Mind-Body Problem, General

The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as the core of a (...) scientific research programme, each of these logically irrefutable hypotheses can be tested rationally. (shrink)

The classical free will debate is paralyzed by a false triage: determinism, compatibilism, or randomness. This framework, a philosophical consequence of classical local physics, is obsolete. The Quantum Binding Argument (QBA) and its corollaries demonstrate that volition is metaphysically possible and must be non-local, thereby systematically eliminating these three options. This paper argues that this cleared conceptual space forces a radical reconception of volition itself. Building on the identity thesis from Non-Local Relationalism—where consciousness (C) is identical to operational non-local correlation (...) (NLC)—we infer that volition (V) is not a separate faculty. Instead, volition is the first-person phenomenology of conscious causation; it is what operational NLC feels like from the inside. This identity unifies will and experience, dissolving the traditional consciousness/volition dichotomy. Volition is thus universalized from a rare executive choice to the constant, dynamic activity of being a conscious system. We demonstrate how this framework accounts for physical constraints and graded agency, is validated by clinical neurology, and resolves the problem of mental causation by revealing it as a category error. The conclusion is not a new answer within the old debate, but the inauguration of a non-deterministic, non-local physics of volition. (shrink)

Informational ontologies more and more envelop the natural sciences. The growth of communication technologies and social networking characterize our age. Instead of seeing our world solely as matter in motion, as did Democritus, we now imagine living in a world composed of flowing information. Bits of information have since replaced atoms of matter, and the space-time movement of bits is now called communication. This work is partly a criticism of the materialism and idealism that gave birth to today’s worldview, and (...) especially a criticism of the concepts of communication and information as they arise in science and language. Not that I have any interest in proving these concepts false; I agree that each is useful in its domain. Rather, these criticisms may open one up to a less confined communication that is not bounded by science or language but perfuses each. This communication nourishes the paradoxical connection between separated things. (shrink)

This paper explores the limitations of physicalist explanations of consciousness through a thought experiment involving a blind individual who perceives objects through touch. By examining the hypothetical case of Daniel, who can identify cars using his sense of touch, the paper raises important questions about the nature of perception and conscious experience. The main argument centers on whether physical properties, such as color, can be perceived through touch if our sensory capabilities were enhanced to a molecular level.1 The conclusion argues (...) that physicalist approaches fall short in explaining the subjective experiences (qualia) that arise from sensory perception. This argument is reinforced through a comparison with Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room thought experiment and John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment, showing that even conscious states obtained through different sensory organs cannot substitute for each other, nor can they grant access to each other. Although dualism is a prominent alternative to physicalism, this paper does not address its validity, focusing instead on highlighting the shortcomings of physicalism alone. (shrink)

In the light of the principle of mediocrity, naturalism is in fact transcendent exceptionalism - as opposed to transcendent mediocrity. As such, it has the burden of proof - and the "inverse criterion" defeats many of such alleged proofs.

This paper explores the profound cognitive and philosophical meaning of relativistic velocities of consciousness, particularly light speed. Drawing upon the findings of cognitive science, the philosophy of mind, and theoretical physics, we explore the paradoxical nature of subjective experience when space and time coordinates undergo radical transformations. We explore how notions of qualia, embodiment, memory, and causality are rearranged or disintegrate entirely within a light speed reference frame. Synthesizing the thoughts of philosophers like Nassim Nicholas Taleb, David Graeber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, (...) Edmund Husserl, and Gilles Deleuze, we present a novel way of thinking about consciousness as not an object, but an active, relational process deeply entwined with the spacetime web. The essay ends by positing that consciousness, far from being a cosmic constant, may only be given meaning in the 'middle speeds' of life as a boundary condition between absolute motion and absolute stasis. This inquiry challenges anthropocentric thinking in our understanding of mind and offers a speculative but scientific inquiry into the final nature of existence in a relativistic universe. (shrink)

In this paper we begin categorizing a plurality of possible worlds on the basis of permitting or not permitting ontologically different things to be causally connected. We build the work on the dual principle that all universes are causally closed either because no universe causes anything outside itself or because no universe has anything in it that is caused by another universe.

While challenges to physicalism typically center around conceivability arguments and the explanatory gap, this paper takes a different approach by examining the coherence of physicalism through the lens of obvious truth. Here the notion of obvious truth extends beyond appearance and concerns not only whether a claim is true but also whether it can be understood as true, in the sense that, when grasped, its truth becomes something like second nature. The argument is presented in two parts. I argue, first, (...) on epistemic grounds, that physicalism cannot be obviously true (in the epistemic sense of accessibility). I argue, second, on conceptual grounds, that if physicalism is true, it must be obviously true (in the conceptual sense of understanding). Since conceptual necessity entails epistemic accessibility under conditions of ideal reflection (in Chalmers’ sense), this argument reveals a limitation within the physicalist view on whether it can both be true and understood as true. (shrink)

The thesis, typical among dualists, that there are no necessitation relations between events of consciousness and physical events implies that it is prima facie lucky that in our world the apparently existing psychophysical laws usually match events of consciousness and physical events in a “harmonious” way. The lucky psychophysical laws argument concludes that typical dualism amounts to a psychophysical parallelism that is prima facie too improbable to be true. I argue that an anthropic reasoning in the space of possible worlds (...) makes the appearance of a harmonious match situation unsurprising, and that this is all that is needed for the argument to be harmless to a typical dualist. (shrink)

Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia and of how people can hold some things (...) to be physically real even when it is clear no one can ever directly experience those things as phenomena. It is further shown to enable a single, internally consistent, largely empirically supported conceptual framework – a ‘metacosmology’ – able to encompass not only the physical world as people conceive of it for everyday purposes, and as scientists conceive of it for scientific purposes, but also people’s first person phenomenal experience of a physical world and, prospectively, the mechanisms by which such first person, conscious experiences can be generated. (shrink)

One of the most pressing problems faced by contemporary parapsychology is the lack of a unified metaphysical position. Here, it is argued, based on the work of Van Fraassen, that parapsychology should adopt a limited anti-realist, neutral stance in regard to metaphysical theory selection. This paper will begin by discussing some relevant work in quantum biology that frames many organisms on Earth today as fundamentally quantum mechanical objects. The discussion will then proceed to an argument demonstrating that viewing biological organisms, (...) especially humans, as quantum mechanical objects is naturally compatible with idealist metaphysical frameworks. This will be followed by a discussion of some persistent yet irrational thought patterns relevant to metaphysics present in the parapsychological research community and the consciousness studies research communities at large. This paper will conclude by presenting its main argument, based on the work of Van Fraassen, arguing for metaphysical neutrality based on the previous arguments and constructions. (shrink)

Panmicropsychism is the view that the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe are also its fundamental phenomenal ingredients. Since there is only a limited number of fundamental physical ingredients, panmicropsychism seems to imply that there exists only a small set (palette) of basic phenomenal qualities. How does this limited palette of basic phenomenal qualities give rise to our rich set of experiences? This is known as ‘the palette problem’. One class of solutions to this problem, large-palette solutions, simply denies that (...) the palette is limited. These solutions assume that all types of phenomenal qualities (color, sound, odor, taste, etc., and presumably also types not experienced by humans) were created fully formed at the birth of our universe. On this view, brains evoke conscious experiences by sampling primordial, preexisting phenomenal spaces. My main claim in this paper is that, by analogy with the mathematical description of the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe, which exhibits simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should expect the mathematical description of the fundamental phenomenal ingredients of our universe to exhibit similar features. The goal of this paper is to exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities—color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems. (shrink)

This paper argues that the contemporary debate surrounding artificial intelligence consciousness is fundamentally misguided, resting on outdated folk psychology and conceptual confusion. Drawing upon Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box thought experiment and Ryle's formulation of the category mistake, the essay demonstrates that treating consciousness as a private, detached property to be discovered within neural weights is a grammatical and logical error. By applying eliminative materialism and strong illusionism, the author contends that the subjective inner theatre, or qualia, demanded of advanced language models is (...) a theoretical fiction that lacks explanatory power for both biological brains and artificial architectures. Furthermore, while functionalist frameworks like Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory offer robust structural descriptions, they fail to bridge the explanatory gap to phenomenal experience. Utilizing Parfit's bundle theory, the essay also shows that artificial systems lack the metaphysical stability required for a coherent self. Ultimately, the paper concludes that anthropomorphizing algorithmic behaviour actively distorts AI safety debates, transforming solvable engineering and alignment challenges into intractable metaphysical disputes. Acknowledging that the box of consciousness is empty allows researchers to refocus on the concrete, material impacts of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is argued that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. A comparison with the significantly more complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist (...) solution. The ontologically emergent character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis relating to system limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena. In the perspective of a modified definition of free will, the character of the physical interactions of the brain's neural system is subsequently studied. As an ontologically open system, it is asserted that its future states are undeterminable in principle. We argue that this leads to freedom of the will. (shrink)

The possibility of algorithmic consciousness depends on the assumption that conscious states can be copied or repeated by sufficiently duplicating their underlying physical states, leading to a variety of paradoxes, including the problems of duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, the Boltzmann brain, and Wigner’s Friend. In an effort to further elucidate the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical copies of a mental state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions (...) due to quantum fluctuations. By assuming the supervenience of a conscious state on some sufficient underlying physical state, I show that the existence of two or more instances, whether spacelike or timelike, of the same conscious state leads to a logical contradiction, ultimately refuting the assumption that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated by any physical means. Several explanatory hypotheses and implications are addressed, particularly the relationships between consciousness, locality, physical irreversibility, and quantum no-cloning. (shrink)

Modern theories do not agree on the origin of consciousness—whether experiences of “what it is like” emerge from the actions of neural structures or from the combined or de-combined properties of matter or mind. The astrological model deserves closer study as an alternative explanation of consciousness as adaptation. Its unique concept of the native protagonist, its grounding in structural realism, and its analogical taxonomy of properties suggest a falsifiable theory with extraordinary reach into the subjective character of lived experience. We (...) attempt to close epistemic gaps in how to think about consciousness and to also resolve important problems in astrology. As a proof-of-concept, we report on empirical evidence from our companion pilot study (published separately) in which we use AI models as inference engines to autonomously replicate the findings of previous Vernon Clark tests with robust improvements. We find that most of the AI models succeed in the Clark test and that some are hundreds-fold more adept at guessing the consciousness of lived experience than others. (shrink)

Many philosophers argue that the mind-body problem is unresolvable, that there are irreconcilable differences between the physical world and the way the mind experiences it. Several others argue that the problem represents an incompleteness of the Galilean view, which conceptually divides the world into two models (physical and consciousness). Recent debates have centered around a proposal to radically alter the physical model to account for the mind-body relationship. However, critics argue that the general approach is flawed and that the specific (...) proposal results in a ‘messy’ and highly complex model with inconsistencies with well-known phenomena. This paper, first, critically examines the argument that the general approach is flawed. Then this paper argues that the proposal is much broader than necessary and that the aspects required to resolve the mind-body problem are already present in the physical model. This results in, I argue, a resolution to the mind-body problem without increased complexity for either model or the aforementioned inconsistencies. (shrink)

We contest the unsubstantiated assumption of both materialists and non-materialist that the ontological status they propose applies to all humans and that the competing claim is false for all - ie we reject both the claim of non-materialists that all humans share the same fundamental aspect of having a "non-material consciousness" (nmc), as well as the contrasting claim of materialists that none do (being fully material as according to eliminative materialists/reductive physicalists etc). Instead, the basic proposition of this paper, our (...) ‘ontological conecture’ (OC) - an updated version of our 1998 website article “Mindless Materialists” - is that the central tenets of proponents on both sides are true, but only regarding themselves. A signature feature of nmc is that brains associated to it are capable of knowing of its existence directly, and as a corollary we would propose that if a sophisticated brain does not know it is associated to nmc then most likely this is because it is in fact not so associated. Thus, in accordance with our OC we will consider a brain’s statements on this issue (that it does or does not possess nmc) as not merely its ‘philosophical position’ but as an authoritative statement, a reflection of an ontological fact. Furthermore, we propose that only those who possess nmc are capable of understanding what it is, so that although they are well-qualified to know directly that they themselves possess it, in contrast those who lack nmc and possess only material consciousness (mc) cannot even comprehend what non-materiality means - they will understandably tend to consider it a non-existent absurdity, which contention would be quite correct in a purely-material reality, such as they effectively inhabit. -/- Terminology reflecting ontological status: Since according to our OC those brains which categorize themselves as non-materialists are presumed to indeed be associated to nmc, for usefulness in phraseology we’ll refer to people whose brain is so associated as being nmc’s (not merely “espousing nmc”). Materialists say they are conscious but that theirs is a material consciousness (abbrev: “mc”) , and since according to our OC we accept this self-determination we will refer to them as being “mc’s” or being materialist (not merely “espousing materialism”). -/- Are materialists mindless or are non-materialists delusional? Notoriously, it is impossible to prove that one possesses nmc (which is a sort of corollary to the fact that it is directly self-known) - being non-material, nmc cannot be detected via the scientific method. However just as those with nmc cannot prove they possess it so too one cannot prove or determine via measurement that materialists do not possess it. Nevertheless we feel that our OC is the simplest solution to the conundrum of how there are materialists if a brain can directly sense its associated nmc. In sum, although of course it is impossible to prove that any particular person possesses or lacks nmc, given all the above our OC considers - as stated by the title of this paper - a brain’s self-identification as "materialist" or “non-materialist” (dualist, panpsychist, idealist etc) as reflecting the absence or presence of an associated real non-material awareness/consciousness, rather than merely as a statement of a philosophical stance. An alternative solution is implicit in the above - that all humans possess nmc just that materialists are those whose brains lack the awareness of theirs, or that the brain-aspect which communicates to others has no access to it. -/- Towards developing more constructive dialogue between mc’s/nmc’s, and greater self-confidence and independence among nmc’s in the face of materialist dominance of the intellectual-climate: A large part of the overall paper is devoted to not just pointing out the futility of communication of the sort usually engaged in - ie based on the erroneous underlying assumption that both sides of the debate are ontologically the same - but also suggesting ways to make the debate less frustrating by a recognition of the OC. Greater clarity in discussions can be achieved partly via a deeper understanding of the different meanings the same term might have to nmc’s/mc’s and suggestions relevant the construction of a sort of translation algorithm to utilize in discussions (as a simple example, substituting ‘higher-level cognitive material brain-processes’ for ‘mind’ when that term is used by an mc); by the frank statement by nmc’s engaged in dialogue with mc’s that the existence of nmc is not up for discussion; by learning how the existence of our nmc colors the meaning we give to certain terms in ways we were not aware of, meanings which are absent for mc’s; and in general via the recognition by the nmc that the dialogue is with a person lacking nmc. -/- Perhaps materialists are right: In the interest of ‘reciprocity’, the paper also offers an alternative/opposing view to the central proposition, to the effect that the materialist claim is correct, and it is a defect of brain wiring or structure which is the source of an active illusion of "self-awareness" underlying the philosophical claims of non-materialists. A prospective source of this illusion is offered - an analog of the sense of presence experienced during ‘sleep paralysis’. (shrink)

In this paper, I will assume that metaphysical naturalism is true, except for the fact that some form of property dualism is true—the view that mental properties are essentially different from, and not reducible to, physical properties. If that is the case, then contrary to a widespread belief, death does not bring about eternal oblivion, a permanent cessation of the stream of consciousness at the moment of death. Several authors (Clark, 1994, n.d.; Darling, 1996; Stewart, 1999; Sharlow, 2009) have independently (...) argued that the stream of consciousness continues after death—devoid of the body’s former memories and personality traits—and it does so as the stream of consciousness of new, freshly conscious bodies (other humans, animals, etc., that are conceived and develop consciousness). And so, any permanent cessation of the stream of consciousness at the moment of death is impossible as long as new, freshly conscious bodies come to exist. Consciousness is defined here as awareness, and is not limited to self-awareness (i.e., the recognition of one’s awareness). In this paper, I will argue for a new, more general thesis, namely the extended existential passage hypothesis. This new thesis has significant implications regarding the requirements of rational choice, as I will point out in this paper. (shrink)

Mind-body problemet analyseras i ett reduktionistiskt perspektiv. Genom att kombinera emergensbegreppet med algoritmisk informationsteori visas i ett tankeexperiment att ett starkt epistemiskt emergent system kan konstrueras utifrån en relativt enkel, ickelinjär process. En jämförelse med hjärnans avsevärt mer komplexa neurala nätverk visar att även medvetandet kan karakteriseras som starkt epistemiskt emergent. Därmed är reduktionistisk förståelse av medvetandet inte möjlig; mind-body problemet har alltså inte en reduktionistisk lösning. Medvetandets ontologiskt emergenta karaktär kan därefter konstateras utifrån en kombinatorisk analys; det är därmed (...) principiellt oreducerbart till lägre-nivå-fenomen. I perspektivet av en modifierad definition av fri vilja diskuteras den fysiska växelverkan som äger rum i hjärnans neurala system. Trots att enskilda neurala lägre-nivå-processer är deterministiska, kan globala processer visas vara icke- deterministiska i ontologisk mening. Vi argumenterar för att detta leder till viljans frihet. (shrink)

Panpsychism holds that experience must already be present in elementary matter for consciousness to arise at the macroscopic level. We argue that this conclusion, however carefully motivated, follows only if one assumes a particular — and independently refutable — model of how phenomenological contents compose. Once that assumption is identified and rejected, the pressure towards panpsychism dissolves. In its place, a transcendental argument shows that consciousness is not distributed through matter but necessitated by the form of composition itself, even when (...) every elementary part carries nothing at all. The position, under the assumption of monism, is called null monism. (shrink)

PSIAD’s core is a two-part proof centered on the concept of Genuine Personal Control (GPC)—a concept often referred to as agent-causation, volition and conscious will. Lemma 1 shows that GPC denialism is self-refuting, while Lemma 2 shows that physicalism/materialism necessitates GPC denialism. Thereby PSIAD at large shows physicalism to be self-refuting. I.e., It shows that GPC stems from a different foundation and that accepting any corresponding counter (by way of compatibilism, epiphenomenalism, quantum indeterminacy, emergentist/nonreductive physicalism, property dualism, arguments from incredulity, (...) etc.)—provably entails needlessly abandoning fundamental principles of both physics and logic. The appendices then survey the literature to underscore supplementary points such as the long-untenable state of contemporary physicalism and the great scientific cost of continuing to neglect Foundational Dualism in favor thereof. (shrink)

The different approaches of the mind-body problem a fortiori have implications on the foundations of Psychology, Psychopathology and Psychiatry, leading to many clashing theories about the determinants of "normal" human behavior, as well of the mental illnesses. These schools of research on the human mind may on a first approach be divided in two main branches: 1) the neurogenetic ones; 2) the psychogenetic ones. This paper sprang up from a lifelong pondering on its subject by its author, while working as (...) a Clinical Psychiatrist and conducting a Ph D in Philosophy. (shrink)

I wish to draw attention to a connection between current changes in the concept of mind and cultural trends that disfavor the cultivation of conscious experience. There is a strain in contemporary philosophy and science that questions the very existence of consciousness. At the same time, trends in our culture, accelerated lately by technological developments, undermine the incentives and space to attend to conscious awareness. A view of the mind that denies the existence of consciousness leads us further away from (...) engagement with consciousness at a time when our ability for such engagement has already been seriously undermined by the digitalization of our lives, social media, and AI. At the same time, these technological changes might make us more receptive to the corrosive view that we lack consciousness. (shrink)

This paper articulates how recent advances in comparative behavioral and biological research are changing the nature of the mind/body problem from a human mind/human body problem to a problem of conceptualizing and organizing diverse types of minds in a hierarchical relational structure that is non-contingently related to phylogeny. It also discusses the impact of this refinement on our assessments of modal claims about possible artificial (AI) consciousness.

Property dualism posits one kind of substance (physical), but two kinds of properties: physical and mental. The view has been criticized for either collapsing into substance dualism or enjoying no distinctive advantage over it. We wield a similar criticism, but our argument has a unique spin: we scrutinize what it could mean for a property to count as mental given different conceptions of the relation between substance and property. We consider various versions of universal realism and trope theory and argue (...) that they either render property dualism incoherent or saddle it with commitments that undermine its initial motivation. (shrink)

We are all familiar with Frank Jackson’s (1982) story about Mary. Mary has lived all her life in a black-and-white room. She has never been “acquainted with” the quality red, although maybe she has read about it in a book. One wonderful day she is released. She sees a tomato and becomes acquainted with this quality for the first time. Jackson used the Mary case to illustrate the “epistemic gap” between the physical and the experiential. That was the basis of (...) his knowledge argument against physicalism. I will use a new Mary case to illustrate a different argument against physicalism: the significance argument. However, my argument will only target one form of physicalism: the austere “reductive” form of physicalism defended by David Lewis, Ted Sider, Cian Dorr, and others. I call it "identification physicalism". (shrink)

This work argues that the apprehension of meaning entails a real ontological distinction between mind and body. Beginning from the phenomenological fact that human beings do not merely register the world but encounter it as meaningful, the work distinguishes meaning-as-such from signal, syntax, utility, affect, and bodily process. It then argues that understanding cannot be reduced to processing, since the grasp of meaning involves significance, truth, normativity, and first-person presence in a way not exhausted by functional or causal description. From (...) this, the book develops a case for the irreducibility of the subject of meaning to bodily ontology. The argument does not defend a complete substance-dualist system, nor does it claim to settle every question concerning embodiment, emergence, or mind-body interaction. Rather, it maintains that wherever meaning is genuinely apprehended, there is already more than body. The concluding chapters consider objections from physicalism, embodiment, computation, and naturalistic theories of consciousness, and argue that a reality in which meaning can truly appear cannot be adequately described as brute process alone. The work thus offers a phenomenological and metaphysical case for the irreducibility of mind and for the ontological seriousness of intelligibility. (shrink)

This work presents "The 35-Level Theory," a conceptual framework proposing a hierarchical architecture of reality governed by absolute determinism across 35 distinct levels. Drawing a trajectory from classical mechanics to quantum fields, the author posits that the universe functions as a multidimensional system where control vectors flow from higher-order deterministic layers down to the macro-world. The hypothesis introduces the "Neurobiological Interface" model, characterizing the human brain as a biological resonator tuned to high-level informational structures via a unique "starter crypto-code" established (...) at birth. By distinguishing between the mathematical Mechanism (World 1) and the subjective Observer (World 2), the theory provides a deterministic explanation for consciousness, postmortem informational matrices, and the "Philosophical Zombie" paradox. The work suggests that human existence is a symbiosis of these two metrics, offering a novel grounding for reconciling the hard sciences with the humanities. DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18875847. (shrink)

This chapter examines Raymond Tallis’ reflections on the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in the context of human embodiment. Tallis asserts that conscious human experience cannot be reduced to naturalistic explanations and emphasizes the opposition between consciousness and “nature.” However, through his analysis of embodiment, he also proposes an “ouroboric” perspective in which subjectivity and objectivity exhibit “reciprocal containment.” The chapter closely examines Tallis’ approach to embodiment in I Am and Seeing Ourselves and evaluates it in terms of oppositional versus (...) ouroboric thinking. It first demonstrates Tallis’ shifts among transcendental, empirical-reflexive, and object-oriented views of the body. It further explores the implications of his limited engagement with embodiment for the figure-ground problem in perception, which has essential consequences for understanding subjectivity as either structurally embodied, indexed to the world, or fundamentally uncoupled from it. The chapter concludes by addressing the consequences of the figure-ground problem for higher-order thinking. The author argues that higher-order intentionality reflects a subject’s distancing from bodily backgrounds through the development of sociocultural contextual frameworks, rather than a separation between subject and object. Even in higher-order cognition and action, the subject remains inherently indexicalized. This analysis advocates for a more integrated conception of embodiment that bridges subjective and objective dimensions. (shrink)

Nietzsche: Philosophical Psychology Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology or “drive theory,” as it is commonly designated in the secondary literature, constitutes a rich, distinctive, and compelling account of the human condition. Broadly speaking, Nietzsche maintains that human psychology is either directly reducible to fundamental animalistic drives (such as sexuality and aggression) or can be understood indirectly through … Continue reading Nietzsche: Philosophical Psychology →.

Since around 1930, the term “physicalism” has been used to designate an epistemic, semantic, and methodological (and anti-metaphysical) viewpoint associated with the Vienna Circle’s logical empiricism, as well as a metaphysical viewpoint, associated with contemporary analytical philosophy, according to which the world is in some manner exhaustively physical. In both cases, physicalism has involved a scientific approach to knowledge and reality and a commitment to physics occupying a special place among the sciences. In its metaphysical guise, physicalism is often centrally (...) understood as a view about the place of mind in the natural world, according to which mental entities (thoughts, emotions, and experiences) are nothing over and above physical entities. This entry traces the use of “physicalism” to the present day and discusses issues and challenges facing contemporary metaphysical physicalism, along with philosophical projects inspired by the physicalist problematic. (shrink)

The Knower Centred Model of Consciousness (KCM) is a foundational framework that positions the knower—the witnessing subject—as the central principle in the structure of reality. KCM proposes an experience‑first ontology, challenging matter‑first and brain‑first interpretations of consciousness. At its core is the K³ Triad: Knower — the witnessing consciousness Knowing — the dynamic act of awareness Known — the contents that arise within experience KCM integrates insights from non‑dual philosophy, phenomenology, observer‑centric physics, cognitive science, and theoretical neuroscience. The model argues (...) that mind, matter, and world‑structure emerge within consciousness, not outside it. (shrink)

En este artículo se muestran las fuertes analogías entre Hegel y Rosmini sobre la relación alma-cuerpo, haciendo referencia a sus textos. Entre el 1807 y el 1830, Hegel va más allá de una lógica dualista y explica la identidad del sujeto, a pesar de todas sus modificaciones. Él valoriza la corporeidad, reconociendo el instinto como finalidad, aunque dentro de un horizonte finito. Además, según el filósofo alemán, el alma y el cuerpo no pueden estar sin un yo y se superan (...) simultáneamente en el espíritu, donde el sujeto toma conciencia de sí mismo como libertad autónoma. En su madurez, Rosmini se ocupa de estos mismos temas y, aunque critica a Hegel, plantea una dialéctica análoga entre cuerpo, alma y espíritu humano. Sin embargo, se aclara que el enfoque ontológico rosminiano es antitético al hegeliano. De hecho, en Hegel el individuo se resuelve en ser un momento del Espíritu; en Rosmini la presencia del ser inicial permite captar la dignidad del sujeto como ser finito y completo, de manera que el hombre, reconociendo el ser inicial, vuelve a sí mismo. (shrink)

[This article serves as the lead article for an article symposium. A call for commentaries is currently open at the journal.] In this lead article for an article symposium, we investigate the possible intersection between metaphysical naturalism and the phenomenological tradition. Our guiding hypothesis is that nature constitutes phenomenology, whereas phenomenology constitutes our access to nature. Pace renowned phenomenologists Gallagher and Zahavi’s call to replace “classic naturalism” with “non-classic conceptions,” we reconstruct “classic naturalism” by drawing on the seminal works of (...) Armstrong, Lewis, Jackson, Braddon-Mitchell, Ney, and others. On this basis, we argue against the common assertion that metaphysical naturalism entails scientism and methodological naturalism and demonstrate their theoretical incompatibility, and thereby contend that a properly characterized classic naturalism could, in fact, accommodate phenomenological approaches. Then, we revise contemporary phenomenologists’ notions of “mutual constraints” and “mutual enlightenment” and reframe the subtle intersection between phenomenology and the naturalistic perspective. Finally, we address standard phenomenological criticisms of naturalism, which appeal to the primacy of the experiential perspective, and explore how the perspective can, in fact, accommodate and critically inform naturalism’s core theoretical commitments. This two-way discussion, which is grounded in both traditions, results in a phenomenology-friendly naturalism and a naturalism-friendly phenomenology that critically complement one another. (shrink)

La tesi della rivelazione asserisce che pensare ad un’esperienza nei termini dell’effetto che fa averla consente di comprendere qual è la natura di quell’esperienza. In questo testo viene presentato un argomento filosofico che mira a confutare il fisicalismo sulla coscienza partendo dalla rivelazione e da premesse aggiuntive. Ciascuna premessa viene esaminata analiticamente. Vengono descritte una strategia argomentativa a favore della rivelazione ed alcune obiezioni rilevanti. Infine, vengono brevemente esaminate le relazioni concettuali che legano l’argomento della rivelazione a tre noti argomenti (...) anti-fisicalisti: l’argomento modale di Saul Kripke, l’argomento della conoscenza di Frank Jackson e l’argomento bi-dimensionale di David Chalmers. (shrink)

In this paper we will present how Merleau-Ponty develops the mind-body problemby dealing with what embodied consciousness is. We will show how hisphenomenological account confronts empiricist-intellectualist views and how itdissolves the problem. To this end, we focus on conceptions of situatedconsciousness and pre-reflective consciousness. We deal with the case of the GhostMember to clarify the problem and, ultimately, as a model of embodied, non-dualistic consciousness.

Functional theories of consciousness, based on emergence of conscious experiences from the execution of a particular function by an insentient brain, face the hard problem of consciousness of explaining why the insentient brain should produce any conscious experiences at all. This problem is exacerbated by the determinism characterizing the laws of classical physics, due to the resulting lack of causal potency of the emergent consciousness, which is not present already as a physical quantity in the deterministic equations of motion of (...) the brain. Here, we present a quantum information theoretic approach to the hard problem of consciousness that avoids all of the drawbacks of emergence. This is achieved through reductive identification of first-person subjective conscious states with unobservable quantum state vectors in the brain, whereas the anatomically observable brain is viewed as a third-person objective construct created by classical bits of information obtained during the measurement of a subset of commuting quantum brain observables by the environment. Quantum resource theory further implies that the quantum features of consciousness granted by quantum no-go theorems cannot be replicated by any classical physical device. (shrink)

Physicalist explanation of consciousness are unsatisfying, even if they may be adequate. In this paper, I give a general account of what makes explanations satisfying: namely, that satisfying explanations explain the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, while unsatisfying ones explain the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar are unsatisfying. This is also why physicalist explanations of consciousness are unsatisfying, as they inevitably must explain the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar. Since consciousness is the most familiar thing to us, (...) any phenomena described in physicalist terms will always be less familiar relative to consciousness. (shrink)

This article presents a philosophical and legal analysis of the transformation of the concept of responsibility in the era of cyborgization, defining the methodological foundations for a shift toward understanding the distributed agency of the augmented subject. To this end, the author first reconstructs historically developed notions of will, intention, and responsibility. Further, applying contemporary theories of "extended mind," actor-network theory, and posthumanism, the work demonstrates the possibility and necessity of rethinking the boundaries of the "self." To this end, drawing (...) on empirical cases such as neural interfaces and popular culture, the author identifies specific problematic areas for law and ethics. Methodologically, the work applies a cyborgian eclecticism approach to integrating productive approaches in an interdisciplinary analysis. The author concludes that classical foundations of responsibility lose their practical applicability when cognitive processes begin to be distributed between biological and technical categories. Given these emerging trends, there is a clear need to move from the binary logic of "guilty/not guilty" to a scale/modal model of responsibility, where responsibility is perceived within the context of the actor's contribution within a hybrid system. This article lays the conceptual foundation for practical solutions that will be presented in the second part of the study. // В статье представлен философско-правовой анализ трансформаций понятия ответственности в эпоху киборгизации, определяются методологические основания для перехода к пониманию распределенной агентности дополненного субъекта. Для этого автор, в первую очередь, реконструирует исторически складывавшиеся представления о воле, намерении и ответственности. Далее, с приложением современных теорий «расширенного разума», акторно сетевой теории и постгуманизма, в работе демонстрируется возможность и необходимость переосмыслить границы «Я», для чего, основываясь на эмпирических кейсах, таких как нейроинтерфейсы, и на образах в массовой культуре, автор выделяет конкретные проблемные точки для права и этики. Методологически в работе применяется подход киборгианского эклектизма для объединения продуктивных подходов в междисциплинарном анализе. Автор приходит к выводу, что классические основания ответственности теряют прикладную работоспособность в условиях, когда когнитивные процессы начинают распределяться между категориями биологического и технического. В условиях развития таких тенденций очевидна необходимость перехода от бинарной логики «виновен/не виновен» к шкаловой/модальной модели ответственности, где ответственность воспринимается в рамках вклада актора, существующего в гибридной системе. Данная статья закладывает концептуальный фундамент для практических решений, которые будут представлены во второй части исследования. (shrink)

For over fifty years, Stelarc has radically explored the fusion of human biology and technology through his provocative artistic practice. This paper draws on a 2024 interview with the artist and examines how his work challenges our fundamental assumptions about human identity and capability. Through analysis of his pioneering projects—from the iconic Third Hand to the Ear on Arm and his internet-enabled performances— we see how Stelarc’s art embodies emerging posthumanist and transhumanist philosophies. His artistic work addresses the idea that (...) humanity has moved beyond natural selection into an era where technological engineering drives our development. The research traces his artistic evolution from early body suspensions to recent explorations of distributed embodiment and AI integration, including insights from our 2024 conversation. By merging art, philosophy, and technological innovation, Stelarc creates not just theoretical frameworks but visceral demonstrations of possible human futures. His bold experiments spark crucial dialogue about consciousness, embodiment and identity in our world, which gets to become more and more technological // На протяжении половины столетия художник Стеларк проводит радикальные художественные эксперименты, разнообразными способами совмещая аспекты человеческой биологии с технологическими системами. Данная работа, в основе которой лежат материалы эксклюзивного интервью с художником, взятого в сентябре 2024 года, а также результаты анализа его творчества, представляет собой попытку систематизировать художественные практики Стеларка с точки зрения динамики определения человеческой идентичности и возможностей человека. Путем детального исследования его различных проектов и перформансов показывается, как работы Стеларка воплощают развитие постгуманистической и трансгуманистической философии. Радикальный взгляд художника направлен на то, что человечество уже вступило в постэволюционную фазу, в которой развитие человека обусловлено в большей степени технологическим проектированием, нежели естественным отбором. В рамках исследования сделан обзор художественного пути Стеларка, его творчество представлено в хронологическом порядке: от ранних перформансов с подвешиванием тела до современных роботизированных инсталляций, что позволило наглядно показать последовательность исследовательских проектов художника в части изучения разных аспектов интеграции человека и машины. При этом отдельное внимание уделяется недавним работам Стеларка, посвященным проблематике распределенной телесности и интеграции искусственного интеллекта в общественную жизнь и природу человека. В статье показано, что творчество Стеларка объединяет искусство, философию и технологические инновации беспрецедентным образом, в результате чего новые концепции сопровождаются осязаемой и нередко провокационной демонстрацией возможных перспектив «человеческого». Делается вывод, что посредством смелых перформансов и физических модификаций Стеларк вносит вклад в междисциплинарную дискуссию о сознании, телесности и идентичности человека в ми ре, становящемся все более технологизированным. (shrink)

This entry surveys the phenomenological concept of flesh (chair), developed primarily by Maurice Merleau-Ponty to overcome the classic divisions of Cartesian ontology - above all, that between subject and object. As an ontological "element," flesh designates the reversible, generative relation between sensing and sensible that underlies perception, intercorporeity, expression, and ideality. Its broader ontological significance rests on the insight that one's body is best understood not as a subjectively lived body opposed to an objective one, but as the dynamic, reversible (...) interdependence of both dimensions in a single being. After clarifying the term's linguistic background and its connections to other key phenomenological concepts (§1), the entry traces how flesh emerges from Merleau-Ponty's earlier work to become a central ontological principle (§2), and surveys interpretations and parallel developments that engage with, move beyond, or contest his account (§3). (shrink)

Apologists have vrious responses to the problem of evil, however, they have not yet pieced together into a coherent picture the definitive answer to this problem as put forth in the Bible. To this end, the directly related passages are found in such books as Isaiah, Ezekiel, passages from the gospels, the letters of Paul, and Revelation, among others; all of which when brought together provide a perfectly rational, understandable answer to the problem. The "Alpha & the Omega, Book Two", (...) can be considered more philosophical as opposed to religious, if one is to fairly categorize the work, for the problem of evil has been discussed more widely by philosophers than anyone else, though often in the sense of a challenge or a refutation to the theistic belief in an omnibenevolent God. If God is indeed not morally perfect, then what good is the Christian faith? If God is not morally perfect, then what good can come from the Christian faith? This present work however demonstrates through the scriptures, combined with our own human reason, that God is not only omniscient and omnipotent, as justifiably arguable on the grounds of the Science put forth in Book One, but God is also morally perfect. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel zeige ich auf, dass das in der aristotelischen Schrift ‚De Anima‘ beschriebene Konzept einer eng mit den Lebensfunktionen von Organismen verbundenen Seele/Psyche auch aus heutiger biowissenschaftlicher Sicht noch Bestand hat. Dies gilt insbesondere auch für die drei Komponenten, in welche die Psyche gemäß Aristoteles unterteilt werden kann: Die ‚Anima rationalis‘ repräsentiert die menschliche Fähigkeit zu vernünftigem Denken, die ‚Anima sensitiva‘ die Fähigkeit tierischer Lebewesen zu sinnlicher Wahrnehmung und triebgesteuerter Bewegungskontrolle, währenddem die allen Lebewesen zukommenden biologischen Grundfunktionen wie (...) Stoffwechsel, Nahrungsaufnahme, Wachstum und Organbildung dem Bereich der ‚Anima vegetativa‘ zugeordnet werden. Ein weiterer zentraler Aspekt der aristotelischen Biopsychologie, welcher erst seit kurzem wieder Einzug in die modernen Biowissenschaften hält, ist das Verständnis lebender Organismen als Akteure, die zu zielgerichteter Tätigkeit befähigt sind. Währenddem Evolutionswissenschaftler dafür den Begriff ‚Agency‘ verwenden und analysieren, wie diese Fähigkeit mit der biochemischen Entstehung von Leben und der natürlichen Selektion zusammenhängt, spricht Aristoteles davon, die Psyche sei die Wesenheit (eidos) und der Zweck (telos) eines natürlichen, lebensfähigen Körpers und dieser bloß ihr Werkzeug (organon). Auch wenn sich die aristotelische und die moderne Biologie bezüglich ihres wissenschaftlichen Hintergrundes stark unterscheiden, stimmen beide in ihrer Quintessenz weitgehend überein: Das, was einen biologischen Organismus ausmacht, ist seine Fähigkeit, selbst etwas zu tun zum Zweck seiner Selbsterhaltung, sei es als Individuum, sei es durch Reproduktion als Spezies. Die Seele/Psyche im aristotelischen Sinne erfüllt damit nicht nur irgendeine biologische Funktion, sondern die zentrale Lebensfunktion biologischer Organismen schlechthin. Der vorliegende Artikel versteht sich als einführender Teil einer dreiteiligen Serie im ‚Aphin-Rundbrief‘ zur Analyse des aristotelischen Konzepts der Psyche aus dem Blickwinkel der modernen Life Sciences. Im 2026 erscheinenden Folgeartikel wird die Frage vertieft, welches Potenzial dieses zur Überwindung des Leib-Seele-Problems sowie zur Erklärung von Entstehung und Funktion des Bewusstseins enthält. Im Mittelpunkt des dritten Artikels wird dann der freie Wille stehen. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of the object of psychology in the context of recent attempts in philosophy of mind to restore the concept of the soul in the framework of a strong anthropological dualism. After an historical and philosophical explanation of the modern dismissal of the human soul as the object of psychology, this article provides a critical examination of the new turn to dualism by reference to an exemplary case. It is shown that apriorism and spiritualism are the (...) two fundamental problems that explain neodualism’s inefficacy to provide a convincing argument for the restoration of the substantial soul as the object of psychology. Finally, certain guidelines for a new approach to this question are proposed in rudimentary form. (shrink)

The world is searching for one ultimate truth—a single principle by knowing which everything in the universe can be understood and defined. Physicists pursue the elusive Theory of Everything, while neuroscientists and philosophers wrestle with the hard problem of consciousness. In this age of urgent questions, this book offers a revolutionary answer that challenges everything we think we know: the key is not hidden in matter, but in Consciousness itself. Drawing on cutting-edge science and timeless wisdom, it reveals that consciousness (...) is not a byproduct of the brain—it is the fundamental reality from which matter, mind, and meaning arise. The deepest crises of our time—conflict, inequality, ecological collapse, and human suffering—demand a radical shift in understanding. This book argues that Consciousness is the missing key—the foundation for solving every global challenge and every inner struggle. -/- When we know the knower, science expands—and life becomes boundless. (shrink)

This paper proposes the “Observer Constraint,” a principled limitation on scientific explanations of real-time qualia that arises from the fact that the observer is identical with the system being observed. I argue that any fully physical, causal description of conscious experience is subject to an intrinsic temporal offset imposed by information-processing and signaling constraints, including the universal speed-of-light limit. Because the observer cannot stand outside their own sensory-processing architecture, the physical basis of experience can only be accessed retrospectively—never in the (...) real-time immediacy in which qualia appear. This structural asymmetry between observation and experience implies that a complete real-time theory of qualia is impossible within standard physical causality. I further analyze how this constraint parallels quantum-mechanical limits on self-measurement, suggesting a deeper, formally specifiable connection between consciousness and physical measurement theory. (shrink)

Materialists about human persons say that we are, and must be, wholly material beings. Substance dualists say that we are, and must be, wholly immaterial. In this paper, I take issue with the “and must be” bits. Both materialists and substance dualists would do well to reject modal extensions of their views and instead opt for contingent doctrines, or doctrines that are silent about those modal extensions. Or so I argue.