Epistemological States and Properties

An important question for evidentialism is: what does it take to have evidence? Feldman (2004) and McGrath (2018) argue that evidence possession requires more than psychological access—it must also satisfy an epistemic condition, such as being justified. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic condition either results in a problematic regress or denies internalism unless one distinguishes between two senses of evidence possession. Developing this distinction helps to clarify the structure and nature of our evidence. In particular, it shows (...) that one’s evidence, at a fundamental level, is self-supporting and consists of one’s mental states rather than their propositional contents. (shrink)

We are all capable of arriving at views that are driven by corrupting non-epistemic interests. But we are nonetheless very skilled at performing a commitment to epistemic goods in such cases. I call this the ‘Problem of Mere Epistemic Performance’, and it generates a need to determine when these commitments are illusory and when they are in fact genuine. I argue that changing one’s mind, when done in response to the evidence and at a likely cost to oneself, are the (...) best indications that an agent is committed to epistemic goods, that they are genuinely in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This is because changing one’s mind in this way goes as far as we can in eliminating the possibility that the agent has an ulterior motivation for their epistemic practices. Moreover, this account shows that the consensus view of the ideal epistemic agent is mistaken. The ideal agent must have false beliefs or deficient epistemic practices because only then do they have the opportunity to change their mind and establish a commitment to epistemic goods – a commitment that even an agent with only true beliefs and maximal justification or understanding may lack. (shrink)

Belief in malevolent global conspiracies is often treated as a defeater for philosophical seriousness. Engaging with Lee Basham's defense of conspiracy theorizing and Genia Schönbaumsfeld's critique, I make two claims. First, we must distinguish the ambitious multi-institutional schemes of non-total malevolent global conspiracies, which nevertheless remain evidentially vulnerable, from conspiracy theories that are self-sealing. Only the latter are epistemically vacuous. Second, properly understood, Cartesian doubt is a norm-governed temporary device for re-ordering reasons, a standing commitment to the view that everything (...) can be doubted. The assumed kinship between radical skepticism and self-sealing conspiracy theories, therefore, overstates their structural similarity. -/- Keywords: conspiracy theories, Descartes, epistemology, malevolent global conspiracy, radical skepticism, Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper proposes a discrete-continuous model of cognition to resolve enduring philosophical difficulties surrounding time, motion, and infinity. The argument begins by establishing the transcendental necessity of discreteness: any cognitive act must already contain a distinction between consciousness and its object, making non continuous recognition a structural condition of cognition itself. Within this framework, a critical distinction is drawn between two types of discrete operation. Signifier discretization is a legitimate operation within the sign system that establishes differential relations among (...) terms in coexisting continuity (space). Signified discretization, conversely, is an illegitimate transgression that covertly attributes a discrete structure to the substrate itself. The paper demonstrates that this transgression occurs through a two-stage process: first, “retention” (Husserl) converts the non juxtaposable flow of successive continuity (time) into a juxtaposed surrogate in consciousness; second, the legitimate operation of signifier-discretization is applied to this surrogate, thereby concealing the original structural conversion. This model is then applied to critically re-examine several philosophical problems. Zeno’s paradoxes are diagnosed as an illicit conversion of successive motion into static, coexisting positions. Bergson’s intuitionism is shown to be self-destructive, as its proposed method of “intuition” inevitably presupposes the very discreteness it seeks to overcome. Russell’s logical atomism is criticized for its foundational commitment to signified-discretization, which is revealed as the source of its insoluble difficulties with relations, change, and self-reference. Finally, the paper extends this analysis to the foundations of mathematics. The Cantorian actual infinite (ἐνεργείᾳ ἄπειρον) is critiqued as an illegitimate product of converting the potential infinite’s (δυνάμει ἄπειρον) endless process in successive continuity into a completed object in coexisting continuity. Consequently, the Axiom of Infinity and the Axiom of Foundation in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are revealed to be non-logical, and in the latter case counter-logical, stipulations introduced to stabilize this structural distortion. The paper concludes that discreteness, while the necessary mode of cognitive operation, can never exhaust the continuous substrate, leaving a remainder that perpetually escapes its grasp. It must be acknowledged that the mathematical-philosophical arguments advanced here—particularly the critique of the Axiom of Infinity and the Axiom of Foundation in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory—are deployed not as a comprehensive intervention in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, but rather as necessary illustrations of the discrete-continuous model’s analytical power. The position taken is deliberately radical, arguing that the actual infinite is a structurally distorted product of cognitive conversion rather than a legitimate logical object; as such, it stands in sharp contrast to mainstream set-theoretic orthodoxy. This paper does not pretend to engage in sustained dialogue with the extensive literature on non-well-founded set theory, intuitionism, or contemporary mathematical practice. Instead, it offers a transcendental diagnosis that, if accepted, would require a fundamental reorientation of how mathematics relates to the structures of cognition—a reorientation that cannot be fully defended within the bounds of this essay, but which invites further critical engagement and refinement. Keywords: discreteness, continuity, infinity, transcendental philosophy, retention, Zeno's paradoxes, Bergson, logical atomism, Russell, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to offer two short criticisms of the linguistic idea of the world, first put by logical positivists and later taken up by analytic philosophers. One objection comes from Bryan Magee and his non-propositional argument for experience, and another comes from me using the traditional idea that philosophy is supposed to fight fixed worldviews, and that the linguistic philosopher is in danger of not asking all the big picture questions as they should.

Consciousness inquiry is self-describing: the apparatus through which phenomenal experience is investigated is itself phenomenal. This structural feature entails explanandum fixation failure—the condition that any well-formed explanatory problem requires its target to remain stable across explanatory attempts cannot be met. The hard problem's thirty-year record of non-convergence is what this structure predicts. -/- From this failure, a positive result follows. What consciousness inquiry has been tracking—not a fixed explanandum but a succession of locally individuated referents constituted through acts of characterization—is (...) the constitutive event M→E. This paper establishes M→E as the primary unit of analysis for consciousness research and derives four structural properties from the conditions the fixation failure discloses: asymmetry, local stability, contextual constraint, and non-recoverability. -/- The principal positions—physicalism, dualism, illusionism, and mechanistic theories—each inherit the fixation failure rather than escape it. The phenomenal concepts strategy relocates rather than resolves it. The reorientation toward fixation dynamics—inquiry into the structural processes by which experience is individuated at all—opens three tractable research directions: attentional structure, linguistic articulation, and reflective constitution. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, varlık ile bilgi arasındaki ilişkinin sistematik ve karşılaştırılabilir biçimde analiz edilmesini sağlayan DuruVizyon Analitik Düzlemi modelini önermektedir. Model, ontolojik ve epistemolojik kipleri iki bağımsız eksen olarak ele alır ve ontolojik imkân, ontolojik gerçeklik, epistemolojik imkân ve epistemolojik gerçeklik ayrımlarını tek bir analitik düzlem üzerinde konumlandırır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, varlık ile bilginin birbirine indirgenemeyen fakat birlikte incelenmesi gereken iki alan olduğunu savunur. Analitik Düzlem, “gerçek”, “mümkün”, “bilinen” ve “bilinmeyen” gibi temel felsefi ayrımların koordinatlı bir yapı içinde analiz edilmesini mümkün (...) kılar. Çalışma ayrıca modelin dört temel bölgesini, bölgeler arası geçişleri ve biçimsel modellemeye açılabilecek kuramsal potansiyelini değerlendirir. (shrink)

Kant’s proposition that "things-in-themselves are unknowable" is the ultimate dilemma of subject-object dualism in Western philosophy for over two thousand years. Kant argued that humans can only know phenomena and cannot grasp the primordial being of things themselves, a conclusion that completely severed the connection between cognition and reality, undermining the legitimacy of metaphysics and leaving an irreparable crack in the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Based on Cognitive Succession Ontology, this paper takes the unfalsifiable first principle that "the essence of (...) cognition is succession" as its starting point, and rigorously proves through strict logical deduction that generalized things-in-themselves (including unmanifested ontological spacetime and manifested authentic physical spacetime), though not directly perceivable, can be precisely known 1:1 through geometrized construction and logical retrospection. This paper further demonstrates that ontological spacetime, authentic physical spacetime, and cognitive logic share the same Universal Meta-Rule of Succession and possess underlying isomorphism; Kant’s so-called "a priori categories" are not inherent structures of the human mind but natural manifestations of the succession meta-rule at the cognitive level. This theory fundamentally resolves the thing-in-itself problem and subject-object dualism, providing a solid epistemological and ontological foundation for Cognitive Succession Ontology and the unification of the four fundamental forces. (shrink)

In 1814, Laplace articulated the ideal of an intellect that, knowing all forces and all positions at a single instant, could predict the entire future and retrodict the entire past with certainty. The demon's power rests on a presupposition that has rarely been challenged: that an observer can stand outside the system, reading its complete state without consuming resources or perturbing the system itself. Subsystem Epistemics (SE) identifies this presupposition as structurally untenable. The relationship between observer and system is not (...) that of a container and its separable contents, but that of a Klein bottle — any attempt to occupy an external vantage point leads back to the interior. A Laplacian demon is therefore not merely practically unavailable but structurally self-defeating: the act of registration is itself a physical operation within the system, subject to the same constraints as everything it seeks to describe. -/- This paper develops SE as a minimal structural framework for analysing information and observation under conditions of embeddedness. The framework rests on two foundational identifications. First, information consists in the registration of a difference between two events: a single isolated event does not constitute information, since no comparison is available. Second, measurement is the unique operational process through which such information is acquired. All observation is performed by subsystems operating under finite resource constraints, with no external vantage point available. -/- From these conditions, minimal temporal and configurational separations — denoted t and l — are introduced as hidden constants: structurally real, but operationally inaccessible. From these we derive a structural rate r = l/t and a maximal subsystem resolution bound r/2. This bound is universal, recursive, and implies an intrinsic coarse-graining that is structural rather than epistemic. -/- Three structural difficulties for continuous spacetime models are identified — indeterminacy of closure completion, limitations on invariance confirmation, and loss of distinguishability — and it is shown that standard mathematical tools address these formally but not operationally for a resource-bounded embedded subsystem. Minimal step structures resolve all three difficulties while preserving the foundational assumptions. -/- The framework is interpretatively neutral. It provides a shared operational floor for both Relational Quantum Mechanics (by grounding the inaccessibility of observer-independent descriptions) and the Cellular Automaton Interpretation (by motivating discrete substrate structures from operational conditions alone). Where Laplace assumed that an external observer could in principle grasp the totality of a system from outside, the SE framework demonstrates that embeddedness is not a practical limitation but a structural condition: observation, resource consumption, and constraint are three descriptions of a single operation. The path to the outside leads back to the inside. (shrink)

The most basic precondition of knowledge is rarely articulated as a question: how is distinction itself possible? Aristotle took this question to its limit when he identified the principle of non-contradiction as the most absolute presupposition of thought (Metaphysics IV.4) — A cannot at once be X and not-X. But the principle itself rests on a prior condition: X and not-X must be Aristotle distinguishable. Without distinguishability, the principle is empty. Distinguishability is therefore prior to thought, and the conditions under (...) which distinguishability can be achieved are the conditions under which knowledge can take any form at all. This paper develops a minimal structural framework addressing that condition, under the constraint that the entity attempting to distinguish is itself part of what it distinguishes. Two assumptions are introduced: (i) information consists in the registration of a difference between two events, and (ii) all observation is performed by subsystems embedded within the system they observe. From these assumptions, together with the existence of minimal temporal and spatial steps t and l, a structural resolution bound r/2 is derived, where r = l/t. Since registering a difference requires at least two events, and each event occupies at least one minimal step, the minimal closure time is 2t and the maximal resolvable rate is r/2. This bound does not depend on measurement precision or specific physical implementations. It follows from the minimal requirements for observational closure under resource constraints, and is therefore structurally distinct from familiar resolution limits in signal processing, which arise from external sampling considerations rather than from the structure of distinguishability itself. Observation is characterised as a coarse-grained process: multiple configurations map to indistinguishable outcomes, and differences that cannot be registered do not enter any internal description. The result is a structural form of epistemic incompleteness — not a deficit of knowledge that better instruments might remove, but a feature of what registration can be when the registering subsystem operates within the system it registers. Possible connections to statistical structure, observation under varying conditions, and the formation of knowledge from accumulated regularities are briefly indicated, without commitment to specific physical interpretations. Where Aristotle established that thought presupposes the principle of non-contradiction, the present framework articulates the prior condition: the structural circumstances under which two events can be registered as distinct, and the bound on what can be so registered when the observer is embedded. form at all. (shrink)

La inteligencia artificial generativa, en su configuración actual, exhibe una paradoja epistémica: amplía técnicamente el acceso al conocimiento al tiempo que restringe las condiciones de su producción crítica. Los modelos de lenguaje de gran escala (LLMs) operan bajo regímenes de verdad computacional que privilegian la verosimilitud estadística sobre la referencia y la justificación, produciendo así una externalización del juicio. Este artículo responde a dicha paradoja mediante la propuesta de una arquitectura cognitiva basada en complejos de indagación jerárquicos, inspirada en el (...) pragmatismo filosófico (Peirce, Dewey), la teoría dialógica del lenguaje (Bakhtin, Tannen) y la epistemología social (Fricker). La arquitectura materializa, en cinco módulos interdependientes —motor de indagación, navegador epistémico, generador contextual, diálogo adaptativo y rastreador de razonamiento—, los principios de trazabilidad, reversibilidad, pluralismo y contestabilidad, desplazando la lógica del prompt aislado hacia un modelo de navegación deliberativa. Para evaluar su funcionamiento, introducimos el Índice de Equilibrio Erotético (EEE), una métrica formativa y procesual que valora la calidad epistémica del proceso en cinco dimensiones: profundidad, pluralidad, trazabilidad, reversibilidad y robustez. En diálogo crítico con enfoques contemporáneos como Chain-of-Thought, Socratic Models y Constitutional AI, sostenemos que la propuesta no constituye una mejora incremental, sino una disrupción deliberativa: en lugar de simular razonamiento o aplicar principios normativos fijos, internaliza la indagación como estructura operativa. Sus aplicaciones en educación, derecho, ciencia y medicina muestran que su relevancia no se mide por la eficiencia instrumental, sino por la capacidad de instituir entornos epistémicamente responsables, donde preguntar, justificar y sostener el disenso son condiciones centrales. Con ello, el artículo defiende que el futuro de una IA epistémicamente activa no debe orientarse a perfeccionar la plausibilidad de las respuestas, sino a restaurar el juicio en el corazón de la computación, configurándola como una infraestructura de deliberación crítica y plural. Palabras clave: Externalización del juicio, Regímenes de verdad computacional, Arquitecturas cognitivas generativas, Complejos de indagación jerárquicos, Índice de Equilibrio Erotético (EEE), Disrupción deliberativa, Epistemología computacional, IA epistémicamente activa, Pragmatismo y dialogismo, Justicia epistémica en IA. (shrink)

I reply here to five excellent commentaries on my book, Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing (Oxford University Press, 2022). In what follows, I address objections and constructive proposals from Gloria Andrada, Kevin McCain, Jesús Vega-Encabo, Duncan Pritchard, and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham. Topics range from the application of autonomy to know-how and cognitive development, the resilience of evidentialism and virtue epistemology against nonautonomous enhancement cases, the distinction between positive and negative (...) epistemic autonomy, and the axiological foundations of autonomous belief and self-constitution. (shrink)

This study develops a structural diagnosis of contemporary transformations in scientific knowledge production under conditions of synthetic intelligence. It introduces the Structural Diagnosis of Scientific Integrity (SDSI) framework, a multi-layer analytical architecture designed to examine how algorithmic mediation may reconfigure the epistemic infrastructure of science. The framework integrates philosophical analysis, metascientific insights, and qualitative observation of generative AI systems. At the centre of the framework lies the concept of Machine Epistemic Singularity (MES) , defined not as a prediction of collapse (...) but as a diagnostic horizon—a conceptual limit clarifying what is at stake when algorithmic systems become deeply embedded in scientific practice. MES denotes a hypothetical regime in which empirical correction becomes structurally marginal, recursive closure becomes self-sustaining, representational drift becomes resistant to reversal, and institutional mechanisms lose their capacity to maintain what the study terms material accountability: the property of epistemic systems whose outputs remain corrigible through empirical engagement with the world. The SDSI framework consists of four interconnected components. First, a diagnostic grammar grounded in the representation–referent distinction identifies referential attenuation, the progressive weakening of causal and evidential links between scientific claims and empirical origins. Second, the regulative ideal of material accountability provides a normative anchor for assessing epistemic stability across hybrid human–machine assemblages. Third, four structural tendencies—referential attenuation, structural opacity, recursive closure, and epistemic lock in—describe mechanisms through which algorithmic mediation may weaken epistemic accountability. Fourth, fifteen axes of epistemic vulnerability, distributed across empirical, representational, institutional, and algorithmic layers, function as systemic stress vectors within a multi layer epistemic network. To explore whether these mechanisms are observable in practice, the study employs qualitative diagnostic probes examining contemporary generative AI systems. Five probes—unattributed recombination, performance without understanding, authoritative posture without accountability, synthetic drift, and recursive reinforcement—indicate that the mechanisms theorised in the framework are operational in micro form within systems increasingly used in research adjacent workflows. The analysis is then extended to system level dynamics by modelling science as a multi layer epistemic network. Three propagation mechanisms—amplification, accumulation, and structural coupling—are identified, along with three threshold conditions—empirical dilution, validation saturation, and recursive dependence—proposed as empirically monitorable indicators of when localised vulnerabilities may become self reinforcing. The study advances five contributions: (1) material accountability as a normative anchor for evaluating epistemic stability; (2) algorithmic mediation as a distinct epistemic layer within scientific infrastructure; (3) four structural tendencies describing pathways of epistemic drift; (4) a systemic stress model derived from fifteen axes of vulnerability; and (5) MES as a diagnostic horizon integrating these mechanisms. The framework is offered as a diagnostic lens rather than a predictive or prescriptive programme. Its aim is not to determine the future of science, but to illuminate the structural pressures that may shape scientific knowledge production as algorithmic systems become increasingly integrated into its epistemic architecture. (shrink)

“Spiritual intelligence” (SQ) is usually treated as an aesthetic: calmness, kindness, “being evolved.” I treat it as a capacity with a hard edge: SQ is the ability to keep judgment online under activation. When activation rises—fear, shame, humiliation, longing—most people don’t simply “reason poorly.” They undergo a regime shift: coherence becomes a survival function, and meaning becomes a sedative. Under that load, IQ becomes a rationalization engine, EQ becomes a persuasion engine, and even SI becomes a weapon. SQ names the (...) stabilizing faculty that prevents competence from being conscripted by panic. I frame SQ as the internal Hard Floor: the place where you can still be interrupted by reality, even when your nervous system wants a finished story. (shrink)

This article proposes a vision of philosophy as living water: a practice grounded in clarity, affectivity, and interpretative freedom. Through a historical and exemplary exploration, the paper argues that philosophical understanding is not a product of abstraction or conceptual rigidity, but a dynamic process shaped by the situated observer. Clarity is examined as an ethical responsibility rather than a stylistic preference; affectivity as an essential dimension of human cognition; and interpretative freedom as the condition that allows meaning to remain fluid, (...) open, and responsive to lived experience. Drawing on diverse philosophical traditions and emblematic figures, the article shows how philosophy becomes most transformative when it flows when it adapts, nourishes, and illuminates without imposing dogmatic structures. Ultimately, the work defends a model of philosophy that is accessible, embodied, and alive: a practice capable of renewing understanding and fostering a more humane relationship with meaning. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the mind as an epistemic infrastructure, rather than a psychological entity or representational system. Within the framework of Natural Possibility, thought is understood as a structured environment for regulating possibility under constraints of coherence and viability. The analysis emphasizes limitation over expansion, highlighting stratification of epistemic space, working copies, separation, delay, and disciplined integration as central epistemic practices. By reframing cognition as restraint rather than accumulation, the paper clarifies how complex systems maintain stability without (...) collapsing into either overload or premature closure. The account does not redefine consciousness, but articulates an ethic of thinking suited to conditions of uncertainty and systemic fragility. Thank you. (shrink)

À la question de savoir quelles sont, parmi nos attitudes cognitives, celles qui admettent des degrés, c’est-à-dire celles qui sont gradables, on sera sans doute enclin à répondre qu’à première vue la chose est clairement vraie de la croyance et qu’elle ne l’est ni de la foi ni de la suspension de jugement. En effet, tandis qu’il semble faire parfaitement sens de dire qu’on ne croit pas complètement quelque chose mais qu’on y croit à moitié seulement, ne serait-il pas étrange (...) d’affirmer qu’on a à moitié foi en quelque chose mais pas complètement ? La foi, pourrait-on ajouter, est une chose qu’on a ou qu’on n’a pas, une chose qu’on peut perdre ou qu’on peut conserver ; et l’on ne peut pas à moitié perdre une chose ni en partie la conserver (étant entendu qu’on peut évidemment en perdre ou en conserver une partie). Quant à la suspension, n’est-elle pas encore plus clairement que la foi affaire de tout ou rien ? N’est-il pas absurde de dire qu’on suspend légèrement, à moitié, ou presque entièrement son jugement sur une question donnée ? ou qu’à son propos tel individu suspend davantage son jugement que tel autre ? Dans ce chapitre, je voudrais montrer qu’aucune de ces affirmations n’est incontestable : il est possible de défendre une conception plausible de la croyance d’après laquelle cette dernière n’admet pas de degrés et des conceptions plausibles de la foi et de la suspension de jugement d’après lesquelles ces attitudes, quant à elles, en admettent. (shrink)

Abstract: This short paper explores the “innermost” and “outermost” limits of what we, as profoundly fallible beings, could consider “knowledge.” -/- Résumé : ce court texte explore les limites « internes » et « externes » de ce qu’on peut penser considérer « connaître » en vertu des profondes limites inhérentes à notre être.

Recent attempts to merge predictive processing with phenomenology underscore the embodied basis of inference but leave unexplained how inherited meanings shape priors that guide thought and action. This article introduces Predictive Hermeneutics (PH), a framework that treats Bayesian priors as interpretive schemas layered through foundational constraints (arkhai), narrative identity, hermeneutic horizons, and metaphorical instantiations. Bias, on this account, is not peripheral error but the structural mark of these schemas at work. To critically evaluate them, PH develops a Comparative Hermeneutic Audit (...) that subjects interpretive commitments to the criteria of coherence, flexibility, and commensurability. Drawing on evidence from cross-cultural psychology, metaphor studies, and cognitive neuroscience, PH demonstrates how culturally embedded priors organize salience and inference in both human cognition and artificial systems. Applied to large language models, this approach demonstrates why statistical tuning alone cannot resolve bias or hallucination without addressing the figurative and narrative scaffolds that shape predictive horizons. By surfacing these deep interpretive structures, Predictive Hermeneutics reframes bias as the constitutive trace of predictive minds and provides a principled method for analyzing how deep interpretive structures shape reasoning in humans and machines. (shrink)

Many Sanskrit epistemologists think there are several basic ways of knowing (pramāṇas). Yet there is also a long tradition of seeking a general definition of pramā, the mental episode of knowing that is the result of a pramāṇa. One popular definition of pramā invokes the concept of anubhava. In ordinary usage, ‘anubhava’ means experience. But in the context of defining pramā it usually receives a more technical-sounding translation, like ‘presentational awareness’ or ‘non-mnemic awareness episode’. This paper considers how to interpret (...) the anubhava condition in Nyāya epistemology. On a presentationalist interpretation, the condition requires pramā to present the cognizer with its object in a perception-like way. On a deflationary interpretation, the condition only functions to exclude memory from counting as a pramāṇa. This paper defends a modest presentationalist interpretation. §2 and §3 present two kinds of arguments for this interpretation. §4 embeds the interpretation within a wider presentationalist framework, but stresses important disanalogies with the presentational conception of knowing Maria Rosa Antognazza claimed was “genuinely traditional” in the history of epistemology. (shrink)

It’s a well-recognized truth that what’s morally or politically required can come apart from what’s best for you individually. But this thought—the thought that what’s epistemically required may be divorced from what’s epistemically best for you—is mostly absent in epistemology. On the traditional picture, epistemic obligations are assumed to be self-regarding. In this paper, I argue against this dogma. I argue that we have other-regarding epistemic obligations and epistemic obligations to the groups we are members of. Further, I show how (...) these obligations can play a role in justifying the levying of epistemic taxes. (shrink)

In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also share some (...) characteristics of what Gendler calls ‘aliefs’. I proceed as follows: First, I develop a general theory of qualiefs. Second, I argue that implicit bias involves generic qualiefs that involve experiences that have been shaped by stereotypes. Elaborating on the particular content of a generic qualief, I explain why we are unaware of the bias even though it involves an experience. Third, I demonstrate that the qualief-model best explains the key features of implicit bias: it accounts for the biases´ implicitness and automaticity. Moreover, it elucidates how implicit bias can be insensitive to logical form and evidence, but at the same time it can serve as propositional input to further mental states. (shrink)

Paradigmatic echo chambers are widely thought to be epistemically unhealthy communities, but there is little agreement about what, exactly, makes them epistemically unhealthy. C. Thi Nguyen argues that echo chambers manipulate members into distrusting outsiders by preparing them for criticism in advance, a form of preemptive distrust. I argue that this kind of trust manipulation is neither necessary nor sufficient to identify the problem with echo chambers. Instead, I argue that the problem is that they exhibit a different kind of (...) trust manipulation: nihilistic distrust. The problem stems from two related issues. First, echo chambers exhibit asymmetrical trust relationships within the group, in which authority figures are highly trusted and critics are distrusted. This distrust is reactive rather than preemptive and is not directed at outsiders as such, so it is not best understood in the terms provided by Nguyen’s account. Second, by distrusting criticism, authorities in an echo chamber abandon the norm of being open to learning from one’s mistakes. By prioritizing the internal power dynamics of the group over their own epistemic standards, echo chambers exhibit a kind of epistemic nihilism. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the Hidden Grounds thesis: in paradigmatic cases of religious hinge commitments, these commitments are rational in virtue of being implicitly based on epistemic grounds. The key intuition behind my argument draws on the work of John Henry Newman. As I understand him, Newman holds that both religious and non-religious hinges are rational because they are grounded in epistemic considerations that are largely implicit and not necessarily accessible to reflection. This, in turn, explains their epistemic (...) stability. I begin by presenting the argument for the Hidden Grounds thesis. The subsequent sections support the premises of this argument. First, I introduce the concept of implicit basing and argue that some doxastic states are rational in virtue of being implicitly based on epistemic grounds. I then present Newman’s view on the implicit grounds of religious hinges and argue for its plausibility. I conclude by addressing several possible objections to my view. -/- . (shrink)

Reprints some well-known articles, some new translations and some hitherto unprinted articles by F. H. Parker and Y. Simon. In all, 22 contemporary authors are presented in a way which manages to cover most of the problems in epistemology. The selection tends to favor realism, but other views are ably represented by such authors as Perry, Wisdom, Lewis and Cassirer. This book could be used as a text in courses on knowledge theory or as an introduction to contemporary philosophy.-- D. (...) D. O. (shrink)

Epistemic trust involves a catch-22. We have to trust others in order to acquire knowledge, but we need knowledge in order to know who to trust. Part of our vulnerability is that we may not realize the extent of our dependence on others to make sense of things. I argue for a holistic conception of epistemic responsibility by examining the roles that different sources of information have on our understanding of the world. Instead of grounding epistemic responsibility in individual virtue (...) or testimonial promises, I argue that what makes a source epistemically accountable is discretionary control over information to which audiences are vulnerable. To explain the apparent credibility of implausible views, we must include a network of sources who corroborate a claim. I distinguish responsible and irresponsible networks by their openness to criticism and self-examination about the plausibility of their views. I conclude that given the holistic account of epistemic responsibility that I develop, even conduits like social media companies can be held epistemically responsible for the distrust and confusion that they promote. (shrink)

What is the epistemic function of imagination? Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that the epistemic function of imagination is exhausted by its ability to provide justification for modal beliefs, or that it is epistemically irrelevant. However, in recent years a number of philosophers have broken with the tradition by arguing that imagination can generate justification or knowledge about contingent empirical facts. This paper argues against this view by developing a new dilemma. The upshot of the argument is that although imagination does (...) have an important epistemic function that has evaded the traditional view, it cannot give rise to new empirical justification or knowledge. (shrink)

What kind of mental state is suspension, according to Sextus Empiricus? Recently, this question has been addressed by attributing to Sextus a metacognitive account of suspension (Dunphy 2023). Roughly, this means that, for Sextus, suspension constitutively involves a particular attitude – namely, a higher-order belief about one’s own epistemic standing. This reading clashes with the standard view, on which Sextan suspension is not a distinctive doxastic attitude. In this paper I challenge that revisionary interpretation and use it as a springboard (...) to argue that Sextan suspension should instead be understood as a kind of affective state. (shrink)

This essay posits the "Philosophy of the Zaguán" as a conceptual framework for contemporary Latin American thought, proposing a dialectical overcoming of the denunciatory phases characteristic of Liberation Philosophy and Decolonial Studies. It is argued that the Latin American ontological condition can be defined as a "Being-in-the-Zaguán," a constitutive form of existence within the liminal threshold between the self and the other. From this ontology, a necessary epistemological inference is derived: the "Threshold Knowledge" (Saber de Umbral). This mode of knowing—analyzed (...) through its principles of methodological mestizaje (sentipensar), situated corporeality, and a hermeneutics of critical hospitality— is presented as a rigorous and original paradigm for producing knowledge from and for the region, in dialogue with the world. The analysis is grounded in an articulated re-reading of Rodolfo Kusch, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, Gloria Anzaldúa, Orlando Fals Borda, and Édouard Glissant. (shrink)

Este artigo investiga a natureza epistemológica do ato de crer, buscando esclarecer em que medida a crença pode ser considerada uma instância legítima do conhecimento ou um estado mental com valor epistêmico. A análise parte da concepção da crença como uma disposição psicológica representacional associada a uma proposição predicativa, cuja validade e veracidade são assumidas a previamente pelo sujeito. Defende-se que, para que uma crença possua status epistêmico pleno, ela deve ser devidamente justificada e verdadeira, resultando de um processo cognitivo (...) orientado à realidade. São examinadas as implicações dos experimentos de Gettier e as abordagens de Alvin Plantinga sobre warrant, confrontando-se perspectivas internalistas e externalistas de justificação. Conclui-se que o crer, embora psicologicamente necessário, é epistemicamente válido apenas quando se abre ao crivo racional e ontológico da verdade, podendo, sob certas condições, coincidir com conhecimento. A crença é, assim, concebida como um estado mental que participa da economia do saber, mas cujo valor epistêmico é condicional, escalonado e dependente de seu enraizamento na realidade. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel framework—phase epistemology—for understanding knowledge as an emergent property of structural resonance, rather than as a product of inferential or probabilistic processes. At the heart of this model lies the epistemic vector: a directional trajectory of intelligibility that arises through asymptotic phase coherence between observer and observed. Rather than treating knowledge as representation or correspondence, the paper situates it within a recursive phase alignment that evolves over time toward topological stabilization. Drawing from quantum theory, philosophy of (...) mind and structural realism, the paper suggests that semantic collapse—the moment when ambiguity resolves into meaning—is governed not by logic alone but by relational coherence. This collapse mirrors the wave-function reduction in quantum measurement and links it to cognitive interpretation. The observer is not a passive recipient of information but an active phase participant whose internal structure aligns with latent fields—including what is metaphorically framed here as dark matter or dark energy. The proposed epistemic framework bridges the quantum–classical divide through the notion of asymptotic cognition, in which consciousness functions as a boundary condition for the stabilization of meaning. Improbability, in this context, is not a statistical deviation but a phase singularity—a point of maximum informational tension and epistemic reorganization. Ultimately, this paper argues for a redefinition of knowledge as a dynamic topology of coherence. It invites new perspectives on cognition, agency, intentionality and the structure of reality itself—where to know is to resonate and to resonate is to shape the possible. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I (...) discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission. (shrink)

The reliability of one´s memory is far from certain. Have you ever misplaced an item, forgotten a name or gotten the date wrong? Everyday situations can introduce doubt about our memorial faculties. This raises epistemological questions: Can we trust our memory as a source of knowledge? If memory is fallible, how can we justify beliefs that depend on it? Andrew Moon` global skeptical argument about memory states that we lack knowledge or warrant when it comes to trusting our memory as (...) a reliable faculty. His argument is the following: I. I can know a proposition on the basis of a faculty only if I know that faculty is reliable. II. I cannot know that my memory is reliable. III. Therefore, I cannot know a proposition on the basis of my memory. Moon’s stance on premise I. is that any reasoning to support the conclusion that one’s memory is reliable will either result in epistemic circularity or fail to sufficiently justify the belief. While he does offer a positive response to circularity by distinguishing between declarative and non-declarative memory, his solution primarily applies to non-declarative memory, such as remembering of how to ride a bike. Within the scope of this text, however, I will focus exclusively on declarative memory, episodic, as in remembering walking to the grocery store, in thought experiments and semantic, as in deriving general conclusions like "going to the grocery store involves leaving home", in deriving conclusions. Moon introduces a refinement to premise I. by suggesting that unless we encounter strong reasons to doubt the reliability of memory, we can trust it as a source of knowledge. This condition is meant to avoid over-intellectualization by not requiring explicit knowledge of memory’s reliability. The text is structured into three sections. In Section A, I begin by introducing Memory-Skepticism. We will build on Moon´s skeptical argument and consider whether we can maintain confidence in our memorial faculties by drawing on Moore’s distinction between epistemic and dialectical issues. I will further demonstrate how an inference to the best explanation can help overcome skeptical challenges. Turning to premise II., Moon argues that knowing whether memory is reliable involves reasoning in its favor. Even if we consider memory to be non-inferential in nature, that is, basic and independent of other beliefs, explaining concepts and theories still requires background knowledge, which, in turn, relies on memory. Regardless of memory´s innate reliability, we are still left with the need of avoiding either epistemic circularity or insufficient justification. However, not all circularity is problematic. Moon introduces the concept of benign circularity, which refers to circular reasoning that does not undermine a belief’s warrant. For instance, if I have no reason to doubt the reliability of my memory, I can use it to recall past experiences and form the belief that my memory is reliable. In Section B, I will build on this idea by starting with Foundationalism and develop Memory-Reliabilism as a contender theory for understanding the reliability of memory. I will try to flesh out the theory in detail. Finally, in Section C, I will turn to Memory-Knowledge and explore how memory can function as a source of knowledge. By drawing on Moon´s cases about forgotten evidence and stored beliefs, we will formulate a memory-related Gettier Case and analyze it for its justification and evidence. By focusing on sensitivity and E=K, I hope to expand on Moon´s approach to memory-skepticism. To narrow the focus of this text, we will consider memory to be non-inferential in nature. That is, memory-based beliefs are justified independently of any inferential relations to other beliefs. The act of remembering itself acts as a source of immediate justification. By examining how memory fits with foundationalist and reliabilist perspectives, I aim to explore memory´s capacity to function as a trustworthy source of knowledge. (shrink)

Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...) will explore a range of structural questions that have been overlooked in regard to our awareness of facts, showing that the degreed structure of awareness has significant implications for our understanding of knowledge. (shrink)

The 1999 volume in the series "Logical Analysis of Language" edited by Nina D. Arutyunova and Irina B. Levontina. The contributions to this volume discuss logical, gnoseological and anthropological problems with focus on natural language ontologies and the image of human across diverse languages and cultures.

This book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the epistemology of science. It not only introduces readers to the general epistemological discussion of the nature of knowledge, but also provides key insights into the particular nuances of scientific knowledge. No prior knowledge of philosophy or science is assumed by The Nature of Scientific Knowledge. Nevertheless, the reader is taken on a journey through several core concepts of epistemology and philosophy of science that not only explores the characteristics of the (...) scientific knowledge of individuals but also the way that the development of scientific knowledge is a particularly social endeavor. The topics covered in this book are of keen interest to students of epistemology and philosophy of science as well as science educators interested in the nature of scientific knowledge. In fact, as a result of its clear and engaging approach to understanding scientific knowledge The Nature of Scientific Knowledge is a book that anyone interested in scientific knowledge, knowledge in general, and any of a myriad of related concepts would be well advised to study closely. (shrink)

In this chapter, Rob Lovering provides some possible answers to the question of whether God—understood as an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, spiritual, personal deity who created the universe—knows what it’s like to undergo a positive, psychoactive, drug-induced experience; or, as he puts it for short, whether God knows what it’s like to get high. For either God knows what it’s like to get high or he does not and, in any case, interesting metaphysical, epistemological, and value theoretical questions arise. Lovering concludes (...) that, collectively, the possible answers he provides to the question of whether God knows what it’s like to get high generate an intriguing (and paradoxical) conclusion: It is hard to see how God could know what it’s like to get high, but it is also hard to see how he could not know what it’s like to get high. (shrink)

In “The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response,” DeVito and McNabb (Int J Philos Relig 92(2):91–98, 2022, 10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3) propose a Wittgensteinian argument against Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. In their paper, they seek to establish symmetry between a component of Plantinga’s premise and the premise of the radical skeptic. The first premise of Plantinga’s argument assumes the possibility of doubting the reliability of our cognitive abilities. The Radical skeptic doubts we have rational grounds to refute being brains in (...) vats. DeVito and McNaab use hinge epistemology and Pritchard’s strategy against the radical skeptic to undermine Plantinga’s premise. This paper offers an alternative argument based on hinge epistemology against Plantinga’s argument. Relying on the various types of certainties Wittgenstein discussed, I argue that some scientific facts are among our certainties and hinges. Evolution (i.e., the theory of evolution by natural selection) is a well-established scientific fact and a hinge. As a result, in Plantinga’s first premise, we have two hinges: evolution and the reliability of our cognitive abilities. I will argue that given that hinges cannot trump one another, we can have these two hinges in place, and therefore, by endorsing hinge epistemology, there is another argument that shows why Plantinga’s argument cannot undermine naturalism if one accepts evolution. (shrink)

When is it (epistemically) rational to suspend judgment on a proposition? Before addressing this question, one has to clarify what suspension of judgment (in short: suspension) is and establish rationality standards for the attitudes that constitute suspension. Ideally, suspending can be reduced to attitudes for which one already has established rationality standards. This paper distinguishes two kinds of suspension, weak and strong, and offers a reductionist account of suspension based on credence. However, it does not reduce suspension to credence alone (...) but takes a higher-order perspective on credence into account. Other doxastic attitudes such as belief and doubtful belief are also reexamined and defined in the light of this higher-order perspective. (shrink)

Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give three examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was not scaled in (...) 1924. The predicate “greverest” is interdefinable with the predicate “green”: the predicate "green" applies to an object if either the object is greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-greverest" applies to an object if either the object is non-green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is green and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-green" applies to an object if either the object is non-greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. We know that the famous diamond called Golden Jubilee is not green. If someone (a greverest-speaker) informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest, we would automatically come to know Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a greverest object can only be either 1) green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) non-green (in case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “greverest” that we are faced with case 2, the case in which the object is both non-green and greverest, and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. Vice versa, if someone informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not greverest, we would automatically come to know that Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a non-greverest object can only be either 1) non-green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) green (in the case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also non-greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “non-greverest” that we are faced with case 1, the case in which the object is both non-green and non-greverest, and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. At the moment no one has yet been able to convince the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest. I am skeptical that anyone will demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether a specific object is greverest; but I would be happy if someone could demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether an object is greverest: that would be a good news for historical studies. The paper continues with two examples, including an example about the predicate "grue". (shrink)

In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as “S should do X.” The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's (...) actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one's potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, (...) e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts. (shrink)

Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of (...) suspension, I argue that all possible credal accounts face serious challenges. They either (i) falsify central claims that uphold the credal picture itself or (ii) do not permit suspension in cases where it is permissible or (iii) rule out the possibility of plainly possible confidence comparisons. (shrink)

This is a 12-page article on the life and work in philosophy of religion by William P. Alston (1921-2009).

This collection of newly commissioned essays, edited by NYU philosophers Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, resumes the current surge of interest in the proper explication of the notion of a priori. The authors discuss the relations of the a priori to the notions of definition, meaning, justification, and ontology, explore how the concept figured historically in the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein, and address its role in the contemporary philosophies of logic, mathematics, mind, and science. The editors’ Introduction (...) familiarizes the reader with the issues that are to be explored in detail in later parts of the anthology. (shrink)

The imagination is ubiquitous in our cognitive lives. You might imagine rotating a puzzle piece to determine whether it fits in an open space, or imagine what things are like from another person's perspective to figure out how they are feeling, or imagine a new rug in your living room to determine whether it matches the color of your sofa. These examples are mundane, but they point to a deep philosophical puzzle: how could merely imagining something give you any reason (...) to believe that it is true? After all, you can imagine anything you want to, from the fictional to the fantastical. This has led many philosophers to be deeply skeptical of the epistemic value of the imagination. When imagination is accorded a justificatory role, it is typically limited to beliefs about what is metaphysically possible. More recently, some philosophers have begun to push back against this orthodoxy by arguing that the imagination can justify empirical beliefs about the actual world. But even then, most contemporary discussions focus on whether the imagination can justify empirical belief, rather than on how the imagination justifies empirical belief, thereby leaving many central questions about the epistemology of the imagination unanswered. This dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna by canvassing the theoretical landscape of this exciting new literature and developing an account of the epistemic structure of the imagination. The first chapter sets the stage for the rest of the dissertation by reviewing extant arguments for and against the view that the imagination can justify empirical belief before posing a new argument in its favor. The second chapter argues that imaginative justification is mediate but non-inferential; it depends on one’s prior justification without depending on an inference from one’s prior beliefs. The third chapter argues that the imagination is informative—it can represent new content and generate new justification—in virtue of its analog representational format. The fourth and final chapter argues that some imaginings just are beliefs, and that this grounds their justificatory force. Together, the arguments of this dissertation suggest that the imagination is a distinctive kind of ampliative reasoning, and that it plays this cognitive and epistemic role by combining the analog representational format of imagery with the evidence-sensitive function of belief. (shrink)