Philosophical Methods, Misc

Complexity is often framed as an ontological property of systems, with profound epistemological and methodological implications–particularly in the social sciences, where it is invoked to justify fundamental limits on the applicability of natural science frameworks. Building on previous discussions by McIntyre, Ruphy, and more recently Francq, this paper challenges this ontological premise by arguing that complexity is best understood primarily as an epistemic property–that is, a feature of the models we use to represent and study systems, rather than an intrinsic (...) characteristic of the systems themselves. Moreover, complexity depends on pragmatic elements, such as the goals at hand or the specific questions being asked. The foundational premise of our argument is that claims about a system’s complexity are invariably grounded in comparative judgments between models, whether formal or intuitive. Such judgments, in turn, depend critically on pragmatic and epistemic goals (e.g., the questions asked or the scale of analysis). We take this idea seriously and formalize it by defining the epistemic complexity of a system with respect to a given goal as the complexity of the least complex model capable of achieving that goal. Our account relies on a complexity score applicable to models, which we develop specifically for the restricted class of agent-based models (ABMs) in the social sciences. By reframing complexity as primarily an epistemic property, we dissolve persistent ambiguities in the literature–particularly the circular reasoning that arises when ontological claims about complexity are used to justify alternative epistemological frameworks. Our approach shifts the debate from metaphysical assertions to empirical questions about model performance, offering a constructive path forward for complexity research in both the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

Walls can be physical; they can also be psychological, social, political, economic, and ontological. Theological walls are ontological and typically also moral, though when we break down the “religion/non-religion” distinction and consider other dimensions of religious life beyond doctrinal ones, they are also psychological, social, and increasingly political. Among Enlightenment era philosophers eager to provide a genealogy of religious and political divisiveness was Rousseau, who held that “Those who distinguish civil from theological intolerance are, to my mind, mistaken. The two (...) forms are inseparable.” Yet despite this perceptive critique, contemporary religious apologetics for salvific and/or doctrinal exclusivism still abound. Indeed, self-described “post-liberal” apologetics is often insular, and promotive of the view that polarized and polemical religious apologetics should be taken as a normal state of affairs. In this paper I argue against this view where ‘good fences to make good neighbors.’ The paper aims to explain how post-liberal apologetics has had a significant dampening effect on comparative and global philosophy. But while a critique of post-liberalism’s retrenchment strategies would seem largely negative, the main burden of the paper is to provide a positive response to it, one which reaffirms genuine “engagement” as a method and goal of global philosophy. One key to success in this endeavor is establishing a methodologically proper balance between concerns for similarity and uniqueness, or form and content. I try to show how establishing this balance is better-achieved when comparative philosophy is taken as multi-disciplinary study, able to utilize insights from not just from philosophic and theological traditions but also from psychology and the emerging field of cognitive science of religions. (shrink)

Starting with Kant’s undeveloped proposal of a “negative science,” the author describes how philosophy may be developed and strengthened by means of a systematic approach that seeks to identify and eliminate a widespread but seldom recognized form of systemic and propagating conceptual error. ¶¶¶¶¶ The paper builds upon the author’s book, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND MEANING (Studies in Theory and Behavior, 2021). ¶¶¶¶¶ The author’s purpose is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize the boundaries of (...) what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. By realizing these objectives, the boundaries of possible meaning are determined. (shrink)

Here is a commonplace for the ancient philosophy scholar: a key term in an ancient author appears to denote different referents in different passages. For example, Aristotle’s ‘substance’ appears to denote concrete individuals in the Categories, but forms in the Metaphysics. One scholarly response is to view such terms as ambiguous. I will explore an alternative interpretive strategy: to view such terms as univocal, but to view the referents of such terms as varying along with a contextually determined contrast class. (...) Since a given context may leave the relevant contrast class underdetermined, this approach suggests that the denotation of some such terms may be indeterminate. I will illustrate this result with a few examples from Aristotle’s metaphysics. Forthcoming in Indeterminacy in Ancient Philosophy, edd. R. Güremen and U. Zilioli. London: Bloomsbury Academic Press. (shrink)

If Social Constructionism does not prefer monistic Postmodernism over dualistic Modernism, it should include, next to living expressions and spontaneous gestures, criticism into its process model, occurring as independent confirmation and implying coordinated reflection between the knowing organism and its sensed environment.

This paper presents two reasons for writing philosophy fast: to succeed in certain competitions; and to realize new and better ideas.

In this paper, I present the possibility of some other analytic political philosophy, in contrast to what is usually given this label. I do so by rejecting what I call the dualism between craftsmanship and vision.

Computers may help us to better understand (not just verify) arguments. In this article we defend this claim by showcasing the application of a new, computer-assisted interpretive method to an exemplary natural-language ar- gument with strong ties to metaphysics and religion: E. J. Lowe’s modern variant of St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Our new method, which we call computational hermeneutics, has been particularly conceived for use in interactive-automated proof assistants. It aims at shedding light on the (...) meanings of words and sentences by framing their inferential role in a given argument. By employing automated theorem reasoning technology within interactive proof assistants, we are able to drastically reduce (by several orders of magnitude) the time needed to test the logical validity of an argu- ment’s formalization. As a result, a new approach to logical analysis, inspired by Donald Davidson’s account of radical interpretation, has been enabled. In computational hermeneutics, the utilization of automated reasoning tools ef- fectively boosts our capacity to expose the assumptions we indirectly commit ourselves to every time we engage in rational argumentation and it fosters the explicitation and revision of our concepts and commitments. (shrink)

Structural Positivism (SP) is a methodological framework emerging from the procedural requirements of the PIE sequence, specifically the Terminal Reliability requirement (P5). This paper argues that SP provides the practical methodology for determining what kind of epistemic content satisfies P5’s convergence demands: measurable structural ratios stripped of subjective interpretation. By combining the empiricist commitments of logical positivism with the structural focus of structural realism while avoiding both traditions’ fatal flaws, SP offers a philosophically justified account of scientific methodology. The framework (...) demonstrates that epistemic objectivity is achieved not through metaphysical correspondence claims but through procedural convergence on structural measurements. This paper develops SP’s theoretical foundations, clarifies its relationship to the Gageian Epistemic Model (GEM) and Infostructural Monism (ISM), demonstrates applications across science, ethics, and everyday reasoning, and responds to anticipated objections regarding scope and completeness. (shrink)

This work is a comprehensive attempt to know the most fundamental knowledge that we can practically know. (thing)exist, not (everything)exist. This work is indirectly related to Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy.

According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, we may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real situation does not fit with what the theory implies. In this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is at most either untenable or otherwise useless in bringing about what is commonly expected from it.

Après la guerre froide, les gouvernements et les services de renseignement ont continué à utiliser le modèle conventionnel pour évaluer les menaces pesant sur l'État. Mais les concepts de sécurité se sont éloignés d'une confrontation hautement militarisée entre des adversaires connus et a augmenté l'inquiétude suscitée par les menaces non étatiques plus difficiles à identifier. Les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus des menaces stratégiques, le concept de « terrorisme stratégique » étant développé immédiatement après les attentats de septembre 2001. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.27419.62249. (shrink)

Experience is commonly treated as both the medium of access to reality and the epistemic foundation of knowledge. While its role as a condition of access is rarely questioned, its status as a condition of justification is often assumed without explicit analysis. This paper challenges that assumption. It argues that the necessity of experience as a medium of access does not entail its epistemic sufficiency. If experience is to function epistemically, it must satisfy minimal structural conditions under which distinctions between (...) success and failure can be sustained. The analysis reconstructs these conditions as constraints rather than theoretical additions. In order to support epistemic function, experience must allow for the registration of differences, the possibility of error, the capacity for correction, and the persistence of consequences across states. Without these conditions, no distinction between correctness and mere occurrence can be maintained. The paper develops this argument through conceptual reconstruction, a minimal formal analysis, and a structural contrast between systems that sustain consequences across states and those that do not. The result is not a theory of experience, but a limitation on its epistemic role. What follows is therefore not a new foundation, but a minimal constraint. Only structures that allow differences to be registered, compared, corrected, and sustained can function within a system of knowledge. No additional epistemic privilege is required. (shrink)

I wrote an essay about why I do philosophy. It would probably not be publishable anywhere, but I think it might be of some interest to others as we reflect on why we do what we do. For those who know me from online I hope in this to provide illustrations of the categories "Sexy Murder Poet" and "Basically Pleasant Bureaucrat", since it so happens that the two tendencies within me can be sorted by these. In any case, I hope (...) the essay helps people think about what they hope to get from philosophy, and whether the tools they adopt are adequate to the tasks they thus set themselves. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel way of exploring the interaction between science and theology. Situating the investigation at the level of cognitive dispositions and mental habits, it examines how and why modes of explanation can be, and often are, transferred from one area of intellectual work to another. Drawing from the work of Ernan McMullin on imagination and retroduction, the paper extends his ideas to determine how cognitive dispositions can change. Three examples are studied in detail: one dealing with styles (...) of reasoning, one dealing with determinism, and one with the logic of self-involvement. These examples indicate not only the way in which cognitive dispositions partly determine what we imagine but also how such dispositions can change. The paper’s overall result shows how agreement or disagreement between science and theology can arise from such deep-seated, cognitive dispositions of which we are sometimes unaware. (shrink)

A conceptual exploration of the umbrella notion Wisdom, as well as dimensions, characteristics and components of the idea of wisdom as suggested by experimental philosophy, neurosciences and other studies and a comparison of the notion of wisdom with those of knowledge, truth, insight and understanding. Keywords: philosophy, knowledge, wisdom, truth, Gettier problem, ibnsights, truth, understanding, knowledge, Experimental philosophy, neuroscience of wisdom Suggested Citation: de Balbian, Ulrich, Philosophy = Philo Sophos = Love of Wisdom (August 24, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3025568.

1 1 Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center (Meta-Philosophy) Death of Philosophy Part 2 PART 2 Philosophy subject-matter page2 Different approaches to doing philosophy (Methods) page 164 Metaphysics, Ontology, Epistemology page.

If you wish to think/write about many dimensional things like the‭ ‘‬world‭’‬,‭ ‬persons,‭ ‬consciousness,‭ ‬human thinking etc,‭ ‬you should at least think multi-dimensional and many levelled. Questioning the purpose,‭ ‬the subject-matter and the methodology,‭ ‬methods of the discipline. I have already dealt in detail about the disappearance of different subject from the philosophical discourse with the differentiation of other disciplines, as well as the involvement in philosophy in inter-disciplinary areas such as cognitive sciences, the creation of experimental philosophy and the (...) philosophies of other discourses, eg art, religion, science, mathematics, sport and every subject possible. Philosophy has/is often interpreted as consisting of logic, which in has its own discourse, while other aspects or forms of logic really form part of mathematics. The doing of philosophy as the doing of (usually informal) logic is in some way related to this belief. As far as the method of philosophy goes, it is always seen as employing arguments, argumentation and reasoning. But all kinds of writing and talking employ arguments, argumentation, reasoning and informal logic – not just philosophy. I conclude with a discussion from theoretical physics (in the past associated with the philosophical discourse) that provides us with ontologies as philosophy used to do. Against that background I present articles on the multiverse, more conventional articles on our universe, our world, our physical reality and the origins of life. I think these are some of the many things that it is necessary that philosophy should take note of and consequently question itself, its aims, objectives, subject-matter and methodologies. We might then have something different than one-levelled and one-dimensional thinking and more many layered and levelled and multi-dimensional thinking. Is this not how our consciousness functions? On many levels, layers and dimensions simultaneously? So should this not be the manner in which we conceive of ‘it’, its nature and functioning? We, philosophy, should at least be thinking ( instead of individual concepts, or statements, linear thinking - we should simultaneously think on many layers, on many levels and in several dimensions) in terms of 3D, for example 3D scatter plots.By this I mean the many different aspects of the person (mentally and physically, socially, culturally, as well as our environment, planetary and universe context should be included in every concept we employ; each concept should therefore be at least like a 3D scatter plot image, including all these levels and information). (shrink)

An exploration of the philosophical and mystical ideas of Plotinus. So as to show that underneath all traditional Western philosophy of being their lies a non-philosophy of 'the one'. The One with whom mystics seek unification or to be united with (also know as realization of the one real self, unity with the Sufi Beloved, buddha-mind, the absolute truth, the foundation or ground of all etc).

Philosophizing is part of the Process/es of Theorizing An illustration (by means of a number of articles, books, opinions, statements, hypotheses, theories, arguments, reasoning and comments) of doing philosophy or philosophizing and its methods, as aspects of the contexts, stages, steps and features of the process/es of theorizing. A number of implicit assumptions and tacit pre-suppositions of this socio-cultural practice and discourse, for example as they resemble that of everyday and religious perception (MNC, ‭“‬maturationally natural‭” ‬perception,‭ ‬cognition,‭ ‬and action), are (...) identified and revealed. (shrink)

My new (Experimental) PHILOSOPHY (XPhi) book for FREE download https://www.academia.edu/31973890/_Meta-Philosophy_Theorizing_about_Philosophy_CMT_CB_and_CM_as_an_e xercise_inXPhi (Meta-Philosophy) Theorizing about Philosophy (CMT, CB and CMA) as an exercise inXPhi The processes of theorizing are explored, Weick's Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Conceptual Blending Theory and Conceptual Metaphor tool are described. This Meta-Philosophy investigation of philosophy and philosophizing is an exercise in Experimental Philosophy. The Empirical Generalization or Hypothesis arrived at states that: Philosophy/izing is like or resembles the process/es of Theorizing.

Conciliatory views of peer disagreement (aka Conciliationism) have repeatedly been challenged on the grounds that they are epistemically self-undermining. Recently, Dixon (2024) argues that this challenge is worse than previously thought: it is (almost certainly) permanent and this provides strong reason to abandon Conciliationism as (almost certainly) hopeless. In response, Justin (2025, Episteme) argues that the self-undermining challenge and Dixon’s arguments, at best, only apply to the belief-suspension versions of Conciliationism but not to degree-of-belief (aka credal) versions of Conciliationism. Thus, (...) not only can Conciliationists largely avoid the self-undermining challenge but, contra Dixon, this challenge also does not provide adequate reason to abandon Conciliationism as hopeless. This paper argues that not only can the self-undermining challenge be reformulated to apply to credal versions of Conciliationism, this reformulated challenge extends and further supports Dixon’s pessimism: because there (almost certainly) is or will be peer disagreement on any way of responding to this reformulated challenge, any response (almost certainly) be defeated by the very view it is attempting to defend. Thus, credal Conciliationism is also (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining and there is (almost certainly) still no hope for Conciliationism. (shrink)

Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound TRAs and evaluates their merits. I show that, in principle, TRAs can support the claim that an ethical theory should be used as a (...) guide for making ethically significant decisions, while TRAs for the truth of theories face additional obstacles. (shrink)

In Time and the World, I undertake a wholly critical metaphysics, one that provides an account of the world – this all-encompassing array of whatnot – and what a thing (i.e., an entity, an existent, a being) is without making any assumption whatsoever about the world. Such an undertaking requires a novel method, original inquiry, which begins by confronting all this, the world, as merely the impetus to inquiry. The execution of a wholly critical metaphysics yields insight into literally everything (...) and the basic structure in reality. If a theory does not comport with what a thing is or the structure in reality revealed by an apt ontology that involves no bias, no limiting perspective, no misleading presupposition, that theory is irredeemably misguided. Hence, original inquiry can illuminate all inquiry. My critics question the feasibility of original inquiry, the wholly critical method I adopt, as well as some of the conclusions regarding the fundamentality of each thing, the scope of explanation and the nature of time per se, that I maintain the method informs. In responding to their concerns, I defend radical ontology, the overarching theoretical framework that original inquiry provides, by clarifying certain details of my enterprise and what these reveal about the limits of inquiry in general. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is a philosophical method that aims to design and spread conceptual and linguistic devices to cause meaningful changes in the world. So far, however, conceptual engineers have struggled to successfully spread the conceptual and linguistic entities they have designed to their target communities. This paper argues that conceptual engineering is far more likely to succeed if it incorporates empirical data and empirical methods. Because the causal factors influencing successful propagation of linguistic or conceptual devices are as complicated and (...) interwoven as they are, proper empirical research will greatly boost the likelihood that propagation is successful. In arguing for the superiority of empirical conceptual engineering over armchair-based conceptual engineering, this paper proposes a framework for understanding the causal forces at play in propagation. This is a three-part framework between the label of a lexical item, the psychological states associated with the lexical item, and the worldly things associated with the lexical item. By understanding the way causal forces affecting propagation play out at these three levels, conceptual engineers can better conceptualize, study, and harness the different causal forces affecting the success of their conceptual engineering projects. (shrink)

Some philosophers are optimistic about progress in philosophy (e.g., Stoljar 2017), whereas other philosophers have more pessimistic views about philosophical progress in comparison to scientific progress (e.g., Chalmers 2015). As far as scientific progress is concerned, there is no question among philosophers of science that science does make progress. Instead, the question philosophers of science are primarily concerned with is this: what is the basic unit of scientific progress? Does science make progress by approximating truth, accumulating knowledge, increasing understanding, or (...) solving problems? Mizrahi (2021; 2022) attempts to approach this question about scientific progress empirically. Using computational, corpus-based methods, Mizrahi (2021; 2022) analyzes a large corpus of scientific publications to find out whether practicing scientists talk about the aim(s) or goal(s) of scientific research in terms of truth, knowledge, understanding, or solutions in their academic publications. In this chapter, we attempt to do the same with respect to philosophical progress. That is, using computational, quantitative, and corpus-based methods, we address the following question empirically. When they talk about the aim(s) or goal(s) of academic philosophy in their academic publications, which of the following terms do academic philosophers use more frequently: ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, ‘understanding’, or ‘solution’? Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study suggest that there is significantly more truth talk than knowledge talk, more knowledge talk than understanding talk, and more understanding talk than solution talk around progress terms in academic articles published in philosophy journals. (shrink)

According to a prevailing view, conceptual engineering introduces a revolutionary philosophical methodology, challenging traditional conceptual analysis. However, in our paper, we argue that closer scrutiny reveals not only the falsity but also the inherent ambiguity of this narrative. We explore four interpretations of the "Anti-Novelty Claim", the claim that conceptual engineering is not a new way of doing philosophy. Discussing the Anti-Novelty Claim from the perspective of a text’s producer, the text’s consumers, and the exegetical potential of the text, we (...) examine each perspective’s metaphilosophical implications and demonstrate that taking each perspective requires different methods. Adopting these different methods, we argue that the different interpretations of the Anti-Novelty Claim range from nearly trivially true to unlikely but untested. Importantly, we emphasize that each interpretation offers unique philosophical insights, yet addressing them requires diverse types of evidence, preventing a singular, straightforward answer to whether conceptual engineering is new. (shrink)

Philosophical argumentation appears minimally adversarial. The assessment of philosophical evidence and reasons we appeal to in our arguments is carried out by critical, reflective scrutiny via objections, challenges, and counterexamples. This critical feature of philosophy has been criticized by feminist and standpoint epistemologists as structurally conducive to epistemic injustice. To remedy this situation, a stance of default trust toward a marginalized philosopher’s arguments should be adopted. This paper objects to the proposal and offers an alternative account of how epistemic injustice (...) arises in philosophical argumentation. First, we argue that default trust is inapplicable in philosophical practice and argumentation, given the essentially dialogical and adversarial assessment of philosophical reasons. Second, rejecting adversariality altogether itself risks generating epistemic injustice. Default trust precludes earnest engagement with the reasons and arguments of marginalized subjects, preventing them from obtaining full credibility within the philosophical community. It is then argued that epistemic injustice in philosophical argumentation primarily arises when subjects are denied recognition as legitimate participants in philosophical assessment, rather than from minimal adversariality. Furthermore, adversariality itself can function as a weapon of resistance when marginalized subjects confront unfair audiences by denying them recognition as philosophically authoritative. (shrink)

Abstract -/- The philosophical discourse has a number of in-built values,‭ ‬norms and attitudes that create for this discipline.‭ ‬Creative-thinking and Intuition are discussed.‭ ‬Then some of the limits of the discourse are identified,‭ ‬some of them concern the methods of philosophizing.‭ ‬The positive aspects of the so-called Socratic Method and those of the Philosophical Investigations as Explorative Methods‭ (‬and metaphysics‭?) ‬are compared with those identified by Strawson as Speculative and Descriptive Metaphysics. -/- It is suggested that the future of (...) Philosophy lies in Theorizing.‭ ‬It is essential to view in the Appendix the articles concerning the Socratic Methods and the nature and processes of‭ (‬Philosophy as‭) ‬Theorizing.‭ -/- https://www.academia.edu/31692986/Intra-Philosophical_Norms_and_other_Limits. (shrink)

Larissa Wallner’s contribution starts from practical, aesthetic, and theoretical problems to trace a critical path that connects with the problem of conceptualism covered in the first part through the shared caveat that intuitions must not be ignored. She applies this presupposition to explore what she considers to be two under-researched sections of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, those on the faculty of premonition and sagacity, identifying a kind of intuitive imagination in these two sections that she regards (...) as crucial for philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

Appealing to the functions of concepts in conceptual engineering projects has been hailed as a promising avenue to explain defects of concepts, the possibility of amelioration, and the continuity of topic post engineering. Some of the most prominent theories of concept functions build on what I call the Usefulness Thesis, i.e. what makes something the function of a concept is what makes it useful. In this paper, I argue that this approach does not meet some of the most fundamental adequacy (...) criteria for a theory of function, that is, (1) they do not draw a stable function/accident distinction and (2) they cannot account for the normativity of functions. I show that theories of concept function that build on the Usefulness Thesis are all essentially forward-looking theories of functions and show that these theories face a problem of overreach and a vacuous normativity proviso. I further argue that they do not lend themselves to conceptual critique, so they are not fit for conceptual engineering purposes. (shrink)

This paper offers an abstract characterization of the scientific realism debate (SRD) as a dialectical process of formulating, testing, and refining epistemic principles, and argues that it inherently involves a comparative methodology: the justification of realist or antirealist stances hinges on identifying epistemically relevant similarities and differences among theories—potentially from different disciplines or eras—within “segments” of science that exhibit optimism- or pessimism-inducing track records. Growing critiques of SRD advocate a “localist” turn, contending that disciplinary diversity undermines the feasibility of “global” (...) principles and theory comparison, thereby necessitating a case-bycase approach. However, I argue that disciplinary diversity alone cannot mandate localism without appealing to particularism—a disputed meta-epistemological thesis that denies the normative force of principles altogether. Demonstrating that the viability of localism depends on particularism is far from trivial, since, as I show, localists themselves often overlook this dependence. Moreover, even when particularism is (apparently) endorsed, its radical implications seem underappreciated. To clarify what is at stake, I introduce a reason-based “weighing” framework for normativity, contrast particularism with two forms of generalism, and examine their consequences for the “localism–globalism” debate and the role of comparative methods in SRD. I conclude that embracing localism requires more demanding philosophical commitments than is commonly acknowledged. The apparent ease of “going local” in response to manifest disciplinary diversity is significantly overstated. (shrink)

An exploration of philosophizing. The nature of research and investigations. Different types of questions . Proceed by reasoning and argumentation to arrive at insights and understanding. The real purpose of doing philosophy, living, being philosophy is to realise wisdom Google, see amazoncom.or academiaedu.

I maintain that philosophy of science regains its public legitimacy when it connects its internal progress with effective forms of impact. To that end, I first reconstruct the genealogy of its institutional retreat in the twentieth century and its subsequent re-emergence as a socially engaged practice. I then integrate recent evidence on the actual pathways of academic influence to show that philosophical impact is primarily relational rather than bibliometric. Against that background, I argue that the most fertile internal metric for (...) assessing philosophical progress is an increase in structural understanding: the capacity to articulate maps of dependence among concepts, phenomena, and practices that enable epistemic co-ordination and support reliable decision-making. Finally, I propose a professional ethics for the contemporary philosopher of science built around four operational principles—epistemic integrity, horizontal collaboration, social responsibility, and institutional transparency—each accompanied by indicators and evaluative metrics beyond citation counts. The result is a normative framework that offers institutional guidance for measuring and demanding impact. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how to account for the distinctive way in which, as a matter of fact, we react to philosophical disagreement and, more generally, to philosophical testimony. The paper explains how exactly the idea that understanding occupies a central place in philosophy can account for this. It examines two interpretations of this idea and argues that the second, but not the first, can solve the so-called puzzle of philosophical testimony. This second interpretation turns out to be (...) compatible with the idea that philosophy aims at finding out or knowing substantive philosophical truths rather than at understanding them. The paper then turns to the question of whether this central place means that philosophy is not a collective discipline. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge the prevailing view—in both medieval Arabic philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy—that treats intuition as a propositional attitude. Instead, I advocate for a conception of atomic intuition—a non-propositional, object-directed cognitive state characterized by immediacy and explanatory power. Unlike propositional intuition, which serves as evidence for justifying beliefs, atomic intuition emerges instantaneously as a fundamental epistemic mechanism that provides access to essential insights. Its role in epistemic thought experiments is not to justify propositions (justification-that) but rather to (...) illuminate why certain conclusions naturally follow in specific epistemic contexts (justification-why). (shrink)

In recent decades, more and more philosophers have been committed to promoting a mutual enlightenment between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Some philosophers including Dermot Moran, A. W. Moore, and Dan Zahavi, among others, have provided thought-provoking reflections on these ongoing exchanges between the two traditions. Since these three philosophers all hold that phenomenology is incompatible with “classical reductionist naturalism”, their terminologies can neither smoothly accommodate the various versions of naturalised phenomenology, nor reserve sufficient logical space for the rich future possibilities (...) of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and naturalism. In contrast, in this article, I first minimally redefine the terms “phenomenology” and “analytic philosophy” as “a philosophy that goes back to the things themselves” and “a philosophy that does analysis”, respectively; second, I argue that there is by no means an intrinsic contradiction between the three terms “phenomenology”, “analytic philosophy” and “naturalism”; third, I argue that, on balance, the minimalistic redefinitions advocated in this article, do more good than harm—say, they are heuristic to reunderstanding phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and philosophy per se; finally, I conclude that such minimalistic redefinitions, will offer a novel, modest, moderate, balanced, or supplementary reunderstanding of the current popular definitions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The Law of Being presents a proposed formal philosophical framework organized as an axiomatic system. The framework begins with a single admitted primitive, Truth (T), and develops through explicitly identified definitions, a primitive axiom, adopted rules of inference, formal derivation, candidate propositions, and open research questions. The primary objective of the framework is methodological rather than demonstrative. It establishes a disciplined structure for philosophical inquiry by requiring that every statement be explicitly identified according to its epistemic status. Primitives, definitions, axioms, (...) derivations, postulates, hypotheses, and open research questions are distinguished throughout the framework, and no statement is assigned greater authority than its supporting justification permits. The framework presents one formal derivation, I = 1, from the admitted definitions and adopted rules of inference. Additional propositions concerning concepts such as Worth, Home, Love, Peace, Healing, and related expressions are intentionally presented as postulates, hypotheses, or open research questions rather than established conclusions. This work does not claim to provide a complete theory of Truth, Being, or human experience. Rather, it proposes a formal structure within which such questions may be examined, refined, criticized, and further developed. The framework is offered as a foundation for disciplined inquiry, not as a final philosophical system. (shrink)

If I were to ask you to name the most important concept in moral and political philosophy today, your answer might be ‘justice’, ‘equality’ or ‘freedom’. But for an intellectual in eighteenth-century Europe, the most likely answer would have been ‘progress’. Living in the Age of Enlightenment, marked by major scientific revolutions, rapid economic growth and the fall of absolute monarchy, ‘progress’ appeared to be an apt description of the arc of history, as well as a moral imperative for human (...) action. But the climate of optimism did not last long. The world wars, colonial conquests and environmental devastation that followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries destroyed many things, including the faith in progress, both as a fact and an ideal. As Theodor Adorno remarked, ‘It could be said that progress occurs where it ends’ (Adorno 1998: 150). And so it did. Interestingly, over the past decade, the philosophical discourse on progress has been experiencing something of a revival. The book Moral Progress (2021) marks a significant contribution to that revival. Edited by Jan-Christoph Heilinger, the book records Philip Kitcher’s three-part Munich Lectures in Ethics from 2019 and includes commentaries from Rahel Jaeggi, Susan Neiman and Amia Srinivasan. Despite its short length and accessibility, the book is rich in philosophical perspectives and empirical insights. In this critical notice, my aim is to situate this work within the larger debate on moral progress and evaluate Kitcher’s pragmatist attempt to re-establish the concept’s relevance and validity. Specifically, I identify three challenges any such attempt faces, viz. metaphysical, epistemic and motivational. I argue that while Kitcher’s Deweyan attempt is successful in overcoming the first two, it is less so with respect to the last challenge. In the hope of sparking more discussion on the topic of moral progress, I end by suggesting possible ways to implement moral progress that are less democratic and less scientific but more communitarian and more artful than the Deweyan method. (shrink)

Hvordan kan man besvare normative spørsmål i politisk teori? Et vanlig svar i analytisk politisk teori er: ved å søke ei reflektert likevekt basert på normative intuisjoner (eller ”veloverveide normative dommer”). Er den en god metode? Denne artikkelen presenterer ei etablert innvending mot intuisjonismen som kjennetegner denne metoden: Våre normative intuisjoners opphav i vår arts evolusjonshistorie er vanskelig å forene med at disse er interessante som utgangpunkt for normativ refleksjon. Normativ politisk teori bør derfor ikke baseres på intuisjoner. Et vanlig (...) motsvar er at det ikke finnes alternativer. Artikkelen viser at dette er et dårlig argument ved å presentere tre alternativer: først et fra Rawls, deretter konsekvensialisme som alternativ, og til slutt skisserer den et nytt alternativ basert på metaetisk subjektivisme. (shrink)

摘要 战争形态历经冷兵器、热兵器、信息化与智能化迭代，制胜底层逻辑保持恒定。本文 基于古今中外数百场经典战役的史实考证与系统复盘，构建战略哲学层 + 战术操作层 双公式体系，以四大战场场景开展全域验证，揭示符合规律即胜、违背规律即败的客 观铁律。论文明确公式为战略思维诊断框架而非量化计算工具，补充反例检验与边界 说明，强化理论严谨性与解释力，为国防建设、战略决策与军事理论研究提供系统化 支撑。.

Many prominent critiques of philosophical methods proceed by suggesting that some method is unreliable, especially in comparison to some alternative method. If one agrees with these critiques, it may seem natural to conclude that these (comparatively) unreliable methods should be abandoned. Drawing upon work on the division of cognitive labour in science, we argue that things are not so straightforward. Rather, whether an unreliable method should be abandoned depends heavily on the crucial question of how we should divide philosophers’ time (...) and effort between different methods in order to maximize our prospects of achieving epistemic success. We show that, in a range of cases, even a (comparatively) unreliable method may deserve to be allocated some of these resources. (shrink)

The general theme of this thesis is the relation between language and philosophical thinking. More specifically, it explores some ways in which language can impact our philosophical thinking, as well as the mechanisms through which it does so. In the first paper, I focus on the nature of a specific kind of philosophical problem: the paradox. I defend a revisionary analysis of philosophical paradox, which highlights an underlying epistemic structure that is shared by many philosophical research problems. In addition, I (...) argue that by examining this underlying epistemic structure, we gain a better understanding of what a satisfactory solution to a philosophical paradox ought to accomplish. The topic of the second paper is the idea that some expressions in natural language have meaning-constitutive principles: inference rules or sentences that are somehow constitutive of the meanings of those expressions. A challenge for the proponent of meaning-constitutive principles is to articulate what, exactly, the relation between semantically competent speakers and meaning-constitutive principles is. In this paper, I explore how this challenge can be met. The third paper closely connects to the discussion in the second paper. Given that the meanings of expressions can be fixed by meaning-constitutive inference rules, a possibility that seems to arise is that some meanings may be fixed by meaning-constitutive inference rules that fail to be necessarily truth-preserving, and thereby come out as inconsistent. This paper considers some arguments against the possibility of such inconsistent expressions. I conclude that none of the arguments considered succeed in ruling out the possibility of inconsistent expressions in natural languages. In the fourth and final paper, I address the question of whether so-called joint-carving concepts – concepts that track the fundamental structure of reality – are epistemically better than other concepts. Firstly, I explore the proposal that joint-carving thought is intrinsically valuable. Secondly, I discuss various attempts to explain the value of joint-carving by appealing to its instrumental epistemic value. I argue that, contrary to our intuitions, there appear to be no persuasive arguments to the effect that joint-carving concepts are epistemically superior. (shrink)

To claim that we can acquire a certain kind of knowledge through mere reflection is to claim that the relevant knowledge is already “obscurely” within us even before we reflect, and that we can make this knowledge explicit simply by exercising our power to make this knowledge “distinct”. Many philosophers have claimed that a core part of philosophy draws its material from reflection. But can this vague but appealing conception of the philosophical enterprise be made clear and determinate? And when (...) it is clarified, does it prove defensible? I propose a way of clarifying the reflective conception of philosophy and argue that reflection thus understood is a defensible method of philosophical inquiry. But I also suggest that, once we address the most immediate objections to the reflective conception of philosophical cognition, various deeper difficulties come into view. These difficulties do not show that the reflective conception is mistaken, but they show how much work must be done to develop this conception systematically and to bring it into harmony with other attractive thoughts about the nature of philosophical understanding. (shrink)

Reflective equilibrium ("RE", for short) is a method of justification which works roughly as follows: We start with our pre-theoretical judgements (about, e.g. moral issues) and try to explain them by a systematic theory. This leads to a process in which judgements and principles are mutually adjusted to each other until a state of equilibrium is reached. For more than half a century, RE has been very popular, as well as controversial, among philosophers of many persuasions. Given how frequently the (...) method is mentioned, embraced and attacked, it is surprising that only very few attempts have been made at analysing and developing RE in detail. This topical collection brings together papers that develop RE on a conceptual level, analyse it using formal methods or investigate applications of RE. (shrink)

Practice-based approaches to philosophy of mathematics have gone mainstream over the past several decades. As the paradigm has grown in popularity, however, there’s been little sustained meditation—and still less any explicit consensus—on what precisely it means for philosophy to take practice seriously. The field’s lack of a clear common methodology has begun to make itself felt in slowed and uncertain progress on core problems. Here I review the methodological situation and propose five canons to guide future research. I focus throughout (...) on the study of explanation in mathematics as a guiding example. (shrink)

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever (C&D) have recently argued that the ideal/non-ideal distinction is ‘useless’ in philosophy of language. This paper responds to C&D’s argument, develops an account of the distinction, and applies it to philosophy of language. Section 1 summarizes C&D’s argument against Charles Mills’s version of the distinction. Section 2 develops an account of the distinction that’s inspired by Mills’s work but that differs from what C&D take Mills’s view to be. Section 3 shows that, pace C&D, this (...) distinction picks out interesting subsets of work in philosophy of language. We say that ideal theories adopt models of the social world that fail to recognize systemic oppression and are therefore systematically inaccurate. Nonideal theories correct these inaccuracies. (shrink)

Linguistic data are commonly considered a defeasible source of evidence from which it is legitimate to draw philosophical hypotheses and conclusions. Traditionally epistemologists have relied almost exclusively on linguistic data from western languages, with a primary focus on contemporary English. However, in the last two decades there has been an increasing interest in cross-linguistic studies in epistemology. In this entry, we provide a brief overview of cross-linguistic data discussed by contemporary epistemologists and the philosophical debates they have generated.