Epistemology, Misc

Ignited by Einstein and Bohr a century ago, the philosophical struggle about Reality is yet unfinished, with no signs of a swift resolution. Despite vast technological progress fueled by the iconic Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen paper (EPR) [1] [2] [3], the intricate link between ontic and epistemic aspects of Quantum Theory (QT) has greatly hindered our grip on Reality and further progress in physical theory. Fallacies concealed by tortuous logical negations made EPR comprehension much harder than it could have been had Einstein written (...) it himself in German. EPR is plagued with preconceptions about what a physical property is, the 'Uncertainty Principle', and the Principle of Locality. Numerous interpretations of QT vis à vis Reality exist and are keenly disputed [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. This is the first of a series of articles arguing for a novel physical interpretation I call ‘The Ontic Probability Interpretation’ (TOPI). A gradual explanation of TOPI is given intertwined with a meticulous logico-philosophical scrutiny of EPR, with Part I focusing on the meaning of Einstein’s ‘incompleteness’ claim for QT: a conceptual confusion, a preconception about Reality, and a flawed dichotomy are shown to be severe obstacles for the EPR argument to succeed. Part II completes the analysis, proving EPR claim of ‘incompleteness’ for QT is fallacious [12]. Part III further develops TOPI, while scrutinizing the mythical ‘Schrödinger’s Cat’, as well as the ‘Basis’ and ‘Measurement’ pseudo-problems [13]. Part IV introduces QR/TOPI: a new theory that solves the century-old problem of integrating Special Relativity with Quantum Theory [14]. (shrink)

In the social sciences, within the explanatory paradigm of structural individualism, a theory of action – like rational choice theory – models how individuals behave and interact at the micro level in order to explain macro observations as the aggregation of these individuals actions. A central epistemological issue is that such theoretical models are stuck in a dilemma between falsity of their basic assumptions and triviality of their explanation. On the one hand, models which have a great empirical success often (...) rest on unrealistic or even knowingly false assumptions; on the other hand, more complex models, with additional more realistic hypotheses, can (trivially) adapt to a wide range of situations and thus loose their explanatory power. Our purpose here is epistemological and consists in wondering to which extent demanding realistic assumptions in such cases is a relevant criterion with respect to the acceptance of a given explanatory model. Via an analogical reasoning with physics, we argue that this criterion seems too strong and actually irrelevant. General physical principles are not just idealized or unrealistic, they can also be formulated in many different yet equivalent ways which do not imply the same fundamental unobservable entities or phenomena. However, the classification of phenomena that such principles allow to highlight does not depend, at the end, on any particular formulation of these basic assumptions. This suggests that some hypotheses in theoretical models are actually not genuine empirical statements that could be independently tested but only substrates of modeling embodying a classification principle. Thus, we develop a structural invariance criterion that we then apply to rational choice models in the social sciences. We argue that this criterion allows to escape from the epistemological dilemma without condemning formal approaches like rational choice theory for their lack of realisticness nor being stuck to any antirealist viewpoint. (shrink)

Kant’s subject as source of universality and necessity in human understanding is Modern Philosophy's solution to the old problem of the universals, a solution which appeared to supersede once and for all the Aristotelian theory of abstraction. The present paper intends to show how Aquinas's Aristotelian doctrine on abstraction may stand the Kantian challenge and resolve the old problem when three principles are brought into play: 1) the same perfection can subsist in two different modes of being, and thus the (...) universal content of knowledge can be present in the particular reality (Summa, I, 84, 1); 2) things which are really distinct between themselves can be known in their distinction, even when they cannot exist separately (metaphysical distinction justifies gnoseological separation); 3) as Cornelio Fabro suggests, it is artificial to separate in the object of experience the object’s different levels of objectivity (quality, configuration and meaning) and, as a result, human experience could be considered the source not only of sensible content but also of intelligible content. This “defense” of Thomistic abstraction intends to offer an account of knowledge which reunites again epistemology with common sense experience, so that philosophy may no longer be a Platonic abstraction but a meaningful explanation of life. (shrink)

Starting with Kant’s undeveloped proposal of a “negative science,” the author describes how philosophy may be developed and strengthened by means of a systematic approach that seeks to identify and eliminate a widespread but seldom recognized form of systemic and propagating conceptual error. ¶¶¶¶¶ The paper builds upon the author’s book, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND MEANING (Studies in Theory and Behavior, 2021). ¶¶¶¶¶ The author’s purpose is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize the boundaries of (...) what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. By realizing these objectives, the boundaries of possible meaning are determined. (shrink)

I argue that, despite claims that might be made to the contrary, no scientific evidence could ever prove that introspection is unreliable, even in principle. This paper was read at the annual POH symposium in Lake Wenatchee in May, 2011.

THESIS ABSTRACT The life of Catholic reformer Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, 1455- 1536, spanned the threshold between Medieval and Renaissance eras. Like other humanists, Lefèvre synthesized philosophical, theological and scientific theories and practices — of such is his unpublished treatise De Magia naturali, On Natural Magic. I elucidate Lefèvre’s focus on universal mystical metaphors of divine union, in order to offer a simpler view into the evolution of his writings. Engaging historic-intellectual background in critical analysis of Book II, I address the (...) conflicting political, religious, and academic opinions of natural magic, demonstrating that current Academia is poised to expand the historical, “theoretical” treatment of natural magic to engage it as a phenomenological, “practical” human experience. In De Magia naturali Book II, Lefèvre decloaks mythology, philosophy, astrology, literature and religion to a scientific theory, practice and experience of number as Idea. He reveals how the limit of metaphorical imagery is duality, the binary Coincidence of Opposites, symbolized by the number 2. The magic in Lefèvre’s number mysticism is human experience of numerical ascension from man to God, achieved through the number 3, the love-nexus re-uniting 2 into One, duality into unity. Renaissance humanists conceived of this prisca theologia, pristine or ancient theology, as embodied in the Christian Trinity through the Spirit of Christ. Current Academia is responsible to teach this wisdom tradition from a multicultural, interdisciplinary worldview, as I posit the humanists intended. (shrink)

David Miller propounds a theory of objective knowledge from which he mistakenly derives some consequences about question-begging and persuasion that appear to be false. He makes a further claim about persuasion that also seems false. I argue that Miller’s account of objective knowledge is explanatorily weak unless supplemented with an account of subjective knowledge and that the latter enables us to extricate Miller’s theory from the falsehoods he associates with it.

Although at first glance, “facts” are the paradigms of straightforwardness, something about facts seems to invite perpetual controversy and dichotomizing. Innumerable bifurcations on the topic have included "Facts vs. Theories”, “Facts vs. Appearance”, "Facts vs. Values", ... and, popular nowadays, "(Real)Facts vs. Fake Facts". This paper most aligns with the facts vs. theories model, so far as whatever facts are, theories seem to be constructed stories that are necessary for connecting and interpreting the facts. Yet the boundary between the two (...) is fluid and fuzzy: Fact in one context is theory in another, depending on what is being accepted or contested at the time. This paper’s views are compatible with—but neutral on the plausibility of having—an optimism like Peirce’s that scientific inquiry may nonetheless converge towards a consensus. To illustrate the challenges of finding “straightforward” facts, the paper includes a case example, related to research on possible health effects of exposure to electromagnetic-field radiation (EMF). _ The source paper for this 2018 update was originally presented at the University of Waterloo 30th Anniversary Philosophy Conference, 1993. (shrink)

Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia and of how people can hold some things (...) to be physically real even when it is clear no one can ever directly experience those things as phenomena. It is further shown to enable a single, internally consistent, largely empirically supported conceptual framework – a ‘metacosmology’ – able to encompass not only the physical world as people conceive of it for everyday purposes, and as scientists conceive of it for scientific purposes, but also people’s first person phenomenal experience of a physical world and, prospectively, the mechanisms by which such first person, conscious experiences can be generated. (shrink)

Prompting has become the primary mechanism for interacting with large language models (LLMs), often accompanied by the implicit assumption that prompts can supply, inject, or constitute knowledge. We challenge this assumption by arguing that prompts do not generate, update, or instantiate knowledge within LLMs; rather, they function as transient control signals that shape inference trajectories grounded in pre-existing parameterized structures [2, 3]. Drawing on epistemology, control theory, and information theory [8, 9], we show that prompt-induced competence systematically fails to meet (...) the criteria for knowledge attribution: persistence across contexts, generalization to novel situations, and counterfactual stability. We further explain why prompting appears to confer knowledge, tracing this to in-context learning effects, linguistic coherence, and human interpretive biases. The paper introduces the PAK(Prompt ̸= Knowledge) thesis, situates it within the DIKCA(DataInformation-Knowledge-Control-Architecture) framework [1, 6], and discusses implications for evaluation, governance, and AI system design. (shrink)

Recently, I proposed the concept of quantum language. This can be characterized as a kind of linguistic turn of quantum mechanics, the true Copenhagen interpretation and a scientific foundation for philosophical epistemology. In this paper I propose that Fisher statistics should progress to quantum language with the concept of measurement (i.e., observable, POVM). Otherwise, statistics risks being viewed merely as a subset of applied mathematics. The present formulation does not aim to conform to contemporary pedagogy or philosophical trends. However, I (...) am convinced that in 10 years, AI will choose quantum language as the foundation of statistics. -/- . (shrink)

This draft Chapter 4 of the book “In the Beginning was Chiasmus: On the Epistemology of Non-quantified Modelling, describes how Plato’s method of divisions and collections (diairesis) accommodates both linear hierarchal classification and combinatoric cross-classification. It presents Plato’s and the early Neoplatonists’ use of cross-classificatory (chiastic) modelling as an ancient prototype of contemporary typological and morphological modelling.

This paper is a standards-and-scaffold proposal; physics completion remains gated by explicit obligations (4D selection/Lorentzian emergence, chirality/index/anomaly closure, and parameter-free predictions). We propose a cross-domain scaffold—physics-facing, cognition-facing, and governance-facing—built from (i) a fixed exceptional geometric ontology scaffold, (ii) a certifiable stochastic dynamics grammar, and (iii) autopoietic interoperability as the dynamic goal for joint work. The ontology scaffold is the 112-dimensional quaternionic-Kähler Wolf space m112 ≅ e8(−24)/(e7 × SU(2)), used as a rigid symmetry-and-representation reference geometry. Operational dynamics are posed on a (...) 156-dimensional product phase space x156 ∶= T∗mH × v64 × n4, expressed in a generator-ready Universal Master Equation (UME) form (Stratonovich SDE + Itô generator). An autopoiesis contract is defined by (a) stochastic viability of a constraint set S and (b) Foster-Lyapunov organizational stability for V. A structural simplifier is Deltron noise isolation: diffusion is confined to the flux/ecology channel V_64, making governance constraints on protected variables diffusion-free in the generator. Autopoietic interoperability is the shared ability of teams and institutions to self-maintain, self-correct, and coordinate across domains via typed, auditable methods. It is the operational target that makes the framework pluralistic with respect to ultimate end goals while enforcing a universal method for shared inquiry. We adopt an industry-grade epistemic foundation for diffusion into action: engineering pragmatism (Koen; Peirce/James/Dewey/Rorty) operationalized as DMEPS conformance gates, with pramāṇas implemented as typed epistemic operators (measurement, inference, testimony with provenance, postulation, etc.). The consciousness-first stance follows James’s radical empiricism as a [MODEL] commitment with 120 years of philosophical warrant. Interpretive modules (e.g., Trika Shaivism mappings) are included as explicitly tagged [MAP] correspondences and do not bear the main mathematical or empirical claims. The pragmatist lineage (Peirce → James → Dewey → Rorty) is a genealogical context for shared themes, not a claim of direct influence on Koen. (shrink)

We present the transmodern philosophy of augmented intelligence. Following Peirce's answer to the question of first philosophy—that logic precedes both epistemology and ontology—we structure the framework accordingly: (1) the Universal Master Equation (UME) as the formal logic of coherent process, (2) engineering-based pragmatism with pramanas mapped to differential geometry as epistemology, and (3) the M112-ToE Wolf space as ontology. "Transmodern" means using modern methods to articulate classical wisdom (Kashmir Saivism's Krama/Trika) within a postmodern relative perspective (Rorty), achieving Indo-American synthesis. We (...) show that Autopoietic Stochastic Differential Geometry (ASDG) subsumes logic itself—meta-consistency is not a separate invariant but what the geometry produces. LLMs exhibit dramatic sensitivity to prompt structure; we explain why structures from contemplative traditions often outperform secular equivalents. This paper demonstrates what it describes: constructed through human-AI collaboration, with AI as peer during argument development. (shrink)

Archetronic Education treats learning as engineering: not the transfer of symbols, but the construction of stable, auditable competence through selection, propagation, measurement, and governance. We introduce the Universal Master Equation (UME) as an intermediate representation for learning dynamics—coherent practice (J∇H), stabilization (−G∇H), constraint-driven selection (−G˜∇Φ), and exploration (Σ ◦ dW)—implemented via an explicit, improvable conformance harness rather than a fixed notion of “competence.” The framework is organized as a layered stack: engineering pragmatism (epistemic rules), autopoietic stochastic geometry as method, and (...) optional physics/ontology/worldview modules kept behind non-collapse rules. The educational goal is self-sustaining, self-propagating competence (cognitive autopoiesis): learners who can specify what counts, self-correct, transfer to novel domains, and teach problem-solving to other humans and AI tools without becoming dependent on augmentation. Mastery performs; autopoiesis reproduces. The primary falsifier is failure of transfer and agency under constraint shifts—especially when augmentation is reduced or removed—and failure of governance under adversarial Goodhart pressure. (shrink)

We propose the Universal Master Equation (UME) as a standard normal form for dynamics on Riemannian and quaternionic-Kähler manifolds. The UME provides a coordinateinvariant, modular decomposition into four irreducible driversconservative (J∇H), dissipative (−G∇H), selection (−G∇Φ), and uctuation (Σ ◦ dW)plus an optional harmonic term from Hodge decomposition when H1 (M) ̸= 0. The selection functional Φ enforces viability constraints (we term this autopoietic structure, following MaturanaVarela, though no biological claim is intended). The UME is not a uniqueness theorem about nature (...) but a universal intermediate representation for well-posed dynamicsa compilation target with optional modules for continuous diusions, discrete Markov chains, and memory. We present: (1) the Theorem of Dynamical Completeness via Hodge decomposition on compact Riemannian-symplectic manifolds; (2) an instantiation on the 112-dimensional Wolf space M112 = E8(−24)/(E7 ×SU(2)), where topological sectoring via H2 (B, Z3) ∼= Z3 and HirzebruchRiemannRoch index computations yield a mechanism for three fermion generations (χ(W) = 1 per sector); and (3) a discrete extension showing that Markov chains admit a parallel four-term decomposition, with Boolean logic emerging as the topological limit of smooth geometry. The framework interfaces with GENERIC/metriplectic systems, Wasserstein gradient flows, diffusion models, and the Free Energy Principle, though we emphasize structural parallels rather than identities. Applications to prompt engineering and conformance standards are discussed as methodological illustrations. (shrink)

This paper develops the transmodern philosophy of augmented intelligence - the epistemological framework for human-AI collaborative inquiry. "Transmodern" here means using modern methods (engineering-based pragmatism, differential geometry) to articulate classical wisdom (Kashmir Shaivism's Krama/Trika) within a postmodern relative perspective (Rorty), achieving Indo-American synthesis rather than mere comparison. Building on Rosst (2025a), which established engineering-based pragmatism as the only coherent epistemology, we address foundations left implicit in that work: the Weak Koen Thesis (that meta-consistency is invariant while logic is heuristic), the (...) three-tier evaluative hierarchy (functional, coherent, teleological), and the role of AI as distributed epistemic integrator. We show that Autopoietic Stochastic Differential Geometry (ASDG) subsumes logic itself - meta-consistency is not a separate invariant but what the geometry produces. The framework achieves genuine integration: American Pragmatism supplies epistemological method, Kashmir Shaivism supplies phenomenological cartography, and differential geometry supplies formal language. (shrink)

We develop engineering-based pragmatism as a framework for evaluating fundamental physical theories. This position holds that there exists a universal method based on broadened engineering heuristics - rules of thumb refined through practice and evaluated by state-of-the-art (SOTA) criteria. Engineering as a discipline does not own this method; rather, engineering has developed these heuristics most explicitly while other disciplines (including science and philosophy) have used them implicitly. We demonstrate that any competing epistemology faces performative contradiction when defending itself, leaving engineering-based (...) pragmatism as the only self-consistent position. This framework is applied to evaluate a nested hierarchy of physical theories: Standard Model (SM), Nielsen's GUT-S9, and Rosst's ToE-M112. The hierarchy represents progressive SOTA advancement: S9 is SOTA relative to SM, M112 is SOTA relative to S9. We conclude with a formal proof that this hierarchy is mathematically realized via the embedding chain S9 ↪ E6/U(1) → E7/SU(2) → M112. The paper constitutes both an argument for engineering-based pragmatism and a demonstration of it. (shrink)

Structural Omission is a framework for realist painting developed for the post-certainty era of generative AI, when images can be produced at scale with a surface of total certainty. This essay argues that realism remains viable only by abandoning completion as its premise. Traditional realism, even at its best, carried an old promise: that completion was available in principle, and that the artist could deliver wholeness if they chose. Generative AI systems now manufacture that kind of closure faster, cheaper, and (...) more convincingly than any human hand. Structural Omission rebuilds realism on a different ground rooted in perception itself: perceptual limits are not an error in representation. They are the condition of representation. The framework formalizes planned, load-bearing incompleteness through three criteria—Ground (perceptual limits), Structure (structural incompleteness), and Consequence (narrative without resolution). Completion-biased image systems can imitate the look of omissions, but they usually treat gaps as a visual effect rather than structural absence. Rather than competing with algorithmic finish, Structural Omission treats partial visibility as the architecture holding the painting together. The result is realism that is accountable to human perception. (shrink)

Intelligence services are currently focusing on the fight against terrorism, leaving relatively little resources to monitor other security threats. For this reason, they often ignore external information activities that do not pose immediate threats to their government's interests. Extremely few external services operate globally. Almost all other services focus on immediate neighbors or regions. These services usually depend on relationships with these global services for information on areas beyond their immediate neighborhoods, and often sell their regional expertise for what they (...) need globally. A feature of both internal and external services is that they behave like a caste. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25847.68006. (shrink)

Starting from the premise that akrasia is irrational, I argue that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. Using that conclusion, I defend logical omniscience requirements, the claim that one can never have all-things-considered misleading evidence about what's rational, and the Right Reasons position concerning peer disagreement.

The idea that the epistemology of modality is in some sense a priori is a popular one, but it has turned out to be difficult to precisify in a way that does not expose it to decisive counterexamples. The most common precisifications follow Kripke’s suggestion that cases of necessary a posteriori truth that can be known a priori to be necessary if true ‘may give a clue to a general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths’. The idea is (...) that whether it is contingent whether p can be known a priori for at least some broad range of sentences ‘p’. Recently, Al Casullo and Jens Kipper have discussed restrictions of such principles to atomic sentences. We show that decisive counterexamples even to such dramatically restricted Kripke-style principles can be constructed using minimal logical resources. We then consider further restrictions, and show that the counterexamples to the original principles can be turned into counterexamples to the further restricted principles. We conclude that, if there are any true restrictions of Kripke-style principles, then they are so weak as to be of little epistemological interest. (shrink)

Which premisses should we use to start our inquiries? Which transitions during inquiry should we take next? When should we switch lines of inquiry? In this paper, I address these open questions about inquiry, formulating novel norms for such decisions during deductive reasoning. I use the first-order predicate calculus, in combination with Carnap’s state description framework, to state such norms. Using that framework, I first demonstrate some properties of sets of sentences used in deduction. I then state some norms for (...) decisions made during deductive reasoning, establishing initial benchmarks for efficient deduction by ideal reasoners. When deciding which transition to make next, reasoners should choose the most informative transition, the one that maximally reduces uncertainty in the sense of ruling out the largest number of state descriptions relevant to their inquiry. Finally, inspired by optimal foraging theory, I show that, under certain assumptions of ignorance, reasoners should change premiss sets when their information intake drops below the global average information intake across premiss sets. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive tothe hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realisers of a person’s cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorising and practice must be updated, by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to (...) include intentional harm towards gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with some critical discussion. (shrink)

Epistemic impermissivism is the view that there is never more than one doxastic attitude it is rational to have in response to one's total evidence. Epistemic permissivism is the denial of this claim. The debate between the permissivist and the impermissivist has proceeded, in large part, by way of 'negative' arguments that highlight the unattractiveness of the opposing position. In light of the deadlock that has ensued, this paper has two aims. The first is to introduce the concept of a (...) 'positive' argument for impermissivism. The second is to show that this argument faces a dilemma, one that generalizes the problems that famously arise for formal constraints like the Principle of Indifference. The aim of this paper is to strengthen the argument against the impermissivist by showing that no positive argument for impermissivism is likely to succeed. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to argue that luck is description-dependent. In § 1, I introduce and defend the description-dependence thesis of luck. In § 2, I distinguish this thesis from some other theses about the nature of luck in the literature. And finally, § 3 explores some of the significant implications of the thesis.

In this paper I explore the contours of a picture of normative epistemology that speaks centrally to the question of how to inquire rather than just the question of what to believe. What if normative epistemology were expanded to encompass inquiry in full? I argue that while a 'zetetic epistemology' builds on traditional normative epistemology in many appealing ways, it also faces some challenges.

I present a puzzle about inquiry and discuss two potential solutions. The puzzle stems from two equally compelling sets of data suggesting that, on the one hand, there’s something epistemically defective with inquiring into questions that don’t have true answers. On the other hand, however, there can be scenarios in which we are epistemically permitted to inquire into questions that don’t have true answers. How is it that inquiries into questions that don’t have true answers can both be defective and (...) permissible from an epistemic point of view? The first solution I consider maintains that inquiries into questions that don’t have true answers are always impermissible but can be excusable. The second solution maintains that inquiries into questions that don’t have true answers are bad inquiries that can be conducted by inquirers we can legitimately trust. I argue against the former and in favor of the latter. -/- . (shrink)

Quietism about the aim of inquiry is the view that there’s nothing to be gained philosophically by theorising about inquiry’s aim. In this article, I address and criticise arguments in favour of Quietism, by focusing especially on some arguments offered by Jane Friedman in a recent important paper (‘The Aim of Inquiry?’, Phil. and Phen. Res., 2024). By so doing, I explain in what sense reflection on the aim of inquiry illuminates the nature and assessment of this type of activity.

_ Source: _Page Count 30 GER Lloyd discerns two conflicting hypotheses concerning human cognition: cross-cultural universality and cultural relativity. The history of science is one discipline among many actively contributing to our understanding of human cognition at present. Not surprisingly, then, the dichotomy is also present in the history of science. In contrast to current approaches to the history of science, which highlight cultural relativity, genetic epistemology, which is conceived by Jean Piaget as a science of the acquisition of knowledge, (...) emphasises cross-cultural universality. Using the multidimensionality of phenomena and different styles of inquiry, I will argue that there is no inherent contradiction in the different approaches to the history of science. However, the amicable co-existence of both approaches has been undermined by Peter Damerow, who criticised the applicability of genetic epistemology to the historical development of knowledge on historical and theoretical grounds. In this paper, I will review Damerow’s theoretical critique, and, in formulating a response, I will argue that genetic epistemology cannot be dismissed as one of many legitimate styles of inquiry into the history of science on the basis of this critique. (shrink)

The focus of this article is the psychological allure of automation, as well as the anticipated cognitive and social consequences of heavily mediated and automated societies. The article approaches these themes through an in-depth analysis of E. M. Forster’s rather dystopian vision of a fully automated society in his 1909 story “The Machine Stops.” The analysis puts Forster’s vision in conversation with contemporary automation trends, for example, addictive designs and data-driven personalization. A series of potential cognitive and social harms are (...) treated as stemming not from automation or mediation in itself but from, e.g., a loss of temporal, navigational, and social conditions for integrating our mediated experiences in a way that supports our epistemic world orientation. Thus, while our current automation trends differ from Forster’s 1909 vision, they might pose systematic and somewhat predictable threats to our cognitive, social, and political ecologies. (shrink)

This paper offers an abstract characterization of the scientific realism debate (SRD) as a dialectical process of formulating, testing, and refining epistemic principles, and argues that it inherently involves a comparative methodology: the justification of realist or antirealist stances hinges on identifying epistemically relevant similarities and differences among theories—potentially from different disciplines or eras—within “segments” of science that exhibit optimism- or pessimism-inducing track records. Growing critiques of SRD advocate a “localist” turn, contending that disciplinary diversity undermines the feasibility of “global” (...) principles and theory comparison, thereby necessitating a case-bycase approach. However, I argue that disciplinary diversity alone cannot mandate localism without appealing to particularism—a disputed meta-epistemological thesis that denies the normative force of principles altogether. Demonstrating that the viability of localism depends on particularism is far from trivial, since, as I show, localists themselves often overlook this dependence. Moreover, even when particularism is (apparently) endorsed, its radical implications seem underappreciated. To clarify what is at stake, I introduce a reason-based “weighing” framework for normativity, contrast particularism with two forms of generalism, and examine their consequences for the “localism–globalism” debate and the role of comparative methods in SRD. I conclude that embracing localism requires more demanding philosophical commitments than is commonly acknowledged. The apparent ease of “going local” in response to manifest disciplinary diversity is significantly overstated. (shrink)

Language use is often described through implication, interpretation, meaning, and narrative without differentiating the work performed by each term. -/- As a result, multiple stages of escalation are compressed into one interpretive designation. -/- This paper distinguishes implication, interpretation, meaning, and narrative as non-equivalent positions in an escalation pathway. Implication concerns suggestive surplus carried by articulation. Interpretation concerns the assigning or reading of significance. Meaning concerns the significance assigned, received, or inferred. Narrative concerns the organization of that significance into sequence. (...) -/- This separation prevents distinct escalation roles from collapsing into a single language of interpretation. (shrink)

Language, vocabulary, and variable are not consistently separated within GIW description, producing instability in how variables are formed. -/- Language names unconstrained expression. Vocabulary names stabilized descriptive terms. Variable names formal descriptive units. -/- Instability begins when variables are formed directly from language without vocabulary constraint. -/- This paper maintains a three-stage transformation pipeline and prohibits direct conversion from language to variable.

This paper distinguishes corpus architecture from canonical compression. Corpus architecture preserves the internal structure of a body of work by maintaining distinctions, relationships, dependencies, and ordered sequences. Canonical compression reduces that structure into condensed forms intended to aid communication, recall, or entry. Both may have a role, but they do not perform the same function. When compression is treated as equivalent to architecture, distinctions collapse, sequence is flattened, and relational dependencies become less visible. The result is not merely brevity, but (...) structural reduction. This paper argues that architecture must remain primary and that compression, where used, must remain derivative. (shrink)

Appearance, indicator , and variable are frequently collapsed within GIW description, producing drift into evidence and mechanism. -/- Appearance names what is present. Indicator names a visible marker within appearance. Variable names a dimension along which appearance varies. Instability begins when indicators are treated as evidence or variables as causes. -/- This paper maintains their separation as distinct descriptive roles without conversion into explanatory function.

Symbolic, expressive, and emotional readings are often gathered under generic interpretation-language. They are not the same kind of interpretive act. Symbolic reading introduces representational reference, expressive reading introduces communicative expression, and emotional reading introduces affective attribution.

This paper presents the formal system map of the corpus. It defines the corpus as an architectural system composed of primary trunks, ordered sequences, and a governing interpretive layer. It also identifies the cross-connections that integrate these components into a single structure. The purpose of the map is not to summarize the work, but to preserve and expose its internal organization. This paper establishes that the corpus is not thematic or associative, but structurally ordered and interdependent.

This paper defines the relationships between all systems within the corpus. It identifies recognition as the central connector , participation as the stabilizing condition, authority as the governing redistribution, and interpretation as the constraint layer regulating all systems. It demonstrates that these systems do not operate independently but emerge from, reinforce, and depend upon one another . The paper establishes that the corpus is not a collection of systems but a unified structure expressed across domains.

This paper connects interpretive method to the internal phenomena system by governing how signal, structure, and condition are described. It argues that internal phenomena must be described according to their layer without being inflated into authority or extended into explanation. The paper first clarifies signal as the layer of appearance, then structure as the layer of organization, then condition as the layer of lived experience. It then formalizes the methodological guardrails required to preserve these distinctions. Its contribution is not the (...) rejection of interpretation, but the stabilization of descriptive discipline so that internal phenomena are not misrepresented or misused. (shrink)

Suppositions can be classified as indicative vs. subjunctive and full vs. partial. We propose a causal account of suppositional reasoning that naturally unifies all four types of reasoning based on this classification, provides a justification of the rather heterogenous canonical update rules, and gives rise to a new update rule for the partial subjunctive case in terms of generalized imaging.

This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses seven kinds of situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise; dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them; and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmist’s replies to them.

Wie jedes unserer Werke — gleich welcher Sphäre es angehört, sei es ein Bauwerk, ein technisches Gerät, ein Gemälde oder etwas anderes — errichten wir auch unsere Welten nach bestimmten kompositorischen Gesetzen. -/- Ihre systemischen Grundlagen werden in der Regel von jenen untersucht, die sich professionell mit schöpferischer Arbeit befassen. Der Künstler macht sich mit ihnen vertraut, um zum Meister des schöpferischen Prozesses zu werden. -/- Ihr Verständnis eröffnet dem Menschen die Möglichkeit, bewusst an die Formung seiner inneren Welt als (...) an ein eigenes Kunstwerk heranzugehen. Ihre Anwendung in der Psychologie stellt die Basis für die Entwicklung eines Instrumentariums bereit, das mit der inneren Welt des Menschen arbeitet. Ihr Verständnis erlaubt der Philosophie, systemisch an die Fragen des Weltgefüges heranzugehen. -/- Damit unser Denken mit der Realität in Beziehung treten kann, stilisieren wir die Welt in der Wahrnehmung unausweichlich. Die von der Menschheit herausgebildeten Stile bestimmen die Grenzen unseres Weltverständnisses sowie unsere Erkenntnis- und kreativen Möglichkeiten. -/- Das erste Buch des Projekts Compositions of Worlds — Stilisierung der Welt: Klassische Stile des Erkennens — führt in das Phänomen der Stilisierung ein und legt die klassischen Stile des Erkennens offen, in deren Optik die modernen geisteswissenschaftlichen Bereiche funktionieren. Es legt die Grundlage für das nächste Buch der Reihe — Stilisierung der Welt: Psychologie und Methodologie. -/- Das Projekt lädt die aufmerksame Leserin und den aufmerksamen Leser dazu ein, die eigene innere Welt als ein Kunstwerk zu betrachten. (shrink)

This treatise provides the complete formal derivation of physical spatial dimensionality from the ontological structure of the Relational Field. Building upon the geometric configuration space (Ωconfig) established in Treatise V, we prove that the three-dimensionality of the universe (d = 3) is not a contingent initial condition or anthropic selection effect, but a derivable necessity arising from the triadic logic of relation. Through four sequential proofs, we establish: (1) The ontological priority of relational dimensionality over physical space, demonstrating that ”dimension” (...) is fundamentally an independent degree of freedom rather than spatial extent; (2) The exact isomorphic mapping (ψ) between the three primitives (E, C, F) and the three spatial axes (x, y, z), with Systematization → Extension (x), Constraint → Separation (y), and Registration → Depth (z); (3) The impossibility of alternative dimensionalities via rigorous reductio ad absurdum: d < 3 leads to information collapse and feedback intersection (Flatland Paradox), while d > 3 creates vacuum instability and thermodynamic dissipation; (4) The formulation of the Isomorphic Law of Spatial Instantiation as a conservation law: dim(Σphys) ≡ dim(Ωrel) = 3. This derivation provides the geometric foundation for understanding the primordial state’s instability, recasting the Tension Integral (TI=0.336) as metric distortion energy arising from ”dimensional frustration”—the compression of 3D logical structure into the 1D geometric singularity of the primordial diagonal (E = C = F ). By proving that physical space is the isomorphic shadow of triadic logic, we render the Anthropic Principle is obsolete and establishes that the Big Bang represents the universe’s violent correction of a dimensional violation. (shrink)

Functionalism is one of the most widely accepted contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind for explaining consciousness. It is based on the principle of multiple realizability. According to this principle, the function of a system does not have an intrinsic correlation with its physical substrate. Therefore, systems with different physical properties can perform similar functions. This principle rests on the assumption that a system's function depends solely on its causal roles within a causal network. In contemporary philosophy of mind, (...) the nature of causal roles has been a topic of intense debate. This debate has not only arisen between proponents and opponents of functionalism, but also among different branches within the functionalist school itself. One of the most heated discussions in this area has been between reductionists, who argue that causal roles can be reduced to physicalist functions, and non-reductionists, who believe in the metaphysical independence of causal roles. This paper, after outlining the foundations of functionalism and the areas of disagreement, aims to offer an epistemological approach to address the existing challenges in explaining causal roles. (shrink)

Structural Omission at Site Scale: Landscape, Land, and the Limits of Knowing at Tablas de Daimiel -/- Five wetland paintings, Grand Prize Art and Nature Award (2026), and partial knowing at Tablas de Daimiel National Park by Deborah Scott -/- July 11, 2026 -/- Abstract Structural Omission is a framework for representational painting built around perceptual limits, structural incompleteness, and narrative without resolution. Before 2026, the framework was argued in published theory and tested in paint across figures, still life, interiors, (...) redacted documents, and landscape. This essay examines a site-scale case: five wetland paintings completed as a body of work during the Arte y Naturaleza residency at Tablas de Daimiel National Park (Castilla-La Mancha, Spain), a Spanish National Park, Ramsar wetland, and UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (La Mancha Húmeda, 1980). Organizers selected the artist for the framework’s epistemic claims, not landscape spectacle. A state jury awarded the Grand Prize, Art and Nature Award (2026) on the body of work, with remarks connecting the paintings to underground peat fire, wetland fragility, and iron-oxide grounds. The argument is that partial knowing is the structural condition at conservation sites where publics practice scenic completion: treating lush wetland images as if they delivered the whole story. Representational painting can make that limit visible in the architecture of the image without functioning as ecological documentation or environmental advocacy. The essay situates the Tablas body of work within prior articulations of Structural Omission and distinguishes this claim from residency field writing on the same site. -/- Structural Omission, representational painting, landscape painting, epistemic limits, conservation, Tablas de Daimiel, post-certainty, narrative without resolution, phenomenology of perception, wetland . (shrink)

In this essay, painter Deborah Scott examines how generative AI is changing representational painting in a screen-first visual culture. She argues that photography challenged painting at the level of recording, while AI challenges painting at the level of authorship, meaning, and provenance. As digital reproduction becomes the primary way viewers encounter art, traditional signals of human origin and image authenticity are weakened. Scott presents Structural Omission as a framework in contemporary painting built around perceptual limits, where partial seeing is treated (...) as load-bearing architecture rather than stylistic effect. She further argues that artist writing now functions as part of artistic practice: not secondary commentary, but evidence of human inquiry embedded in the work. The essay positions painting and writing together as a response to post-certainty conditions in contemporary visual culture. -/- . (shrink)

The paper responds to two recent versions of the argument against ex contradictione quodlibet (the principle that says that a contradiction entails any proposition, also known as ‘explosion’) based on the normative role of logic for reasoning. Both versions of the argument I am concerned with assume that a subject has defeasible reasons to believe any logical consequence of her beliefs. After showing this assumption to be more controversial than it might seem, I argue that even if it is true, (...) and assuming ex contradictione quodlibet, no absurdity follows about what reasons the subject with inconsistent beliefs has. There is an independent explanation of the fact that a subject with inconsistent beliefs is not in a position to rationally infer anything. The reasons that derive from the inconsistency, if there are any, are a of peculiar kind, which I call inert reasons. (shrink)

What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second-personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. (...) And it offers an account of the complex content in play if interpersonal knowledge is to be understood in terms of its mental states and their functions. (shrink)