Neuroethics

This article adopts a liberal perspective on political legitimacy grounded in the protection of freedom and examines the use of digital technologies as instruments of surveillance, censorship, and manipulation. By taking the cases of Egypt (2011) and Iran (2025) as illustrative entry points, the article highlights repressive strategies in the digital age and shows how political power may operate upon individuals’ psychological processes. The political dynamics associated with cognitive control and repression reveal the limits of the neurorights paradigm. While necessary (...) to safeguard cognitive liberty and mental privacy, neurorights remain defensive individual rights unable to counter the structural asymmetries generated by states and digital platforms. The paper therefore proposes Habeas Mentem, which incorporates and at the same time transcends neurorights by embedding them within a normative, constitutional, and systemic principle, as well as within a broader framework for balancing cognitive power. This framework requires the separation of digital power, antitrust measures, informational pluralism, and critical education, since mental freedom cannot be secured merely by prohibiting intrusions into the mind, but also by constructing the social and institutional conditions that prevent the emergence of mental domination. (shrink)

This article explores the intersection of science fiction, philosophy, and ethics in the context of emerging technologies, with a specific focus on Brain–Machine Interfaces (BMIs). It asks how the development and potential normalization of BMIs may transform our understanding of autonomy, agency, identity, and justice, and whether speculative fiction can illuminate the ethical and socio-political implications of these transformations. -/- Science fiction, with its imaginative exploration of alternative futures, offers a unique platform for anticipating the ethical challenges posed by technological (...) advancement. Speculative narratives invite critical reflection on issues such as autonomy, identity manipulation, justice, and the concentration of power in the hands of corporations and governments. -/- Through an examination of works such as John Scalzi’s Lock In, Mary Robinette Kowal’s The Spare Man, and S. B. Divya’s Machinehood, this article highlights emerging ethical dilemmas and the far-reaching societal changes that the widespread adoption of BMIs could give rise to. Ultimately, these narratives provide a philosophical lens through which to examine the relationship between technology and human values, offering ethical insights that may help anticipate future challenges. (shrink)

Neurotechnologies such as brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) and deep brain stimulation (DBS) raise distinctive concerns about human agency. A recent proposal by Schönau et al. (2021) identifies four dimensions along which neurotechnologies may threaten agency: responsibility, privacy, authenticity, and trust. Schönau et al.’s framework valuably maps how neurotechnologies affect users and has inspired qualitative assessment tools. Yet although it acknowledges interconnections among the four dimensions, it does not explain what structurally unifies them. This represents a key gap in the view. Assessment (...) instruments modeled on the framework, such as their Qualitative Agentive Competency Tool (Q-ACT), evaluate each dimension independently, risking fragmented assessments that miss the integrated nature of agential harm. I argue that agential self-trust unifies these four dimensions. Each tracks a distinct way that neurotechnologies can erode the self-trust constitutive of planning agency: confidence in one’s control over action (responsibility), in the boundaries of one’s deliberative life (privacy), in one’s psychological continuity (authenticity), and in one’s sensory and evaluative capacities (trust). This carries concrete policy implications. Current informed consent procedures for neurotechnology trials enumerate risks along separate dimensions without flagging the cumulative threat to a user’s capacity for agential self-trust. Likewise, assessment instruments should include integrative measures that track agential self-trust across domains. As neurotechnology governance develops at the international level, a unified account of agential harm within this dimensional framework can guide both consent design and longitudinal monitoring. (shrink)

Recent cases of forced explantation of neurotechnologies seem to be grounded on a pre-theoretical naturalist conception of the body as an entity that cannot have a non-biological object as a proper part. However, this conception has been challenged by functional approaches, according to which if an artifact robustly contributes to the function of a body, it is part of it and should be legally treated as such. Bublitz (2022) argues that a series of problems would result from revising the law (...) to accommodate an extended functionalist view and, for this reason, naturalism is the best option. We claim that it is unacceptable to endorse naturalism for purely pragmatic reasons while recognizing that it is theoretically groundless. We argue that contemporary versions of Autopoietic Theory can be used to provide a theoretically sound naturalistic view. We articulate a criterion for the attribution of degrees of bodiliness to any given object, depending on how closely it is related to autopoiesis, and then specify a threshold that defines the degree required to be a part of the body. Crucially, according to our view, only a very restricted set of devices can become body parts, which significantly mitigates the legal problems of body/device hybridization. (shrink)

This article presents findings from a first-in-human trial involving implantation of a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) into a quadriplegic patient. It explores the psychological consequences of being integrated into a continuous BCI feedback loop, focusing on how such intimate interaction can enhance users’ sense of empowerment and ownership. At the same time, it reveals complex ethical tensions surrounding the notions of agency and control. Our results suggest that prolonged engagement with BCIs can lead to a profound sense of integration—where users begin (...) to perceive themselves as part of the system. While this can foster a heightened sense of control, it also introduces risks such as psychological disruption and distress, particularly when users are abruptly disconnected from their devices or the device generates false positives (e.g. the device producing unintended outcomes). A key insight from our study is the emergence of what we term being-of-the-loop—a condition in which a symbiosis develops between the user and the AI system, giving rise to a de novo agency that neither could achieve alone. In this state, the BCI is no longer experienced as an external tool but as a constitutive part of the self, fundamentally reshaping how users perceive control, authorship, and action. While this integration can foster empowerment and restored capabilities, it also creates a fragile dependence: agency becomes entangled with the system’s functioning, rendering users vulnerable to false positives and identity disruption when the loop is severed. These findings raise urgent ethical concerns about psychological rupture and the risks of disconnecting a technology that has become embedded within—and transformative of—the user’s lived experience. (shrink)

Embodied robotic neurotechnologies such as medical exoskeletons or neuroprostheses can enhance the ability of neurological patients to lead independent lives and thereby increase their functional agency. Modern approaches leverage methods from artificial intelligence to detect neurologically generated intent and to automate complex parts of the actions based on contextual data. However, the potential broadening utility and apparent benefits of these neurotechnologies to restore, sustain, or expand individual agency can also incur risks of their overuse. Excessive automatization of movements could reduce (...) the causal influence that individuals exert upon their actions and thus may compromise their sense of agency. The construct of a sense of self and thus an identity to which responsibility can be attributed requires that a person is able to distinguish self-generated actions from actions of others, attribute their actions to themselves, and take ownership of the actions’ consequences. However, when parts of one’s movements are assisted or automated by intelligent robotic neurotechnologies, the distinction between endogenous and exogenous actions becomes blurred, resulting in a co-agency. In this paper, we discuss how this co-agency between humans and neurotechnologies can be shaped through the lens of the cross-cultural value of harmony, emphasizing the central role of intentions, balance, synchrony, and context. We argue from a cosmopolitan neuroethical perspective that embodied robotic neurotechnologies should prioritize supporting their users’ sense of agency, next to and above increasing their capacity for objective functional actions. Optimality should not be the prime goal of assistive neurotechnology, but a harmonious balance between human and machine agency. (shrink)

Providing ethical care for people living with dementia is essential for safeguarding their rights, dignity, and well-being. However, ethical decision-making in dementia care is complex, often involving tensions between competing moral claims such as autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, and non-discrimination. This scoping review aimed to map and describe the ethical principles, related normative considerations, and ethical frameworks discussed in the scientific literature on dementia care, and to identify how these have been conceptualized. Following the methodological guidance of Arksey and O’Malley (...) (2005), Levac et al. (2010), and Peters et al. (2021, 2022), a comprehensive search across five databases (Web of Science, Scopus, CINAHL, Medline/PubMed, and PsycInfo) identified peer-reviewed papers published in English. In total, 388 papers published between 1981 and 2024 were included. The results revealed a wide range of ethical principles and related normative considerations frequently cited in the literature, although they were typically discussed in an isolated way without reference to other principles or broader ethical frameworks. In contrast, ethical frameworks were mentioned far less often, and when they were, they mostly reflected traditional approaches such as principlism. Four gaps were identified: the plurality of ethical frameworks and limited conceptual integration underpinning dementia care research and practice; insufficient attention to ethnic and socioeconomic diversity among people living with dementia; limited consideration of diverse care settings and geographical regions; and the limited inclusion of people living with dementia themselves in the studies reviewed. These findings underscore the need for conceptually integrative, inclusive, and context-sensitive approaches to dementia care ethics that can better inform both ethical reflection and care practices. (shrink)

Thinking with Cases is an open, case-based introduction to bioethics designed for undergraduate and pre-professional courses—particularly in nursing and the health sciences, though accessible to any reader coming to the field for the first time. An opening chapter develops the conceptual toolkit such courses require: the four principles of biomedical ethics (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice), the major moral theories that stand behind them, the history of informed consent and human-subjects protection from Nuremberg through the Belmont Report, and the practical (...) skill of reconstructing an argument to locate the single premise in dispute. Twelve true case studies then put those tools to work, ranging across the field's classic and contemporary controversies: Dax Cowart's demand to refuse life-saving burn treatment; the Tuskegee and Guatemala syphilis studies; the He Jiankui CRISPR twins; conscientious refusal and provision in post-Dobbs medicine; racial bias in a widely used medical algorithm; the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Skrmetti; and the first transplant of a genetically modified pig heart into a living human. Each case presents opposing positions in their strongest form, reconstructs the central arguments in standard form, and closes on an open question rather than a verdict—inviting students to reach and defend their own judgments. The book is released as an open educational resource under a Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) license, free to read, adapt, and teach from. (shrink)

Psychedelic-assisted therapy (PAT) has several unusual features compared to other treatments. The most obvious is the psychedelic experience that patients undergo during therapy. Some authors, including myself, have argued that this feature is not only unusual but exceptional within medicine and that it poses exceptional challenges to common bioethical standards—challenges that no other treatment presents in this form. To address these challenges, the introduction of exceptional policies not currently found in medicine is therefore justified. In a recent comment, Earp et (...) al. [1] reject this argument for what I have termed Type-B psychedelic exceptionalism. According to them, PAT either does not possess exceptional features, or these allegedly exceptional features do not give rise to ethical challenges that cannot be adequately addressed by existing policies. In this article, I counter their critique and argue that Type-B psychedelic exceptionalism can indeed be justified, using the example of PAT’s capacity to induce doxastic changes. (shrink)

Returning individual research results (IRR) from observational brain studies confronts stakeholders – investigators, participants, families, clinicians, regulators, sponsors – with conflicting ethical, legal, and social considerations. The mismatch between stakeholder standards and expectations leaves investigators uncertain about whether and how to return IRR. We propose to clarify matters by exploring what cognitive liberty, a value salient in neuroscience, portends for the return of IRR from observational neurodegeneration research. IRR specialists have not yet connected cognitive liberty with the return of data (...) from observational studies, despite its similarity to autonomy, a prominent value in this literature. To make this connection, we completed a narrative literature review to inventory the different conceptions of cognitive liberty and assessed their relevance for returning IRR from observational studies of neurodegeneration, with a focus on amyloid-beta imaging results in Alzheimer’s disease. A title/abstract search of PubMed and Web of Science for “cognitive liberty” and a supplementary search returned 16 search results that articulated at least one conception of cognitive liberty, for a total of 32 distinct conceptions. We explored their relevance to returning IRR in two ways. First, we evaluated two of four core conceptions and found that cognitive liberty offers little new explanatory value about why IRR should be returned. Second, we examined two peripheral conceptions – mental integrity and informational self-determination – and judged the latter a defeasible reason to posit investigator duties or participant claims to return amyloid-beta results. Overall, depending on the precise conception, cognitive liberty motivates different stances towards returning amyloid-beta imaging and other IRR. (shrink)

Adaptive deep brain stimulation (aDBS) and other genuinely closed-loop brain–computer interfaces deliver stimulation according to a learned control policy that is continuously updated by the patient's own neural activity. This activity is itself being shaped by the stimulation. This paper argues that this architecture undermines the conceptual frameworks currently used to evaluate moral responsibility for actions performed by patients using such devices. Individualist, historicist, and relational accounts of agency each, in different ways, presuppose what I call a separability assumption: that (...) the patient's contribution and the device's contribution to action can in principle be distinguished and weighted, even where doing so in practice is difficult. I argue that genuinely adaptive systems defeat this assumption, not because patient and device are merely causally entangled (ordinary biological coupling is too) but because three features of aDBS together produce a coupling of a different kind: the device's policy is externally authored, continuously modified by patient neural activity, and intervenes on the very tissue whose activity is shaping it. The contributions the separability picture asks us to apportion are each, individually, joint products of the other. I then propose that aDBS sits far enough toward the structurally entangled end of a spectrum of joint-agency cases that the practical default for responsibility-attribution flips: distribution becomes the default, and any specific localization requires affirmative justification. Four loci: patient, clinical team, manufacturer, and regulator, bear distinct, irreducible kinds of responsibility, picked out by a constitutive criterion. To address the dissolution worry, I distinguish the synchronic locus of action from the diachronic locus of moral standing, arguing that the patient retains the latter through capacities the synchronic distribution does not defeat. I close with implications for informed consent and neurorights, proposing in the latter case a category of "constitutive rights" alongside existing protective rights. (shrink)

As explained in the previous chapter, human brain organoids are organoids that resemble parts or aspects of the human brain, and human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one type of brain organoid that mimics the cerebrum. They can be described as miniature 3D biological models of the cerebrum derived from human embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells. Insofar as these organoids accurately resemble the cerebrum in early development, they can advance our understanding of how this part of the human brain develops (...) and propel neurological progress. But given that they resemble a part of the human brain thought to corresponds to consciousness, the research development and use of HCOs elicit a question with substantial ethical implications: Can these brain organoids become conscious? Whether HCOs could become conscious depends on two factors. The first factor, which was addressed in the previous chapter, is how consciousness relates to the brain. The second factor, which is addressed in this chapter, is whether or not the neurobiological conditions for consciousness are present in the organoids. To this second factor, Owen et al. (2024) applied three neurobiological theories of consciousness: the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory. This chapter extends their work by applying several additional theoretical frameworks: Higher-Order Thought Theory, the Attention Schema Theory, as well as Predictive Processing and Neurorepresentationalism. After introducing each theory, we consider what it implies about the neurobiological conditions that HCOs need to meet in order to become conscious. (shrink)

Human organoids can be thought of as three-dimensional biological models developed from human pluripotent stem cells that resemble human organs. There are various types of organoids that resemble different types of organs in the human body, such as kidney organoids, liver organoids, heart organoids, and so on. Human brain organoids are organoids that resemble parts or aspects of the human brain. Human cerebral organoids are one type of brain organoid, which mimics the cerebrum. They can be described as miniature 3D (...) biological models of the cerebrum derived from human embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells. Insofar as these organoids accurately resemble the cerebrum in early development, they can advance our understanding of how this part of the human brain develops and propel progress in neurology. Yet, the research development and use of human cerebral organoids, which is rapidly advancing, elicits questions about what ethically responsible research progress requires. One significant question is: Can human cerebral organoids become conscious, given that they resemble a part of the human brain thought to corresponds to consciousness? Whether human cerebral organoids could become conscious depends on two factors. The first factor is how consciousness relates to the brain. The second factor is whether or not the neurobiological conditions for consciousness are present in the organoids. This first chapter focuses on the first factor, which is a central topic in philosophy of mind. We survey what several prominent philosophical views say about how consciousness relates to the brain or body, and what these views imply about whether cerebral organoids could become conscious. (shrink)

The ethical analysis of AI-generated content has developed almost exclusively along cognitive lines — persuasion, attentional capture, behavioral nudging, dark patterns in interface design. This paper identifies a distinct site of ethical concern that these frameworks do not reach: the autonomic nervous system. Integrating active inference, the extended mind thesis, and basal cognition, we argue that AI-generated audio, haptic, and ambient environmental content engages the organism’s predictive autonomic regulation below the threshold of conscious awareness and outside the scope of every (...) major regulatory instrument currently in force. We introduce the term SOMASTIADORE — sub-threshold autonomic colonization, self-administered under engineered conditions — and the construct of the uninhabited signal: AI-generated content that is sensorially complete but carries no embodied biological signature available for reciprocal regulation. Two mechanisms — entrainment and saturation — converge through a double self-sealing loop in which precision-weighting recalibration dulls detection while prefrontal inhibition of the dorsal raphe disables active resistance. We distinguish SOMASTIADORE from chronic stress (excess versus insufficient contrast), propose somatic dark patterns and somatic nudging as ethical categories identifying the same mechanism directed toward opposing ends, document six regulatory gaps in the EU AI Act, neurorights legislation, and FDA oversight, and articulate autonomic informed consent as a regulatory standard. A staged empirical research agenda with explicit falsification criteria is proposed. The argument is offered as a theoretically grounded extrapolation rather than a direct empirical demonstration. (shrink)

Advances in Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) have intensified debates about their alleged capacity to read minds and the implications for mental privacy. Prevailing accounts often assume that brain data can reveal inner mental states, framing privacy as a matter of data protection. Yet experimental demonstrations, such as PIN decoding or semantic reconstruction, show that successful decoding depends on structured tasks, controlled stimuli, and participant cooperation. This paper asks: what does mind reading with BCIs really mean, how should such results be interpreted, (...) and what are the ethical stakes? Drawing on enactivism, we reframe BCI-mediated mind reading not as direct access to hidden thoughts but as an interactional effect co-produced by technology, environment, and user engagement. From this perspective, protecting mental privacy requires more than controlling data: it must safeguard individuals’ autonomy and agency in sense-making and embodied expression. This reframing not only challenges inflated claims about BCI capabilities but also grounds a more robust ethical framework for protecting mental privacy and guiding neurotechnology governance. (shrink)

As neurotechnology and artificial intelligence increasingly converge in NeuroAI systems, concerns about fairness have become central to debates in AI ethics, neuroethics, and law. This article examines a recurring conceptual ambiguity in these debates: the tendency to treat AI algorithmic bias and neurodiscrimination as interchangeable. AI algorithmic bias concerns distortions in data, model design, or deployment that generate systematically unfair outputs. Neurodiscrimination concerns person-centred disadvantage based on neural characteristics or inferences drawn from neurodata. The article further examines the proposed neuroright (...) to protection from algorithmic bias as an important site where this ambiguity becomes especially evident and consequential: although framed as a rights-based response, the proposed right often translates equality concerns into the language of technical system design. The article argues that treating these concepts as interchangeable obscures mechanisms of harm, misallocates responsibility, and misdirects regulatory responses. Through analysis of academic literature, neurorights frameworks, and policy documents, it shows how conceptual slippage could lead to mismatched interventions: technical auditing may be offered where rights-based protection is required, while individual remedies may leave biased systems uncorrected. The article concludes that conceptual clarity is not merely semantic. It is a necessary condition for coherent, accountable, and rights-respecting governance of NeuroAI systems. (shrink)

Both scientists and philosophers have increasingly focused on the prospect of moral neuroenhancement—the use of neurotechnologies or psychoactive substances to facilitate moral improvement. Recent scholarship distinguishes between two main approaches: direct moral neuroenhancement, which seeks to implant specific moral beliefs, motives, or behaviors, and indirect moral neuroenhancement, which aims to enhance capacities such as moral reasoning, conceptual understanding, or self-control, enabling individuals to arrive at better moral judgments through their own deliberation. Several philosophers have argued that the direct approach is (...) ethically impermissible, as it risks undermining moral autonomy and suppressing valuable disagreement. The indirect approach, by contrast, is taken to avoid these concerns and is widely regarded as ethically permissible or even required. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge for the project of moral neuroenhancement—the discernibility challenge: for any given intervention, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether it truly qualifies as indirect rather than direct. We demonstrate this by examining a range of experimental designs intended to discern between these two types of interventions, arguing that the evidence they produce is ultimately insufficient for this task. The discernibility challenge, we propose, exposes a profound epistemic uncertainty with notable implications for the ethical permissibility of moral neuroenhancement: if we cannot reliably distinguish permissible (indirect) from impermissible (direct) interventions, we lack a crucial epistemic basis for ethically justifying their use. (shrink)

The contemporary psychopharmacological paradigm exhibits a profound epistemic and systemic bias favoring selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) as first-line modalities for isolated anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), irrespective of an absent depressive baseline. This thesis challenges this clinical consensus through a iatrogenic and neurophilosophical critique, demonstrating that the off-label imposition of serotonergic agents on non-depressed brains introduces pathological biological friction, acute neurological activation, and an iatrogenic discontinuation syndrome that medically and (...) volatilely exceeds the withdrawal parameters of traditional GABAergic agents. Utilizing an N-of-1 single-subject case design methodology, this paper constructs a conceptual model around distinct neurological phenotypes, exploring how structural alterations (such as post-traumatic brain injury mechanical shifts) isolate hyper-arousal into a purely somatic, hyper-adrenergic loop. We apply a rigorous neuropharmacological analysis to the mechanism of differential tolerance, establishing that while central receptor systems downregulate sedative actions rapidly, anxiolytic efficacy remains stable and preserved long-term without requiring dose escalation. Conversely, chronic antidepressant use introduces a profound chemical overlay linked to permanent limbic flattening, executive cognitive decline, and a protracted withdrawal syndrome that severely threatens cognitive safety and intellectual autonomy. Ultimately, this work provides a framework for the de-stigmatization of long-term benzodiazepine maintenance, arguing that for non-depressive autonomic phenotypes, targeted GABAergic stabilization possesses superior neurobiological integrity, bioethical alignment, and clinical utility over the algorithmic uniformity of modern antidepressant over-prescription. (shrink)

Emerging research in contemplative science and psychedelic neuroscience suggests that deeply entrenched patterns of selfhood and cognition—often associated with mental disorders like depression—can be profoundly altered through both meditative practice and pharmacological intervention. This paper presents a neuroconstructivist framework for understanding how deep meditation and dissociative catalysts (exemplified by the NMDA-antagonist ketamine) synergistically suspend the ‘constructed self’ and give rise to a temporally minimal mode of awareness preceding conceptual structuring. We begin by outlining the problem of cognitive rigidity and the (...) notion that the self is a construct generated by top-down predictive processing. In this view, the brain is a prediction machine that filters incoming sensory data through entrenched priors, creating a coherent self-model that can become maladaptively inflexible in conditions like treatment-resistant depression. We then describe how both intensive meditation and ketamine can deconstruct this self-model: deep meditation via focused attention and minimal-dual awareness training that quiets self-referential networks, and ketamine via pharmacological inhibition of neural predictive pathways. A detailed neurobiological analysis of ketamine is provided, highlighting its unique mechanisms (NMDA receptor antagonism, glutamate surge, BDNF-mediated synaptic plasticity) and contrasting them with classical psychedelic 5-HT2A agonists. We propose a “double inhibition” model wherein the combination of ketamine and meditation leads to an amplified suspension of top-down mechanisms (“ego dissolution”) through concurrent silencing of the Default Mode Network (via meditative absorption) and NMDA-receptor blockade (via ketamine). Neural oscillatory signatures (notably increased frontal theta and gamma coupling) common to both subanesthetic ketamine states and deep meditative states are discussed as markers of this low-construction conscious state. We further present comparative tables of neural and phenomenological features across normal waking consciousness, deep meditation, and the meditative-ketamine synergy. Finally, the paper explores clinical implications for treating cognitive rigidity and “stuck” self-schemas in conditions like refractory depression and PTSD. We introduce Ketamine-Assisted Contemplative Therapy (KACT) as a potential approach, wherein ketamine’s neuroplastic “window” of 24–72 hours (opened by rapid BDNF upregulation) is harnessed by contemplative practices to instill new, healthier cognitive patterns. Ethical and philosophical considerations are addressed, including the management of ego dissolution experiences, the necessity of skilled guidance and integration, and the insight into minimal-dual awareness as both a therapeutic end and a challenge to our understanding of self. We conclude that the strategic coupling of pharmacological dissociative resets with disciplined contemplative training offers a novel, synergistic pathway to ‘unlearn’ maladaptive constructs and re-enter a minimally constrained mode of present experience. (shrink)

Debates on the ethical status of disembodied neural organoids (DNOs) focus on whether, and when, precautionary principles should apply given the uncertain possibility of organoid consciousness. Some advocate applying precautionary principles to DNOs despite uncertainty; others deem such measures premature given current simplicity but foresee their future necessity; while more skeptical views hold that genuinely conscious DNOs remain too remote to warrant present ethical concern. By contrast, Croxford and Bayne [1] defend a more radical skepticism, as they claim that there (...) is little reason to ascribe consciousness not only to current DNOs, but to DNOs as such. They ground this view on a constraint-based approach composed of an Embodiment Constraint (EC) and a Representational Constraint. EC is presented as enjoying broad cross-theoretical support among externalists and internalists, and thus undermining the grounds for a precautionary ethical concern regarding DNOs. We examine EC and argue that, as stated, fails to meet the authors’ own requirement of representing a broad consensus among externalists and internalists. (shrink)

This study examines cognitive warfare through the lens of critical neuroscience and situates it within peace research as a methodological contribution. Cognitive warfare-understood as the strategic modulation of perception, belief, and decision-making-highlights how the human mind has become a contested domain of contemporary conflict. The weaponization of neuroscience unfolds within sociocultural contexts where empirical findings, theoretical interpretations, and normative commitments are deeply entangled. Drawing on Johan Galtung’s epistemological triad of data, theory, and values, I propose a framework for analyzing cognitive (...) warfare that makes explicit the normative dimensions of neuroscientific knowledge. This perspective highlights not only the weaponization of neuroscience itself, but also of its reputation: exaggerated claims and neuropolitical imaginaries can shape expectations, distort public discourse, and erode trust in science independently of actual technological capabilities. Applying this framework, the study examines resilience and solidarity as two domains in which empirical mechanisms, theoretical interpretations, and normative priors intersect. Cognitive warfare is shown to undermine resilience by destabilizing shared models of reality, while evolutionary and social dynamics demonstrate the long-term advantages of cooperation, reciprocity, and generosity over manipulation and defection. By integrating critical neuroscience with peace research, the article advances an expanded notion of peace as the safeguarding of mental and social autonomy-conditions under which cognition remains free from systematic manipulation and capable of sustaining cooperative forms of life. (shrink)

Background Informed consent in psychedelic-assisted services is ethically complex, difficult to implement, and remains largely unstudied and unstandardized. Objectives The current study sought expert recommendations on informed consent challenges, best practices and recommendations for supervised psilocybin experiences across various settings. Methods Participants with psilocybin content expertise and psilocybin providers were recruited with purposive sampling. Qualitative interviews on informed consent best practices and recommendations were analyzed using Thematic Analysis. Results Participants (_N_ = 36; 71% white; 53% female) reported providing psilocybin services (...) (64%) for a mean of 15.2 (_SD_ = 13.1) years in clinical trial, underground, or ceremonial settings. Participants viewed _informed consent as a process_ (Theme 1), necessitating a strong therapeutic relationship, centering client empowerment, and occurring as an ongoing process. Potential _risks and benefits_ should be comprehensively conveyed (Theme 2), including potential long-term psychological and social changes from psychedelic use, and the potential for disappointing experiences. Participants specifically recommended detailed consent processes around _touch and boundaries_ (Theme 3), including explicitly establishing boundaries prior to psychedelic administration, maintaining those boundaries throughout, and recognizing subtle non-verbal cues that may indicate lack of true consent. For _provider training_ (Theme 4), participants emphasized cultivating a deep respect for client agency, and experientially learning relational and boundary setting skills. Conclusion Findings may inform provider training programs, consent practices in varied psychedelic service settings, and improved safety practices. (shrink)

The Environmental Container Model (ECM) proposes that many difficulties with task initiation and participation are not problems of motivation or discipline, but mismatches between a nervous system and the environments it is expected to operate within. This paper establishes that for individuals with Volitional Dysregulation with Cognitive Preservation (VDCP) (Pines, 2026b), the primary barrier to action is Open Loop Overwhelm (OLO) (Pines, 2026a). A "Container" is a constructed set of conditions that reduces ambiguity, clarifies roles, and lowers the "activation cost" (...) required for participation. ECM reframes executive dysfunction as an environmental accessibility problem. (shrink)

Volitional Dysregulation with Cognitive Preservation (VDCP) is a neurofunctional condition characterized by a persistent and unpredictable severance between cognitive intent and executive activation. Unlike traditional executive dysfunction models, VDCP specifically identifies a state where high-level reasoning, meta-awareness, and intellectual capacity remain fully intact (Preserved) while the reliable initiation of physical or mental tasks is compromised (Dysregulated). This paper defines the core features of the condition, its relationship to environmental signal density (Open Loop Overwhelm), and its management through the Environmental Container (...) Model (ECM). It argues for the recognition of VDCP as a distinct clinical profile for individuals who are functionally impaired by the mismatch between their cognitive ability and volitional access. (shrink)

Introduction Brain-computer interface technology offers potential for non-therapeutic military applications, including enhanced decision-making and human–machine teaming. While ethical implications are frequently debated, empirical research regarding the viewpoints of servicemembers—the end-users facing unique operational risks—is largely missing. This scoping review aims to map the current state of the literature on empirically gathered viewpoints of military personnel toward non-therapeutic BCIs. Methods Three databases (EMBASE, PubMed, and SCOPUS) were searched for articles published in English through October 2025. Supplemental strategies included backward citation tracking (...) and targeted grey literature searches. Eligibility criteria required empirical studies (qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods) evaluating military servicemember attitudes toward brain-computer interfaces. Two investigators independently performed screening. Results Only two relevant sources were identified, highlighting a significant data gap. One survey study of 332 international officers found consensus on the need for pre-surgical transparency regarding post-service implant retention. A qualitative study of 13 special forces operators emphasized concerns regarding command pressure, data security, and the absolute necessity of guaranteed long-term, post-service maintenance. Conclusion There is a near-total absence of empirical data on servicemember perspectives toward military BCIs. The limited evidence reveals foundational concerns regarding trust, accountability, and post-service care. Neglecting end-user viewpoints risks creating ethically misaligned systems. We provide several recommendations for next steps. (shrink)

The use of neurocognitive enhancement is controversial. Some social actors and scholars support its application in professions like medicine, while others view it as morally problematic and suggest prohibitive policies. To examine how the public perceives the use of substances for performance enhancement in professional contexts, together with the motivations and consequences of this behavior, we conducted two 2×2×2 between-subjects design scenario-based experiments. The experiments build upon the Agent–Deed–Consequence (ADC) model of moral judgment. A Germany-wide random sample of adults was (...) used in Experiment 1 (N = 1,346) and Experiment 2 (N = 2,161). Both experiments involve scenarios in which a surgeon with either egoistic or altruistic motivation (agent–component) decides either to prepare for the surgery or to use the illegal substance “speed” for performance enhancement (deed–component) before failing or succeeding in surgery (consequence–component). Results show that the illegal substance use condition negatively impacted moral judgment, which statistically accounted for part of the association between the deed and the willingness to undergo surgery. The effect of the Deed on moral judgment and the indirect association of the deed with willingness via moral judgment were moderated by the agent and the consequence components. In summary, this research provides evidence that respondents perceive illegal substances for performance enhancement as morally problematic and that this judgment hinders acceptance of medical services. These results offer support for key assumptions of the ADC model within a healthcare scenario involving illegal enhancement, which could be investigated across a wide range of technologies. They also point to implications for professional bodies to maintain public trust. (shrink)

Psychedelics are increasingly being studied and used in clinical and therapeutic contexts, prompting renewed ethical and regulatory debate. Claims of psychedelic exceptionalism—whether “negative,” portraying psychedelics as uniquely risky and thus requiring stricter oversight, or “positive,” portraying them as uniquely beneficial and thus exempt from ordinary ethical rules—have become common. In a recent article, we argued that while psychedelics may involve distinctive constellations of features, these do not justify fundamentally new ethical standards. In response, Daniel Villiger and, separately, Edward Jacobs, agreed (...) that psychedelics should not be exempt from existing ethical standards (what Villiger calls Type A ethical exceptionalism) but suggested that their distinctive qualities may still warrant unique applications of those standards (Type B ethical exceptionalism). For example, Villiger argues that psychedelics possess certain features that do not, in his view, exist anywhere else in medicine, including the unpredictability and emotional intensity of the psychedelic experience, alongside a temporary lowering of psychological defences, leading to heightened suggestibility and sensitivity to context. He argues that such allegedly unique features call for exceptional policies around how existing ethical standards are to be applied—Type B exceptionalism. In this essay, we argue that the features Villiger identifies are only ethically significant insofar as they raise concerns about (inter alia) autonomy and vulnerability. But these concerns arise also in other medical settings. As such, policies addressing these issues would apply more broadly to other medical interventions raising similar concerns. Villiger thus fails to establish a genuine case for psychedelic ethical exceptionalism, even of the more modest, Type B variety. (shrink)

The challenge of making healthcare decisions for incapacitated patients continues to confront stakeholders worldwide. Annette Rid and David Wendler proposed a Patient Preference Predictor (P3) that uses population-level data to infer an incapacitated patient’s likely treatment choices, with the aim of aligning care with the values and preferences they held when last autonomous. Some objectors claimed this would fail to respect patients’ (former) autonomy because the basis for prediction would not be specific to the individual (e.g., based on data reflecting (...) their own specific reasons for preferring one course of action over another). In response, we proposed a ‘Personalised Patient Preference Predictor’ (P4) that would harness the predictive capacities of personalised large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on individual-level data of various kinds. The envisioned P4, if realized, would be akin to a ‘digital psychological twin’ or AI simulation of the patient that would encode their unique preferences and values to enable an individualised prediction of their likely treatment preferences. The P4, in turn, has been criticised on various grounds: philosophical, practical, and ethical. Here, we comprehensively evaluate the concerns of our critics based on all known published critiques as of the time of writing. While acknowledging the weight of some of these concerns, we argue that they do not entail that a P4 should not be developed. Rather, the concerns point to areas where thoughtful design choices, responsible regulation, and further philosophical reflection are needed to steer the proposal in a positive direction. (shrink)

Genetic counseling has long relied on the principles of non-directiveness and patient autonomy, yet these ideals become strained when patients face decisions that will fundamentally alter their identities and values. Such decisions, known as transformative experiences, challenge the basic assumptions underlying informed consent: patients cannot predict what the experience will be like or who they will become afterward. This essay argues that the transformative experience framework exposes the inherent epistemic limits in traditional models of autonomy and informed consent within genetic (...) counseling. By examining the evolving historical trajectory of non-directiveness and analyzing two clinical cases—prenatal decision-making after a Down syndrome diagnosis and predictive testing for Huntington disease—the essay demonstrates why counselors cannot fully preserve neutrality or facilitate value-aligned decision-making in these contexts. The incorporation of a transformative experience framework provides a more realistic and ethically coherent basis for supporting patients, enhancing decisional authorship, and potentially reduces regret. Reframing non-directiveness as an embedded, relational process rather than an isolated ideal offers a more philosophically honest and clinically useful foundation for modern genetic counseling practice. (shrink)

Empirical scholarship in neuroethics is steadily growing, adding greater context and complexity to conceptual and ethical debates Starke et al. BMC Medical Ethics 25:89, 2024. For example, qualitive studies have been used to understand what it is like for research participants to take part in implantable neural device trials Kögel et al. BMC Medical Ethics 21:2, 2020. These studies are broadly unidirectional when considering their impact through the lens of engagement practices: engagement with research participants takes place through uptake of (...) data collection processes, which are then analyzed for understanding and academic dissemination. Beyond one or two formal interactions (e.g., qualitative interviews, surveys) for data collection, with a few exceptions Illes et al. Frontiers in Communication 9:1267065, 2024, there have not been many efforts to promote iterative engagement between research participants and neuroethics researchers, which we will argue is a shortcoming that should be addressed. Focusing on research participants of implantable neural device trials or Brain Pioneers, this paper offers a conceptual argument and roadmap for why neuroethics researchers ought to pursue more bidirectional and iterative engagement with this community. Drawing on models in health science research, we argue that the framework of community-based participatory research (CBPR) can help fill in key engagement gaps not offered by unidirectional engagement: long-term relationship-building between Brain Pioneers and neuroethicists, creating opportunities for co-learning and mutual benefit. The CBPR framework can also help to further bring Brain Pioneers together, making space for community-empowerment so that they have increased capacities to collectively and actively advocate for their needs before, during, and after research. In addition, a CBPR partnership between neuroethicists and Brain Pioneers can better position neuroethics scholarship to identify and address immediate ethical concerns in implantable neural device research to ensure the fair and non-exploitative treatment of prospective and current research participants. (shrink)

The development of neuroenhancement technologies raises questions about their influence on an agent’s authenticity and autonomous agency, as well as the safeguards required to protect these capacities. The article distinguishes between cognitive and moral neuroenhancements, outlining their aims and the challenges in defining moral enhancement, particularly concerning its purpose and appropriate targets. I then examine how both forms of enhancement affect human agency, drawing on distinctions between authenticity and autonomy. While skeptics argue that neuroenhancements diminish achievement or disrupt identity, I (...) claim that such concerns depend on how new traits are integrated into the agent’s cognitive and moral character. I argue that neuroenhancements can support autonomous agency when certain conditions are met, including reflective integration, ongoing informed consent, and safeguards ensuring control and reversibility. Despite persistent uncertainties, the paper concludes that properly governed neuroenhancement can contribute to autonomous agency. (shrink)

The moral weight of preferences expressed by people with advanced dementia remains a persistent challenge for clinical ethics, in part because healthcare professionals (HCPs) often treat some such preferences as still deserving respect even while acknowledging that decision-making capacity is compromised. Drawing on dilemmas discussed in a 2023 ethics workshop in a Danish nursing home, we argue that HCPs differential responses are plausibly tracking a distinction between disorder-driven prefer- ences and authentic preferences that remain genuinely expressive of the person. We (...) defend a thin, procedure- externalist conception of authenticity on which pref- erences can be authentic even without higher-order critical reflection, and we argue that such authenticity can ground defeasible normative reasons for compli- ance even without autonomy. We address three chal- lenges and note converging experimental-bioethics findings suggesting that stakeholders’ judgments in dementia cases are sensitive to authenticity consider- ations. Given persistent uncertainty, we propose three defeasible, clinically usable indicators for presuming authenticity: (i) stability and minimal prioritisation in preference patterns, (ii) domain-specific mini- mal ("spherical") comprehension, and (iii) absence of salient distortion or undue influence. We apply these indicators to the workshop cases and illustrate how the framework can guide practice while leaving room for justified override in high-stakes or distorted cases. Overall, the framework extends current debates in neuroethics both rationalises a common source of clinical hesitation about capacity-based decision rules and offers a principled, action-guiding approach to care decisions. (shrink)

In the tradition of moral philosophy, long dominated by a rationalist paradigm, the idea of moral intuition has often been a source of embarrassment. How can the mind form a moral judgment within seconds, without any apparent reasoning? In the spirit of neuroethics, this book demystifies moral intuition by examining the mental and neural processes that generate such automatic evaluations. Addressed to specialists in philosophy, psychology, and AI ethics, the book systematically investigates three questions: how moral intuitions work, how they (...) can improve, and how they can be implemented in artificial agents. Challenging the dominant default-interventionist view of moral reasoning, the first part argues that moral intuitions play a dual role: they detect harm and help in the environment, and they metacognitively regulate the deployment of cognitive resources, triggering reflection when intuitive outputs are uncertain or conflicting. Building on this foundation, the book offers a dyadic classification of the cognitive biases that shape moral intuitions and critically assesses strategies for mitigating them, including reasoning, expertise, and nudging. The final part extends this moral-psychological framework to artificial intelligence, arguing that the implementation of moral intuitions in artificial agents is both a feasible and a philosophically defensible goal, compatible with the functional capacities of contemporary AI systems. In doing so, the book sets a new research agenda for understanding, improving, and implementing moral intuitions in both human and artificial agents. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has emerged as a promising therapeutic intervention for individuals with treatment-resistant post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, the ethical acceptability of DBS as a neurointervention remains a subject of considerable debate. These concerns include the reliability of therapeutic efficacy, the evaluation of safety risks, the adequacy of informed consent processes, and the potential effects of DBS on personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self (PIAAAS). Moreover, current ethical assessments of DBS for PTSD may neglect cultural sensitivity, despite (...) substantial cross-cultural differences in how therapeutic benefits are perceived, how traumatic memories are valued, and how personal change is understood, as illustrated in contexts such as the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and China. Therefore, to ensure the ethical application of DBS for PTSD, it is imperative to develop an evidence-based and culturally sensitive normative framework to guide clinical practice, striking a balance between the subjective pursuit of personal well-being and the objective demands of cultural norms. (shrink)

Abstract ​This paper analyzes the documentary My Mind & Me as a functional case study in Neuroethics and Active Agency. By applying the Langley Equation (A(B) = L > M), it argues that Selena Gomez’s public disclosure of psychological and biological "glitches" constitutes a deliberate Human Bypass of the standard celebrity simulation. This work explores the transition from a passive state of Maintenance (M) to an active state of Redirect, demonstrating how the "Involuntary Honesty" of a single Pilot can provide (...) a technical manual for survival to a global audience. (shrink)

A full answer to the problem of how to treat human brain organoids (HBOs) and other liminally conscious beings requires (at least) book-length analysis, but a significant part of the problem is disagreement not just about which moral principles apply to such beings, but which beings count as “conscious” at all. Van Gyseghem, Kierickx, and Barnhart (2025) survey the scientific, ethical, and philosophical literature surrounding HBOs and find an utter lack of consensus regarding which theory of consciousness is best, or (...) even adequate; consequently, many different theories of consciousness feature in the surveyed papers. They propose we move beyond consciousness as the subject of ethical analysis; I agree. I propose a framework for first-line ethical analysis with the more tractable subject of sentience. I provide four brief arguments for this framework: parsimony, ecumenism, conservativism, and the treatment of permissive theories of consciousness such as Integrated Information Theory. (shrink)

The development of biological sciences in the twentieth century clearly demonstrated that the positive and negative sensations and emotions of living organisms can be controlled by influencing the material structure of the nervous system. Today it seems quite probable that in the foreseeable future humanity will learn to artificially, at the physiological level, associate pleasant and unpleasant sensations and emotions with any stimuli and life situations, thus gaining the ability to artificially program their needs. This work analyzes the prospects for (...) creating and using such technologies, their possible limitations, and social consequences. It is shown that the factor of striving for individual survival will apparently allow people to avoid the most dystopian consequences and preserve the incentive for development under various social models — from completely liberal (even permitting simple artificial stimulation of pleasure centers) to totalitarian, based on the forced programming of needs. (shrink)

In Sect. 1, we describe a forthcoming technological revolution (the advent of 6G wireless technology). We then look at the increasingly close ties between the development of this type of technology and the emerging new field of embodied artificial intelligence (EAI). After quickly surveying (Sect. 2) recent advancements in EAI we focus (Sect. 3) on how the close integration between 6G technologies and EAI research might reshape the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and on what benefits and dangers in may (...) pose for our societies. Specifically, we analyze (Sect. 4) important philosophical ramifications related to this new, much promised, holistic and hyperconnected experience, in various domains. While we draw our readers’ attention to the potentially unexpected or unwanted nefarious consequences related to the implementation of this combined technology (6G + EAI), we also see in it a path for human flourishing. We connect this research (Sect. 5) with works on the extended mind thesis (EMT) in the cognitive sciences and argue that the future of our species will likely be one in which we will see increasingly holistic reliance on bio-artificial unions, thereby confirming EMT seminal intuition. We reflect on the risks and benefits underlying this scenario and claim that EMT could be used to guide the positive realization of the revolution underlying the development of 6G-EAI ecosystems. We conclude (Sect. 6), by summarizing what we have achieved and by pointing out future research directions. (shrink)

Sergio Canavero made headlines in 2017 for a controversial medical procedure – the world’s first human head transplant (HHT). Though the operation was only carried out on a corpse, and has yet to be successfully tested on any living person (if it ever is) the mere possibility itself raises serious questions for the philosophy of personal identity as well as form medical ethics in general. This paper explores an often neglected perspective on this intersection of personal identity and bioethics: the (...) Confucian tradition. While most existing debates are framed through Western metaphysical and individualistic ethical assumptions, Confucianism offers a fundamentally different account of what persons are and what medicine is for – one that shifts the terms of the discussion in interesting and profound ways. Confucianism’s relational conception of identity and role-based ethical framework provide a unique take on the questions of who the post-transplant person would be, and what counts as legitimate medical intervention. Understanding these differences is important beyond merely increasing cross-cultural understanding, but for expanding the normative tools available to contemporary transplant ethics and revealing assumptions that standard Western approaches often leave unexamined. Ultimately, we argue Confucianism would treat HHT as impermissible – not due to metaphysical or religious objections, but because (given the foreseeable medical consequences) it does not preserve the embodied, relational, and functional conditions necessary for moral cultivation and the good human life. (shrink)

Background People ascribe mental function to and place more emphasis on the brain than the rest of the body in mental health care. Here, we sought to understand whether this brain-body dualism extends to 1) beliefs about how much people can change their “brain” vs. their “body” and how these beliefs map onto attitudes towards mental health interventions. Methods We developed a new scale—Beliefs about Biological Malleability (BBM) – to measure beliefs about the malleability of human biology and the extent (...) to which biological malleability affects mental health. Undergraduates (N = 424) completed a survey with the BBM, reappraisal use and hypothetical mental health treatment preferences for traditional treatment (e.g., medication and psychotherapy) and lifestyle interventions (e.g., exercise and meditation). Results We found that the BBM separated into two factors: neurogenetics (e.g., perceived gene function and brain structure) and the peripheral body (e.g., heart rate and muscle size). The body was rated as more mutable than neurogenetics, whereas neurogenetics was rated as more likely to affect mental well-being than the body. Higher belief that biology is malleable related to greater reappraisal use. Greater belief that the body impacts mental-wellbeing related to preference for lifestyle interventions over traditional treatment, and preference for combining medication with psychotherapy over medication alone. Greater belief that neurogenetics affects mental well-being related to preference for combining traditional treatment with lifestyle interventions over traditional treatment alone. Conclusions Our results highlight the significance of essentialist and dualistic beliefs in students’ approaches to mental health care, and that universities may benefit from incorporating lifestyle interventions into treatment. (shrink)

Philosophers have argued that people with psychiatric conditions are vulnerable to epistemic injustice because their testimony is systematically, and unjustly, discredited relative to psychotypical individuals. Whether such differences in credibility amount to epistemic injustice is a normative question, yet whether and how they occur is an empirical one. In five pre-registered experiments (N = 1,908) on Prolific, we tested whether and when people grant less credibility to psychiatric patients’ testimony compared to other patients and to individuals without any medical condition. (...) We used vignette-based designs depicting both clinical and non-clinical settings to compare credibility attributions across these groups of speakers, and an incentivized prediction game to elicit beliefs about others’ attributions of credibility in these contexts. Overall, our experiments reveal that psychiatric patients’ testimony is deemed slightly less credible than the testimony of comparable non-patients in tightly matched comparisons. This surprisingly small effect was due partly to individual differences in its magnitude: participants who moralized epistemic injustice were least likely to discount psychiatric patients’ testimony, while participants who were skeptical of the phenomenon showed a stronger tendency to treat psychiatric patients as less credible than psychotypical speakers. These findings support the claim that psychiatric patients are granted reduced credibility by some audiences–in particular, by those who are least likely to view epistemic injustice as a genuine problem–a key empirical premise in the debate on whether psychiatric patients are vulnerable to epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The use of supportive touch in psychedelic-assisted therapy (PAT) and MDMA-assisted therapy (MDMA-AT) presents unique ethical challenges and opportunities. While touch can be a valuable component of treatment, its implementation requires careful consideration due to the altered states of consciousness induced by psychedelics and the potential for boundary violations. This paper addresses a critical gap in existing protocols by proposing a comprehensive, conservative model for the ethical implementation of supportive touch within PAT. Our framework features: (1) a structured two-stage consent-assent (...) process distinguishing between permission obtained in ordinary consciousness and psychedelic sessions, (2) a range of touch options with clear categories and boundaries, (3) protocols for ongoing assessment of touch experiences, and (4) practical alternatives when touch is contraindicated. Drawing from clinical experience and ethical principles, we provide specific guidelines for discussing touch during preparation, administration, and integration sessions. The model emphasizes cultural sensitivity, power dynamics, and individual differences while prioritizing client autonomy and safety. We discuss limitations of our approach and suggest directions for future research and the development of specialized training programs. By offering pragmatic guidelines that balance therapeutic potential with ethical constraints, this paper contributes to the development of evidence-based practices in psychedelic-assisted therapy. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that we each possess a right against interference with our body. In this book, Thomas Douglas argues that we each also possess an analogous right against interference with our mind. Douglas offers two arguments in favour of the view that we possess this right. The first appeals to intuitions regarding cases. Douglas describes a series of cases in which one individual influences the mind of another in a seemingly wrongful way, and argues that we can best (...) account for the wrongfulness of these influences by invoking a right against mental interference. The second argument appeals to the notion of self-ownership. According to this argument, our ownership of ourselves implies ownership of our minds, which in turn implies a right against interference with our minds. Douglas then turns to the task of defining the scope of the right against mental interference. On the view he develops, the right against mental interference protects us against some actions that alter our mental states via processes that are insensitive to the reasons that bear on the alteration. The interventions that most obviously infringe the right are ‘nonconsensual neurointerventions’—interventions that alter a person’s mental states by physically modulating their brain states—and are performed without the target’s consent. But Douglas argues that some psychological forms of influence can infringe the right too. Examples include the use of subliminal imagery and conditioning-based interventions, such as the use of loot boxes in computer games. (shrink)

This abstract was accepted for presentation at the Sixth Annual InMind International Interdisciplinary Conference. By reconceptualising travel beyond physical mobility, this paper examines embodied forms of imaginative, narrative, virtual, and ethically guided altered experience as compensatory and liberatory practices for individuals with constrained bodies, reframing exploration as a fundamental dimension of autonomy and dignity.

Informed consent for elective neurosurgery presents unique challenges and perspectives pertaining to the ethics of neuroscience. Interprofessional presurgical assessments marshal the full complement of twenty-first century clinical neuroscientific technologies to provide patients and healthcare providers with copious and nuanced information about the risks and benefits of various medical and surgical treatment options. In contrast, the ethical analysis and scientific study of presurgical counselling and shared decision-making in elective neurosurgery is relatively under-developed. Here, we summarize the ethical context for epilepsy neurosurgery (...) and spotlight a particular ethical conundrum in the practice of presurgical epilepsy assessment by considering the case of a patient recently seen at our epilepsy surgery center. This patient presented with frequent non-medical cannabis use which initially confounded the interpretation of their neuropsychological profile and thereby disqualified them from resective surgery. Through an iterative assessment-feedback-intervention process, the patient eliminated their use of non-medical cannabis. Subsequent neuropsychological reassessment revealed reduced psychological distress and improved quality of life and yielded an interpretable, favourable profile such that the patient and team then confidently proceeded with a successful right anterior-temporal lobectomy. The insights gleaned via serial assessment data from this single case underscore the importance of considering the confounding effects of non-medical cannabis use in presurgical assessment for epilepsy. Also highlighted are the broader threats to justice and autonomy – as well as the potential harms through action or inaction – when we fail to take appropriate account of sources of false-positive and false-negative inferential error in evaluating elective neurosurgery candidacy. (shrink)

Introspecting subjects are widely believed to enjoy some form of epistemic privilege with regard to their mental states. While it is unclear if introspective knowledge is indeed infallible, our authority in the mental realm derives much of its force from the sheer absence of persuasive competing interpretations. With the advent of brain-decoding technology, such competition is now being introduced. While the literature sees the danger of decoding mental states in their revelation to third parties, I argue that divulging them to (...) the subjects themselves is equally problematic: in addition to the introspective viewpoint, subjects will henceforth take on a third-personal, supposedly objective perspective on the same mental events that they are simultaneously observing from the inside. I shall analyse what it means to let oneself in via another route and explore the psychological effects that the ensuing confrontation is likely to have on our perceived introspective authority. (shrink)

This chapter explores the possibility of using advances in the cognitive sciences to develop strategies to intentionally manipulate human motivation and behaviour. The authors ask whether using the knowledge from the biological and cognitive sciences to influence motivation and behaviour erodes autonomy and, if so, whether this makes it wrong.

In this paper, we clarify the nature and the scope of the right to concentrate. We argue that a right to concentrate constitutes a right against significant, non-consensual interference with a person’s concentration-requiring task. An agent has a right to concentrate when others have a duty not to intentionally or negligently distract her from her performance of a task that requires concentration when concentrating on the task is in the fundamental interests of the agent in question. We analyse the protection (...) of the right to concentrate through different roles in concentration spaces, environments in which concentration-requiring tasks are protected through the governance of impermissible distractions and through norms regulating the access to and the use of such environments. This analysis helps us understand the relevant rights and duties in situations where an agent’s concentration on a task is in her fundamental interests. (shrink)