Naturalism

The Sorites paradox arises from projecting pragmatic tolerance onto semantic truth-conditions. This paper develops a two-layer semantic-pragmatic framework to dissolve that projection. At the pragmatic layer, speakers acquire a tolerance range through reference-fixing practices: paradigms, correction, shared use, and finite discriminatory capacities make adjacent cases appear indistinguishable, thereby giving the inductive premise its intuitive force. This tolerance, however, is a pragmatic phenomenon rather than a semantic truth. At the semantic layer, the predicate admits a sharp boundary when its referential instruction (...) is successfully satisfied by the physical world. In the case of “heap,” the relevant boundary is not fixed by linguistic use, but by a physically privileged transition in the granular system. On the model defended here, the global maximum of cascade-like rearrangement in the force-chain network functions as the physical correlate of the extensional boundary. This correlate is model-mediated and scientifically revisable, but not conventionally chosen: it tracks a real structural inequality among candidate cut-points. The relation between the pragmatic and semantic layers is therefore correlation, not constitution or interaction. In normal cases, the physical boundary falls near or within the tolerance range because human cognition and linguistic practice have evolved to track macroscopic worldly structure roughly but not exactly. This alignment is contingent. In abnormal cases, the tolerance range may badly misalign with the physical boundary; in more extreme cases, the physical presuppositions of reference-fixing may fail altogether, producing reference failure rather than semantic vagueness. The resulting framework preserves the central commitments of epistemicism—classical logic, bivalence, sharp boundaries, and ordinary ignorance—while replacing Williamson’s metasemantic foundation with a naturalistic one. Our ignorance of the boundary is not a metaphysical necessity generated by the essence of vague meaning, but a consequence of cognitive economy: ordinary speakers have no practical need to measure the physical structure that fixes the boundary. Classical logic is thus preserved at the semantic layer, while the felt plausibility of Sorites reasoning is explained at the pragmatic layer. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the reciprocity of Nature in Spinoza as a central yet underappreciated dimension of Spinoza’s relational metaphysics. Building on Ziporyn’s interpretation of Spinoza, the paper argues that any understanding of infinity and necessity is incomplete without Spinoza’s relational account of the reciprocity of God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Through a close analysis of the Ethics, the Principles and Letter 32, the paper shows that for Spinoza all finite things are reciprocally determined by another singular (...) thing to exist in a certain way through the infinite, eternal and equal force [vis] of Nature by which each thing perseveres in existing. This reciprocal and omnipresent structure of the whole of Nature constitutes the engaged, phenomenological experience of Individuality: God or Nature does not respond purposively or personally, yet every movement and thought is necessarily met by reciprocal determinations within the immediacy of Nature itself. The paper concludes that Ziporyn’s account is strengthened by a relational metaphysics grounded not in intellectual contemplation of infinite Substance but rather in the active and embodied immersion in the infinite encounters of Nature’s reciprocity. (shrink)

Una delle lenti attraverso le quali è stato tematizzato il rapporto tra natura e cultura in Wittgenstein è quella che vede attribuirgli una certa forma di naturalismo, solitamente specificato come “naturalismo liberale”. Questa attribuzione viene giustificata sulla base della dimensione “naturalistica” di alcuni concetti centrali della seconda fase della sua riflessione (“gioco linguistico”, “forma di vita”, ma anche “disposizione naturale”, “storia naturale”, ecc.) i quali, ponendosi in continuità con la nostra natura biologica, attestano l’intreccio indissolubile tra dimensione naturale e simbolico-culturale (...) tipica della forma di vita umana. In questo contributo contesto la legittimità di questa attribuzione sotto due diversi punti di vista. In primo luogo, argomenterò che Wittgenstein non ha offerto elementi sufficienti per giustificare la descrizione della sua filosofia come naturalista. Per sostenere questo punto mi soffermerò in particolare sul caso delle auto-ascrizioni psicologiche in prima persona, le quali, in virtù del loro legame con la dimensione delle reazioni fisiologico-naturali, dovrebbero fornire un caso privilegiato in cui il supposto naturalismo di Wittgenstein emergerebbe con forza (ma non lo fanno). In secondo luogo, sosterrò che la categoria del naturalismo non rappresenta una chiave di lettura adeguata a leggere il rapporto tra natura e cultura come pensato da Wittgenstein: nel caso migliore, la caratterizzazione che ne offre è semplicemente troppo vacua per risultare significativa; nel caso peggiore, rischia di condurre ad una semplificazione del rapporto tra i due (a scapito della seconda). (shrink)

Can Gilles Deleuze be read as a naturalist philosopher within analytic philosophy of science? This position has recently been defended by Manuel DeLanda. In order to examine it critically, I first delimit a minimalist conception of ontological naturalism, understood as a broad commitment to the ontology inherited from our best scientific theories and to criteria of intersubjective evaluability. I then reconstruct, following DeLanda, the Deleuzian notions of multiplicity, virtuality, event, and individuation, showing that they can be understood as theoretical resources (...) for thinking real dynamic processes. On this reading, Deleuzian ontology leads to a processual and anti-essentialist realism sensitive to scientific modelling. However, this reading depends on a selective reconstruction which is philosophically fertile but exegetically problematic, and whose explanatory yield diminishes where scientific mediation becomes more tenuous. I conclude by arguing that Deleuze can be accepted as a sui generis ontological naturalist, but that this is insufficient to make his philosophy of science especially useful when set against clearer, more revisable, and more fully integrated analytic naturalist alternatives within contemporary scientific practice. (shrink)

The theoretical framework of the Anatomy of Chaos has previously established the structural mechanics of socio-political collapse and the gradient dynamics of expansion. However, the ultimate vector of these processes—the "why" behind the physics of history—remains to be defined. This paper proposes the final, metaphysical component of the model: the Channel of Singularity. We posit that the historical process is driven by a fundamental "Archi-Will"—a primordial systemic impulse towards the acceleration of complexity and the equalization of energy. Under specific conditions (...) of critical internal entropy and external structural vacuum, the system undergoes a radical phase transition into a state of "superconductivity." In this mode, the friction of the Operating System is temporarily suspended, allowing the raw energy of the collective to flow without resistance into direct historical action. -/- To operationalize this dynamic, the paper introduces the concept of the "Agent of Singularity"—a leader whose internal psychological configuration resonates perfectly with the structural void of the crisis. While this selection mechanism bears a functional resemblance to Darwinian natural selection, and the resulting projection of power recalls the Nietzschean Will to Power, our model integrates these phenomena into a new synthesis: the individual is not the source of the will, but the necessary conduit for a systemic imperative. Furthermore, we argue that the trajectory of this acceleration is not random. The system tends towards a state where the velocity of progress approaches infinity and the distribution of energy becomes perfectly uniform. We propose that this point of absolute equilibrium represents not a thermodynamic "heat death," but a critical Phase Transition—a moment of saturation required for the system to shift to a fundamentally higher level of organization. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce a novel and comprehensive theory of truth grounded in modern cognitive science and the principles of mathematical modelling. This is achieved by proposing a general theory of cognition, where the beliefs of the brain represent a unified predictive model of how best to consider and act in the world in order to maximise future subjective wellbeing. The concept of wellbeing is grounded in a neurocognitive reward signal, well supported by current cognitive science, that drives individuals (...) toward evolutionarily motivated priorities and facilitates decision making. Truth in belief is simply the success condition of cognition, and is defined by how similar the predictive model of belief is to the structures of reality that determine the future reward that an individual experiences. In this way, the theory I propose allows for the naturalised unification of existing concepts such as the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth. Stable truths in this framework are produced by predictive belief structures that are consistent in their truthfulness over time and between subjective perspectives. Applied within a dynamic social context on the other hand, this theory also produces emergent phenomena similar to consensus, social constructionist, and post-structuralist ideas regarding truth. I detail the process of belief update in response to reward prediction error, demonstrating how this can increase the truthfulness of belief over time, and resolve any concerns regarding epistemological circularity. The metaphysical and ethical implications of this theory are briefly discussed, as is its relationship with Bayesian epistemology, and structurally related concepts in science and engineering such as predictive processing and reinforcement learning. This theory has the potential to act as a basic structural philosophical concept, which can be used to construct, evaluate, and refine more complex ideas, both in and outside of philosophy. By providing a stable epistemological and metaphysical foundation, this framework should facilitate increased agreement on truth between perspectives, and promote the required conditions for cooperation and progress in society. (shrink)

Practice-based approaches to philosophy of mathematics have gone mainstream over the past several decades. As the paradigm has grown in popularity, however, there’s been little sustained meditation—and still less any explicit consensus—on what precisely it means for philosophy to take practice seriously. The field’s lack of a clear common methodology has begun to make itself felt in slowed and uncertain progress on core problems. Here I review the methodological situation and propose five canons to guide future research. I focus throughout (...) on the study of explanation in mathematics as a guiding example. (shrink)

Das Welt- und Menschenbild des Naturalismus basiert gemäß dem Verständnis seiner Anhänger durchwegs auf wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen. In seltsamem Kontrast dazu steht allerdings der Umstand, dass von naturalistischer Seite meist Vorstellungen über die Ordnung der Natur und die Wirkungsweise der Naturgesetze vertreten werden, welche weitaus mehr auf metaphysischen Glaubenssätzen beruhen als auf empirisch-wissenschaftlichen Befunden. Gewisse dogmatische Züge weisen sowohl die drei „Ismen" Physikalismus, Reduktionismus und Determinismus auf, als auch verschiedene mit ihnen verbundene metaphysische Prämissen naturalistischer Erklärungen, darunter die Annahme, kausale Wirkungen (...) gingen immer und ausschließlich von elementaren Kräften auf der untersten physikalischen Ebene aus. Derartige Annahmen werden im vorliegenden Aufsatz gestützt auf wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen mit Bezug zu Physik (vor allem Thermodynamik), Evolutionsbiologie, Synergetik und Komplexitätsforschung kritisch hinterfragt. Als Alternative dazu wird ein Erklärungsschema vorgestellt, welches zwei Denkansätze aus der Naturphilosophie von Aristoteles miteinander kombiniert. Einerseits geht es dabei um seine vier Formen kausaler Erklärungen, und andererseits um drei Stufen der Verwirklichung von Naturvorgängen, nämlich Dynamis (Möglichkeit), Energeia (Wirklichkeit) und Entelecheia (Vollendung). Wer da ein überholtes unwissenschaftliches oder gar mystisches Erklärungsmodell erwartet, irrt sich, denn dieses ist ganz dem naturalistischen Grundsatz verpflichtet, wonach es in der Welt durchwegs mit rechten Dingen zugeht. Die modernen naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien können bruchlos darin integriert werden, auch wenn sie Aristoteles noch unbekannt waren. Sein Naturverständnis ist allerdings weiter und offener als das neuzeitliche Konzept der Naturgesetzlichkeit. Da es jenseits von Reduktionismus und Determinismus zu verorten ist, kann es als Schlüssel zu deren Überwindung dienen. Dies führt entgegen der Erwartung vieler Naturalisten nicht zu einer unwissenschaftlichen, antinaturalistischen Denkweise, sondern zu entscheidenden Fortschritten auf dem Weg, auch menschliches Fühlen, Denken und Handeln natürlich erklärbar zu machen. (shrink)

In recent decades, more and more philosophers have been committed to promoting a mutual enlightenment between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Some philosophers including Dermot Moran, A. W. Moore, and Dan Zahavi, among others, have provided thought-provoking reflections on these ongoing exchanges between the two traditions. Since these three philosophers all hold that phenomenology is incompatible with “classical reductionist naturalism”, their terminologies can neither smoothly accommodate the various versions of naturalised phenomenology, nor reserve sufficient logical space for the rich future possibilities (...) of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and naturalism. In contrast, in this article, I first minimally redefine the terms “phenomenology” and “analytic philosophy” as “a philosophy that goes back to the things themselves” and “a philosophy that does analysis”, respectively; second, I argue that there is by no means an intrinsic contradiction between the three terms “phenomenology”, “analytic philosophy” and “naturalism”; third, I argue that, on balance, the minimalistic redefinitions advocated in this article, do more good than harm—say, they are heuristic to reunderstanding phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and philosophy per se; finally, I conclude that such minimalistic redefinitions, will offer a novel, modest, moderate, balanced, or supplementary reunderstanding of the current popular definitions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The paper presents a phenomenological critique of the enactive approach inaugurated by Francisco Varela, Eleanor Rosch, and Evan Thompson in The Embodied Mind (1991/2016). The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, to provide a sharper distinction between the natural and the transcendental viewpoints on consciousness against the backdrop of enactivists’ alleged commitment to the latter. On the other, to show that the lack of a proper distinction between the viewpoints in question leads to self-inconsistency in the (...) enactive approach. I particularly analyze the enactivists’ idea of “fundamental circularity” between subjectivity and objectivity along with the closely related principle of “groundlessness” and attempt to demonstrate that these ultimately result in circular reasoning rather than “virtuous” or “creative” circularity, as enactivists seem to suggest. (shrink)

In philosophy, it is common for a concept to be modified according to the author and the role this concept will play in a theory. This is the case with the term “naturalism.” Various naturalistic approaches have emerged from disagreements on how the inquiry underlying the term “naturalism” should be understood. Consider the approach to naturalism designed in the early days of “institutional” philosophy of science (Hanna 2006) versus proposals such as Putnam’s liberal naturalism or Price’s subject naturalism. Our intuition (...) is that the latter two positions defend reformulations of the meaning of the term and of the underlying inquiry that go so far that it is difficult to see any naturalism in them beyond the minimal demand that explanations or inquiries are to be compatible with science. -/- The purpose of this paper is to see whether conceptual engineering can be useful to argue for the abovementioned intuition. Our tenet is that the case of liberal naturalism involves not just a change of meaning, but also a change of subject. To this purpose, we rely on Belleri’s (2021) notion of Progressive Semantic Inquiry and what counts as going too far in that change. The paper serves two objectives: on one hand, it helps to understand what is going on with the versions of naturalism mentioned above; on the other, it assesses Belleri’s solution to the change of subject objection. (shrink)

The term “naturalism” is often used to refer to reductive naturalism and is thus closely linked to physicalism. As an alternative to reductive naturalism, various forms of liberal naturalism have been developed. This paper argues that a further widening of the concept of “naturalism” is helpful. A “broad” liberal naturalism is advocated, where the criterium for “naturalistic” is not linked to the premise of a specific metaphysics, but instead to that which arguably constitutes naturalism as such: the presence of universal (...) fundamental principles on how the world operates and of regularities or laws of nature describing the concrete behavior of the world. This type of naturalism allows for the inclusion of non-materialistic metaphysics, such as forms of dualism and idealism. This finding is significant, since the physicalist position falls short on several issues, most notably the adequate handling of the problem of consciousness. Given the positive connotations of the predicate “naturalistic,” such an inclusion seems helpful in legitimizing potentially fruitful research into less conventional alternatives to physicalism and materialism. Further, this might well turn out to be of value not only from a theoretical or academic perspective but from an existential standpoint as well. (shrink)

The prevailing assumption holds that the process of disenchantment driven by the life sciences culminates in a worldview devoid of ultimate ends. This assumption, however, overlooks the possibility that scientific naturalism itself may harbor problematic forms of enchantment. I argue that the most prevalent forms of naturalism do not necessarily yield a fully disenchanted worldview. More specifically, I examine a philosophy of nature developed by prominent thinkers such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, who are commonly regarded as proponents of (...) disenchantment. I seek to demonstrate that this philosophical framework nevertheless incorporates a conception of an ultimate end that governs the existence of all living beings, including humanity. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a minimalist characterization of naturalism as the thesis that: 1) we must have a minimal, but not total, commitment to the ontology of our sciences, and 2) we must have a meta-methodological commitment to the use of methods that allow for justifications and claims that can be intersubjectively evaluated, such as formal and informal arguments, or the use of the methods of science themselves. In this way, I will first critique the classical definitions of naturalism (...) understood as a form of physicalism and as a restriction on the postulation of supernatural entities and explanations in science. Then I will defend the priority of this meta-methodology not only in science and philosophy, but in all intellectual endeavors of research. I conclude that if philosophy intends to be an intellectual enterprise of research, then it must be oriented according to this meta-methodology; that is, it must be naturalistic. (shrink)

The current advocacy for the so-called PhyloCode has a history rooted in twentieth-century arguments among biologists and philosophers regarding a putative distinction between classes and individuals. From this seemingly simple and innocuous discussion have come supposed distinctions between definitions and diagnosis, classification and systematization, and now Linnaean and "phylogenetic" nomenclature. Nevertheless, the metaphysical dichotomy of class versus individual, insofar as its standard applications to the issue of biological taxonomy are concerned, is an outdated remnant of early logical positivist thinking. Current (...) views on natural kinds and their definitions under a scientific realist perspective provide grounds for rejecting the class versus individual dichotomy altogether insofar as biological entities are concerned. We review the role of natural kinds in scientific practice and the nature of definitions and scientific classifications. Although inherent instabilities of the PhyloCode are clearly sufficient to argue against the general application of this nominally phylogenetic system, our goal here is to address serious and fundamental flaws in its very foundation by exposing the unsubstantiated philosophical assumptions preceding and subtending it. (shrink)

In this article, we propose meta-subjectivity and ideational analysis. Meta-subjectivity is a philosophically grounded social ontology that posits the self as a dynamic intersubjective and relational environmental process. Ideational analysis is a sociohistorical abductive method for studying the generation of collective belief systems and their structuration. We critique contemporary epistemologies found within the humanities and social sciences, such as Smith and Searle’s critical realism. Building on Storm’s metamodernism, we offer our perspective as innovation. We conclude with a call for greater (...) interdisciplinarity and methodological plurality in the humanities and social sciences, in the spirit of Storm, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. (shrink)

Abstract: This very short paper tries to identify what we believe is our most basic ontological state and truth. -/- Résumé : ce très court texte cherche à cerner ce que nous concevons être notre état ontologique le plus réel et basique.

ABSTRACT: For 2,500 years, Western philosophy has been defined by a fundamental schism—a civil war between the ideal and the material, the mind and the body, the one and the many. This work argues that this intractable conflict is the product of a catastrophic flattening: a shift instigated by Parmenides from describing a dynamic, 4-dimensional reality to analyzing it through static, 3-dimensional snapshots. This "synchronic" view created the very contradictions it then struggled to solve. Neo-Pre-Platonic Naturalism (NPN) proposes a way (...) out: the Diachronic Turn. It confronts the hardest problem for any unifying system by taking the 'Is-ought' problem head-on and revealing it to be a synchronic categorical error. By systematizing the foundational intuitions of the Pre-Platonic philosophers—the pioneers who discovered the territory's landmarks but not its governing laws—NPN restores the missing dimension of time. While this shift in perspective may seem complex at first, it provides the fundamental basis for understanding reality as it is: a process, not a picture. In essence, NPN provides the conceptual tools to solve philosophy's most fundamental problems by grounding them in the dynamic, 4-dimensional reality we actually inhabit. The result is the collapse of ancient dualisms. The subjective mind (Nous) is revealed not as a spectral outsider but as the emergent navigator of an objective physical reality (Arche). Knowledge is redefined as a confidence gradient, not certain possession. Value is grounded in the constitutive striving of life itself. This framework does not merely resolve philosophical problems; it bridges the divides between Eastern and Western thought, offering a unified compass for navigating the deepest questions of existence. (shrink)

In this chapter, I outline what I take to be a promising Strawsonian response to the sceptic who asks for a justification of our responsibility practices. I provide a brief overview of three kinds of response that have been given to the responsibility sceptic on the basis of Strawson’s work: Humean, Kantian, and Wittgensteinian ones. I argue that they all face difficulties and look for a different kind of response, drawing attention to a functional strand in Strawson’s thought. A functional (...) or pragmatic account of moral responsibility along Strawsonian lines emphasizes that our responsibility practices are rooted in our nature as social beings, which comes with a basic concern for the attitudes and intentions of other people towards us. We have a need to manifest this concern, which we do through the reactive attitudes, and to adopt reactive attitudes towards people is to hold them responsible. I argue that the fact that our responsibility practices are rooted in the need to express a basic concern is a weighty reason for not abandoning these practices. My functionalist Strawsonian response to the responsibility sceptic has several advantages over existing Humean, Kantian and Wittgensteinian responses: it makes better sense of Strawson’s references to human nature, it draws the right kind of connection between responsibility practices and interpersonal relationships, and it does not send the sceptic away with the message that she is asking the wrong kind of question. (shrink)

Some philosophers challenge the advisability of naturalizing social metaphysics by appeal to social science. They argue that social science fails to meet criteria for realist commitment, such as unity and novel predictive power, and that social science would therefore be a poor anchor for naturalization projects. These skeptical challenges are rooted in traditions in the philosophy of science that have held the social sciences in low esteem. Through a case study that highlights the ways in which archaeology is methodologically converging (...) on hard science, I show that the old philosophical bias against social science is outmoded. I suggest that at least some of the methodological advances of archaeology and other social sciences are epistemologically significant and should be taken to bear on the question of realism. However, I conclude with the thought that realist commitment need not be a precondition for naturalization. The paper therefore accomplishes two main things: 1) it removes argumentative roadblocks to the use of social science in the naturalization of social metaphysics, and 2) it motivates a higher estimation of the epistemological credentials of social science as compared with more skeptical traditions. (shrink)

Three core commitments run through Kornblith's work in epistemology. First, epistemologists should investigate knowledge itself rather than the concept of knowledge. Second, knowledge is a natural kind. Third, knowledge is reliably produced true belief. These commitments are related in several ways, and they are intended to provide mutual support for each other. In this chapter we argue that, when we subject them to detailed scrutiny, they have some quite surprising results. Kornblith should be open to a promiscuous pluralism about knowledge (...) that, among other things, threatens his first core commitment and opens the door to non-factive and relativistic conceptions of knowledge. Moreover, it is not clear that Kornblith can preserve his reliabilist picture of knowledge, and he may be forced to accept a form of relativism that goes beyond what he himself seems willing to accept. (shrink)

Hilary Kornblith is one of the world’s leading epistemologists, a champion of an innovative philosophical research program that is at once traditional and revisionary. In viewing the study of knowledge as inseparable from the empirical study of the mind, Kornblith aligns himself closely with the approach of the traditional empiricists of the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet in taking contemporary empirical work seriously, Kornblith has developed views and arguments that shift the epistemological focus away from what is available first-personally _within_ (...) the mind towards what is revealed third-personally _of_ the mind instead. Indeed, anyone looking seriously at the history of 20th century epistemology can draw a straight line from W.V.O. Quine through Alvin Goldman to Hilary Kornblith – all three, in their ways, champions of a science-centered epistemology. On the innovative leading edge of that tradition, however, Kornblith has developed a systematic rejection of the traditional philosophical method of conceptual analysis (_pace_ Goldman) while establishing a thoroughly empirical and yet unambiguously philosophical approach to the study of knowledge (_pace_ Quine). As such, Kornblith’s work is required reading for anyone interested in the structure and nature of knowledge, the structure and grounds of justification, the sources of epistemic normativity, the history and the prospects for a naturalized epistemology, the legitimacy of intuition-dependent conceptual analysis as a philosophical method, and the significance and reliability of reflection and reasoning. This volume collects 16 original essays that advance the state of play by engaging critically and substantively with Kornblith’s views on these and other topics, along with an essay by Kornblith himself replying to his critics. (shrink)

In recent years, a new theory has been developed which explains free will based on evolutionary science. It is best represented by Kevin Mitchell’s book 'Free agents: how evolution gave us free will'. However, it is also supported by a considerable number of scholars from the fields of evolutionary biology, systems science, physics and philosophy, some of whom have contributed to its development or are working to apply, substantiate and further develop it. In this paper, I propose giving this theory (...) a name: the 'Evolutionary Theory of Free Agency' (ETFA). According to my proposal, this theory is characterised by the following seven core elements: 1) Indeterministic elementary physics as its basis. 2) Emergence of higher-level laws. 3) Biological agency as a key factor. 4) Co-evolution of agency, autonomy and freedom. 5) Deliberation and free choice among alternatives as a foundation of decision-making (in order to survive) 6) Free will as its highest form, based on human rationality. 7) The concept of naturalistic libertarian free will as its result. This paper is written in German. An English translation is planned. However, in order to open up the proposed name and my thoughts on the theory for discussion as soon as possible, the paper is now being posted on my PhilPapers profile in its original form, together with an abstract in English. (shrink)

This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism not in the name of some form of supernaturalism, but in order to defend a...

In World Without Design, Michael Rea says that naturalists are disposed to take the methods of science, and those methods alone, as basic sources of evidence. Supernaturalists, he says, share with naturalists the disposition to trust the methods of science in the basic way---that is, in the absence of any epistemic reason to do so. But unlike naturalists, supernaturalists are also disposed to take religious experience as a basic source of evidence. I raise a number of objections to these characterizations (...) of naturalism and supernaturalism. First, they mistakenly presuppose both that the methods of science are all methods of inquiry and that the demarcation problem can be solved. Also, if they are correct, then both naturalism and supernaturalism are committed to an undesirable form of scientism. Finally, they overlook both the fact that most of the methods of science are not basic sources of evidence and the fact that the methods of science include the method of searching only for natural causes of natural phenomena. I close by proposing an alternative characterization of naturalism. (shrink)

Despite its name, “naturalism” as a world-view turns out to be rather unnatural in its strict and more consistent form of materialism and determinism. This is why a number of naturalists opt for a broadened version that includes objective moral values, intrinsic human dignity, consciousness, beauty, personal agency, and the like. But in doing so, broad naturalism begins to look more like theism. As many strict naturalists recognize, broad naturalism must borrow from the metaphysical resources of a theistic world-view, in (...) which such features are very natural, common sensical, and quite “at home” in a theistic framework. The Naturalness of Belief begins with a naturalistic philosopher’s own perspective of naturalism and naturalness. The remaining chapters take a multifaceted approach in showing theism’s naturalness and greater explanatory power. They examine not only rational reasons for theism’s ability to account for consciousness, intentionality, beauty, human dignity, free will, rationality, and knowledge; they also look at common sensical, existential, psychological, and cultural reasons—in addition to the insights of the cognitive science of religion. (shrink)

A Philosophy of Sacred Nature introduces Robert Corrington’s philosophical thought, “ecstatic naturalism,” which seeks to recognize nature’s self-transforming potential. Ecstatic naturalism is a philosophical-theological perspective, deeply seated in a semiotic cosmology and psychosemiosis, and it radically and profoundly probes into the mystery of nature’s perennial self-fissuring of nature natured and nature naturing. Edited by Leon Niemoczynski and Nam T. Nguyen, this collection aims to allow readers to see what can be done with ecstatic naturalism, and what directions, interpretations, and creative (...) uses that doing can take. A thorough exploration of the prospects of ecstatic naturalism, this book will appeal to scholars of Continental philosophy, religious naturalism, and American pragmatism. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a rise in the engagement with empirical methods in philosophy. However, explicit discussion of the method and methodology behind such approaches is scarce, in particular for engagement with qualitative ethnographic styles of empirical research. This entry gathers debates from various philosophical subfields where ethnography has found a philosophical use. First, I introduce ethnography and highlight different versions through examples from phenomenology, political philosophy, ethics and philosophy of science. Then, I address three common challenges raised against the (...) relevance and legitimacy of ethnographic philosophy, some specific to ethnography, others shared with experimental philosophy and integrated history and philosophy of science. The entry ends by suggesting some benefits of ethnographic philosophy, including a potential for genuine surprise, the opportunity to fine-tune and enrichen concepts and a better grasp at philosophical significance in human lives. In addition, I note that ethnography encourages more thoroughgoing philosophical self-reflection about contextual and situational features of philosophical theories and about the particularities of the philosophers developing them, introducing the idea of ‘naturalising the philosopher’. (shrink)

Wybrałem naturalizm jako temat, kierując się tym, że, chociaż kierunek ten jest coraz częściej dyskutowany w filozofii światowej, stosowna problematyka nie znajduje zbyt dużego oddźwięku w Polsce, może poza etyką i filozofią prawa. Prezentowana książka ma także na celu przybliżenie polskiemu czytelnikowi istotnej współczesnej problematyki filozoficznej. Intencja sprawozdawcza nie jest jednak ani jedyną, ani nawet najważniejszą, ponieważ dominuje zamiar merytoryczny, czyli udział w dyskusji wokół naturalizmu. Moje rozważania nad tą orientacją są prowadzone z punktu widzenia kogoś, kto sympatyzuje z naturalistycznym (...) punktem widzenia, dokładniej z jego umiarkowaną wersją, którą uważam za możliwą do obrony. Staram się także przedstawić argumenty przeciwko naturalizmowi i nie ukrywam, że są one bardzo poważne. Jan Woleński, Wstęp. (shrink)

This volume offers critical responses to philosophical naturalism from the perspectives of four different yet fundamentally interconnected philosophical traditions: Kantian idealism, Hegelian idealism, British idealism, and American pragmatism. In bringing these rich perspectives into conversation with each other, the book illuminates the distinctive set of metaphilosophical assumptions underpinning each tradition's conception of the relationship between the human and natural sciences. The individual essays investigate the affinities and the divergences between Kant, Hegel, Collingwood, and the American pragmatists in their responses to (...) philosophical naturalism. The ultimate aim of Responses to Naturalism is to help us understand how human beings can be committed to the idea of scientific progress without renouncing their humanistic explanations of the world. It will appeal to scholars interested in the role idealist and pragmatist perspectives play in contemporary debates about naturalism. (shrink)

This book explicates and defends ethical naturalism. It explains the naturalist's position, why it is important, and why it is plausible even though it faces serious objections. The book answers in detail many such objections, including Moore's and Parfit's objections, and including the "just too different" objection. Underlying many of the objections, and motivating them, is the view that ethical naturalism is unable to account for the normativity of the ethical facts and properties that it postulates. This is the normativity (...) objection, and the book as a whole deals with this objection. The book argues that ethical naturalism is able to answer the objection, and, surprisingly, that it is in a better position to explain the nature of normativity than its alternatives, such as nonnaturalism, constructivism, expressivism, and so on. The book evaluates various answers that ethical naturalists can offer to the challenge to explain what normativity consists in. It deals with technical issues about metaphysical analysis and grounding, both metaphysical grounding and normative grounding. It examines Cornell realism, the Canberra program, Neo-Humean subjectivism, Neo-Aristotelian naturalism, and Pluralist-Teleology. (shrink)

It is often assumed that a commitment to scientific realism naturally, if not necessarily, accompanies a commitment to naturalizing metaphysics. If one denies that our scientific theories are approximately true, it would be unclear why one should index metaphysics to them. My aim is to show that the project of naturalizing metaphysics does not require realist assumptions. I will identify two success conditions for the project of disentangling naturalized metaphysics from realism: 1) the narrow success condition, which requires the antirealist (...) to explain why naturalized metaphysics is preferable to non-naturalized metaphysics, and 2) the broad success condition, which requires the antirealist to explain why naturalized metaphysics is preferable to metaphysical quietism. I believe that the antirealist can meet these conditions. Although I will not defend any definitive way of meeting them, I will explore argumentative avenues open to the antirealist. In particular, I will consider some conceptions of naturalized metaphysics, discuss their antirealist-compatible expected payoffs, and consider whether those payoffs enable the antirealist to meet the success conditions of the project. I will find that the antirealist has several argumentative avenues open to them. (shrink)

Turkish translation of the book "Gott denken: Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie" (Thinking God: An Outline of a Rational Theology) by Holm Tetens published in Reclam Verlag.

The topic of naturalism has been at the heart of philosophical pragmatism since the beginning of the 20th century. The interest in philosophical naturalism in recent decades has led to reformulations of earlier pragmatic insights from this origin, such as Hilary Putnam's position of 'liberal naturalism' . Richard J. Bernstein's final work, 'The Vicissitudes of Nature : from Spinoza to Freud' provides a historical survey of naturalism in major philosophical figures including the topic of this paper, Karl Marx. The relationship (...) between pragmatism and Marxism is fraught, marked with misunderstandings on both sides. In this article, I argue that Bernstein's engagement with Marx over his career clarifies the close relationship of pragmatism and Marx's naturalism especially at the level of philosophical anthropology. In important ways, Bernstein demonstrates the common social and political emphases of both Dewey and Marx with respect to humans-in-nature. His articulation of Marx's naturalism as involving a "dialectical historical transaction" between humans and non-human nature is in important ways the fruition of a dialogue between Marx and Dewey begun five decades ago in his Praxis & Action. (shrink)

How do we know what is possible or impossible, what is inevitable or unattainable, or what would happen under which circumstances? Since modal facts seem distinctively mysterious and difficult to know, the epistemology of modality has historically been fraught with uncertainty and disagreement. The recent literature has been dominated by rationalist approaches that emphasise a priori reasoning (sometimes including direct intuition of possibility). Only recently have alternative approaches emerged which recognize a broader range of sources of modal knowledge. Yet even (...) emerging non-rationalist views have tended to assign scientific investigation at best a supporting role. Our project in this Element is to develop and defend a new approach to the epistemology of modal facts which assigns a central role to scientific investigation. According to modal naturalism, science (construed broadly) is our primary source of evidence concerning the modal facts. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Dewey’s ultimate solution to the mind-body problem is grounded not in his emergentist metaphysics per se but rather in his metametaphysical qualitative naturalism. The latter precedes Dewey’s emergent theory of mind, as postulated in his Experience and Nature. Thus, Dewey’s emergentism is rather a consequence of his qualitative naturalism. As such, Dewey’s ultimate metametaphysical solution to the mind-body problem precedes his emergentist metaphysics, and not vice versa. The essence of Dewey’s qualitative naturalism can be (...) captured in a maxim “Quality first, quantity second!” which is an alternative to Galileo’s quantitative naturalism with the maxim “Quantity first, quality second!”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion, Psychiatry, and “Radical” Epistemic InjusticesRosa Ritunnano, MD (bio) and Ian James Kidd, PhD (bio)Hermeneutical injustice as a concept has evolved since its original formulation by Miranda Fricker (2007). The concept has been taken up in psychiatry, with its moral, epistemic and clinical premium on the interpretation of extremely complex and difficult experiences (Kidd et al., 2022). There are many varieties of hermeneutical injustice with different forms, sources, degrees, (...) effects, and interpersonal and socio-structural aspects (Medina, 2017). José Eduardo Porcher has proposed the addition of a new form of ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustice, with a case study of psychotic symptoms involving religious content.He offers different characterizations of this injustice:a particularly radical form of injustice, namely, having their own interpretation of their experiences unjustifiably undermined.a form of hermeneutical injustice that occurs when a patient diagnosed with psychosis is denied the opportunity of interpreting their own experiences within their own religious framework.These are different things. Denying someone the opportunity to interpret their experiences in their own, preferred framework is one way of undermining their interpretations. Another is forcing someone to use your own preferred framework and then belittling their own, which seems doubly wrong. Misusing some preferred interpretive framework can be as unjust as not using it. The two definitions could be combined, but then much will depend on what it means to undermine someone’s interpretation of an experience. We think there is a form of radical hermeneutical injustice—different to the one described by Porcher. Some interpretations of kinds of experience with religious content can be undermined if one is committed to a metaphysical naturalism. In these cases, one person cannot regard someone’s interpretive framework as coherent or intelligible (one that involves supernatural entities, for instance).Most discussions of hermeneutical injustice focus on social structures. Fricker notes structural dimensions to hermeneutical injustice. In a standard case, a group has unequal participation in collective practices for making and using interpretive resources (Ritunnano, 2022). In a rich analysis, José Medina describes four ‘axes’ or dimensions for distinguishing forms of hermeneutical injustice [End Page 235] (Medina, 2017). The source of these injustices can be semantic or performative. The dynamics may be structural or interpersonal, or both. Moreover, there are different degrees of breadth and depth, defined here in terms of the ‘reach’ of the injustice across one’s life, and the depth of damage to one’s hermeneutic agency, respectively (Medina, 2017, p. 45). On this model, what might count as ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustices? Deep and broad hermeneutical injustices can be radical when they are very broad in scope and very deeply damaging. This might be what Porcher has in mind. But we think there is a further option, relevant to his case study.Porcher focuses on a case where individuals experience unusual beliefs and perceptions with religious content receive a ‘psychosis’ diagnosis. The alleged injustice is that the possibility of a genuine religious experience is not recognized and validated. The example is Femi, a young man with Christian background, who enters the mental health system following the onset of psychotic ‘symptoms’. After being found “disoriented and depleted in public” – tired and undernourished—Femi is compulsorily admitted to hospital, explaining he undertook fasting and isolation in response to orders from God. During this time, Femi devoted himself to Bible reading and stopped going to work. In hospital, where the authenticity of God’s voice is challenged by clinicians, Femi is treated for acute psychosis with pharmacotherapy. While remission of symptoms follow, there is no functional recovery, and Femi is described as “unmotivated and apathetic”.Femi interpreted his experiences in religious terms, but this interpretation is not accepted or pursued by the clinicians. Is this a hermeneutical injustice? If so, is it a ‘radical’ one? Granted, Femi’s religious interpretation may be psychologically adaptive—enhancing his sense of life as meaningful (Ritunnano & Bortolotti, 2022). But this is consistent with it being a hermeneutical injustice. Plus, a religious framing may be conducive to his functional recovery after being discharged, especially in conjunction with a supportive religious community, able to help him articulate, understand, and respond to those religious experiences (see Cottingham, 2005; Wynn, 2005). However, none of... (shrink)

Complementarity is the basis for identity, because, duplicity is the basis for a unit. -/- .

Transcendental realism and the problem of naturalism. The problem of naturalism -- How is a philosophy of science possible? Experiment and application : the intransitive dimension -- Discovery and development : the transitive dimension The social sciences and philosophy -- Towards a new critical naturalism -- Societies. Against individualism -- On the society/person connection -- Some emergent properties of social systems -- On the limits of naturalism -- Social science as critique : facts, values and theories -- Agency. Agents, reasons (...) and causes I : objections to naturalism -- Agents, reasons and causes II : naturalism vindicated -- Emergent powers and materialism I : against reductionism -- Emergent powers and materialism II : in defence of transcategorial causality -- Rational explanation -- Philosophies. Metaphilosophical preliminaries -- The critique of the positivist tradition : explanation, prediction and confirmation -- The critique of the hermeneutical tradition I : concepts, reasons and rules -- The critique of the hermeneutical tradition II : explanation and understanding -- The hermeneutical circle and the logic of emanicipation. (shrink)

Super-Humeans argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an (...) ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super-Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology. (shrink)

Super-Humeans argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an (...) ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super-Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology. (shrink)

Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges. This is often seen as an advantage; but it also calls into question its claim of belonging to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge. This paper argues that skeptical challenges can be stated to defy epistemic optimism within naturalized epistemology, and that there are distinctively naturalistic forms (...) of skepticism. To that end, it outlines some assumptions underlying many attempts to naturalize epistemology. It contrasts these approaches to traditional epistemology and identifies the reasons offered by naturalistic epistemologists to dismiss traditional skeptical challenges. Next, it argues that the problem of skepticism can be sensibly stated within a naturalistic setting. Finally, it contends that there are distinctively naturalistic strategies to argue for skepticism and diagnoses the prospects of naturalism vis-à-vis these kinds of skeptical challenges. (shrink)

This presentation introduces the third issue of Mɛtascience, a journal dedicated to metascientific research. It highlights ten contributions from authors with diverse backgrounds, exploring various aspects of Mario Bunge's thought and metascientific epistemology. The issue is divided into four categories: Studies on Bunge's System, Metascientific Contributions, Applications of Bungean Thought, and Around Metascience. Key topics include the characterization of metascientific epistemology, its distinction from philosophical epistemologies, and its focus on scientific constructs and epistemic operations. The issue explores applications of Bunge's (...) systemist philosophy, conceptual modeling in information technology, and debates surrounding linguistics as an empirical science. It also addresses the relationship between epistemology, science education, and the teaching of scientific models. (shrink)

Historical reconstructions of the effects of the intellectual migration are typically informed by one of two conflicting narratives. Some scholars argue that refugee philosophers, in particular the logical positivists, contributed to the demise of distinctly American schools of thought. Others reject this ‘eclipse view’ and argue that postwar analytic philosophy can best be characterized as a synthesis of American and positivist views. This paper studies the fate of one of the most influential schools of U.S. philosophy—Columbia naturalism—and argues that both (...) narratives are part of a larger story. First, I reconstruct the rise of the Columbia school, focusing on its naturalist analyses of science, morality, and religion as well as its contributions to the history of ideas. Next, I trace some of the naturalists’ contacts with German philosophers and show that they encountered a strong bifurcation between historical and scientific philosophy in their discussions. I argue that a similar distinction gradually infected debates between naturalists, eventually resulting in a split within the Columbia school itself. The historically-oriented naturalists, I argue, were overshadowed by the analytic movement, whereas the science-minded naturalists were able to incorporate the views of the émigrés, thereby developing the tradition in new directions. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine the naturalist approach in the philosophy of memory through the lens of the simulation theory of memory. On the theory, episodic memory is a kind of constructive simulation performed by a functionally specialized neurocognitive system. Taking naturalism to be a kind of methodological stance characterized by a cluster of epistemic guidelines, we illustrate the roles these guidelines have played in the development of the theory. We show how scientific evidence has guided both the selection of (...) the research question and the initial elaboration of the theory. We demonstrate how such evidence has led the simulationist to reject a familiar, commonsense picture of memory. We also trace the recent radicalization of the theory, highlighting the simulationist's continual reflection on their concepts and assumptions. In the spirit of such reflection, we end by outlining some outstanding challenges for the theory. (shrink)