Applied Virtue Ethics

In this study, I explored the causal links among psychological functional components constituting phronesis, practical wisdom, identified in the Short Phronesis Measure (SPM) model. I focused on the multifaceted, interactive nature of phronesis for optimal moral functioning and flourishing as proposed in the SPM model for the conceptualization of the construct. For statistical analysis, I employed Bayesian network analysis to estimate the causal network model among the components in a data-driven manner based on the data collected from participants in the (...) United States and United Kingdom. The resultant network model demonstrated that aspired moral identity was located at the top of the network as the common necessary condition and predictor for other components. Meanwhile, virtue identification and emotional regulation were located at the bottom of the network. I discussed the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, particularly those for moral education aiming at phronesis cultivation and human flourishing. (shrink)

Two of the most consequential debates in political philosophy have proceeded for decades without recognising a shared structural flaw. The debate about when civil disobedience is legitimate and the debate about whether protective rights produce genuine equality for the weakest members of a community both mistake a nominal framework — procedural compliance rules in the first case, legal permission in the second — for the actual causal variable that determines whether the acts in question are genuinely what they claim to (...) be. That variable is the virtue-state of the agent: the integrated exercise of practical wisdom and justice. This article formalises that variable and derives two linked results. First, the Injustice Threshold Function (ITF) specifies the conditions under which institutional capture is sufficient to dissolve procedural authority and generate a moral obligation — not merely a permission — to transgress. Second, the Equalisation Proximity Function (EPF) specifies the conditions under which a community’s protective architecture achieves genuine equalisation for its weakest members beyond legal permission. The two results share a common structure, and their integration constitutes the Unified Virtue-Legitimacy Framework (UVLF). We prove that the standard acceptance-of-punishment criterion is internally incoherent (Theorem T1), derive the obligation threshold as an indicator function on objective structural indices, specify the generalised EPF with a saturation-bounded capacity term and a collective security coupling coefficient, and demonstrate cross-domain structural invariance in five unlike domains including AI alignment. We design a pre-registerable empirical test using Mahalanobis-matched state-pair comparisons and Structural Equation Modelling. The UVLF resolves the anomalies of both traditions and opens a new observational programme. Keywords: civil disobedience, virtue ethics, Tutela Libertatis, legitimate transgression, political obligation, equalisation proximity function, injustice threshold function, spoudaios confirmation, cascading virtue-atrophy, philosophy of virtues, Alguilas-AI, Virtuous Transgression, Guns. (shrink)

भारतीय समाज मूल्यप्रधान समाज है. भारतीय संस्कृति में मूल्यों को मनुष्य के सामाजिक, राजनैतिक और धार्मिक जीवन में विशेष स्थान दिया गया है क्योंकि मूल्यों के वास्तवीकरण का नाम ही संस्कृति है. वर्तमान समय में विज्ञान ने जहाँ मनुष्य को भौतिक सुविधाएँ उपलब्ध करने के लिए प्रत्येक क्षेत्र में अविष्कारों के ढेर लगा दिए हैं ,वहां उसके जीवन में एक खोखलापन भी उत्त्पन्न कर दिया है. ऐसे में समाज, देश और अपने स्वयं के जीवन में उसने मानव मूल्यों को तिलांजली (...) दे दी है. मानव जीवन की सार्थकता तभी है जब वह श्रेष्ठ भावनाएं रखे. हम एक लोकतान्त्रिक समाज का हिस्सा हैं जहाँ पर हम आपसी भाई-चारे, न्याय, समान अधिकार और स्वतन्त्रता का हिमायती बनने का नाटक करते हैं. संविधान में दिए गये मूल्यों की प्राप्ति से पहले हमें व्यक्ति के जीवन और समाज का भी मुआयना करना होगा तभी हम श्रेष्ठ मूल्यों को समाज में स्थापित कर सकते हैं. मूल्य, व्यक्ति की सामाजिक विरासत का एक अंग होता है इसलिए मूल्यों की व्यवस्था मानव आस्तित्व के विभिन्न स्तरों या आयामों में व्यक्ति के अनुकूलन की प्रक्रिया का मार्गदर्शन करती है. नैतिक मूल्य व्यक्ति के जीवन के साथ साथ समाज को भी उत्कृष्टता की तरफ अग्रसर करते हैं. इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य उद्देश्य नैतिक मूल्यों के व्यक्ति के जीवन और वर्तमान भारतीय समाज में उपयोगिता का अध्ययन करना है. (shrink)

In this commentary, I will discuss the relationship between purpose and morality from developmental and educational perspectives based on empirical and philosophical works. Reviewing previous psychological studies, I will explore the potential association between purpose and moral development. I will also analyze a dataset including variables related to purpose and moral functioning. Furthermore, based on recent works in moral philosophy, particularly those focusing on wisdom cultivation, I propose that pursuing a purpose that embraces virtues and ethical values, instead of a (...) non-moral purpose, will be conducive to flourishing. Finally, I will discuss the implications of moral purpose within educational contexts. While working on these points, the connection between William Damon’s two main research themes (i.e., ethical development and purpose development) will be reviewed and discussed. My primary intent is to integrate his views and works in those two dimensions of human development to propose ideas for flourishing and eudaimonic well-being. (shrink)

The present study aimed to examine how to improve the effectiveness of moral exemplar-applied interventions based on the pillars of the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) framework, autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Past research has mainly focused on the relatedness and attainability of moral exemplars for predicting motivation outcomes. The data for this study consisted of synthesized data sets from previous studies examining the motivational impacts of distinct moral exemplars and intervention methods. The main syntheses for these data sets used Multilevel Modeling (MLM) (...) focusing on relatability, attainability, and intervention methods, corresponding to relatedness, competence, and autonomy in the SDT, respectively, as predictors. In general, there was a significant interaction effect between the attainability or relatability, and the intervention method. Autonomous instruction methods, which support autonomy, were demonstrated to boost motivational outcomes. Implications from this study support the employment of SDT to examine the use of moral exemplars in moral education and were consistent with previous exemplar studies. (shrink)

The VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues is the most commonly used model of positive personality. In this study, we used two methods of model modification to develop models for two measures of the character strengths, the VIA Inventory of Strengths-Revised and the Global Assessment of Character Strengths. The first method consisted of freeing residual covariances based on modification indices until good fit was achieved. The second was residual network modeling (RNM), which frees residual partial correlations while minimizing a function (...) that penalizes more complex models. Models based on both strategies were developed for the two questionnaires. The resulting structural models were then applied to four other samples. Though both modification procedures achieved good fit in the sample used to develop the models, only RNM resulted in adequate model fit for both measures in all cross-validation samples. This finding suggests RNM is more robust against overfitting than traditional practices. Moreover, the result supports the validity of the three-factor model of character strengths with replicability. (shrink)

Gratitude, the proper or fitting response to benevolence, has often been conceptualized as a virtue—a temporally stable disposition to perceive, think, feel, and act in certain characteristic ways in certain situations. Many accounts of gratitude as a virtue, however, have not analyzed this disposition accurately, and as a result, they have not revealed the rich variety of ways in which someone can fail to be a grateful person. In this paper, I articulate an account of the virtue of gratitude, and (...) I use this account to explore various vices that can manifest in its absence. (shrink)

This paper is about reasons to love people. I defend a “particularist” view: that the central reason to love someone is simply who she is. I begin with a framing question—“why do you love me?”—and a taxonomy of views of love's reasons (§1). I argue that a particularist view is demanded by that framing question (§2). But offering such a view requires saying something about who the beloved is—so I borrow an account of human nature from Edith Stein which, I (...) hope to show, yields a compelling account of love's reasons (§3). I conclude with an argument that the extent to which a view of love's reasons genuinely answers our framing question is the extent to which it becomes particularist (§4). (shrink)

This chapter argues that virtue ethics offers a promising framework for understanding the nature and value of personal relationships. Unlike consequentialism and deontology, virtue ethics prioritizes the agent’s own perspective, focusing on human flourishing, the importance of emotional life, and the development of moral character. In particular, I argue that, especially when supplemented by the idea of relational virtues—such as filial piety and the virtue of friendship—virtue ethics offers a plausible account that captures the unique ethical significance of personal relationships. (...) Additionally, I argue, the idea of virtuous relational activity helps justify partiality towards one’s intimates from a virtue-ethical perspective. I conclude by suggesting how virtue-ethical approach, supplemented by the idea of relational virtue, can further enrich our understanding of ethics in personal relationships. Overall, this chapter aims not only to survey existing approaches but also to structure and extend the emerging virtue-ethical discourse on the normativity of personal relationships. (shrink)

I begin the first part by showing how situationism should make us question traditional understandings of virtues as intrinsic dispositions. I concentrate specifically on situationist experiments related to mood. I then introduce Islamic virtue ethics and the dawa movement. In parts two and three I examine ethnography of the dawa movement to explore how they deal with worries about the influence of mood on their virtue. In part two I show how they train their habits in very traditional virtue ethics (...) ways in order to be more resilient when faced with virtue-diminishing affective situations. In part three I show how the situation, rather than hindering practitioners, is recruited into helping these women achieve piety. I conclude, in part four, by showing the dawa movement's creative use of the Islamic veil as a way to help these women deal with the objection that one cannot avoid all bad situations. Going beyond social psychological experiments, I examine two methodological sources not found in situationist debates. First, I argue for ethnography as an empirical method through which to study virtue. I draw on ethnography of the Islamic women's dawa movement. Secondly, the work in the philosophy of mind on ‘affective scaffolding’. (shrink)

The prioritization of belligerent perspectives at the expense of civilian protection and welfare has a long history in just war theory and practice, from the works of early just war theorists to the legal and scholarly defenses of colonial conquest to the contemporary moral injury discourse. In this article, I show how this history has contributed to the ongoing infliction of devastating harms on civilians, as evidenced in the case studies of drone warfare and the war in Gaza, and I (...) argue for the inclusion and prioritization of noncombatant civilian perspectives in academic, policy, and legal analyses of war. Doing so, as I demonstrate, radically disrupts traditional just war thinking and has important implications for broader social, legal, and policy approaches to armed conflict and its aftermath. (shrink)

Many gamers complain about “cheap” or “cheesy” tactics in competitive play. I give an account of these complaints as moral claims expressing a negative evaluation of players’ actions and/or character. After a brief history of cheap tactics, I survey existing definitions of cheapness, arguing none are adequate. I then offer my own definition, arguing that it avoids the shortcomings of existing definitions, captures the essence of cheapness, explains the moral grounds for complaints about cheapness, and distinguishes cheapness from cheating and (...) toxicity. In closing, I reflect on what can be done about cheapness in competitive gameplay. (shrink)

Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) is an invisible disability. It is a condition of overwhelming fatigue that can last for years with various other symptoms including, most importantly, post-exertion malaise. I offer my own experience with CFS and the experience of others to explain its staggering deprivations: CFS greatly reduces the scope of access to objective goods; it greatly diminishes autonomy about their realization; it creates hardships that tend to end or diminish friendships; it tends to habituate in ways that mitigate (...) inner peace and corrupt good character; and it diminishes bodily health. With those serious deprivations in view, I explain how various virtues can recapture some degrees of well-being lost from CFS and how their corresponding vices magnify its deprivations. The virtues of humility, patience, prudence, courage, and hope mitigate the deprivations of CFS and promote well-being. The vices of pride, impatience, impulsiveness, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, cowardice, presumption, and despair compound its deprivations. (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical dimensions of violence in sporting contexts, proposing that violence can be a virtue when characterized by controlled physicality. While society often views violence negatively, the paper argues that within rule-governed sports, certain forms of violence are morally permissible, strategically valuable, and essential to upholding the integrity of the game. Drawing on Suitsian terms and Kantian ethics, the paper develops a theory of lusory violence, distinguishing it from uncontrolled physicality or unmitigated violence. By examining the roles (...) of enforcers in hockey, the development of MMA, and the ethics of sport jiu-jitsu, the paper suggests that violence is acceptable within a lusory framework only when it is purposive, strategically relevant, and constrained by rules that prioritize technical skill over raw damage. Ultimately, the paper argues that the ability to modulate violent behaviour represents a form of moral development, framing virtuous violence as a necessary tool for maintaining natural justice and personal excellence within specific sporting environments. Yet, virtuous violence is subordinate to technique, justice, and other defining elements of sports. (shrink)

This volume explores the intersection of virtue theory and video games. By bringing together emerging and established scholars who analyze video game ethics from a virtue-theoretical perspective, this volume both fills gaps in the literature and provides a foundation for advancing discussions in the emerging field of video game ethics. The volume covers a wide range of topics, offering both abstract analyses of the application of virtue theory to video game ethics and practical insights into the impact of gaming on (...) our relationships, communities, and individual self-conception. The first part examines the advantages and limitations of virtue theory as an ethical framework in the context of video games. The second part delves into specific virtues and vices that emerge during gameplay, illustrating how virtue theory can enhance our understanding of the ethical dimensions of gaming. Finally, the third part addresses the social dimensions of gaming, focusing on the roles of friendship, relationships, and community. It demonstrates how the unique social contexts of gaming provide interesting opportunities for cultivating virtue and vice. Virtue Theory and Video Games is essential reading for researchers and graduate students working in virtue ethics, philosophy of games, the ethics of technology, game studies, media studies, and communication studies. (shrink)

There are two ways that philosophy could transform a philosopher’s life to make it substantially more meaningful: on the one hand, philosophical inquiry might reveal other activities beyond it that would make the life meaningful, enabling a philosopher to live meaningfully as a result of the inquiry, while, on the other hand, it might be that doing philosophy is in itself one way to make the philosopher's life notably meaningful. In this chapter I explore the latter path. I argue against (...) views of meaning in life entailing that philosophy could not itself be particularly meaningful or only rarely could be, after which I critically reflect on respects in which philosophical reflection might enhance the meaning in the philosopher's life. In particular, I critically discuss views of Bertrand Russell, W. D. Ross, Joseph Mintoff, and Robert Nozick that purport to explain how philosophy itself confers meaningfulness in terms of the extensiveness of its object, contending that their explanations are not as comprehensive and explanatorily deep as the new one I provide. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between vulnerability, virtue, and human flourishing through the case of the Rarámuri-pagótuame indigenous communities of the Sierra Tarahumara in northwestern Mexico. Drawing on the dialogue between Aristotelian ethics and Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of human beings as dependent rational animals, it explores how practices of reciprocity and mutual care contribute to the achievement of a good human life. Particular attention is given to kórima, a traditional practice often translated as “sharing,” which is interpreted as an expression (...) of just generosity, social interdependence, and communal responsibility. The study argues that vulnerability should not be understood merely as a limitation to be overcome, but as a constitutive dimension of human existence that makes possible the development of the social virtues. More broadly, it suggests that cultural and religious traditions such as that of the Rarámuri-pagótuame offer valuable models of human flourishing grounded in reciprocity, solidarity, and the cultivation of communal goods. (shrink)

The bite of the lone star tick spreads alpha‐gal syndrome (AGS), a condition whose only effect is the creation of a severe but nonfatal red meat allergy. Public health departments warn against lone star ticks and AGS, and scientists are working to develop an inoculation to AGS. Herein, we argue that if eating meat is morally impermissible, then efforts to prevent the spread of tickborne AGS are also morally impermissible. After explaining the symptoms of AGS and how they are transmitted (...) via ticks, we argue that tickborne AGS is a moral bioenhancer if and when it motivates people to stop eating meat. We then defend what we call the Convergence Argument: If x‐ing prevents the world from becoming a significantly worse place, doesn't violate anyone's rights, and promotes virtuous action or character, then x‐ing is strongly pro tanto obligatory; promoting tickborne AGS satisfies each of these conditions. Therefore, promoting tickborne AGS is strongly pro tanto obligatory. It is presently feasible to genetically edit the disease‐carrying capacity of ticks. If this practice can be applied to ticks carrying AGS, then promoting the proliferation of tickborne AGS is morally obligatory. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine why moral exemplars are useful and even necessary in moral education despite several critiques from researchers and educators. To support my point, I review recent AI research demonstrating that exemplar-based learning is superior to rule-based learning in model performance in training neural networks, such as large language models. I particularly focus on why education aiming at promoting the development of multifaceted moral functioning can be done effectively by using exemplars, which is similar to exemplar-based learning (...) in AI model training. Furthermore, I discuss the potential limitations and issues related to exemplar-applied moral education with findings from recent studies in AI research raising concerns about model biases and toxic outcomes. I attempt to propose ways to address the concerns regarding employing moral exemplars as well. As remedies, I suggest that autonomy-supporting deliberative and reflective learning processes should be utilized. Furthermore, based on the discussion, I examine how macroscopic socio-cultural aspects influence the effectiveness of exemplar-applied moral education. Suggestions for moral educators and future directions for research in moral education are briefly discussed. (shrink)

Imagine a man chatting with his AI girlfriend app. He looks at his smartphone and says, ‘Finally, I'm being understood’. Is he deceiving himself? Is there anything morally wrong with it? The human tendency to anthropomorphize AI is well established, and the popularity of AI companions is growing. This article answers three questions: (1) How can being charmed by AI's simulated emotions be considered self-deception? (2) Why might we have an obligation to avoid harmless self-deception? (3) When is self-deception in (...) emotional relationships with AI morally questionable, and can it be blameworthy? Regarding question 1, I describe being seduced by AI's simulated emotions as self-deception, where desires bias beliefs. In response to question 2, I outline two ways to justify a prima facie obligation to avoid harmless self-deception – instrumental and autotelic. For question 3, I highlight crucial factors to consider in assessing the blameworthiness of harmless self-deception, such as the emotional and cognitive competences of the self-deceiver, reasons for self-deception, and its consequences for one's predispositions, self-image, and other people. Moreover, I argue that the ethical requirement to avoid self-deception does not easily translate into attributing blame to others for being self-deceived. (shrink)

This paper aims at two goals. First, I analyse the possibility of virtuous machines. I shall argue that this might be of interest not only for ethics of technology taken as a regulation of designing and market implementation of certain kind of autonomous machines, but also as a method of uncovering some hidden aporias of the language of current debate in ethics of technology, and primarily in the ethics of Artificial Intelligence and robots. Thus, the second goal of the paper (...) is critical and aims at pinpointing some of the sources of these limitations and a handful of significant philosophical questions which the turn to the language of virtue makes available. (shrink)

This book argues that virtue ethics should be incorporated into public health ethics. It provides the theoretical foundations for a virtue ethics that is applicable to public health, as well as political institutions more broadly. -/- Ethical analyses of public health policies and practices have been mostly conducted in terms of examining the best consequences or weighing outcomes against liberty, autonomy, justice, and harm. While these debates are important, analyses conducted only in these terms leave a huge range of moral (...) issues under-examined. This book contends that a virtue ethics developed for political institutions such as public health provides the tools for a more robust moral analysis of institutional structures, actions, and responsibilities. First, it presents theoretical arguments for political virtues, explaining how institutions like public health have moral agency and how these institutional agents can, in turn, have (or lack) virtues. It then presents three political virtues that are particularly relevant to public health: justice, civic friendship, and epistemic humility. Each of these virtues is important to what it means for public health to do its work excellently, and each sheds light upon the moral justifiability of past or current public health practice. -/- Public Health Virtue Ethics will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in virtue ethics, bioethics, and public health ethics. (shrink)

Indigenous knowledge and work in social science demonstrates the importance for well-being of people’s relationships with places, but western moral theorists have said little on this topic. This paper argues that there is a neo-Aristotelian virtue associated with forming a relationship with a place or places; that is, human beings can form relationships with places that affect their perceptions, emotions, desires and actions, and such dispositions, when properly developed, increase the chance that people will flourish. As well as discussing the (...) virtue, the paper considers related vices and briefly outlines implications of this virtue for dispossession, pro-environmental action, and education. (shrink)

Virtue theory is a natural approach toward the design of artificially intelligent systems, given that the design of artificial intelligence essentially aims at designing agents with excellent dispositions. This has led to a lively research programme to develop artificial virtues. However, this research programme has until now had a narrow focus on moral virtues in an Aristotelian mould. While Aristotelian moral virtue has played a foundational role in the field, it unduly constrains the possibilities of virtue theory for artificial intelligence. (...) This paper aims to remedy this limitation. Philosophers have developed a rich tradition investigating virtues, their normative domains and their structure. Drawing on this tradition, I propose a three-dimensional classification system of possible artificial virtues: virtues can be classified according to the domain in which virtue is an excellence, norm that makes a virtue an excellence, and mode of how the virtue delivers the excellence. With this framework, we can discern gaps in the current theorising about artificial virtues. Additionally, it gives us a tool to evaluate the competences of extant artificially intelligent systems. (shrink)

The application and practice of virtue ethics raises an important question: How do we become virtuous? The pessimistic mainstream view is that virtue can only be cultivated in children who still have malleable characters and virtuous predispositions. This paper argues that even adults can cultivate virtues. We can cultivate virtues by using the empirically tested techniques of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) – if they work in the treatment of difficult problems like depression or phobias, then they should also work to (...) ameliorate our character. This paper develops an account of cognitive behavioural virtue. To this purpose, it first introduces CBT’s theoretical framework, second it shows how this framework naturally integrates with Aristotelian rather than Stoic virtue theory, third it proposes how CBT’s techniques can be applied in the cultivation of virtue. Finally, it examines some of the proposal’s theoretical consequences and shows its advantages over competing accounts, notably Stichter’s account of virtue cultivation as skill acquisition. (shrink)

Τὸ παρὸν δοκίμιο διερευνᾶ τὴν ἔννοια τῆς ἠθικῆς βελτίωσης μέσω τῆς τεχνολογίας ὡς θρησκευτική – θεολογικὴ ἐπιταγή, ἐρειδόμενη στὶς διδα-σκαλίες τῆς Ἁγίας Γραφῆς, καὶ συγκεκριμένα στὸ Α΄ Πέτρου 1:16 («ἅγιοι γίνεσθε, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἅγιος εἰμί») καὶ στὴν Πρὸς Ρωμαίους 12:2 («με-ταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός»). Ἐξετάζεται ἡ σύνθετη καὶ ἀμφι-λεγόμενη ἰδέα ἑνὸς ὑποθετικοῦ ‘μηχανήματος τοῦ Θεοῦ,’ τὸ ὁποῖο θὰ μποροῦσε νὰ ἀκυρώνει ἐν τῇ γενέσει τους ὁρισμένες ἠθικῶς ἀνεπιθύμη-τες ροπὲς καὶ νὰ περιορίζει τὶς ἀντίστοιχες ἐπιλογές. Τὸ δοκίμιο ἑστιάζει στὶς ἠθικὲς (...) προεκτάσεις μιᾶς τέτοιας ἐξωτερικῆς παρέμβασης στὴν δια-μόρφωση τῆς ἠθικῆς συμπεριφορᾶς, ἰδίως ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενο τοῦ περιορισμοῦ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ ἠθικοῦ προσώπου. Ἐξετάζεται τὸ ἐρώτη-μα κατὰ πόσον τέτοιες τεχνολογικὲς παρεμβάσεις θὰ μποροῦσαν νὰ θεωρηθοῦν ἠθικὰ ἐπιτρεπτές, στὴν περίπτωση ποὺ τὰ ἠθικὰ πρόσωπα ἐπέλεγαν ἐλεύθερα νὰ περιορίσουν ὁρισμένες πτυχὲς τῆς αὐτονομίας τους, προκειμένου νὰ ἀνταποκριθοῦν στὴν θεία ἐπιταγὴ τῆς ἐπιδίωξης τῆς ἁγιότητας διὰ τῆς μεγιστοποίησης τῆς αὐτονομίας τους κατὰ τὴν καντιανὴ νοηματοδότηση τοῦ ὅρου, ἤτοι τῆς ἀποδέσμευσής τους ἀπὸ τὴν φυσικὴ ἑτερονομία στὴν ὁποία ὑπόκειται ἡ ἀνθρώπινη κατάσταση. (shrink)

This paper argues that aggression, while often conflated with violence and harm, is a virtue in sports. We distinguish aggression from violence and assertiveness, exploring its positive moral value within rule-governed contexts. We examine the permissibility of violence in sports, considering consent and the public good while acknowledging the potential for harm and the importance of restraint. The paper uses anecdotal evidence and philosophical analysis to support the claim that controlled aggression, a form of self-restraint, is a valuable skill both (...) in and outside of sport. Finally, we explore the relationship between aggression and other virtues like sportsmanship, highlighting the importance of context in evaluating aggressive behaviours. (shrink)

The study explores the epistemological and axiological aspects of the transformation of the worldview paradigm among Ukrainian student youth in the context of sociocultural changes, military conflict, and the formation of a modern national identity. The mechanisms of socio-psychological adaptation of youth to crisis conditions and the modification of the educational process are analyzed. The role of the university environment as an integrative space for shaping professional and worldview identities is substantiated. The research findings highlight the necessity of a methodological (...) transformation of the educational paradigm to synthesize cognitive, emotional-sensory, and praxeological components in the development of the younger generation’s worldview in response to contemporary social challenges. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the present study, I explore the relationship between purpose, which was measured by the Claremont Purpose Scale, and moral psychological indicators, moral reasoning, moral identity, and empathy. Purpose was quantified in terms of three subcomponents: meaning, goal, and beyond-the-self motivation. Moral reasoning was assessed in terms of utilization of postconventional moral reasoning. Moral identity was examined with two subscales: moral internalization, and symbolization. Among diverse subscales of empathy, I focused on empathic concern and perspective taking, which have been (...) reported to be strongly related to morality. To explore the best prediction models using the data, I employed Bayesian Model Selection and Bayesian regression analysis. In general, purpose was significantly predicted by most surveyed moral psychological indicators but not by moral symbolization. The best prediction model for beyond-the-self motivation included the most moral psychological indicator predictors including moral reasoning, which did not significantly predict other dependent variables. (shrink)

I explored the association between components constituting the basis for moral and optimal human functioning, i.e., moral reasoning, moral identity, empathy, and purpose, via network analysis. I employed factor scores instead of composite scores that most previous studies used for better accuracy in score estimation in this study. Then, I estimated the network structure among collected variables and centrality indicators. For additional information, the structure and indicators were compared between two groups, participants who engaged in civic activities highly versus lowly. (...) The results demonstrated significant intra- and inter-scale associations in the network. The network structure was invariant across the two groups. Despite the network invariance, I found that the global connectivity between and centrality indicators of examined factors were higher among the high civic engagement group in general. I discussed the implications of the findings in research on moral functioning based on moral psychology and virtue ethics. (shrink)

The police are routinely recognized for displaying heroic virtues associated with combat. I take a contrarian position in this paper. Part I begins with the claim that if bravery is to be prioritized in policing, then bravery should be part of the police’s routine roles and responsibilities. However, bravery is not central to what the police do every day, and, therefore, shouldn’t be prioritized (in recruiting, training, and so on). Conversely, Part II claims that if the virtue of honesty is (...) centrally connected to the police role, then it should be prioritized in policing. Because honesty is deeply connected to the police’s routine roles and responsibilities, it should be prioritized. By turning away from misconceptions about the police, the hope is that we will be in a better position to see both the practical and the moral importance of virtue in policing. (shrink)

In this paper, findings from research in neuroscience of morality will be reviewed to consider the purposes of moral education. Particularly, I will focus on two main themes in neuroscience, novel neuroimaging and experimental investigations, and Bayesian learning mechanism. First, I will examine how neuroimaging and experimental studies contributed to our understanding of psychological mechanisms associated with moral functioning while addressing methodological concerns. Second, Bayesian learning mechanism will be introduced to acquire insights about how moral learning occurs in human brains. (...) Based on the reviewed neuroscientific research on morality, I will examine how evidence can support the model of moral education proposed by virtue ethics, Neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy in particular. Particularly, two main aims of virtue ethics-based moral education, the habituation of virtues and the cultivation of phronesis, will be discussed as the important purposes of moral education based on neuroscientific evidence. (shrink)

Eudaimonistic virtue ethics has an equality problem: virtuous character is compatible with denying everyone’s fundamental equality. This problem is glimpsed in traditional objections such as the charges of egoism and conventionalism. Julia Annas responds to these challenges by examining the issue of slavery and abolitionism. I rebut Annas’s response and argue that standard eudaimonistic accounts cannot overcome conventionalism because they lack an account of fundamental equality. However, the equality problem can be resolved by incorporating a standalone virtue of solidarity, understood (...) (following David Wiggins) as coequal membership of the “party of humankind.” Notwithstanding Wiggins’s deontological framing of solidarity, I argue that this conception works better in a virtue-ethical context because it accommodates Leonard Harris’s “insurrectionist” challenge. Moreover, building on Liz Gulliford and Robert Roberts’s theory of the virtuous character, I argue that a virtue of solidarity does important work in unifying the virtues and connecting virtue to flourishing, two essential aspects of eudaimonistic theories. A virtue of solidarity provides, not the “root” of the ethical, but part of its point. (shrink)

How should ethical standards be maintained within engineering and engineering education? The present paper addresses this question with relation to the dominant models of engineering ethics (EE) to show that their limits might be overcome by incorporating the vocabulary of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. On the basis of the MacIntyrean concept of practice, the secondary role of engineering is highlighted which echoes similar debates concerning education. This similarity is picked up to argue that the role of the engineer in relation to (...) the end-users of their projects should be understood as on a par with the teacher-student relationship. This enables us not only to redefine the internal good of engineering and the ground for EE, but also to indicate the key virtues and educational models for engineering that they should be key parts of. (shrink)

In recent years there has been growing interest in adapting virtue ethics to the ethics of technology. However, it has most typically been invoked to address some particular issue of moral importance, and there is only a limited range of works dealing with the methodological question of how virtue ethics may contribute to this field. My approach in this paper is threefold. I start with a brief discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, with a view to constructing a framework in which (...) to then address at least some of the aspects of the growing technicization of life that call for scrutiny. I subsequently proceed further by outlining three possible models of virtue-theoretical analysis within the ethics of technology, giving special attention to those changes in human agency where technicization can be seen to exert a significant influence. Finally, I focus on the third such possibility, the extended virtue model, as a basis for calling for a more inclusive account of moral agency. (shrink)

"Legitimacy is lost when the police either fail to protect the public or rely on coercion rather than consent to achieve that protection. Recovering Police Legitimacy challenges conventional criminological, political, and public solutions to the problem by approaching it from the bottom up"--.

At the present state of industrialized agriculture and specialized economy, achieving nutritional self-sufficiency on a personal level is widely considered a naïve goal, unsuited to the present technological era. Furthermore, nutritional self-sufficiency is considered overly demanding in terms of training, land, labor intensity, and time requirements. This study contests these common notions. Drawing on a study of a small (approximately 0.075 ha) low-input self-sufficient farm in an industrialized country, we show that achieving nutritional self-sufficiency on this farm required modest initial (...) agricultural training, a small parcel of land, and, perhaps most surprisingly, a single day of labor per month, on average. We offer these results as proof of concept that, when properly planned, nutritional self-sufficiency may be sustained over an extended period (more than a decade) and that doing so may be compatible with working full-time outside the farm, as well as engaging in regular leisure activities. We also propose that some upscaling is viable at the industrial, small-scale, and household levels. (shrink)

What is the role of intimacy in sex? The two culturally dominant views on this matter both share the implicit assumption that sex is genuinely intimate only when connected to romance, and hence that sex and intimacy stand in a contingent relationship: it is possible to have good sex without it. Liberals embrace this possibility and affirm the value of casual sex, while conservatives attempt to safeguard intimacy by insisting on romantic exclusivity. I reject their shared assumption and argue for (...) a necessary connection between intimacy and sex, in that sexual activity as such aims at a specific form of intimacy, irrespective of whether it takes place in casual encounters or romantic relationships, and the difference between good and bad sex consists in whether this end is attained. To defend this view, I develop a general account of intimacy, as based on joint action, and apply it to isolate its specifically sexual form. (shrink)

This book argues that in order for people to live well, they must develop a virtue of playfulness. Inspired by Aristotle, the book draws on work from philosophy, classics, history, biology, psychology, and media studies to understand the place of play and playfulness in a good life. -/- Many philosophers have written about play, from Presocratics such as Heraclitus to contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Suits. Some champion play as the most crucial value in life. Others deride it and warn (...) strongly against it. This book evaluates the research for how play and playfulness bear on living a good life and becoming a good person. Its main argument is that in order to understand play as an action we must understand playfulness as a virtue in the lives of good people. The author develops a theory of playfulness from an Aristotelian perspective. Like Aristotle sees the virtues as necessary for a happy life, the author argues that playfulness is necessary for living well. And just as Aristotle offers multifaceted characterizations of core virtues, the author argues that playfulness includes aspects of seriousness, creativity, humility, optimism, and sociality. Playful people take play seriously, learn new skills, overcome failure, strive for success, and keep others in mind. As a result, playful people have a better shot at living well. -/- The Virtue of Playfulness is an accessible, empirically-informed, and detailed treatment of the philosophy of playfulness. It will appeal to scholars and students in philosophy and related disciplines who are interested in virtue ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of games, philosophy of sport, and ancient philosophy. (shrink)

Humans ought to do much more in order to remedy the severe harm caused by climate change. While there seems to be an overall consensus that governments and other national and international political agents need to resolve the problem, there is no agreement yet on the role and responsibility of individuals in this process. In this paper, I suggest an argument of integrity that offers strong pro tanto moral reasons for individuals to reduce their personal greenhouse gas emissions. Hourdequin (2010) (...) has presented an argument of integrity to justify a corresponding obligation. In this paper, I argue that even though Hourdequin’s argument is appealing, it has important limitations. I advance the argument in light of the current literature so that it is not subject to these limitations and establishes an overall more comprehensive justification for why individuals ought to reduce their personal emissions. (shrink)

The current struggles that antiracist activists have faced, though uniquely awful, are also part of a larger tapestry of what one might call spiritual and moral exhaustion. This problem has been recognized and many have called for clear practical solutions, including mental health services and intentional rest, for the suffering of those who work to care and advocate. There linger, however, deeper theoretical questions that have not received wide enough attention: What is the nature of the connection between the kind (...) of psychological suffering that affects caring work and oppression? Why does it seem that those who, by many standards, are the most alive to a life of virtue are also the most at risk for experiencing spiritual and moral exhaustion? In what follows, I hope to show that this connection is not mere happenstance but instead an essential feature of what happens when humans attempt to pursue virtue under certain sorts of nonideal conditions, particularly the conditions of injustice and oppression. To make this connection, I will lean heavily on Lisa Tessman’s concept of burdened virtues, that is, character traits that are fitting and reasonable for fighting injustice but that actually undermine a person’s ability to flourish. My small contribution to Tessman’s insightful burdened virtue account is to take it one step further. Many traditional accounts of virtue ethics—arguably all of Western philosophical ethics—have an individualist structure. It is our flourishing as individual humans that virtue is supposed to contribute to, and it is our flourishing as individual humans that these burdened virtues can undermine. In contrast, much of Christian theology posits a radical interconnectedness—we are, after all, one body. It is this insight that opens a communal possibility for hope despite oppressive and unjust powers. For, although the tragedy of the human condition is that doing the right thing can lead to burdened virtues that undermine our individual well-being, our hope rests in realizing that we do not bear our burdens alone. (shrink)

Smartphone technology is ubiquitous and subject to frequent complaints, both by reformers and the recalcitrant. The ubiquity of smartphone technology has led to many negative consequences, some of which may not be fully addressed by empirically oriented literature. One such consequence is a threat to a certain kind of autonomy. I argue that this threat justifies a form of Cynicism about smartphone technology, styled after ancient Cynicism. Cynicism is importantly different from its colloquialized, contemporary namesake (“cynicism”). While ancient Cynicism shares (...) the theme of opting out, in some sense, with contemporary cynicism, it is not a philosophy of withdrawn futility; in fact, the Cynic emphasis on embodiment may have an import on our lives in a time of smartphone ubiquity. Accordingly, I offer one Cynic value, autarkeia (self-sufficiency), which can be recruited to address the way that smartphone technology threatens our autonomy. (shrink)

We explored the relationship between 24 character strengths measured by the Global Assessment of Character Strengths (GACS), which was revised from the original VIA instrument, and moral functioning comprising postconventional moral reasoning, empathic traits and moral identity. Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) was employed to explore the best models, which were more parsimonious than full regression models estimated through frequentist regression, predicting moral functioning indicators with the 24 candidate character strength predictors. Our exploration was conducted with a dataset collected from 666 (...) college students at a public university in the Southern United States. Results showed that character strengths as measured by GACS partially predicted relevant moral functioning indicators. Performance evaluation results demonstrated that the best models identified by BMA performed significantly better than the full models estimated by frequentist regression in terms of AIC, BIC, and cross-validation accuracy. We discuss theoretical and methodological implications of the findings for future studies addressing character strengths and moral functioning. (shrink)

For smart cities, data-driven innovation promises societal benefits and increased well-being for residents and visitors. At the same time, the deployment of data-driven innovation poses significant ethical challenges. Although cities and other public-sector actors have increasingly adopted ethical principles, employing them in practice remains challenging. In this commentary, we use a virtue-based approach that bridges the gap between abstract principles and the daily work of practitioners who engage in and with data-driven innovation processes. Inspired by Aristotle, we describe practices of (...) data-driven innovation in a smart city applying the concepts of virtue and phronêsis, meaning good judgment of and sensitivity to ethical issues. We use a dialogic case-study approach to study two cases of data-driven innovation in the city of Helsinki. We then describe as an illustration of how our approach can help bridge the gap between concrete practices of data-driven innovation and high-level principles. Overall, we advance a theoretically grounded, virtue-based approach, which is practice oriented and linked to the daily work of data scientists and other practitioners of data-driven innovation. Further, this approach helps understand the need for and importance of individual application of phronêsis, which is particularly important in public-sector organizations that can experience gaps between principle and practice. This importance is further intensified in cases of data-driven innovation in which, by definition, novel and unknown contexts are explored. (shrink)

Hegelian philosophical treatise beginning with analysis of Reversal Theory and restructuring into Resurrexit Theory, a structured phenomenology centred around Spirit (first three articles: Hegelian Analysis of Reversal Theory, Structural Reformation of Reversal Theory, & Resurrexit Theory - The Dualist Expansion of Structural Phenomenology). This is followed by a theory of mind and consciousness based in complex universality (Dialectic Mind). Naturally, this leads into how particularity can best align with universality, to thereby generate Good. Such a discussion begs the question of (...) virtues and sins. Sins are defined in materialistic terms, while virtues are given definition as aspects and moments of Reason through skill interactions and pathology, which is to say the experiences in emotions that instigate self-understanding and inform purpose (Structural Virtues Theory - The Dozen Skills in Reason). The series of articles then dives into evolutionary concepts of personality development and evidenced-based psychological theories. Spirit is identified with personality, and then personality is associated with mind module evolution and mate selection, especially within religious organisation (Spiritual Material - Evolutionary Theory of Spiritual Mate Selection and Personality Development). Finally, the author's dissertation is used to suggest an alteration of attachment theory for the greater contribution of fathers in the role of early socialisation (First Other Theory - The Paternity of Civilisation - Evolutionary Roots of Attachment and the Paternal Role in Formation of Civilisation). (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ethics is receiving increased emphasis in civil and environmental engineering. However, despite the proliferation of college textbooks and courses encouraging ethical reasoning, engineers in practice often limit their understanding narrowly to their individual actions. Broader issues of global importance are usually addressed in an ad-hoc manner, if at all. Our goal is to present the topic of ethics in a way that appeals to engineers, especially those receptive to ‘systems thinking’. Our broader motivation is to encourage the development of (...) educated, virtuous and caring professionals who engage in contextual ethical reasoning about complex systems. To these ends, we summarise relevant theoretical and applied concepts for ethical analysis, building from a recent chapter that reflects on ethics from an engineering systems perspective (but applied to the healthcare industry). We emphasise virtue ethics and the ethics of care as crucial supplements to duty ethics and utilitarianism. Analytical methods we discuss include Value Sensitive Design, Design for Care, and a multi-level classification of ethical issues into the micro (individual), meso (institutional), and macro (societal) levels. This work collects relevant considerations for designers of civil and environmental engineering systems and researchers interested in developing related design and analysis methods that include practical ethical reasoning. (shrink)

This article ("Looting or Sharing?") is located at the intersection of societal and ecological discourses, and analyzes local actions from the perspective of digital ethics. The case study is centered around a public bookcase (or free library) in a neighborhood in the Ruhr area, a post-industrial and partly impoverished metropolitan district in Germany. The rather banal local actions - people take books from the public bookcase as is the proclaimed objective of having such an institution in the first place - (...) eventually morph into highly polarized discussion threads on a local social media platform that are charged with bitter accusations of "looting" (i.e., allegations of some people taking out too many books) and rife with outrage (i.e., allegations of some people selling books taken from the free library on secondary markets). This debate reflects a conflict that points to larger social divisions and rifts. This is analyzed empirically (via a discourse analysis) and philosophically (drawing on Aristotle as well as contemporary debates on moralism). When the free sharing of books, i.e., the recycling of otherwise unused goods, gets scandalized by some residents of the neighborhood as "looting," as the accusations on social media proclaim, this conflict suggests a self-referential moralism among the online discussants. Epistemic fallacies combined with irrational counterfactual claims lead to immoderate hypercriticism. This is a finding that can be observed in many online debates and points to larger disruptions in the digital arena. (shrink)

Some stories of moral exemplars motivate us to emulate their admirable attitudes and behaviors, but why do some exemplars motivate us more than others? We systematically studied how motivation to emulate is influenced by the similarity between a reader and an exemplar in social or cultural background (Relatability) and how personally costly or demanding the exemplar’s actions are (Attainability). Study 1 found that university students reported more inspiration and related feelings after reading true stories about the good deeds of a (...) recent fellow alum, compared to a famous moral exemplar from decades past. Study 2A developed a battery of short moral exemplar stories that more systematically varied Relatability and Attainability, along with a set of non-moral exemplar stories for comparison. Studies 2B and 2C examined the path from the story type to relatively low stakes altruism (donating to charity and intentions to volunteer) through perceived attainability and relatability, as well as elevation and pleasantness. Together, our studies suggest that it is primarily the relatability of the moral exemplars, not the attainability of their actions, that inspires more prosocial motivation, at least regarding acts that help others at a relatively low cost to oneself. (shrink)