Neoplatonists

This article suggests a novel approach to the study of the argumentative structure of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (ET). Instead of studying it through the prism of the Elements of Euclid (EG), this novel approach proposes an evaluation of ET’s argumentative structure based on Proclus’ reflections about the genre of stoicheiôsis and the methods of dialectic and geometry. Thus, I argue that studies under the suggested form of evaluation should standardize the conceptual framework of their analyses about the features of (...) ET’s argumentative structure, explicating their relevance for the interpretation of the text’s system of logical relations. Moreover, this article presents some examples of editorial enhancements made by editors of ET clarifying the argumentative structure of the text. With these examples, I will show how these enhancements help us clarify the argumentative structure of ET. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a revised account of two fundamental conceptual structures in late antique Platonism: the scale of virtues (βαθμοί τῶν ἀρετῶν) and the scale of inspired madness (βαθμοί τῶν μανίων). Both structures are invoked by Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonists between the 5th-6th centuries CE, serving to organize discussions of ethics and epistemology, metaphysics, hagiography, and reading curricula. I focus on apparently contradictory evidence for the highest tiers of the scale of virtues, as well as its relationship (...) to the inspirations or maniai, drawing on Hermias (c.410-450 CE), Damascius (c.462-after 538 CE), and Olympiodorus (c.500-after 565 CE). While many interpreters have reasonably found these latter testimonies irreconcilable, I argue that all three witnesses share a consistent view with one another and with Proclus (412-485 CE). I conclude that the stages of virtue and inspiration may be pictured as parallel scales, which transform the human soul (psychē) in comparable ways, although inspiration reaches further. The Porphyrian sage might be compared to a painter, alternating attention between her intelligible model (paradeigma) and the ‘canvas’ of her habits, in order to adapt the latter to the former. The post-Iamblichean sage strives to act in the very moment that she receives intelligible illumination, like a dancer moving to the music of inspiration. (shrink)

The modal-existential account of ontological priority was, until relatively recently, the standard account in both the scholarship of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics. This paper proposes that the dominance of this account can be traced to the Platonist Commentators on Aristotle (300–600 CE), who explicated the notion of priority Aristotle ascribes to Plato in modal and existential terms and assumed that Aristotle adopted the same Platonist notion of priority. Specifically, the paper examines how Porphyry and Philoponus addressed two major challenges (...) in their efforts to ascribe the modal-existential notion of priority to Aristotle in their commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. The first challenge is to explain how sensible particular substances could enjoy modal-existential priority over other things, while the second is to reconcile Aristotle’s ascription of priority to sensible substances with the Platonist privileging intelligible substances over sensible ones. The paper shows that Porphyry and Philoponus addressed these challenges by supplementing the modal-existential account of priority with assumptions about the natures of the things involved. This supplementation may help to explain why the limitations of the modal-existential account remained largely unnoticed until recently. (shrink)

Prezentul studiu ofera o traducere romaneasca adnotata a unui tratat scurt atribuit lui al-Kindi, transmis in editia lui Muhammad Abd al-Hadi Abu Rida sub titlul al-qawl fi al-nafs al-mukhtasar min kitab Aristu wa Filatun wa sair al-falasifa. Textul prezinta o expunere concisa a doctrinei filosofilor despre natura sufletului, cunoasterea inteligibila si destinul spiritual al omului. -/- Articolul prezinta contextul istoric si intelectual al operei lui al-Kindi in cadrul miscarii de traducere din Bagdad, discuta traditia textuala a tratatului si principiile filologice (...) ale traducerii, iar in partea centrala ofera traducerea romaneasca a textului insotita de note explicative. -/- Analiza filosofica arata ca tratatul trebuie inteles ca o reflectie asupra naturii sufletului si asupra finalitatii vietii filosofice, in care elemente aristotelice sunt combinate cu motive platonice si neoplatonice caracteristice filosofiei arabe timpurii. (shrink)

This essay explores the ethical and soteriological implications of the Stoic and Neoplatonic conception of eternal recurrence and the cosmic cycle, taking as its point of reference a lecture delivered in 1928 by the Japanese philosopher Shūzō Kuki, ‘La notion du temps et la reprise sur le temps en Orient’ (The Notion of Time and Repetition in Oriental Time). Kuki argues that the ‘Oriental’ notion of time culminates in the idea of eternal recurrence—an idea he also finds in ancient Greek (...) philosophy, particularly in the Stoics. What he calls the Bushidō approach to emancipation from time, in contrast to the ‘Buddhist’ approach, resonates with the Stoic cosmic perspective, especially as explored by Pierre Hadot. Plotinus adopts a conception of the cosmic cycle that reflects Stoic views, yet as a Platonist he appears to affirm the ‘Buddhist’ model of emancipation—an apparent ambivalence that proves philosophically suggestive. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Bryson’s Oikonomikos is a fascinating example of the oikonomia genre in several different respects. Although the problematic transmission of this Neopythagorean text makes studying it a challenge, such effort is well-rewarded with an elaborate argument which paints the human bodily constitution, the central bodily functions and oikonomic activities as intrinsically linked. Focusing on Bryson’s argument which roots oikonomic behaviour in human biology, I explore the underlying conceptualisation of human nature and contextualise it within relevant (...) philosophical and scientific traditions. (shrink)

An aporia posed by Theophrastus prompts Priscian to describe the process by which perception formally assimilates to its object as a progressive perfection. I present an interpretation of Priscian’s account of perception’s progressive perfection, and I consider a dilemma for the general class of accounts to which Priscian’s belongs based on related problems raised by Plotinus and Aquinas. Doing so reveals the explanatory structure of Priscian’s account and the limitations of the general class of accounts to which Priscian’s belongs.

This article presents a new interpretation of the later Neoplatonists’ reading of Chaldean Oracles fragment 138. In doing so, it exploits, for the first time in this context, Proclus’ distinctive interpretation of the myth of Er in In Rempublicam II. The central argument posits that the so-called pure and perfect souls (e.g., Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato) are tantamount to the highest theurgists as ‘functional’ angels—i.e., they function as angels when engaging in their highest activity. By drawing on Iamblichus, Proclus, and Hermias (...) of Alexandria, the article thus delves into the profound synthesis of philosophy and revelation in Late Antiquity. (shrink)

In On Divine Names the Christian neoplatonist Dionysius the Areopagite (~500 AD) develops a philosophical mode in which the form of the text follows from and advances his topic. This has not been recognized mostly because modern philosophical treatises have followed primarily the expository line of the text. However, Dionysius’ topic here, how properly to name God or as he would put it more broadly, how to praise God (hymnein), requires a technique of a certain indirection. In short, the reader (...) cannot be led by argument alone to appropriate naming of the divine. Instead, the reader is led to a performative, almost liturgical philosophizing. This paper will consider in particular Dionysius’ opening chapters that serve to orient the reader to such a performative mode and to Dionysius’ modification of neoplatonic thinking on naming the divine. (shrink)

In this volume, the relationships between two of the most vital currents in Western thought are examined by a group of nineteen internationally known specialists in a variety of disciplines—classics, patristics, philosophy, theology, history of ideas, and literature. The contributing scholars discuss Neoplatonic theories about God, creation, man, and salvation, in relation to the ways in which they were adopted, adapted, or rejected by major Christian thinkers of five periods: Patristic, Later Greek and Byzantine, Medieval, Renaissance, and Modern. Contributors include (...) G.-H. Allard, A. Hilary Armstrong, Elizabeth Bieman, Linos Benakis, Henry Blumenthal, Mary T. Clark, Norris Clarke, John Dillon, Cornelio Fabro, John N. Findlay, Maurice de Gandillac, Edward P. Mahoney, Bernard McGinn, Dominic J. O’Meara, John J. O’Meara, Jean Pépin, Mary Carman Rose, Henri-Dominique Saffrey, Charles B. Schmitt, and Gérard Verbeke. (shrink)

This paper proposes a taxonomy to systematise the diverse ways in which Platonists appropriated foreign concepts and terminology. Through a case study, it demonstrates that Platonists did not merely replicate foreign notions but rather assimilated them into their own framework. It argues that such appropriations were justified from a Platonist perspective. Platonists accorded absolute epistemic authority to Plato, and they hence conceived of all truthful beliefs as inherently Platonic, whether in nature or origin.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd century CE), a key figure in Hellenic philosophy, influenced Arabic-speaking thinkers through two distinct interpretations: a Neoplatonized Aristotelianism and a faithful Peripatetic approach. In the treatise entitled Fī l-tadbīrāt al-falakiyya (On the Governments of the Celestial Spheres), he explores themes like good arrangement (al-sharḥ wa-l-niẓām), reason (naṭīq), and the rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqa). These concepts frame the emanative process where the First Cause creates and governs the cosmos. Nature, embodying divine power, compensates for human imperfections with (...) the rational soul while maintaining cosmic harmony. This study highlights key passages, illustrating Alexander Arabus’ contribution to Arabic Aristotelianism. (shrink)

Despite a short eclipse during the Hellenistic period, Aristotle’s Categories has been one of the most influential texts in the history of philosophy. Yet, while Aristotle was the first to speak about “categories” and to devote an entire treatise to them, one may wonder whether he was really the first to develop a theory of the categorial structure of reality. Contrary to the majority of modern scholars, many of the ancient Platonists claimed the invention of a full-blown categorial theory for (...) Plato. Rightly or wrongly, they either found in Plato’s dialogues doctrines that could rival, or even surpass, Aristotle’s categories, or they developed a set of Platonic “categories” on the basis of Plato’s work. (shrink)

Book 6 of Eusebius’ Church History contains a fascinating fragment of Porphyry’s Against the Christians in which the latter lambasts Origen’s allegorical reading of the Jewish Scriptures. Though many aspects of this text have received abundant scholarly attention, relatively little has been written on the theory underlying the critique, that is, why exactly Porphyry thought Christian allegories were illegitimate. Furthermore, among the few scholars who have treated this topic at any length, there is no consensus about the precise nature of (...) Porphyry’s objection. In this article I will argue that Porphyry denies the legitimacy of Christian allegories because he thinks the texts they exegete are clear and simple. They are not, for Porphyry, full of the mysteries and enigmas that indicate allegorical exegesis is appropriate. Consequently, Porphyry understands Christian allegories as an attempt to save a text that is plainly immoral rather than genuinely mysterious. (shrink)

Refutes the often-held view that Proclus - in line with other Neoplatonists - adheres to the idea of an essential harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Enables a reassessment of the reception and authority of Aristotle in late antiquity, a crucial period for the transmission of Aristotelian thought.

In a series of specially commissioned essays, an international team of scholars examine both Platonism's metaphysical principles (the One or the Form of the Good and the Indefinite Dyad: the principles that account for unity and multiplicity) and the tradition's role as a source for ethical and political principles. In honor of Lloyd Gerson's remarkable contribution to Platonic scholarship, the full breadth of the tradition has been explored: from Plato's own manipulation of the wisdom that preceded him via his students (...) in the Old Academy, Speusippus and Aristotle, and on to the Middle Platonic (Alcinous) and Neoplatonic (Plotinus, Proclus, Damascius) phases. An extensive section on Christian Platonism examines the Platonic appropriations of Cyril of Alexandria, as well as the great mediator of Plato in the Latin West, Marsilio Ficino, while the volume traces the influence of Platonic principles up to Heidegger. Key topics in this volume include time and eternity, the origin of evil, the planetary orbits, the status of nature, and theurgy. This Festschrift includes Gerson's intellectual autobiography in the light of Platonic principles, particularly as a justification for libertarianism. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the use of the concept and image of divine Sophia in the works of Philo, the great Jewish scholar from Alexandria, and Origen, who was raised in the same city two centuries later and certainly read Philo’s texts in detail. Both authors describe two different aspects or phases of Wisdom: one that is more divine and transcendent, and the other that is closely related to creation. Our analysis of this twofold (...) orientation of Sophia will be eminently philosophical, since what interests us is to show how both authors apply logical and metaphysical principles from their contemporary Greek schools to divine Wisdom, while at the same time creating an original conception beyond those influences. The main hypothesis is that, when judged against Philo's thought and the Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean categories of Absolute (τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό) and Relative (τὸ πρός τι), Origen’s notion of Sophia reveals unexplored and fundamental aspects of his Trinitarian doctrine and opens new questions for future research. In particular, the immanent relation between the Father and the Son may be conceived as a full and absolute unity, although not as an identity of essence or consubstantiality ‒according to later Nicene orthodoxy‒ but as a unique sort of Absolute-Relative. (shrink)

In the Consolation of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy leads Boethius through a series of obstacles that prevent him from finding happiness within his prison cell: the role that luck and misfortune play in our affairs, the false paths to happiness in comparison with the true journey, the problem of evil and the disproportion between people’s lives and eschatological deserts, and, finally, whether God’s providential order necessitates our outcomes or if we can choose freely to pursue the happy life. As the pair (...) discuss each problem, the same argumentative move and countermove play out. Boethius, forgetful of what he had learned from Philosophy long ago on account of his grief, blames the very nature of reality itself for each of the problems that beset him. He thinks that Fortune has taken from him all that is good and that God’s providence only extends to the non-human world. Philosophy, by contrast, argues in each case that the problem at hand is, in fact, no problem at all when we see reality rightly. In each case, Philosophy shows that it isn’t reality that’s to blame for the problem at hand but instead human ignorance’s misunderstanding of the true nature of reality. Boethius’s conversation with Philosophy showcases a puzzling feature of self-knowledge: on the one hand, too much attention to the world (e.g., fortune’s wiles) is the problem and self-inquiry (e.g., the nature of one’s desires) is the solution, but on the other hand, too much attention to one’s self (e.g., attention to passions and limitations) is the problem and turning toward recognizing the true structure of the world is the solution. Philosophy seems to indicate that both poles are true, and the task is to determine how best to clarify how. After showcasing the dialogue’s argumentative pattern, I argue that, in Boethius’s case, each of his problems, as well as his misery in general, are caused by his ignorance and self-deception. Boethius’s ignorance is, in this case, the more proximate cause of his misery, but underlying his ignorance is an act of self-deception that causes him to be ignorant in the first place. As Philosophy tells Boethius early on, he already knows what she plans to teach him (more accurately, of what she plans to remind him). Nevertheless, he has forgotten what he has known and, as a result, is more the architect of his own misery than is Fortune or any of the events that have befallen him. Wounded by grief, he has allowed his affective response to his misfortune to becloud his understanding. As Philosophy says, he is unhappy because he has “forgotten what he is.” He has forgotten himself precisely because of the way in which he has allowed his affective responses to rule in his soul. Hence, while the ultimate cure for Boethius’s misery will be a newly rediscovered knowledge that reality itself is providentially structured, Philosophy must begin by soothing Boethius’s passions and undoing the damage that they have wrought on his understanding of the world. Philosophy cannot turn Boethius’s intellect until she has first turned his passions (cf. Republic 518b-d), which, while still wrongly-turned and governing the soul, are liable to lead to tremendous intellectual mistakes precisely because they are blind to the true nature of reality (cf. Phaedrus 247c). I argue in conclusion that the Consolation is unified by the theme of self-deception as the primary cause of philosophical misery. Boethius is upset primarily because he has convinced himself that he is otherwise than he is and that reality is otherwise than it is rather than because of what has happened to him, contrary to his own view of things. Philosophy’s argumentative strategy suggests that self-deception can only be undone by attending to it as a problem besetting the whole soul, not just the intellectual part of the soul. We thus have good warrant for thinking that simply rational responses to ignorance will be fruitless when ignorance is caused by or accompanied by a moral failing. (shrink)

The papers in this anthology, are collected from the papers given at the 20th annual conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies in Catania, Sicily. The authors of the twenty chapters of this anthology cover a wide range of topics and of philosophers, including Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, the Emperor Julian, Hierocles, Proclus, Syrianus, Olympiodorus, Boethius, Albertus Magnus, Catherine of Genoa, Robert Grosseteste , and Carl Jung. -/- Edited by R. Loredana Cardullo, John F. Finamore and Chiara Militello. Other contributors: (...) Michele Abbate, Ryan M. Brown, Claudia Lo Casto, Jean-Michel Charrue, Piera De Piano, Kevin Corrigan, Paula Pico Estrada, Camille Guigon, Maja Kaleziæ, Tamar Khubulava, Marios Koutsoukos, Bruce MacLennan, Donka Markus, Aurelia Maruggi, Tomáš Nejeschleba, Ina Schall, Marcin Trepczyñski, Sergey Trostyanskiy. (shrink)

Within a broadly Thomistic frame, this paper shows how simple apophaticism in the theology of Pseudo‐Dionysius the Areopagite is the more fitting mode of knowing the triune God, beyond the use of all divine names. Specifically, we will proceed using the work of Father Bernard Lonergan, SJ on theological fittingness. After setting forth Father Lonergan's understanding of fittingness, the paper will proceed through Dionysius's cataphatic names, apophatic names, and apophatic silence. The cataphatic and apophatic names, while true, useful, and fittingly (...) said of God, will be shown to be imperfectly applied to God. As such, their fittingness pales in comparison to the simple silence of the intellect orientated towards God, despite such pure apophaticism's dissimilarity to normal human intellectual operations. (shrink)

This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to 'improve' on his achievement. (...) The significance of this development is highlighted through parallel studies of the Hellenistic debate over the status of Jewish culture; and of the philosophical beginnings of Christianity, where the notions of 'orthodoxy' and 'heresy' in particular are shown to be tools in the construction of a unified history of Christian philosophy stretching back to primitive antiquity. (shrink)

I argue that in his commentary on Epictetus’ Encheiridion, Simplicius derives a method by which his students can enter into the process of self-constitution, which is only achieved through completion of the study of Plato’s dialogues. The result of following the method is the attainment of a perspective consonant with the level of political virtue, which I call ‘political subjectivity’. This is a speculative interpretation of the effect the student would. experience in following the method, accomplished through analyses of Simplicius’ (...) interpretation of Epictetus’ concept of to eph’ hēmīn and the related prohairesis. I complement this with an analysis of the metaphysical foundation Simplicius gives the method in light of Charles Taylor’s notion of ‘strong evaluation’. In this way, I show how Simplicius adapts these concepts to his Neoplatonic psychology and virtue theory to make the method serve as preparation for the development of virtue prior to study of Plato. (shrink)

Part of the material contained in the present book was presented in the form of a lecture course given by me at the University of Oxford in I962 as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer. Scripps College and the Claremont Graduate School contributed to the cost of research and publication. The staff of the Honnold Library, Claremont, California, was extremely obliging in matters concerning inter-library loans. The page proofs were read in part by Professor Richard Walzer, the University of Oxford. Mr. Salih (...) Alich, Blaisdell Institute, Claremont, California, corrected many errors occurring in the transliteration from Arabic in Section V. To all these institutions and persons I express my most sincere thanks. The manuscript was essentially completed early in I960. Scripps College, Claremont, California. TABLES OF CONTENTS I GENERAL I Introduction 1-3 II Three neoaristotelian and neoplatonic concepts: mono­ psychism, mysticism, metaconsciousness III Three A verroistic problems I Collective immortality and collective perfection in A verroes and Dante 2 Ecstatic conjunction, death, and immortality in the individual 102 94- 3 The double truth theory and the problem of per­ sonal immortality in A verroes 102-II3 IV Collective consciousness, double consciousness, and metaconsciousness (unconscious consciousness) in Kant and some post-Kantians 114-137 V Select bibliography of translations of philosophical works by al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, ibn-Bagga, and Averroes 138-150 VI Index of names 151-154 11 ANALYTICAL OF SECTION 11 I The starting point: Plotinus, Enn. V 1. Plotinus' principle l)'rL oux ~~c. u VOU 't"oc V01)'t"CX. (shrink)