Science and Values

This paper demonstrates that modern science is structurally identical to engineering at the methodological level, while differing institutionally by adopting universal truth as a transcendent and unreachable goal. The argument proceeds within a three-tier architecture: Tier 1 (Noology) is the regulative layer of foundational norms; Tier 2 (Operatiology) is the layer of operational structural necessity, definitionally independent of measurement; Tier 3 is the layer of formal descriptions, models, and predictions. -/- All coherence evaluation normalizes to the evaluate–update–debug cycle that defines (...) engineering operation. The formal criterion of Translatability—a unique, exclusive homomorphic map from Tier 2 structural necessity to Tier 3 formal description—is orthogonal to falsifiability: the two criteria operate over disjoint variable spaces, and predictive success cannot establish structural correctness. -/- Falsifiability is shown to be a Tier 3 internal debugging condition structurally independent of science's own definition. Popper was the first to articulate, without recognizing it as such, the methodological identity of science and engineering. The discomfort that attentive readers have long felt with falsifiability as a definition of science is the correct intuition: it describes what scientists do, not what science claims to be. -/- The central theorem establishes that after decomposition into engineering (S ⊆ E) and philosophy (S ∩ P = ∅), no epistemically autonomous domain remains unique to science. Science is Authorized Engineering: engineering practice bearing the institutional authority of truth-seeking, sustained by the systematic misidentification of Tier 3 utility as Tier 2 truth of nature (Fictionality). -/- The following Python program demonstrates that multiple structurally distinct models simultaneously satisfy the falsifiability condition |ε| < σ, confirming that falsifiability certifies engineering utility only. -/- ◆◆◆ [PYTHON VERIFICATION CODE] ◆◆◆ -/- from numpy import polyfit, polyval, linspace, mean, abs, max from numpy.random import seed, normal -/- seed(42) x = linspace(0, 10, 30) y_true = 2.0 * x + 1.0 noise = normal(0, 0.3, len(x)) y_obs = y_true + noise sigma = 0.5 # measurement tolerance -/- models = { "Linear (correct structure)": polyfit(x, y_obs, 1), "Cubic (wrong structure) ": polyfit(x, y_obs, 3), "Degree7 (wrong structure) ": polyfit(x, y_obs, 7), } -/- print("Model pass_rate max_resid") print("-" * 52) all_pass = True for name in models: coeffs = models[name] resid = abs(polyval(coeffs, x) - y_obs) rate = mean(resid < sigma) print(f"{name} {rate:5.1%} {max(resid):.4f}") if rate < 1.0: all_pass = False -/- print() if all_pass: print("CONCLUSION: All structurally distinct models satisfy") print(" |epsilon| < sigma (falsifiability condition).") print(" This result is structurally independent of") print(" science's own definition (pursuit of universal truth).") print(" Falsifiability certifies engineering utility only.") print(" Science's self-definition is not operationalized") print(" by its method.") -/- ◆◆◆ [END] ◆◆◆ -/- Published on June 30, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21052267. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that if consciousness is practically significant, non-epistemic values may legitimately influence the conduct of consciousness science. Drawing on the literature on inductive risk and adequacy-for-purpose, I argue that value encroachment is not limited to isolated debates but is a pervasive feature of the field. Values can shape methodological and statistical choices, as well as the evaluation and selection of theories of consciousness. This reframes theory choice as relative to the aims of different epistemic agents. Finally, (...) I provide a framework for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate value intrusions in consciousness science. Overall, this paper offers new value-based dialectical moves to defend methodological and theoretical choices in consciousness science. (shrink)

The Hallmarks of Aging framework has become a widely accepted schema within geroscience, organizing diverse mechanisms of cellular and molecular decline. This article examines whether the Hallmarks function as a scientific paradigm and, beyond that, whether they have enabled genuine scientific progress—an angle largely absents from current literature. Drawing on models from the philosophy of science, the article evaluates the framework’s status and impact from multiple perspectives. From Kuhn, the Hallmarks act as exemplars within the damage paradigm, guiding “normal science” (...) without instigating revolutionary change. From Lakatos, they form part of a protective belt that stabilizes a research programme rather than producing theoretical innovation. From Laudan, they help solve empirical problems but leave conceptual issues unresolved. From Kitcher, their success lies in rhetorical and institutional unification more than inferential structure. From Galison, they are best understood as an instrumental “trading zone” that enables cross-disciplinary coordination. In sum, while the Hallmarks have brought coherence and methodological infrastructure to aging research, they may also constrain conceptual imagination—raising critical questions about the field’s long-term epistemic vitality. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical examination of the integrative field of sociogenomics which seeks to incorporate genomic tools into social science research on individual outcomes. I characterise sociogenomic integration as being guided by two main promises, which I define as the promises of credibility and trustworthiness. I demonstrate that for the social sciences, this type of integration has been associated with the promise of epistemic credibility, especially in the context of claims about causal effects of the social environment. In turn, (...) for behavioural genetics and genomics, the introduction of theoretical resources from disciplines such as sociology is thought to generate ethical trustworthiness by supporting a non-determinist, sociocontextual perspective on the role of genetic factors in individual outcomes. The paper offers a detailed analysis of sociogenomic research on gene-environment interaction (G × E) to illustrate what the two promises entail and to examine whether they are being convincingly realised by this type of inquiry. I argue that sociogenomic studies of G × E fall short on both counts: they cannot be said to measure complex dimensions of social organisation such as equality, and they are also not as clearly opposed to genetic determinism as their advocates maintain. I draw out the implications of this state of affairs for sociogenomic integration and for the role of the social sciences within it. (shrink)

O livro oferece uma introdução didática e rigorosa ao debate sobre a presença de valores na atividade científica. Estruturado em seis questões fundamentais, aborda temas como o ideal da ciência livre de valores, a distinção entre valores epistêmicos e não epistêmicos, autonomia científica, conceitos carregados de valor, risco indutivo e a gestão de juízos de valor na ciência, trazendo exemplos e discussões próximos à comunidade brasileira.

Recently, philosophers' attention has been draw to science done in response to ongoing crises, such as natural disasters, pandemics, or climate change. In this paper, I argue that extant accounts of crisis science, which understand it as merely faster science, are reductive and oversimplified. Instead, I characterize crisis science as a qualitatively distinct phase of science that incorporates a variety of temporal and causal scales and addresses unique communicative challenges. This fuller account of the phenomenon is then detailed with respect (...) to what some contend is the archetypal crisis science, conservation biology. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes and critically evaluates a distinctive class of objection to the Argument from Inductive Risk. ‘Expertise-objections’ question the fitness of scientists to engage in moral decision-making during research, on grounds of deficiencies in scientists’ relative expertise. Such critiques bring considerations of inductive risk into important dialogue with wider literature from moral philosophy; but, once contextualised therein, it becomes apparent that expertise-objections fail to decisively prohibit the articulation of moral duties for scientists.

Science advising committees are an integral part of many public policies and, therefore, affect the political legitimacy of such policies. The role of science advising in the policymaking process is complicated by the fact that science and science policy advising are value-laden. Thus, an account of what values are appropriate for use in science policy advising is needed so that the final advice helps ensure that public policies are politically legitimate. One leading approach to solving this problem is using a (...) deliberative democracy account of political legitimacy. In this paper, I build on existing objections by Soazig Le Bihan ( 2024 ) and Kristina Rolin ( 2021 ) and argue that this approach is underspecified and fails to adequately prevent the marginalization of knowledge and values of oppressed and minority groups in the science policy advising process. I explore how a different account of political legitimacy, public reason, addresses the problem of value-laden science policy advising. I then argue that Lori Watson and Christie Hartley’s () feminist account of public reason provides more detailed criteria for appropriate value influence in science policy advising, thereby better preventing marginalization. Specifically, their account requires the absence of domination and the provision of the social conditions necessary for recognition respect. Finally, I argue that these two criteria of feminist public reason can be achieved in practice if science policy advising committees adopt a combination of Helen Longino’s ( 1990, 2002 ) critical contextual empiricism and Sandra Harding’s ( 2015 ) strong objectivity. (shrink)

I build on Elizabeth Anderson’s account of local knowledge by defending a stronger relation between mētis and technē (Dependency). According to Dependency, the production of technē depends essentially on mētis. I argue for the stronger relation by appealing to the circulatory model of knowledge production from the history and philosophy of science. The refined account of local knowledge — based on Dependency — offers two key benefits: it strengthens the case for integrating indigenous knowledge in science education by demonstrating the (...) foundational role of local knowledge in knowledge creation and it provides a more robust counter-argument to the superiority position advocated by Daniel Kahneman. (shrink)

While the term ‘flood’ may elicit clear images of rushing water or overflowing river banks, genuine concerns around formally demarcating this phenomenon remain. In this paper, we investigate the phenomenon’s conceptual space, discussing its physical and social components. We highlight key features of the term, as it is commonly used, while illustrating existing conceptual challenges, including the lack of direct reference to the assumptions about how things ought to be, what the philosophical literature calls normativity, involved in setting relevance parameters (...) and the rarity threshold. We propose defining the flood phenomenon by referencing both its physical and normative properties. Within this demarcation framework, physical floods constitute pools or fluxes of water beyond a normatively-specified rarity threshold. A second demarcation occurs when a notion of desirability is used to identify if the presence of water is bad or good. Anthropocentric floods are then physical floods deemed undesirable or desirable. Recognizing the uncertainty present in identifying and adopting notions of desirability can then help explain instances of lack of consensus in communities, what we call interventional ambiguity, on whether to seek engineered solutions to specific flood-related problems. Our demarcation framework can facilitate cross-disciplinary communication and motivate further refinement of flood-related concepts. (shrink)

Book review of _Explanatory particularism in scientific practice_ by Melinda Bonnie Fagan.

How ought scarce health research resources be allocated, where health research spans basic, translational, clinical, health systems and public health research? In this article, I first outline a previously suggested answer to this question: the ‘fair-share principle’ stipulates that total health research funding ought to be allocated in direct proportion with suffering caused by each disease. Second, I highlight a variety of problems the fair-share principle faces. Like other resource allocation frameworks, the principle needs to address the aggregation and distribution (...) of harms and consider cost-effectiveness. Moreover, to make resource allocation recommendations, the principle has to be used in conjunction with real-world estimates of ‘suffering’, usually provided by the Global Burden of Disease Study. These estimates are disease-centric and only take ‘proximal’ causes of health loss into account. Applying the principle based on such estimates disregards ‘distal’ causes, including social determinants of health, thus skewing resource allocation towards biomedical research and away from public health research. Since public health research aims at improving population health while reducing health inequalities, the principle leads to inequitable priority-setting. The fair-share principle can only become equitable when due consideration is also given to ‘distal’ causes that are amenable to public health research and interventions. (shrink)

In this paper, we present technical review practices in High-Energy Physics (HEP) as a collaborative mechanism for managing epistemic risks in the design and upgrade of large-scale detectors. Building on the concept of phronetic risk, which encompasses the epistemic consequences of practical decisions in science-engineering contexts, and drawing on empirical research conducted at the ATLAS collaboration at CERN, we show that technical review facilitates collective deliberation over non-epistemic values, thereby shaping which experimental directions are deemed pursuitworthy. Our analysis highlights an (...) organizational approach to risk management in scientific practice, challenging the predominant focus on individual decision-making in the philosophical literature on values in science. (shrink)

This paper identifies two challenges for science-based policymaking in representative democracies and argues that both require institutional rather than individual solutions. The first arises when seeking to align value-laden choices embedded in scientific research with democratically endorsed values. The value-laden choices in different pieces of research interact once combined and can compound or offset each other. Therefore, alignment with democratically endorsed values must be assessed holistically at the level of the total body of evidence before policymakers. Since individual scientists cannot (...) foresee or coordinate these interactions, we need institutional mechanisms to manage values at the point where advisory bodies integrate evidence from multiple sources. The second challenge emerges from the incentives of advisory body members and policymakers to shape the evidence informing policy in ways that undermine democratic accountability. Addressing this requires a realistic approach to advisory process design that accounts for actors’ incentives and constraints. Taken together, these challenges show that integrating scientific advice into policymaking in ways that uphold democratic commitments requires an institutional approach. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the use of non-epistemic values in the communication of scientific information. We examine how values, by way of the precautionary principle, have been used to move from a deeply uncertain scientific concept, climate tipping points, to a metaphor which promotes political action. We argue that the precautionary principle has been used to produce a metaphor which idealizes the tipping point context. The idealization highlights specific features that are relevant for decision-making, including the potential for catastrophe, (...) while omitting others, such as the deep uncertainty related to specific climate tipping points. We discuss the negative impacts of using precautionary principle-like reasoning when communicating about tipping points, highlighting the potential to (1) mischaracterize the uncertainty present within the decision-making context, and (2) further politicize a scientific debate to the point of hyperpolarization. We conclude that when communicating about deeply uncertain events the precautionary principle ought to be used as a meta-principle directed at the research community, the more-research-needed argument, rather than as a decision-making principle for policy. (shrink)

Eating Disorders (EDs) raise significant challenges from a diagnostic and nosological perspective. Much of this is due to the extensive overlap among diagnostic criteria, with symptoms being shared by several conditions and subtypes. This nosological uncertainty is further exacerbated by two additional features of EDs, which will be the focus of this paper, namely diagnostic crossover and recovery. First, patients who acquire or lose one or more symptoms over time (symptom shifting) often transition to a new diagnostic category (crossover). Second, (...) researchers working on EDs have recently underscored a problematic lack of inclusion of patients’ perspective on diagnostic and recovery processes, which results in an incomplete understanding of key aspects of EDs. Drawing on theoretical frameworks and concepts from Dynamical Systems Theory and epigenetics, we present a dynamic characterization of EDs that allows us to tackle the challenges of crossover and recovery. In our framework, different conditions represent robust endpoints in individuals’ developmental trajectories that are nonetheless flexible in certain circumstances. Thinking about EDs in diachronic terms also prompts us to significantly reframe our notion of recovery, not so much as the return to health but as the generation of future healthy trajectories, to be pursued in compliance with patients’ self-perception and aims. Indeed, the key role of patients’ values in determining their future trajectories testifies how psychiatric categories are not merely descriptive but constitutive, influencing both self-understanding and clinical practice. (shrink)

Die Entwicklungen im Bereich der Open Science (OS) versprechen bereits seit einiger Zeit Lösungen für Schwierigkeiten im Kontext des elektronischen Publizierens und der damit einhergehenden Metrisierung wissenschaftlicher Expertise. Im Beitrag wird dieses Lösungsversprechen kritisch in den Blick genommen. Was wird eigentlich unter ‚Open Science‘ (OS) verstanden? Und mit welchen Herausforderungen sehen sich Initiativen in diesem Umfeld konfrontiert? In der Analyse wird ausführlich auf Sabina Leonellis Kritik an der derzeitigen OS-Bewegung eingegangen, die unter ‚Offenheit‘ v.a. ein ‚Teilen von Ressourcen‘ verstehe. Demgegenüber (...) postuliert sie epistemische Diversität und Gerechtigkeit als Leitprinzipien für künftige OS-Initiativen. Die Diskussion zeigt auf, dass die Problembehebung tatsächlich nicht, wie Leonelli meint, eine Neukonzeptionierung von OS erforderlich macht, sondern vielmehr in der gegenwärtigen Wissenschaftskultur selbst zu suchen ist. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird die These vertreten, dass gerade hier die wesentliche Stellschraube für gelingende OS-Initiativen zu finden ist, welche das Potential haben, dysfunktionalen Entwicklungen wie dem Datentracking durch Informationsanalysten nachhaltig entgegenzuwirken. (shrink)

The difference between holding a commitment provisionally and pretending to have none is the difference between intellectual humility and intellectual evasion — and what passes as metaphysical neutrality in contemporary scientific and technological culture is almost always the latter. This essay argues that the posture of neutrality, examined carefully, turns out to be unexamined physicalism: a specific ontological thesis functioning as invisible background because it does not experience itself as a framework at all. The essay’s contribution is conceptual disambiguation. It (...) distinguishes humility from evasion; separates methodological naturalism (a rule of inquiry) from physicalism (an ontological thesis about what exists); and clarifies why physicalism is itself a metaphysical position rather than the absence of one. The costs of the confusion are concrete: they shape research programs across consciousness studies, clinical psychology, medicine, and AI alignment; they thin the felt reality of ethics and meaning; and they narrow our understanding of what minds and worlds can be. This essay does not advocate for any particular metaphysical system, and its empirical applications are developed in companion essays. The claim is that metaphysics is inescapable, that pretending otherwise is epistemically irresponsible, and that intellectual honesty requires making ontological commitments explicit and revisable. (shrink)

Measurement of racial populations is commonplace in many social sciences, and metaphysical accounts for the reality of race implicitly assume race is real because measurements of racial populations are successful, and therefore are best explained by a realist account of race. This paper challenges the first premise in this implicit argument: measurements of race in the social sciences are not successful due to a number of epistemic issues with the use of race in social-scientific survey instruments. The paper concludes by (...) pointing towards a metaphysical solution that does not assume that empirical measures of race are coherent. (shrink)

According to 4E cognitive science, our cognitive capacities depend on, and have been transformed by, the environments we have made. Most early works of 4E cognitive science tend to focus on the upside of agent-environment interactions: they have made us smarter and allowed us to do more, despite the same, limited brain (and body) power. However, the recent critical turn focuses on the downsides of agent-environment interactions. Critical 4E cognitive science, as we call this emerging research program, adopts the 4E (...) frameworks and concepts but with a critical lens: questioning its hidden assumptions and leveraging its theoretical resources for social criticism. In particular, we distinguish two kinds of normative critique that bring out the downsides of agent-environment interactions. Prudential critiques focus on how agent-environment interactions can shape an agent’s cognition to undermine their own interests. Political critiques focus on how agent-environment interactions can shape an agent’s cognition to contribute to the reinforcement and exacerbation of unjust social forces. (shrink)

This feature reports on the first meeting of the Milano Logic and Philosophy of Science Network, held at Politecnico di Milano (12 March 2025). It focusses on the contributions investigating the roles of values and uncertainty in contemporary scientific practice. The five contributions presented by the authors are summarized, spanning climate science, medicine, measurement theory, and scientific classification.

Intelligence is one of the most influential yet contested constructs in psychology. Psychometric research, beginning with early intelligence testing and the proposal of a general factor of intelligence, established influential models that continue to shape scientific and applied work. Yet competing theories, challenging the focus on abstract reasoning, highlight ongoing disputes about the nature of intelligence and the assessment of intellectual differences among individuals. Central debates concern the relationship between measurement and theory and the ontological status of the g factor (...) - particularly whether intelligence is reducible to neurocognitive processes or must be treated as an emergent phenomenon. Contemporary research is marked by ontological and epistemological pluralism, reflecting divergent explanatory aims and practical needs. This pluralism also carries normative implications, as different conceptions of intelligence guide educational practices, inform policy, and shape broader societal understandings of human cognitive abilities. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a rational reconstruction of Hasok Chang’s (2012) “active normative epistemic pluralism” (ANEP). I identify the main conceptual resources Chang uses to define and support ANEP, and I assess the extent to which those resources vindicate his claim that the view both avoids relativism and yields a beneficial plurality of scientific “systems of practice” (Chang, The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2009, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(3): 205–221, 2011, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(2): (...) 103–122, 2017f, Reasoning in measurement. Routledge, pp. 25–38, 2017i). On the basis of this reconstruction, I argue that Chang assumes, rather than demonstrates, that ANEP can exclude from its remit inquisitive arrangements that are widely regarded as scientifically suspect, such as astrology. I then formulate desiderata for any version of ANEP that aims to non-arbitrarily exclude practices commonly labelled “pseudo-scientific” or “non-scientific”. I argue that these desiderata are difficult to satisfy not only for ANEP, but for any epistemic pluralism that relies on epistemic values or epistemic contexts to constrain what counts as “science” or “scientific”. The core difficulty is to non-arbitrarily assess the comparative legitimacy of different interpretations of familiar epistemic values, such as predictive power and explanatory strength, when those interpretations are grounded in distinct meta-epistemic commitments. I support this diagnosis with an exploratory argument that draws on recent work in hinge epistemology (Coliva, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 79–96, 2016, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10(3–4): 346–366, 2020; Kusch, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 120–142, 2016). (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to overcome the opacity of black box systems, i.e., to make them understandable to suitable stakeholders. In this chapter, I investigate how understanding depends on how much is at stake in a context. I support the intuition that understanding is sensitive to the stakes with a pair of cases. I further use this pair of cases to spell out how exactly the stakes affect understanding, particularly, outright understanding why. To do so, I connect discussions of (...) the concept of understanding with debates on pragmatic encroachment and on inductive risk. I zoom in on one necessary condition on understanding specifically, viz. the epistemic justification condition, according to which the beliefs involved in understanding have to be supported by sufficient evidence and have to cohere sufficiently well. I argue that, where the stakes are high, there are more stringent standards for sufficient evidence and coherence, and that this explains the stakes-sensitivity of understanding. (shrink)

This chapter aims to be a comprehensive (yet non-exhaustive) overview of the ways the concept of race appears across medical practice - including historical uses, patient–physician interactions, pharmaceutical development, the use of machine learning tools in clinical settings, the recording of medical statistics, the controversial and continued use of race norming in medicine, and the ways in which racism affects patient diagnoses and outcomes. The focus on the ways that the concept is used in medical practice is to illustrate that (...) an anti-realist ontological position (rather than a biological realist or a social constructionist one) is the best way to have a logically consistent position that can accommodate the empirical examples discussed in the chapter. The chapter concludes with a sketch of how to best deal with these issues with an eye toward future developments in medicine. (shrink)

How are we to understand situations where science fails on its own terms? Scientists have blamed perverse incentives for systematic epistemic failures like non-replicability and publication bias, but the exact relationship remains an open question. Let’s assume they are right to blame the (social) system. This paper presents a novel framework for understanding how features of the social organization of science are implicated in collective epistemic failures: the material theory of values in science (MTV). This project is inspired by and (...) follows in the tradition of feminist philosophers of science who have called attention to the need for explanations of systemic, specifically antifeminist, biases in science and for embodied models of scientists as epistemic agents. In the first part, I discuss the replication crisis as involving a particular type of collective action problem: a no-win standoff. The next part introduces the MTV and the explanation it supplies for this phenomenon. In the third section, the MTV is compared to several alternative explanatory strategies, including from the contemporary literature values in science and social epistemology, specifically agent-based computational models. I argue for why my approach is preferable and describe an important revision it entails for the general Mertonian sociological picture invoked in discussions of incentives in science. By way of conclusion, I summarize the philosophical task of the MTV, which is to take seriously the sociological and material conditions constituting scientists’ epistemic agency. (shrink)

An aspect of the Indigenous struggle against colonial oppression is the struggle for the inclusion of their knowledge in policymaking. Perceived as epistemically inferior to science, Indigenous knowledge and subsequently interests are systematically excluded in science-based policy. This article advances an anti-colonial political philosophy of science. As Indigenous knowledge feeds into the necessary political value judgments in policy-relevant science, Indigenous knowledge inclusion, I contend, should be treated as a political, not solely epistemic, matter. I further argue that Indigenous peoples, not (...) just scientists, should have the power to make such political value judgments given the politics of representation under coloniality. (shrink)

Essay review on Chrysostomos Mantzavinos’ The Constitution of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024, 214 pp., €31,54 (Paperback), ISBN: 978-1-009-50917-6; Forthcoming at Journal for General Philosophy of Science .

At first sight, measurement might appear to be a natural candidate for a scientific practice that is value-free. This chapter reviews prominent arguments supporting the opposite view, i.e., that values play significant roles in measurement practices. Some of the arguments reviewed concern background assumptions underlying the pursuit of measurement and shaping its character. Other arguments focus on the various socially significant consequences of measurement practices (or aspects thereof), while still others focus on the content of the concepts being measured and (...) how scientists specify such contents. In discussing these arguments, the chapter aims to demonstrate the importance of greater engagement between the values-in-science literature and the historical-philosophical literature on measurement. (shrink)

Open science is good for both epistemic and social reasons, but in nonobvious ways, it can have detrimental epistemic side effects. Drawing on case studies and the social epistemology of science, I show how practices intended to increase transparency, communication, and information sharing in science can backfire. We should not reject Open Science, just implement it carefully. I argue that we can do so by treating openness as a governing value in science, and thus, that our pursuit of openness needs (...) to be balanced against our pursuit of the whole scheme of values that govern science. (shrink)

Considerations of realism and pluralism pervade Feyerabend’s later works, as they do in his earlier corpus. However, Conquest of Abundance and surrounding papers mark Feyerabend’s first sustained foray into metaphysics. Specifically, he hypothesizes a pluralist realism that incorporates Kantian and constructivist elements. This work was composed when the ‘metaphysical disunity’ hypothesis was fashionable among members of the ‘Stanford School’. After building on previous explorations of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics (‘abundance realism’), we compare Feyerabend’s later works to prominent formulations of metaphysical pluralism (...) in the Stanford School. We point to overlaps and divergences between Feyerabend’s later metaphysical pluralism and the formulations in the Stanford School. Despite significant intellectual overlap, the historical connections between Feyerabend’s later work and the Stanford School remain minimal. We argue that this is largely due to Feyerabend’s self-isolation from academic philosophy in the 1980s and his radical antiscientism. Moreover, we argue that Feyerabend’s metaphysics naturally extend from his attempts to situate science in diverse, democratic societies with hints of his later metaphysics in earlier writings, suggesting that Feyerabend’s “metaphysical turn” represents a shift in emphasis rather than a substantive change of position. (shrink)

In recent decades, a complex regime of national, regional, and global climate assessments has emerged to apprehend the vast body of evidence on climate change and deliver authoritative reports to policymakers. Focusing on the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, this chapter synthesises insights across recent philosophy of science, together with the broader findings of “assessment studies”, to outline the many ways in which social, ethical, and political values impinge on climate assessment reports. Notably, the chapter demonstrates how (...) entrenched social-epistemic features of assessment – features that remain stable despite changes in authorship – constrain the agency of authors and the decisions that can be entertained in assessment. These features include the institutionalisation, political constitution, synthesis-orientation, curatorial nature, and agenda-setting power of assessments. Thus, the chapter provides an institutional analysis of values in climate assessment reports that does not reduce to tracking the psychological states or moral compasses of authoring scientists. (shrink)

In this chapter, we identify four specific subtypes of epistemic injustice that target Indigenous knowledge systems, practices, products, and methods of transmission. These four subtypes of epistemic injustice are: cultural-methodological epistemic injustice, epistemic diminishment, epistemic cultural disruption, and epistemic biophysical disruption. These subtypes identify avenues for the framework of transformative justice targeting these epistemic injustices and their harms. We provide three case studies from the Salish Sea, in British Columbia, Canada, of epistemic transformative justice, described as responses to these subtypes (...) of epistemic injustice. The first involves Indigenous archaeological work on marine resource use over long spans of history. The second involves a Squamish First Nation-led collaborative herring monitoring initiative. The third is about work on revitalizing Straits Salish reef net fishing technology. (shrink)

The idea that political debate should be resolved through knowledge —by deferring to those with more knowledge— recurs persistently in discussions of governance. In these turbulent times, in which democracy faces increasing skepticism, it is worth critically examining the proposals that “epistemize” democracy. In this contribution, I discuss epistemological as well as philosophy of science arguments against epistocracy, defending that democracy remains superior even on purely epistemic terms. In doing so, I also highlight the surprising parallels between technocracy and so-called (...) populism. On the basis of a good understanding of scientific pluralism and the role of values in the sciences, we can elaborate an alternative to epistocracy, technocracy and populism: one that calls for a deeper democratization of both science and policymaking. This approach revitalizes political, democratic debate as a space where competing interests, values, and visions for society are deliberated and weighed —rather than framing societal problems as mere knowledge deficits to be solved through more knowledge and expertise. In an attempt to make the best possible use of (scientific) knowledge in shaping policy, epistocrats overlook a fundamental feature of democratic politics: the clash of worldviews and the necessity of negotiating provisional compromises among divergent values and interests. (shrink)

Matt Brown’s Science and Moral Imagination (2020) offers a groundbreaking pragmatic pluralist theory of values, challenging the traditional value-free ideal in scientific inquiry. Drawing from American pragmatism and feminist philosophy, Brown argues for the cognitive status and evidential warrant of values in science. Despite its many virtues, in this chapter, I highlight some issues faced by this account, stemming from Brown’s focus on individual scientists and the significant impact of the commercialization of science on research practices. The transition to privately (...) funded research has influenced methodological choices and the integrity of scientific values, leading us to a dilemma. We could acknowledge that scientific practice has notably evolved to align with the commercial objectives of private companies, potentially necessitating a redefinition of scientific values. Alternatively, we could assert that commercialized science is dysfunctional, questioning the integrity of a vast quantity of contemporary scientific research. I conclude by pressing for the inclusion of the broader social context of science and its commercial influences in order to address the dilemma and develop a comprehensive theory of values in science. (shrink)

Digital philosophy of science has split into a normative, model-driven first wave and a descriptive, text-driven second wave. This paper argues for a synthesis of these traditions. We propose a framework grounded in normative naturalism for evaluating scientific norms based on their role in solving local, context-specific problems. This framework is advanced through three complementary digital methods: tracking norm effectiveness, computational modeling research systems, and analyzing scientific discourse. To demonstrate our approach, we conduct a detailed analysis of how reviewers use (...) the term “pseudoscience” in a large corpus of open peer review reports. This case study shows how combining quantitative methods with close reading can uncover the operative, and often implicit, norms that guide scientific communities. Our approach suggests that digital philosophy of science, by systematically examining scientific communication, can open new possibilities for empirically-informed normative guidance in practice. (shrink)

Wieviel Ethik braucht der Mensch, wieviel Ethik braucht die Wissenschaft? Vor dem aktuellen Hintergrund einer gewandelten Wissenschaftsgesellschaft von hoher Entwicklungsdynamik geht es darum, Anleitung zu ethischer Selbst- und Situationsreflexion zu geben. Denn die spektakulären Errungenschaften nicht nur im Bereich der Biomedizin haben jedenfalls vorübergehend Zonen von moralischer und ethischer Ratlosigkeit geschaffen. Sie eröffnen Spielräume, von denen nicht sicher ist, ob sie genutzt werden dürfen und sollten. Die Empfindlichkeit gegenüber den Nachteilen und Risiken der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation ist jedenfalls dort, wo die (...) Möglichkeiten verfügbar sind, so weit gestiegen, dass sich ihre praktische Nutzung längst nicht mehr von selbst versteht. Auch das Recht ist derzeit weder auf der nationalen noch auf der internationalen Ebene in der Lage, überzeugende Handlungsanleitung zu geben. Welche Ziele und Mittel mit den neuen Möglichkeiten aber verfolgt werden dürfen, ist in der Tat eine Frage nach der Legitimität von Bedürfnissen und der Angemessenheit der Mittel. Nicht zuletzt appelliert sie (die Empfindlichkeit gegenüber den Errungenschaften der wissenschaftlich-technischen Gesellschaften?) potentiell auch an die Tugend der Selbstbeschränkung, die vielleicht dort noch wirksam wird, wo andere Steuerungsmechanismen versagen oder zu schwach sind. Diese komplexe Problemlage bei der Suche nach einer neuen Wertordnung an den Grenzen der Anwendung von Forschung und Wissenschaft hat der Ethik derzeit eine unerwartete Konjunktur beschert. (shrink)

NASA and the CNSA have both released plans for lunar human exploration. This paper reviews those plans through the lens of strategic capability development. It examines the history of NASA’s development of bioregenerative space habitation systems and shows how past research and policy decisions, including funding cuts and program discontinuations, have led to critical gaps in current NASA capabilities. These gaps pose a strategic risk to US leadership in human space exploration that must be addressed urgently to sustain international competitiveness. (...) It concludes with recommendations for program investments crucial for the deployment of mature bioregenerative technologies in the coming decade. (shrink)

That science is value-dependent has been taken to raise problems for the democratic legitimacy of scientifically-informed public policy. An increasingly common solution is to propose that science itself ought to be ‘democratised.’ Of the literature aiming to provide principled means of facilitating such, most has been largely concerned with developing accounts of how public values might be identified in order to resolve scientific value-judgements. Through a case-study of the World Health Organisation’s 2009 redefinition of ‘pandemic’ in response to H1N1, this (...) paper proposes that this emphasis might be unhelpfully pre-emptive, pending more thorough consideration of the question of whose values different varieties of epistemic risk ought to be negotiated in reference to. A choice of pandemic definition inevitably involves the consideration of a particular variety of epistemic risk, described here as ontic risk. In analogy with legislative versus judicial contexts, I argue that the democratisation of ontic risk assessments could bring inductive risk assessments within the scope of democratic control without necessitating that those inductive risk assessments be independently subject to democratic processes. This possibility is emblematic of a novel strategy for mitigating the opportunity costs that successful democratisation would incur for scientists: careful attention to the different normative stakes of different epistemic risks can provide principled grounds on which to propose that the democratisation of science need only be partial. (shrink)

Advocates for open science argue that it democratizes access to and benefits from scientific knowledge. However, large-scale infrastructures such as public scientific databases are typically managed by closed organizations not subject to public democratic governance and that rely on a mix of volunteering, philanthropy, and service revenue alongside public funds. We argue that organizations are fruitful and overlooked objects of study for setting and implementing policies for open science to achieve just and equitable benefits. To this point, we show how (...) social science theories of organizational path dependence and cumulative advantage predict that commonly adopted organizational policies will lead to negative outcomes under a wide range of conditions. In particular, we focus on epistemic oppression, which Kristie Dotson defines as persistent epistemic exclusion from knowledge production. We use examples from biodiversity science to illustrate how our theoretical inferences can apply to current practices. While advocates of open science highlight its intended benefits for justice, we hypothesize that openness will generally exacerbate oppression without additional measures to change the governance of the organizations involved. (shrink)

Many scientists, philosophers, and commentators of science have argued that science ought to made responsive to the public, or ought to be “democratized”. This chapter begins by showing that the case for making science responsive to the public compares favorably to the case for making other critical institutions - such as a society’s educational or health care system - responsive to the public. It then shows several ways that science is not currently responsive to the public. It concludes by discussing (...) three unresolved philosophical questions that must be answered in order to determine what it would mean for science to be appropriately responsive to the public. The first comes from the importance of looking at science as a complex system; the second and third arise from considering diversity within the public and within the scientific community, respectively. (shrink)

We humans are diverse. But how to understand human diversity in the case of cognitive diversity? This Element discusses how to properly investigate human behavioural and cognitive diversity, how to scientifically represent, and how to explain cognitive diversity. Since there are various methodological approaches and explanatory agendas across the cognitive and behavioural sciences, which can be more or less useful for understanding human diversity, a critical analysis is needed. And as the controversial study of sex and gender differences in cognition (...) illustrates, the scientific representations and explanations put forward matter to society and impact public policy, including policies on mental health. But how to square the vision of human cognitive diversity with the assumption that we all share one human nature? Is cognitive diversity something to be positively valued? The author engages with these questions in connection with the issues of neurodiversity, cognitive disability, and essentialist construals of human nature. (shrink)

This book in the philosophy of law and risk assessment is concerned with the topic of the standards of evidence in legal proceedings and regulatory decisions regarding the toxicity of chemicals. The book argues that the scientific and statistical criteria usually used to determine whether substances are toxic are too rigorous and time-consuming for evidentiary purposes in tort cases and for regulation. The result is the under-regulation of toxic substances and the under-compensation of plaintiffs in tort cases. The book proposes (...) the evidential standards now used should be evaluated with the purposes of the law in mind. (shrink)

Discussions of science and values in risk management have largely focused on how values enter into arguments about risks, that is, issues of acceptable risk. Instead this volume concentrates on how values enter into collecting, interpreting, communicating, and evaluating the evidence of risks, that is, issues of the acceptability of evidence of risk. By focusing on acceptable evidence, this volume avoids two barriers to progress. One barrier assumes that evidence of risk is largely a matter of objective scientific data and (...) therefore uncontroversial. The other assumes that evidence of risk, being "just" a matter of values, is not amenable to reasoned critique. Denying both extremes, this volume argues for a more constructive conclusion: understanding the interrelations of scientific and value issues enables a critical scrutiny of risk assessments and better public deliberation about social choices. The contributors, distinguished philosophers, policy analysts, and natural and social scientists, analyze environmental and medical controversies, and assumptions underlying views about risk assessment and the scientific and statistical models used in risk management. (shrink)

Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Kitcher’s (Science in a democratic society, Prometheus Books, Amherst, 2011) takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of (...) what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand how his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink)

_Ethics of Science_ is a comprehensive and student-friendly introduction to the study of ethics in science and scientific research. The book covers: * Science and Ethics * Ethical Theory and Applications * Science as a Profession * Standards of Ethical Conduct in Science * Objectivity in Research * Ethical Issues in the Laboratory * The Scientist in Society * Toward a More Ethical Science * Actual case studies include: Baltimore Affair * cold fusion * Milikan's oil drop experiments * human (...) and animal cloning * Cold War experiments * Strategic Defence Initiative * the Challenger accident * Tobacco Research. (shrink)