Skepticism, Misc

This paper argues that the classical formulation of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” rests on a false symmetry between “something” and “nothing.” In its standard metaphysical form, the question treats both terms as if they were equally available explanatory alternatives and then asks why one obtains rather than the other. Against this framing, I develop a reconstruction of the problem from within MARP (Metaphysics of the Absolute and Reference Points). On this view, judgment does not begin (...) from an absolute standpoint but from a point of reference: a structured condition under which differentiation, attribution, and intelligibility become possible. What appears as certainty, stability, or presence is therefore not evidence of an unconditioned absolute, but the effect of highly stabilized referential configurations. On this basis, unity is reinterpreted not as an ontological primitive but as an operational consequence of determination, while determination itself is understood not as an object before judgment but as the condition of possibility of judgment. The central claim is that “nothing” fails to qualify as a genuine explanatory alternative to “something,” because it lacks the conditions of determination, reference, and inferential support required for comparison. The question of existence must therefore be reformulated: not why being was selected over nothingness, but how determination becomes possible such that something can appear at all. (shrink)

If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth, or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent that by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeals to the subjective ought or to subjective probabilities are self-defeating. Adapting Karl Popper, I argue that the task of theoretical reason is to obtain theories (...) that we can agree to instate given that they appear to have greater explanatory merit than their rivals. I then argue that the task of practical reason is to decide which ought-propositions to act on. As a consequence theoretical reason is seen as a branch of practical reason. This approach makes both theoretical and practical reason practicable and free of the defects of the usual accounts. (shrink)

David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there are epistemic (...) sufficient reasons which are relative to the game of science and how their existence is consistent with Miller's main contentions while avoiding Miller's apparently anarchic account of our knowledge. (shrink)

Two common claims in philosophy are that deep disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved by argument and that normal disagreements will be resolved by argument. In each claim it is assumed that the parties to the disagreement are rational. I argue that both claims are false. The first fails to take account of refutations. The second fails to recognise the role of conjectures in the dynamics of the growth of knowledge. There is no disagreement such that it is impossible for (...) rational parties to reach agreement by argument; but there is also no disagreement for which parties are rationally required to reach agreement by argument. Given the same evidence, it may be rational for one person to believe a specific proposition and another to believe its negation. (shrink)

Metaphysics has done everything to involve God in the world of being. However, in case of considering Reality as being and nothingness, naturally, the metaphysical approach toward the idea of God is losing its grounds. If Reality is being and nothingness, so the idea of God, too, should concern nothingness as well as being.

There is a common belief that non-being and nothingness are identical, a widespread, even general delusion the wrongness of which I will try to demonstrate in this work. And which I consider even more important, that is to define nothingness for further determination of “its” place and role in the reality and especially in human life.

A critique of the assumptions underlying contemporary Western astrology.

This paper presents a concise eliminative argument against strong solipsism understood as an epistemic foundation. The target is not solipsism as a private mood, introspective stance, or phenomenological report, but a specific epistemic claim: that only one mind truly exists and that this fact is absolutely certain. The argument is structural rather than empirical. It proceeds by identifying minimal functional conditions that any claim must satisfy in order to qualify as epistemic truth at all—namely distinguishability, relational assessability, and the possibility (...) of error and correction. It is shown that strong solipsism attempts to occupy two incompatible roles simultane- ously. On the one hand, it claims absoluteness, independence from relations and criteria. On the other, it seeks to function as a foundational epistemic truth. These commitments jointly entail contradiction: a claim cannot be both epistemically assessable and absolutely detached from all criteria and relations. Independent of this contradiction, the paper identifies a re- cursive collapse of absolute certainty: any attempt to assert final, self-sufficient certainty generates an infinite hierarchy of higher-order certainty claims, preventing epistemic closure. The paper further argues that attempts to rescue solipsism by retreating to private inner certainty constitute an epistemic surrender rather than a solution. Such a retreat reclassifies solipsism from epistemology to a non-epistemic description of subjective experience, inca- pable of grounding knowledge. Finally, the argument shows that solipsism is performatively incompatible with epistemic practice itself: reasoning, communication, and justification pre- suppose stable relational structures that solipsism denies while simultaneously relying on them. The conclusion is eliminative. Strong solipsism does not fail because it is empirically false, but because it is structurally incapable of serving the epistemic role it assigns to itself. The analysis complements a broader program concerned with epistemic eligibility and structural limits of foundational claims, developed in earlier work on the logical conditions of cognition and the relational character of information. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry routinely eliminates privileged standpoints in practice, yet the underlying methodological principle is rarely stated explicitly. This paper formulates a simple criterion: an explanation is epistemically preferable when it does not rely on privileged elements that are exempt from the standards applied to alternative hypotheses. From this starting point, the paper argues that existence is not a property possessed by objects in isolation but a relational function that becomes epistemically available only through interaction and trace. The analysis culminates in (...) a minimal operational certainty: what acts and leaves a trace exists in the relevant sense, independently of perspective. (shrink)

Debates in epistemology and philosophy of science often proceed as if any well-formed claim were, in principle, eligible for empirical confirmation or refutation. Disagreements are then framed in terms of evidence, interpretation, or methodology. This paper argues that such debates presuppose a logically prior condition that is rarely made explicit: not all claims qualify as candidates for epistemic evaluation at all. The central thesis is that a claim can enter empirical inquiry only if it determines conditions under which it could (...) be mistaken. If no such conditions can be specified, empirical investigation is not merely inconclusive but logically inapplicable. This is not an empirical failure, but a structural one. The paper distinguishes between empirical falsification and structural ineligibility, and argues that the latter precedes and constrains the former. Building on a minimal, non-metaphysical analysis, the paper identifies basic logical preconditions that any epistemic claim must satisfy in order to enter evaluation. In particular, a claim must allow for distinguishable alternatives, specify relations to possible evidential conditions, and admit the possibility of error. Claims that fail to meet these conditions are not rejected as false; they are excluded as epistemically ineligible. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a theory of cognition, but specifies a necessary condition for epistemic function: only claims that generate differences in possible outcomes can be assessed, tested, or disputed. The reference to Kant in the title is methodological rather than doctrinal. Whereas Kant investigated the conditions of the possibility of experience, the present work examines the logical conditions under which claims can qualify as candidates for cognition in the first place. (shrink)

Abstract. Boltzmann brains (BBs) are minds which randomly appear as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. In this article, the question of if we are BBs, and the observational consequences if so, is explored. To address this problem, a typology of BBs is created, and the evidence is compared with the Simulation Argument. Based on this comparison, we conclude that while the existence of a “normal” BB is either unlikely or irrelevant, BBs with some ordering may have observable consequences. (...) There are two types of such ordered BBs: Boltzmannian typewriters (including Boltzmannian simulations), and chains of observer moments. Notably, the existence or non-existence of BBs may have practical applications for measuring the size of the universe, achieving immortality, or even manipulating the observed probability of events. -/- Disclaimer and trigger warning: some people have emotional breakdowns when thinking about topics described in the article, especially the “flux universe”. However, everything eventually adds up to normality. (shrink)

(Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming).

In that book I had two different, though not unrelated aims. The first chapter was concerned with traditional scepticisms about, e.g., the external world and induction. In common with Hume and Wittgenstein (and even Heidegger) I argued that the attempt to combat such doubts by rational argument was misguided: for we are dealing here with the presuppositions, the framework, of all human thought and enquiry. In the other chapters my target was different. It was that species of naturalism which tended (...) to discredit, or somehow to reduce to more scientifically acceptable, physicalistic terms, whole regions of ordinary human thought, language, and experience -- in particular the regions of moral discourse, of the subjectively mental and of the intensional. Here my reaction, as well as my target, was different. I did not merely stress the inescapability of the natural or common human standpoint from which we normally take for granted all that is called in question by scientistic naturalism. I also allowed the latter its own validity from its own limited standpoint.2 Philosophical scepticism and scientistic naturalism represent two types of challenge to ‘central features of our ordinary thought and talk’.3 The overall aim of Scepticism and Naturalism is to respond to these challenges and thereby to vindicate what Strawson refers to elsewhere as ‘our natural metaphysics’. (shrink)

Moore and Russell thought that perceptual knowledge of the external world is based on abductive inference from information about our experience. Sosa maintains that this ‘indirect realist’ strategy has no prospects of working. Vogel disagrees and thinks it can and does work perfectly well, and his reasoning (and variations on that reasoning) seem initially promising, moreso than other approaches. My aim, however, will be to adjudicate this dispute in favor of Sosa’s pessimistic answer, and in doing so, to better uncover (...) the important role abductive inference does have in a wider theory of perceptual knowledge, even if it doesn’t feature in any promising vindication of (anti-skeptical) indirect realism. (shrink)

According to veridicalism, if a subject’s beliefs have always been elicited by a computer simulation that wholly and perfectly simulates the world W it is a simulation of, and that is as open-ended as W is, then most of their beliefs are true. In this paper I examine David Chalmers’ argument that a subject’s being wrong about the fundamental nature of the entities that their everyday beliefs refer to does not render those beliefs false and show that it is unconvincing.

Omissions in the moral sphere are often as morally significant as actions. Failing to rescue might be as morally bad as an act of cruelty—and open you as fully to blame. There’s no parallel for this in the evaluation of beliefs—at least according to Mark Nelson: “It is hard to see ourselves as epistemically blameworthy for our not-believings as much as for our believings” (Nelson 2010: 95). This is more or less what we deny: We can be epistemically culpable for (...) a skeptical inclination to not believe many of the things our evidence adequately supports. Just as a tendency to neglect the interests of others is probably morally bad and makes you morally culpable, a tendency to not believe—when your evidence favors believing—is epistemically bad and makes you epistemically culpable. Since this tendency can be grounded in skepticism, skepticism can make you culpable. That’s what we’re going to argue. (shrink)

According to the loose speech theory of knowledge, strictly speaking, knowledge is a very demanding state, one that we rarely occupy; however, knowledge ascriptions are instances of loose speech and thus often convey truths. Just as I can convey a truth by saying, “This class begins at 9 AM,” even if the class starts a trillionth of a second past 9 AM, I can convey a truth by saying, “I know that I have hands,” even if I merely have strongly (...) justified, high confidence that I have hands. This paper is a defense of the loose speech theory. On the negative side, I address a series of objections—first, that we ascribe knowledge in the absence of certainty and infallibility; second, that the loose speech theory is uncharitable; and third, that the loose speech theory delivers an overly demanding interpretation of knowledge norms. On the positive side, I show that the loose speech theory neatly dissolves a difficult problem about inductive knowledge, and I conjecture that it can dissolve many other problems in a similar way. (shrink)

Some leading cosmological models predict that in the future history of the universe, there will be vast numbers of Boltzmann Brains (“brains” formed by chance in otherwise empty space), including many that are physical duplicates of your own brain and that (arguably) have conscious experiences indistinguishable from your own experiences. This article advances the skeptical challenge posed by this prediction in two ways. First, the author challenges the common assumption that scientific evidence for Boltzmann Brain superabundance presents a serious skeptical (...) worry only if that evidence gives one reason to assign significant credence to the hypothesis that one is a Boltzmann Brain. On this assumption, Boltzmann Brain-related skeptical worries are easily swept aside. The author develops a new and more formidable Boltzmann Brain skeptical argument that is not committed to this assumption. Second, the author takes up recent objections to Center Indifference, a principle underlying Boltzmann Brain skeptical arguments. Dogramaci and Schoenfield (2025) have argued that Center Indifference imposes absurd constraints on one’s credences for certain scientific theories. The author shows that their arguments turn on some subtle confusions and that Center Indifference does not have the absurd implications that they attribute to it. (shrink)

Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) made important contributions to mathematics, the theory of probability, and several scientific fields, was one of the inventors of the first mathematical calculator, and was also a deeply religious thinker who grappled with issues concerning the existence of God, the possibility of human salvation, and the sinfulness of human life. His famous Wager is often discussed, but there is much else of interest and relevance in his thought which remains undiscovered. This book provides an accessible yet detailed (...) account of Pascal's philosophy and how it applies to important issues facing all of us today, as well as novel interpretations of Pascal's ideas. It will stimulate and challenge anyone who is interested in the role of the heart in rationality, human nature, our relation to reality and our individual and collective purpose, and the underexplored thoughts of one of history's greatest geniuses. (shrink)

The global skeptic, who claims to not know anything, is often met by the self-contradiction objection, which claims that if they can establish their own position then they must have knowledge of at least that conclusion. I consider a response to this problem from Francisco Sanches, a 16th-century global skeptic. Sanches’ response is unique in that it concedes the charge of self-contradiction, but argues that self-contradiction does not impede an argument for global skepticism. I first establish that Sanches’ response to (...) the objection differs from that of ancient global skeptics. Then I reconstruct Sanches’ argument, using the underdetermination principle to show that a successful argument for global skepticism does not lead to knowledge of any proposition. Finally, I show how such an argument can be useful to a global skeptic nonetheless, arguing that, if accepted, it gives one a reason to suspend judgment on the question of knowledge. (shrink)

Abstract: This short paper tries to expose the nature and the foundations of our epistemic limitations and fallibility, and also their ontological necessity for our profoundly dependent nature and existence. -/- Résumé : ce court texte cherche à exposer la nature et les fondements de nos limites et de notre faillibilité épistémique ainsi que leur nécessité ontologique pour notre nature profondément dépendante.

This short essay or reflection founded on Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching has for principal purpose to nourish a reflection on Nature as “wholeness” of possibility and being—i.e., similarly to Tao, albeit in a more “determinate” manner (we take into account and acknowledge the differences between both concepts). Our own relation with such primordiality and absoluteness is also central, as it is through such reflection that proper “reconceiving” and “repositioning” become possible. We center our exposition on the notions—among many others—of (...) “indetermination,” “reception,” “inherence,” “possibility,” “emanation,” “determination,” “partaking,” “humility” and “necessity.” *Important precision: We often find it necessary to adapt (to “bend,” if not to reconstruct) the vocabulary and grammar to convey specific conceptual meanings and also for other semantical purposes. Résumé : ce court essai ou cette réflexion fondée sur Lao Tzu et le Tao Te Ching a pour but principal de nourrir une réflexion sur la Nature en tant que « totalité » en termes de possibilité et d’être – un principe similaire au Tao mais davantage « déterminé » (nous prenons en considération et reconnaissons les différences entre les deux concepts). Notre propre relation avec une telle primordialité et absoluité demeure centrale, de par le fait que c’est par une telle réflexion qu’une « reconception » et un « repositionnement » adéquats deviennent possibles. Nous centrons notre exposition sur les notions – parmi plusieurs autres – d’« indétermination », de « réception », d’« inhérence », de « possibilité », d’« émanation », de « détermination », de « participation », d’« humilité » et de « nécessité ». *Précision importante : nous croyons souvent nécessaire d’adapter (de « plier », si ce n’est pas de reconstruire) le vocabulaire et la grammaire pour transmettre des conceptualisations particulières ou pour d’autres fins sémantiques. (shrink)

While Sextus Empiricus, according to the traditional view, tries to motivate suspension of judgment, e.g. regarding religious questions, by adducing equally convincing arguments for and against the claims in question, there is another – and hitherto unnoticed – dimension to Sextus’ remarks: Sextus not only tries to motivate the dogmatists to suspend judgment in the case of ‘first-order’ religious questions (like ‘Are there gods?’) but also on ‘higher-order’ or ‘metaphilosophical’ questions that are not concerned with the objects of religious faith (...) themselves (the gods and their properties) but with our cognitive capacities required to answer the first-order questions (e.g., ‘Do we have an adequate concept of gods?’). The paper explores an argument pattern that is intended to challenge the very meaningfulness of our discourse about god. Sextus here relies in an ad hominem argument on a kind of empiricist account of concept formation he adopts from the Epicureans and the Stoics and tries to show that based on their own views on concept formation we are unable to form a proper concept of gods. The paper traces the origins of this sceptical stance toward the meaningfulness of religious discourse back to Sextus’ Pyrrhonian precursor Aenesidemus and to Academic scepticism, namely Carneades. (shrink)

In his excellent new book Epistemic Courage, Jonathan Ichikawa argues that epistemology evinces a bias towards the skeptical. In its most extreme forms (i.e., radical skepticism), this leads to complete suspension of judgment and inaction. Less extreme forms manifest themselves in a reluctance to believe what the evidence supports, and to act accordingly. Ichikawa thinks that this is a political as well as an epistemological mistake: skepticism tends to support the status quo and is allied with some of the animating (...) ideas of political conservatism. We reconstruct Ichikawa’s argument that skepticism is allied with political conservatism and explain why we are not convinced. We also sketch a form of skepticism that is explicitly anti-political, and so cannot be closely identified with any political ideology, conservatism included. (shrink)

According to the loose speech theory of knowledge, strictly speaking, knowledge is a very demanding state, one that we rarely occupy; however, knowledge ascriptions are instances of loose speech and thus often convey truths. Just as I can convey a truth by saying, “This class begins at 9 AM,” even if the class starts a trillionth of a second past 9 AM, I can convey a truth by saying, “I know that I have hands,” even if I merely have strongly (...) justified, high confidence that I have hands. This paper is a defense of the loose speech theory. On the negative side, I address a series of objections—first, that we ascribe knowledge in the absence of certainty and infallibility; second, that the loose speech theory is uncharitable; and third, that the loose speech theory delivers an overly demanding interpretation of knowledge norms. On the positive side, I show that the loose speech theory neatly dissolves a difficult problem about inductive knowledge, and I conjecture that it can dissolve many other problems in a similar way. (shrink)

Pietro Montanari (Invited Ed.): The Ancients and Their Knowledge. In memory of David Konstan. Diálogos: Year LVI, no. 116, May 2025, pp. 530. ISSN-e: 2693-9339 | ISSN-L: 0012-2122. -/- A volume on ancient knowledge, in memory of a dear friend and wonderful scholar, David Konstan (1940-2024). It is the follow-up of an international workshop in which David and many other colleagues and friends took part in October 2022 at the University of Guadalajara. A huge thank you to the amazing scholars (...) who took part in this project and to the editor of the Journal, Etienne Helmer. The attached pdf contains the first pages, table of contents and preface. The complete volume is available online -/- Un volumen sobre el conocimiento de los antiguos, en memoria de un querido amigo y gran estudioso, David Konstan (1940-2024). Es la continuación de un congreso internacional en el que David y muchos otros colegas y amigos participaron en octubre de 2022 en la Universidad de Guadalajara. Un enorme agradecimiento a los increíbles académicos que participaron en este proyecto y al editor de la Revista, Etienne Helmer. El pdf adjunto contiene las primeras páginas, el índice y el prólogo. El volumen completo está disponible en línea. (shrink)

“Modesty Problems and Epistemic Modesty”. In Pietro Montanari (invited ed.): The Ancients and Their Knowledge. In memory of David Konstan. Diálogos, LVI, 116, May 2025, pp. 473-529. Epistemic modesty is a hermeneutic category that has sometimes been used with reference to certain authors or intellectual trends in ancient thought. In this article, I present my doubts about the concept, especially when applied to ancient theories of knowledge. I begin by highlighting two plausible determinations of epistemic modesty, the first related to (...) diatribes among philosophical schools, the second to ethics and character formation. Next, I discuss the interpretive problems that arise from attributing modesty, a psychological trait rather than a virtue, to literary and philosophical texts usually characterized by conflicting or ambiguous epistemic attitudes. I argue that an objective determination of modesty seems improbable, unless we understand modesty, as I propose somewhat paradoxically, as a way of affirming something by means of negation and dissimulation (this is my third determination of the concept). I conclude by briefly presenting some remarkable recent perspectives on epistemic modesty, mostly centered on Platonic-Socratic dialogues. This paves the way for three further determinations of the concept. They stem, however, from a modern epistemological background, whose features may turn out to be partly at odds with ancient epistemological conceptions. (shrink)

“Ancient Knowledge in Perspective: Problems of Demarcation”. In Pietro Montanari (invited ed.): The Ancients and Their Knowledge. In memory of David Konstan. Diálogos, LVI, 116, May 2025, pp. 15-54. -/- The main topic addressed in this introduction is demarcation between ancient and modern knowledge. My idea is that there are important differences between modern and ancient epistemologies, but they can hardly be treated in general terms (taking ancient epistemology as a whole and opposing it to modern). Specific differences need to (...) be evaluated almost case by case, while the hermeneutic practice itself turns the very idea of demarcation into something problematic, if not paradoxical. I analyze Lloyd Gerson's view, driven by a general intent of demarcation between ancient and modern knowledge, its strengths and weaknesses. Then I compare it with the more complex approach that David Konstan proposed for the demarcation between different cultural contexts. In the second part, I introduce the volume's contributions, placing them into three thematic groups, Theology, Praxis and Hermeneutics, which identify as many relevant points regarding the problem of demarcation. (shrink)

Many argue that the standard understanding of the second law of thermodynamics combined with the supposition, backed by recent scientific evidence, that the future is infinite entails that one is, most likely, a momentary Boltzmann brain that will quickly disintegrate into the cosmos. The argument is as follows: (1) Given infinite time, the universe will eventually reach thermodynamic equilibrium; (2) once there, every possible fluctuation away from equilibrium, no matter how improbable, will recur, ad infinitum; (3) those fluctuations that create (...) stable, long-lived creatures, such as we take ourselves to be, will be extremely rare compared to those that create short-lived brains that mistakenly think they are ordinary human beings; hence, by statistical reasoning, (4) one is, with overwhelming probability, just a fleeting instantiation of experience. I argue that this reasoning is invalid since it rests on an error regarding the relationship between infinite sets and their subsets. Once this error is eliminated, the power of the argument fades, and the evidence that we are ordinary human beings becomes decisive. Surprisingly, I find that the best argument for the Boltzmann brain hypothesis requires the assumption that the future is very long but finite. (shrink)

Cultural cognition is the thesis that laypersons' factual beliefs about politically important issues are often shaped by their political values. The question, then, is whether a layperson who believes in anthropogenic climate change should doubt her beliefs insofar as they might be influenced by values. Cultural cognition raises concerns for the epistemic status of these beliefs and appears to threaten the viability of debunking strategies in contexts of expert disagreement. Such strategies consist in attributing bias to dissenters to rationally dismiss (...) their views, but if laypersons are also biased, debunking may be self-defeating. I shall refute this challenge on three grounds. First, there is controversy over whether the empirical literature on cultural cognition has genuinely identified a form of motivated reasoning, since the data can also be explained in non-motivational, rational terms. Second, even if it has, this is not evidence that a particular individual is biased. Greater caution is needed when moving from statistical generalisations to individual cases. Finally, evidence of bias is not always evidence of error – something especially clear in the case of belief in anthropogenic climate change. The discussion allows me to explore the general sceptical import of the psychological literature on cultural cognition. (shrink)

Evidence for cognitive impairment – say, by bias or hypoxia – can defeat the epistemic permissibility of belief. This paper argues that such higher-order defeat is an instance of a more basic normative phenomenon: whenever the permissibility of one’s belief is defeated, it is defeated by an epistemic reason to withhold belief that is provided by evidence that one is fallible to some degree. This reason can do significant theoretical work in epistemology: it sets a threshold of sufficient evidence for (...) permissible belief and breaks epistemic ties. The resulting view opens the space for reasons-based evidentialism. (shrink)

Great scholars in philosophy possess a keen analytical mind, excel in logical reasoning, and exhibit meticulous attention to detail. They rigorously define terms, avoiding ambiguities and errors. Originality and the willingness to challenge conventions are their hallmarks. They make significant contributions across various philosophical fields. They transparently address the exact aim of their research, and what it is not. Finally, they anticipate the impact of their theories on the current literature, and how such an impact should blossom across the future (...) generations. In this respect, great philosophers address open problems and propose big questions for the foreseeable research efforts of those who will follow. Mario Alai embodies the qualities of a great scholar in philosophy, and the various essays in this volume are an evidence to that. It is challenging to condense a lifetime of research in one book. However, the Editors of the present volume’s aim was to face this challenge, to make a collection dedicated to Mario Alai’s work not only possible but, as metaphysicians would say, actual. The book attempts to bring together the reflections of three different generations of scholars - i.e., mentors, colleagues, and students - on Alai’s thought. Viewed from this perspective, the extensive and valuable contributions that follow, crafted in honor of Mario Alai and his scholarly endeavors, come as no surprise. All the chapters focus on a theme that was very dear to the philosophical curiosity of Mario Alai. Moreover, in engaging with these different topics, the plethora of contributions gives us a sense of the work by Alai. To make sense of the different contributions as a unified enterprise, this volume is organized into three sections, which seek to gather writings that revolve around Mario’s most substantial contributions, while elucidating their contemporary significance in the global discourse. Moreover, it endeavors to offer precious insights into the origins and development of these contributions, as observed through Mario’s writings and responses. This represents a sort of closure of the theoretical circle, clearly showing how the work by Mario Alai has been appreciated through different generations, originating from his relation to his mentors, on the one hand, while also shedding new light on his students’ research interests, on the other. Editing such a wealth of material was, again, no small feat. Still, the taxonomy we have chosen for this book will assist readers in navigating the profound depths of Alai’s philosophical research. Consequently, the book is structured into the following three parts: 1. Realism in History of Philosophy, History of Science, and Metaphysics. 2. Scientific Realism. 3. Realism in Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, and Experimental Philosophy. Each contribution actively participates in a substantial conversation with Alai’s body of work, as a deep theoretical dialogue between the author and Mario. Consequently, it appeared fitting to let Alai conclude this conversation, with direct responses to these philosophy-provoking pieces in his honor. We shall refrain from further commentary on the works within this book and allow them to express their significance independently to appreciate the river of ideas flowing through Mario’s work1. Beyond their philosophical substance, they are a vivid testament to Alai’s enduring dedication and ongoing contributions, in different moments of his research life. (shrink)

According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by (...) that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies. (shrink)

When it comes to Quine's position on the naturalization of epistemological inquiry, it is generally considered that as the first and most important step, that position implies the abandonment of Cartesianism and the skepticism it implies. However, here we will argue that such a diagnosis is inappropriate, and that, in principle at least, Quine's attitude towards skepticism, even of the Cartesian type, is much more flexible than is usually thought, and perhaps even than Quine himself thought. In this regard, we (...) will try to show how Quine was actually the one who accepted what Barry Stroud called the 'conditional correctness of skepticism (Cartesianism)' and not the logical positivists, and that the main reason for this is that he recognized the autonomy of the discourse (‘epistemology’s meta-context’) established by Descartes. (shrink)

This paper explores the consequences of applying two natural ideas from epistemology to decision theory: (1) that knowledge should guide our actions, and (2) that we know a lot of non-trivial things. In particular, we explore the consequences of these ideas as they are applied to standard decision theoretic puzzles such as the St. Petersburg Paradox. In doing so, we develop a “knowledge-first” decision theory and we will see how it can help us avoid fanaticism with regard to the St. (...) Petersburg puzzle and related puzzles. The result will be a decision theory that gives a novel, but well-motivated, reason for discounting small probabilities when making decisions. We examine the merits and demerits of such a decision theory. (shrink)

The article discusses the main ideas of Alvin Goldman’s process reliabilism and related epistemological theories. A conceptual distinction between epistemic reliability and veritic effectiveness is introduced as a more parsimonious alternative to traditional arguments against reliabilism. The main ideas of reliabilism are examined in light of the notion of veritic effectiveness.

Descartes claimed that the Cogito is ‘so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it’. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story ‘The Circular Ruins’ by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one’s own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it (...) is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’ is false. (shrink)

Axiarchism holds that fundamental concrete reality is necessarily ordered toward goodness. I argue that it is not fully rational to reject axiarchism while also rejecting radical skepticism. A key premise in the argument is that among conceivable worlds that contain one’s internal duplicate, ‘epistemically inhospitable’ worlds (i.e. worlds where all or most of one’s internal duplicates are radically deceived) are predominant. This predominance of inhospitable worlds provides a prima facie reason for thinking that the actual world is probably inhospitable. To (...) avoid skepticism, this prima facie support for inhospitableness must be countered by a good reason to think that the actual world is probably epistemically hospitable. I argue that opponents of axiarchism lack any such reason. I consider various non-axiarchic ways of dismissing the inhospitable world hypothesis, including appeals to simplicity considerations and to a certain ‘representationalist’ theory of phenomenal consciousness, and find them wanting. (shrink)