Specific Expressions

This paper examines like, a highly frequent English expression with a complex functional distribution, and proposes a minimal structural analysis from the perspective of understanding formation. Existing accounts often classify like into functional categories such as similarity, approximation, exemplification, quotation, discourse marking, or preference expression. These classifications are descriptively useful. However, if the analysis remains only at the level of functional distribution, it may obscure the local mode of relation formation shared across different uses. -/- Based on a small-scale observation (...) of natural language data, this paper proposes that the core role of like should not be understood merely as “similarity” or “preference.” Rather, it can be described as a form of unspecified shared-feature bridging. In approximate and discourse-related uses, like connects a target with subsequent content, allowing certain shared features in the subsequent item to enter the understanding of the target. Crucially, like does not specify which particular feature-line has been activated. As a result, the subsequent item does not enter understanding as a flat literal value, but remains accessible through multiple possible facets. This paper describes this pattern as a form of prismatic shared-feature bridging: the multi-faceted accessibility produced by like is not its primary function, but a structural effect of unspecified bridging. -/- This paper further argues that although verbal like grammatically fixes the relation as one of liking or disliking, the features supporting that orientation remain unspecified. For example, I like him or I don’t like your answer does not specify whether the orientation arises from appearance, personality, tone, logic, attitude, or some other feature. What these expressions fix is a positive or negative orientation, not the specific feature-line supporting that orientation. Thus, although approximate like and verbal like occupy different structural positions, they still share a deeper local pattern: a relation is established, while the shared feature-line supporting that relation is not locked into a single path. -/- This paper does not attempt to establish a complete lexical theory of like, nor does it claim that all uses of like can be reduced to a single model. Instead, it takes uses such as approximation, quotation, perceptual judgment, manner-of-treatment expressions, preference, and numerical approximation in natural language data as points of observation, and proposes a structural hypothesis that can be further tested: in understanding formation, like often establishes a relation through unspecified shared features, thereby allowing the subsequent item, object, or source of orientation to remain in a state of multi-faceted accessibility. Through this analysis, the paper aims to show that small linguistic expressions not only mark semantic or pragmatic functions, but may also participate in the local organization of relation formation, feature emergence, and multi-path accessibility in understanding. (shrink)

This paper examines the structural operation of the common English expression already in understanding formation. Existing analyses often treat already as a marker of completion, prior occurrence, state establishment, or earlier-than-expected timing. Such descriptions have considerable explanatory value and can account for the basic effects found in sentences such as I already told you, She already knows, or Sunday morning already? However, when already is further examined in commands, urging contexts, the early emergence of affective positions, and cases involving “having (...) already come this far” or “no longer being able to delay,” completion or earlier-than-expected timing alone is insufficient to explain how it actually operates in understanding. -/- This paper argues that the core of already should not be understood merely as completion marking, but can be described as a crossed-side positioning operation. By crossed-side positioning, I refer to the operation by which already makes the relevant content no longer understood as still remaining on the pre-crossing side, but instead requires it to be repositioned on the other side of a boundary. In this process, the pre-crossing side is no longer understood as a position in which understanding can naturally remain. This “crossed-side” status is not equivalent to grammatical perfect aspect, nor does it necessarily mean that an event has been objectively completed. Rather, it means that the position of understanding has been required to stand on the other side. -/- Through a small-scale observation of natural-language data, this paper distinguishes several local forms of already. First, in its basic uses, already makes the side of the unknown, the untold, the unfamiliar, or the not-yet-entered no longer naturally available, and positions understanding on the side of the known, the told, the familiar, or the entered. Second, its uses in temporal, life-stage, and affective positions show that already can mark a position as having to be acknowledged as located on the other side, even when subjective expectation has not yet adjusted to it. Third, interactional urging uses, such as Say something already or Shut up already, clearly show that already does not describe an event as completed, but requires the other party to leave the original side and cross into the side where something should hold or should stop. Fourth, uses involving excessive load, advanced procedural positioning, or opportunities that can no longer be retained show that already can mark a load, institutional process, commitment, or opportunity path as having crossed a critical point, such that it can no longer be handled from the original side. -/- This paper does not aim to establish a complete lexical theory of already, nor does it attempt to exhaust all of its grammatical and pragmatic distributions. Its goal is more limited: through a set of observable examples and a minimal structural description, it aims to show that already repeatedly exhibits a stable local operational core across different contexts. This core is not lexical monosemy, but stability at the operational level: already makes the pre-crossing side no longer naturally available and repositions understanding on the other side. Through this analysis, the paper seeks to show how small linguistic expressions participate in the reconfiguration of positions of understanding, and to provide an initial structural description of local crossing and repositioning in understanding formation. (shrink)

This paper examines two highly frequent English expressions, almost and too, whose modes of operation in understanding formation differ. Existing studies often treat almost as a marker of near completion, approximation, or incomplete attainment, and treat too as a degree expression indicating excess, overextension, or exceeding a standard. However, such analyses often remain at the level of semantic content or degree function, and less often address how these expressions form local structures of progression in the process of understanding. -/- Based (...) on a small-scale observation of natural language data, this paper proposes a minimal structural distinction: almost may be understood as the formation of boundary pressure, whose function is to bring a state close to a threshold, point of completion, or categorical boundary, while still keeping it on the side of non-completion. Its core does not lie in completion itself, but in the state of tension formed near the boundary: the relation has moved very close to the point of crossing, but has not actually crossed. In some contexts, this incomplete state of approach may still leave downstream effects, residual pressure, or eventive traces. -/- By contrast, too may be understood as a structural operation of disequilibrium induction. Its function is not merely to raise degree, but to mark a property, intensity, or state as exceeding the accommodative proportion of the context, thereby producing instability, resistance, blockage, difficulty of accommodation, or a shift in downstream understanding. In structures such as too … to V, this disequilibrium is further connected to an action path, such that an originally continuable direction of action becomes obstructed or suspended. -/- This paper therefore argues that the difference between almost and too should not be understood merely as a difference in degree level or semantic function. Rather, it involves two distinct forms of local structural dynamics: the former develops around boundary pressure of approaching without crossing, while the latter develops around a state of disequilibrium formed after exceeding accommodative proportion. -/- Through this minimal contrast, the paper further suggests that small linguistic expressions do not only participate in semantic modification. They may also participate, within local progression in understanding, in the formation of threshold approach, proportional disequilibrium, and tension distribution. (shrink)

This case study of Marathi discourse particle 'bərə' in medial position makes two contributions: 1. 'bərə' is used to question (how come p?) or reject (as if p) the prejacent p. Importantly, p is necessarily part of not-at-issue content of the preceding context update proposal 2. Hence, not-at-issue updates should be represented as proposals too. In advancing these points, a unified account of the two readings is offered. Formally, the proposalhood of not-at-issue updates is represented in the waiting room model (...) (Biezma & Rawlins 2017) of discourse. The resulting outlook therefore shows that being at-issue =/= being a proposal. Instead, at-issueness should only be relativized to the current QUD. (shrink)

Using the Hindi-Urdu discourse particle 'lo' as a case study, the present paper models mirativity within the Table model framework (Farkas & Roelofsen, 2017). This comes with an enrichment of the Table model; we propose the discourse structure to encode, in addition to discourse commitments, the time these commitments are publicized. We also incorporate a component that contains the public record of private beliefs. With these two additions, we seek to capture mirativity in the Table model, emphasizing recency as a (...) condition for surprise and underlining the need and the conceptual difficulty of incorporating private beliefs in a public scoreboard of conversation. We show that the difficulty can be overcome to fulfill the modeling need. (shrink)

Propaganda and philosophy go hand-in-hand, and this essay seeks to explore the relationship of knowledge, the philosopher, and propaganda. In the age of AI, clarification and the exploration of what propaganda’s possible meanings are and what its implications could be, are pertinent.

This meditation explores the profound and intimate relationship between the author and the question mark, elevated here to the status of philosophical paramour. Through poetic invocation and reflective prose, this treatise celebrates the question mark as the most elegant and essential symbol in all of language. She is not merely punctuation but a gateway to truth, a vessel of purity, and the sustaining force of intellectual and emotional life. The author argues that the question mark embodies beauty in her curved (...) form, depth in her capacity to unlock meaning, and love in her endless invitation to seek understanding. This work positions inquiry itself as the highest form of human engagement with existence, suggesting that with the question mark alone, one could navigate any circumstance, survive any catastrophe, and find meaning in any void. The treatise blends philosophical reflection with romantic devotion, presenting the question mark as both muse and beloved. (shrink)

Tarana Burke’s #MeToo movement is about “healing and action. Everything else is a distraction” (Burke 2019). That is, Burke helps people develop local resources for survivors of sexual violence, and local strategies for the prevention of sexual violence: healing and action. This essay is focused on Burke’s “community healing circles.” These are small groups of people who meet to talk about the sexual violence they have suffered. Using her own theory of insults, Daly describes the damaging insult that results from (...) sexual violence, and proposes an explanation of how Burke’s community healing circles help survivors to overcome that harm. She then briefly considers how similar practices could be used in other contexts. Her central contention is that sexual violence expresses a profound lack of respect, and that this tends to diminish survivors’ sense of self-worth. Sharing these experiences with similarly-situated people can help survivors recover their dignity. She proposes two mechanisms involved in this recovery: First, being treated with respect counters the tendency to believe that one does not deserve respect. Second, understanding your experiences can be easier when you see them reflected in another. (shrink)

This is an ambitious book. Onora O'Neill argues for an interpretation of the Critical philosophy as a whole which recognizes the categorical imperative as the first principle of theoretical as well as practical reason. She offers an interpretation of Kantian ethics which attempts to answer the central charges that have been brought against it since the critiques of Mill and Hegel: empty formalism and moral rigorism. She enters into dialogue with contemporary positions both hostile and sympathetic to Kant's practical philosophy. (...) In both cases the claim is made that Kant has resources that would enable MacIntyre's communitarian and Rawls's constructionist positions to complete their own projects. (shrink)

Der Beitrag konzentriert sich auf die Entwicklung dreier verschränkter Thesen: 1. Ein zentraler Baustein der Phänomenologie als Methode besteht in einem verbalen Zeigen auf Phänomene, die den Adressierten vorprädikativ oder präreflexiv bereits vertraut sind. Phänomenologie ist verbal vermitteltes Sehenlassen präreflexiver Phänomene. 2. Die uns in der Erfahrung gegebenen Phänomene (etwa Situationen, Ereignisse, Dinge) lassen sich selbst als ‚Hinweissysteme, Strahlensysteme von Hinweisen‘ (Husserl) explizieren. Phänomene zeigen innenhorizontal auf naheliegende Möglichkeiten von Erfahrungsverläufen, die jeweilige Art dieses Zeigens ist ihre Gegebenheitsweise. 3. Der (...) erlebte Wirklichkeitscharakter von Phänomenen korreliert mit dem Grad ihrer einstimmigen Bewährung im zeitlichen Verlauf der Erfahrung. Daher können uns auch virtuelle Situationen und Entitäten in gewöhnlichem Sinn als wirklich gegeben sein. (shrink)

The goal that the author of this study focuses on is to provide a brief introduction to the issue of language in the work of Theodor W. Adorno and, in this context, to interpret his approach to philosophy through a presentation of his essayistic form. She first presents Adorno’s philosophical views about the nonidentity of reality, thought and concepts, out of which grows his approach to language, and then briefly introduces his concept of constellations, which follows up on the thinking (...) of Walter Benjamin. She then presents individual features of Adorno’s textual method of composing constellations, or essays, that primarily consist in the negation of the traditional philosophical method. The concluding part of the study contains a brief discussion about what Adorno’s essays are trying to represent and how to discern a text that meets Adorno’s requirements for good essays. With this, the author wants to provide an insight into Adorno’s philosophical efforts from the perspective of his textual method and at the same time she would like to help Adorno’s readers better orient themselves as they make their way through his demanding texts. (shrink)

Numismatics is a broad and complex area of study connecting with many different areas of human endeavor, including philosophical analysis. This paper critically discusses some of the practical and conceptual issues involved in applying the obverse- vs. reverse-side distinction to coins. We may not be able to come up with precise definitions which take care of all the counterexamples, but we still must be careful in how we define the terms within the discipline and how we use these terms.

Hofweber (Ontology and the ambitions of metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2016) argues for a thesis he calls “internalism” with respect to natural number discourse: no expressions purporting to refer to natural numbers in fact refer, and no apparent quantification over natural numbers actually involves quantification over natural numbers as objects. He argues that while internalism leaves open the question of whether other kinds of abstracta exist, it precludes the existence of natural numbers, thus establishing what he calls “restricted nominalism” about (...) natural numbers. We argue that Hofweber’s internalism fails to establish restricted nominalism. Not only is his primary argument for restricted nominalism invalid, the analysis of quantification proposed threatens to collapse internalism into either a traditional form of error theory or realism. (shrink)

This book is an examination of the foundations and applications of the program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages introduced in 1967 by Donald Davidson in his classic paper “Truth and Meaning.” This is the second of two books on Donald Davidson’s central philosophical project. The first, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), dealt with the basic framework of Davidson’s truth-theoretic approach to providing a meaning theory for a natural language, and then with his (...) development of his general project in the philosophy of language and theory of meaning by way of the analysis of the empirical confirmation of a meaning theory for a speaker, from the stance of the radial interpreter, that is, the interpreter who starts out without any detailed knowledge of the speakers’ meanings or attitudes. This book turns to the development of details of Davidson’s semantic program, specifically, the pursuit of the project of providing a compositional semantic theory for natural languages by making strategic use of an appropriately adapted Tarski-style axiomatic truth theory. Such a theory aims to provide a specification of the truth conditions of any felicitous utterance of a natural language sentence which serves to interpret it, and exhibits in the proof of the theorem that gives the truth conditions the compositional structure of the sentence and how its truth depends on its context of utterance. The book develops the basic framework, applies it to quantifiers, proper names, indexicals, simple and complex demonstratives, quotation, adjectives and adverbs, simple tenses of state and event verbs, temporal adverbs and quantifiers, tense in sentential complements and perfect tenses, opaque contexts, especially indirect discourse and attitude sentences, non-declarative sentences, semantic structure and logical form, and discusses the relation of the framework the metaphysics of truth. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 209-231, January 2022.

Esta entrevista realizada al primer vicepresidente de la Academia Nacional de Letras de Uruguay, Gerardo Caetano, tiene como propósito debatir sobre la situación política que atraviesa Latinoamérica, a partir de los cuestionamientos que se han hecho acerca de algunos conceptos fundamentales, como el que se entiende por democracia. Las respuestas que brinda el doctor son esenciales, puesto que efectúa un recuento de la historia de los dos últimos siglos para confrontar el panorama que se aprecia en las coyunturas nacionales actuales (...) y el rol que ejercen otras instituciones u organismos, como la prensa. (shrink)

English is spoken all around the world as it is chosen as the second language to speak within most of the countries. However, from the ancient history of the British to come into this South Asian region, the entrance of English as a speaking language happened. Though, after some centuries, the British went out of the mainland of India, it remains the second-largest spoken language there. Here comes another fact; many words in Standard English changed its form. So, this made (...) the dialects as much as changed that many ones refer to English in India as Indian English. In this present time, though, there are hundreds of languages chosen to speak Indian English that differ in many ways. The characters playing English roles also have a dialect changing of English in somewhat ways. Though the grammars and principal terms of English are still the same for Indian English, deviations came across the spoken language in many attributes. This paper identifies the entrance of English in India, the deviation of dialect change in Indian English with examples of characters still making way to English (Both British and Hollywood) movies with the dialects of Indian English many ways. The paper studies those ways and deviations of words in English in India that they use and call it Indian English. (shrink)

This is a short response piece to Jeremy Schwartz's "Saying 'Thank You' and Meaning It", published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020, 98, pp. 718-731. -/- Schwartz argues against the received view that 'Thank You! is for expressing gratitude, claiming instead that it is for expressing one's judgment that gratitude is appropriate or fitting. I argue against the judgment view while defending the received one. -/- I mainly consider the objection that the judgment view is implausible since it makes ‘Thank (...) you!’ semantically indistinguishable from the declarative sentence ‘Gratitude is appropriate to you’ and show that Schwartz’s attempt to sidestep it relies on misunderstanding Kaplan's view of what it is for a sentence to be an expressive vs. a declarative. (shrink)

Supervenience in metaethics is the notion that there can be no moral dif-ference between two acts, persons or events without some non-moral difference underlying it. If St. Francis is a good man, there could not be a man exactly like St. Francis in non-evaluative respects that is not good. The phenomenon was first systematically discussed by R. M. Hare (1952), who argued that realists about evaluative properties struggle to account for it. As is well established, Hare, and following him, Simon (...) Blackburn, mistakenly took the relevant phenomenon to be weak rather than strong supervenience, and the explanations they offered for it are accordingly outdated. In this paper, I present a non-factualist account of strong su-pervenience of the evaluative and argue that it fares better than compet-ing realist views in explaining the conceptual nature of the phenomenon, as well as in offering an account of the supervenience of the evaluative in general, rather than more narrowly the moral. While Hare and Blackburn were wrong about the specifics, they were right in that non-factualists can offer a plausible account of the supervenience of the evaluative, that in certain respects is superior to competing realist explanations. (shrink)

We offer a novel account of metalinguistic comparatives, such as 'Al is more wise than clever'. On our view, metalinguistic comparatives express comparative commitments to conventions. Thus, 'Al is more wise than clever' expresses that the speaker has a stronger commitment to a convention on which Al is wise than to a convention on which she is clever. This view avoids problems facing previous approaches to metalinguistic comparatives. It also fits within a broader framework—independently motivated by metalinguistic negotiations and convention-shiftingexpressions— (...) that gives linguistic conventions a role in the semantics. (shrink)

Existe un tipo particular de usos de términos discriminatorios en el que las emociones negativas típicamente asociadas a él no se hallan de hecho presentes. Aun así, lo incorrecto o inadecuado sigue resonando en esos usos. Este tipo de ``uso distante'' resulta interesante per se, en cuanto fenómeno conversacional rara vez advertido. Sin embargo, también presta apoyo a una aproximación a los términos discriminatorios basada en el concepto sociolingüístico de ``registro'', de la cual se sigue esta relación entre emociones e (...) incorrección. Este trabajo examina algunos tipos de usos distantes y sus rasgos esenciales, y considera cómo el registro sociolingüístico de los términos discriminatorios puede dar cuenta de ellos. (shrink)

У статті проаналізовано місце паронімічної атракції в словотворчій практиці І. Павлюка. Наголошено на стилістичних особливостях функціювання новотворів-атрактантів. На основі лексико-стилістичного аналізу засвідчено розширення меж сполучуваності неологізмів-атрактантів та узуальних слів до паронімічних гнізд. Із застосуванням методу компонентного аналізу описано семантику складних слів, утворених за допомогою компонентів-атрактантів.

Words form a fundamental basis for our understanding of linguistic practice. However, the precise ontology of words has eluded many philosophers and linguists. A persistent difficulty for most accounts of words is the type-token distinction [Bromberger, S. 1989. “Types and Tokens in Linguistics.” In Reflections on Chomsky, edited by A. George, 58–90. Basil Blackwell; Kaplan, D. 1990. “Words.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIV: 93–119]. In this paper, I present a novel account of words which differs from the atomistic and platonistic (...) conceptions of previous accounts which I argue fall prey to this problem. Specifically, I proffer a structuralist account of linguistic items, along the lines of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics [Shapiro, S. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Oxford University Press], in which words are defined in part as positions in larger linguistic structures. I then follow Szabò [1999. “Expressions and Their Representations.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 145–163] and Parsons [1990. “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects.” Synthese 84: 303–346] in further defining words as quasi-concrete objects according to a representation relation. This view aims for general correspondence with contemporary generative linguistic approaches to the study of language. (shrink)

Frege famously held that numbers play the role of objects in our language and thought, and that this role is on display when we use sentences like "The number of Jupiter's moons is four". I argue that this role is an example of a general pattern that also encompasses persons, times, locations, reasons, causes, and ways of appearing or acting. These things are 'objects' simply in the sense that they are answers to questions: they are the sort of thing we (...) search for and specify during investigation or inquiry. I support this epistemological conception of objects by studying specificational sentences, a class of sentences which includes Frege's original example. I defend an analysis of such sentences as question-answer pairs, and show how to formally represent this analysis using game-theoretical semantics. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the debate over the so-called “easy argument for numbers”, an argument that uses evidence from natural language to support the metaphysically significant claim that numbers exist. It presents novel data showing that critical examples in the literature are ambiguous between two readings, contrary to previous assumptions. It then accounts for these data using independently motivated linguistic theory. The account developed rescues the easy argument from the primary challenges leveled against it in the literature and sets the (...) agenda for future work to determine whether or not the argument is valid. (shrink)

A central question for ontology is the question of whether numbers really exist. But it seems easy to answer this question in the affirmative. The truth of a sentence like ‘Seven students came to the party’ can be established simply by looking around at the party and counting students. A trivial paraphrase of is ‘The number of students who came to the party is seven’. But appears to entail the existence of a number, and so it seems that we must (...) conclude that numbers exist. This is sometimes called the puzzle of how we can get something from nothing. Most extant attempts to solve the puzzle take it for granted that is ontologically innocent, and focus their attention either on or on the transition from to. We argue that both attempts go wrong at the first step: the assumption that is ontologically innocent is undermined by a highly attractive and independently well-motivated degree-based account of number word constructions. Thus the degree-based account provides a straightforward linguistic resolution of the puzzle of how we can get something from nothing. But the paper also has a second aim. The semantics we present treats ‘seven’ as a referring expression that refers to a degree of a certain sort. But what are degrees? We consider various anti-platonist proposals that seek to account for degrees in terms of relations between concrete entities, and argue that they are incompatible with the Universal Density of Measurement hypothesis of Fox and Hackl. While the UDM cannot yet claim to be the consensus view among degree-based semanticists, our aim is to use it to illustrate how views about the nature of degrees can be evaluated by considering the properties degrees must have if they are to play the explanatory roles they are called upon to play in linguistics. In the present state of development of degree-based semantics there are difficult open questions about what these properties are. These questions need to be addressed if we are to develop a clear picture of what natural language semantics has to contribute to ontology and metaphysics. (shrink)

Causation is generally conceived of as a relation that holds between events. Apart from a few cursory remarks, the case of stative causation has been widely neglected. The paper aims at contributing to a more balanced perspective by arguing for a stative variant of causation, on a par with eventive causation. The stative variant is analyzed in terms of Moltmann’s ontological notion of tropes. German causal von-modifiers are taken as a linguistic window into our understanding of causation. The study of (...) von is particularly suited to this endeavor, because von-modifiers are confined to expressing the core notion of “direct causation” :1–48, 2003). The paper develops a compositional semantics of causal von-modifiers that derives their eventive and stative readings from a single lexical entry and allows for coercive adaptions to account for the observed range of interpretive adjustments. Characteristic features of the interpretation such as the inferential behavior of causal von-modifiers and the holistic effect of the stative reading are traced back to independently motivated conceptual assumptions concerning the spatiotemporal grounding of direct causation. The formal analysis is couched in terms of Asher’s type composition logic. (shrink)

Colli is best known for his co-editorship, with Mazzino Montinari, of the vast and most thorough edition of Nietzsche's complete works, published simultaneously in Italy, France, and Germany. His own publications include: Filosofia e Espressione, La Nascita della Filosofa, and La Sapienza Greca. Not long before his death in 1979, his last and most personal volume appeared--Dopo Nietzsche--a singular document which testifies to a life-long involvement with the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche.

In this article, we describe and attempt to solve a puzzle arising from the interpretation of modified numerals like less than five and between two and five. The puzzle is this: such modified numerals seem to mean different things depending on whether they combine with distributive or non-distributive predicates. When they combine with distributive predicates, they intuitively impose a kind of upper bound, whereas when they combine with non-distributive predicates, they do not. We propose and explore in detail four solutions (...) to this puzzle, each involving some notion of maximality, but differing in the type of maximality involved and in the source of maximality. While the full range of data we consider do not conclusively favor one theory over the other three, we do argue that overall the evidence goes against the view that modified numerals lexically encode a ‘standard’ maximality operator, and suggests the need for a pragmatic blocking mechanism that filters out readings of sentences that are generated by the grammar but intuitively unavailable. (shrink)

Chapin reviewed this 1972 ZEITSCHRIFT paper that proves the completeness theorem for the logic of variable-binding-term operators created by Corcoran and his student John Herring in the 1971 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE paper in which the theorem was conjectured. This leveraging proof extends completeness of ordinary first-order logic to the extension with vbtos. Newton da Costa independently proved the same theorem about the same time using a Henkin-type proof. This 1972 paper builds on the 1971 “Notes on a Semantic Analysis of (...) Variable Binding Term Operators” (Co-author John Herring), Logique et Analyse 55, 646–57. MR0307874 (46 #6989). A variable binding term operator (vbto) is a non-logical constant, say v, which combines with a variable y and a formula F containing y free to form a term (vy:F) whose free variables are exact ly those of F, excluding y. Kalish-Montague 1964 proposed using vbtos to formalize definite descriptions “the x: x+x=2”, set abstracts {x: F}, minimization in recursive function theory “the least x: x+x>2”, etc. However, they gave no semantics for vbtos. Hatcher 1968 gave a semantics but one that has flaws described in the 1971 paper and admitted by Hatcher. In 1971 we give a correct semantic analysis of vbtos. We also give axioms for using them in deductions. And we conjecture strong completeness for the deductions with respect to the semantics. The conjecture, proved in this paper with Hatcher’s help, was proved independently about the same time by Newton da Costa. (shrink)

The expression ‘Like’ has a wide variety of uses among English and American speakers. It may describe preference, as in (1) She likes mint chip ice cream. It may be used as a vehicle of comparison, as in (2) Trieste is like Minsk on steroids.

The paper argues that two distinct and independent notions of plurality are involved in natural language anaphora and quantification: plural reference (the usual non-atomic individuals) and plural discourse reference, i.e., reference to a quantificational dependency between sets of objects (e.g., atomic/non-atomic individuals) that is established and subsequently elaborated upon in discourse. Following van den Berg (PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1996), plural discourse reference is modeled as plural information states (i.e., as sets of variable assignments) in a new dynamic system (...) couched in classical type logic that extends Compositional DRT (Muskens, Linguistics and Philosophy, 19, 143-186, 1996). Given the underlying type logic, compositionality at sub-clausal level follows automatically and standard techniques from Montague semantics become available. The idea that plural info states are semantically necessary (in addition to non-atomic individuals) is motivated by relative-clause donkey sentences with multiple instances of singular donkey anaphora that have mixed (weak and strong) readings. At the same time, allowing for non-atomic individuals in addition to plural info states enables us to capture the intuitive parallels between singular and plural (donkey) anaphora, while deriving the incompatibility between singular (donkey) anaphora and collective predicates. The system also accounts for empirically unrelated phenomena, e.g., the uniqueness effects associated with singular (donkey) anaphora discussed in Kadmon (Linguistics and Philosophy, 13, 273-324, 1990) and Heim (Linguistics and Philosophy, 13, 131-177, 1990) among others. (shrink)

The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them. Thirteen leading philosophers present specially-written essays, and a substantial introduction is provided by the volume editors, who demonstrate the importance of these topics to a wide range of issues in contemporary philosophy.

The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them. Thirteen leading philosophers present specially-written essays, and a substantial introduction is provided by the volume editors, who demonstrate the importance of these topics to a wide range of issues in contemporary philosophy.

There is a widely shared account of the distinction between types and tokens, which might be termed the standard account. However, it has some surprising consequences that are not always realized. According to the standard account, a type is a contingent abstract object that can be created by us, but it does not allow any change and can never be destroyed once it is created, because it is an abstract object. I would like to present an alternative account of types (...) and tokens, according to which types are concrete objects that are located in space and time. This new account is based on a concept that I call a "token generator", which is something that specifies in detail how to produce the tokens. (shrink)

Proper names play an important role in our understanding of linguistic ‘aboutness’ or reference. For instance, the name-bearer relation is a good candidate for the paradigm of the reference relation: it provides us with our initial grip on this relation and controls our thinking about it. For this and other reasons proper names have been at the center of philosophical attention. However, proper names are as controversial as they are conceptually fundamental. Since Kripke’s seminal lectures Naming and Necessity the controversy (...) about proper names has taken the form of a debate between two main camps, descriptivists and non-descriptivists like Kripke himself.The lectures were given in Princeton in 1970 and published in book form as Naming and Necessity .Descriptivists hold that there is a close connection between proper names and definite descriptions: the meaning or sense of a proper name can be given by a definite description. Th .. (shrink)

(English then french abstract) -/- This article, which can be read by non-psychoanalysts, intends to browse in four stages through the issue offered to our thinking : two (odd-numbered) stages analyzing the argument that provides its context, and two (even-numbered) of propositions presenting our views on what could be the content of the analytic discourse in the coming years. After this introduction, a first reading will point by point but informally review the argument of J.-P. Journet by showing that each (...) of its clauses may generate a “bifurcated” comment able to serve or go against the analytic discourse. Hence the interest of the “differential diagnosis” mentioned in our title, which makes glimpse the traps that the homonymy may set to this speech. Then, to prepare a second scan which sticks neither to the analytical doxa, nor to the even authoritative opinions of our tenors and seniors, it will be proposed two attempts at redefinitions (“apophatic” and “recursive”) of what psychoanalysis is, as well as methodological tools operating downstream from these redefinitions to thwart the obstacles of “external” and “internal” homonymy (starting from a syllogism which can make consensus).The third stage will precisely be made of our second scan of the issue, whose elements will be reviewed and analyzed more methodically :“external differential diagnosis” between the analytic discourse and psychology, philosophy, sociology, and modern science, and “internal differential diagnosis” on the entanglement between theoretical advances of psychoanalysts and the repeated survival of fantasmatic elements...Finally, a fourth part will present propositions and perspectives resulting from these analysis (principle of economy as to the source of psychoanalytical theorizations; dialogue with the other fields, but without compromising; specific relations with the discourse of science), all this leading to an invitation, beyond disputes, to renew the content of the analytic discourse on some points... -/- --------------------------------------------------------------------- -/- Cet article, qui se veut lisible aux non-analystes, se propose de parcourir en quatre temps la problématique offerte à notre réflexion : deux temps (de rang impair) d'analyse de l'argument qui en fournit le contexte, et deux (de rang pair) de propositions présentant nos vues sur ce que pourrait être la teneur du discours analytique dans les prochaines années. Après cette introduction, un premier parcours réexaminera point par point mais informellement l'argument de J.-P. Journet en montrant que chacune de ses propositions peut donner lieu à un commentaire “bifide” à même de servir ou de desservir le discours analytique. D'où l'intérêt du “diagnostic différentiel” évoqué dans notre titre, qui fait entrevoir les pièges que l'homonymie peut tendre à ce discours.Puis, pour préparer un second balayage qui ne s'en tienne ni à la doxa analytique, ni aux opinions même autorisées de nos ténors et seniors, il sera proposé deux tentatives de redéfinitions (“apophatique” et “récursive”) de ce qu'est l'analyse, ainsi que des outils méthodologiques fonctionnant en aval de ces redéfinitions pour déjouer les embûches de l'homonymie “externe” et “interne” (à partir d'un syllogisme pouvant faire consensus). Le troisième temps sera fait justement de ce second balayage de la problématique, dont les éléments seront reconsidérés et analysés plus méthodiquement : “diagnostic différentiel externe” entre le discours analytique et les discours psychologique, philosophique, sociologique et celui de la science moderne ; et “diagnostic différentiel interne” portant sur l'intrication entre avancées théoriques des analystes et survivance à répétition d'éléments fantasmatiques...Enfin une quatrième partie exposera propositions et perspectives résultant de ces analyses (principe d'économie quant à la source des théorisations analytiques ; dialogue avec les autres champs, mais sans compromissions ; relations spécifiques avec le discours de la science), l'ensemble débouchant sur une invitation, au delà des différends, à renouveler sur certains points la teneur du discours analytique... (shrink)

Humankind has always been fascinated and troubled by the way languages and dialects differ. Linguistically based differences in point of view have preoccupied many original minds of the past, such as Kant, and remain at the forefront of language study: in philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism, and other fields. Paul Friedrich's The Language Parallax argues persuasively that the "locus and focus" of differences among languages lies not so much in practical or rational aspects as in the complexity and richness of more (...) poetic dimensions—in the nuances of words, or the style and voice of an author. This poetic reformulation of what has been called "linguistic relativism" is grounded in the author's theory of the imagination as a main source of poetic indeterminacy. The reformulation is also based on the intimate relation of the concentrated language of poetry to the potential or possibilities for poetry in ordinary conversation, dreams, and other experiences. The author presents challenging thoughts on the order and system of language in their dynamic relation to indeterminacy and, ultimately, disorder and chaos. Drawing on his considerable fieldwork in anthropology and linguistics, Friedrich interweaves distinct and provocative elements: the poetry of language difference, the indeterminacy in dialects and poetic forms, the discovery of underlying orders, the workings of different languages, the strength of his own poetry. The result is an innovative and organic whole. The Language Parallax, then, is a highly original work with a single bold thesis. It draws on research and writing that has involved, in particular, English, Russian, and the Tarascan language of Mexico, as well as the personal and literary study of the respective cultures. Anthropologist, linguist, and poet, Friedrich synthesizes from his experience in order to interrelate language variation and structure, the creative individual, ideas of system-in-process, and questions of scientific and aesthetic truth. The result is a new view of language held to the light of its potentially creative nature. (shrink)