This Element is a concise, high-level introduction to the philosophy of physical symmetry. It begins with the notion of `physical representation' (the kind of empirical representation of nature that we effect in doing physics), and then lays out the historically and conceptually central case of physical symmetry that frequently falls under the rubric of 'the Relativity Principle', or 'Galileo's Ship. This material is then used as a point of departure to explore the key hermeneutic challenge concerning physical symmetry in the (...) last century, namely understanding the physical significance of the notion of 'local' gauge symmetry. The approach taken stresses both the continuity with historically important themes such as the Relativity Principle, as well as novel insights earned by working with contemporary media such as the covariant phase space and derived critical locus formalisms. (shrink)

This essay examines the collapse of traditional narrative structure within realist painting and positions Structural Omission as a framework for making that collapse visible. For centuries, storytelling — in literature, visual art, and culture — has relied on the arc Aristotle defined: beginnings, middles, and ends. Roland Barthes disrupted the author’s control by exposing the “hermeneutic code,” while Joan Didion chronicled the fragility of narrative as a way to contain lived experience. My work builds on this intellectual lineage but departs (...) from the idea that wholeness could ever be restored. Structural Omission is a framework originated by Deborah Scott that structures representational painting around omissions as compositional architecture — load-bearing absences that reveal the limits of perception, narrative, and knowing. It names a deliberate design strategy: paintings planned with intentional voids that disable the expectation of resolution, confronting the limits of both maker and viewer. In a cultural moment dominated by AI-generated completeness and seamless digital storytelling, this framework challenges realism to remain honest about what cannot be seen or known. It offers a post-certainty realism: precise, perceptually rigorous, yet built around absence as structure rather than accident. (shrink)

In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally (...) intend things? Is there such a thing as a collective mind? If so, should groups be held morally responsible? Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of the social world. In this lively, engaging introduction Deborah Tollefsen offers a careful survey of contemporary philosophers? answers to these questions, and argues for the unorthodox view that certain groups should, indeed, be treated as agents and deserve to be held morally accountable. Tollefsen explores the nature of belief, action and intention, and shows the reader how a belief in group agency can be reconciled with our understanding of individual agency and accountability. _Groups as Agents_ will be a vital resource for scholars as well as for students of philosophy and the social sciences encountering the topic for the first time. (shrink)

Some truths are not hidden; they are simply beyond reach. No matter how long you look or how fully you render, the whole story will not appear because it was never fully there. This essay examines that epistemological limit and its implications for representational painting. Structural Omission is a framework I originated that structures representational painting around omissions as compositional architecture. These are load-bearing absences that reveal the limits of perception, narrative, and knowing. Rather than disguising uncertainty, the work builds (...) from it. Drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied perception, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s unsayable, and contemporary painter Megan Rooney’s resistance to finality, I argue that painting can acknowledge what cannot be known without surrendering rigor or depth. Structural Omission does not conceal truth; it asserts that some truth is inaccessible and refuses to offer false wholeness or narrative closure. This position reframes realism for a post-certainty era, resisting the polished, algorithmic completeness of contemporary image culture and restoring honesty about the limits of seeing and knowing. Deborah Scott is the originator of Structural Omission, a framework designed for the Post-Certainty Era— a cultural condition where image-saturation has eroded the credibility of visual and narrative closure. Her representational paintings and essays investigate load-bearing absences as a necessary record of perception in an age of algorithmic completion. By formalizing the limits of seeing and knowing, Scott’s practice restores human uncertainty to the architectural foundation of the representational image. (shrink)

In this essay, painter Deborah Scott examines how generative AI is changing representational painting in a screen-first visual culture. She argues that photography challenged painting at the level of recording, while AI challenges painting at the level of authorship, meaning, and provenance. As digital reproduction becomes the primary way viewers encounter art, traditional signals of human origin and image authenticity are weakened. Scott presents Structural Omission as a framework in contemporary painting built around perceptual limits, where partial seeing is (...) treated as load-bearing architecture rather than stylistic effect. She further argues that artist writing now functions as part of artistic practice: not secondary commentary, but evidence of human inquiry embedded in the work. The essay positions painting and writing together as a response to post-certainty conditions in contemporary visual culture. -/- . (shrink)

Structural Omission, originated by Deborah Scott, is a framework in contemporary realist painting that addresses the limits of observation, perception, and knowing. It is not an abstract theory but a practice formalized through three principles—Ground (Perceptual Limits), Structure (Structural Incompleteness), and Consequence (Narrative Without Resolution). It organizes painting around what can be seen and what remains beyond reach, holding the known and the unknowable together. This paper defines Structural Omission as an epistemological framework that repositions realism after the collapse (...) of certainty. By connecting art practice to the philosophical problem of incomplete knowledge, it proposes that absence within representation can operate as load-bearing structure rather than deficiency. Drawing on thinkers such as Michael Fried, Jacques Rancière, Roland Barthes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the text argues that Structural Omission offers realism a conceptual survival strategy in an era of algorithmic completion and digital closure. (shrink)

This is a book about Aristotle's philosophy of language, interpreted in a framework that provides a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and science. The aim of the book is to explicate the description of meaning contained in De Interpretatione and to show the relevance of that theory of meaning to much of the rest of Aristotle's philosophy. In the process Deborah Modrak reveals how that theory of meaning has been much maligned. This is a major (...) reassessment of an underestimated aspect of Aristotle that will be of particular interest to classical philosophers, classicists and historians of psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Structural Omission is a framework for realist painting developed for the post-certainty era of generative AI, when images can be produced at scale with a surface of total certainty. This essay argues that realism remains viable only by abandoning completion as its premise. Traditional realism, even at its best, carried an old promise: that completion was available in principle, and that the artist could deliver wholeness if they chose. Generative AI systems now manufacture that kind of closure faster, cheaper, and (...) more convincingly than any human hand. Structural Omission rebuilds realism on a different ground rooted in perception itself: perceptual limits are not an error in representation. They are the condition of representation. The framework formalizes planned, load-bearing incompleteness through three criteria—Ground (perceptual limits), Structure (structural incompleteness), and Consequence (narrative without resolution). Completion-biased image systems can imitate the look of omissions, but they usually treat gaps as a visual effect rather than structural absence. Rather than competing with algorithmic finish, Structural Omission treats partial visibility as the architecture holding the painting together. The result is realism that is accountable to human perception. (shrink)

The seventeenth century was a period of extraordinary invention, discovery and revolutions in scientific, social and political orders. It was a time of expansive automation, biological discovery, rapid advances in medical knowledge, of animal trials and a questioning of the boundaries between species, human and non-human, between social classes, and of the assumed naturalness of political inequality. This book gives a tour through those objects, ordinary and extraordinary, which captivated the philosophical imagination of the single most important French philosopher of (...) this period, Rene Descartes. Deborah J. Brown and Calvin G. Normore document Descartes' attempt to make sense of the complex, composite objects of human and divine invention, consistent with the fundamental tenets of his metaphysical system. Their central argument is that, far from reducing all the categories of ordinary experience to the two basic categories of substance, mind and body, Descartes' philosophy recognises irreducible composites that resist reduction, and require their own distinctive modes of explanation. (shrink)

Venetian Red, an iron-oxide earth pigment long used as an invisible ground in Western painting, has underpinned realist image-making for more than five centuries. Technical literature documents its permanence and tonal stability, but its conceptual potential has been overlooked. This essay traces Venetian Red’s role from Renaissance Venice through Rembrandt, Chardin, Turner, and Robert Henri, showing how the pigment served illusion by disappearing. It then repositions Venetian Red as a contemporary strategy of Structural Omission: the deliberate construction of images that (...) build realism only to reveal its limits in the post-certainty era. By reactivating a material once trusted to stabilize representation, Structural Omission makes incompleteness structural rather than stylistic, countering today’s algorithmic drive toward seamless visual closure. -/- Author’s note: This essay approaches Venetian Red from the perspective of an artist rather than a technical pigment historian. It references well-documented historical uses of iron-oxide grounds to support a conceptual argument about Structural Omission, not to provide exhaustive conservation scholarship. (shrink)

Descartes is often accused of having fragmented the human being into two independent substances, mind and body, with no clear strategy for explaining the apparent unity of human experience. Deborah Brown argues that, contrary to this view, Descartes did in fact have a conception of a single, integrated human being, and that in his view this conception is crucial to the success of human beings as rational and moral agents and as practitioners of science. The passions are pivotal in (...) this, and in a rich and wide-ranging discussion she examines Descartes' place in the tradition of thought about the passions, the metaphysics of actions and passions, sensory representation, and Descartes' account of self-mastery and virtue. Her study is an important and original reading not only of Descartes' account of mind-body unity but also of his theory of mind. (shrink)

This essay examines the collapse of traditional narrative structure within realist painting and positions Structural Omission as a framework for making that collapse visible. For centuries, storytelling — in literature, visual art, and culture — has relied on the arc Aristotle defined: beginnings, middles, and ends. Roland Barthes disrupted the author’s control by exposing the “hermeneutic code,” while Joan Didion chronicled the fragility of narrative as a way to contain lived experience. My work builds on this intellectual lineage but departs (...) from the idea that wholeness could ever be restored. Structural Omission is a framework originated by Deborah Scott that structures representational painting around omissions as compositional architecture — load-bearing absences that reveal the limits of perception, narrative, and knowing. It names a deliberate design strategy: paintings planned with intentional voids that disable the expectation of resolution, confronting the limits of both maker and viewer. In a cultural moment dominated by AI-generated completeness and seamless digital storytelling, this framework challenges realism to remain honest about what cannot be seen or known. It offers a post-certainty realism: precise, perceptually rigorous, yet built around absence as structure rather than accident. Deborah Scott is the originator of Structural Omission, a framework designed for the Post-Certainty Era— a cultural condition where image-saturation has eroded the credibility of visual and narrative closure. Her representational paintings and essays investigate load-bearing absences as a necessary record of perception in an age of algorithmic completion. By formalizing the limits of seeing and knowing, Scott’s practice restores human uncertainty to the architectural foundation of the representational image. (shrink)

In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there (...) are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends. (shrink)

Autism is one of the most compelling, controversial, and heartbreaking cognitive disorders. It presents unique philosophical challenges as well, raising intriguing questions in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and philosophy of language that need to be explored if the autistic population is to be responsibly served. Starting from the "theory of mind" thesis that a fundamental deficit in autism is the inability to recognize that other persons have minds, Deborah R. Barnbaum considers its implications for the nature of consciousness, (...) our understanding of the consciousness of others, meaning theories in philosophy of language, and the modality of mind. This discussion lays the groundwork for consideration of the value of an autistic life, as well as the moral theories available to persons with autism. The book also explores questions about genetic decision making, research into the nature of autism, and the controversial quest for a cure. This is a timely and wide-ranging book on a disorder that commends itself to serious ethical examination. (shrink)

Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N–P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N–P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We argue that the relevance of error probabilities (...) is to ensure that only statistical hypotheses that have passed severe or probative tests are inferred from the data. The severity criterion supplies a meta-statistical principle for evaluating proposed statistical inferences, avoiding classic fallacies from tests that are overly sensitive, as well as those not sensitive enough to particular errors and discrepancies. Introduction and overview 1.1 Behavioristic and inferential rationales for Neyman–Pearson (N–P) tests 1.2 Severity rationale: induction as severe testing 1.3 Severity as a meta-statistical concept: three required restrictions on the N–P paradigm Error statistical tests from the severity perspective 2.1 N–P test T(): type I, II error probabilities and power 2.2 Specifying test T() using p-values Neyman's post-data use of power 3.1 Neyman: does failure to reject H warrant confirming H? Severe testing as a basic concept for an adequate post-data inference 4.1 The severity interpretation of acceptance (SIA) for test T() 4.2 The fallacy of acceptance (i.e., an insignificant difference): Ms Rosy 4.3 Severity and power Fallacy of rejection: statistical vs. substantive significance 5.1 Taking a rejection of H0 as evidence for a substantive claim or theory 5.2 A statistically significant difference from H0 may fail to indicate a substantively important magnitude 5.3 Principle for the severity interpretation of a rejection (SIR) 5.4 Comparing significant results with different sample sizes in T(): large n problem 5.5 General testing rules for T(), using the severe testing concept The severe testing concept and confidence intervals 6.1 Dualities between one and two-sided intervals and tests 6.2 Avoiding shortcomings of confidence intervals Beyond the N–P paradigm: pure significance, and misspecification tests Concluding comments: have we shown severity to be a basic concept in a N–P philosophy of induction? (shrink)

While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are "novel facts", there continues to be disagreement over both the definition of novelty and why it should matter. The view of novelty favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall and many others is that of use-novelty: An accordance between evidence e and hypothesis h provides a genuine test of h only if e is not used in h's construction. I argue that what lies behind the intuition that (...) novelty matters is the deeper intuition that severe tests matter. I set out a criterion of severity akin to the notion of a test's power in Neyman-Pearson statistics. I argue that tests which are use-novel may fail to be severe, and tests that are severe may fail to be use-novel. I discuss the 1919 eclipse data as a severe test of Einstein's law of gravity. (shrink)

According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman’s analysis of joint (...) intention that reflects the socio-cognitive abilities young children do have. This revision makes sense of joint action among young children and equally well explains simple joint actions involving adults. Key Words: collective intentionality • joint action • child’s theory of mind • joint attention. (shrink)

The fact that much of our knowledge is gained through the testimony of others challenges a certain form of epistemic individualism. We are clearly not autonomous knowers. But the discussion surrounding testimony has maintained a commitment to what I have elsewhere called epistemic agent individualism. Both the reductionist and the anti-reductionist have focused their attention on the testimony of individuals. But groups, too, are sources of testimony - or so I shall argue. If groups can be testifiers, a natural question (...) to ask is whether our beliefs based on the testimony of groups are ever justified and whether such a justification is to be conferred inferentially or non-inferentially. I consider and dismiss the possibility of extending an anti-reductionist account of justification to our group testimonial beliefs. I also argue against a version of reductionism that would have our group testimonial beliefs justified only in so far as we were able to monitor the trustworthiness of members of the group. However, there are forms of reductionism that can be extended to make sense of the justification of our group testimonial beliefs. There are mechanisms for monitoring the trustworthiness and competency of a group (rather than its members) and, further, a variety of background beliefs allow us to assess the testimony of a group for reliability. (shrink)

In “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore (...) the issue of group testimony in greater detail by focusing on one putative source of testimony, that of Wikipedia. My aim is to the answer the following questions: Is Wikipedia a source of testimony? And if so, what is the nature of that source? Are we to understand Wikipedia entries as a collection of testimonial statements made by individuals, some subset of individuals, or is Wikipedia itself (the organization or the Wikipedia community) the entity that testifies? If Wikipedia itself is a source of testimony, what resources do we have for assessing the trustworthiness of such an unusual epistemic source? In answering these questions I hope to further elucidate the nature of collective epistemic agency (Tollefsen 2006), of which group testimony is a paradigm example. When a mans Discourse begineth…at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; and the Resolution is called Beleefe, and Faith: Faith in the man. (1651/1991, Ch. 7; p. 48). (shrink)

Some truths are not hidden; they are simply beyond reach. No matter how long you look or how fully you render, the whole story will not appear because it was never fully there. This essay examines that epistemological limit and its implications for representational painting. Structural Omission is a framework I originated that structures representational painting around omissions as compositional architecture. These are load-bearing absences that reveal the limits of perception, narrative, and knowing. Rather than disguising uncertainty, the work builds (...) from it. Drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied perception, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s unsayable, and contemporary painter Megan Rooney’s resistance to finality, I argue that painting can acknowledge what cannot be known without surrendering rigor or depth. Structural Omission does not conceal truth; it asserts that some truth is inaccessible and refuses to offer false wholeness or narrative closure. This position reframes realism for a post-certainty era, resisting the polished, algorithmic completeness of contemporary image culture and restoring honesty about the limits of seeing and knowing. Deborah Scott is the originator of Structural Omission, a framework designed for the Post-Certainty Era— a cultural condition where image-saturation has eroded the credibility of visual and narrative closure. Her representational paintings and essays investigate load-bearing absences as a necessary record of perception in an age of algorithmic completion. By formalizing the limits of seeing and knowing, Scott’s practice restores human uncertainty to the architectural foundation of the representational image. (shrink)

This book examines a widespread, and often misunderstood, doctrine within the medieval Aristotelian tradition, namely the inclusion of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics within the scope of the Organon. It studies this doctrine, as presented by the Islamic philosophers Al- Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, from a purely philosophical perspective, and argues that the logical construal of the arts of rhetoric and poetics is both interesting and illuminating. The book begins by examining some prevalent misconceptions regarding the logical interpretation of the Rhetoric (...) and Poetics. Chapter two considers the Greek background of the doctrine, first through an examination of the Aristotelian divisions of the sciences, and then through an examination of the beginnings of the logical classification of the Rhetoric and Poetics among the Greek commentators from the school of Alexandria. The remainder of the work is devoted to a detailed consideration of the Arabic philosophers' development of the doctrine, both their understanding of its general epistemological and logical underpinnings, and their elaboration of the specific logical structures upon which poetical and rhetorical discourse is based. Consideration is also given to the relationship between contemporary philosophical views of rhetoric and poetics, and the views of these medieval authors. (shrink)

The concept of innateness is central to Descartes's epistemology; the Meditations display a new, non-Aristotelian method of acquiring knowledge by attending properly to our innate ideas. Yet understanding Descartes's conception of innate ideas is not an easy task, and some commentators have concluded that Descartes held several distinct and unrelated conceptions of innateness. In Descartes on Innate Ideas, Deborah Boyle argues that Descartes's remarks on innate ideas in fact form a unified account. Addressing the further question of how Descartes (...) thinks innate ideas are known, the author shows that, for Descartes, thinkers have implicit knowledge of their innate ideas. Thus she shows that the actual perception of these innate ideas is, for Descartes, a matter of making them explicit, turning the intellect away from sense-perceptions and toward pure thought. The author also provides a new interpretation of the Cartesian "natural light," an important mental faculty in Descartes's epistemology. (shrink)

Deborah Brown looks at how Hobbes and Descartes used the language of ‘tendency’ in their natural philosophies. She contrasts the problems that arise for Hobbes as he tries to reduce tendencies away with a Descartes, for whom ‘tendency talk is not a mere _façon de parler_’ but rather is ‘real and causally explanatory’, and who strives to incorporate inherent tendencies into his broader mechanistic ontological framework. The resulting interpretation of Descartes sees him as much closer in his conception of (...) natural laws to Nancy Cartwright than to David Lewis. One of the real benefits of this interpretation, claims Brown, is that it ‘might just help to demystify Descartes’s references to active forces’. Having thus establishing that Descartes was a realist about tendencies who nevertheless remained committed to a non-teleological, mechanistic account of nature, Brown contrasts this Cartesian picture with Hobbes’s reductive mechanics that eliminated forces and tendencies by equating them with actual motions, including even the ‘force of a body at rest’. (shrink)

Conducting this interview with Professor Deborah Kerdeman has been an immense honour. Deborah Kerdeman is Emerita Professor of Educational Philosophy at the University of Washington, Seattle. She e...

Chapter Introduction Hobbes's political doctrine presents the unusual feature that it has given rise to an "official" interpretation, in terms of which,...

Floridi and Sanders, seminal work, “On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as “artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also argue that (...) adopting certain levels of abstraction out of context can be dangerous when the level of abstraction obscures the humans who constitute computer systems. We arrive at this critique of Floridi and Sanders by examining the debate over the moral status of computer systems using the notion of interpretive flexibility. We frame the debate as a struggle over the meaning and significance of computer systems that behave independently, and not as a debate about the ‘true’ status of autonomous systems. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that while levels of abstraction are useful for particular purposes, when it comes to agency and responsibility, computer systems should be conceptualized and identified in ways that keep them tethered to the humans who create and deploy them. (shrink)

_An engaging, accessible survey of the ethical issues faced by engineers, designed for students_ The first engineering ethics textbook to use debates as the framework for presenting engineering ethics topics, this engaging, accessible survey explores the most difficult and controversial issues that engineers face in daily practice. Written by a leading scholar in the field of engineering and computer ethics, Deborah Johnson approaches engineering ethics with three premises: that engineering is both a technical and a social endeavor; that engineers (...) don’t just build things, they build society; and that engineering is an inherently ethical enterprise. (shrink)

One of the chief innovations in medieval adaptations of Aristotelian psychology was the expansion of Aristotle's notion of imagination orphantasiato include a variety of distinct perceptual powers known collectively as the internal senses. Amongst medieval philosophers in the Arabic world, Avicenna offers one of the most complex and sophisticated accounts of the internal senses. Within his list of internal senses, Avicenna includes a faculty known as “estimation”, to which various functions are assigned in a wide variety of contexts. Although many (...) philosophers in the Arabic world as well as in the Latin West accepted Avicenna's positing of an estimative faculty, Avicenna's best-known critics, al-Ghazâlî and Averroes, found Avicenna's arguments in support of a distinct estimative faculty problematic. For different reasons, both Averroes and Ghazâlî raised the basic question of whether one needed to posit a distinct faculty of estimation to supplement the perceptual abilities of the other internal senses, and whether the notion of an estimative power as defined by Avicenna was internally coherent. Such criticisms suggest that the Avicennian conception of estimation is not entirely unambiguous, and that a correct understanding of Avicenna's motivations for delineating an estimative power requires a careful study of the diverse activities assigned to it throughout Avicenna's philosophical writings. (shrink)

The key problem in the controversy over group selection is that of defining a criterion of group selection that identifies a distinct causal process that is irreducible to the causal process of individual selection. We aim to clarify this problem and to formulate an adequate model of irreducible group selection. We distinguish two types of group selection models, labeling them type I and type II models. Type I models are invoked to explain differences among groups in their respective rates of (...) production of contained individuals. Type II models are invoked to explain differences among groups in their respective rates of production of distinct new groups. Taking Elliott Sober's model as an exemplar, we argue that although type I models have some biological importance--they force biologists to consider the role of group properties in influencing the fitness of organisms--they fail to identify a distinct group-level causal selection process. Type II models if properly framed, however, do identify a group-level causal selection process that is not reducible to individual selection. We propose such a type II model and apply it to some of the major candidates for group selection. (shrink)

This paper examines how unethical behavior in the workplace occurs when management places inordinately strong emphasis on goalattainment without a corresponding emphasis on following legitimate procedures. Robert Merton's theory of sodal structure and anomie provides a foundation to discuss this argument. Key factors affecting ethical climates in work organizations are also addressed. Based on this analysis, the paper proposes strategies for developing and changing aspects of organizational culture to reduce anomie, thereby creating work climates which discourage unethical practices and provide (...) employees with mechanisms to resolve ethical conflicts in a constructive way. (shrink)

In this essay, Deborah Bird Rose takes up Val Plumwood's challenge that Western thought needs radical revitalization by pursuing the liveliness of the biosphere and human ontologies of connectivity. The first part looks at obstacles to the West's understanding of Earth as a place of lively, interactive connectivities that promote diversity, complexity, and relationality. In this context Rose offers a brief overview of Indigenous animisms. The second part explores the question of liveliness. It is taken as given that the (...) West now seeks ontological legitimacy in science, and so this discussion focuses on what biological scientists have contributed to contemporary ontology wars. The third part examines trauma in the Garden of Eden narrative, highlighting both the disaster of the story and its continuing relevance. Drawing on the work of theologians, in particular, Rose seeks in this section to recuperate a mythic foundation for a Western animism from within that great site of loss. (shrink)

In _Essential Vulnerabilities, _Deborah Achtenberg contests Emmanuel Levinas’s idea that Plato is a philosopher of freedom for whom thought is a return to the self. Instead, Plato, like Levinas, is a philosopher of the other. Nonetheless, Achtenberg argues, Plato and Levinas are different. Though they share the view that human beings are essentially vulnerable and essentially in relation to others, they conceive human vulnerability and responsiveness differently. For Plato, when we see beautiful others, we are overwhelmed by the beauty of (...) what is, by the vision of eternal form. For Levinas, we are disrupted by the newness, foreignness, or singularity of the other. The other, for him, is new or foreign, not eternal. The other is unknowable singularity. By showing these similarities and differences, Achtenberg resituates Plato in relation to Levinas and opens up two contrasting ways that self is essentially in relation to others. (shrink)

Germund Hesslow has argued recently [2] that a probabilistic theory of causality as advocated by Patrick Suppes [4] has two problems that a deterministic theory avoids. In this paper, I argue that Suppes' probabilistic causal calculus is free of each of these problems and, moreover, that several broader issues raised by Hesslow's discussion tend to support a probabilistic conception of causes.

Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas both champion the goal of a rational society. However, they differ significantly about what this society should look like and how best to achieve it. Exploring the premises shared by both critical theorists, along with their profound disagreements about social conditions today, this book defends Adorno against Habermas' influential criticisms of his account of Western society and prospects for achieving reasonable conditions of human life. The book begins with an overview of these critical theories (...) of Western society. Both Adorno and Habermas follow Georg Lukács when they argue that domination consists in the reifying extension of a calculating, rationalizing form of thought to all areas of human life. Their views about reification are discussed in the second chapter. In chapter three the author explores their conflicting accounts of the historical emergence and development of the type of rationality now prevalent in the West. Since Adorno and Habermas claim to have a critical purchase on reified social life, the critical leverage of their theories is assessed in chapter four. The final chapter deals with their opposing views about what a rational society would look like, as well as their claims about the prospects for establishing such a society. Adorno, Habermas and the Search for a Rational Society will be essential reading for students and researchers of critical theory, political theory and the work of Adorno and Habermas. (shrink)

In seeking general accounts of evidence, confirmation, or inference, philosophers have looked to logical relationships between evidence and hypotheses. Such logics of evidential relationship, whether hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian, or instantiationist fail to capture or be relevant to scientific practice. They require information that scientists do not generally have (e.g., an exhaustive set of hypotheses), while lacking slots within which to include considerations to which scientists regularly appeal (e.g., error probabilities). Building on my co-symposiasts contributions, I suggest some directions in which a (...) new and more adequate philosophy of evidence can move. (shrink)

Abstract:“Poetry in the Wake” series: (pp. 563 - 574)Deborah Rosenfelt, I Need a Poem (pp. 565)Rosamond S. King, This Was Always Going to Be a Poem about Work (pp. 566 - 567)Ashwini Tambe, November 9; One Week Later (pp. 568 – 569)Yvette Christianse, Eve (pp. 570 - 571)Amanda Solomon Amorao, To My Student Who Is an Immigrant (pp. 572 - 573)Carmen Gimenez Smith, Ethos (pp. 574).

The concept of education—its dangers and promises and its illusions and revelations—threads throughout Sigmund Freud’s body of work. This introductory volume by psychoanalytic authority, Deborah P. Britzman, explores key controversies of education through a Freudian approach. It defines how fundamental Freudian concepts such as the psychical apparatus, the drives, the unconscious, the development of morality, and transference have changed throughout Freud’s _oeuvre_. An ideal text for courses in education studies, human development, and curriculum studies, _Freud and Education_ concludes with (...) new Freudian-influenced approaches to the old dilemmas of educational research, theory, and practice. (shrink)