Social Groups

This paper proposes a comprehensive framework aimed at deepening the understanding of hierarchical coordination mechanisms in complex systems by integrating Attention Agent Theory (AAT) with Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) from social sciences. The core argument is that in a collective composed of lower-level AAT agents pursuing their own "Existence and Order" (E&O), a hierarchical structure spontaneously emerges to achieve a superior collective E&O. In this structure, lower-level agents functionally delegate their "attention resources" or "selection weights" (analogous to delegated matters in PAT) (...) upwards to a specialized higher-level AAT agent (analogous to the agent in PAT). This higher-level agent guides the formation of "collective attention" through activities such as integrating information, processing information, and broadcasting coordination signals, thereby maximizing the system's overall E&O. However, this emergent hierarchical attention delegation structure also faces potential costs and risks analogous to PAT agency problems, such as information bottlenecks, coordination inefficiency, tension between optimizing local and global E&O, and structural rigidity. This paper analyzes these potential dysfunctional patterns by using PAT concepts as a functional analogy tool. Through applications to cross-domain examples (biological swarms, human organizations, computational/AI systems), the framework demonstrates its explanatory power, revealing the common logic of hierarchical coordination in different complex systems. The contribution of this study lies in theoretically bridging the ontological perspective of AAT with the functional analysis perspective of PAT, clarifying the intrinsic drive (E&O) and core mechanism (attention delegation) of hierarchical emergence, and providing new analytical leverage for understanding issues related to complex system organization, governance, and AI alignment. (shrink)

In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is (...) true on the speaker's intended interpretation, when the speaker does not intend to mislead and indeed intends to cooperatively inform, and when the audience incorporates the evidence from the testimony as they should. I conclude by arguing that these consequences should lead us to stop using such ascriptions. (shrink)

Psychological essentialism has played an important role in social psychology, informing influential theories of stereotyping and prejudice as well as questions about wrongdoers’ accountability and their ability to change. In the existing literature, essentialism is often tied to beliefs in shared biology—i.e., the extent to which members of a social group are seen as having the same underlying biological features. Here we investigate the possibility of “value-based essentialism” in which people think of certain social groups in terms of an underlying (...) essence, but that essence is understood as a value. Study 1 explored beliefs about a wide range of social groups and found that both groups with shared biology (e.g., women) and shared values (e.g., hippies) elicited similar general essentialist beliefs relative to more incidental social categories (e.g., English-speakers). In Studies 2-4, participants who read about a group either as being based in biology or in values reported higher general essentialist beliefs compared to a control condition. Because biological essences about social groups have been connected to a number of downstream consequences, we also investigated two test cases concerning value-based essentialism. In Study 3, beliefs about both shared biology and shared values increased inductive generalizations about the social group relative to control, but in Study 4, only the shared biology condition reduced blame for wrongdoing. Together these findings join with recent work to support a broader theoretical framework of essentialism about social groups that can be arrived at through multiple pathways, including, in the present case, shared values. (shrink)

Philosophers have appealed to a wide variety of different factors in providing a metaphysics of race: appearance, ancestry, systems of oppression, shared ways of life, and so-called “racial essences”. I distinguish four importantly different questions about racial groups that one may be answering in appealing these factors. I then show that marking these distinctions proves quite fruitful, revealing ways of strengthening existing arguments for the non-existence of racial groups, new avenues for addressing challenges to biological and constructionist accounts of race, (...) and a range of hybrid positions that have been largely overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

Nations are social groups that are often considered strong candidates for collective self-determination. While nations play a central role in many debates in political philosophy, they have thus far been neglected by metaphysicians. This paper develops an ontology of nations. First, I introduce the concept of a nation as it appears in political philosophy, distinguish it from neighboring concepts, and list a number of platitudes that a plausible ontology ought to respect. Next, I present a problem (which, following Allen Buchanan, (...) I call the “Infeasibility Objection”) that is considered a major challenge for national identity as a proper basis of political self-determination. I then present a minimal plenitude ontology of nations. This view not only respects our platitudes about nations, but also helps us make significant progress on the Infeasibility Objection. Finally, I discuss a number of objections to this view and show that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

Should we displace the moral responsibility from the individual to the social in accounts of oppression, discrimination, and injustice? Here, I consider anti-individualist challenges to the explanation of social phenomena and of social injustice. First, I argue that those challenges are consistent with social phenomena that are constituted by people’s attitudes and actions, and I provide evidence from research in the social sciences to this effect. Second, I argue that putative paradigm cases of structural injustice are cases where individuals, or (...) collectives of individuals, have moral responsibility, or are cases with no individual or collective culprits, and where it is questionable that they are unjust. (shrink)

Kant’s interpreters often assume that his conception of freedom rules out collective responsibility for human badness. Yet in Part 3 of the 1793 Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, he claims that human beings “mutually corrupt each other’s moral disposition and make one another evil” (6:94.5-6). On the going assumption, this corrupting act would be something that individuals do to individuals; however, Kant takes it to be something “we” do together, as some kind of group agent. He also supposes (...) that our common corruption is to be overcome through the establishment of the “ethical commonwealth”, which he deems a “duty of its own kind” because it does not hold of individuals to other individuals but of the species to itself, ostensibly acting as a group agent (6:97.17-19). While many commentators acknowledge that Kant calls for a social solution to a social problem, almost no serious attention has been directed to his appeal to group agency and responsibility in this context. This chapter puts contemporary work on group agency — namely, that of Margaret Gilbert, Stephanie Collins, and Thomas Crowther — into dialogue with Kant to advance our understanding of a curious and drastically understudied aspect of his later ethical thought. (shrink)

When thinking about life’s meaning as a highly desirable final value, a very large majority of contemporary work in English-speaking philosophy has focused on the life of an individual human person. When thinking about the meaningfulness of the life of such a person, it has been common to maintain that we have in mind a cluster of related properties such as making a difference, achieving a purpose higher than one’s own subjective well-being, making sense, doing something that merits pride or (...) admiration, and authoring a compelling life-story. In addition, many philosophers hold that, in order to exhibit these properties, one would be wise to ensure that the parts of one’s life cohere over time. In this article I consider whether similar considerations apply at the group level. That is, I answer the questions of whether it is possible for a group such as a people, state, or lineage to exhibit the final value of meaning in its existence and, if so, whether coherence in the life of the group is likewise crucial for the realization of its meaning. I conclude that there are good reasons to think that groups can be bearers of meaning, which reasons have the implication that it is unlikely that the human race as a whole can be such a bearer, at least not in the same, robust ways. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a new approach to we-mode agency drawing on the concept of layered agency. I argue that agents can shut out their personal attitudes in favour of a perspective jointly established with other people. I can act as a member of the philosophy department aiming for what the department agreed on, even if that might conflict with my personal beliefs. I can shut out these personal beliefs for a moment and reason from the group’s standpoint. While (...) this observation itself is not novel, I provide an original account for this phenomenon building on C. Thi Nguyen’s proposal of layered agency. I then use this new account of the we-mode as a basic building block for conceptualising social groups and group attitudes. I end by showing how the proposal deals with common cases from the literature. (shrink)

Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present moral risks, often leading to harm or ethical violations. We propose a (...) second-order ‘duty of moral control’ that mandates closing these gaps to reduce risks within acceptable moral limits. Our analysis encompasses both autonomous machines and collective agents, acknowledging their similarities and key differences in constitution and moral status. We suggest four methods to close control gaps: ensuring artificial agents attain moral agency, providing meaningful human control, implementing safety engineering, and employing social control. These methods aim to responsibly integrate artificial agents into society. We conclude that a realistic approach, which addresses the practical problems posed by control gaps, is essential. This approach provides solutions to manage the risks posed by artificial agents while maintaining acceptable moral standards, ensuring we responsibly harness their potential and address the ethical challenges they present. (shrink)

From the fashion label Dior being accused of cultural appropriation after using American Indian imagery in an ad campaign for its “Sauvage” fragrance, to the backlash against Kendall Jenner’s afro-esque hairstyle in Vogue, debates about cultural appropriation have reached a fever pitch. In this much-needed analysis of the phenomenon Aurélia Bardon and Jennifer Page step back and ask: when is cultural appropriation wrong and when are we right to criticize it? Their analysis of wrongful cultural appropriation centers on three questions: (...) whether appropriation involves theft; whether it communicates disrespect; and whether it disregards requests made by marginalized groups about their cultural practices. Sometimes, they argue, it is structural injustice rather than individual wrongdoing that is at stake. They examine cultural appropriation’s political dimensions, asking whether the state should be neutral between appropriative and non-appropriative artistic expression. They contrast bans on wrongful cultural appropriation and the state’s using its expressive power as a speaker, spender, and educator to discourage it. They also consider the ethical questions that arise when cultural appropriation debates spur further debates about online shaming and cancel culture. Using cases from music, fashion and the arts, Cultural Appropriation: Wrongs and Rights will be of great interest to students and researchers in philosophy, politics and related subjects, such as race and ethnic studies, sociology, and cultural studies. (shrink)

Accusations of hypocrisy are a recurring theme in the public debate on climate change, but their significance remains poorly understood. Different motivations are associated with this accusation, which is leveled by proponents and opponents of climate action. In this article, I undertake a systematic assessment of climate hypocrisy, with a focus on lifestyle and political hypocrisy. I contextualize the corresponding accusation, introduce criteria for the conceptual analysis of climate hypocrisy, and develop an evaluative framework that allows us to determine its (...) moral significance. I argue that different instances of climate hypocrisy are problematic to different degrees, depending on how detrimental they are to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity. The resulting framework helps clear the confusion caused by disinformation campaigners, by distinguishing objectionable uses of the climate hypocrisy charge from constructive ones motivated by genuine concern for integrity. (shrink)

This article proposes an ontological approach to the distinction between truth and falsehood, shifting the debate from moral and epistemic registers to the material plane of language. Drawing on a critical reading of metaphysical traditions—from Plato to Kant—and their contemporary crisis, the text argues that truth is not a static property but a degree of exposure to the real, measured by the symbolic reor-ganization that occurs in response to friction. Falsehood, in turn, is treated as a structural possibility of language, (...) characterized by the suspension of proof and temporal economy. The distinction between truth and fiction is explored through its temporal, ethical, and political dimensions, engaging with the Ontology of Emerg-ing Complexity, pragmatist philosophy, and critiques of symbolic acceleration. The article defends that to think today is to inhabit friction, resist performative efficacy, and cultivate institutions capable of sustaining the duration required for proof. (shrink)

Testimony is a central concept in the epistemological debate on knowledge and learning. It is therefore surprising that testimony plays a minor role in the empirical literature on cultural learning. This raises the question of whether our approach to knowledge in epistemology might be missing out on some things when applied to cultural knowledge and its transmission. By taking the semantic component of knowledge in the compound folk-lore at face value, we aim to explore whether the concept of folklore could (...) potentially help out here. Three persistent puzzles concerning folklore and its study are discussed to this end: (1) What is the ontological status of folkloric objects of study? (2) How shall one safeguard folkloric objects, depending on different possible answers to the ontological question? (3) How could we distinguish fake-lore, i.e. folklore that is merely seemingly representative of epistemic groups, from more generally representative folklore? (shrink)

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman’s project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman’s claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggests that these forms of power share the same (...) basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power specifically helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we argue that Burman’s arguments for the conclusion that telic power can exist without deontic power are unsuccessful. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions as sets of constitutive rules, which are––in her opinion––the source of deontic power. Burman’s arguments are not persuasive because she disregards the plausible view that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a collective recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, a recognition of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require recognition of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is particularly useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that the relation between teleological normativity and the forms of telic power has not been fully clarified by Burman and requires a deeper analysis. (shrink)

I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock reductive / ontological dependence accounts of social groups arguably lack.

In this article, we propose meta-subjectivity and ideational analysis. Meta-subjectivity is a philosophically grounded social ontology that posits the self as a dynamic intersubjective and relational environmental process. Ideational analysis is a sociohistorical abductive method for studying the generation of collective belief systems and their structuration. We critique contemporary epistemologies found within the humanities and social sciences, such as Smith and Searle’s critical realism. Building on Storm’s metamodernism, we offer our perspective as innovation. We conclude with a call for greater (...) interdisciplinarity and methodological plurality in the humanities and social sciences, in the spirit of Storm, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. (shrink)

Political life presents a strange and persistent paradox. Decisions are made quickly, loudly, and with unmistakable confidence, yet their outcomes repeatedly miss their stated targets. Policies arrive framed as corrective, restorative, even inevitable, only to generate friction, distortion, or quiet circumvention once they encounter reality. Our system appears active, forceful, and decisive, while remaining curiously ineffective at producing alignment between intent and consequence.

What can philosophy learn from social movements? In this volume, authors from various philosophical paradigms and disciplines (sociology, history) highlight the unique theoretical and political importance of social movements, bridging the abstract realm of philosophy with the concrete realm of social reality. Among the movements explored are the Climate Justice movement, the Disabled People’s Movement, and the Chinese antilockdown protests.

Praise and blame can function to manage membership in informal social groups. We can be praised into groups, like if you remark on my good taste in music and invite me to have lunch with you. We can be blamed out of groups, like if I’m rude to your spouse and you stop inviting me to parties. These can move in the opposite direction, with praise removing you from a group and blame drawing you in. If we attend to the (...) way praise and blame shape our social world, we can revisit some debates about the ethics of praise and blame with new eyes. (shrink)

I argue against group agent realism, or the view that groups have irreducible mental states. If group agents have irreducible mental states, as realists assume, then the best group agent realist explanation of corporate agents features only basic mental states with at most one motivational function each. But the best group agent realist explanation of corporate agents does not feature only basic mental states with at most one motivational function each. So corporate agents lack irreducible mental states. How so? I (...) defend the conditional with an argument from disagreement. On cognitivist approaches to desire, desires function to both motivate and represent the world. Yet such desires are subject to a significant amount of disagreement. Reflection on the folk-psychological properties of desire and belief suggest that this disagreement is better explained by a non-cognitivist approach to desire where they do not have both functions. I then defend the claim that realists are committed to at least some cognitivist motivational states. Using the example of fire brigades, I argue that the best realist explanation of group agents involves mental states with both representational and motivational functions. By modus tollens, corporations then lack irreducible mental states, period. (shrink)

It is common to ascribe agency to some organized collectives, such as corporations, courts, and states, and to treat them as loci of responsibility, over and above their individual members. But since responsibility is often assumed to require free will, should we also think that group agents have free will? Surprisingly, the literature contains very few in-depth discussions of this question. The most extensive defence of corporate free will that I am aware of (Hess [2014], “The Free Will of Corporations (...) (and Other Collectives)”, Philosophical Studies 168 (1): 241–260) rests on a compatibilist understanding which takes reasons-responsiveness and acting from one’s own ‘actional springs’ as key conditions for free will but says little about a condition that free-will libertarians emphasize: the possibility of doing otherwise. In this paper, I will argue that group agents can have free will not only in a (less demanding) compatibilist sense, but also in a recognizably libertarian sense, which includes the possibility of doing otherwise. In developing this account of corporate free will, I will bring together recent work on group agency and recent work on free will. (shrink)

This paper has two aims: first, to introduce a philosophical audience to research on implicit and explicit biases related to age; and second, to identify and explain ageist biases within social-scientific research. In the first case, evidence drawn from massive datasets, including both large language corpora and online tests with millions of participants, shows that implicit ageism has stayed remarkably persistent across time and space. This persistence stands in contrast to explicit ageism and other implicit biases, many of which have (...) declined dramatically in the 21st century. In the second case, however, researchers have been preoccupied with a small fraction of biases related to age: for example, against the old rather than the young, and against ‘old people’ in general rather than specific oppressed older subgroups. Claims about the all-around intransigence of ageism are thus oversimplified overgeneralizations, which fail to heed lessons from contextual, embodied, critical, and intersectional perspectives on the social mind and world. Stubbornly flawed assumptions and methods have prevented the social sciences from addressing core questions for intergenerational justice, including the systematic disempowerment of the young. Fortunately, there is nothing inevitable leading to these oversights; empirical developments in the 2020s suggest that these limitations can—and have begun to be—overcome. (shrink)

The social groups we are often concerned with, such as clubs, teams, and bands, are relatively organized. Structures, as complex properties of collections of individuals, play a central role in providing the existence and identity conditions, among other things, for such organized groups. A structuralist view is one that individuates groups primarily in terms of their structures, as opposed to only in terms of their members. Any structuralist view must be able to accommodate not only changes in membership, when a (...) group gains or loses members, but also structural changes, such as when a group gains or loses roles in its structure. I describe and refine two versions of structuralism which allow both kinds of changes. The discussion further highlights the need for a richer conception of structure for the structuralist, in order to limit the kinds of changes that groups can survive as well as distinguish between structurally identical groups. I propose two such conceptions which better capture the complexity inherent in groups. (shrink)

In Speaking for Others: The Ethics of Informal Political Representation, I provide a novel conceptual and normative theory of informal political representatives (IPRs), who speak or act for others despite having been neither elected nor selected to do so by means of a systematized election or selection procedure. IPRs are everywhere. Some are internationally recognized leaders of social movements. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. informally represented Black Montgomerians during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and Black Americans generally throughout the course (...) of the civil rights movement. Me Too movement leader Tarana Burke informally represents survivors of sexual assault, abuse, and harassment. Greta Thunberg informally represents Generation Z or, as she has put it, “we who have to live with the consequences” of climate change. Others are just our neighbors and friends. But when they go to the city council meeting to give voice to our neighborhood’s shared interests, they become our representatives, too. Despite IPRs’ ubiquity and significance to our political lives, their role is conceptually puzzling, morally troubling, and markedly undertheorized. The central ethical challenge of informal political representation is that IPRs can provide valuable political goods to those they represent; yet they are neither institutionally nor procedurally constrained in the ways formal political representatives (FPRs) like legislators are. Moreover, IPRs are often the only political actors working to advance the interests of oppressed and marginalized groups, meaning these groups rely on their IPRs. As a result, relationships between represented groups and their IPRs can be inegalitarian and oppressive. How may IPRs permissibly undertake activities central to their roles without thereby wronging those they represent? This is the question that drives my book. (shrink)

In this essay, I respond to both David Estlund’s “But Do They Speak for Black People?” (this issue, 211–215) and Anne Iavarone-Turcotte’s “Speaking for Others Beyond Representation” (this issue, 217–228), commentaries on my book, Speaking for Others: The Ethics of Informal Political Representation (2024). Estlund asks whether my definitions of “representation” and “speaking for” stretch the meanings of these terms too far beyond their ordinary uses. In reply, I explain the senses of “speaking for,” “representation,” and “representative” I use in (...) Speaking for Others and show that my use is not novel. I further introduce what I call “the speaking for spectrum,” which accommodates a variety of related phenomena. I conclude by restating the main aim of Speaking for Others: to understand better the familiar but undertheorized social practice of informal political representation, whereby people speak or act for others despite having been neither elected nor selected to do so by means of a systematized election or selection procedure. Iavarone-Turcotte explores how the “novel principles and criteria” I introduce in Speaking for Others apply to contexts “outside the core of” the book’s central focus (217–218). She does so by raising questions concerning the relationship between representation and speaking for, self-appointed spokespersons, intragroup marginalization, and two principles I introduce and examine in Speaking for Others: the descriptive preference principle and the nonmember deference principle. In answering these questions, I reaffirm the scope of the argument advanced in Speaking for Others and welcome the application of my theory to novel contexts beyond that scope. (shrink)

Members of large, complex groups – organizations – often need to know what the group wants. They usually need to know what the group’s goals are to figure out how to best aid the group. But how exactly do these group members gain that knowledge? In this paper I suggest that one main route to member knowledge of group goals and attitudes is inferential and analyze that route. Some of the inferential mechanisms are based on human’s mindreading abilities, but members (...) also use evidence from within the group that has no analogue in reading other human minds. Overall, the inference basis for member knowledge of group goals and attitudes uses evidence from group behavior and from the inner workings of the group, in particular evidence related to the group’s decision-making and attitude-forming processes. I discuss these inferential processes in relation to empirical research on ‘line of sight’ and employee-organization alignment by Wendy Boswell and her colleagues and show how my proposal fits with the empirical findings. (shrink)

Proponents of corporate moral responsibility take certain corporations to be capable of being responsible in ways that do not reduce to the responsibility of their members. If correct, one follow-up question concerns what leads corporations to fail to meet their obligations. We often fail morally when we know what we should do and yet fail to do it, perhaps out of incontinence, akrasia, or weakness of will. However, this kind of failure is much less discussed in the corporate case. And, (...) where it is discussed, the view is that corporations are less prone to weakness. Here, I argue that proponents of corporate responsibility should say that corporations can and often do instantiate weakness of the will, and that this is important to recognize. Weakness of the will requires certain capacities that these proponents typically take corporations to have. And once this is appreciated, we can assess how corporate weakness might proceed differently than how it does for individuals. We can also begin a conversation about how best to meet the distinctive challenges for recognizing and correcting corporate weakness, using a number of resources from management scholarship. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers and scientists have done much to expand our understanding of the structure and neural mechanisms of joint action. But the phenomenology of joint action has only recently become a live topic for research. One method of clarifying what is unique about the phenomenology of joint action is by considering the alternative perspective of agents subsumed in group action. By group action we mean instances of individual agents acting while embedded within a group agent, instead of with individual coordination. (...) Paradigm examples are educational bureaucracies, corporations, and nation states. There is a phenomenological difference between agents whose actions are subsumed within a group action (“the university did X”) as compared to agents who act jointly (“we did x”). Attending to this difference clarifies what is phenomenologically distinctive about joint action. Appealing to an Aristotelian account of agency and to the metaphysical concept of weak emergence, we argue that what makes paradigmatic group action distinctive is the relative inaccessibility, un-revisability, and evaluative simplicity of the group agent’s goal(s) from the perspective of individual agents. This suggests that a distinctive feature of joint agency is the maintenance of a greater sense of individual agency. Put simply, joint agency is often experienced as an enhancement of the individuals’ agency precisely because our paradigmatic agential powers are extended intersubjectively as we act together. In contrast, group agency often involves a loss of the sense of agency, precisely because it is the emergent group agent that maintains the agential powers. (shrink)

Aesthetic communities offer us opportunities for collective, communal, and value-disclosing shared aesthetic experiences. This paper develops an account of shared aesthetic experiences andprovides an answer to the question of their significance: when they occur within aesthetic communities, their distinctive phenomenology is a powerful resource for creating a sense that our lives are aesthetically meaningful.

Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view (...) appears to work well with regard to – you guessed it – ‘simple’ scenarios but it is riddled with further questions and problems. In this chapter, we raise five problems for the Simple View: (a) We suggest that one cannot develop a view concerning the citizenry’s duty to promote just institutions in isolation from a conception of the ontological relationship between the state and its citizens; (b) We argue that it is not obvious that the citizenry is the right entity to be attributed duties in the first place; (c) We show that a plausible account of collective duties to promote just institutions must not remain silent on the complexities and difficulties amorphous, unorganized group face in vis-à-vis collective action; (d) We contend that without allocation principles for contributory duties amongst the citizenry, or – alternatively – a method for practical deliberation that is action-guiding in collective action contexts, the claim that the citizens have a collective duty to promote just institutions remains moot; and, finally, (e) We demonstrate that the problem of reasonable disagreement is a serious threat to a collective duty to promote or create just institutions – it potentially undermines such a duty altogether and allows for conflicting contributory duties amongst the citizenry. We hope that our discussion will ultimately help improve existing theories and conceptual frameworks with a view to better understanding citizens’ obligations to promote justice under non-ideal conditions. (shrink)

This paper is on the metaphysics and normativity of Jewish identity. It starts with a metaphysical question: “Can a Jewish person become non-Jewish?” This question and the related question “What is Jewishness?” are both ambiguous, because the word “Jewish” is ambiguous. The paper outlines five concepts of Jewishness: halachic, religious, ethnic, and cultural Jewishness, as well as being Jewish in the sense of belonging to the Jewish community. In some of these senses of “Jewish” a Jewish person is always Jewish. (...) In other senses a Jewish person can become non-Jewish. The paper closes with a normative question: Should a person who is Jewish, in the sense of belonging to the Jewish community, become non-Jewish? The paper explains reasons for and against staying in the Jewish community and in doing so highlights a tension, rather than telling anyone how they should identify. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that socially significant places such as countries, cities and establishments are immaterial objects, despite their being spatially located. In contrast, we aim to defend a reductive materialist view of such entities, which identifies them with their physical territories or premises. Accordingly, these are all material objects; typically, aggregates of land and infrastructure. Admittedly, our terms for these entities may also sometimes be used to denote their associated groups of people. But as long as countries, cities and (...) establishments are understood as places, we submit, they are all material objects: the physical territories or premises of their associated groups. (shrink)

Can a group be morally responsible instead of, or in addition to, its members? An influential defense of corporate responsibility is based on results in social choice theory suggesting that a group can form and act on attitudes held by few, or even none, of its members. The members therefore cannot be (fully) responsible for the group’s behavior; the group itself, as a corporate agent, must be responsible. In this paper, I reject this view of corporate responsibility by showing how (...) it pays insufficient attention to individual agency. By accounting for group members’ strategic behavior, we shall see how they control collective attitude formation and are therefore responsible for their group’s behavior. (shrink)

Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires treating people as agents in the appropriate capacity. We call this the Agency Attunement Account. This (...) view has the surprising implication that it's not only possible to fail in treating people as individuals but also possible to fail in treating people as members of groups, on the presumption that people's agency is sometimes nested in, and exercised via, agential groups. (shrink)

Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads to (...) a specification of the properties these intentions need to have in order to be genuine commitments. I then show how a structure of conditional intentions with these properties settles a collection of agents on engaging in social interactions that display all the features typically associated with shared agency. (shrink)

This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating and detailed picture of different kinds of social inequality will help relational egalitarians move beyond a discussion (...) of the justice or injustice of social equality as a single general category. (shrink)

Recently, there has been growing interest in the metaphysics of musical groups. However, the concern of philosophical theorising has mainly been on rock and pop music and the transtemporal identity of bands in particular. In this contribution, I will take a look at rap music and hip-hop culture and the related phenomenon of collaborations between solo artists. More specifically, I will examine whether collaborations, as found in the rap genre, meet the constraints imposed by Petersen’s hylomorphistic account of musical groups. (...) I will show that what I call full-blown collaborations satisfy all of the requirements that are thought to exhaustively characterise musical groups, except for having a name and a mental file associated with them. To maintain the distinction between musical groups and collaborations, and to provide an explanation for why only the former have names and mental files, I suggest invoking a further essential feature of the form of BEING A MUSICAL GROUP: the group-related attitudes and behaviours of the collection of people supposedly forming the musical group. (shrink)

The current struggles that antiracist activists have faced, though uniquely awful, are also part of a larger tapestry of what one might call spiritual and moral exhaustion. This problem has been recognized and many have called for clear practical solutions, including mental health services and intentional rest, for the suffering of those who work to care and advocate. There linger, however, deeper theoretical questions that have not received wide enough attention: What is the nature of the connection between the kind (...) of psychological suffering that affects caring work and oppression? Why does it seem that those who, by many standards, are the most alive to a life of virtue are also the most at risk for experiencing spiritual and moral exhaustion? In what follows, I hope to show that this connection is not mere happenstance but instead an essential feature of what happens when humans attempt to pursue virtue under certain sorts of nonideal conditions, particularly the conditions of injustice and oppression. To make this connection, I will lean heavily on Lisa Tessman’s concept of burdened virtues, that is, character traits that are fitting and reasonable for fighting injustice but that actually undermine a person’s ability to flourish. My small contribution to Tessman’s insightful burdened virtue account is to take it one step further. Many traditional accounts of virtue ethics—arguably all of Western philosophical ethics—have an individualist structure. It is our flourishing as individual humans that virtue is supposed to contribute to, and it is our flourishing as individual humans that these burdened virtues can undermine. In contrast, much of Christian theology posits a radical interconnectedness—we are, after all, one body. It is this insight that opens a communal possibility for hope despite oppressive and unjust powers. For, although the tragedy of the human condition is that doing the right thing can lead to burdened virtues that undermine our individual well-being, our hope rests in realizing that we do not bear our burdens alone. (shrink)

The extreme incidence and prevalence of rage-driven aggression and destructiveness in the United States is without parallel in any other industrialized country in the world. During 2022 alone, there were 647 mass shootings in the U.S. (in each, at least four victims were killed). Unfortunately these many killings comprise only one form of widespread rage in America. This paper seeks to answer why this is happening.

According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update Argument. An agent is morally competent only if the agent has (...) sufficient positive and negative control over updating their goal-seeking states. Positive control involves the general ability to update one’s goal-seeking states, whereas negative control involves the absence of other agents with the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with updating one’s goal-seeking states. I argue that even if purposive groups qualify as plural subjects or we-mode group agents, these groups necessarily lack negative control over updating their goal-seeking states. This creates a cut-off point for groups as duty-bearers: Organized groups may qualify as duty-bearers, whereas purposive groups cannot qualify as duty-bearers. (shrink)

Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed in response to Löhr's critiques, reflects on the role of experimental research in the development and refinement of philosophical theories, and adds (...) to Löhr's suggestions about the path forward. (shrink)

This paper argues that hate differs from mere disliking in terms of its “depth,” which is understood via a notion of “othering,” whereby one rejects at least some aspect of the identity of the target of hate, identifying oneself as not being what they are. Fleshing this out reveals important differences between personal hate, which targets a particular individual, and impersonal hate, which targets groups of people. Moreover, impersonal hate requires focusing on the place hate has within particular sorts of (...) communities, enabling a further important distinction between “insider” and “outsider” hate in terms of whether the hater includes members of the targeted group within a particular community or rejects them as “beneath” membership in that community. (shrink)

All too often, social kinds function as sites of oppression. To be a woman, to be Black, to be trans – each, in its own way, situates someone at the lower end of a social hierarchy. Membership in such groups thus constitutes a liability: notwithstanding the goods people draw from sharing in these identities, they also stand at perpetual risk of those same identities exposing them to significant harm. What, if anything, can members of oppressed groups do to counter that (...) oppression? In this article I explore one possible strategy: people can – and do – strategically invoke their membership in what I call ‘anti-oppressive kinds’, in order to contest the oppression they face qua members of oppressed groups. Focusing on one particularly salient anti-oppressive kind, the human, I first offer an explanation as to how and why its invocation might be politically effective, before considering some hazards with its use. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 2, Page 140-165, Spring 2023.

How should we understand the relation between corporate agency, corporate moral agency and corporate moral patienthood? For some time, corporations have been treated as increasingly ontologically and morally sophisticated in the literature. To explore the limits of this treatment, I start off by redeveloping and defending a reductio that historically has been aimed at accounts of corporate agency which entail that corporations count as moral patients. More specifically, I argue that standard agents are due a certain type of moral concern, (...) but corporate agents are not due that type of concern, so they are not agents of, at least, the standard type. Diagnosis: because corporations plausibly lack qualia, they are ‘zombie agents’ that mimic real agents. This explains why they are neither standard agents nor standard moral patients: they are not standard agents because they lack mental states, and because they lack experiences, they are, at best, morally notable rather than morally respectable. However, I then argue that we nevertheless have instrumental reasons to include them in our moral responsibility practices, both because that is what notability involves and bluffingly, and both when it comes to treating them as moral agents and as moral patients. Hence, we may treat corporations as part of our moral responsibility practices to a limited extent anyway. (shrink)