Simulation Hypothesis

Space Time Information (a thought experiment) proves that protein evolution is the result of computation: possibly due to a simulation.

This paper outlines how a potential new interpretation of quantum mechanics—the Many-Interacting Simulations (MIS) interpretation—may explain why our world has many of the bizarre quantum features it does. §1 provides an overview of what has been termed the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Simulation Hypothesis, showing how it explains general features of quantum phenomena. §2 then examines dead reckoning, a framework utilized to ensure ‘believable’ simulated worlds for P2P networked games. §3 details how dead reckoning in P2P games reproduces—and hence, computationally explains—properties broadly (...) analogous to (§3.1) quantum mechanical standing waves, (§3.2) Gaussian wave packets, (§3.3) the double-slit experiment, and (§3.4) the ‘Wigner’s friend’ thought experiment. §4 then details how, if this explanation is correct, then traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics each contain elements of truth. §5 concludes that quantum phenomena may be the ‘glitches in the Matrix’ that many have suggested would be evidence that we live in a computer simulation. (shrink)

Observable consequences of the hypothesis that the observed universe is a numerical simulation performed on a cubic space-time lattice or grid are explored. The simulation scenario is first motivated by extrapolating current trends in computational resource requirements for lattice QCD into the future. Using the historical development of lattice gauge theory technology as a guide, we assume that our universe is an early numerical simulation with unimproved Wilson fermion discretization and investigate potentially-observable consequences. Among the observables that are considered are (...) the muon g-2 and the current differences between determinations of alpha, but the most stringent bound on the inverse lattice spacing of the universe, b−1 > ~ 10^11 GeV, is derived from the high-energy cut off of the cosmic ray spectrum. The numerical simulation scenario could reveal itself in the distributions of the highest energy cosmic rays exhibiting a degree of rotational symmetry breaking that reflects the structure of the underlying lattice. (shrink)

Can the theory that reality is a simulation be tested? We investigate this question based on the assumption that if the system performing the simulation is nite (i.e. has limited resources), then to achieve low computational complexity, such a system would, as in a video game, render content (reality) only at the moment that information becomes available for observation by a player and not at the moment of detection by a machine (that would be part of the simulation and whose (...) detection would also be part of the internal computation performed by the Virtual Reality server before rendering content to the player). Guided by this principle we describe conceptual wave/particle duality experiments aimed at testing the simulation theory. (shrink)

Those who believe suitably programmed computers could enjoy conscious experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility that their own experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation. It would be a mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical possibility: for as Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer technology were to continue at close to present rates, there would be a strong probability that we are each living in a computer simulation. (...) The first part of this paper is devoted to broadening the scope of the argument: even if computers cannot sustain consciousness (as many dualists and materialists believe), there may still be a strong likelihood that we are living simulated lives. The implications of this result are the focus of the second part of the paper. The topics discussed include: the Doomsday argument, scepticism, the different modes of virtual life, transcendental idealism, the Problem of Evil, and simulation ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an analysis of the Simulation Argument as formulated by Nick Bostrom (2003). We begin by outlining the argument, with particular attention to its disjunctive structure. We then proceed to reconstruct the argument by making explicit several of its underlying assumptions. Furthermore, we supplement the original argument with several elements that we regard as pertinent premises. Finally, we attend to the completion of the argument, paying special attention to the decision tree that underpins it. Having completed (...) the argument by supplying the missing assumptions and decision-tree components, we derive a conclusion that diverges significantly from that of the original formulation. (shrink)

Nous proposons dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation, décrit par Nick Bostrom (2003). Nous décrivons tout d’abord l’argument de la Simulation, en mettant l’accent sur sa structure disjonctive. Nous nous attachons ensuite à compléter l’argument, en restituant plusieurs hypothèses sous-jacentes. Nous ajoutant également à l’argument original plusieurs éléments, dont nous considérons qu’ils constituent autant d’hypothèses pertinentes. Enfin, nous nous attachons à compléter l’argument et en particulier l’arbre de décision qui le sous-tend. Une fois l’argument complété, à (...) l’aide des hypothèses et des éléments de l’arbre de décision manquants, nous en tirons la conclusion, qui est tout à fait différente de celle de l’argument original. (shrink)

This paper shares a new idea about the Simulation Hypothesis. I argue that human beings are naturally designed to live and process a two-dimensional (2D) world. The 3D depth we see is just a heavy illusion calculated by our brain. When we move too fast, our brain experiences a "hardware lag" because it cannot calculate this 3D illusion in real-time. This paper presents my theory based on how we see things and proposes a practical experiment using Virtual Reality (VR) and (...) an EEG machine to prove this lag. Finally, I discuss the Stoic and humanitarian consequences if this experiment succeeds. (shrink)

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation. Outlined here is a method for programming relativistic mass, space and time at the Planck level as applicable for use in Planck Universe-as-a-Simulation Hypothesis. For the virtual universe the model uses a 4-axis hyper-sphere that expands in incremental steps (the simulation clock-rate). Virtual particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass point-state are mapped within this hyper-sphere, the oscillation driven (...) by this expansion. Particles are assigned an N-S axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled along by the expansion, thus an independent particle motion may be dispensed with. Only in the mass point-state do particles have fixed hyper-sphere co-ordinates. The rate of expansion translates to the speed of light and so in terms of the hyper-sphere co-ordinates all particles (and objects) travel at the speed of light, time (as the clock-rate) and velocity (as the rate of expansion) are therefore constant, however photons, as the means of information exchange, are restricted to lateral movement across the hyper-sphere thus giving the appearance of a 3-D space. Lorentz formulas are used to translate between this 3-D space and the hyper-sphere co-ordinates, relativity resembling the mathematics of perspective. (shrink)

The electron is found at discrete energy levels within the atom, transition between these levels is considered to involve a `jump' rather than via a continuous motion. If we simulate the transition in the H atom as a series of individual steps, with each step the frequency of the electron, we can map a semi-continuous transition (from n=1 to n=2 requires about 1887860 steps, transition period a function of the photon wavelength). Plotting the electron from n=1 to ionization traces a (...) hyperbolic spiral, the significance being that at specific spiral angles, the angle components cancel returning an integer value for the radius (360°=4r, 360+120°=9r, 360+180°=16r, 360+216°=25r ... 720°). If we set initial radius r = Bohr radius, then we can use the spiral perimeter to calculate the transition frequencies at these angles. As these spiral angles correlate the energy level Bohr radii directly with pi, we may ask if quantization of the atom has a geometrical origin. Furthermore, the closer the vicinity of the electron to the proton, the greater the divergence from the idealized value suggesting the electron maybe causing a distortion within the proton internal structure. (shrink)

This article develops a unified theory of the w-axis, linking the mass domain ($Q^2$) and the charge domain ($Q^3$) through the square root of Planck momentum $Q$. We investigate the geometric origin of the difference in orbital periods between gravitational systems (Article 3: Orbital Mechanics) and atomic systems (Article 4: Atomic Orbitals), demonstrating that the scaling shift from $r_{alpha}$ to $r_{alpha}^2$ is a consequence of the dimensional contribution of the third wave-axis ($z/w$). By modelling particles as an intersection of standing (...) waves of $Q$, we derive the $Q^5$ monopole structure and provide a first-principles derivation of the Ampere $A$. (shrink)

This overview presents a summary of a 7-article series proposing a geometric framework for physics. Based on the Simulation Hypothesis, the model suggests that the universe operates on a computationally efficient geometric substrate defined by a single fundamental constant — the fine-structure constant α — and the mathematical constants π and e. We demonstrate that complex physical phenomena, from gravitational orbits to atomic structure and quark confinement, emerge naturally from simple geometric rules on an expanding 4D hypersphere. We argue that (...) this reduction of free parameters represents a minimization of Kolmogorov Complexity, suggesting this geometric code is a likely candidate for the underlying “source code” of physical reality. (shrink)

Wepresent a geometric reformulation of Planck units and fundamental constants based on an integer-valued unit-number map θ and a small set of dimensionless gen erators. Physical quantities are represented by dimensionless geometric objects con structed from (π,Ω) and a dimensionless fine-structure parameter α, while local unit systems (e.g. SI) enter only through two dimensioned scalars (r,v) that translate the geometry into conventional units. The framework yields a unified table of con stants expressible in the form xθipyq with i = π2Ω15, (...) x = Ωv/r2, and y = πr17/v8, where cancellation rules enforce dimensionless invariants (units = 1, scalars = 1) for selected ratios. An exhaustive integer-space search over admissible unit-number assignments, subject to dimensional homogeneity, a dimensionless electron invari ant ψ, and quark bookkeeping constraints, collapses onto a unique equivalence class characterized by the base-15 rail 3M +2T = −15 (up to lattice shifts), selecting the canonical representative M = 15, T = −30. We evaluate agreement with CODATA 2014 means using a tolerance-based coincidence model (not CODATA uncertainties) and report strong joint improbabilities for the dimensionless-combination suite, the dimensioned-constant suite, and electron-parameter reconstruction. Finally, we in terpret these results through a Minimum Description Length lens: the framework acts as a compact generator that compresses many apparently independent numer ical facts into a small set of structural constraints. (shrink)

Outlined here is a simulation hypothesis approach that uses an expanding (the simulation clock-rate measured in units of Planck time) 4-axis hyper-sphere and mathematical particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass (unit of Planck mass per unit of Planck time) point-state. Particles are assigned a spin axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled by this (hyper-sphere pilot wave) expansion, thus all particles travel at, and only at, the velocity of expansion (the origin of $c$), (...) however only the particle point-state has definable co-ordinates within the hyper-sphere. Photons are the mechanism of information exchange, as they lack a mass state they can only travel laterally (in hypersphere co-ordinate terms) between particles and so this hypersphere expansion cannot be directly observed, relativity then becomes the mathematics of perspective translating between the absolute (hypersphere) and the relative motion (3D space) co-ordinate systems. A discrete `pixel' lattice geometry is assigned as the gravitational space. Units of $\hbar c$ `physically' link particles into orbital pairs. As these are direct particle to particle links, a gravitational force between macro objects is not required, the gravitational orbit as the sum of these individual orbiting pairs. A 14.6 billion year old hyper-sphere (the sum of Planck black-hole units) has similar parameters to the cosmic microwave background. The Casimir force is a measure of the background radiation density. (shrink)

An orbital simulation program is described that uses a geometrical approach to modeling gravitational and atomic orbits at the Planck scale. Orbiting objects A, B, C... are sub-divided into points, each point representing 1 unit of Planck mass, for example, a 1kg satellite would divide into 1kg/Planck mass = 45940509 points. Each point in object A then forms a rotating orbital pair with every corresponding point in objects B, C... resulting in a universe-wide, n-body network of rotating point-to-point orbital pairs. (...) Each orbital pair rotates 1 unit of Planck length per unit of Planck time at velocity c in hypersphere space co-ordinates, the results are then summed and averaged to give the new co-ordinates, the program then repeats. When these rotations are mapped over time on a 2-D plane (representing 3D space), objects A, B, C... appear to be orbiting each other. The basic simulation uses the fine structure constant alpha as an orbital constant to simulate gravitational orbit parameters. As each orbital comprises only 2 points, 1 at each orbital pole, information regarding the objects A, B, C... ; momentum, size, center of mass, barycenter etc ... is not required, instead only the start (x, y, z) co-ordinates of each point are defined. Each point, by having a mass of Planck mass, is itself a construct of multiple particles, and so we can also form individual particle to particle orbital pairs. The simulation uses only geometry, no dimensioned constants (G, h, c ...) are required, although the results can be measured in Planck units for comparison. Points are physically linked together by a unit of momentum (a graviton), the rationale for this is described in a subsequent article on atomic orbitals. (shrink)

Embedded within the mathematical electron formula $\psi = 4\pi^2q^3$ are geometrical objects with attributes of the Planck units. The object M = 1 is a unit of mass, T = $\pi$ a unit of time, P = $\Omega$ as momentum. The fine structure constant alpha and $\Omega$ (formed from pi and e) combine into a geometrical AL = $q = (2^6 3\pi^2\Omega^5/\alpha)$. This $q$ has the units for a magnetic monopole (ampere-meter) giving the electron a $q^3$ internal structure that suggests (...) quarks could be related to monopoles. We expand upon this constructing a quark model entirely from the geometrical objects; Ampere, length L and time T (themselves constructs of $\alpha, \pi$, e). We find solutions with ($D = AL$, charge $-\frac{1}{3}e$) and up ($U = AV$, charge $+\frac{2}{3}e$). The unit relationship rules between these objects permit a DDD electron but the positron would have to be a DUU, the same configuration as the proton, which could explain the matter-antimatter asymmetry, universe neutrality and why the electron proton charge magnitudes are the same. We then investigate how a DDD configuration could have a spin-1/2. (shrink)

This paper advances a geometric reinterpretation of economics. Its core claim is that for any movement from one state of affairs to another, there exists a true shortest path: a geodesic, understood as a Platonic object of economic life. This path is not defined by observed behavior, nor by retrospective success, but by the underlying structure of the possibility space itself. Yet because real economic life unfolds in a distorted world—shaped by institutions, technological limits, information asymmetries, infrastructure, and path dependence—the (...) geodesic does not generally appear as a straight line. Once mapped onto reality, it bends around hills, basins, and other sources of curvature, often taking forms that seem indirect from a naive perspective. The paper argues that ordinary agents approximate these routes only imperfectly, relying on intuition in the absence of a true map. From this it draws a methodological conclusion: economics should be understood less as the science of predicting agents, and more as the craft of mapping the geometry of possibility space. On this view, economists function as map makers, identifying the contours of constraint and opportunity so that agents may better navigate toward whatever ends they desire. Inefficiency is thus reconceived as excess expenditure induced by curvature, rather than simply as irrationality or failure to optimize. -/- To quote the great Martin Luther King Jr. “The moral arc of the universe is long, but it bends towards Justice.” . (shrink)

According to the most common interpretation of the simulation argument, we are very likely to live in an ancestor simulation. It is interesting to ask if some families of simulations are more likely than others inside the space of all simulations. We argue that a natural probability measure is given by computational complexity: easier simulations are more likely to be run. Remarkably this allows us to extract experimental predictions from the fact that we live in a simulation. For instance we (...) show that it is very likely that humanity will not achieve interstellar travel and that humanity will not meet other intelligent species in the universe, in turn explaining the Fermi's Paradox. On the opposite side, experimental falsification of any of these predictions would constitute evidence against our reality being a simulation. (shrink)

In this paper we interpret some key passages of scripture from Eastern religions and correlate them with salient features of a computer simulated universe. Apparently, the Eastern mystics of the past were able to intuit through philosophy and meditation the key properties of what we now call the Simulation Hypothesis.

If we are serious about the Simulation Hypothesis, which posits that the world is a computer simulation, then it is important to test this hypothesis by whatever means are available. Previously, some key papers have proposed physical, materialistic experiments to test for “flaws in the simulation” to detect whether we are living in a simulation. This approach relies on sophisticated experiments based on quantum mechanical properties of the universe. However, even if these scientific experiments can be run, it is unclear (...) whether they would expose flaws in the simulation or just flaws in our underlying quantum mechanical theory. In this paper, we attempt a metaphysical experiment as an alternative. Specifically, we use the venerable Chinese method of querying the I Ching Oracle for its judgement. We utilize the three-coin method of I Ching reading to gain insight into the question of how should we proceed to determine if we live in a computer simulation or not. (shrink)

Both patched versions of the Bostrom/Kulczycki simulation argument contain serious objective errors, discovered while attempting to formalize them in predicate logic. The English glosses of both versions involve badly misleading meanings of vague magnitude terms, which their impressiveness benefits from. We fix the errors, prove optimal versions of the arguments, and argue that both are much less impressive than they originally appeared. Finally, we provide a guide for readers to evaluate the simulation argument for themselves, using well-justified settings of the (...) argument parameters that have simple, accurate statements in English, which are easier to understand and critique than the statements in the original paper. (shrink)

Are we living in a computer simulation? Some philosophers say it's very likely we are. Some philosophers say that even if we're not in a simulation, we could never know for sure. In this short piece I would like to respond to a more practical question: that is, whatever the case may be, ontologically or epistemically, how do we actually escape (or break) a simulation? I propose a rather simple and sure-fire way to escape a computer simulation—whether we're in one (...) or not. I also connect my solution to the Fermi Paradox. (shrink)

This article introduces Cosmo-Methodology, a novel theoretical framework challenging classical Darwinian and anthropocentric paradigms of human evolution. By proposing the concepts of the "Macrobial Shadow" and the "Visceral Downgrade," we argue that humanity's current biological fragility is not the apex of natural ascent, but the result of systemic, parasitic domestication. To resolve this existential vulnerability, this paper outlines the Justika Framework—a theoretical and topographical model for systemic sovereignty. It examines the necessity of a trans-dimensional paradigm shift, termed the Visceral Escape, (...) positing that sociological, biological, and cosmic liberation must be approached strictly as engineering failures requiring bio-synthetic correction. Ultimately, we construct a teleological model in which humanity ascends from a domesticated biological host into a sovereign, multi-dimensional Creator Species, utilizing a non-parasitic Man-Made Matrix to navigate the broader cosmic architecture. (shrink)

I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in the ground-level of reality. (Similar arguments can be marshalled for the view that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary people, but I focus on the case of simulations.) I explain how this argument overcomes some objections to Bostrom’s classic argument for the same conclusion. I also consider to what extent the argument depends upon an internalist conception (...) of evidence, and I refute the common line of thought that finding many simulations being run—or running them ourselves—must increase the odds that we are in a simulation. GPI Working Paper No. 16-2021. (shrink)

Bostrom's simulation argument presents a trilemma: either almost no human-level civilizations reach a posthuman stage, or almost no posthuman civilizations run ancestor-simulations, or almost everyone with experiences like ours is living in a simulation. This paper grants the trilemma's formal apparatus in full and shows that Bostrom's conclusion — that we ourselves are probably simulated — does not follow from it. The formula behind the trilemma computes over a reference class with two subgroups: originating civilizations, and the simulations their descendants (...) produce. The formula's own specification places us in the originating subgroup. To reach his conclusion, Bostrom performs a separate inference, from we will create simulations to we are simulated — from what we can make to what we are. I call this the capability-inversion fallacy. The paper identifies the inference, shows Bostrom committing it throughout his text, diagnoses the features of his formulation that concealed it for two decades, and shows that the standard defenses of the argument commit it afresh. The simulation hypothesis remains a logical possibility. Bostrom's argument provides no evidence for it. (shrink)

The goal of the article is to explore what is the most probable type of simulation in which humanity lives (if any) and how this affects simulation termination risks. We firstly explore the question of what kind of simulation in which humanity is most likely located based on pure theoretical reasoning. We suggest a new patch to the classical simulation argument, showing that we are likely simulated not by our own descendants, but by alien civilizations. Based on this, we provide (...) classification of different possible simulations and we find that simpler, less expensive and one-person-centered simulations, resurrectional simulations, or simulations of the first artificial general intelligence’s (AGI’s) origin (singularity simulations) should dominate. Also, simulations which simulate the 21st century and global catastrophic risks are probable. We then explore whether the simulation could collapse or be terminated. Most simulations must be terminated after they model the singularity or after they model a global catastrophe before the singularity. Undeniably observed glitches, but not philosophical speculations could result in simulation termination. The simulation could collapse if it is overwhelmed by glitches. The Doomsday Argument in simulations implies termination soon. We conclude that all types of the most probable simulations except resurrectional simulations are prone to termination risks in a relatively short time frame of hundreds of years or less from now. (shrink)

Abstract: In the last decade, an urban legend about “glitches in the matrix” has become popular. As it is typical for urban legends, there is no evidence for most such stories, and the phenomenon could be explained as resulting from hoaxes, creepypasta, coincidence, and different forms of cognitive bias. In addition, the folk understanding of probability does not bear much resemblance to actual probability distributions, resulting in the illusion of improbable events, like the “birthday paradox”. Moreover, many such stories, even (...) if they were true, could not be considered evidence of glitches in a linear-time computer simulation, as the reported “glitches” often assume non-linearity of time and space—like premonitions or changes to the past. Different types of simulations assume different types of glitches; for example, dreams are often very glitchy. Here, we explore the theoretical conditions necessary for such glitches to occur and then create a typology of so-called “GITM” reports. One interesting hypothetical subtype is “viruses in the matrix”, that is, self-replicating units which consume computational resources in a manner similar to transposons in the genome, biological and computer viruses, and memes. (shrink)

On the basis of the symmetry principle, I propose a structure of simulation that rejects a global absolute level of reality. I define multi-world loops as closed cycles of simulation relations and illustrate a three-world case. This framework contrasts with hierarchical models and single-world self-simulation, and points to future work on formalization and physical constraints.

This monograph is a companion to The Redemption Optimization (TRO), extending its solution to the problem of evil by modeling reality as a governed "moral operating system." We formalize the kernel axioms (freedom preservation, harm-certifying rejection, typal closure, and global convergence), prove a guardrail condition that stabilizes the minimal trigger under delegation, and map a large basin of stability (98.2% in seven-dimensional parameter space). A simulation-coherent reading interprets miracles and prophecy as lawful supervisor patches in a governed render, with eschatological (...) convergence as the end of evil. -/- Version 2.2 introduces two major additions: (1) Appendix C tightening harm-positive necessity as a test of conscience under ethical cross-pressure, and (2) Appendix D positioning TAOS as a meta-theory over physics, providing an axiomatic ground for any future completed Theory of Everything. The work concludes with falsifiable predictions and a pre-registered RCT protocol for empirical validation, making TAOS a bridge between philosophical theodicy, applied ethics, and scientific testability. (shrink)

So the Fine-tuning Argument goes, because it is so unlikely for the physical constants of the laws of nature to have taken the values that they in fact take, we should significantly raise our credence that God exists. Simulation Arguments argue that our world might be (or, in stronger versions, that it probably is) a mere computer simulation. This paper argues that, in light of a Simulation Argument with a particularly weak conclusion, fine-tuning reasoning instead motivates atheists to believe that (...) we live in a computer simulation. (shrink)

External-world skepticism challenges, among other things, the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other people. Some external-world skeptics deny that I know my loved ones exist; some claim that my belief that my loved ones exist is epistemically impermissible. However, abandoning this belief would be highly unattractive. In fact, new developments in the ethics of belief provide the groundwork for an argument that skeptical doubts about loved ones, even if well-grounded, are prima facie morally wrongful. I defend the external-world skeptic from (...) this moral criticism. Our moral obligations, I note, are sensitive to our epistemic limitations; the fact that you have no epistemic reason to believe that your uncle exists, for instance, can explain why you are under no moral obligation to visit him in the hospital. Drawing on this point, I demonstrate that we face no moral obligation to avoid skeptical doubt when that doubt is genuinely well-grounded. (shrink)

According to veridicalism, if a subject’s beliefs have always been elicited by a computer simulation that wholly and perfectly simulates the world W it is a simulation of, and that is as open-ended as W is, then most of their beliefs are true. In this paper I examine David Chalmers’ argument that a subject’s being wrong about the fundamental nature of the entities that their everyday beliefs refer to does not render those beliefs false and show that it is unconvincing.

On some cosmological models, we’re cosmically early: we arrived roughly 14 billion years after the Big Bang in a universe that will evidently remain conducive to the emergence of intelligent observers for trillions of years. Why are we so early? I’ll survey two broad classes of responses: large-world responses that turn on reality being much larger than on standard single-universe hypotheses and small-world responses that are compatible with the world being no larger than such hypotheses take it to be. One (...) upshot will be that cosmic earliness suggests a diverse range of large-world explanations. In contrast, it turns out to be difficult to account for cosmic earliness while steering clear of large-world commitments. I conclude with some reflections on why our time of arrival seems thoroughly entangled with our world’s size. (shrink)

This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications.

The simulation hypothesis has always depended on a certain asymmetry of confidence. Physics is still groping toward a final account of reality, while speculative philosophy confidently announces that reality is “probably” a computer program. As long as physics appears incomplete, the simulation hypothesis can parasitize that uncertainty. What has begun to change in the last few years is that the direction of pressure is reversing. The closer physics gets to a genuine theory of everything, the less room there is for (...) the simulation hypothesis to occupy. My earlier paper argued that once you take adaptive emergence, thermodynamic constraints, and recursive irreducibility seriously, the hypothesis is either physically impossible or logically meaningless. The undecidability work by Faizal, Krauss, and collaborators reaches the same destination from a different starting point. If our ultimate physics necessarily includes non-algorithmic structure, then no Turing-equivalent device can ever host a complete copy of our universe. They frame this as a consequence of Gödel, Tarski, and Chaitin. I agree with their core result, but I think the implications are stronger than they themselves are willing to draw. Once you integrate their undecidability constraints with the ontological, thermodynamic, and epistemic problems I previously outlined, the simulation hypothesis is not merely an unbuildable technology. It is not a coherent description of any possible world. (shrink)

This monograph presents Moral Kernel Optimization (MKO), the successor to Theology as Operating System (TAOS), and the formal companion to The Redemption Optimization (TRO). MKO frames reality as a governed render whose kernel axioms guarantee freedom preservation (F ≠ 0), single-instance harm certification per typal (minimal-trigger R = 1), and global convergence (S* = 1). Version 3.1 strengthens the prior release by: (i) introducing a variational bridge to physics (App. D) that selects physical law-sets to maximize the moral objective J (...) subject to F ≥ ε, yielding gauge-like symmetries, entropy floors, and cosmological sandboxing as empirical consequences; (ii) formalizing kernel-constrained evolution (App. F), which explains why worlds must produce moral agency within finite time and converge harm thereafter; (iii) reinterpreting quantum superposition and time as mechanisms that preserve freedom-space until event-valued decisions resolve, defining time as moral latency rather than mere physical parameter; and (iv) incorporating over fifty rounds of adversarial validation with xAI’s Grok, which stress-tested MKO’s axioms and acknowledged its provisional supremacy among event-valued frameworks until falsified or surpassed. MKO is not merely metaphysical speculation but a Popperian research program: it offers guardrail inequalities, typal-closure criteria, and pre-registered RCT predictions for measurable outcomes including incident-rate declines, no-reopen frequencies, and societal psychological uplift. These predictions render MKO falsifiable—it stands until data proves otherwise. If validated, MKO provides a candidate for a true meta-Theory of Everything, uniting theology, physics, and governance into a single schema in which freedom, justice, and human flourishing are not accidental but structurally guaranteed. -/- Author’s Note. This work supersedes prior versions circulated as Theology as Operating System (TAOS). MKO should be cited as the canonical name going forward. All previous Zenodo, OSF, and PhilPapers entries for TAOS will be updated to reference this version. (shrink)

According to the simulation hypothesis, the world we live in is a computer simulation. According to long-termism, we should aim to bring about the best possible future. In this paper, I argue that there is a tension between the two: in so far as we have reason to think we are living in a computer simulation, we have reason to think the long-termist project will fail (or has already failed). I make my case by developing a novel version of the (...) problem of evil. It says that there exist certain forms of evil in our world that longtermist philosophers have argued we should try to eradicate. But then, the existence of those evils gives us reason to think our world is not a computer simulation run by a being aligned with longtermist values. In short, the more that longtermists think we could make the world a better place in the future, the more troubling they should find it that the world is not already a better place, given the assumption that we are living in a computer simulation. (shrink)

According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by (...) that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies. (shrink)

Preston Greene (2020) argues that we should not conduct simulation investigations because of the risk that we might be terminated if our world is a simulation designed to research various counterfactuals about the world of the simulators. In response, we propose a sequence of arguments, most of which have the form of an "even if” response to anyone unmoved by our previous arguments. It runs thus: (i) if simulation is possible, then simulators are as likely to care about simulating simulations (...) as they are likely to care about simulating basement (i.e. non-simulated) worlds. But (ii) even if simulations are interested only in simulating basement worlds the discovery that we are in a simulation will have little or no impact on the evolution of ordinary events. But (iii) even if discovering that we are in a simulation impacts the evolution of ordinary events, the effects of seeming to do so could also happen in a basement world, and might be the subject of interesting counterfactuals in the basement world Finally, (iv) there is little reason to think that there is a catastrophic effect from successful simulation probes, and no argument from the precautionary principle can be used to leverage the negligible credence one ought have in this. Thus, if we do develop a simulation probe, then let’s do it. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to a restricted version of the principle of indifference in the case of self‐locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle states that, within any given possible world, one should be indifferent between different hypotheses concerning who one is within that possible world, so long as those hypotheses are compatible with one's evidence. My first goal is to defend a more precise version of this principle. After responding to several existing criticisms of such a principle, I argue (...) that existing formulations of the principle are crucially ambiguous, and I go on to defend a particular disambiguation of the principle. According to the disambiguation I defend, how we should apply this restricted principle of indifference sensitively depends on our background metaphysical beliefs. My second goal is to apply this disambiguated principle to classical skeptical problems in epistemology. In particular, I argue that Eternalism threatens to lead us to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism threatens to lead us to inductive skepticism. (shrink)

In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Chalmers views these claims as at least weakly connected: The former claim helps forestall a concern that if objects in the simulation are not genuine (and so not knowable), then life in the (...) simulation is illusory and therefore, not as valuable as a non-simulated life. Taking up these questions, I argue that in general, the value of social knowledge for a meaningful life dramatically swamps the value of non-social knowledge for a meaningful life. Along the way, I propose a non-additive model of the meaningfulness of life, according to which the overall effect of some potential contributor of value to a life depends in part on what is already in a life. One upshot is that the vindication of non-social knowledge, absent a correlative vindication of social knowledge, contributes either not at all or scarcely at all to the claim that our lives in the simulation might be deeply meaningful. This is so even though the vindication of non-social knowledge does forestall the concern that in the simulation, our lives might be wholly meaningless. (shrink)

l argue that, contra Chalmers,a skeptical scenario involving deception is a genuine possibility,even if he is correct that simulations are real. I call this new skeptical position “Illusory World Skepticism.” Illusory World Skepticism draws from the simulation argument,together with work in physics,astrobiology, and AI,to argue that we may indeed be in an illusory world—a universe scale simulation orchestrated by a deceptive AI—the technophilosopher’s ultimate evil demon. In Section One I urge that Illusory World Skepticism is a bone fide skeptical possibility. (...) In Section Two, I explore features of quantum computation. Then, in Sections Three and Four, I draw from the discussion of quantum computation and assume that the simulation argument is correct,applying considerations from the fields of astrobiology and AI safety to illustrate that illusory world skepticism constitutes what I call “a serious epistemic threat”, a scenario that cannot be dismissed as requiring that knowledge is certainty or which seems to just depict a remote, fictional situation. (shrink)

In Reality+, David Chalmers suggests that it wouldn't be too bad if we lived in a computer simulation. I argue on the contrary that if we live in a simulation, we ought to attach a significant conditional credence to its being a small or brief simulation. Our existence and the existence of many of the people and things we care about would then unfortunately depend on contingencies difficult to assess and beyond our control. Furthermore, all the badness of the world (...) would appear to reflect the gods’ intentional cruelty or callous disregard. A large, stable rock is a more dependable and less axiologically troubling fundamental ground for reality. (shrink)

Los avances de la más reciente faceta de la inteligencia artificial y su respectivo campo de aplicación, creando fascinantes mundos virtuales, hacen vislumbrar un trialismo ontológico y postular con seriedad la pregunta de si nuestra realidad es una Matrix (simulation hypothesis). Esta propuesta implicaría una serie de consideraciones sobre la sensibilidad, es decir, nuestra relación con el mundo físico y el metaverso, replanteando nociones que antaño se han considerado sobre la realidad y la experiencia. Esto abre posibilidades ontológicas, ya no (...) solo hacia lo material sino también a lo virtual, comprendiendo las mismas dentro de mundos posibles basados en sistemas binarios y de relación it-from-bit. La presente ponencia propone cinco tesis de contingencia para ahondar el papel que juega la virtualidad desde estos nuevos ámbitos ontológicos y la problematización epistémica que implica tanto aceptar como rechazar que acaecemos dentro de una realidad virtual. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis can reinforce a cynical dismissal of human potential. This attitude can allow online platform designers to rationalize employing manipulative neuromarketing techniques to control user decisions. We point to cognitive boosting techniques at both user and designer levels to build critical reflection and mindfulness.

This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying to uncover the hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations. He then gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of having and applying this rule. Based on these ideas, (...) he shows how we can give a new response to the traditional problem of global skepticism. He also argues that philosophical skepticism is not just something that comes up during philosophical reflection, as David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce and other philosophers have urged. Instead, it is of great practical significance. The rule which produces skepticism may itself be operative in certain pathologies such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, in creative endeavors, and in conspiratorial thinking. The rule can also explain some of our reluctance to trust statistical evidence, especially in legal settings. More broadly, this volume aims to breathe new life into a classic problem in philosophy by tackling it from a new perspective and exploring new areas of application. The book will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists and anyone interested in the human capacity to doubt and to question our beliefs. (shrink)

This report explores interactions between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. It offers a tour of the surrounding theoretical terrain and brings together disparate literatures that bear on the topic.

Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that (...) we live in a simulation. We then argue that if panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then viable simulation hypotheses are substantially sceptical scenarios. We conclude that the nature of consciousness has wide-ranging implications for simulation arguments. (shrink)

This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that _cannot_ be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. (...) Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished. (shrink)

The interplay between the virus, infected cells and immune responses to SARS-CoV-2 is still under debate. By extending the basic model of viral dynamics, we propose here a formal approach to describe neutralisation versus weak (or non-)neutralisation scenarios and compare them with the possible effects of antibody-dependent enhancement (ADE). The theoretical model is consistent with the data available in the literature; we show that both weakly neutralising antibodies and ADE can result in final viral clearance or disease progression, but that (...) the immunodynamics are different in each case. As a significant proportion of the world’s population is already naturally immune or vaccinated, we also discuss the implications for secondary infections after vaccination or in the presence of immune system dysfunctions. (shrink)