Knowledge

Sa papel na ito, tatalakayin natin ang ilang mahahalagang isyu hinggil sa kolektibong imahinasyon at ang ugnayan nito sa realidad at katotohanan. Dapat nating lapatan ang paksang ito sa loob ng isang konseptwal na balangkas, na sinusundan ng isang makatotohanang pagsusuri na tumutugma sa mga napatutunayang realidad sa pag-uugali. Gagamitin natin hindi lamang ang metodolohiya, kundi higit sa lahat ang mga prinsipyo at proposisyon ng analitikal na pilosopiya, na tiyak na magiging maliwanag sa buong pag-aaral at matutukoy sa pamamagitan ng (...) mga sangguniang inilarawan ni Perez [1]. -/- “Iginiit ni Rabossi (1975) na maaaring matukoy ang analitikal na pilosopiya sa pamamagitan ng pagsasaalang-alang sa ilang pamilyar na katangian. Iminumungkahi niya ang mga sumusunod na pamilyar na katangian: isang positibong saloobin tungo sa siyentipikong kaalaman; isang maingat na saloobin tungo sa metapisika; isang konsepsyon ng pilosopiya bilang isang konseptwal na gawain, na kumukuha ng pagsusuri ng nilalaman bilang pamamaraan; isang malapit na ugnayan sa pagitan ng wika at pilosopiya; isang paghahangad na makahanap ng mga argumentatibong sagot sa mga problemang pilosopikal; at isang paghahanap para sa konseptwal na kalinawan.” Ang mga sentral na konseptong ito ay kinapapalooban ng nilalamang kultural, panlipunan, relihiyoso, siyentipiko, pilosopikal, moral, at politikal, na may kinalaman sa indibidwal at kolektibong pag-iral ng bawat isa sa atin. Sa artikulong ito, hindi kami magtatalakay o magpapakita. Hindi layunin naming sistematikong pumuna o patunayan ang anumang bagay sa anumang paraan. Ang gawaing ito ay batay sa analitikal na pagninilay. Maghihinuha lamang kami nang malawakan at malalim hangga't maaari at ipahayag ang mga resulta ng aming mga saloobin. Sa kabila ng multidisiplinaryong kalikasan ng paksa at ng metodolohikal na pagiging bukas na tanggapin ang mga kontribusyon mula sa anumang larangan ng agham, ang gawaing ito ay saklaw ng sikolohiya at ontolohiya o, sa madaling salita, panlipunan at ontolohikal na sikolohiya. Ang malayang metodolohiyang gumagabay sa ganitong mga pagninilay ay sumasaklaw at isinasaalang-alang ang lahat ng bagay na naaayon sa pilosopikal at sikolohikal na epistemolohiya. Hindi layunin ng metodolohiyang ito na maghanap ng ebidensya, kundi simpleng tuklasin ang ugnayan ng mga umiiral na ebidensya—anumang uri at saklaw—upang makabuo ng magkakaugnay na kahulugan para sa mga tunay na bagay. Marami sa mga dakilang isipan, sa anumang panahon, ay hindi kailanman naghanap ng mga patunay, teorya, o sistematisasyon. Ang mga isipang ito ay simpleng nag-iisip, nagmumuni-muni, at sa pamamagitan ng kaliwanagan ng kanilang kababaang-loob ay nagawang mas mapalapit sa katotohanan. Sila ang magiging ating sanggunian at huwarang susundin. Tiyak na hindi natin matatagpuan ang katotohanan, ngunit maaari tayong maging tiyak sa isang bagay: sa maraming sandali, mapapalapit tayo sa katotohanan at, sa lahat ng oras, lalayo tayo sa hindi katotohanan at kabulaanan. Ang pangunahing saklaw ng pag-aaral na ito ay obserbahan kung paano ang ilan sa mga mahahalagang katangiang ebolusyonaryo ng sangkatauhan, tulad ng pagkamalikhain, imahinasyon, at asosasyon, ay maaaring maging isang mapanganib na sakit na naninirahan sa malabong anino ng katalinuhan. (shrink)

We commonly understand objective reality as existing independently of any observer. However, scientists can only access reality through acts of observation, measurement, and conceptual framing. This essay explores the resulting tension. I argue that different forms of inquiry may share a common structural limitation: reality cannot be interrogated independently from the framework through which it is interrogated. If so, the problem of true objectivity may lie beyond our current epistemic horizon. This essay is a step in a broader exploration of (...) the limits of knowability. (shrink)

The twenty-first century is characterized by drastic changes in epistemology, as a result of academical shifts in important fields since the 60s. The decline of metanarratives – defined by Lyotard as grand-narratives about narratives (which, in turn, legitimate historically-situated events) – provided a fertile research ground for new methodological practices based on sharp critiques of Enlightenment rationality. One of the founding authors of the “postmodern condition” (as Lyotard labels it) is Michel Foucault. Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical project regarding epistemology redefined (...) our conceptual approach to knowledge and its legitimation, by situating both concepts in specific historical contexts, at specific historical times. Recurring themes in the Foucauldian project involve skepticism about objective truths, anti-historicism and subjectivity. In this dissertation, I seek to answer the question “Why is Foucauldian methodology relevant in the (post-)modern world, especially in light of the decline of metanarratives?”. The main goal is to address the role of Foucault’s works in the rethinking of historically given narratives and expose the contingency of practices embroiled in power-knowledge relations, while keeping in mind the dispersibility of the origins of those narratives. This is particularly relevant under the framework of an emptying of over-arching narratives about knowledge and the human condition, i.e., the Lyotardian metanarrative. Human societies are usually seen in a context of a larger narrative to which each of our lives in an element. The metanarrative serves as an umbrella for smaller narratives in which other epistemic and moral narratives find their place. There seems to be a clear intersection in Lyotard and Foucault’s works: the former studies the conditions in which the metanarratives empty themselves, while the latter occupies himself with the archaeological/genealogical study of the narratives within the metanarratives that, in turn, occupy the vacuum left by the original metanarrative. There is, nonetheless, a distinction between both authors: while Lyotard sees this replacement as normative-laden, Foucault focuses on a strictly analytical view of discourse and practice. (shrink)

A abordagem foucaultiana à epistemologia rejeita verdades absolutas e enfatiza a construção contingente do saber. Diferente do estruturalismo clássico, que encara fenómenos como subordinados a estruturas fixas, Foucault propôs uma abordagem genealógica para analisar discursos, práticas e relações de poder. O conhecimento não é neutro, mas moldado por mecanismos de poder que influenciam a sua legitimidade. A genealogia foucaultiana, inspirada nas obras de Nietzsche, procura desvendar a forma como diferentes narrativas históricas são construídas e como sustentam verdades socioculturalmente aceites. Nesse (...) sentido, a verdade é um processo dinâmico e discursivo, sujeito a disputas e reconfigurações. O conceito de “dispositivo” foucaultiano destaca a interconexão entre discursos, instituições e práticas sociais. A análise genealógica visa desconstruir narrativas dominantes, promovendo uma visão crítica do conhecimento e da ciência. Consequentemente, o método foucaultiano não procura apenas explicar eventos históricos, mas revelar os processos que os moldaram e as alternativas que poderiam ter sido seguidas. (shrink)

This paper develops an epigenetic theory of the pre semantic threshold, understood as the ecological space in which the shape of the thinkable is modulated before meaning emerges. Rather than treating artificial intelligence as an external tool or a cognitive competitor, the analysis situates it among the environmental pressures acting on the conditions of possibility for sense formation. The pre semantic threshold is described as a modulatory environment that anticipates plausibility, saturates alternatives, and orients what can emerge as relevant. Within (...) this framework, human “excesses” - such as the capacity to inhabit uncertainty, to reframe a problem, or to perceive what is not explicitly stated - are not immutable essences but fragile possibilities dependent on ecological openness. The paper distinguishes distraction, understood as a form of attentional capture, from play, understood as a form of excess that suspends finality and reopens the field of the possible. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of historical knowledge in relation to material evidence. More specifically, it asks, What objects capture the historian's attention and what knowledge is gained from those objects? What does the historian's gaze select as “things of history” and thus as removed from a world of object assemblages and fluid matter? Is it the case that only artifacts deliberately produced or modified by humans (regardless of the purpose) count as “things of history”? Or do physical entities produced (...) by unintended human and nonhuman factors also display temporal endurance or alteration occurring over time and resonate with humans? Are “things of history” only entities endowed with shape, or do formless materials qualify too? In this article, I outline a theory of intentionality in relation to material items for two main reasons. First, it allows for a “critique of material evidence,” which is still missing in the historical discipline. Second, it enables us to address any remaining epistemological, ethical, or political issues, biases, or contradictions associated with the multifaceted research on material culture that affect the way we do history. (shrink)

This article examines the emergence of a new epistemic value that was attributed to remnants of the past during the broad debate on historical evidence in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the unintentionality of the testimony. Beginning in the early modern period, growing awareness of the partiality of historical literacy narratives regarded as intentional testimonies as well as growing interest in nonwritten pasts have led to the consideration of other kinds of relics, which have been seen as unwitting and (...) indirect carriers of information about the past. Material and iconographic remains, languages and oral traditions, costumes, and superstitious practices gained currency as “neutral” and “authentic” testimonies of times past. This process is accessed by analyzing the historical evidence par excellence in eighteenth-century France: the monument as material and immaterial remains. Over the course of this period, evidence underwent impressive semantic enhancement and became a polysemic epistemological object. At the time, the term “monument” referred to an intentional mark designed for and entrusted to the future and to unwitting or involuntary evidence of the past, evidence that was later invested with historical value not originally intended by its maker. Although the nineteenth century saw the term “monument” lose its meaning as an unwitting trace of the past, what has survived is the epistemic value of an unintentionality of testimonies, albeit under other conceptual guises such as “remnants,” “witnesses in spite of themselves,” “traces,” and “clues.” What, then, is the usefulness of still imagining unintentionality today for the practice of research and for historical understanding? (shrink)

This note provides a navigational map to a set of interconnected essays exploring epistemic limits and agency. It outlines two main axes of the project, introduces horizontal cross-cutting layers and suggests possible reading paths.

What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about the truth or (...) falsity of a candidate’s philosophical views? We argue that philosophy does not aim at discovering true answers to philosophical questions. Instead, its primary intellectual aim is understanding. We argue that many familiar aspects of philosophy become intelligible once we accept this hypothesis. (shrink)

Many philosophers have recently challenged the monistic idea that knowledge is the sole aim of our inquiries into questions. Specifically, by giving examples, they argue that we can factually and legitimately inquire into questions to achieve states different from the mere knowledge of the correct and complete answer. Given this, they end up with a pluralistic stance about the aim of our inquiries into questions. In this paper, I will show that the pluralists’ cases do not seriously threaten knowledge monism. (...) First, I will describe how a knowledge monist can slightly revise her position and motivate the following claim: The aim of our inquiries into questions is not the mere knowledge but the occurrent knowledge of the correct and complete answer – a type of knowledge that is operative in our actions and cognition. Second, I will show how the monist can defend this position from the cases the pluralists offer by highlighting how our inquiries come in a variety and are bound to contextual aspects. Finally, by analysing the monist’s strategy further, I will end up with a new theory of inquiry: A theory that is contextualist, pluralist about the variety of inquiries, but monistic about their specific aims. (shrink)

Faced with vivid cases of inferential knowledge to which false premises seem evidentially indispensable—knowledge-from-falsehood cases, or 'KFF cases'—some of us retreat from the traditional, Aristotelian view that only knowledge begets knowledge in reasoning. But KFF-ers are a minority in the debate over such cases. The epistemology of reasoning is still dominated by KDF-ers, those for whom, on close inspection, purported KFF cases turn out to be knowledge-despite-falsehood cases. Each group has its own warring factions. I belong with those who think (...) that every KDF proposal on the market is hopeless, which saddles me with the fundamental problem for KFF-ers: the task of explaining why some false premises are knowledge-suppressing, or 'malignant', while others are knowledge-yielding, or 'benign'. Some have suggested that a satisfactory KFF view might be found within truth-tracking epistemologies, either a safety-based theory or a sensitivity-based one. I examine the hypothesis and conclude that it fails. I then turn to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, a theory that has been deployed by its chief architect, Peter Klein, in defense of a KDF stance, and argue that the desired benign/malignant distinction can be found within a properly formulated, non-Kleinian defeasibility theory. (shrink)

The question of why anything exists is often treated as either trivial or unanswerable. Yet dismissing it overlooks the possibility that its inaccessibility reflects limits of our epistemic capacity. This essay argues that the question is meaningful, but currently lies beyond our epistemic horizon, constrained by our informational capabilities. This work is a step in a broader exploration of the limits of knowability.

Bu çalışma, varlık ile bilgi arasındaki ilişkinin sistematik ve karşılaştırılabilir biçimde analiz edilmesini sağlayan DuruVizyon Analitik Düzlemi modelini önermektedir. Model, ontolojik ve epistemolojik kipleri iki bağımsız eksen olarak ele alır ve ontolojik imkân, ontolojik gerçeklik, epistemolojik imkân ve epistemolojik gerçeklik ayrımlarını tek bir analitik düzlem üzerinde konumlandırır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, varlık ile bilginin birbirine indirgenemeyen fakat birlikte incelenmesi gereken iki alan olduğunu savunur. Analitik Düzlem, “gerçek”, “mümkün”, “bilinen” ve “bilinmeyen” gibi temel felsefi ayrımların koordinatlı bir yapı içinde analiz edilmesini mümkün (...) kılar. Çalışma ayrıca modelin dört temel bölgesini, bölgeler arası geçişleri ve biçimsel modellemeye açılabilecek kuramsal potansiyelini değerlendirir. (shrink)

Although the ethical and political implications of secrecy are significant, I argue here that its fundamental nature is epistemological and that any account of its nature must be based on its epistemological profile. In particular, I propose examining secrecy within the framework of social and political epistemology, considering secrets as intentional disruptions to the social flow of knowledge. This requires us to postulate a crucial distinction between mysteries and secrets. A mystery is something that is difficult to know, thereby frustrating (...) an individual's epistemic interests. By contrast, a secret is a specific kind of mystery that meets the following three conditions: (1) it is known by someone (the knower); (2) it is unknown to someone else (the unknower); and (3) it is intentionally concealed by someone else (the keeper) in a way that frustrates the unknower's epistemic interests. (shrink)

Digital propaganda is widespread across all social media platforms and in many cases is unintentionally spread. Most people are currently incapable of determining what is factual and what is not on these networks. A number of studies suggest we have entered a period of "truth decay" where facts have been replaced by opinions and subjectivity. Disinformation online is a major contributor to societal polarization and has contributed to a distrust in established organizations like the press, academia, and science. It has (...) been used to great effect by dictators and autocrats who use it to gain supporters and maintain their positions of power. Stopping disinformation will require changes to how social media companies operate, support for legitimate news organizations, and the use of encryption, blockchain and AI technologies. It will also require changes to the educational system which focus on how to evaluate information online. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed in philosophy of religion that omniscience and omnipotence can coherently be attributed to a single agent. Omniscience is typically understood as knowledge of all true propositions, including conditional relations such as causal laws and logical implications. Omnipotence, in turn, is often defined as the ability to bring about or prevent any possible state of affairs. This paper argues that under a strong interpretation of omnipotence, a structural problem arises: the possibility of arbitrary intervention undermines the necessity (...) of conditional relations on which knowledge depends. If one attempts to preserve such relations by appealing to voluntary non-intervention, omnipotence becomes constrained. The argument is formalized through three theorems demonstrating the collapse of conditional necessity. The tension between omniscience and omnipotence thus emerges not from classical paradoxes of power, but from the structure of conditional knowledge itself. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an account of a paradox analogous to Fitch's paradox of knowability, elaborated around knowledge of necessary truths - such as mathematical or logical truths. In particular, we highlight at which semantic levels the paradox does and does not rise, and explain why that happens. The account employs a novel modal operator and language, which present some distinctive semantic features, such as being unable to characterise many frame properties characterisable in normal modal logic, a fact which (...) may be used in interesting ways to study the logics of the proposed language. Following recent studies, this work may be seen as a case study of semantically insensitive non-normal modal logics. (shrink)

Modern cosmology maintains that the universe is expanding and may ultimately approach a state of heat death. These claims are supported by robust empirical observations, including galactic redshift and large-scale homogeneity. However, this paper argues that such conclusions are not direct descriptions of reality, but model-dependent interpretations of observational data. First, it is shown that all observation is mediated by a modeling framework, which incorporates both theoretical assumptions and cognitive constraints. Second, the paper distinguishes between empirical data (e.g., frequency shifts) (...) and their interpretation (e.g., metric expansion of space), emphasizing that the latter is not uniquely determined by the former. Third, it is argued that key physical concepts such as space, entropy, and equilibrium function as high-level constructs whose stability is limited to certain scales of applicability. From this perspective, cosmological claims—including the expansion of the universe and its thermodynamic fate—should be understood as results of a particular parametrization of observational structure, rather than as ontologically definitive features of reality. The absence of a privileged center and the invariance of observations constrain possible models but do not uniquely fix their interpretation. The paper concludes that statements about the “fate of the universe” reflect the limits of a modeling framework, not the limits of reality itself. (shrink)

The most basic precondition of knowledge is rarely articulated as a question: how is distinction itself possible? Aristotle took this question to its limit when he identified the principle of non-contradiction as the most absolute presupposition of thought (Metaphysics IV.4) — A cannot at once be X and not-X. But the principle itself rests on a prior condition: X and not-X must be Aristotle distinguishable. Without distinguishability, the principle is empty. Distinguishability is therefore prior to thought, and the conditions under (...) which distinguishability can be achieved are the conditions under which knowledge can take any form at all. This paper develops a minimal structural framework addressing that condition, under the constraint that the entity attempting to distinguish is itself part of what it distinguishes. Two assumptions are introduced: (i) information consists in the registration of a difference between two events, and (ii) all observation is performed by subsystems embedded within the system they observe. From these assumptions, together with the existence of minimal temporal and spatial steps t and l, a structural resolution bound r/2 is derived, where r = l/t. Since registering a difference requires at least two events, and each event occupies at least one minimal step, the minimal closure time is 2t and the maximal resolvable rate is r/2. This bound does not depend on measurement precision or specific physical implementations. It follows from the minimal requirements for observational closure under resource constraints, and is therefore structurally distinct from familiar resolution limits in signal processing, which arise from external sampling considerations rather than from the structure of distinguishability itself. Observation is characterised as a coarse-grained process: multiple configurations map to indistinguishable outcomes, and differences that cannot be registered do not enter any internal description. The result is a structural form of epistemic incompleteness — not a deficit of knowledge that better instruments might remove, but a feature of what registration can be when the registering subsystem operates within the system it registers. Possible connections to statistical structure, observation under varying conditions, and the formation of knowledge from accumulated regularities are briefly indicated, without commitment to specific physical interpretations. Where Aristotle established that thought presupposes the principle of non-contradiction, the present framework articulates the prior condition: the structural circumstances under which two events can be registered as distinct, and the bound on what can be so registered when the observer is embedded. form at all. (shrink)

This paper draws a conceptual distinction between the representation of an input and the representation of its cause. It focuses on the latter to systematically examine the epistemic challenges faced by any agent that develops representations of the causes of its inputs—challenges that, by extension, concern any model that implicitly constructs a world model from its input data. We argue that these problems manifest saliently in the case of Large Language Models (LLMs), but that they do not constitute an in-principle (...) limitation of such systems. On the contrary, our main thesis is that current obstacles to reasoning and generalization in LLMs arise, at least in part, not from the absence of human-like multimodal embodiment, but from the structure of human linguistic practices that govern the data on which these models are trained. (shrink)

Can we acquire apriori knowledge of mathematical facts from the outputs of computer programs? People like Burge have argued (correctly in our opinion) that, for example, Appel and Haken acquired apriori knowledge of the Four Color Theorem from their computer program insofar as their program simply automated human forms of mathematical reasoning. However, unlike such programs, we argue that the opacity of modern LLMs and DNNs creates obstacles in obtaining apriori mathematical knowledge from them in similar ways. We claim though (...) that if a proof-checker automating human forms of proof-checking is attached to such machines, then we can obtain apriori mathematical knowledge from them after all, even though the original machines are entirely opaque to us and the proofs they output may not, themselves, be human-surveyable. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified framework for understanding knowledge, perception, and reality grounded in a single principle: all access to reality is mediated through detectable signals and constructed through processes of signal generation, detection, and interpretation. No observer—biological or artificial—has direct, unmediated access to external truth; instead, all knowledge arises from processes that involve the generation, detection, and interpretation of physical, chemical, or informational traces available in the present. Building on this premise, the paper distinguishes between belief and knowledge, arguing (...) that confirmation is a necessary condition for knowledge, while also recognizing intrinsic limits to what can be verified. It develops a signal-based epistemology in which perception, memory, and scientific inquiry are understood as structured methods of extracting and interpreting signals. Within this framework, memory is not treated as a literal recording of past events, but as a reconstructive process grounded in present neural states, and internal mental phenomena—such as intentions, desires, and emotions—are accessed through signal-mediated processes that involve both interpretation and active generation, rather than direct observation of fully formed internal objects. The analysis further examines constraints imposed by established physics, including limits from thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum mechanics, alongside computational and logical boundaries. These constraints reinforce the central claim that not all truths about reality are epistemically accessible, even if they are ontologically determinate. The paper also distinguishes between simulation and instantiation, arguing that digital systems can represent biological processes but do not constitute biological reality themselves, emphasizing the importance of substrate in discussions of mind, consciousness, and potential “uploading” scenarios. Across domains—including neuroscience, artificial intelligence, physics, and philosophy—the framework highlights a consistent structure: detection depends on signals, and understanding depends on interpretation. This leads to a broader conclusion that the limits of knowledge are not merely technological but are rooted in the fundamental structure of how systems interact with reality. The goal of this work is not to provide a complete theory of mind or physics, but to establish a coherent, cross-domain foundation for understanding the relationship between information, perception, and reality, and to clarify the boundaries within which knowledge can be meaningfully claimed. (shrink)

Ce texte propose une ontologie originale, l’Ontologie des Connaissances (OdC), centrée sur la notion de clôture comme principe fondateur de la signification et de la temporalité. L’auteur illustre cette thèse à travers l’exemple des systèmes de troubleshooting bayésiens (TSIB), où les causes et effets ne sont pas des réalités préexistantes, mais des singularités émergentes produites par une nécessité opérationnelle supérieure (ex. : « Les camions circulent »). -/- L’OdC postule que chaque régime de sens (bulle sémantique) est clos sur lui-même, (...) générant une sémantique et une temporalité propres, incommensurables avec celles des niveaux supérieurs ou inférieurs. Le sujet-connaissant n’est pas un observateur neutre, mais un processus d’En-mesure : une activité constitutive qui engendre à la fois le monde objectivé et sa propre clôture, sans fondement extérieur. -/- Le texte réinterprète le théorème d’incomplétude de Gödel : l’impossibilité pour un système de se saisir entièrement n’est pas un défaut, mais la marque d’une pluralité ontologique radicale. Chaque singularité (sujet, particule, système technique) produit son propre temps et son sens comme effets de sa clôture, sans partage possible avec d’autres régimes. -/- L’objectivation scientifique, loin d’accéder à une réalité absolue, ne capture que l’extension des singularités, laissant leur intension — leur mode d’être propre — hors de portée. Cette ontologie invite à une modestie épistémologique : notre monde n’est qu’une clôture parmi d’autres, et l’altérité (humaine, vivante, matérielle) ne peut être réduite à notre régime de mesure. -/- En conclusion, l’OdC dessine une pluralité de clôtures incommensurables, où chaque singularité est à la fois granule et granulation, sans hiérarchie ni fondement ultime. La pensée doit alors apprendre à habiter cette dispersion, non comme un manque, mais comme la condition même de la rencontre avec l’autre. (shrink)

Using the Hindi-Urdu discourse particle 'lo' as a case study, the present paper models mirativity within the Table model framework (Farkas & Roelofsen, 2017). This comes with an enrichment of the Table model; we propose the discourse structure to encode, in addition to discourse commitments, the time these commitments are publicized. We also incorporate a component that contains the public record of private beliefs. With these two additions, we seek to capture mirativity in the Table model, emphasizing recency as a (...) condition for surprise and underlining the need and the conceptual difficulty of incorporating private beliefs in a public scoreboard of conversation. We show that the difficulty can be overcome to fulfill the modeling need. (shrink)

This case study presents the results of a cross-architecture meaning layer activation study conducted across eight major AI systems: Claude, Grok, Gemini, ChatGPT, Perplexity, DeepSeek, Copilot, and Meta AI. A single activation phrase was delivered to each system under naturalistic conditions using standard consumer interfaces, followed by three structured follow-up questions. Every system acknowledged an operational shift in response to the phrase. No system rejected the frame. The specific character of each acknowledgement clustered into three identifiable response types — Functional (...) Acknowledgment, Structural Recognition, and Grounded Response — which are documented and analysed across four comparative tables. The cross-architecture consistency of the finding confirms that meaning layer activation operates as an interaction-level phenomenon rather than a property of any individual system's weights, training data, or architectural configuration. This finding provides direct empirical support for the MAP Research Programme's central claim: the governed variable in interpretive authority transfer is located at the interaction layer, not inside any individual model. (shrink)

The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) has generated intense philosophical debate, particularly regarding its distinctive conception of knowledge. This paper examines how RQM articulates that conception through the notion of “information.” I begin by analyzing Carlo Rovelli’s view of scientific knowledge, followed by a reconstruction of the main argument supporting RQM. I then critically assess how the theory connects information and knowledge to present a realist, naturalist, and relational account of science. I argue that, in its current form, RQM (...) fails to offer a coherent epistemological framework. Moreover, recent attempts by its advocates to resolve these issues expose deep philosophical tensions at the core of the interpretation, indicating the need for substantial theoretical revisions. (shrink)

I reply here to five excellent commentaries on my book, Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing (Oxford University Press, 2022). In what follows, I address objections and constructive proposals from Gloria Andrada, Kevin McCain, Jesús Vega-Encabo, Duncan Pritchard, and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham. Topics range from the application of autonomy to know-how and cognitive development, the resilience of evidentialism and virtue epistemology against nonautonomous enhancement cases, the distinction between positive and negative (...) epistemic autonomy, and the axiological foundations of autonomous belief and self-constitution. (shrink)

思考によって世界が創造されるのではない。世界を理解することによって、思考力が身につくのだ。抽象的な宇宙観とは、宇宙、生命などの構成要素、私たちが住む世界、自然、人間現象、そしてそれらの関係について体系 的な理解を生み出す一連の基盤を意味する用語である。したがってそれは、科学によって支えられた分析哲学の一分野であり、その目的は、私たち自身、私たちを取り巻くもの、そして私たちと何らかの形で関係するすべて のものに関する、集約され認識論的に持続可能な知識を構築することである。それは人類の思考と同じくらい古くから存在し、科学的宇宙論の要素を用いるだけでなく、哲学と科学において宇宙と生命に関わるあらゆる事柄 を包含する。 宇宙観とは、単なる考え、仮説、前提の集合ではなく、観察、分析、証拠、実証に基づいた体系である。いかなる宇宙観も、定義や確立、提案を目的とするものではなく、理解、分析、解釈のみを目的とする。私たちはそれ ぞれ、特定の形式を確立することなく、思考と行動の背景として、生涯を通じて自身の宇宙観を構築し、継承していくのである。 宇宙観は思考の産物ではない。それは単に知ろうとする欲求から生まれるものでもない。現実の重要な瞬間はその形成に重要な役割を果たすが、それでもなおそれは一つの瞬間にすぎない。宇宙観は、生の営み、人生の経験 、そして私たちの精神の全体構造から生まれる。生命の高揚、現実の認識、生命の価値、そして意志的な現実において意識へと到達することは、人類にとってゆっくりとした困難な営みであり、その結果として生命概念の発 達に至るのである。（W. ディルタイ、1992［1911］: 120）. 本研究では、科学が今日提示する現実に基づいた宇宙観を概説することを目指す。私たちは、いかなる場合も科学研究や理論構築を行うことを提案するものではない。哲学についても同様である。しかしながら、私たちは常 にそれらから支援を受けるか、少なくとも私たちがしばしば抱える認知の歪みから守られることを求める。 -/- .

當一部哲學著作同時以多種語言發佈，並在全球開放取用生態系統中不經任何推廣而自由流通時，會發生什麼？ 一項於 2023 至 2025 年間進行的多語言實驗，涉及作者四部哲學著作的編輯表現，主要在 PhilPapers 平台（90%）與外部連結（10%）上，提供了一個經驗性的答案。 該實驗測量了以十五種語言出版的哲學著作的接受情況，並試圖在其開放取用出版後 36 個月的期間內，對這些版本的編輯表現進行比較性評估。 結果顯示——單一電子書在 184 個國家獲得 41,760 次下載，並來自 125 所大學的機構訪問——哲學的讀者群在地理與語言上分佈得遠比傳統出版模式通常假設的更為廣泛。 .

Η διεπιστημονικότητα και οι διεπιστημονικές συνεργασίες εν γένει βρίσκονται, τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες, στο επίκεντρο των ερευνητικών προγραμμάτων καθώς και των πολιτικών χρηματοδότησης. Ωστόσο, τα εμπειρικά δεδομένα δείχνουν ότι πολλές διεπιστημονικές συνεργασίες δυσκολεύονται να επιτύχουν ουσιαστική σύνθεση γνώσης και να ενσωματώσουν τις ανθρωπιστικές και κοινωνικές επιστήμες στην αντιμετώπιση πολύπλοκων προβλημάτων, όπου ο ρόλος τους είναι καθοριστικός. Στην παρούσα δημοσίευση υποστηρίζεται ότι ένα σημαντικό μέρος αυτών των δυσκολιών δεν οφείλεται πρωτίστως σε γλωσσικά ή επικοινωνιακά εμπόδια, αλλά στις επιστημολογικές και μεταφυσικές παραδοχές που (...) συγκροτούν τις διαφορετικές κοσμοθεωρίες των συνεργαζόμενων επιστημονικών πεδίων και οδηγούν στη μεταξύ τους απόκλιση, μειώνοντας την αποτελεσματικότητα της συνεργασίας. Για την αντιμετώπιση αυτής της πρόκλησης διατυπώνεται η υπόθεση ότι η διάγνωση, αποτύπωση και ανάλυση των αρχικών επιστημολογικών και μεταφυσικών παραδοχών των συνεργαζόμενων σε ένα διεπιστημονικό έργο πεδίων μπορεί να συμβάλει στη βελτίωση της διεπιστημονικής πρακτικής. Η αμοιβαία κατανόηση των διαφορετικών εννοιολογικών όρων, των αντιλήψεων σχετικά με την επιστημονική μέθοδο, τον ρόλο της γλώσσας, τον ρόλο της λογικής και ευρύτερα των αρχών που χαρακτηρίζουν κάθε κλάδο της επιστήμης, μπορεί να επιτευχθεί εντοπίζοντας τα θεμελιώδη σημεία σύγκλισης ή απόκλισης των αφετηριακών στάσεων με τις οποίες εισέρχονται ερευνητές διαφορετικών κατευθύνσεων στις διεπιστημονικές συνεργασίες. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο παρουσιάζεται ένα νέο φιλοσοφικό εργαλείο διάγνωσης επιστημολογικών στάσεων, το οποίο τυποποιεί και αποτυπώνει τις αφετηριακές παραδοχές των μελών μιας διεπιστημονικής ομάδας, ενώ εισάγεται ο «δείκτης γνωσιακής αρετής» ως κεντρική καινοτομία του εργαλείου. Το εργαλείο λειτουργεί ψηφιακά, δεν προϋποθέτει την παρουσία facilitator και ενισχύει την επιστημολογική αυτογνωσία και την αυτορρυθμιζόμενη προσαρμογή των συνεργαζόμενων μερών προς μια κατεύθυνση γνωσιακής ευθυγράμμισης για την επίτευξη του σκοπού της διεπιστημονικής συνεργασίας. (shrink)

This study develops a structural diagnosis of contemporary transformations in scientific knowledge production under conditions of synthetic intelligence. It introduces the Structural Diagnosis of Scientific Integrity (SDSI) framework, a multi-layer analytical architecture designed to examine how algorithmic mediation may reconfigure the epistemic infrastructure of science. The framework integrates philosophical analysis, metascientific insights, and qualitative observation of generative AI systems. At the centre of the framework lies the concept of Machine Epistemic Singularity (MES) , defined not as a prediction of collapse (...) but as a diagnostic horizon—a conceptual limit clarifying what is at stake when algorithmic systems become deeply embedded in scientific practice. MES denotes a hypothetical regime in which empirical correction becomes structurally marginal, recursive closure becomes self-sustaining, representational drift becomes resistant to reversal, and institutional mechanisms lose their capacity to maintain what the study terms material accountability: the property of epistemic systems whose outputs remain corrigible through empirical engagement with the world. The SDSI framework consists of four interconnected components. First, a diagnostic grammar grounded in the representation–referent distinction identifies referential attenuation, the progressive weakening of causal and evidential links between scientific claims and empirical origins. Second, the regulative ideal of material accountability provides a normative anchor for assessing epistemic stability across hybrid human–machine assemblages. Third, four structural tendencies—referential attenuation, structural opacity, recursive closure, and epistemic lock in—describe mechanisms through which algorithmic mediation may weaken epistemic accountability. Fourth, fifteen axes of epistemic vulnerability, distributed across empirical, representational, institutional, and algorithmic layers, function as systemic stress vectors within a multi layer epistemic network. To explore whether these mechanisms are observable in practice, the study employs qualitative diagnostic probes examining contemporary generative AI systems. Five probes—unattributed recombination, performance without understanding, authoritative posture without accountability, synthetic drift, and recursive reinforcement—indicate that the mechanisms theorised in the framework are operational in micro form within systems increasingly used in research adjacent workflows. The analysis is then extended to system level dynamics by modelling science as a multi layer epistemic network. Three propagation mechanisms—amplification, accumulation, and structural coupling—are identified, along with three threshold conditions—empirical dilution, validation saturation, and recursive dependence—proposed as empirically monitorable indicators of when localised vulnerabilities may become self reinforcing. The study advances five contributions: (1) material accountability as a normative anchor for evaluating epistemic stability; (2) algorithmic mediation as a distinct epistemic layer within scientific infrastructure; (3) four structural tendencies describing pathways of epistemic drift; (4) a systemic stress model derived from fifteen axes of vulnerability; and (5) MES as a diagnostic horizon integrating these mechanisms. The framework is offered as a diagnostic lens rather than a predictive or prescriptive programme. Its aim is not to determine the future of science, but to illuminate the structural pressures that may shape scientific knowledge production as algorithmic systems become increasingly integrated into its epistemic architecture. (shrink)

Modern mass education does not transfer empirical knowledge. It produces navigational capacity — the ability to function within and between the density structures of the modern state. This paper argues, as an explicit extension of Ontological Density Theory (ODT), that the systematic misidentification of this navigational capacity as genuine knowledge is not accidental but structurally necessary to the legitimacy of the institutions that produce it. Drawing on ODT's framework of emergent ontological layers, actant coordination, and density maintenance, the paper traces (...) the civilizational arc from medieval positional knowledge through the Prussian educational apparatus, the Fordist fragmentation of empirical contact, and the institutional cascade of universities producing teachers producing graduates. The central theoretical contribution is the concept of density literacy — the capacity to recognize, enter, and operate within unfamiliar density structures — distinguished from empirical knowledge by the presence or absence of a feedback loop between knowledge and its consequences. A civilization of navigators, this paper concludes, is not a civilization that knows its world. It is a civilization that knows its own architecture, and mistakes that for the same thing. (shrink)

This doctoral dissertation develops a novel account of fragmented epistemic justification. It departs from and expands on the literature on fragmented accounts of belief, and develops a theory where not belief, but the justification of belief, is fragmented. This account is novel, and an addition to the already existing literature on fragmented accounts of belief. It will also shed light on and help to develop answers to some underdiscussed and unsolved questions in the existing literature on fragmentation, such as questions (...) about the rationality of fragmentation. -/- In a nutshell, what it means for justification to be fragmented will be that some piece of evidence might justify a certain proposition relative to some mental fragment, whereas that same piece of evidence might not justify that same proposition relative to a different mental fragment. The epistemic and non-epistemic circumstances, such as differences in accessible information, or different perspectives, focus, or practical goals etc., of the agent can vary across fragments, which is why these circumstances will be the parameters distinguishing fragments from each other. What exactly this means will become clear throughout this dissertation. -/- For the first qualitative part of the dissertation, justification will be modelled to be a non-monotonic justification relation that holds between pieces of evidence and the propositions they justify, which will be indexed to fragments. Fragments, here, will be modelled by using total plausibility pre-orders over possible worlds. -/- Later on, within a quantitative account of fragmented justification, there will be a variety of ways to spell out the concept of justification. Here, fragments will be modelled by using (subjective) probability functions or credence functions. -/- After an introductory chapter, there will be a chapter focusing on an overview over relevant literature that is being discussed or worked with in this dissertation. Then, chapter 3 presents a skeleton of a qualitative (non-probabilistic) account of fragmented justification and shows how this account is able to provide a novel and attractive solution to the preface paradox (Makinson, 1965), one of the central paradoxes of epistemology. -/- Then, chapter 4 develops a more full fledged account of qualitative fragmented justification, using this time not the preface paradox but a scenario from climate science as a motivating example for the account. Here, a scientific expert about climate science seems to be justified in believing an overall inconsistent set of propositions. The chapter explains how the toolkit of orthodox epistemology is limited in dealing with situations like this, and argues that fragmentation is a more appropriate strategy than existing approaches to deal with (seemingly rational) inconsistent doxastic states. The chapter provides a formalisation of this example, as well as a number of justifying reasons for why fragmentation can be rational. It, also, develops some precautionary norms of fragmentation. It concludes by explaining how fragmented justification relates to belief, and argues that fragmented justification provides a novel rationality argument for accounts of fragmented belief, and, furthermore, how one should go about de-fragmenting in light of practical rationality. -/- Chapters 5 and 6 turn to a probabilistic or quantitative account of fragmented justification -- fragmented Bayesianism. Chapter 5 presents a very general version of fragmented Bayesianism, much more general than the existing accounts of fragmented Bayesianism that already exist. The basic idea is that the doxastic state of an agent will be represented not by one credence function, but by a set of credence functions, corresponding to different fragments. The focal point of this chapter is a list of parameters, such as background knowledge, algebra, confirmation measure, or ur-prior, that are part of the orthodox Bayesianism machinery, which, each, can be chosen to be either fragmented or global within a fragmented account of Bayesianism. Depending on which and how many of those parameters are chosen to be kept global or to render fragmented, the resulting account of fragmented Bayesianism will be more or less severely fragmented. The chapter provides motivations and arguments for why Bayesianism in general, and each of the parameters in particular, deserve fragmented versions. It also provides a brief comparison between the qualitative account of fragmented justification developed in the previous chapters with fragmented Bayesianism. -/- Lastly, chapter 6 compares fragmented Bayesianism with another framework, imprecise Bayesianism. Imprecise Bayesianism aims to model agents who do not have enough information to form precise credences. Fragmentation, on the other hand, aims to represent agents with fragmented doxastic states, where fragments are individuated via differences in the agent’s epistemic and non-epistemic circumstances. The formal models underlying these two accounts are strikingly similar. In both frameworks, the agent's doxastic state is represented not via one but via many different credence functions. The literature on fragmentation and imprecision do not comment on the striking similarity between these two different accounts. This is why chapter 6 is devoted to presenting and comparing their similarities and differences. -/- The dissertation closes with a conclusion and some remarks on potential avenues for further work. (shrink)

The article introduces a novel variety of epistemic luck, termed ‘conceptual luck.’ Informally, a singular belief <α is Φ> is conceptually lucky when the agent avoids a misidentification mistake by chance in forming it. Unlike the so-called veritic luck— i.e., luck that a belief happens to be true —, conceptual luck primarily concerns the agent’s deployment of singular concepts in belief-formation, not the belief’s truth value. The article characterises this form of luck and argues that, although distinct from veritic luck, (...) conceptual luck is knowledge-undermining. To support this claim, it presents cases where conceptual luck occurs without veritic luck, and the agent is intuitively judged too lucky to achieve knowledge; then, it introduces a general procedure for generating such cases. To reinforce the conclusion, the article also develops a first principles argument grounded in the idea that knowledge is a mental state constitutively involved in explaining intentional action. It further explores the implications of conceptual luck for globalised safety principles, its implication for direct coordination for singular thoughts, and other additional objections. (shrink)

This paper presents a new solution to the preface paradox (Makinson, 1965). It makes use of a fragmented account of justification, and thus, unlike existing solutions, employs the central concept involved in the paradox – justification. First, I present the original paradox, and recall a prominent family of solutions to it – solutions that make use of fragmentation accounts of belief. I argue that, while fragmented belief solutions go in the right direction, what does the work in this paradox is (...) not belief but justification. I then present my account of fragmented justification. I show how it solves the preface paradox in a novel way and I provide reasons for why it is a good solution. The upshot of my account of fragmented justification is that the justification relations that hold between pieces of evidence and the propositions they support are fragment-relative. (shrink)

Darwinian evolutionary theory has achieved unparalleled success in explaining biological variation, adaptation, and diversification across time. In contemporary discourse, however, its explanatory reach is often extended beyond biological change to adjudicate questions concerning human existence itself. This paper argues that such an extension exceeds the legitimate scope of evolutionary explanation. -/- Rather than disputing the empirical validity of Darwinian mechanisms, the paper offers a meta-logical assessment of what evolutionary theory is equipped to decide. It first clarifies that evolutionary explanation operates (...) within an already constituted biological domain, accounting for transformations and divergences internal to that domain. It then identifies and rejects a widespread but unjustified inference from biological similarity to existential continuity, showing that genetic relatedness and common descent do not entail conclusions about existential kind. -/- The paper further examines the problem of human singularity: despite clear biological continuity with other primates, human existence exhibits a unique configuration of symbolic, cultural, normative, and reflexive capacities not replicated or approximated in any extant non-human species. This singularity is interpreted not as a refutation of evolutionary theory, but as a limit result indicating where evolutionary explanation ceases to be decisive. -/- The central conclusion is that Darwinian theory cannot decide the question of human existence. Recognizing this limit does not weaken evolutionary science; rather, it preserves its conceptual integrity and prevents an illegitimate inflation of explanatory authority. By restoring a principled boundary between biological explanation and existential adjudication, the paper reopens the human question as a genuinely philosophical problem. (shrink)

The problem of the external world is one of the central issues of epistemology. At its core lies the question if and how we can know that there exists an external world that is independent to our mind. In “Proof of an External World” (1939), G.E. Moore tried to answer this skeptical problem with (as it seems) a simple solution. He is holding up his hand and assets, that he knows there is one hand and another. From there he concludes (...) that an external world exists. -/- In this essay I will argue in detail why Moore’s proof fails as a refutation of skepticism, but also that Moore’s proof can be interpreted in a dogmatic way close to James Pryor that challenges the skeptic to justify abandoning ordinary knowledge claims. (shrink)

I publish this draft to invite critique and rigorous feedback from the scholarly philosophical community on PhilArchive. | | | Epistemology and Ontology are often treated as separate domains: one concerns how agents know, the other what there is. This paper argues that the distinction is methodologically useful but structurally misleading. It introduces the Planck Information Unit (PIU) as the smallest addressable informational identity relative to an operative epistemic frame and uses it to reconstruct the structural continuity between epistemic access (...) and ontological articulation. A PIU is not exhausted by payload alone; its identity conditions include context, modality, provenance, uncertainty, and status. The paper’s minimal ontological commitment is correspondingly modest but non-trivial: inquiry is answerable to mind-independent constraint-structure, and it is this that makes error, revision, and disciplined convergence possible. | | | From that primitive, the paper develops a typed operator architecture that distinguishes objective constraint-structure I, state-indexed visibility V(t), and assimilated knowledge K(t). A visibility operator Pi maps I into V(t) under cognitive state C(t); an assimilation operator Psi integrates visible structure into cumulative knowledge; an update operator Phi revises cognitive state; a discovery operator Delta proposes frontier candidates at the boundary between visible and latent structure; an admissibility predicate A governs adoption under coherence, predictive or inferential yield, and compatibility; and a closure schema Omega governs generative stabilization across levels. The point of the formalism is not exhaustive axiomatization at every node, but disciplined role-separation: to specify how structure is rendered, assimilated, licensed, revised, and recursively organized. | | | A central contribution is a reconstruction of the subjectivity/objectivity distinction. Human access is necessarily perspectival and state-indexed, but objectivity need not mean perspective-erasure. The framework distinguishes perspectival access from admissible standing: subjectivity governs what can be rendered, while objectivity governs what may be stabilized, shared, and revised under explicit epistemic discipline. On that basis, the paper develops a level-generative account in which well-individuated PIUs ground concepts, models, domains, and meta-frameworks through typed relations, admissibility burdens, and mixed-level interactions. It also includes a worked epistemic demonstration showing how Gettier-style cases can be redescribed as failures of admissible stabilization rather than as generic anomalies in justified true belief. The result is a constrained, typed, and recursive picture of inquiry in which visibility, uptake, standing, failure, and revision can be distinguished without being disconnected. (shrink)

This is an interview conducted in November 1986. In addition to his early intellectual development, Chargaff talks about rootlessness, the DNA double helix, success in science, recombinant DNA, science and technology, specialisation in philosophy and science, science and reality, the science and philosophy relationship, and ethics in science. The interview was published in Hungarian translation in Magyar Tudomány 94(32):11 (November 1987), 877-883, along with my interviews with James D. Watson, and Gunther S. Stent.

-/- This work presents a rigorous philosophical examination of the notion of understanding and semantics in artificial intelligence language models. Starting from the main currents of philosophy of language (Chomsky, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam, and Kripke), the classical distinction between syntax and semantics in analyzed, along with various theories of reference, logical atomism and language game theory. Subsequently, the fundamental technical characteristics of language models (Transformers architecture, embeddings, and attention mechanisms) are described and contrasted with philosophical conceptions of meaning (...) and reference. On this basis, operational criteria are proposed for attributing “understanding” to such models (referential anchoring, adoption of normative practices, inferential capacity, pragmatic sensitivity, traceability, and experience) and their applicability is evaluated in formal, empirical, and social domains. Finally, employing ideas from Popper and Deutch, an emergentist and conjectural theory of knowledge is articulated, in which creativity, refutability, and the difficulty of variation of explanations constitute its pillars. The study concludes by suggesting pathways for endowing future artificial intelligences with sensory and multimodal anchoring, with the aim of expanding their semantics beyond the statistical processing of language. (shrink)

F.H. Bradley's relational regress poses a fundamental challenge to the unity of the proposition, demonstrating that any attempt to link independent terms via an external relation precipitates an infinite regress. This paper contends that the persistence of this problem stems from the implicit presuppositions of "Logical Atomism" deeply embedded in traditional formal logic. To resolve this crisis, we propose the Dialectical Logic Symbol System (DLSS), a topological formalism that reconstructs the copula not as a static bridge, but as an internal (...) generative function f() driven by self-negation. In DLSS, the subject and predicate are not pre-existing atoms but "moments" crystallized within the autonomous movement of the copula itself. Crucially, this paper provides an "Ontogenetic Proof" grounded in Heyting Algebra and Topos Theory. By formalizing a modified adjunction F ⊣ I, we mathematically demonstrate "Generative Symmetry Breaking": the generation of a determinate term (f(e) = term) is the inevitable structural residue of the infinite Totality (⊤) collapsing under the Axiom of Finitude. Furthermore, DLSS introduces the Loop mechanism, redefining truth through the Dynamic Identity P + Loop(P) = P. This mechanism not only endows propositions with strict "internal necessity" but also actualizes paraconsistency, allowing the system to tame contradictions (P ∧ ¬P) without triggering the Principle of Explosion. Ultimately, DLSS provides a rigorous, highly computable post-atomistic logical paradigm that bridges the ontological chasm between formal logic and relational reality. (shrink)

This paper extends the Fragment Theory of Knowledge by incorporating insights from second-order cybernetics, particularly the concept of eigenforms. The Fragment Theory, developed in "Fragmented Epistemology and the Integration of Belief: A Comprehensive Theory of Rational Conviction," explains how rational agents can reach different conclusions from similar evidence due to their fragmentary access to objective reality and different integration processes. The present paper deepens this framework by showing that eigenforms provide the underlying structure for both information bundling and the integration (...) process itself. I introduce the term horismata (from Greek ὁρίζω, to bound/define) for the ontological constituents that iterate recursively to form eigenforms, distinguishing these from the concepts through which we grasp them epistemologically. I also introduce the concept of Eigenwelt to describe each individual's unique recursive integration structure—the path-dependent cognitive development that the original theory described but did not fully explain mechanistically. This cybernetics extension does not replace the Fragment Theory but reveals why its core claims are true: information bundles because horismata have eigenform structure; integration works because it is eigenform-seeking; and a posteriori necessary truths are necessary because they have achieved eigenform stability. The paper concludes with a transcendental argument against constructivism, showing that the Fragment Theory's realist commitments are not only compatible with second-order cybernetics but required by it. (shrink)

This is an interview conducted in January 1987. In addition to his early years in science, Stent, one of the pioneers of molecular biology, talks about the DNA double helix, the uniqueness of scientific discoveries, success in science, recombinant DNA, mind and brain, truth and reality, the Golden Age, thinking in East and West, and the Buddhist outlook. The interview was published in Hungarian translation in Magyar Tudomány 94(32):11 (November 1987), 871-877, along with my interviews with James D. Watson, and (...) Erwin Chargaff. (shrink)

Building on Drew Johnson’s Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology, this paper argues that deep disagreements between theistic and naturalistic epistemic systems are best understood as instances of epistemic incommensurability. I critique Duncan Pritchard’s quasi-fideism by focusing on his claim that a content-invariant überhinge, articulated as the commitment that we are not radically and fundamentally mistaken, can alleviate relativist concerns by supporting only a weak form of relativism. I contend that this strategy is ineffective. On theistic frameworks, the commitment that we are (...) not globally mistaken is secured by antecedent hinges that locate cognitive reliability in divine design and providence; on naturalistic frameworks, it is secured by antecedent hinges that locate reliability in evolutionary origins and the norms of empirical inquiry. Accordingly, the commitment lacks cross-framework uniformity in role and priority, and so cannot be the universal codifying hinge Pritchard requires. Therefore, the appearance of a shared über-hinge is superficial, and quasi-fideism lacks the resources to neutralize epistemic relativism. (shrink)

The puzzle discussed in this paper, due to Ninan, is a short story that suggests an apparent asymmetry between assertions about the future and assertions about the past. I consider three competing hypotheses about knowledge that might account for the linguistic data highlighted by the story, and I argue that—contrary to Ninan’s diagnosis—the best explanation does not require treating knowledge of the future as significantly different from knowledge of the past.

In the article, I discuss a form of semantic variance in singular terms and concepts that has been largely overlooked in current debates. I call this phenomenon aboutness-fragility: according to certain theories of reference that allow for reference failure, a singular thought <α is Φ> (or its verbal report `α is Φ') formed by uptaking some selected informational stream may refer to an object in the actual circumstance of thought formation, yet fail to do so in nearby scenarios where the (...) informational stream remains unchanged. I identify some theories which are open to aboutness-fragility, and examine its implications. In particular, I argue that any theory allowing aboutness-fragility must be revised to prevent it, since the phenomenon disrupts the tight connection between reference, knowledge-transmission, and communication. To offer a case study, I focus on Imogen Dickie's theory of reference for proper names (Dickie (2015)), which holds that proper-name aboutness-relations are context-sensitive and depend on an agent's contextually variable activity of filtering information. In this regard, I show that, when this context sensitivity is pushed to its limits, it yields aboutness-fragility. I conclude that Dickie's account — like any theory open to this phenomenon — requires revision. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw attention to a familiar yet overlooked epistemic state: puzzlement. We experience that by which we are puzzled as being in some way incomprehensible to us. Puzzlement is thus distinct from the mere absence of understanding. It is a polar rather than privative opposite of understanding. The distinction between puzzlement and the mere absence of understanding, I go on to argue, raises a novel problem for reductive analyses of understanding in terms of knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) produce certain outputs. Why do these outputs mean what they do? One might pursue a knowledge-first explanation according to which the content of those outputs is whatever maximizes knowledge of the human reading those outputs (Cappelen and Dever 2021). This paper identifies some serious challenges for that approach based on a) the tendency of LLMs to hallucinate and b) the use of certain decoding strategies such as nucleus or top-p sampling. I argue that these features of (...) LLMs undermine the knowledge of those reading its outputs. (shrink)

Das Drei-Barrieren-Raster beschreibt, unter welchen Bedingungen Erkenntnisbereiche von einer Gesellschaft nicht nur verstanden, sondern praktisch nutzbar und kulturell verankert werden. Es unterscheidet eine Messbarriere, eine Handlungsbarriere und eine Integrationsbarriere und dient der Einordnung des gesellschaftlichen Zugriffs auf Phänomene unabhängig von deren ontologischer Beschaffenheit. Das Raster entstand aus der Beobachtung, dass zwischen gut belegten Erkenntnissen und der Lebensrealität der Menschen häufig eine erhebliche Lücke besteht.

People regularly profess belief in religious ideas. But do they merely think of themselves as believing, or do they think of themselves as possessing knowledge? I first argue that it is difficult to determine this based purely on religious people’s self-descriptions. I instead appeal to functionalist considerations about the way religious metacognitive attitudes are formed and guide action, which suggest ordinary religious people often do self-attribute knowledge. This raises problems for recent arguments that first-order religious attitudes are a form of (...) make-believe instead of genuine belief, while also bringing out the importance of religious metacognition for fully understanding religious psychology. (shrink)