fall on us as a result? This paper summarizes contemporary debates related to these questions. Topics include: how different theories of the basis of moral standing might apply to AI systems; what kind of moral importance our treatment of AI systems might have if they have any moral standing at all; possible tensions between respecting the moral status of future AI systems and the (...) goal of achieving AI alignment; economic and political rights; the significance of empirical and moral uncertainty; and what practical measures, if any, should be implemented now to address the possibility that AI systems exhibiting morally significant mental states might appear within the not-too-distant future – assuming they are not already here. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you're uncertain about basic normative principles (e.g., Kantianism vs. utilitarianism)? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order" norm: e.g., "comply with the first-order norm you regard as most probable" or "maximize expected choiceworthiness". But what if you're uncertain about second-order norms too -- must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, it seems that any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty is doomed to a vicious regress. In this paper, I aim (...) to rescue second-order norms from this threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the suggestion some philosophers have entertained that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on agents regardless of their beliefs or evidence concerning that norm. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order (e.g., moral) norms, thus closing off any question of what an agent should do in light of her normative beliefs. Rather, it is more plausible to ascribe external force to a single, second-order rational norm: the enkratic principle, correctly formulated. This modest form of externalism, I argue, is both intrinsically well-motivated and sufficient to head off the threat of regress. (shrink)

While the foundations of climate science and ethics are well established, fine-grained climate predictions, as well as policy-decisions, are beset with uncertainties. This chapter maps climate uncertainties and classifies them as to their ground, extent and location. A typology of uncertainty is presented, centered along the axes of scientific and moral uncertainty. This typology is illustrated with paradigmatic examples of uncertainty in climate science, climate ethics and climate economics. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the IPCC’s preferred way of representing uncertainties and (...) evaluates its strengths and weaknesses from a risk management perspective. Three general strategies for decision-makers to cope with climate uncertainty are outlined, the usefulness of which largely depends on whether or not decision-makers find themselves in a context of deep uncertainty. The chapter concludes by offering two recommendations to ease the work of policymakers, faced with the various uncertainties engrained in climate discourse. (shrink)

Often, we’re unsure what morality requires, and a debate has emerged about whether our moral uncertainty and beliefs about morality matter to what we should do. I argue that (1) our moral-epistemic circumstances (our beliefs, credences, and evidence about moral norms) matter to what we morally ought to do; (2) many objections to this view are only problems if we assume all moral norms are sensitive to our moral-epistemic circumstances; and finally, (3) we should avoid this with an account that (...) incorporates procedural norms that are sensitive to our moral-epistemic circumstances (analogous to legal due process norms) and substantive norms that are not sensitive to them (analogous to norms of substantive justice). (shrink)

It is hard to deny that that we possess any moral knowledge, and yet it is even harder to explain where this moral knowledge comes from. We know, for instance, that the Holocaust was profoundly immoral, but how do we know this? Many philosophers explain moral knowledge in the same way as perceptual knowledge. On the perceptual model, we acquire moral knowledge without inference based on experiences that represent moral facts. In Deductive Moral Knowledge, Declan Smithies challenges that perceptual model (...) and replaces it with a deductive model, according to which our most basic moral knowledge is based on deductive inference. -/- Smithies argues against Hume's Law, which states that you can never deduce an “ought” from an 'is”. In its place, he defends “the anti-Humean thesis” that we can know moral facts by deducing them from the non-moral facts on which they depend. We can know the moral conclusion that the Holocaust was wrong, for example, by deducing it from the known non-moral premise that it was genocide. -/- The anti-Humean thesis has wide-ranging implications for moral epistemology. It undermines regress arguments for moral skepticism without relying on special moral faculties such as moral perception, intuition or emotion. It supplies a new form of moral rationalism that explains how we can acquire a priori moral knowledge by deducing moral principles from non-moral assumptions in suppositional reasoning. It explains why no one can be justified in holding or acting upon morally repugnant beliefs, such as the belief that genocide is permissible. In addition, it resolves puzzles about the epistemology of moral disagreement, moral testimony, and moral uncertainty. -/- Deductive Moral Knowledge uses recent innovations in general epistemology to illuminate contemporary debates in moral epistemology. In doing so, it advances our understanding of deductive knowledge and a priori knowledge in general, as well as moral knowledge. (shrink)

Moral understanding has typically been defined as grasping the explanation, q, for some proposition, p, where p states that some action is morally right (or wrong). This article deals with an underdiscussed point within the literature on moral understanding: the degree of moral understanding one has deepens with the more moral reasons that one grasps, whereby these reasons not only consist of those that speak in favor of an action’s moral permissibility but also those speaking against. I argue for a (...) surprising and important implication of this: having a deep degree of moral understanding can make it harder to carry out the right action. Furthermore, I propose that we should think of our pursuit of moral understanding in an analogous way as to how some have thought of scientific understanding: There may be good reasons to fail to appreciate all of the actual moral reasons that in fact exist; sometimes we should seek a surfaced-level moral understanding instead of something deeper. Just as idealizations used within science – which can involve deviations from the truth – can help us achieve scientific understanding, so too we might restrict the moral reasons that we seek to grasp in pursuit of moral understanding. (shrink)

Is abortion homicide, the morally unjust killing of a person? Should it be illegal? There is widespread disagreement. However, there is a way through the impasse. It is not necessary to establish whether abortion is homicide, only whether it substantially risks homicide. If abortion presents this risk of harm, then lawmakers have a powerful reason to criminalize it. This paper defends The Prevention Argument: if abortion substantially risks committing homicide after 10 weeks’ gestation, then lawmakers should criminalize such abortions to (...) prevent the foreseeable harm of mass homicide. Why 10 weeks? Because it is plausible that abortions after 10 weeks endanger an innocent person’s life and, if so, the harm preventive case for criminalizing them is strong. This argument deserves a hearing because it has a modest burden of proof and relies on accepted normative principles like the harm principle. It could also be extended to earlier abortions. (shrink)

A full answer to the problem of how to treat human brain organoids (HBOs) and other liminally conscious beings requires (at least) book-length analysis, but a significant part of the problem is disagreement not just about which moral principles apply to such beings, but which beings count as “conscious” at all. Van Gyseghem, Kierickx, and Barnhart (2025) survey the scientific, ethical, and philosophical literature surrounding HBOs and find an utter lack of consensus regarding which theory of consciousness is best, or (...) even adequate; consequently, many different theories of consciousness feature in the surveyed papers. They propose we move beyond consciousness as the subject of ethical analysis; I agree. I propose a framework for first-line ethical analysis with the more tractable subject of sentience. I provide four brief arguments for this framework: parsimony, ecumenism, conservativism, and the treatment of permissive theories of consciousness such as Integrated Information Theory. (shrink)

Moral latitude is only ever a matter of coincidence on the most popular decision procedure in the literature on moral uncertainty. In all possible choice situations other than those in which two or more options happen to be tied for maximal expected choiceworthiness, Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness implies that only one possible option is uniquely appropriate. A better theory of appropriateness would be more sensitive to the decision maker’s credence in theories that endorse agent-centred prerogatives. In this paper, we will develop (...) and defend a modified version of this view that allows for agent-centred prerogatives and supererogation as part of its verdicts about appropriateness. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a growing number of philosophers come to defend normative nihilism. Even if their arguments do not induce in many a belief in normative nihilism, there may be grounds on which to be less than certain about the falsity of normative nihilism. How, then, can we accommodate the possibility of normative nihilism when deliberating about what to do? In this article, I defend two theses. First, I distinguish between normative questions and deliberative questions and argue that the (...) question “what am I to do under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism?” is best understood as an example of the latter. Second, I propose a novel framework for deliberation under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism: maximize expected decision-relevance. A striking upshot of this article is that there is an important sense in which we need make no mistake by flouting normative considerations under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism. (shrink)

Contractualism and rule consequentialism both hold that whether a moral principle is true depends on what would happen if it were generally adopted as a basis for conduct. This paper argues that theories with this feature face a profound epistemic problem. The question of what would happen if different moral principles were generally adopted is a complex empirical question, comparable in difficulty to the question of what would happen if a nation adopted different laws, or if humanity had evolved different (...) traits. Reflection on the epistemic demands of this question shows that we have no clue what would happen if different moral principles were generally adopted, and thus no clue what moral principles contractualism and rule consequentialism endorse. The only way to avoid cluelessness is to test principles on groups small enough to be epistemically tractable, which requires accepting an implausibly extreme form of moral relativism. I conclude that we must reject contractualism, rule consequentialism, and any other moral theory that entails that the truth of a moral principle depends on what would happen if it were generally adopted. (shrink)

We might create artificial systems which can suffer. Since AI suffering might potentially be astronomical, the moral stakes are huge. Thus, we need an approach which tells us what to do about the risk of AI suffering. I argue that such an approach should ideally satisfy four desiderata: beneficence, action-guidance, feasibility and consistency with our epistemic situation. Scientific approaches to AI suffering risk hold that we can improve our scientific understanding of AI, and AI suffering in particular, to decrease AI (...) suffering risks. However, such approaches tend to conflict with either the desideratum of consistency with our epistemic situation or with feasibility. Thus, we also need an explicitly ethical approach to AI suffering risk. Such an approach tells us what to do in the light of profound scientific uncertainty about AI suffering. After discussing multiple views, I express support for a hybrid approach. This approach is partly based on the maximization of expected value and partly on a deliberative approach to decision-making. (shrink)

As well as disagreeing about how much one should donate to charity, moral theories also disagree about where one should donate. In light of this disagreement, how should the morally uncertain philanthropist allocate her donations? In many cases, one intuitively attractive option is for the philanthropist to split her donations across all of the charities that are recommended by moral views in which she has positive credence, with each charity’s share being proportional to her credence in the moral theories that (...) recommend that particular charity. Despite the fact that something like this approach is already being used by real-world philanthropists to distribute billions of dollars of donations, it is not supported by any of the approaches to moral uncertainty that have been proposed thus-far in the philosophical literature. In this paper, we will develop a bargaining-based approach to moral uncertainty that honors the proportionality intuition in favor of splitting one’s donations. We also show how this bargaining-based approach has several further advantages over the best alternative proposals. (shrink)

Many philosophers have recently defended the Maximise Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) approach to moral uncertainty. Perhaps the most important problem for MEC is the problem of intertheoretic choiceworthiness unit comparisons; and one extant response to this problem is a technique called ‘variance normalization.’ Although there has been some short, scattered commentary on variance normalization in the philosophical literature, nobody has yet offered a detailed critical discussion of this proposal. This paper fills that lacuna, arguing that there are serious problems which would (...) need to be addressed before variance normalization could be invoked to rescue MEC from scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend a new criterion for appropriate choice under conditions of moral uncertainty. According to this new criterion, it is appropriate to follow some moral theory T under conditions of moral uncertainty iff T maximises expected truthlikeness. This approach to moral uncertainty has several important advantages: (1) it does not require any intertheoretic choiceworthiness comparisons; (2) it respects agent-centred prerogatives and supererogation; (3) it does not suffer from any ‘individuation problems’; and (4) it has a (...) prima facie plausible motivating idea. (shrink)

This paper presents a unifying diagnosis of a number of important problems facing existing models of rational choice under moral uncertainty and proposes a remedy. I argue that the problems of (i) severely limited scope, (ii) intertheoretic comparisons, and (iii) 'swamping’ all stem from the way in which values are assigned to options in decision rules such as Maximisation of Expected Choiceworthiness. By assigning values to options under a given moral theory by asking something like “how much do I desire (...) this option, supposing this theory is true?” rather than “how much value does this theory assign to this option?” these problems can be avoided, while the appealing features of these accounts can be preserved. This amendment provides a role for the preferences, desires, or goals of rational agents that is curiously absent from the existing discussion of what individuals rationally ought to do when they are uncertain about what they morally ought to do. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths. We consider an argument for ‘normative hedging’ based on this principle, and examine the structure of decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent with the principle that learning empirical truths is instrumentally valuable. Along the way, we develop a unified framework for modeling normative and empirical uncertainty, and we conclude with a (...) brief comment on ‘metanormative regress’. (shrink)

Calculus is seen as describing continuous functions through the act of breaking them down to the smallest possible parts, suggesting that the whole is only an aggregation of its parts. But modern science has demanded the creation of new kinds of measurements, where the deterministic rules of classical physics cease to exist and we can no longer see the individual member parts as sole explanations towards the continuity of the whole. There is a duality between states of dis/continuous being, and (...) we seem to be doomed to only see the measured discontinuous version grounded in our own objectivity. But can the knowledge of this duality maybe help us better understand the social consequences of our world’s massively intraconnected social order? With the infrastructure of modern trade, seemingly instant communication possibilities, and newly created tribes numbering beyond what we thought possible; we have created a world that seem to defy our preconceptions of what social groups and responsibility means. Using agential realism and its groundbreaking insights into quantum philosophy with the idea of complementarity, I think we can start to understand these new states of being, and with it bring about a better grasp of the ethics that are an intrinsic part of all. Setting a foundation for how we can understand the duality of groups and individuals across all areas of our world, seeing complementarity as the grounding state of un/certain objectivity. (shrink)

Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payoff options. Proponents of MEC have offered two main lines of response. The first is that MEC should simply import whatever are the best solutions (...) to fanaticism on offer in decision theory. The second is to propose statistical normalization as a novel solution on behalf of MEC. This paper argues that the first response is open to serious doubt and that the second response fails. As a result, MEC appears significantly less plausible when compared to competing accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty, which are not fanatical. (shrink)

When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (a more (...) than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that descriptive uncertainty is relevant to what we subjectively ought to do. This leads to a further question: is what we subjectively ought to do sensitive to our moral uncertainty as well? Includers say yes—what we subjectively ought to do is sensitive to both descriptive uncertainty and moral uncertainty. Excluders say no—only descriptive uncertainty matters to what we subjectively ought to do (i.e., moral uncertainty is irrelevant). Excluders argue that common motivations for the subjective ought only give (...) us reason to think that descriptive uncertainty matters. This paper focuses on one motivation: accessibility. Excluders argue that accessibility does not motivate the Includers’ view because moral truths are always accessible – unlike descriptive facts which are not always accessible. My goal is to defend the Includers’ view by arguing that moral truths are not always accessible in the relevant sense. (shrink)

Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed “moral Bayesianism,” from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, ifPA∩B=0thenPA∪B=PA+PB, known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one (...) hand and degrees of desires on the other. Results generally converged to show that degrees of moral judgment are more similar to degrees of belief than to degrees of desire in this respect. This supports the adoption of a Bayesian approach to the study of moral judgments. To further support moral Bayesianism, we also demonstrated its predictive power. Finally, we discuss the relevancy of our results to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any (fundamental) change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally (...) and unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

Distance relativism (Williams, 1975, 1985) can be distinguished from other ethical relativisms in two ways. First, moral assessment is appropriate between contemporary societies and those of the recent past. Second, where moral assessment is not appropriate, the distance relativist practices quietism. Fricker (2010) critiques Bernard Williams’s (1975, 1985) distance relativism, claiming it fails to deliver the intended results regarding which societies we can appraise. Here, I address Fricker’s critique and present a novel interpretation of Williams’s idea of ‘outlooks,’ showing that (...) Fricker’s criticisms are not insurmountable. (shrink)

In this article I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward earlier events: other things equal, we should prefer for good events to occur earlier and disprefer for bad events to occur earlier. The argument contends that we should accord at least some credence—if only a small one—to a theoretical package featuring the growing block theory of time and that this package generates a presumptive bias toward earlier events. Rival theoretical packages are considered. Under reasonable allocations of (...) credence to them, the presumptive bias escapes defeat. The argument has several corollaries: other things equal, we should be biased toward the past over the future, the further past over the nearer past, and the nearer future over the further future. (shrink)

If God commanded you to do something contrary to your moral conscience, how would you respond? Many believers of different faiths face a similar challenge today. While they take scripture to be the word of God, they find scriptural passages that seem incompatible with their modern moral sensibilities. In Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond, philosopher Amir Saemi identifies this as the problem of divinely prescribed evil. -/- Saemi unpacks two approaches to answering this problem. In the first (...) part of the book, Saemi demonstrates how Islamic thinkers of various historical traditions (including the Ash'arites, the Mu'tazilites, and the Greek influenced Philosophers, falasifa) adhered to a scripture-first view. By appealing to hidden moral facts known only to God or the prophet, a scripture-first approach views moral reasoning, at least when it conflicts with Scripture, with skepticism. An ethics-first view, however, places our independent moral judgments before scripture. In the second part of the book, Saemi offers two ethics-first solutions, with some roots in the Islamic tradition, to the problem of divinely prescribed evil. Each solution argues that our own moral reasoning is reliable in the face of skeptical arguments presented by Scripture-first views and shows how a theist can maintain their belief in scripture's divinity while relying on their own moral judgments. By studying the conflict between morality and revelation in Islamic thought, Saemi offers unapologetic solutions not only for progressive Muslims but for all theists who take their moral judgments seriously. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order:" norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a vicious regress. This paper aims to rescue second-order norms from the threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the claim (...) some philosophers have made that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on all agents regardless of their normative beliefs. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order norms, thus closing off any question of how agents should respond to normative uncertainty. Rather, we can head off the threat of regress by ascribing external force to a single second-order norm: the enkratic principle. (shrink)

Pleasants has developed the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties, they are best described as universal moral certainties which are natural and nonpropositional, and show unreflectively in the way we act. A clear-cut example is the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Philosophers have levelled three damaging criticisms against Pleasants' proposal by (i) offering counterexamples to his proposed example of moral certainty, (ii) highlighting some disanalogies between moral certainties and Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties and, lastly, (...) (iii) showing the lack of arguments and evidence offered by Pleasants to substantiate the claim that moral certainties are natural. To address these criticisms, Laves has revised Pleasants' proposal by providing numerous amendments. In this paper, I develop some concerns about Laves' proposed amendments and indicate that, at present, they are unable to fully overcome the criticisms levelled against the idea of basic moral certainty. Whether Laves' proposal can escape these troubles demands further attention. (shrink)

In this paper I present an account of a distinctive form of ‘practical’ or ‘deliberative’ uncertainty that has been central in debates in both ethics and metaethics. Many writers have assumed that such uncertainty concerns a special normative question, such as what we ought to do ‘all things considered.’ I argue against this assumption and instead endorse an alternative view of such uncertainty, which combines elements of both metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. A notable consequence of this view is that even (...) if there are objective and irreducible truths about how we ought to act, all things considered, the ‘central deliberative question,’ as it’s sometimes called, doesn’t concern such truths. Instead, that question doesn’t have a true answer. (shrink)

We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and its place in moral epistemology is important. Yet, I argue, that existing accounts of moral (...) inquiry do not give us the resources to do so. This paper develops a positive account of hermeneutical inquiry. I argue that when we engage in hermeneutical inquiry, we search for an apt perspective on our situation. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers have argued that, when faced with moral uncertainty, we ought to choose the option with the maximal expected choiceworthiness (MEC). This view has been challenged on the grounds that it is implausibly demanding. In response, those who endorse MEC have argued that we should take into account the all-things-considered choiceworthiness of our options. I argue that this gives rise to another problem: acts that we consider to be supererogatory are rendered impermissible, and acts that we consider to (...) be suberogatory are rendered obligatory, under MEC. I suggest a way to reformulate MEC to solve this problem. (shrink)

Jennifer Rose Carr’s (2020) article “Normative Uncertainty Without Theories” proposes a method to maximize expected value under normative uncertainty without Intertheoretic Value Comparison (hereafter IVC). Carr argues that this method avoids IVC because it avoids theories: the agent’s credence is distributed among normative hypotheses of a particular type, which don’t constitute theories. However, I argue that Carr’s method doesn’t avoid or help to solve what I consider as the justificatory problem of IVC, which isn’t specific to comparing theories as such. (...) This threatens the implementability of Carr’s method. Fortunately, I also show how Carr’s method can nevertheless be implemented. I identify a type of epistemic states where the justificatory problem of IVC is not a necessary obstacle to maximizing expected value. In such states, the uncertainty stems from indecisive normative intuitions, and the agent justifiably constructs each normative hypothesis on the basis of a consistent subset of her intuitions by reference to the same unit of value. This part of my argument complements not only Carr’s (2020) argument, but also some moderate defenses of IVC. The combination of Carr’s paper and mine helps to illuminate the conditions for maximizing expected value under normative uncertainty without unjustified value comparison. (shrink)

Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of “irreparable corruption” is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the “aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors” determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to our (...) sentencing case law,” as the Supreme Court recently put it. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 119 (2016). According to these courts, “it would mean nothing” to ask whether the defendant “deserves mercy beyond a reasonable doubt” or “more-likely-than-not deserves it” because moral questions are not “factual.” Instead, moral determinations are highly subjective “value calls” to which concepts of doubt and certainty do not intelligibly apply. Implicit in these rulings is a controversial view of the nature of moral judgment. This Article traces the contours of the view and argues that it is out of step with the way the broader public thinks about morality and fails to address the issues defendants have raised. Courts should avoid wading into such controversial waters for two reasons. First, the judiciary has historically maintained neutrality on issues of significant public concern. Second, even if moral determinations are not factual, applying a standard of proof to at least some moral decisions at sentencing would change the outcome of the sentencer’s deliberations, and improve the legitimacy of the legal system. For the reasonableness of doubt depends on context; and moral questions—"are you certain the defendant deserves death?”—make salient the stakes relative to which a person should decide what to believe about ordinary empirical matters. On the resulting view, reasonable doubt in the final moral analysis is not just intelligible, but essential for correcting a bias in the structure of the bifurcated criminal trial that systematically disadvantages defendants: the tendency for de-contextualized "factual findings” in the guilt phase to control outcomes at sentencing. (shrink)

While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty -- normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle -- maximising expected value (`Expectationalism') -- has different formulations, namely (...) Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition. (shrink)

A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition this, problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My (...) Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization, and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value. (shrink)

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgements. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgements express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object—can (...) play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgements. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view: deciding how to act under moral ambivalence. (shrink)

It has been argued that evolutionary considerations favour utilitarianism by selectively debunking its competitors. However, evolutionary considerations also seem to undermine the practical significance of utilitarianism, since commonsense beliefs about well-being seem like prime candidates for evolutionary debunking. We argue that the practical significance of utilitarianism is not undermined in this way if we understand the requirements of practical rationality as sensitive to normative uncertainty. We consider the view that rational decision-making under normative uncertainty requires maximizing expected choice-worthiness, as well (...) as the possibility that different theories’ choice-worthiness rankings are not all interval-scale measurable or intertheoretically comparable. Finally, we suggest how evolutionary considerations may increase the practical significance of utilitarianism even if belief in utilitarianism is debunked by evolutionary considerations, so long as belief in competing theories is undermined to an even greater extent. (shrink)

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. (...) Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions. (shrink)

We begin by showing that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. _Reckless_ theories recommend giving up a sure thing, no matter how good, for an arbitrarily tiny chance of enormous gain; _timid_ theories permit passing up an arbitrarily large potential gain to prevent a tiny increase in risk; _non-transitive_ theories deny the principle that, if A is better than B and B is better than C, then A must be better than (...) C. Having set up this trilemma, we study its horns. Non-transitivity has been much discussed; we focus on drawing out the costs and benefits of recklessness and timidity when it comes to axiology, decision theory, and normative uncertainty. (shrink)

Should we allocate costly health care to patients diagnosed with disorders of consciousness (DoC), such as patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state or minimally conscious state? Peterson,...

According to the sufficiency principle, distributive justice requires that everyone have some sufficient level of resources or well-being, but inequalities above this threshold have no moral significance. This paper defends a version of the sufficiency principle as the appropriate response to moral uncertainty about distributive justice. Assuming that the appropriate response to moral uncertainty is to maximize expected choiceworthiness, and given a reasonable distribution of credence in some familiar views about distributive justice, a version of the sufficiency principle strikes the (...) optimal balance between the competing moral risks posed by implementing these views. In particular, it avoids the moral risk posed by views like Nozick’s libertarianism, which forbid redistributive taxation even for the sake of helping to provide for people’s basic needs: failing to do the latter, if it turns out that justice does require it, would be very morally wrong. This “uncertainty argument” has the advantage of minimizing reliance on controversial intuitions about distributive justice, helps to specifying a non-arbitrary threshold for sufficiency, and shows that the substantive moral implications of moral uncertainty are not limited to high-stakes applied ethics issues such as abortion and vegetarianism but instead extend to an issue at the heart of political philosophy. (shrink)