Realism and Anti-Realism, Misc

Throughout his career, Barry Taylor argued for several key theses in semantics and in epistemology. He calls these theses “Antirealism”. I will suggest, however, that a “Realist” could, and perhaps should, accept these semantic and epistemic theses. Doing so would not, I argue, conflict with the core this of philosophical Realism, properly so-called, since this thesis is not semantic or epistemological, but “ontological”. A Realist about (say) badgers is just someone who believes that there are badgers. And Taylor’s semantic and (...) epistemological theses are not intended to entail any denial that there are (say) badgers. However, Taylor argues that the core theses of “realism” cannot be any such merely ontological theses. I will defend a simplistic, “ontological” understanding of “realism” against Taylor’s arguments. Taylor also usefully identifies something that others have called “Common-sense Realism”. But this so-called “Realism”, Taylor argues, is not properly described as any kind of “realism” at all – because it does not affirm Taylor’s key theses in semantics and epistemology. Yet I say it is realism – provided only that it does not also take a perverse stand on a realist’s “Euthyphro” question: Do (say) badgers exist because our ways of talking and knowing would ideally converge on an affirmation of the sentence “Badgers exist”? Isn’t it, rather, the case that, insofar as our ways of talking and knowing would ideally converge on an affirmation of the sentence “Badgers exist”, this is so at least in part because badgers exist? (shrink)

Arguments for a theory about the nature of the ontological categories, the relations that determine them and their epistemic role in the construction of different kinds of limited, but true knowledge of reality in itself.

This paper develops a realist metaphysical framework according to which reality consists of irreducibly distinct beings that are genuinely present to one another in relations that do not exhaust them, their manifestations, or any theoretical description. Against representationalist epistemologies, reductionist physicalism, idealism, and ontic structural realism, I argue that knowledge is real contact with beings rather than indirect access to mental or structural proxies. Such contact is always partial because beings exceed every relation and every mode of disclosure. The resulting (...) view, Participatory Non-Reductionist Realism, affirms both the irreducibility of beings and the reality of participation while rejecting any principle of ontological exhaustibility. (shrink)

Philosophy part of theory of emergent space-time-matter is discussed. It was shown that anthropic principle is direct consequence of emergent time. It was shown that consciousness is epiphenomenon, but it is more fundamental than matter.

The construction of space-time in a physical system without time and dynamics is considered. It is shown that the anthropic principle and causality principle inevitably arise in models without time and dynamics. It is shown that for any physical model based on a system without time and dynamics, the anthropic principle is a scientific principle and, in principle, can be falsified. It is shown that, in principle, there is the possibility of experimental verification of what is true - realism or (...) idealism. (shrink)

Is reality the basis of everything or has reality itself an other basis? What makes reality – not the real things – to be active, to exist? The question of what is real seems to be an easy question, because in our daily lives we are and must be naive realists. We ourselves, the things around us, the world, the facts, all that is real. there must be several concepts of reality if we want to say that not only physical (...) or material things of everyday life are real, e. g. numbers, π, Dr. Faustus, thoughts, emotions and other things. On the other hand, given the difference of classical physics and modern physics, we see that even that form of knowledge, which seems to be most responsible for reality, natural science, cannot give the desired uniqueness in terms of what itself wants or needs to understand as real. Alternatively, when we see that nothing can be and nothing can be real without being in a world, and when we understand the world as the order of things, which I call worldI , then this leads us to the speculative answer that it is exactly the “unreal” worldI which is the reason why the everyday reality, worldI I , is real. The worldI is the basis for the reality of our empirical worldI I . The considerations presented here have nothing to do with the idealistic conception of possibility, founded in the power of the subject, nor with the existential concept of potentiality, founded in the Entwurf des Daseins. (shrink)

Recently, there has been much debate concerning the value of theorizing in terms of natural properties. In particular, some philosophers have sought to explain the greater objective value of theorizing truly in terms of natural, as opposed to non-natural, properties. This comes in response to an explanatory challenge raised by Dasgupta, who argues that there can be no such explanation to begin with. But this paper argues that the existing attempts at resolving Dasgupta’s explanatory challenge have largely been unsuccessful. Properly (...) understood, Dasgupta’s explanatory challenge demands a more intuitive source for the objective value of theorizing in terms of naturalness than the ones provided. Instead, this paper approaches the challenge from a different angle, aiming at illuminating an intuitive explanatory pathway for how certain properties can even come to be objectively valuable to theorize upon to begin with. Paired with the view that natural properties are themselves primitive sources of objective (alethic) value, a satisfying response to the challenge can be forged. (shrink)

Can we learn from imagination? This article surveys a thread from an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and brings it into dialogue with Proclus's notion of mathematical imagination. Imagination for Proclus mediates between intellect and perception and reveals a unique level of reality borne by “intelligible matter.” By contrast, the contemporary debate, focused on concepts such as instructive versus transcendent imagining and propositional versus doxastic justification, is primarily epistemic in nature and seems not to require the fifth-century Platonist's commitment (...) to a distinctive level of imaginal reality. Even so, I argue that Proclus could converse fruitfully with the contemporary debate on questions about whether there is evidence accessible only to imagination and irreducible to other sources and about whether imagination is situationally responsive and able to inform belief. (shrink)

This is a review of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Adrian Del Caro, trans. The Joyful Science / Idylls from Messina / Unpublished Fragments from the Period of The Joyful Science (Spring 1881– Summer 1882): Volume 6 (The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023. x + 772 pp. $28.00, paper, ISBN 978-1-5036-3232-5.

This article explains Aristotle’s view of conflicting appearances of the same objects in perception. Examining his responses to the Protagoreans who take all such appearances as true, the article argues that Aristotle treats this epistemological position as fundamentally metaphysical. He distinguishes two versions of Protagoreanism, each connected to a distinct metaphysical thesis: a realist thesis urging simultaneous ascription of contrary perception-independent qualities to objects, and an anti-realist thesis making perceptible qualities’ existence dependent on perception. Against both positions, Aristotle develops a (...) restrictive realist response that preserves the perception-independent existence of qualities while denying that all appearing qualities actually belong to objects—thereby indicating the previously underappreciated scope of his realism. Rather than revising our conception of the world’s uniform structure, Aristotle suggests that we should treat conflicting appearances as perceptual deceptions arising from deviations in perceivers’ conditions such as illness, distance, or weakness. (shrink)

In Unreal Beliefs, Krzysztof Poslajko argues that socially constructed beliefs exist but are not real. In this commentary, I argue that the grounds for taking socially constructed beliefs to exist are also grounds for taking them to be real (per Poslajko’s own definition of reality).

Chirimuuta (2024) proposes that the theory and practise of neuroscience are incompatible with scientific realism: she claims that our neuroscientific theories are mind-dependent projections of regularity and simplicity, and that our interest-dependent neuroscientific practices prevent us from acquiring objective knowledge of the brain. This paper challenges both claims.

The concept of the interdependence of all things appears across Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. Jizang (549−623 CE), a prominent Chinese Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher, contends that all objects are established by virtue of their mutual dependence. He endorses what can be termed “the interdependence thesis”—the view that the referents of complementary concepts or words are interdependent. In this paper, I clarify this thesis and characterize Jizang’s ontology as a form of metaphysical nonrealism. Drawing on this ontology, I construct an argument (...) for the plausibility of the interdependence thesis. I also respond to several objections to the argument. (shrink)

Despite some notable similarities between the scientific realisms of Sellars and Peirce (such as both being anti-representationalist, and future-directed), in his mature work Science and Metaphysics Sellars explicitly critiqued Peirce’s account of truth, as lacking “an intelligible foundation” (Sellars 1968: vii). In this paper, I explore Sellars’ proposed remedy to Peirce’s purported lack, in his complex and enigmatic account of picturing – a non-discursive ‘mapping’ of the world. I argue that although Sellars’ development of this idea is largely sound, much (...) of what he charges Peirce’s philosophy with missing is actually present there. By means of his semiotic icon / index / symbol distinction, Peirce manages to develop a philosophy of language which effectively coordinates the real order and the order of signification within the very structure of the proposition as he understands it, by contrast to Sellars’ claim that the two orders are merely connected through ‘analogy’. I also argue that in between Sellars’ ambitious account of veridicality, which appears to anticipate a form of scientific self-mensuration, and the dismissive ‘anti-truth’ quietism of neopragmatists such as Rorty, Peirce’s “contrite fallibilism” (Peirce CP 1.14) charts a wise middle path. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’ distinctive scientific realism has lately been gaining ground, but a crucial issue is how it can or should theorize modality. We argue that many interesting questions in this area transcend the usual ‘first-order’ concerns: “Is there an objectivist modal ontology?” and “What modal entities should we posit”? Rather, Sellars invites us to take a fresh look at the relationship between logic and metaphysics through an investigation of ‘second-order’ philosophical categories. This investigation contrasts with both the first-order 'external' ontologising (...) of metaphysicians such as David Lewis and the 'easy' ontologising of metaphysicians such as Amie Thomasson. We argue that Sellars' approach stimulates a more conscious and fruitful examination of our role and methods as philosophers in the modal arena. Moreover, since the notion of metaphysics as a ‘second-order’ activity has recently gained attention in contemporary philosophy of science through the work of David Wallace, we explore both Sellars’ potential contribution to these discussions and the relationship between Sellars’ approach and contemporary ontic structural realist views regarding modal structure, thereby opening up fundamental questions concerning where and how the metaphysics of modality might be integrated with our current best physics. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand dependent origination, a central thesis of the Buddha’s teachings, within the framework of radical skepticism. The conceptual tools developed by the contemporary work on radical skepticism, taken up by philosophers such as Hilary Putnam, James Conant, and Tim Button, enable us to clarify and gain insight into dependent origination, thereby making it possible to achieve a deeper understanding of the interrelations among dependent origination, the act of holding a belief, the world, and right mindfulness—the key (...) practice in the Buddha’s teachings aimed at reducing or ending suffering. (shrink)

A philosophical meditation on merit and meritocracy in times when both have long been under fire and there is a pressing need to reconsider. Chapters within: 1. Running to and from BIG Monsters. 2. Grounding Merit Objectively. 3. Rethinking Meritocracy. 4. Nation, Utopia, Roots, Tradition. 5. A Summing Up. -/- The first chapter is geared toward a general readership; chapters two through four are primarily scholarly; chapter five engages everyone. Amazon Kindle offers a free preview of the front matter and (...) some of chapter one. (shrink)

Realist metaphysical views often rely, explicitly or implicitly, on variations of the presupposition that genuine structure is sparse; call this assumption Sparsity. This includes views where there is one uniquely correct way to carve up the world, and also apparently pluralistic views that allow more structure yet still add a limit so there is not ‘too’ much. This conflates the question of how to characterize what structure is, with two other questions: how much structure there is; and which particular structures (...) there are. I draw on Dennettian patterns, combining deflationary realism with profligacy about real patterns, to demonstrate a pragmatist metaphysical approach to identifying structure without begging the question of how much structure there is. Pragmatist pattern metaphysics allows that the world may be dense in structure, beyond any presupposed particular upper bound from Sparsity. Finding genuine structure may be easy, and most of it reiterative, useless, or uninteresting; the world may be so dense with structure that we could never exhaust it, such that trying to find ‘the’ correct structure is in principle unachievable. This shifts the substantive task away from the metaphysical question of what structure is, and towards methodological considerations. If there may be more genuine structure than we could ever investigate, our interests as inquirers must play a role in narrowing down which structures we choose to investigate, and which of many closely related structures yields the most systematicity, usefulness, or other epistemic desiderata. This pragmatist approach is minimalist with respect to metaphysical commitment: saying some structure is genuine says very little of substance about it. (shrink)

It is well known that modern epistemology is a discipline that was left as a legacy by the great French philosopher René Descartes, and it is generally believed that it is a typically philosophical discipline whose problems can be dealt with only by philosophical (speculative) means of inquiry. Recently, however, the idea of naturalization of epistemological inquiry has emerged, and one of its most prominent advocates was Quine. However, the question is to what extent, if at all, the proposal offered (...) by Quine is tenable, as evidenced, apart from numerous criticisms, by significantly different interpretations regarding assumptions on which it should be based. Namely, three types of interpretations of Quine’s call for the reform of epistemological inquiry prevail in contemporary literature: behaviorist, which was largely advocated by Quine, but also coherentist and physicalist, which some of his interpreters argued for. However, while the first two of these options are in my opinion unacceptable because they are unable to provide the necessary autonomy for the epistemological context of inquiry, I will try to show that physicalism is also burdened with difficulties, albeit different ones, which make it an untenable position when it comes to epistemological inquiry. Nevertheless, even before I started writing, I thought that there were valuable insights in Quine’s proposal, and that we could learn important lessons from the failure of previous interpretations, both regarding the position that should be taken in its interpretation, and, closely related to this, the possibility of reforming epistemological inquiry in general. In other words, informed by the weaknesses of Quine’s proposal and its interpretations, I will argue that epistemological inquiry can ultimately be approached from one of two mutually incompatible theoretical positions: the traditional or Cartesian one, and the Kantian one. Given that, as noted above, Quine’s proposal was primarily a reaction to Cartesianism, I discuss the possibility of establishing the fundamental level of inquiry such as epistemological to which Quine had to aspire, but in a way that would enable the synthesis of his approach with Kant’s view, which is in my opinion the only genuine alternative to the traditional program. Although it implies taking a position that would be a kind of compromise and could not be attributed to Quine (which is why it is uncertain whether he would have supported this interpretation), I believe that, apart from preserving certain naturalistic elements, it is an interpretation that would ultimately satisfy most of the demands that Quine himself has set for epistemological inquiry. (shrink)

For Kant, “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” (KrV, A51/B75). This formula was directed against the conception of concepts held by authors such as Wolff and Baumgarten, who regarded as empty only those concepts whose content is contradictory. According to these thinkers, concepts whose content is possible are not empty, since their content consists in the sum of the determinations that define that content as such. For Kant, by contrast, even concepts of possible contents are empty, (...) since, taken as such, they do not yield knowledge of an actually existing object; for this, an empirical intuition grounded in perception is required. Hegel, for his part, disputes the claim that the content of empirical intuitions contains anything more than its own determinate content. But if both the content of concepts and that of empirical intuitions are merely possible, when and how does the mind come into contact with the real world? For the explanatory model proposed by Hegel, this apparent problem rests on a fallacious line of argument, namely, that if both concepts and empirical intuitions are empty, then the totality formed by the two cannot itself be anything but empty. On the contrary, for Hegel the reference of contents to the real world results from the coherent system that mediates all determinate contents among themselves; the way in which concepts and empirical intuitions acquire their reference to the world is precisely through this totality insofar as it singularizes itself within itself as a concrete, particular object. (shrink)

In this paper, I take two recent arguments in the literature against naturalistic metaphysics, that is, a metaphysics guided by our best science, and show that these arguments should be directed instead against metaphysical realism, which is roughly the view that our metaphysics aims to provide a unique and true account of the world out there. The first argument is the argument from progress which states that since metaphysical theories are not quantitative like scientific theories, they cannot inherit the progress (...) from the scientific theories they are based upon. The second argument is the argument from metaphysical underdetermination which states that each scientific theory can be compatible with many metaphysical theories with no way to choose the true theory among them. These two arguments undermine metaphysical realism. As a result, I conclude that we ought to adopt instead a form of antirealistic metaphysics. (shrink)

I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock reductive / ontological dependence accounts of social groups arguably lack.

RésuméAlberto Voltolini préconise une analyse syncrétique des entités fictives, affirmant qu'elle satisfait tous les desiderata d'une analyse appropriée des entités fictives. Cet article présente une analyse des personnages fictifs qui réponde à ces critères, tout en évitant les problèmes que rencontre l'analyse de Voltolini. Selon mon analyse antiréaliste et leibnizienne, un personnage fictif peut être identifié par la collection de prédicats attribués à son nom. Cette analyse offre le bénéfice de la théorie des faisceaux, puisqu'elle écarte la question des porteurs (...) des noms fictifs, tout en expliquant pourquoi un personnage fictif est plus qu'une simple collection de prédicats. (shrink)

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(3), 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that (...) whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism. (shrink)

The present document constitutes the second indispensable anthropological foundation for the proposal of the Illumanesimo cultural movement. If the introductory volume L'Illumanesimo delineates the general coordinates of the new paradigm's philosophy, Esperienze develops its beating heart: a vision of the human being capable of surpassing both materialist reductionism and fideistic spiritualism, offering the movement a conception of humanity coherent with the ambitions of a "third cultural turning point." The work articulates the pillars of Illumanesimo anthropology: the origin of the ontological (...) duality of the human being, resulting from the interaction between CEFA (Campo Energetico di Forze Autocoscienti — Energy Field of Self-Conscious Forces) and the biological body; the soul understood as a functional "bridge" between the spiritual and material dimensions; incarnation conceived not as a fall but as an evolutionary choice oriented towards knowledge; the existential programme as an orientative outline elaborated by the Spirit prior to each earthly life. Central to this framework is the process of symbolisation — the mechanism through which material experiences are transformed into permanent spiritual knowledge — which establishes an original and operative gnoseology. The document extends the implications of the theory to the domains of ethics and pedagogy, proposing a reconfiguration of good and evil as phases of a single evolutionary process, and delineating the principles of an education that valorises self-determination and critical thinking. These elaborations furnish the Illumanesimo movement with the conceptual instruments to intervene in the contemporary debate on formation, individual responsibility, and social coexistence. Esperienze thus represents the strategic bridge between the theoretical foundations and the concrete existential dimension of the project: the document that translates Illumanesimo metaphysics into a vision of the human capable of orienting both the individual search for meaning and the collective cultural action of the movement. (shrink)

Social metaphysics raises intriguing questions about realism and antirealism. I focus on properties because other social entities arguably involve the instantiation of socially constructed properties, properties are relevant to discussions of causation, and their reality may have implications for the reality of other social entities. I delineate a possible distinction between socially constructed, social, and nonsocial properties. I outline and then resist recent attempts to revise the criteria for realism and antirealism about such properties, specifically about the mind‐independence criterion for (...) existence, relative frame manipulability, and kind projectibility. Instead, I propose that realism and antirealism about socially constructed properties should be understood in terms of the existence of socially constructed universals or tropes. If we accept this alignment, we can draw on the traditional arguments for and against the existence of specific kinds of properties within a given domain, without having to revise the conditions for realism that we have traditionally relied on. (shrink)

This dissertation argues for an antirealism about socially constructed properties by arguing that it has a more plausible way of addressing the issues of a complete theory of social construction than its realist counterpart. -/- The first chapter lays the groundwork for the dissertation. In this chapter, I lay down the definitions of socially constructed properties, realism, and antirealism about them. Socially constructed properties are those that depend on the collective acceptance or behavior of a society. Realism about socially constructed (...) properties holds that these properties are universals or tropes instantiated in the world. Antirealism, by contrast, denies that such properties are instantiated in the world. -/- The second chapter lists and explains the issues that a complete theory of social construction must address. The issues are: (a) SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION; (b) CONTINGENCY; (c) SOCIAL TRUTH; (d) OBJECTIVITY; (e) CAUSAL POWER; (f) INCONSISTENCY; (g) ETHICS. -/- The third chapter delineates how realism might address these issues. While realism might have straightforward account of most of the issues, I argue that realism fails to address INCONSISTENCY and CAUSAL POWER satisfyingly. If realism is right, then social construction yields genuine properties even when it results in inconsistent properties. However, the world cannot accommodate inconsistent properties. Thus, realism is false. Second, many have claimed that socially constructed properties such as race, gender, and being the president have causal powers. However, I argue that this claim is problematic. -/- The fourth and the final chapter argues that antirealism—of the conceptualist variety—fares better in accounting for these issues. Conceptualism is the view that there are no socially constructed properties, only socially constructed concepts whose application conditions are determined by collective acceptance or behavior of a society. This view readily avoids the issues above: the messiness of the social world does not make the world countenance worldly inconsistencies and socially constructed properties have no causal powers since they do not exist. Moreover, conceptualism is consistent, if not conducive, to the project of resisting oppression based on socially constructed properties. (shrink)

Some metaphysically interesting notions fall outside of the realm of the mind-independent, and as such will erroneously be considered unworthy of our attention by any view that thinks only of realist metaphysics as substantive (Taylor, 2023). In this article I propose two ways of conceiving of substantive metaphysics that includes some mind-dependent phenomena. The first is to understand substantivity in terms of carving at the joints, but to take where the ‘joints’ are to depend in part on our own interests, (...) preferences, and conceptual schemes (the joints are ours, not nature’s). The second is to think of ‘reality’ as a system of explanatory dependence that includes some suitably embedded mind-dependent phenomena, and thus to deny (if we continue to characterize realism in terms of mind-independence) that we should be realists about all of ‘reality’. (shrink)

This paper develops the Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World (MEOW), a relational metaphysics that dissolves the inherited realism–idealism dichotomy by treating encounter-events rather than substances as ontologically primary. Both realism and idealism presuppose a subject–object architecture in which “mind” and “world” exist independently and subsequently enter into epistemic relation. MEOW argues that this bifurcation is conceptually untenable: all access to reality is structured through mediation (biological, cognitive, cultural), yet experience also exhibits genuine resistance that cannot be reduced to projection (...) or construction. -/- An encounter-event is analysed as a unified relational occurrence in which mediation, presentational structure, and constraint co-emerge. “Mind” and “world” are reinterpreted as abstractions distilled from stable patterns across such events, rather than as metaphysical primitives. Worked examples from colour perception and scientific inference illustrate how cross-perspectival stability is achieved without invoking a noumenal substrate. MEOW is positioned within, but distinguished from, phenomenology, pragmatism, enactivism, process philosophy, and agential realism. -/- By relocating ontology at the level of encounter rather than substance, MEOW preserves empirical constraint, avoids epistemic foundationalism, and reframes longstanding disputes in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. The framework provides resources for future work on causation, temporal organisation, cognition, and the interpretation of scientific practice. (shrink)

Great scholars in philosophy possess a keen analytical mind, excel in logical reasoning, and exhibit meticulous attention to detail. They rigorously define terms, avoiding ambiguities and errors. Originality and the willingness to challenge conventions are their hallmarks. They make significant contributions across various philosophical fields. They transparently address the exact aim of their research, and what it is not. Finally, they anticipate the impact of their theories on the current literature, and how such an impact should blossom across the future (...) generations. In this respect, great philosophers address open problems and propose big questions for the foreseeable research efforts of those who will follow. Mario Alai embodies the qualities of a great scholar in philosophy, and the various essays in this volume are an evidence to that. It is challenging to condense a lifetime of research in one book. However, the Editors of the present volume’s aim was to face this challenge, to make a collection dedicated to Mario Alai’s work not only possible but, as metaphysicians would say, actual. The book attempts to bring together the reflections of three different generations of scholars - i.e., mentors, colleagues, and students - on Alai’s thought. Viewed from this perspective, the extensive and valuable contributions that follow, crafted in honor of Mario Alai and his scholarly endeavors, come as no surprise. All the chapters focus on a theme that was very dear to the philosophical curiosity of Mario Alai. Moreover, in engaging with these different topics, the plethora of contributions gives us a sense of the work by Alai. To make sense of the different contributions as a unified enterprise, this volume is organized into three sections, which seek to gather writings that revolve around Mario’s most substantial contributions, while elucidating their contemporary significance in the global discourse. Moreover, it endeavors to offer precious insights into the origins and development of these contributions, as observed through Mario’s writings and responses. This represents a sort of closure of the theoretical circle, clearly showing how the work by Mario Alai has been appreciated through different generations, originating from his relation to his mentors, on the one hand, while also shedding new light on his students’ research interests, on the other. Editing such a wealth of material was, again, no small feat. Still, the taxonomy we have chosen for this book will assist readers in navigating the profound depths of Alai’s philosophical research. Consequently, the book is structured into the following three parts: 1. Realism in History of Philosophy, History of Science, and Metaphysics. 2. Scientific Realism. 3. Realism in Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, and Experimental Philosophy. Each contribution actively participates in a substantial conversation with Alai’s body of work, as a deep theoretical dialogue between the author and Mario. Consequently, it appeared fitting to let Alai conclude this conversation, with direct responses to these philosophy-provoking pieces in his honor. We shall refrain from further commentary on the works within this book and allow them to express their significance independently to appreciate the river of ideas flowing through Mario’s work1. Beyond their philosophical substance, they are a vivid testament to Alai’s enduring dedication and ongoing contributions, in different moments of his research life. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to extend the explanatory power of Martin Thrupp’s legacy within the framework of critical realism. Specifically, it argues that critical realism’s methodological complement, the morphogenetic approach, provides a metatheoretical toolkit that can deepen and expand Thrupp’s realist analysis of school contexts. The article elaborates on how the morphogenetic approach offers a stratified, temporally phased view of causality that integrates structure, agency, and culture (SAC). By foregrounding SAC, it argues for a layered and nuanced understanding (...) of context in education policy analysis, refining Thrupp’s conceptualisation of the constraints and opportunities available to school leaders. The article also delineates how the morphogenetic approach offers greater analytical precision in examining how emergent socio-cultural configurations condition agency and change within global educational systems, particularly through its positing of ‘situational logics’ that predispose agents towards specific courses of action. The final section outlines the potential of the morphogenetic approach for theorising the impact of globalised neoliberalism and managerialism on education, ultimately complementing and sharpening Thrupp’s realist contextualism. The article concludes that Thrupp’s contextual approach can be ‘rebranded’ through the morphogenetic framework, enhancing his realist analysis with a stratified understanding of how global neoliberal forces shape local educational contexts while offering strategies to resist managerialism and promote social justice. (shrink)

La concepción de la existencia como enteramente ajena a los predicados reales del concepto de una cosa no es una concepción original y exclusiva de Kant; es, en rigor, una variación de una concepción posible sobre la existencia que fue ya advertida por la Escolástica medieval y moderna. Recurrir a los debates de la metafísica escolástica sobre el ser y la esencia permite comprender mejor el sentido de las distintas posturas posibles sobre el problema general de la relación entre lo (...) determinado y lo existente. Sobre este trasfondo histórico y conceptual deviene posible abordar con nuevas herramientas teóricas la tesis de Kant sobre la existencia y delimitar con mayor precisión su sentido y su diferencia no sólo respecto de la tesis de autores como Wolff y Baumgarten, sino también respecto de la de los sucesores inmediatos del propio Kant. Éstos criticaron expresamente la postura de Kant sobre la existencia recurriendo, por su parte, a argumentos que en no pocos casos también habían sido reconocidos y parcialmente desarrollados ya por la metafísica escolástica. (shrink)

Call the epistemological grounds on which we rationally should determine our ontological (or alethiological) commitments regarding an entity its arbiter of existence (or arbiter of truth). It is commonly thought that arbiters of existence and truth can be provided by our practices. This paper argues that such views have several implications: (1) the relation of arbiters to our metaphysical commitments consists in indispensability, (2) realist views about a kind of entity should take the kinds of practices providing that entity’s arbiters (...) to align with respect to their metaphysical dependencies, (3) if realists take a kind of practice to provide grounds on which to affirm the existence of a kind of entity, they should turn to those same grounds when seeking to provide an epistemology of the relevant domain. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze Charles Crittenden’s account of fictional objects in his Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects (1991). I argue that Crittenden’s sketchy ontology of fictional objects does not support his weak eliminativism. Going along the lines of Amie Thomasson (1999), I stress that the problem of fictional objects is a strictly ontological problem, which requires an ontological solution. A solution to the problem of fictional objects (or ficta) that accommodates “practice” (ordinary language and literary practices) is of (...) course to be praised, but not when it is foregrounded at the expense of “ontology.” I argue for Roman Ingarden as a champion of ontology and practice, whose way of dealing with ficta fares better than Crittenden’s on both the ontological and practical sides. In short, ficta should be approached as something over and above mere grammaticalia (grammatical objects) namely as “purely intentional” objects that are formally incomplete, and which readers complete by resorting to practices of language and literary criticism. (shrink)

It is difficult to deny that Jean-Paul Sartre is influenced by the transcendental tradition. Although he employs forms of transcendental argumentation, he refrains from embracing transcendental idealism, which he equates with phenomenalism. He also critiques the necessity of the transcendental ego and challenges the primacy of epistemological questions over ontological ones. Providing a concrete characterization of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is not without difficulties. Interpretations range from ontologically non-committal readings to more robust ones that interpret Sartre as a phenomenalist. Others continue (...) to view the so-called dualism between the “for-itself” and the “in-itself” as a relapse into “transcendental realism.” -/- In order to substantiate Sartre as a transcendental philosopher—and to avoid reading his project as merely descriptive—I will argue that Sartre’s transcendentalism follows from his attempt to ground freedom ontologically. In this respect, Sartre finds himself in good company with the classical German tradition. From the outset of his philosophical career, F. W. J. Schelling aspired to make freedom “the A and Ω of all philosophy,” and he consistently insisted on the primacy of ontology over any other philosophical discipline. From a Kantian perspective, this might be seen as a relapse into a pre-critical metaphysics that sidesteps the question of the justification of knowledge claims. Schelling has often been regarded as the first existentialist, yet there are few systematic attempts in the literature to understand his relationship to Sartre’s philosophy. In this paper, I aim to take a step toward closing this gap by examining Schelling’s middle-period work, the so-called Freiheitsschrift (Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom), which reveals striking parallels with Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. A shared core insight between Sartre and Schelling is the conviction that any adequate treatment of the problem of freedom must also address the question of how consciousness and intentionality can be integrated into reality without sacrificing either the independence of reality or the existence of the mental realm. (shrink)

The “four-dimensional” colour space pigeons see may contain millions more colours than ours. Despite the long history of close association between our species, we might say humans and pigeons live in quite different worlds. If different species effectively live in different worlds, does that mean our biology constructs reality? This article sketches a way to resolve this dilemma based on inquiry and action as theorised by pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce. It reports on an academic paper recently published by my colleague (...) Andre Sant’Anna and myself. (“Pragmatic Realism: Towards a Reconciliation of Enactivism and Realism”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Feb 2024). (shrink)

Conventionalism about essence is the view that truths about what is (and isn’t) essential to things are based upon talk and thought about the world, rather than mind-independent facts. This chapter presents motivations for conventionalism, and explains how conventionalism can be (and has been) developed to accommodate essences that can only be discovered with the help of empirical investigation, like “water is H2O” or “Obama is human”. We examine a range of objections that have been raised against conventionalism—often presented dismissively (...) and decisively—and show how conventionalism has ample resources with which to plausibly respond to these challenges. (shrink)

Explanatory metaphysics aspires to explain the less fundamental in terms of the more fundamental. But we should recognize two importantly different approaches to this task. According to the generation approach, more basic features of reality generate (or give rise to) less basic features. According to the reduction approach, less perspicuous ways of representing reality reduce to (or collapse into) more perspicuous ways of representing reality. The main goals of this paper are to present the core differences between the two approaches (...) (§2), to demonstrate the distinction's significance (§3), to provide some resources for adjudicating between the approaches (§4), and to argue that the project of explanatory metaphysics needs both (§5). (shrink)

According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules.

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta (...) and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma. (shrink)

What are some of the distinctive virtues of the confluence approach that sets it apart from other attempts to do philosophy across cultural boundaries? First, unlike comparing and contrasting, the confluence approach remains faithful to the dominant conception of philosophy as an intellectual enterprise centered on dialogue and argumentation, in which philosophers pursue unresolved problems by building on the achievements of their acknowledged forbears. Second, confluence philosophy implements a syncretic and creative approach to doing philosophy by drawing on non-Western philosophical (...) sources while using the tools and conceptual resources of analytic philosophy. Third and last, the confluence approach highlights possible tensions when the traditions of thought brought into dialogue are on a diverging path on certain matters. Contemporary philosophy, at least in the Anglophone world and its satellites, is an avowedly secular enterprise, deferring to the sciences for its account of what can be said to exist at the most fundamental level and for its understanding of the processes that realize cognition. Buddhism at its core is often understood as a soteriological project manly concerned with overcoming suffering, which sometimes is taken to entail an insight into the emptiness of all the constitutive elements of existence and/or experience. Confluence philosophy thus makes it possible to ask whether defending a theoretical framework which affirms this truth of emptiness means that one must engage in the very sort of activity, namely, rational self-assertion, that hinders enlightenment. (shrink)

Mark Siderits’ confluence approach to philosophy, first sketched in his landmark monograph, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy (2003), is emblematic of what has arguably become the most influential way of engaging historically and culturally distant Buddhist thinkers and texts systematically and constructively. For nearly half a century, and rather fittingly for someone enthralled by Madhyamaka, Siderits has successfully charted a middle ground between the text-based, exegetical approach to Buddhist philosophy still dominant in many parts of Europe and East Asia and (...) the methods of contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy. Indebted to both, yet unconstrained by either, the confluence approach represents Siderits’ unique brand of historically-informed systematic reflection, delivered in the characteristically forceful and tightly argued prose that defines his inimitable style. (shrink)

What grounds the truth of modal statements? And how do we get to know about what is possible or necessary? One of the most prominent anti-realist perspectives on the nature of modality, due to Peter Menzies, is the response-dependent account of modal concepts. Typically, offering a response-dependent account of a concept means defining it in terms of dispositions to elicit certain mental states from suitable agents under suitable circumstances. Menzies grounded possibility and necessity in the conceivability-response of ideal conceivers: P (...) is possible iff an ideal conceiver could conceive that P. I will draw attention to three major objections that can be identified in the modal metaphysics and epistemology literature: Chalmers’ Incoherency Objection, Sherratt’s Transparency Objection and Geirsson’s Irrelevancy Objection. Each of these objections raises a different worry regarding Menzies’ account: that the notion of an ideal conceiver is incoherent, that the account implies a controversial thesis, and that it fails to offer an explanation of our knowledge of modality. The aim of this paper is to defend the response-dependent account of modality against these three objections. (shrink)

I critically discuss Douglas Edwards' construal of the debate over truth, and his case for truth pluralism. Toward the end I present a constructive suggestion on Edwards' behalf. This suggestion avoids the problems I have presented, whatever in the end its fate.

I propose that metaphysical study is initially indifferent to the truth of Metaphysical Realism about Metaphysics (MRM) and Metaphysical Realism and does not presuppose them. Metaphysical Realism is a metaphysical doctrine the truth of which cannot be settled logically prior to metaphysical investigation. MRM presupposes Metaphysical Realism and therefore, one should not hold MRM uncritically. An epistemological consequence of this is that arguments against the possibility of cognition about metaphysically real entities (by e.g., Hume) are not arguments against the epistemic (...) legitimacy of metaphysics without further arguments for MRM. This paper is also a case study of the philosophical significance of having rich enough acquaintance with the history of philosophy, the recent history included. (shrink)

Amie Thomasson’s work provides numerous ways to rethink and improve our approach to metaphysics. This chapter is my attempt to begin to sketch why I still think the easy approach leaves room for substantive metaphysical work, and why I do not think that metaphysics need rely on any ‘epistemically metaphysical’ knowledge. After distinguishing two possible forms of deflationism, I argue that the easy ontologist needs to accept (implicitly or explicitly) that there are worldly constraints on what sorts of entities could (...) exist, and could co-exist. I argue this leaves room for a substantive role for metaphysics if (following the work of E.J. Lowe) we take metaphysics to be concerned with the possible ways that reality could be. I explain how this conception does not need to appeal to any ‘epistemically metaphysical’ knowledge, and need only make use of conceptual and/or empirical means to arrive at views on what could exist (and co-exist). Thus, the answer I propose to the question posed in the title, at least in my view, is no-one. Or, at least, no-one should be afraid of conceptual analysis. Not even metaphysicians. (shrink)

Quine says that ontology is about what there is, suggesting that to be ontologically committed to Fs is to be committed to accepting a sentence which existentially quantifies over Fs. Kit Fine argues that this gets the logical form of some ontological theses wrong. Fine is right that some ontological theses cannot be rendered simply as ‘There are Fs’. But the root of the problem has yet to be recognized, either by Fine or by his critics. Sometimes to adopt an (...) ontological thesis is not merely to commit yourself to there being at least one F; it is to take a stand on which Fs there are. Once we recognize the ‘particularity’ of these ontological theses, we can adequately express them within the confines of a Quinean approach to ontology and ontological commitment. (shrink)

In recent work Allan Gibbard claims to be both a local quasi-realist, in Blackburn’s sense, and a global expressivist. His local quasi-realism rests on an argument that for naturalistic discourse but not ethical discourse, the semantic relation of denotation and the causal relation of tracking can and should be identified; that denoting simply is tracking, for naturalistic vocabulary. I argue that Gibbard’s case for this conclusion is unconvincing, and poorly motivated by his own expressivist standards. I also argue that even (...) if it were successful, it is doubtful whether the resulting position would count as global expressivism, as Gibbard and I both use that term. (shrink)

Grounding has become all the rage in recent philosophical work and metaphilosophical discussions. While I agree that the concept of ground marks something useful, I am skeptical about the metaphysical weight many imbue it with, and the picture of ‘worldly layering’ that grounding talk inspires. My skepticism centers around the fact that grounding involves necessitation, combined with reasons for thinking matters of necessity are matters of logical or conceptual (semantic, psychological) relations. I sketch an argument for deflationism about ground based (...) on this sort of deflationism about necessity and essence. I also note that in at least some cases, the considerations supporting modal deflationism directly support deflationism about whatever grounding relations may obtain in these cases. (shrink)