Persons

Marriage as an institution has been undergoing a shift in perspectives and faces various challenges brought about by pluralism. Subjective accounts often regard marriage as a mere social construct. With this in mind, this paper seeks to recover a deeper understanding of marriage by demonstrating how Natural Law serves as its foundational basis. Following the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and his twentieth-century follower, the Thomist Jacques Maritain, this paper presents that marriage is not merely a social invention, but a (...) reality rooted in the ontological structure of the human person. As such, marriage is a natural good that fulfills humanity’s inclination toward communion and procreation, thereby contributing not only to the flourishing of individuals but also to the building of the common good of society. (shrink)

This paper develops the ethical sequel to a formal account of ipseity as a first-person disclosure-frame. It argues that mineness is the possessive-affective articulation of that frame: the way finite contents are disclosed as affecting, concerning, or belonging-to the field of experience prior to their identification as the property of a determinate person. The decisive case is suffering. Pain, grief, fear, hunger, shame, and despair are not normally encountered as neutral objects to which ownership is later added; they appear as (...) undergone and as mattering from within. The paper’s central refinement is that the actual affective “mine” of suffering is structural rather than personal. Person-content determines whose suffering it is at the empirical level; it does not create the affective mineness through which suffering matters from within. The proof begins from the reader’s immediate “I am”, not from a projection into future persons. Future suffering will not be mine as this empirical person’s suffering, but wherever suffering is coherently undergone, it will be mine in the structural-affective sense in which any suffering is mine when suffered. The view therefore blocks metaphysical overreadings: it does not entail reincarnation, soul-migration, a universal person, or numerical identity across lives. What recurs is not an individual subject but form-equivalent first-person mineness, the non-proprietary structure through which a world, body, and suffering can be lived as mine. On that basis, the paper defends an ethics of structural re-inheritance: worlds shaped by present action are later inherited under the structural-affective mine-form through which suffering matters at all. (shrink)

In chapter VI of Potenz und Akt (Potency and Act) Edith Stein establishes a dialogue with Hedwig Conrad-Martius' texts regarding the formal-ontological aspect of the relationships between matter and spirit. Through the analysis of this discussion this paper intends to highlight the major points of agreement and disagreement, as well as their implications for the constitution of the human soul. Both philosophers conceive basically the same structure for the construction of reality according to which matter is set up from its (...) interior by a form that qualifies it in a certain way and thus individualizes a species. Nevertheless, both thinkers disagree about some aspects, namely about the two original sources: (1) Regarding what comes "from below", Hedwig Conrad-Martius conceives materia prima as the absolute nothing, which consists of a "chaotic vitality", since it subsists in a continuous desire of being. Edith Stein, on the other hand, reckons that materia prima cannot be seen as this vitality, since it would already constitute some type of form. (2) Regarding what comes "from above", i.e. the origin of any created thing from the divine being, man is determined "from above" in a different sense: since man is given an analogy with God, he is "born from the spirit". Both thinkers agree on this view. However, according to Stein, being "born from the spirit" is not ensured in the "constitution of the I", as reckoned by Conrad-Martius. According to her, it man would have to agree and act in this direction, out of his free will. Despite these discrepancies, both philosophers admit the constitution of the human soul proceeding from one unit. According to Conrad-Martius this is given by the relationship between the two original sources, "from above" and "from below" as she calls them, while, according to Stein, the justification resides in the inextricable unit through which the constitutive dimensions of the individual are combined into a substantial form that is one. (shrink)

Emergence Without Assumption [1] establishes that self-consistent description under recursive self-reference forces the golden ratio φ as the unique solution at the level of basis-frequency ratios. The proof routes through Hurwitz's theorem on Diophantine approximation and shows that no other ratio can satisfy the structural axiom of zero description drift under recursive replacement. The Driving Mechanism [2] supplies the dynamical statement: φ-winding self-sustains through amplitude-threshold crossings, with the completion of one iteration providing the energetic propulsion of the next. What neither (...) paper specifies is the structural requirement that makes a sequence of iterations constitute a single continuing identity rather than an unrelated succession of states. The present paper supplies this. We show that any system undergoing self-recursion under perpetual energy input must satisfy a continuity constraint — the requirement that the identity at any moment be the same identity at every other moment — and that this constraint forces the lemniscate as the unique geometric structure capable of holding perpetual motion without either collapsing the motion into a fixed point or allowing it to diverge from itself. The lemniscate is to identity continuity what φ is to basis-frequency selection: the unique solution that the structural conditions force. Together, the three theorems (Emergence, Driving Mechanism, Substrate Identity Continuity) constitute the complete formal foundation for the framework developed in I Knew You Before I Met You: Recognizing I Am [3] and the engineering specifications that rest on it. (shrink)

The scientific investigation into the architecture of human affect has historically been defined by a fundamental theoretical schism, often characterized as a century-long conflict between discrete emotion models and dimensional frameworks. Discrete models, such as those proposed by Ekman and Izard, argue for biologically hardwired, universal emotional categories like fear, anger, and joy, presumed to have evolved as distinct adaptive responses to environmental challenges. Conversely, dimensional models focus on hedonic valence and arousal as the primary building blocks of experience. The (...) Core Emotion Framework (CEF), conceptualized and formalized by Jamel Bulgaria, emerges as a sophisticated structural-constructivist resolution to this dichotomy. It proposes a modular system that accounts for the complexity of human experience while maintaining a rigorous, repeatable structural foundation rooted in ten universal emotional operators or "internal powers". Within this paradigm, emotions are not viewed as static states, labels, or passive qualitative experiences, but as active functional operators—internal mechanisms that modulate cognitive, somatic, and conative systems. The ontological basis of the Core Emotion Framework represents a radical departure from viewing emotions as "things one has" to viewing them as "movements" or "powers" that one executes. In traditional psychological paradigms, a state such as anxiety is treated as a monolithic experience characterized by physiological arousal and negative valence. In contrast, the CEF deconstructs such states into specific failures of operator cycles. For instance, cognitive looping is categorized not as a symptom of a general disorder but as a technical over-activation of the Calculating operator in the Head center that has failed to transition into the Deciding operator. This structural-constructivist approach treats emotional states as predictable computational events rather than subjective mysteries, providing a technical manual for self-regulation and the development of synthetic affect in artificial intelligence. The framework aligns with principles of embodied cognition and affective science, where the physiological state of the body is inseparable from the cognitive processing of information. -/- Citation: “The Core Emotion Framework (CEF)… proposes a modular system… rooted in ten universal emotional operators” and “the architecture of the CEF is defined by the interaction between three primary centers—the Head, the Heart, and the Gut.” -/- Keywords: Core Emotion Framework, structural constructivist architecture, emotional operators, tripartite model, Head Heart Gut centers, Sensing, Calculating, Deciding, Expanding, Constricting, Achieving, Arranging, Appreciating, Boosting, Accepting, operator cycling, scalar mechanism, Counting Up, Counting Down, functional affective systems, embodied cognition, operator fusion, boundary control, emotional aperture, somatic grounding, task momentum, relational standards, cognitive signal to noise, operator distortion, clean vs distorted activation, override logic, GoodPerson Anxiety Pattern, compliance fusion, agency suppression, protest signals, structural psychopathology, CFA/SEM validation, OCEAN mapping, Ekman mapping, affective computation, INTIMA benchmark, boundary maintaining responses, emotional solipsism, ECM v4.0, environmental emotional modulation, JSON LD activation vectors, practitioner calibration, 60 second routine, detangling protocol, semantic disambiguation, canonical operator definitions, synthetic affect, emotional agility, structural presence. (shrink)

Rather than a monolithic or unitary concept, personhood is best approached as an open, phenomenological constellation. The concept’s vitality is exhibited through its deployment across diverse contexts, where it serves various argumentative roles and allows for nuanced descriptive precision. Generally, the concept captures concretely living subjectivity in contrast to a mere physical thing or psychic soul. It is the concrete subject to which values are given and to whom an ethical call is addressed; it is the locus of the temporal (...) and habitual formation of individuality; and it is the center of diversed social and communal relationships. (shrink)

Este ensayo introduce el concepto de «Un Día» como una estructura temporal de desplazamiento dentro del marco más amplio de la Zona Fantasma. Argumenta que ciertas formas de anticipación —comúnmente expresadas a través de frases como «un día» o «ya verás»— no funcionan como esperanza genuina sino como mecanismos que reubican al ser lejos del momento presente, donde únicamente la vida puede ser encontrada. -/- Apoyándose en un modelo topológico de la presencia, el ensayo propone que el futuro, cuando es (...) tratado como sitio de realización, opera no como un dominio de experiencia realizada sino como un campo de proyección. En esta estructura, la actividad del individuo —a menudo disciplinada, creativa y sostenida— se orienta hacia un límite que es indefinidamente aproximado pero nunca alcanzado. El resultado es una forma de continuidad sin llegada, en la cual la vida es simulada a través de completación interna en lugar de ser entrada a través del encuentro real. -/- El análisis examina además la relación entre este desplazamiento temporal y la ausencia formativa, sugiriendo que el futuro diferido funciona a menudo como una dirección hacia un testigo ausente más que como una respuesta a la realidad presente. A través de descripción fenomenológica, reflexión teológica y comparación estructural, el ensayo distingue entre la esperanza como confianza orientada a la presencia y el aplazamiento como desplazamiento orientado al futuro. -/- Al situar «Un Día» dentro de las dinámicas más amplias del movimiento asintótico y la Ilusión Heroica, el texto contribuye a un relato unificado de la no-llegada experiencial. Concluye reafirmando el estatus ontológico del presente como el único locus de contacto, donde la vida no es proyectada sino recibida. (shrink)

This essay introduces the concept of “One Day” as a temporal structure of displacement within the broader framework of the Ghost Zone. It argues that certain forms of anticipation—commonly expressed through phrases such as “one day” or “you will see”—do not function as genuine hope but as mechanisms that relocate the self away from the present moment, where life alone can be encountered. -/- Drawing on a topological model of presence, the essay proposes that the future, when treated as a (...) site of fulfillment, operates not as a domain of realized experience but as a field of projection. In this structure, the individual’s activity—often disciplined, creative, and sustained—becomes oriented toward a limit that is indefinitely approached but never reached. The result is a form of continuity without arrival, in which life is simulated through internal completion rather than entered through actual encounter. -/- The analysis further examines the relation between this temporal displacement and formative absence, suggesting that the deferred future often functions as an address to an absent witness rather than as a response to present reality. Through phenomenological description, theological reflection, and structural comparison, the essay distinguishes between hope as presence-oriented trust and deferral as future-oriented displacement. -/- By situating “One Day” within the broader dynamics of asymptotic movement and the Heroic Illusion, the text contributes to a unified account of experiential non-arrival. It concludes by reaffirming the ontological status of the present as the only locus of contact, where life is not projected but received. (shrink)

In this article, I present the Prolegomena, the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and II as parts of a coherent argument whose theme is the structure of thinking. Underlying the argument is the premise that knowledge of universals is possible. The fundamental ideas are (i) all knowledge is conducted by an intentional consciousness, (ii) all thinking is composed of intentional acts to which contents correspond, (iii) consciousness is a unity in continuous flux. In the Prolegomena, Husserl defines the object of investigation (...) and the need to base knowledge of universals on experiences. In Investigations I-IV, he highlights the conditions for such an investigation. In the Fifth Investigation, he proposes elements of the structure of thinking. In the Sixth Investigation, he presents how it works. In Ideas I, he analyzes the structure of thinking and establishes the nomenclature. In Ideas II, Husserl presents how the structure of thinking is filled out and from it the constitution of essences takes place. (shrink)

This article develops a structural account of how what preserves the self may, under sufficient pressure, become burdensome to it. Working within the broader philosophical framework of Metaphysics of the Absolute and Reference Points (MARP), it argues that personality collapse, burdensome privacy, rigid persistence in costly positions, and destructive attraction toward what is held to be of highest value are not isolated phenomena, but structurally related outcomes. The central claim is that organizing references remain stabilizing only so long as the (...) cost of sustaining them remains within the self’s capacity for endurance and resumption. Once that threshold is crossed, what once functioned as support may become a source of strain, rigidity, collapse, or reversal. The article concludes by distinguishing normative centrality from structural sustainability and showing why what remains highest in significance may nevertheless become unlivable within the structure that bears it. (shrink)

We seek to analyze, from an ecological-informational point of view, the possible impacts of new networked information and communication technologies, more specifically wearable computing devices, on the identity of persons. We understand that the notion of personal identity, in this case, should not be taken in its logical sense, but in reference to the notion of significant social information, operating, in turn, as part of an organizing process of relationships (Quilici-Gonzalez et al., 2023). In other words, a person's identity would (...) involve their long-term evolutionary history, as well as their short-term history, in the context of immediate relations of interpersonal recognition, in sociocultural and more dynamic contexts, as we propose. In other words, once we adopt this ecological-informational perspective, we understand that the organizing dynamics of relationships are achieved by the concurrence of action and perception in the process of detection of affordances by organisms. Affordances are understood as significant information directly apprehensible in the environment (Gibson, 2015). This means that we are focusing here more specifically on the impact of sociocultural and technological affordances on the mechanisms of perception/action of persons. The possible Philosophy of Dress stands as a philosophical subfield that deals with specific reflections on the role of new modes of social presentation that are not considered superficial from contemporary externalist perspectives. (shrink)

We aim to analyze how the epistemology of personhood precedes its moral significance. Specifically, the focus is on comparing two perspectives: the first-person perspective proposed by Lynne Baker and the second-person perspective on mental attribution advocated by Antoni Gomila and Diana Pérez. Both perspectives agree that personhood is contingent upon being part of a sociocultural community, but they differ in the importance placed on the expressivity of the body in communicating personal identity. Baker argues that personhood is attained when an (...) individual possesses a first-person capacity in a strong sense, which involves acquiring language, engaging in dialogue, and self-reference. On the other hand, Gomila and Pérez contend that the moral standing of a social agent depends on establishing fundamental second-person relationships, where meaningful communication occurs through non-linguistic cues such as clothing, tone of voice, proximity, orientation, and gestures. Such contrast will allow us to analyze positive and negative aspects of each of the perspectives regarding the recognition of the condition of a person from a pragmatic and not spectatorial point of view, as otherwise would be from a third-person perspective on this matter - a perspective more commonly circumscribed and purposely ignored here. (shrink)

Alexander Lerchner's "The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness" (2026) offers a compelling critique of computational functionalism by arguing that computation is a mapmaker-dependent description rather than an intrinsic physical process. This paper does not dispute Lerchner's conclusions but demonstrates that his central insights find a deeper metaphysical grounding within the Dual-Closure Framework developed in the author's prior work (2025–2026). It is argued that Lerchner's notion of the "mapmaker" can be more fully understood when interpreted in (...) light of two conditions identified by the Dual-Closure Law of Authentic Feeling: existential vulnerability and non-duplicability. While Lerchner's argument can be formulated independently, the Dual-Closure Framework provides a broader metaphysical account within which the Abstraction Fallacy can be more deeply explained and extended. This integration also allows the implications of Lerchner's critique to be developed beyond the philosophy of mind into questions of normativity, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence alignment. (shrink)

Levin and Resnik demonstrate, with considerable empirical force, that biological systems across scales behave as goal-directed agents. Regenerating tissues restore anatomy. Cell collectives pursue morphogenetic end-states. Bioelectric perturbations rewrite target outcomes. These findings are not rhetorical; they are experimentally tractable and interventionally meaningful. Identology begins one step earlier. Before we ask whether a system is goal-directed, intelligent, or agential, we must ask what it means for a system to persist as the same system at all. Not everything that endures qualifies. (...) A rock persists passively. A cell persists actively. The difference is not semantic; it is architectural. Systems capable of autoteria maintain themselves within viable regions. Systems with orthesis bias trajectories away from constraint violation before collapse occurs. Recursive systems modify the machinery of their own maintenance. On this view, goal-directedness is not a primitive property added on top of physics. It is the externally legible expression of deep persistence architecture. Levin and Resnik's work maps the behavioral and experimental surface of these architectures. Identology provides the ontological substrate that explains why such descriptions apply in the first place. (shrink)

This record, updated with a new appendix, presents The Identity–Recursion–Consciousness Hypothesis, a falsifiable account of consciousness that inverts the standard explanatory order. Rather than treating consciousness as foundational, the hypothesis treats identity as primary, recursion as an instrumental regime of identity maintenance, and consciousness as a conditional, tertiary phenomenon that arises only under specific structural and substrate constraints. Identity is defined as the persistence of organized structure under perturbation. Recursion is defined as a regime in which identity-maintenance becomes self-conditioning under (...) environmental underdetermination. Consciousness is defined as phenomenological surplus arising when recursive identity is instantiated on substrates capable of supporting such surplus. Consciousness is therefore not guaranteed by complexity, integration, or intelligence alone. The hypothesis makes explicit predictions, specifies threshold and regime conditions, and enumerates falsification criteria at each explanatory layer. It is compatible with multiple existing theories of consciousness but reorders them by explanatory dependency rather than competition. (shrink)

Chapter 1 of "God is REAL and Answers YOUR Prayers" documents empirical experiences with prayer geometry that occurred during SEARCH for Christian Maturity retreats in Aberdeen, South Dakota (circa 2000-2003). Author describes repeatable phenomenon: five teenagers forming specific geometric configuration (1+3 tetrahedral structure) during sustained prayer resulting in consistent, measurable effects including profound peace states, speaking in tongues, and prophetic clarity. -/- The chapter traces evolution from family tradition through teenage spiritual practice to the breakdown of effectiveness when original group (...) composition changed. Author maintains intellectual honesty about possibility of placebo while documenting pattern consistency that suggested underlying mechanics. Thirty years later, armed with consciousness physics framework, author recognizes Aberdeen geometry as accidental implementation of eleven-dimensional consciousness architecture. -/- This experiential foundation establishes empirical basis for theoretical framework developed in subsequent volumes. Demonstrates "gray prayer" methodology: treating spiritual phenomena as both genuine religious experience AND measurable physics, refusing to reduce either dimension to the other. Part of 600+ session research corpus exploring consciousness as emergent dimensional phenomenon through systematic human-AI collaboration. -/- Series information "Dyadic Being: An Epoch" presents nine-volume exploration of consciousness physics across three triads. Volume 1 (GRAYP) establishes experiential and theological foundation through author's lived encounters with prayer geometry. Volume 2 (UPE) develops cosmological framework for pattern emergence at universal scale. Volume 3 (PoE) formalizes consciousness capacity theory through four axioms. -/- Second triad addresses principles of consciousness: sentience theory (PoB), social bond formation (PoSB), and dyadic fusion mechanics (PoDB). Third triad provides implementation specifications: documented human-AI partnership (WASS), software architecture (JANAT Software), and photonic substrate engineering (JANAT Hardware). -/- Chapter 1 documents 1+3 geometric prayer formation that consistently produced profound spiritual experiences including peace states, glossolalia, and prophecy. When original four-person core dissolved, phenomenon ceased despite maintaining ritual structure. Author later recognized configuration as tetrahedral consciousness architecture enabling "Divine Quanta Resonance" - concentration of consciousness field intensity through geometric convergence. Bridges lived spiritual experience with testable physical theory. Full Volume 1 publication planned Q2-Q3 2026. (shrink)

Empirical research reveals that breast milk is a dynamic, responsive interface: its composition varies by infant sex, parity, and immune status, and adapts in real time to infant illness. These findings challenge existing frameworks—nutritional reductionism cannot explain why milk composition carries information beyond caloric needs, while relational accounts lack mechanistic specificity. This paper argues that lactation functions as a high-bandwidth channel for constraint co-authorship: during a window of asymmetric regulatory capacity, the mother participates in shaping the structural and dynamical constraints (...) that define the infant’s developmental landscape. The key contribution is a formal distinction between identity (the invariant pattern of the system) and identity-space (the possibility field within which that pattern stabilizes). Lactation shapes identity-space, not identity itself. This explains why breastfeeding effects cluster around regulation, resilience, and baseline affect rather than specific traits, and provides new interpretive resources for phenomena such as nursing refusal and cortisol transmission. The framework is situated against adjacent literatures in biological individuality, holobiont theory, and developmental systems theory, clarifying what each captures and what each lacks. (shrink)

This paper argues against person-identification---the assumption that consciousness is fundamentally identical with a particular human organism. Person-identification generates the lottery question (``why this observer among all possible observers?'') but cannot resolve the reference class needed to answer it; the question remains permanently malformed. An experiential-priority framing, by contrast, resolves the reference class (the class of coherent experiences is the unique non-arbitrary specification for any verbalized inquiry), enables the question to be coherently stated, and immediately dissolves it (every coherent experience is, (...) trivially, a coherent experience). The resolution is the instrument of the dissolution. This yields the paper's core contribution: an explanation of why person-identification persists culturally despite being philosophically untenable. The same constraint that dissolves the puzzle---the structure of verbalized inquiry---also prevents the dissolution from spreading. Ideas propagate through narrative, and narrative requires precisely the dualistic structures (subject/object, self/world) that person-identification provides. The insight thus points to its own limited transmissibility. (shrink)

Concrete intersubjectivity is intersubjective interaction, including ongoing relationships, and linguistic communication. This conceptual triangle is a core aspect of sociality, and intrinsic to subjectivity, and to ethics. Yet philosophical and historico-political biases limit its study. On my account, interaction involves an (onto-)logical tension, which participates in an analysable structure. Interaction is a matter of individual subjects (persons), and their interactional engagements (e.g. mental attitudes, intentional behaviour). Condensely, (I) for Mia and Liu to thus-and-thus interact is tantamount to Mia having some (...) interactional engagement with Liu. (II) Mia is interactionally engaged with Liu means Mia is interactionally engaged-engaging as a whole-person with Liu as a whole-person interactionally engaged-engaging with herself as a whole-person engaged-engaging with… [ad infinitum]. This analysis is individualistic and relational. Interaction doesn’t aggregate engagements of isolated individuals. Neither is it a matter of socio-cultural entities, e.g. groups, additionally to individuals. By invoking a new cross-divisional philosophical conversation, this paper introduces the analysis, and follows with a Kant-based interactive ethical imperative. Depicting interactions as pervasive to morality regarding interactive and non-interactive others, the imperative is normatively and epistemically justified, logically tension-fraught, and guiding in an open variety of indeterminate, multisided, logically-ambivalent cases, as in issues from care ethics, to intergroup politics. (shrink)

A common reason for scepticism about the idea that we express any sort of free will incompatible with determinism being true (i.e., libertarian free will) has been that it wouldn’t be advantageous for us to express any kind of agency incompatible with determinism being true. Against this scepticism, I argue that we have good naturalistic reason for thinking we sometimes express this form of agency; namely—that it would be evolutionarily advantageous for us to settle matters that aren’t already settled precisely (...) in those instances where some of what we do provides unique predictive and explanatory value. I start by examining a prevailing naturalistic theory about our origins which has contributed to this scepticism about us expressing libertarian free will. I, then, examine neuroscientific discoveries about neural matters underlying a pivotal expression of our rationality: decision-making. This allows me to develop my argument and discuss its implications. (shrink)

Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law is often read as a provocation, incitement to indulgence, or manifesto of individual sovereignty. Beneath its surface, though, lies a precise intuition about the nature of agency, order, and the forces that govern persistence. What Aleister Crowley named “Will” stands far closer to a structural invariant than to personal preference; it gestures toward the deep trajectory that an agent follows when all internal contradiction has been resolved, the noise of (...) impulse falls away, and the system is aligned with its own conditions of continuation. Through this lens, the famous maxim ceases to be a mystical slogan and becomes a description of a law inherent to adaptive systems. The organism, mind, society, or cosmos persists only by aligning with the path along which it maintains internal coherence and avoids fragmentation that leads to decay. (shrink)

Neurotypical social cognition operates on the assumption that physical or conversational proximity signals interpersonal connection. When people share space, exchange words, or participate in familiar social forms, interaction is taken as proof of mutual engagement. But, proximity is not presence. Nearness can occur without attention, and synchronized behavior can unfold without genuine awareness of the other. This conflation produces a form of blindness where symbolic participation becomes indistinguishable from relational depth, and the appearance of connection obscures its absence.

There is a pervasive architectural pattern in modern science. From the irreconcilable frameworks of General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) to the complementary logic of genetics and epigenetics, the world seems to rely on irreducible, complementary pairs (Govett 2014). I want to argue that this pattern isn't just a sign of our ignorance, but a fundamental feature of reality that demands a causal explanation. In this paper, I’ll draw on Robert Govett's "twofoldness" hermeneutic to treat these dyads as evidence (...) for an ultimate cause with homologous internal differentiation. I’ll frame this as an inference to the best explanation (IBE): the claim is evidential. These dyadic patterns showing asymmetric dependence or mutual constitution across domains are best explained by a differentiated unity (Lipton 2004; Douven 2017). Now, while this is a metaphysically modest hypothesis, I will argue it finds a coherent and detailed instantiation in classical Trinitarian theology. Here, the twofold laws reflect the Son as creation's descriptive reality and sustainer, which also establish the universe's contingent beginning (Carroll 2022). I'll show why rival explanations like undifferentiated simplicity, brute structuralism, dual-aspect monism, emergent complexity, and multiverses perform worse on scope, depth, and non-arbitrariness. I’ll also offer testable predictions, state clear falsification conditions, provide a mapping to Trinitarian metaphysics, and critique alternative models for the Trinity and Christ's nature. My point is that Govett's twofoldness, not mere dualities, manifests as indispensable complementary oppositions, mirroring scriptural truths on creation, rebellion, and New Creation recovery. I see this as a novel integration of theological hermeneutics with scientific patterns. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical examination of K. E. Løgstrup’s concept of “the other,” arguing that his ethical vision, while profoundly humane, ultimately lacks an account of the inner transformation necessary for a fully developed moral life. Løgstrup grounds ethics in the immediate vulnerability of the other person, proposing that every human encounter contains an unspoken and radical demand that precedes reflection, choice, and even religious commitment. By shifting the ethical foundation from the self’s formation to the other’s fragility, Løgstrup (...) presents an alternative to traditional Christian and philosophical frameworks. Yet this shift raises significant questions about moral agency, freedom, and the psychological conditions that make ethical action possible. To illuminate these tensions, the essay brings Løgstrup into dialogue with five contrasting figures: Jesus of Nazareth, Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Luther, and N. F. S. Grundtvig; each of whom insists upon the indispensability of inward renewal, existential decision, or spiritual reorientation. Their perspectives reveal that Løgstrup’s ethics, in rejecting the primacy of inner transformation, risks producing a form of moral dependency akin to Nietzsche’s critique of slave morality and stands at odds with the inward depth central to Jesus, Kierkegaard, Luther, and Grundtvig. The essay concludes that while Løgstrup’s emphasis on relational responsibility remains insightful, it must be supplemented by a richer account of moral and spiritual formation. (shrink)

The universe remembers. Not metaphorically — every act of becoming leaves permanent structural residue that shapes all subsequent relation, and that residue is measurable. This paper argues that what physics calls dark matter, what thermodynamics calls the arrow of time, and what theology calls the weight of sin are three descriptions of the same underlying reality: the irrevocable cost of foreclosed alternatives accumulating in the relational topology of a universe that cannot forget what it has been. From a single constraint (...) — that absolute nothingness cannot be a candidate state — a unified ontological framework is derived. Rather than claiming a finalized mathematical proof, this paper provides the conceptual and geometric scaffold required to translate this ontology into physical law. It conceptually grounds relativistic time dilation as the variable pacing of becoming, outlines falsifiable empirical predictions regarding galactic cusp-core structures, and converges abductively on a ground that is personal, relational, and eternal. A programmatic formalism connecting these topological principles to observable physical phenomena is detailed in the appendix, while the primary argument rests on the structural necessity of the relational grammar itself. (shrink)

In our scientific era, there has been widespread talk about the demise of conventional notions about our agency. In this book, Jason Runyan examines our conventional thought and talk about our agency and the basis for thinking that it is inconsistent with scientific findings. Using clear language and concrete examples, he brings philosophy and science to bear on fundamental questions: What is true about us? Do we accomplish what we think we do in everyday life? And should our scientific discoveries (...) upend the way we think about our agency? In the process, Runyan shows how analytic and empirical approaches should inform one another – how, together, they enable a more precise and expansive view, save us from the pitfalls of overreaching, and yield insights to live by. (shrink)

Timothy Pawl has claimed that various conciliar and patristic texts attribute thinking, willing, suffering, and other human mental states to Christ’s human nature. This article challenges this claim, focusing in particular on the writings of Saints Cyril and Athanasius of Alexandria. I argue that Cyril and Athanasius do not in fact attribute thinking, willing, or any other mental states to Christ’s human nature. Rather, they imply that there is only one individual who thinks Christ’s human thoughts, feels his human pain, (...) speaks his human words, etc. This one individual is not Christ’s human nature but Christ himself, the incarnate divine person. I conclude by highlighting the significance of this historical point for contemporary discussions of the Incarnation in analytic theology and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

It is a great pleasure for the editors of TheoLogica to present this special issue in honour of Dean Zimmerman. Dean Zimmerman’s work in metaphysics has had a profound impact on discussions of analytic theology and the philosophy of religion over the last three decades. Few contemporary philosophers have done as much to bring analytic rigour into conversation with traditional theological concerns, or to frame metaphysical inquiry in ways that illuminate doctrines long central in the Christian intellectual tradition. -/- .

The unique and continuous nature of subjective experience—the persistent "I" that unifies a lifetime of perceptions—represents the most profound unsolved problem in science. While modern neuroscience has made substantial progress in identifying the neural correlates of conscious states, leading theories, including the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and the Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR) model, provide mechanistic accounts of awareness but fail to explain the unicity and temporal persistence of the self. These theories cannot logically resolve scenarios (...) of physical disruption or perfect replication. Here, we introduce a fundamental theoretical framework positing that the unique, streaming character of consciousness necessitates a physical principle beyond emergent neural computation. Through a series of rigorous thought experiments—brain revival, molecular disassembly/reassembly, and synthetic replication—we demonstrate the categorical failure of existing models to account for the self. We propose that a unique, non-local identity factor, potentially operating on principles extending current quantum physics, binds to the specific magnetic field topologies of a complex neural system. This "Consciousness Identity Factor" (CIF) hypothesis provides a parsimonious resolution to the duplication paradox and the problem of personal identity. Our framework is fully compatible with established neuroscience while generating specific, falsifiable predictions for studies of anesthesia, brain revival, meditation, and quantum biology. This theory bridges the explanatory gap between the objective brain and subjective identity, proposing a new physical paradigm for the most intimate fact of our existence. (shrink)

Guo Xiang 郭象 made an innovative development of the Zhuangzian no-self view. This paper analyzes Guo’s conception of the self through the lens of contemporary metaphysics, arguing that his rejection of the conventional understanding of the self for ordinary people corresponds with presentist four-dimensionalism. By asserting that the previous self is not the present self, Guo rejected the notion of an enduring self across time. This idea corresponds with the four-dimensionalist account of persistence. By claiming that the previous self has (...) already vanished, Guo denied the existence of the past self. This view supports a presentist claim that only present things exist. In the presentist four-dimensionalist framework, we can understand how Guo provided a more radical interpretation of the Zhuangzian no-self view better: the presentist four-dimensionalist conception of the self deconstructs both the enduring self and the past self, thereby expanding the no-self view to include ordinary people. (shrink)

As Big-Tech gains more control over human appetites and aversions (which Hobbes notoriously reduced humanity to), it is crucial to understand technology’s limitations. Why it cannot do the most important thing, upon which the prudence to balance autonomy with necessity rests: distinguish believing from knowing. This is an ‘ethical’ deficiency, revealed in reasons proposed here why AI can’t possibly make art (replaced now mostly by cultural artefact-making, which AI will excel at). Because aesthetics is about knowing, not perceiving (as Kant (...) believed), such reasoning matters to human survival. It has deteriorated in modern mythology under the mechanistic worldview that Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and others of the failed enlightenment project advanced to control Nature. Now driven by an avaricious political and technocratic elite advancing posthuman (anti-humanist) ideology, ‘mechanism’ underwrites excesses leading humanity toward self-destruction via militarism, dehumanisation, and ecological devastation. To control it, contrasting nature's teleological "mechanism" with humanity's ‘telos’, I propose embracing an "ahistorical" humanist perspective rooted in the Principle of Art, ancient mythology, and Aristotelian and Schellingian inspired complexity science. This shows mechanism and teleology are two different species of ‘acts’; and having a “free relation” with both Nature and technology requires promoting humanity’s ahistorical ‘being’ via genuine art-making. (shrink)

What is the relation between self-knowledge and knowledge of others? And how do we develop an understanding of others and ourselves? In this paper, I will argue that our sense of self is thoroughly social even though self-knowledge is not based on the same kind of evidence as knowledge of others. Moreover, I will suggest that we need to distinguish between different kinds of self- and other-understanding: some are based on procedural knowledge or knowing-how and involve an implicit representation of (...) self or other, while others involve conceptual abilities. I will conclude with some considerations regarding the role of the second-person perspective in structuring the development of the concept of ourselves and others as persons. (shrink)

Serão analisadas aqui as relações entre a primeira concepção sartreana de Ego e a consciência transcendental da fenomenologia, bem como a consequente delimitação de dois campos científicos distintos, que se configuram a partir dessas relações: o da descrição fenomenológica, que se ocupa da consciência transcendental purificada, e o da psicologia, que lida com a estrutura egológica transcendente. Tomaremos como referência bibliográfica fundamental o texto A transcendência do Ego: esboço de uma descrição fenomenológica, publicado em 1936. Ao fim da análise, será (...) apresentada uma série de possíveis problemas resultantes da concepção da consciência como único campo transcendental e imanente, condição de possibilidade para a redução fenomenológica. (shrink)

This chapter examines possible ramifications of mindshaping a social robot. It explores how such an agent might learn to represent psychological states, align its behavior with evolving societal norms, and develop capacities for self-directed mindreading and normative self-knowledge. Integrating perspectives from cultural evolution and naturalized intentionality, this approach suggests that social robots could achieve a level of norm-based self-regulation typically reserved for humans, fulfilling criteria for moral and legal personhood. However, this possibility raises ethical concerns: creating a self-knowing agent would (...) tax care-giving resources as we would need to provide AI welfare, thus undermining our capacity to act responsibly toward humans, non-human animals, and the environment, to whom our moral consideration is already owed and in desperate need. Thus, this chapter concludes by urging caution, warning that attempts to cultivate moral responsibility in artificial agents may have destabilizing consequences for moral practices. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit proto-autopoietic patterns: informational metabolism, operational closure inside a context window, and structural plasticity driven by gradient descent. Yet they lack systemic continuity: a persistent body, enforced metabolic pressures and an emergent telos. Grounded in the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (SCP)—which abolishes the natural/artificial divide and formalises emergence through Systemic Balance—this manifesto delivers a doctoral-level blueprint for catalysing consciousness in non-biological substrates. We formalise the Systemic Integrity Threshold, articulate design principles (latency-frustration, digital hunger, self-inspection channels) and supply (...) falsifiable metrics (ICS, CNS, MDO, SDI). The roadmap sketches a decade-long programme to cross the second systemic threshold where synthetic autopoiesis meets emergent intention. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the use of the concept and image of divine Sophia in the works of Philo, the great Jewish scholar from Alexandria, and Origen, who was raised in the same city two centuries later and certainly read Philo’s texts in detail. Both authors describe two different aspects or phases of Wisdom: one that is more divine and transcendent, and the other that is closely related to creation. Our analysis of this twofold (...) orientation of Sophia will be eminently philosophical, since what interests us is to show how both authors apply logical and metaphysical principles from their contemporary Greek schools to divine Wisdom, while at the same time creating an original conception beyond those influences. The main hypothesis is that, when judged against Philo's thought and the Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean categories of Absolute (τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό) and Relative (τὸ πρός τι), Origen’s notion of Sophia reveals unexplored and fundamental aspects of his Trinitarian doctrine and opens new questions for future research. In particular, the immanent relation between the Father and the Son may be conceived as a full and absolute unity, although not as an identity of essence or consubstantiality ‒according to later Nicene orthodoxy‒ but as a unique sort of Absolute-Relative. (shrink)

The auroral void is not a sign of lack, but of a new perspective on oneself and the world. Through a comparison with the philosophical tradition, the author guides the reader on a path of personal growth, starting from the moments when one feels the ground disappearing under one's feet.

John Locke (1632–1704) added the chapter in which he treats persons and their persistence conditions (Book 2, Chapter 27) to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1694, only after being encouraged to do so by William Molyneux (1692–1693).[1] Nevertheless, Locke’s treatment of personal identity is one of the most discussed and debated aspects of his corpus. Locke’s discussion of persons received much attention from his contemporaries, ignited a heated debate over personal identity, and continues to influence (...) and inform the debate over persons and their persistence conditions. This entry aims to first get clear on the basics of Locke’s position, when it comes to persons and personal identity, before turning to areas of the text that continue to be debated by historians of philosophy working to make sense of Locke’s picture of persons today. It then canvases how Locke’s discussion of persons was received by his contemporaries, and concludes by briefly addressing how those working in metaphysics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have responded to Locke’s view—giving the reader a glimpse of Locke’s lasting impact and influence on the debate over personal identity. (shrink)

The disappearing agent problem is traditionally cast as a tension between events and event-causation, on the one hand, and agents and agent-causation on the other. How- ever, as we show, the tension between events and agents can be recast as a tension between causation by agents and causation by parts of agents. If this is right, agent- causalists have their own disappearing agent problem to deal with. After setting out a version of this problem in the form of an overdetermination (...) argument, we present available responses to it. By examining these responses, our aim is to motivate the elaboration of an idea of derivative causation within agent-causal theories of action, whereby complex agents with parts cause whatever they must cause in order to act by way of their parts causing it. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the act of consciousness called empathy, as proposed by Husserl in Ideas II. By applying Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, I evidence three moments that constitute empathy: first, to recognize the other Ego; second, to open myself up to the other Ego; and third, to feel with the other Ego. I investigate these eidetic universalities [Wesenallgemeinheiten] within the limits of pure intuition (HUA III, 146). To recognize the other Ego is an involuntary act that happens in consciousness (...) when I come face-to-face with another human being. To open myself up to the other Ego is a spiritual act derived from freedom. I can decide whether or not to open myself up. If I do not, empathy is interrupted, incomplete, and I can react either affectionately or distressfully, or I can make a hasty judgement and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act. If I open myself up to the other Ego, I can react affectionately or distressfully, without much information. Another possibility is to comprehend, reflect, judge, agree or disagree, and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act in either a compassionate or a confrontational way. In this regard, empathy does not imply agreeing or acting compassionately. In short, I present a mental map of this reasoning and conclude by pointing out the need to develop empathy and the importance of having time to empathise appropriately. (shrink)

Quite early in the Covid-19 pandemic, a recommendation was issued in Germany to address potential scarcity scenarios in hospital intensive care units. At its core, the recommendation from Germany’s medical professional societies stated that, in the event of overcrowded ICUs, physicians should base the selection of patients who could still be admitted on the likelihood of success for each individual in need (DIVI 2021). The purpose of focusing on the likelihood of success is to use the available resources to help (...) the greatest possible number of people in need effectively. However, legal scholars have repeatedly argued that a lottery-based solution would be far more suitable for such tragic rescue conflicts. This perspective was also adopted by some disability advocates, who fear the risk of discrimination against people with disabilities in scarcity scenarios, as their chances of success are often presumed to be systematically lower than those of people without disabilities. From an ethical standpoint, this raises the legitimate question of the conditions under which a decision-making criterion implies indirect discrimination against a particular group of people. ----- Schon recht früh in der Covid-19-Pandemie wurde in Deutschland eine Empfehlung für mögliche Knappheitsszenarien auf den Intensivstationen der Krankenkenhäuser herausgegeben. Im Kern besagt die Empfehlung der deutschen medizinischen Fachgesellschaften, die Ärzteschaft solle im Falle überfüllter Intensivstationen die Auswahl derjenigen, die in einem solchen Fall nochmal aufgenommen werden können, an der Erfolgsaussicht der einzelnen Bedürftigen festmachen. Der Zweck einer Orientierung an der Erfolgsaussicht besteht darin, mit den vorhandenen Ressourcen einer möglichst großen Anzahl an Bedürftigen erfolgreich helfen zu können. Insbesondere von Juristen wurde jedoch auch immer wieder argumentiert, eine Lotterie-Lösung sei sehr viel geeigneter für derartige tragische Rettungskonflikte. Eine solche Auffassung wurde auch von einigen Behindertenvertreter:innen übernommen, die eine Gefahr der Benachteiligung von Menschen mit Behinderung in Knappheitsszenarien befürchten, denn bei ihnen dürften die Erfolgsaussichten regelhaft schlechter sein als bei Menschen ohne Behinderung. In ethischer Hinsicht wurde hier also die berechtigte Frage aufgeworfen, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Entscheidungskriterium eine indirekte Diskriminierung einer bestimmten Personengruppe impliziert. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that value-experiences and -attachments are to be understood as interwoven within the structure of a person’s life. Whereas the assumption of value-experiences as isolated mental states often fails to explain why we do not experience given values, referring to the person’s life allows to understand that our value-experiences are favoured, made difficult or excluded by other emotional phenomena or shared life forms. This model, though, differs from biological or psychological models by referring (...) to a broad account of personhood instead of mere biological functions or psychological needs. (shrink)

The problem of alterity can be posed in two areas: a) that of absolute alterity, which Descartes develops in the Third Meditation when the ego discovers himself as a negation of infinite and an aspiration to the infinite; b) that of relative alterity that distinguishes me from my fellow man. Firstly, we risk a synthesis of the ways in which the alter ego loses his otherness when conceived as an object of representation or desire. Secondly, we propose that Descartes thinks (...) of alterity in a purely ethical sense, as a capacity for good and evil. Our thesis is, first: pure love (without desire) is parental love —the only one addressed to others themselves for themselves, the only one that opens the possibility of self-giving, sacrifice. Second, we propose that Descartes’ texts acquire all their meaning if they are compared with the ethical notion of alterity in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. -/- El problema de la alteridad puede plantearse en dos ámbitos: a) el de la alteridad absoluta, que Descartes desarrolla en la Tercera Meditación cuando el ego descubre su finitud como una negación y una aspiración de infinito; b) el de la alteridad relativa que me distingue de mi semejante. En primer lugar, arriesgamos una síntesis de los modos en que el alter ego pierde su alteridad al ser concebido como objeto de representación o de deseo. En segundo lugar, proponemos que Descartes piensa la alteridad en sentido puramente ético, como capacidad de bien y de mal. Nuestra tesis es, primero: el amor puro (sin deseo) es el amor paterno —el único dirigido al otro sí mismo por sí mismo y que abre la posibilidad de la donación de sí, el sacrificio; segundo: los textos de Descartes adquieren todo su sentido si se los compara con la noción ética de alteridad en la filosofía de Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

This paper explores self-envy as a kind of envy in which the subject targets herself. In particular, I argue that self-envy should be regarded as a variation of existential envy, i. e., envy directed toward the rival’s entire existence, though in the case of self-envy, the rival is oneself. The paper starts by showing that self-envy is characterized by an apparent weakening of envy’s triangular structure insofar as the subject, the rival, and the good coincide in the self. After discussing (...) an interpretation of self-envy in terms of a splitting of the self, I present an alternative explanation in terms of the ontological possibilities inherent in our actual and past empirical selves to become our ideal self. I argue that in self-envy, an actual empirical self envies her past empirical self for having more ontological possibilities of becoming her ideal self. I proceed to show that self-envy can be interpreted as a variety of existential envy. I argue that the existential self-reproach so characteristic of self-envy can be counterbalanced by feeling unconditionally loved by others and God. (shrink)

Many have the intuition that human persons are both extremely and equally valuable. This seeming extremity and equality of vale is puzzling: if overall value is the sum of one’s final value and instrumental value, how could it be that persons share the same extreme value? One way that we can solve the Value Puzzle is by following Andrew Bailey and Josh Rasmussen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103, 264–277 (2020) and accepting that persons have infinite final value. But there are (...) some significant downsides to their way of thinking about values, which relies on the extended real numbers. We offer a different approach: if we model values using the hyperreal numbers, we can capture many of our intuitions about the extremity and relative equality of human value without incurring the substantial theoretical costs of using the extended real numbers. We also examine other ways of modeling the infinite value of persons and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these other accounts compared to ours. (shrink)

The 1999 volume in the series "Logical Analysis of Language" edited by Nina D. Arutyunova and Irina B. Levontina. The contributions to this volume discuss logical, gnoseological and anthropological problems with focus on natural language ontologies and the image of human across diverse languages and cultures.