Parenthood

Surrogacy and uterus transplantation (UTx) are current forms of assisted gestation. Support for UTx is often grounded on the basis that it would ethically and legally mitigate the moral issues associated with surrogacy. In this article, I problematize this narrative by highlighting the perspective of third parties to assisted gestation through the topics of incentivization and compensation. I demonstrate that the ethical, legal, and social idiosyncrasies associated with each technique make it the case that UTx does not easily resolve the (...) shortcomings of surrogacy – and vice versa. (shrink)

Confucian ethics fundamentally rejects the notion of individual physical immortality, grounded in its intrinsic generative cosmology of“shengsheng”(continuous generation and renewal) and the temporal structure of filial piety. Familial emotions, such as the“joy”and“fear”concerning parental years, along with the consciousness of filial piety, both originate from the experience of life’s finitude and the limited horizon of inner time−consciousness. Physical immortality, by contrast, would result in the rigidification of family roles, the dissolution of ethical authority, and paradoxes in the practice of filial care, (...) thereby undermining the ethical order of generational succession. The Confucian concept of“longevity”(shou) aims at fulfilling one’s allotted natural lifespan and integrating into the flow of“shengsheng”, which differs essentially from the pursuit of physical immortality that seeks to transcend natural rhythms. Confucian efforts to attain“longevity”seek to preserve the intergenerational continuity and ethical significance of life, rather than the infinite persistence of the individual. -/- 儒家伦理以内在的“生生”宇宙观为根基，其孝道的时间性结构决定了它在根本上拒斥个 体身体不朽的构想。家庭情感，如对父母之年的“喜”与“惧”，以及孝道意识，均源于生命有 限性的体验与内时间意识的有限视域。身体不朽则会导致家庭角色固化、伦理权威消解以及行孝 实践的悖论，从而瓦解代际更替的伦理秩序。儒家“寿”的概念以尽天年为旨归，融入“生生” 之流，与试图超越自然节律的身体不朽存在本质差异；其对“寿”的追求旨在维护生命的代际连 续性与伦理意义，而非个体的无限持存。. (shrink)

This paper presents the first structural constructivist model of parenting grounded in the Core Emotion Framework (CEF), offering a mechanistic account of how caregivers regulate attunement, boundaries, and developmental vision through ten functional emotional operators. As the document states, caregiving is best understood as “an active, self regulating feedback system governed by the foundational polarity of self assertion (Agency) and connection (Yielding).” By mapping parental behavior onto the Head (Sensing–Calculating–Deciding), Heart (Expanding–Constricting–Achieving), and Gut (Arranging–Appreciating–Boosting) centers, the model reveals how real (...) time operator sequencing shapes child co regulation, emotional safety, and long term developmental scaffolding. The paper further demonstrates how pathological fusions—such as Sensing–Calculating hypervigilance—disrupt parental flexibility, producing instability in the caregiver child affective loop. A mathematical formulation using coupled state vectors and cross individual influence matrices formalizes the dynamics of family co regulation, while the Detangling Protocol provides a clinically actionable method for restoring operator independence. As summarized in the text, “Accepting represents the capacity to accept the child exactly how they are,” functioning as the global baseline that recalibrates the entire system. Together, these contributions establish a unified computational, somatic, and clinical architecture for understanding and improving parental emotional agility. Keywords: Core Emotion Framework (CEF); parental attunement; boundary regulation; emotional operators; Head Heart Gut somatic centers; developmental vision; co regulation dynamics; operator fusion; Detangling Protocol; somatic choreography; Sensing–Calculating loop; authoritative parenting architecture; structural constructivist affective modeling; family systems computation; Accepting baseline integration. (shrink)

On Growing is a lyric-philosophical essay on parenthood, the perceptual inheritance of childhood, and the parent's vocation as cultivation rather than control. It begins from the claim that children arrive perceiving the world "the way it was meant to be seen," and that maturation is less an acquisition than a slow forgetting — a loss it sets in dialogue with Wordsworth's Intimations ode, Rousseau's conviction that the soul is sound as it leaves its maker's hands, Blake's cleansed "doors of perception," (...) and Jung's account of the unlived life of the parent descending onto the child. Against this, the essay reframes the parent as gardener and as bow — drawing on Gibran's image of children as living arrows and on the recurrence of the parent-and-child across art history (Cassatt; the Madonna-and-child tradition) — to argue that an aligned parental life leaves legible, durable traces through time. The piece situates this within the author's "jays" framework and continues the series' use of the "quantum lens," treating maturity as a state superpositioned over a child's original clarity. It closes as a dedication to the author's two children. (shrink)

This paper (in Chinese) is focusing on Zhang Xianglong’s temporal interpretation of filial piety. Zhang Xianglong argues that parental love is necessary for filial consciousness, emerging from a temporal reversal when children become parents. This paper challenges that claim using counterexamples (parental absence, abuse, adoption, childlessness), showing filial consciousness can arise without receiving or giving parental love. While affirming the inner time consciousness framework, it proposes a revised view: filial consciousness is rooted in past-present-future intertwining but can be activated by (...) blood-related “Jemeinigkeit” or existential empathy with parents’ struggles. -/- 张祥龙先⽣融合胡塞尔与海德格尔的现象学时间性理论，提出了孝意识⽣成的内时间意识阐释，其核⼼论断为：⽗⺟之慈是孝意识产⽣的必要条件。该阐释强调，⽗⺟慈爱蕴含过去-现在-未来的统⼀时间性体验，⽽当⼦女为⼈ ⽗⺟施予慈爱时，会触发时间性“反转”(Kehre)，使其回溯理解⽗⺟艰辛，从⽽⽣发孝⼼。本⽂旨在重思张祥龙先⽣“慈为孝之必要条件”这⼀核⼼观点。通过分析⽗⺟缺位、亲⼦虐待（如舜之案例）、弃⼉收养、无后 （丁克）等实践反例，本⽂论证：孝意识之产⽣可独立于接受或施予⽗⺟之慈。本⽂在肯定内时间意识理论价值的同时，主张其解释⼒不应囿于⽣育⾏为或慈爱经验。本⽂尝试提出⼀种修正性现象学阐释：孝意识虽植根于内时间 意识结构（过去-现在-未来的交织），但其激活机制或具多元性，既可源于⾎缘“向来我属”(Jemeinigkeit)的⽣存论指引，亦可⽣于相似⼈⽣困境中对⽗⺟处境的⽣存论共情。此模型或可回应张祥龙先⽣阐释 遇到之挑战，亦为理解现代多元家庭结构中的孝道实践提供⼀种哲学思考维度。. (shrink)

The relationship between parents and children is often framed through moral structures of duty, sacrifice, and indebtedness. This paper challenges such interpretations by examining the relationship as an expression of existence rather than a transactional or hierarchical bond. It argues that while the idea of debt is a psychological and social construct, the connection of love remains an undeniable existential fact. By dissolving imposed meanings, this inquiry seeks to uncover a form of relationship rooted in freedom rather than obligation.

This paper examines the long-term psychological and ethical dimensions of parenthood through the lens of responsibility, autonomy, and intergenerational conflict. It argues that resentment between parents and children often emerges not from material failure but from unconscious emotional conditioning, suppressed identity formation, and unexamined expectations embedded within family structures. During childhood, responsibility rests primarily with parents, who shape the emotional and cognitive framework of the developing individual. However, adulthood requires a transfer of responsibility to the individual, a transition that frequently (...) fails due to unresolved psychological dependency and control. The paper further explores how suppressed anger and depression during adolescence—often culturally silenced in the name of obedience—can later manifest as blame and estrangement. By reframing parenthood as an ethical and conscious act rather than a purely biological or social function, this work proposes that the central question is not whether to have children, but at what level of psychological maturity and consciousness life should be brought into existence. (shrink)

Parenthood is commonly regarded as a biological inevitability, a social expectation, or a personal milestone. However, reproduction, though natural, does not automatically justify conscious parenthood. This paper advances a philosophical argument for the ethical reform of parenthood. It contends that before choosing to bring new life into the world, individuals must move beyond mere economic survival and psychological instability toward inner maturity, emotional responsibility, and existential awareness. To “live fully” is not indulgence but preparedness—the cultivated capacity to experience love deeply, (...) provide mental peace, and nurture a child without expectation, comparison, or projection. Parenthood is not simply a biological act; it is an ethical creation of future consciousness. The paper calls for a cultural and philosophical shift that reframes reproduction as moral responsibility rather than automatic continuation. (shrink)

This book examines the ethical issues surrounding assisted reproductive technologies and queer family-making practices. By focusing on LGBTQ+ people and experiences in relation to procreative ethics, this book challenges dominant approaches and views in philosophical bioethics. -/- In Part 1 of this book, the author introduces the idea of queer epistemic privilege regarding issues of family and reproduction and applies this notion to the bioethical debates around donor conception. In Part 2, the author problematizes the typical philosophical conception of the (...) debate over donor anonymity by centering queer perspectives and experiences. Drawing on social science research, she makes the case for “queer difference” in how donor conception is practiced and then employs this notion to show why the dominant ethical views opposing donor anonymity fail. Whereas most scholars view this issue as an issue of pure procreative/parental ethics, this book instead employs a queer perspective to draw out an alternative framing of the conflict—one between procreative/parental ethics and the moral responsibility to resist unjust social systems and norms, e.g. bionormativity. This broader framing offers a limited defense of some uses of anonymous donor gametes that is tied directly to the nature of ongoing LGBTQ+ family marginalization. Finally, in Part 3, the author draws attention to two aspects of donor conception that are common in the queer community but receive virtually no attention in the bioethical literature—known donation and donor sibling contact/relationships—and shows what we miss philosophically when these queer practices are erased from the bioethical discussions around donor conception. -/- LGBTQ+ Family-Making, Reproductive Ethics, and the (Re)Shaping of Family Values is an essential resource for researchers or advanced students working in Moral Philosophy—especially Reproductive Ethics, Feminist Philosophy, and LGBTQ+ Philosophy—Bioethics, and Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies. (shrink)

abstract This essay considers the moral status of certain practices that aim to enhance offspring traits. I develop an objection to offspring enhancement that draws on an account of the role morality of parents. I work out an account of parental ethics by reference to premises about child development and to observations about parenting culture in the United States. I argue that excellence in parenthood consists in a dual responsibility both to guide children toward the good life and to accept (...) them as they are. I conclude that prenatal manipulation of healthy and normal characteristics in human offspring fails to balance the dispositional extremes of control and restraint to which many parents today are susceptible. I apply this account of good parenting to the challenging case of height enhancement for short but otherwise healthy children. Finally, I reply to objections, first, about the phenomenology of bearing normative obligations to people who do not yet exist and, second, about the moral logic of criticizing embryo selection in the context of assisted reproduction when we accept child selection in the context of adoption. (shrink)

A short reflection arguing that the Non-Identity Problem depends on excluding the mother’s continuing identity and welfare from the moral calculus.

In this paper, I address the philosophical consistency of the term “three-parent babies,” which is often used to describe children born through mitochondrial replacement therapy. I will argue that two primary arguments, based respec-tively on identity and causality, fail to excludeegg donors as candidates as mor-al parents due to their essential contribution to the child’s existence (moral parenthood encompasses a set of rights and responsibilities that are not direct-ly regulated by a legal system). Finally, I shall show how the potential (...) extension of parental status to donors is conceivable, relying on the concept of “investment” in the procreative dynamic, and a conventional and institutional conception of parenthood. (shrink)

Definition of problem Newborn screening (NBS) is an internationally successful program for the secondary prevention of rare congenital diseases. At present, most of the target conditions in NBS are diagnosed by biochemical markers. Recent advances in genomic sequencing and in the bioinformatic evaluation of genetic variants will soon make it feasible however to expand NBS significantly by testing newborns directly for pathogenic variants. Yet, genomic newborn screening (gNBS) raises important ethical issues that require resolution, given that several pilot studies on (...) gNBS implementation are already underway. Given a rapidly growing scholarly engagement with the ethics of gNBS, a more systematic and comprehensive mapping of the ethical issues and considerations relevant to gNBS is needed to move the debate forward at this point. Methods In this integrative review, we survey the literature with the aim of delineating a conceptual framework for the ethics of gNBS, which organizes the ongoing debate and thereby provides guidance for further research. Here in Part II, we outline a tentative normative framework for the ethics of gNBS by systematizing the core ethical principles advanced in the literature and offer an original contribution to the debate beyond a mere survey of considerations by proposing a substantive interpretation of these principles and how they relate to each other in the gNBS context. We demonstrate the general utility of this framework for addressing the ethical issues involved in gNBS program design by drawing out its implications for some of the issues presented in Part I. Conclusion In Part I, we formulated a requirement of informed consent for gNBS. Since newborns still lack a capacity for autonomous choice and informed consent, we approach gNBS program design through the question of what renders it ethically permissible for the child’s custodians to consent to gNBS in its name. Consequently, we discuss the authority of parents as surrogate decision-makers for their child, who are bound by a duty of care towards it. We substantiate this duty (a) by discussing several rights of the child, viz., its rights to informational self-determination, genetic ignorance, privacy, and an open future, and (b) by developing a specification of the best interest standard for children as the main principle that should guide and constrain both parental decision-making and gNBS program design. Finally, we consider concerns that gNBS could result in a harmful medicalization of healthy children. (shrink)

Joona Räsänen, in his article ‘Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the fetus’ (this journal), has argued for the view that parents have a right to the death of the fetus. In this brief article, I will explicate the three arguments Räsänen defends, and show that two of them have false or unmotivated premises and hence fail, and that the support he offers for his third argument is inconsistent with other views he expresses in his article. Therefore, (...) I conclude that there is no right to the death of the fetus, or, if there is one, Räsänen has not shown it. (shrink)

Supporting the development of children’s autonomy is widely recognized as a fundamental good. Despite this, social practices that reflect and reinforce patriarchal gender norms are ubiquitous. These norms, however, curtail the development and exercise of children’s autonomy by constraining their opportunities along gendered lines and promoting falsehoods about “natural” identity expression. In recognition of these limitations, many parents across the political spectrum are pushing back against patriarchal gender norms in their parenting approaches. One particular model that aims to fully embrace (...) a progressive parenting methodology is the “gender-open” model of parenting (GOP). Broadly, the GOP methodology involves withholding disclosure of a child’s biological sex as assigned at birth from public knowledge. With the necessary support, this approach aims to encourage children to choose their own gender in their own time. Advocates of this model claim that adopting the GOP ensures a child’s autonomy in self-expression. But despite these claims, none of the advocates clearly articulates how the model promotes children’s autonomy. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate how the GOP protects and promotes children’s autonomy in robust ways, making a strong case for its adoption. (shrink)

It is commonplace to observe that members of the same family resemble each other in various ways. So perhaps it surprising to learn that some philosophers see family resemblances as deeply intertwined with myths. But how could this be? Aren’t the resemblances out there, waiting to be noticed quite apart from any family mythology? This paper argues that family resemblances can be thought of as myth-involving through one of three myths: 1. The myth of ubiquity, 2. The myth of natural (...) salience and 3. The myth of significance. Beyond explaining the myths, I explain their ethical and political ramifications. (shrink)

Value change is a phenomenon that is gaining increasing attention in ethical analyses of technologies. However, a comprehensive study of how reprogenetic technologies and values coevolve is lacking. To remedy this gap, in this overview article, I address the relationship between reprogenetics and value change. This contribution thus argues for the importance of investigating the phenomenon of value change in relation to the technological controversies discussed in bioethics. To meet this goal, I begin by clarifying, first, how technologies shape reproductive (...) choice. I then clarify what “values” and “moral values” are, how reprogenetic technologies are value laden, and what values are often discussed in reprogenetics debates. Next, I show five types of value changes that have occurred in advance in reproductive and genetic technologies. Finally, I argue for the bioethical relevance of discussing future techno-value change, pointing out the descriptive and normative challenges of this philosophical endeavor. (shrink)

Mitochondrial replacement therapy has been developed in order to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial mutations, yet it raises ethical concerns, particularly regarding the involvement of third-party DNA and the risks associated with donor procedures. This paper explores an alternative approach using synthetic DNA (synDNA) to construct mitochondrial organelles, thereby bypassing the need for donor oocytes and bypassing risks to donors. We argue that those who support mitochondrial replacement techniques as an ethically acceptable means of preventing the transmission of mitochondrial disease (...) should consider the use of synthetic mitochondria as a preferable ethical alternative, should it prove technically viable. That this will be viable is more than we can demonstrate here. However, progress in synDNA technology suggests that it is not unreasonable to think that synthetic mitochondria creation is feasible, and perhaps even probable. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Bio-heteronormative conceptions of the family have long reinforced a nuclear ideal of the family as a heterosexual marriage, with children who are the genetic progeny of that union. This ideal, however, has also long been resisted in light of recent social developments, exhibited through the increased incidence and acceptance of step-families, donor-conceived families, and so forth. Although to this end some might claim that the bio-heteronormative ideal is not necessary for a social unit to count as a family, a more (...) systematic conceptualization of the family—the kind of family that matters morally—is relatively underexplored in the philosophical literature. This paper makes a start at developing and defending an account of the family that is normatively attractive and in line with the growing prevalence of non-conventional families and methods of family-formation. Our account, which we call a constitutive-affirmative model of the family, takes the family to be constituted by an ongoing process of relevant affective and affirmative relations between the putative family members. (shrink)

The growing demand for uterus transplantation (UTx) invites continued philosophical evaluation of the function of UTx (and what constitutes its ‘success’), as well as the recipient eligibility for UTx. Currently, UTx caters to partnered, cisgender women of childbearing age looking to get pregnant and give birth to a biogenetically related child. The medical justification for this—the treatment of uterine infertility—explains the primacy of this practice. However, this dominant conceptualization of UTx does not necessarily capture the diverse needs for which both (...) cis‐ and transgender women might take interest in UTx that are not strictly procreative, such as bodily integrity and gender identity reasons. In this paper, I argue that non‐procreative motivations for uterus acquisition ought to be taken seriously as a matter of non‐discrimination and consistency. (shrink)

A global trend of institutionalised pronatalism situates low fertility as a site of demographic disaster – positioning primarily women’s bodies as both its cause and solution. In light of such demographic dread, assisted reproductive technologies (ART) may be utilized by pronatalist states as a strategy for fertility recovery, rather than as a benefit for individual aspiring parents. In other words, ARTs are at risk of being co-opted by nation-states for problematic demographic designs which do not advance emancipatory goals. The underlying (...) issue of pronatalism, however, is not always explicitly acknowledged in feminist bioethics as a barrier to ethical ART usage. In my paper, I argue that it would be a mistake to assume ART can be used for emancipatory ends if we do not, at the same time, critically investigate its connections to institutionalised pronatalism. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge standard views of the moral badness of sentimentality defended by art critics and philosophers. Accounts based on untruthfulness and self-indulgence lack the resources to both explain the badness of bad sentimentality and to allow that there are benign instances. We are sometimes permitted to be sentimental even though it is self-serving. A non-moralistic account should allow for this. To provide such an account, I first outline a substantive view of the ideal of unsentimentality by turning (...) to Rainer Maria Rilke’s Letters on Cézanne. Rilke celebrates the artist for his unsentimental love of his subjects and “untiring objective wakefulness” to them. I then turn to Iris Murdoch’s ethics of attention (itself influenced by Rilke) to explain why this ideal is so difficult to live up to in practice, the various ways that we fall short, and what our failures mean. What Murdoch contributes is both a sense that the lovingly attentive attitude that Rilke describes is morally—and not just artistically—important and a compassionate account of the human egocentrism that inhibits it. By thinking of sentimentality as a failure of moral attention, we can appreciate how particular instances differ from one another. Sentimentality can console us in difficult times or can gratify our egos; it can be a form of escapism or can rigidly enclose reality; and it can be harmlessly self-serving or a selfish failure to morally attend to the other when it counts. I conclude by outlining some ways that being seen with Cézanne-like moral attention can matter to us. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the ethical concerns that may arise from the synthesis of human DNA. To date, only small stretches of DNA have been constructed, but the prospect of generating human genomes is becoming feasible. At the same time, the significance of genes for identity, health and reproduction is coming under increased scrutiny. We examine the implications of DNA synthesis and its impact on debates over the relationship with our DNA and the ownership of our genes, its potential (...) to disrupt common understandings of reproduction and privacy, and the way in which synthetic DNA challenges traditional associations between genes and identity. We explore the degree to which synthetic DNA may further undermine overgeneticised accounts of identity, health, reproduction, parenthood and privacy that are prevalent in the public domain and in some areas of policy-making. While avoiding making normative claims of our own, we conclude that there is a need for reflection on the ethical implications of these developing technologies before they are on us. (shrink)

The idea of artificial wombs began to be seriously discussed in the West in Britain after WWI, inspired by modern feminism and the invention of neonatal incubators. J. B. S. Haldane’s imagined future use of artificial wombs in his essay Daedalus, or, Science and the Future inspired debate among his contemporaries for a decade, including Aldous Huxley who indelibly cast the technology as dystopian. After WWII bioutopian ideas like artificial wombs were associated with fascism, although socialist feminists briefly renewed the (...) debate over the liberatory potential of artificial wombs in the 1970s. Recent innovations in neonatal intensive care have again generated discussion of the ethical and political impacts of artificial wombs. Again, artificial wombs are seen by some as a way to expand reproductive freedom and gender equality, while critics worry they might have negative impacts on women and abortion access. (shrink)

We argued in a recent issue of this journal that if abortion is restricted,1 then there are parallel obligations for parents to donate body parts to their children. The strength of this obligation to donate is proportional to the strength of the abortion restrictions. If abortion is never permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ if they are a match. If abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not. Our argument (...) was based on the following ideas: (a) that a fetus has full moral status, (b) that parents have special obligations to their offspring, fetus or not, and (c) that this special obligation is to protect them. The result is the conclusion that abortion restrictivists cannot also consistently deny that organ donation should be compulsory. (shrink)

‘Gender disappointment’ is regularly reported by those whose child’s sex does not match the sex that they, the parent, desired. With symptoms ranging from mere fleeting sadness to documented cases of serious depression, alienation from one’s child, and emotional suffering, it is clear that so-called ‘gender disappointment’ is a serious issue, that has, as yet, seen little philosophical attention (though see Hendl and Browne 2020). In this chapter I explore gender disappointment, not from the perspective of a parent who ended (...) up with the child of the wrong sex at birth, but rather, from the perspective of a different kind of gender disappointment: the transgender person who grew up and only then disappointed their parents by turning out to be the ‘wrong’ gender. This perspective, I argue, reveals a great deal about the shared gender essentialism at the heart of patriarchal and cissexist ideology. Moreover, I will argue that it reveals the underlying propertarian relationship of parents to their children under contemporary capitalism – a troubling relationship that legitimates the treatment of children as objects to be designed and controlled as commodities at the whims of parents. In this way I disagree with Whyman when he writes that “a preference for having a child of one sex over the other should be considered one of those irrational things of which some sense can nevertheless be made – like aesthetic taste” (Whyman 2021, 113-114). I argue, to the contrary, that the desire for a child of one particular gender is not akin to a mere unproblematic aesthetic preference. Instead, and following the rich feminist tradition of thinking about the patriarchal origins of sexual desire, I argue that we must see these desires as troubling reflections of dominant patriarchal and cissexist ideology, underwritten by a particular neoliberal capitalist mode of production. Moreover, we can seek to change those desires. (shrink)

Este trabajo titulado " El Deber de Adoptar y los Derechos de la niñez en Chile" será incluido en el Volumen 24. Número 86(2024) de Revista Iberoamericana en la sección Foro de Debate denominada “Infancias Latinoamericanas: desafíos para la garantía de derechos en la región".

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding (...) Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways. (shrink)

Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person‐affecting constraints. I propose (...) the parent–child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person‐affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person‐affecting morality. (shrink)

Because many involuntarily childless people have equal interests in benefitting from assisted reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization as a mode of treatment, we have normative reasons to ensure inclusive access to such interventions for as many of these people as is reasonable and possible. However, the prevailing eligibility criterion for access to assisted reproductive technologies—'infertility'—is inadequate to serve the goal of inclusive access. This is because the prevailing frameworks of infertility, which include medical and social infertility, fail to precisely (...) capture and unify the relevance of certain involuntarily childless experiences as warranting assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatment. I argue that the least we can do for those who have an interest in accessing ARTs is to conceptualize involuntarily childless experiences in dialogue with interactionist and ecological models of disability, to outline a unified and more inclusive eligibility criterion. (shrink)

An in-depth critique of arguments of John Finnis, Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and William May to the effect that contraception is necessarily contralife in the sense of exhibiting a will against a possible person.

Is moral or other regret for abortion an indicator that abortion may not be morally or prudentially choice worthy? This paper examines the work of Kate Greasley in this area, who offers an explanation of any asymmetry in openness to regret between women who have abortions and women who give birth. The latter, not unlike Derek Parfit’s 14-year-old who conceives deliberately, may feel duty-bound not to regret their decision (in their case, to continue their pregnancy) and to affirm the life (...) of their child. In response to Greasley, testimonial evidence of one group cannot be dismissed simply because regret may be less available to another group of decision-makers. Moreover, if moral regret for childbearing is uncommon, this is not because mothers have a moral duty, as Greasley argues, not to regret even a morally mistaken choice to conceive. On the contrary, one must separate the evaluation of choices and of the results of these choices, whether positive or negative. Regret, while not infallible, can elucidate values at stake in choices, and testimonial evidence in the form of regret should be taken more seriously in regard to certain kinds of choice. (shrink)

Recent philosophical work on children and childhood has revealed many new questions concerning minors’ rights. This special issue of Moral Philosophy and Politics offers new contributions to the topics of paternalism, the nature of the right to parent and children’s voting. It also contains articles about the so far less explored questions of adolescents’ parental rights, minors’ rights against the harms of parental imprisonment, and their right to veto their own parents’ decision to relocate.

What would the institution of the family look like, if it were reformed according to republican desiderata? Would it even survive such re-shaping?

Should parental rights be allocated to the best available parent? Anca Gheaus has argued that they should and that the interests of those who might rear them are strictly irrelevant to their allocation. This discussion article defends the view that parents’ interests are relevant to parental rights, against this latest argument. I show that the Best Available Parent View, as stated, conflicts with the exclusion of parental interests, on which it allegedly rests. I show that by including parental interests we (...) better explain how parental rights should be distributed and over a wider range of cases. (shrink)

The common liberal understanding of reproductive autonomy – characterized by free choice and a principle of non-interference – serves as a useful way to analyse the normative appeal of having certain choices open to people in the reproductive realm, especially for issues like abortion rights. However, this liberal reading of reproductive autonomy only offers us a limited ethical understanding of what is at stake in many kinds of reproductive choices, particularly when it comes to different uses of reproductive technologies and (...) third-party reproduction. This is because the liberal framework does not fully capture who benefits from which reproductive options, the extent of the risks and harms involved in various reproductive interventions, and the reasons for why people are driven to make certain reproductive choices. (shrink)

The article argues that procreation is intrinsically valuable because it produces persons. The essential thought of the argument is that among the valuable things in the world are not only products, but the actions by which they are produced. The first premise is that persons have great value, for which a common consent argument is offered. The second premise is that, as an action type, procreation has persons as a product. Procreation is always a part of the action that produces (...) a person. This is because procreators take as their goal the creation of an organism that itself has development into a person as a goal. Such a claim also helps explain the moral obligations of procreators, the affective lives of procreators and the common preference for procreation. The third premise is that if an action type has a product of value, then all its tokens have intrinsic value. I argue that even when such actions fail to produce anything outside the agent, they are intrinsically valuable because of how they actualise the powers and virtues of the agent, in part achieving the agent’s goal. I then apply that argument to the case of procreation and person producing. (shrink)

Most people desire to have a romantic relationship, and most people desire to have a child. The paper suggests one respect in which it is more desirable to have a child with a romantic partner rather than with someone other than a romantic partner, as platonic parents do. The first premise claims that the romantic relationship, and only this relationship, has a certain desire as a constitutive part. This is the desire to be as related to someone as one can (...) be. That this ‘desire for relatedness’ is a constitutive part of the romantic relationship explains why those related by a romantic relationship tend to become related in other ways and explains why romantic partners tend to desire to have relationships with those to whom their romantic partner is otherwise related. The second premise is that by having a child together romantic partners become related in an important and unique way, satisfying their desire for relatedness. Since platonic parents do not have the desire for relatedness toward one another they do not satisfy such a desire in having a child together. A brief review of the sociological literature on platonic parenting is included and eight objections are answered. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against any state intrusion and interference that amounts to scrutiny of parents based on their decision to separate. The state, to my mind, ought not to be involved in childrearing decisions in cases of divorce unless there is a sufficient reason, and, as I will argue, divorce per se does not present a level of risk to children that justifies state intervention. The claims I am about to make apply not only to parental capability tests (...) but also to the entire process of legal divorce, which allows the courts to decide who they believe is a better parent—a decision that, in my view, the state is not capable of (and should not be) making. I do not claim that states ought not to interfere at all but rather that, unless parents fail to do what they are morally required to do, state interference should not be permitted. To make this case, I present two claims: claim A, that only a risk reaching a certain level (which I will call level H) justifies state intervention; claim B, that the act of divorce does not meet level H; and therefore C, there is no justification for state intervention in divorce. (shrink)

Care este statutul moral al copiilor? Ce înseamnă egalitatea morală dintre copii şi adulți? Care sunt constrângerile pe care le impune acceptarea acestei egalități în ceea ce priveşte felul în care pot fi tratați copiii în familie sau în societate? Cine are ce fel de responsabilitate pentru copii? În capitolul de față voi discuta astfel de întrebări. Voi analiza relația dintre copii, părinți şi stat, în dimensiunea ei practică (felul în care ne raportăm la copii), din punct de vedere legal (...) (constrângerile legale asupra felului în care ne raportăm la copii) şi din punct de vedere moral (cum ar trebui să ne raportăm la copii). Voi începe cu o scurtă incursiune în istoria relațiilor dintre copii, părinți, şi stat, atât din punct de vedere legal, cât şi filosofic. Voi prezenta conceptul de statut moral şi ideea de egalitate morală între copii şi adulți. Voi ilustra schimbările sociale şi legislative în ce priveşte acceptarea statutului moral al copiilor şi a egalității morale între copii şi adulți, folosind exemple din România şi Suedia. Voi examina dinamica dintre aspirațiile legale şi morale la care aderă România în ce priveşte statutul moral al copiilor şi normele sociale despre copii, copilărie, şi familie, care nu sunt întotdeauna în acord cu aceste aspirații. Voi urmări apoi schimbările care au avut loc în ultimele decenii în ce priveşte limitele responsabilității parentale. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Co-parents who differ in their ideal child rearing policies should compromise, argues Marcus William Hunt. Josh Milburn and Carlo Alvaro dispute this when it comes to veganism. Milburn argues that veganism is a matter of justice and that to compromise over justice is (typically) impermissible. I suggest that compromise over justice is often permissible, and that compromise over justice may be required by justice itself. Alvaro offers aesthetic, gustatory, and virtue-based arguments for ethical veganism, showing that veganism involves sensibilities (...) and virtues, and argues that veganism involves a belief. Alvaro takes this to show that parental compromise is impermissible. I suggest that Alvaro’s arguments are implausible and that the shaping of a child’s sensibilities and virtues is an apt matter for parental compromise. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that there is value in the biological tie between parent and child. An implication of this is that adoption is often considered a less desirable alternative to procreation. This paper offers a philosophical defence of adoptive parenthood as a valuable and authentic form of parenthood. While previous defences have suggested that society’s valorisation of the biological tie is unjustified, I argue herein that the conception of the biological tie that features in the normative discourse on parenthood (...) is too narrowly genocentric. Against this genocentric conception, recent work in the philosophy of biology has emphasised the roles of joint determination, dynamic construction, and extended inheritance in development, which I suggest can substantiate a more inclusive conception of the biological tie. Accordingly, I propose that adoptive parents form a rich variety of biological ties with their children, some of which are as heritable and formative as genetic relatedness. (shrink)

In Search of Just Families. By Chhanda Gupta.

Concerning abortion and infanticide, ethics has always seen to each one as quite puzzling an issue. The dilemma expectedly goes like this: “Are they morally good, permissible or acceptable, or are they not?” All three major approaches in ethics, viz. virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism, have fervently exerted themselves in order to settle both. A virtue ethicist is expected to approach the issue wondering: “Is performing abortion and infanticide indicative of virtues, to wit of character traits that the virtuous agent (...) possesses?” A deontologist would bring the dilemma up for discussion asking: “Is conducting abortion and infanticide in accordance with some moral rule or principle?” To an act utilitarian, on the other hand, the same question would strike as: “Do abortion and infanticide promote the best consequences, to wit those in which happiness is maximized?” All three approaches have been applied to the subject matter ever since the classic era, sadly with no remarkable success and, most of the times, even without the slightest suspicion of the promised rigor. (shrink)

This chapter explores current and prospective reproductive technologies and some of their likely implications for reproductive and family ethics and policymaking. The technologies discussed include uterus transplants, mitochondrial transfer, ectogenesis, the development of in vitro gametes, and solo reproduction. The chapter considers the impact of these developments on the content of concepts such as 'infertility', 'mother', or 'father'. Another layer to this process of redefinition originates in ongoing socio-cultural changes that shift the focus in parenting from the way in which (...) children have come into the world, to relationships within the family. Considering these scenarios beforehand can help to clarify some of the current challenges in defining and regulating infertility. The chapter therefore aims to raise a number of questions rather than provide answers. (shrink)