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Deliberation
Edited by Jonathan Way (University of Southampton)
About this topic
| Summary | In (practical) deliberation we aim to decide what to do by considering reasons to act. Deliberation of this sort raises many questions, including: (i) What is the relationship between deliberation and acting for reasons? For instance, is deliberation necessary for acting for a reason? (ii) To what extent is it possible for us to take into account things other than reasons for and against doing A in deliberating about whether to A? What explains any such restriction? (iii) What kind of freedom, if any, is presupposed in deliberation? (iv) What is the relationship between rational deliberation and rational action? For instance, does rational deliberation which concludes in a decision to A ensure that it is rational to A? (v) What kinds of factors make for rational deliberation? Is deliberation about whether to A rational only insofar as it responds to reasons for and against A-ing? Or do other factors – for instance, about the benefits of being disposed to deliberate in certain ways – also bear on the rationality of deliberation? Some philosophers have also discussed the possibility of doxastic deliberation – deliberation about what to believe. Some philosophers have argued that features of doxastic deliberation support the view that belief is essentially normative. |
| Key works | For a very helpful recent discussion of (i), see Arpaly & Schroeder 2012. For discussion of (ii) see e.g. Hieronymi 2006, Kavka 1983, and Shah 2008. Much of the literature on (iv) and (v) takes off from David Gauthier's work, especially Gauthier 1986. Morris & Ripstein 2001 is a very useful collection of essays on Gauthier's work. Much of the recent debate about doxastic deliberation begins with Shah 2003. |
| Introductions | Pettit 2010 |
Show all references
Related
Siblings
- Decision (306)
- Desire and Motivation (402)
- Desire and Reason (490)
- Instrumental Reasoning (472)
- Practical and Theoretical Reasoning (356)
- Rational Requirements (488)
- Pratical Reason, Misc (636)
Contents
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| 1 — 50 / 465 |
- On the content and role of we-intentions.Olle Blomberg - manuscript[Forthcoming 2026 in *Ontology of the Social: Agency, Attitudes and Ethics*, edited by Bhaskarjit Neog, and published by Routledge.] For a penultimate draft, please email the author.] Assuming a causal theory of action, this chapter argues that the distinctive feature of joint intentional activity is that each participant’s contribution is rationalised and guided by a ‘we-intention’. It contends that such we-intentions can be reduced to ordinary mental states with collective content, in accordance with the ‘content approach’. The chapter proposes two (...)
- Risk, Ignorance, and What We Ought to Do.Danny Frederick - manuscriptI consider cases in which risk or ignorance create barriers to our discovery of what we ought to do. I argue that neither expected utility theory, nor the maximin principle, nor a timid gambling temperament, is relevant to discovering what we ought to do in one-off or infrequently recurring types of decisions involving risk, or to decisions involving ignorance. I argue, contra Kolodny and MacFarlane, that the miners case does not require us to give up any classical logical principle in (...)
- How Do You Like Me Now?Gerald Hull - manuscriptThese reflections are an attempt to get to the heart of the "reason is the slave of the passions" debate. The whole point of deliberation is to arrive at a choice. What factors persons find to be choice-relevant is a purely empirical matter. This has significant consequences for the views of Hume, Williams, Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard regarding practical reason.
- Center, Horizon, and “Taking a Stand”: A Phenomenological Map of Decision Episodes.Claus Janew - manuscriptThis paper offers a phenomenological description of conscious decision episodes in which agents experience themselves as facing a live choice and “taking a stand.” It also argues that such a description supplies a structural supplement to existing accounts of decision and self-commitment, especially Moran’s account of avowal and Chang’s account of hard choices. Moran shows why deciding is not merely reporting an antecedent psychological fact; Chang shows why some choices are not settled by the balance of given reasons and may (...)
- (1 other version)Exploring People’s Normative Judgements About Future Bias and The Temporal Value Asymmetry.Andrew J. Latham, Rita Li, Kristie Miller & Wen Yu - manuscriptThis paper empirically probes people’s judgements about whether future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry (TVA for short) are rationally permissible, obligatory, or impermissible. While philosophers are divided about the normative status of these attitudes/preferences, they have typically agreed that non-philosophers will judge that future-bias is at least permissible, and probably obligatory, and will judge that TVA is not permissible. If this is right, it is important for two reasons. First, many researchers have argued that future-bias is a manifestation of TVA. (...)
- Is there a liberal principle of instrumental transmission?Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018Some of our reasons for action are grounded in the fact that the action in question is a means to something else we have reason to do. This raises the question as to which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of a liberal transmission principle, which plays a prominent role in the current literature. The principle states that an agent has an instrumental reason to whenever -ing is (...)
- Planning for Mistakes.Sam Carter - forthcoming - Noûs.How should you decide what to do? Orthodox decision theory offers attractively simple advice: do whatever has the most expected value. In what follows, I argue that this is not always good advice for agents like us. -/- Agents like us are susceptible to error: Sometimes, we do not succeed at doing what is recommended by the advice we are trying to follow. For agents susceptible to error, there can be situations in which trying to do what they expect to (...)
- On the Normative Status of Future Bias.Conall Clarke, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Synthese.While philosophers disagree about the permissibility of future-bias, they have typically agreed that non-philosophers will at least judge that future-bias is permissible, and probably judge that it is obligatory as well. Recent empirical work supports this supposition: people overwhelmingly judge that they themselves ought to prefer, of a negative event, that it lies at a certain point in the past rather than an equidistant point in the future. This finding can potentially be marshalled into an argument that people ought to (...)
- What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian, New Essays on Normative Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.Logical monism is the view that there is ‘One True Logic’. This is the default position, against which pluralists react. If there were not ‘One True Logic’, it is hard to see how there could be one true theory of anything. A theory is closed under a logic! But what is logical monism? In this article, I consider semantic, logical, modal, scientific, and metaphysical proposals. I argue that, on no ‘factualist’ analysis (according to which ‘there is One True Logic’ expresses (...)Find it on Amazon.com (collection)Remove from this list Direct downloadExport citationBookmark 6 citations
- Précis of Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - Analysis.
- Libertarianism, Motivation and Objective Probabilities of Free Actions.Daniele Conti - forthcoming - Res Philosophica.In recent years, the literature on free will libertarianism has seen the unfolding of a debate over whether undetermined free actions should be assigned (non-trivial) objective probabilities or can instead be considered probabilistically indeterminate (Buchak 2013; Vicens 2016; O'Connor 2016; Schlosser 2017; Conti 2024). According to one line of reasoning, the ascription of objective probabilities is justified by the phenomenology of decision-making processes. Typically, in situations of choice, we are not equally inclined towards the options open to us, but we (...)
- Ought We to Do What We Ought to Be Made to Do?William A. Edmundson - forthcoming - In Georgios Pavlakos Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.The late Jerry Cohen struggled to reconcile his egalitarian political principles with his personal style of life. His efforts were inconclusive, but instructive. This comment locates the core of Cohen’s discomfort in an abstract principle that connects what we morally ought to be compelled to do and what we have a duty to do anyway. The connection the principle states is more general and much tighter than Cohen and others, e.g. Thomas Nagel, have seen. Our principles of justice always put (...)Find it on Amazon.com (collection)Remove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citationBookmark 3 citations
- How Virtues and Institutions Limit Practical Thought.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - In Silvia Caprioglio Panizza, Moral Impossibility: Ethical, Political, and Psychological Approaches. New York: Routledge.This paper develops a broadly neo-Aristotelian account of how virtues and institutions shape practical thought, focusing in particular on which options virtuous agents consider in deliberation. The central claim is that virtues and institutions render some options what I call “practically impossible” for an agent. Options are practically impossible if the agent is disposed not to consider them (invisible options) or disposed to reject them immediately when they are pointed out (options that are out of the question). I argue that (...)
- Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.This paper offers an account of deontic normativity in terms of attributive goodness. An action is permissible for S in C just in case there is a good practical inference available to S in C that results in S performing (or intending to perform) the action. The standards of goodness for practical inferences are determined by what is a good or bad exercise of the human capacity of practical reason, which is an attributive (and not a deontic) assessment.
- Robust vs Formal Normativity II, Or: No Gods, No Masters, No Authoritative Normativity.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati, The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity”. It’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normative” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative normativity”: (...)Find it on Amazon.com (collection)Remove from this list Direct downloadExport citationBookmark 7 citations
- Rationality, coherence, and reasons responsiveness.Samuel Kahn - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.In Nora Heinzelmann's recent ‘Rationality is not Coherence,’ she sets out a novel and forceful challenge for coherence accounts of rationality (henceforth: CRs). Heinzelmann argues that, first, there are cases in which the norms in CRs generate conflict and, thus, agents cannot be rational; but, second, it is counterintuitive that agents cannot be rational in these cases; and, third, reasons responsiveness accounts of rationality (henceforth: RRs) do not have this counterintuitive result. From this, Heinzelmann concludes that RRs are superior to (...)
- Review of Reasons Last: Agency, Morality, and the Reasoning View. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.This is a review of Samuel Asarnow's book 'Reasons Last'. It surveys the book's main achievements and critically examines Asarnow's Unity Argument alongside several other aspects of his view.
- The Inconsistency of a Normative Pluriverse.Seungsoo Lee - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.Normative realism is the view that there are ought facts, i.e. facts about what we ought to do. A recent influential challenge to normative realism, raised separately by Justin Clarke-Doane and Matti Eklund, argues that ought facts—even if they exist—are inert in the sense that they cannot tell us what to do. The ground for this challenge is the epistemic possibility of a normative pluriverse, that is, the epistemic possibility of there being not only ought facts but also ought-like facts. (...)
- Time Travel and Knowledge of the Future.Kristie Miller - forthcoming - In Joshua Heter & Richard Greene, Back to the Future and Philosophy: This is Heavy!In Back to the Future II, Doc incapacitates Jennifer when she arrives in 2015, in order to prevent her having too much knowledge of her future. Doc clearly believes that having knowledge of the future, or at least, too much knowledge, is a bad thing. But if it is bad, why is it bad? This chapter explores one reason why Doc might have thought knowing too much about one’s future is bad: namely that it undermines one’s deliberative freedom. This chapter (...)
- Bargaining with Myself: Humean Temptation and Rational Resistance.Marina Moreno - forthcoming - In Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl & Attila Tanyi, Problems of Choice: Normativity, Rationality, Axiology, and Morality. London: Routledge.This paper examines robustly Humean solutions to temptation cases. Such cases are typically characterized by a pattern of preference reversal: at an initial time t1, an agent prefers not to give in to a temptation; at a later time t2, when the temptation becomes imminent, this preference reverses; and at a subsequent time t3 after the agent has either succumbed to or resisted the temptation, the preference often reverts again. Standard Humean accounts of rationality and motivation face a difficulty here. (...)
- Problems on the Legalization of LGBT Marriage in the Communist Block - A Preliminary Legal Review.Yang Immanuel Pachankis - forthcoming - Scientific Research Publishing.The article analyzes the legislative issues on equal marriage in P. R. China. It adopts a path dependency analysis on the liberal institutional order’s effects to the regime’s structural discrimination on the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) population. The research adopted a duo-lingual paradigm on Christianity with intercultural and transnational interpretations, and the research found the mis-adaption of language in the Chinese text of the United Nations charter is the key source to the suppression of the LGBT population in (...)
- Deciding Decision-Making Away.Matthew Rachar & Jules Salomone Sehr - forthcoming - Mind.When faced with a hard decision, we can and sometimes should decide decision-making away, for instance by flipping a coin. At first, this strategy might look suspect: it seems that conforming with the verdict of a coin flip and φ-ing as a result involves making the decision to φ. To address this worry, we inquire into the psychological structures that make deciding decision-making away possible. Our main contention is that it involves conditional intentions: you form the intention to φ if (...)
- Believe It or Not: Transparency Is False.Conner Schultz - forthcoming - Noûs.Transparency is the view that the deliberative question whether to believe P gives way to the question whether P. In this paper, I argue that transparency is false. I begin by teasing out two commitments of transparency: (i) the set of possible answers to the question whether to believe P is the same set of possible answers to the question whether P; (ii) the question whether to believe P can be settled on the basis of all and only those considerations (...)
- The Positional Nature of Valuing.X. Zhang - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-28.This paper aims to explore one significant yet insufficiently elaborated aspect of valuing, namely the positional nature of valuing, which essentially reveals the fact that the valuer occupies a particular position or takes a specific viewpoint in relation to the object being valued. This positional nature of valuing does not merely embody a specific viewpoint from which the valuer’s beliefs, attitudes, reasons, and emotions are conveyed in a complex manner towards the valued object, but also constitute a particular position from (...)
- Do we have (in)compatibilist phenomenology of deliberation?: a survey.Souichiro Honma, Kiichi Inarimori & Kengo Miyazono - 2026 - Frontiers in Psychology 16:1605079.In this article, we survey contemporary works on the phenomenology of deliberation and discuss its relevance to the philosophical problems of free will. We first articulate the debate between compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations of (leeway and source) freedom in the phenomenology of deliberation (Section 2). Next, we examine this issue in light of relevant psychological studies of the folk experiences of deliberation (Section 3), followed by a discussion of four general methodological problems in the investigation of the phenomenology of deliberation (...)
- Review of Chris Tucker: The weight of reasons: a framework for ethics. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2026 - Ethics 136 (4):947-953.This is a review of Chris Tucker's "The Weight of Reasons: A Framework for Ethics" (OUP 2025). It critically examines his defense of Weight Pluralism and his claim that the fundamental model of weighing reasons requires multiple scales.
- Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2026 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 21:144-169.According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be (...)
- The Deliberative Significance of Moral Obligations.Lukas Naegeli - 2026 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 29 (1):193-210.Moral obligations are often seen as deliberatively significant in a way that differs from the role that ordinary reasons play in our practical deliberations about what we ought to do. R. Jay Wallace claims that his relational approach to morality is well-suited to make this feature intelligible, while other approaches fail. Against this, I argue that rationalists who trace obligations back to reasons have the means either to explain the deliberative significance of moral obligations or to reject it as illusory, (...)
- Rules, Rights, and Hedges.John Schwenkler & Marshall Bierson - 2026 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 13.One is sometimes, but only sometimes, justified in pursuing a suboptimal course of action due to a concern that, in attempting the ideal course, one might fail to follow through and so make the situation even worse. This paper explains why such hedging is sometimes justified and sometimes not. -/- The explanation we offer relies on Elizabeth Anscombe’s distinction between reasons and logoi. Reasons are normative considerations that identify something good or bad that an act will secure or avoid, while (...)
- The Illusion of Permissive Balancing.Jordan Scott - 2026 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.The standard view among philosophers of normativity is that practical reasons balance permissively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible actions, either action is rational), while epistemic reasons balance prohibitively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible doxastic attitudes, neither attitude may be rationally formed). Those who disagree, typically epistemic permissivists, think that epistemic reasons behave like reasons for action and that all reasons exhibit permissive balancing. One thing widely agreed on is that a third possibility, that all reasons exhibit (...)
- Beyond Normativity.Lewis Williams - 2026 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 112 (2):379-391.Recent years have seen a growing number of philosophers come to defend normative nihilism. Even if their arguments do not induce in many a belief in normative nihilism, there may be grounds on which to be less than certain about the falsity of normative nihilism. How, then, can we accommodate the possibility of normative nihilism when deliberating about what to do? In this article, I defend two theses. First, I distinguish between normative questions and deliberative questions and argue that the (...)
- A Hybrid View of Commitment.Facundo M. Alonso - 2025 - In David W. Shoemaker, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 9. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 28-50.We often appeal to the notion of an agent’s commitment to action to characterize, e.g., an agent’s faithfulness to a promise she has given to another, her robust disposition to pursue a goal she values or cares about, and her determination to stick to that goal. In the philosophy of action, that notion is often associated with the idea of an agent’s intention to act. In ethics, it is associated primarily with the idea of an agent’s commitment to, or endorsement (...)Find it on Amazon.com (collection)Remove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citationBookmark
- A Two-Factor Explication Of ‘Reflection’: Unifying, Making Sense Of, And Guiding The Philosophy And Science Of Reflective Reasoning.Nick Byrd - 2025 - Res Philosophica 102 (3):373-392.Reflective reasoning has been central to philosophy and cognitive science more generally. However, scholars lack a unified empirical explication of ‘reflection’. This paper synthesizes a cross-disciplinary account from philosophers, scientists, and centuries of English speakers: ‘reflection’ often refers to—among other things—conscious and deliberate reconsideration of an initial intuition. This two-factor account of reflection empirically distinguishes reflection from often conflated phenomena such as rumination; it also tidily classifies self-conscious reflection as a subset of reflection. This account also accommodates mounting evidence that (...)
- Replies to Carroll, Horwich and McGrath.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2025 - Analysis.I am grateful to Sean Carroll, Paul Horwich, and Sarah McGrath for their stimulating responses to Morality and Mathematics (M&M). Their arguments concern the reality of unapplied mathematics, the practical import of moral facts, and the deliberative and explanatory roles of evaluative theories. In what follows, I address their responses, as well as some broader issues.
- A Theory of Assessability for Reasonableness.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2025 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):1-37.This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.
- Practical Deliberation is Normative.Jesse Hambly - 2025 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 11 (2):338-353.It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis—‘the Normativity Thesis’—is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is inescapable for us. In this article, I defend the Normativity Thesis against objections.
- Knowing what to do.Ethan Jerzak & Alexander W. Kocurek - 2025 - Noûs 59 (1):160-190.Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like where to meet, when to leave, and what to bring. We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge‐how reduces to knowledge‐that, no such reduction of knowledge‐to is forthcoming. Knowledge‐to, unlike knowledge‐that and knowledge‐how, requires the agent to have formed (...)
- The Normative Insignificance of the Will.Jason Kay - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (3):891-909.The fact that I am a committed gardener has some practical upshot or other. But what, exactly, is the upshot of the fact that I am committed to some project, person, or principle? According to a standard view, my commitment to gardening directly effects a change in the normative facts by giving me a further reason to garden. I argue that we should reject this view and its attendant psychological story involving a normatively significant will. According to the view I (...)
- Doxastic Agent's Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):112-122.European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
- Knowing what you Want.Eric Marcus - 2025 - In Lucy Campbell, Forms of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.How do you know what you want? Philosophers have lately developed sophisticated accounts of the practical and doxastic knowledge that are rooted in the point of view of the subject. Our ability to just say what we are doing or what we believe—that is, to say so authoritatively, but not on the basis of observation or evidence—is an aspect of our ability to reason about the good and the true. However, no analogous route to orectic self-knowledge is feasible. Knowledge of (...)Find it on Amazon.com (collection)Remove from this list Direct downloadExport citationBookmark 2 citations
- Shared Tastes: Similarity in Aristotelian Character Friendship.Ashley Purdy - 2025 - Phronesis 70 (3).Aristotle claims that character friends are similar to each other. How should we understand this similarity, and what role does it play in friendship? In the paper, I argue that a broad similarity of ‘tastes’—which I understand as the appreciation of relatively good ends—is at least a facilitating condition on the formation of character friendship. This is because it (i) facilitates seeing the other as good in the first place, which is essential to character friendship; and (ii) enables the friends (...)
- Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - 2025 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):72-87.In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism—the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to that attitude. My argument for this premise is that in order to have reasons for an attitude, we need to be able to exhibit some relevant (...)
- The Aim of Practical Reasoning.Matthew Silverstein - 2025 - Ethics 136 (1):121-146.What are we trying to figure out when we are trying to figure out what to do? My view is that there must be some substantive answer to this question: practical reasoning must be directed at some substantive object. I argue that this conclusion follows from widely accepted views in the philosophy of action, some of which have been proposed as alternatives to that conclusion. I also argue that the most familiar argument against the conclusion that practical reasoning has an (...)
- (1 other version)Unthinkable actions.Etye Steinberg - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):342-364.For each person, some actions are unthinkable: performing them requires crossing a line that one's conscience cannot allow crossing. This article explores what such unthinkability is. In doing so, it introduces a novel categorization of theories of action and practical reason. The article argues that an action is unthinkable if and only if the agent judges that she should never treat any consideration as a reason in favor of performing this action. This view meets two important tests. The first is (...)
- On Essentially Intentional Actions.Armand Babakhanian - 2024 - Dissertation, Georgia State UniversityEssentially intentional actions are kinds of action that can only be done intentionally. Essentialism is the view that essentially intentional actions exist. Accidentalism is the view that essentialism is false. In my thesis, I develop and argue for naïve essentialism, a species of essentialism based on Michael Thompson’s naïve action theory. First, I present key features of naïve action theory and the broader Anscombean tradition, distinguish between essentially and accidentally intentional actions, and provide an argument for the existence of essentially (...)
- Temptation and Apathy.Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Samantha Berthelette, Gabriela Fernández-Miranda, Alfonso Anaya & Diego Rodríguez - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 8:10–32.Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes (...)
- Vontade, Autonomia e Universalidade: Um ensaio sobre a capacidade da razão prática de gerir autonomamente a conduta moral sob uma perspectiva universalista na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant.Fernanda Cardoso - 2024 - Revista If-Sophia 28.Como começamos a refletir e deliberar sobre nossa conduta moral, colocando-nos no lugar dos outros? Mais especificamente, de que forma gerimos, de maneira arbitrária, nossa conduta a partir de uma perspectiva que prioriza o bem de todos os seres humanos de forma universal? Com o objetivo de responder essa questão, parto da hipótese de que o conceito de razão prática, frequentemente tratado como 'vontade' na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant, pode esclarecer o desenvolvimento de nossa capacidade de refletir (...)
- Anscombe and the Anscombe Archive.Nathan Hauthaler & Nicholas Ogle (eds.) - 2024 - Philadelphia, PA: Collegium Institute for Catholic Thought and Culture.The present collection of essays is dedicated to the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, in particular her work collected in the Anscombe Archive at the University of Pennsylvania. The collection brings together scholars working on Anscombe and her tradition, all of whom have significant expertise in Anscombe’s philosophical thought, with many having worked directly at the Archive. While a variety of perspectives on Anscombe’s thought are represented in the collection, including some vigorous scholarly disagreements, the contributing authors nevertheless share a commitment (...)
- Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik Tollerup Junker & Thor Grünbaum - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (5):706–725.Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...)
- When Reasons Run Out.Jason Kay - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent’s favoring and disfavoring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent’s normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favor, if not because favoring is (...)
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