Charitable Giving, Misc

I respond to Tim Crane’s paradox of analytic philosophy’s success: “the paradox is that the more analytic philosophy became dominant in the universities, the more it became removed from the concerns of the average person with philosophical interests.” Is it actually paradox, because we have analytic political philosophy, analytic ethics, and applied ethics? I argue that the same or a similar paradox can be posed once these areas of research are drawn attention to. “What about all this other stuff?!” I (...) also argue for distinguishing between the question of whether philosophers ought to address the concerns of the average person with philosophical interests and the question of how analytic philosophy could have expanded without doing so. (shrink)

Philanthropy has an uneasy relationship with democracy. It distributes decision‐making power plutocratically, in proportion to wealth. It allows unelected, unaccountable, and often untrustworthy individuals to shape social outcomes. And it does so in domains where democracy should be authoritative. Yet, at the same time, philanthropy does much good, and hardly anyone would claim we should eliminate it altogether. So how can we make philanthropy consistent with democracy? In this article, I propose a new answer to this question. I argue that (...) while democratic critics are right to worry about much current philanthropy, there is an important class of philanthropy that is not only highly beneficial, but that also, so far from undermining or conflicting with democracy, can complement or even enhance it. I call this “philanthropy for the disenfranchised,” and argue that we can resolve the tension between philanthropy and democracy by encouraging this sort of philanthropy while discouraging forms of philanthropic abuse and folly. I also outline a program for social reform that involves differentiating the institutions surrounding philanthropy to make them better perform this role, which I contrast with the more familiar programs of democratization and effective altruism. (shrink)

The evidence on the influence of rational appeals on moral behavior remains inconclusive. The opportunity to donate to a charity provides a fruitful applied case to test the details that might explain the mixed results. Previous studies have demonstrated the power of emotional appeals to induce participants to donate, while different rational appeals vary in their performance. Our paper presents the results of three pre-registered experiments comparing how much participants were willing to donate via direct cash transfers when exposed to (...) different conditions. Experiment 1 tested five conditions. Three are vignette-based: Narrative, our emotional textual prompt, presents the testimony of an identified recipient, while Argument presents a Singer-style argument for charitable giving, and Facts consists of the numerical results of an evaluation of a cash transfer program. The other two conditions are based on perspective-taking exercises with either a reasonable donor or a suffering recipient, designed to elicit empathy with the beneficiaries. As predicted, the average amount donated in the control condition was significantly lower than in each of the other five conditions. Narrative performed best, significantly better than all other conditions. Among the rational conditions, Facts performed better descriptively. Its success is surprising given the poor performance of adding numerical information in other studies. After a replication with the vignette conditions in Experiment 2, we tested two variations of our Facts condition to explore how numerical information was taken into consideration. The numerical information in Large Numbers conveyed a highly effective intervention, while those in Small Numbers presented a barely positive impact. Since both variations generated roughly the same average donation amount, it seems that the numbers were not processed as numerical information. (shrink)

The standard case for longtermism focuses on a small set of risks to the far future, and argues that in a small set of choice situations, the present marginal value of mitigating those risks is very great. But many longtermists are attracted to, and many critics of longtermism worried by, a farther-reaching form of longtermism. According to this farther-reaching form, there are many ways of improving the far future, which determine the value of our options in all or nearly all (...) choice situations, and will continue to do so over the coming decades even if we make substantial investments in longtermist priorities. This chapter highlights the gap between the minimal form of longtermism established by standard arguments and this more expansive view, and considers (without reaching any firm conclusions) which form of longtermism is more plausible. (shrink)

Many real-world agents recognise that they impose harms by choosing to emit carbon, e.g., by flying. Yet many do so anyway, and then attempt to make things right by offsetting those harms. Such offsetters typically believe that, by offsetting, they change the deontic status of their behaviour, making an otherwise impermissible action permissible. Do they succeed in practice? Some philosophers have argued that they do, since their offsets appear to reverse the adverse effects of their emissions. But we show that (...) they do not. In practice, standard carbon offsetting does not reverse the harms of the original action, nor does it even benefit the same group as was harmed. Standard moral theories hence deny that such offsetting succeeds. Indeed, we show that any moral theory that allows offsetting in this setting faces a dilemma between allowing any wrong to be offset, no matter how grievous, and recognising an implausibly sharp discontinuity between offsettable actions and non-offsettable actions. The most plausible response is to accept that carbon offsetting fails to right our climate wrongs. (shrink)

Philanthropy involves the voluntary contribution of money or other goods and resources for broadly public purposes. Unlike taxation, contributions are not coerced: rather, their magnitude, their direction, and often their specific use is determined by the donor’s discretion. Unlike the case of ordinary market exchange, the giver does not ask or receive payment for what she offers, though she may receive psychological, reputational, or even material benefits from her gift (e.g., she may feel a “warm glow”, see her name above (...) a building or on a wall honoring donors, receive perks from the organizations she supports, or enjoy tax benefits). What constitutes a “public purpose” is of course controversial, but for now we adopt a very broad definition (excluding, e.g., gifts to family and friends and politicians or electoral campaigns, but otherwise inclusive as to beneficiaries and purpose). It satisfies most ordinary understandings of philanthropy for a gift simply to be other-regarding. -/- Note that the above definition focuses on philanthropy as a practice. Alternative definitions might attempt to specify the philanthropic motivation (i.e., love of humanity, altruism, or public-spiritedness) or philanthropic organizations as a legal category. While this entry engages with these other meanings of philanthropy, a practice-based definition provides the most appropriate lens through which to evaluate philosophical reflection on practices of voluntary giving and receiving. Motives of altruism or beneficence can animate many actions not ordinarily classed as cases of philanthropy (e.g., a decision to run for office), and the legal and tax treatment of philanthropy varies across time and jurisdictions. Additionally, we do not, for the purposes of this entry, draw a distinction between “charity” and “philanthropy”, or assume a necessary contrast between philanthropy and justice: the relationship of philanthropy to justice is a complicated matter that we discuss below. -/- We begin with a historical survey of the role of gift-giving in philosophical traditions, followed by a discussion of the relationship between charity or philanthropy and justice. We then turn to a more detailed discussion of philosophical perspectives on the ethics of philanthropy (e.g., moral questions for prospective givers and recipients) and the politics of philanthropy (e.g., questions about philanthropy’s relationship to the state and to political values like democracy and freedom). Finally, we consider some more specific topics of contemporary philosophical controversy. (shrink)

Are philosophical arguments as effective as narratives in influencing charitable giving and attitudes toward it? In four experiments, we exposed online research participants to either philosophical arguments in favor of charitable giving, a narrative about a child whose life was improved by charitable donations, both the narrative and the argument, or a control text (a passage from a middle school physics text or a description of charitable organizations). Participants then expressed their attitudes toward charitable giving and were either asked how (...) much they would hypothetically donate if given $10 (Experiment 1) or told they had a 10% chance of winning $10 and given the opportunity to donate from their potential winnings (Experiments 2–4). Across the four experiments, participants in all of the narrative conditions and in some of the argument conditions tended to express more positive attitudes toward charitable giving and donated about $1 more on average than did participants in the control conditions. These effects appear to have been mediated by the “narrative transportation” scale, which suggests that appeals to donate can be effective if they engage participants’ emotions, imagery, and interest. (shrink)

Digitality requires new ethical approaches in the context of an all-encompassing mediatization. At the same time, the advance of artificial intelligence (AI) brings forth additional new challenges, as do questions about the ecological responsibility of digital technologies. This edited volume presents a broad range of topics and case studies linked to the sub-discipline of digital ethics. What all contributions in this book have in common, regardless of the their academic or philosophical perspective, is a focus on the question whether human (...) beings are taken into account appropriately when new technologies are developed and applied. (shrink)

Intergenerational transfers are a core feature of the practice of private philanthropy. A substantial portion of the resources committed to charitable causes comes from transfers (either during life or at death) that continue to pay out after death. Indeed, much of the power of the charitable foundation lies in its ability to extend the life of an enterprise beyond the mortal existence of its initiating agents. Despite their prevalence, whether and in what way the instruments of intergenerational philanthropy can be (...) justified is controversial. Many have argued that these instruments unfairly privilege the interests of the dead at the expense of the living and unborn. More recently, others have argued that intergenerational charitable transfers comport with the demands of distributive justice and are therefore legitimate. This paper contends that both of these perspectives fail to see the problem for what it is. Intergenerational charitable transfers may indeed promote justice in certain respects, but they do so at the cost of imposing the judgments of the dead onto the living. Respecting the wishes of the past conflicts with an interest in “generational sovereignty.” The paper concludes that properly accounting for this interest in generational sovereignty doesn’t require the abolition of intergenerational philanthropy. But it does tell in favor of a different regulatory orientation than most legal systems currently adopt. (shrink)

This article ("Looting or Sharing?") is located at the intersection of societal and ecological discourses, and analyzes local actions from the perspective of digital ethics. The case study is centered around a public bookcase (or free library) in a neighborhood in the Ruhr area, a post-industrial and partly impoverished metropolitan district in Germany. The rather banal local actions - people take books from the public bookcase as is the proclaimed objective of having such an institution in the first place - (...) eventually morph into highly polarized discussion threads on a local social media platform that are charged with bitter accusations of "looting" (i.e., allegations of some people taking out too many books) and rife with outrage (i.e., allegations of some people selling books taken from the free library on secondary markets). This debate reflects a conflict that points to larger social divisions and rifts. This is analyzed empirically (via a discourse analysis) and philosophically (drawing on Aristotle as well as contemporary debates on moralism). When the free sharing of books, i.e., the recycling of otherwise unused goods, gets scandalized by some residents of the neighborhood as "looting," as the accusations on social media proclaim, this conflict suggests a self-referential moralism among the online discussants. Epistemic fallacies combined with irrational counterfactual claims lead to immoderate hypercriticism. This is a finding that can be observed in many online debates and points to larger disruptions in the digital arena. (shrink)

Effective altruism is a growing social movement whose members are committed to directing at least some portion of their money, time, and/or other resources in the ways that available evidence suggests will do the most good. Although Singer and others did much to promote the movement and its central ideas in the years immediately following the publication of The Life You Can Save and the founding of many of the organizations noted earlier, effective altruism's public philosophy footprint began to grow (...) more rapidly around 2015. It is an important example of how public philosophy can both contribute to shaping public discussion of important issues and play a key role in motivating action on the part of individuals. (shrink)

According to the World Bank’s latest figures, around 700 million people live in utter destitution, on less than $1.90 per day, poorer than the average pet cat in the rich world. It is easy to agree that this is a terrible thing. It has so far been much harder – even for philosophers – to agree on what should be done about it. Peter Singer, for example, argues that rich people should donate more to effective charities. Thomas Pogge argues that (...) rich world citizens should stop their governments from supporting less than ideally just global institutions. Yet this intellectual debate is an unnecessary distraction. We already have all the moral agreement we need to act. Ending extreme poverty is not an intellectual problem but a practical one, and not even a particularly difficult one. We just need to find the people who are poor and give them enough money so that they aren’t poor anymore. (shrink)

Effective altruism’s identity as both a philosophy and a social movement requires effective altruists to consider which philosophical commitments are essential, such that one must embrace them in order to count as an effective altruist, at least in part in the light of the goal of building a robust social movement capable of advancing its aims. The goal of building a social movement provides a strong reason for effective altruists to embrace an ecumenical set of core commitments. At the same (...) time, there are risks involved in adopting an ecumenical approach to social movement building. In this paper, I develop a view about how effective altruists should characterize the movement’s core philosophical commitments, in light of the challenges of social movement building. I suggest that John Rawls’s idea of an “overlapping consensus” provides a useful model for thinking about the philosophical core and broader structure of the movement. (shrink)

Uniformity in human actions and attitudes incumbent with the ceteris paribus clause of folk psychology lucidly transits moral thoughts into the domain of subject versus object-centric explorations. In Zettel, Wittgenstein argues, “Concepts with fixed limits would demand uniformity of behaviour, but where I am certain, someone else is uncertain. And that is the fact of nature.” (Wittgenstein 2007, 68). Reflecting on the moral principle of “ethical giving” revives a novel stance in modern moral philosophy. An “ethical giving” is a moral (...) position that looks at giving from the context of harmonizing the changing demands of situations with normative ethical principles. Despite giving more prominence to the query of intuition, the chapter brings up the justification of normative moral principles pertaining to their applications and purports. Human activities aimed at decision-making goals conducted by the moral compass are nothing but the sanction of certain ethical norms and rules. In this context, two principles, the normative aspect and the perspective aspect need to be expounded in parallel. The perspective-based principle seeks practical guides to action, whereas the normative aspect principle looks for the concrete moral justification behind it. Normatively based moral decisions hinge on the probabilities and interests of agents that can sometimes lead towards a better choice. Thomas Nagel’s thought sounds more appealing, since his idea of practical conflict bends towards “...conflict between values which are incomparable for reasons apart from uncertainty about the facts.” (Nagel 2013, 128). Positions on moral personality and equality of justice collide with the conception of verities of the agents’ reason that cogitate a minimal aspect on the morally significant properties (range properties), which can hardly be possessed by all human beings equally. This argument sounds reasonable in light of Singer’s thought of “the principle of equal consideration of interests.” (Singer 2003, 21–22) The concern of this section is deliberative about how an agent could balance the demand of moral situations and the spirit of the moral principle devoid of being close to the relative truth. The conception of the moral decision remains capricious in line with the agent’s mood, time, and situation. The germane queries are: (a) How could one get the simpliciter of moral balance in “ethical giving” or offering help to the poor, orphans, and so on, who need helps from the agents and society? (b) Can we find any universalized principle in defense of ethical giving? (shrink)

This concluding chapter summarizes and reflects on the arguments of the book. Even when philanthropy comes with noble intentions, just aims, and rigorous methods, it can objectionably privatize matters that all of us have equal interests in deciding, augment the power of the richer at the expense of the poorer, empower the dead at the expense of the living, and perpetuate structural inequalities between donors and recipients. But democracy’s contribution to the ethics of philanthropy isn’t merely critical. The chapter insists (...) that reflection on the value of democracy shows how philanthropy can be consistent with, and facilitative of, the democratic ideal. When sensitively regulated and conducted, philanthropy provides a valuable vehicle for individual liberty that complements and strengthens democratic institutions. The chapter goes on to clarify the arguments’ practical upshots, note some of the topics and questions left outstanding, and propose issues for further research. (shrink)

The chapter considers what kinds of goods and services a democratic polity should furnish via donation. Donations are a well-known solution to the problem of “public goods,” goods with characteristics that prevent efficient market provision. But are all such goods equally appropriate objects of philanthropy? Common arguments fail to appreciate that part of democracy’s value lies in reserving certain decisions for collective control. Democracy, the chapter argues, makes citizens sovereign over the legislation and administration of matters of basic justice. Citizens’ (...) interests in democratic sovereignty supply a strong reason to maintain public control over public goods that are intimately linked to fundamental rights, duties, and opportunities. The argument helps to justify and explain discomfort that many share about privately sponsored social assistance and private funding of public schools. It also indicates that philanthropy for goods more distant from basic justice—such as the arts, research, sport, and religion—may be easier to justify in democratic terms. (shrink)

This chapter considers how arguments from previous chapters inform the ethics of corporate philanthropy. It also draws help from an unlikely ally, the libertarian economist Milton Friedman, notorious for his opposition to corporate philanthropy. The chapter argues that this controversial stance can be anchored in a democratic critique of corporate power. Because a firm’s shareholders, managers, and employees are already free to make donations in their individual capacities as citizens, allowing firms to donate in addition can objectionably multiply the public (...) influence of their stakeholders. Furthermore, as firms typically command concentrated wealth, deploying that wealth for social purposes can afford them domineering influence over receiving communities. Finally, an inherent conflict between a commercial firm’s acquisitive and altruistic motives exposes vulnerable beneficiaries to mistreatment. The chapter reveals how corporate philanthropy can overcome this criticism and proposes that new developments in business that blend commercial and nonprofit aims invite further research. (shrink)

This introductory chapter begins with a case study of a prominent donation by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos. Reactions to this announcement represent a common trend in criticism of philanthropy that overlooks the value of democracy. The chapter offers a formal definition of philanthropy as a social practice constituted by impersonal gratuitous transfers of private property. It reports recent statistics about the practice’s development. It argues that philanthropy raises distinctive political questions. It summarizes recent work on philanthropy in moral and political (...) philosophy, noting its limited appreciation of democratic concerns. The chapter closes with a preview of the subsequent chapters and a disclaimer about the selective treatment of topics. (shrink)

The practice of philanthropy, which releases private property for public purposes, represents in many ways the best angels of our nature. But this practice's noteworthy virtues often obscure the fact that philanthropy also represents the exercise of private power. In The Tyranny of Generosity, Theodore Lechterman shows how this private power can threaten the foundations of a democratic society. The deployment of private wealth for public ends may rival the authority of communities to determine their own affairs. And, in societies (...) characterized by wide disparities in wealth, philanthropy often combines with background inequalities to make public decisions overwhelmingly sensitive to the preferences of the rich. Allowing private wealth to dictate social outcomes collides with core commitments of a democratic society, a society in which people are supposed to determine their common affairs together, on equal terms. But why exactly is democracy valuable? How should these values be weighed against the liberty of donors and the many social benefits that philanthropy promises? Lechterman explores these questions by examining various topics in the practice of philanthropy: the respective roles of philanthropy and government, public subsidies for private giving, the use of donations for political speech, instruments of perpetual giving, the rise in giving by commercial corporations, and effective altruism as a guide for individual giving. These studies build to a surprising conclusion: realizing the democratic ideal may be impossible without philanthropy--but making philanthropy safe for democracy also requires fundamental changes to policy and practice. (shrink)

An especially underappreciated problem regarding philanthropic power concerns the way in which charitable gifts exercise control over future generations. Charitable bequests and trusts, which are popular instruments of donation, bind future generations to respect the wills of past donors. This chapter draws on views of Thomas Jefferson—noted critic of institutions that favor the dead over the living—to illustrate the problem of “dead-hand control.” Jefferson’s perspective helps us to appreciate that donations meant to benefit future persons may also mistreat them by (...) imposing conditions on their use of resources. The chapter argues that generations have an interest in sovereignty over their common affairs that qualifies how resources can be donated across time. Though it ultimately defends the practice of intergenerational philanthropy, the chapter also shows how taking the value of sovereignty seriously recommends restrictions on the duration that donors can expect to have their wills honored. (shrink)

How should opportunities for donation be distributed? Laissez-faire treatment of the ability to convert wealth into voice allows wealthier citizens to augment their influence over public affairs, further marginalizing poorer citizens. The present chapter contends that this state of affairs is ultimately incompatible with the requirements of political equality. The reasons to regulate political spending, it argues, also apply to certain kinds of philanthropic donations. It explores various policy proposals for redressing this problem, including a progressive voucher scheme that would (...) replace cash donations for expressive activities with vouchers whose price increases the more vouchers one purchases. Such a proposal seeks to balance interests in liberty and efficiency with the demands of political equality. (shrink)

What does it mean to give well? This chapter argues that political considerations are essential—though often neglected—ingredients in the practical ethics of giving. It develops through an examination of effective altruism, an increasingly popular and sophisticated perspective on the ethics of philanthropy. A core component of effective altruism is the relief of poverty through targeted interventions in the developing world. The chapter rearticulates and expands on the moral challenges of relieving the symptoms of poverty through philanthropic interventions. It counters that (...) redirecting philanthropists to institutional reform—as effective altruism’s critics often advocate—falls unwittingly into some of the same traps. Unqualified recommendations for diverting more money into politics stumble right into to the challenges of political injustice observed in Chapter 4. The chapter suggests that donors can mitigate these challenges by (e.g.) making assistance projects self-consciously transitional and investing in community organizing rather than direct policy change. (shrink)

Having considered why a democratic polity might have reason to limit philanthropy’s reach, the book moves to consider the conditions under which such a polity might have reason to offer donations affirmative support. Policies that subsidize philanthropic donations are a fixture of the public finance regimes of most democratic societies. Most instantiations of this policy make subsidies available on a neutral basis, with no special priority accorded to specific categories of nonprofit activity. Numerous critics find this policy wanting, contending that (...) public support for philanthropy can only be justified as a way of responding to poverty. The chapter affirms that a society’s least advantaged members have powerful claims on collective resources but notes serious limitations with using philanthropy to satisfy them. Meanwhile, it proposes that public support for citizens’ varied philanthropic commitments is valuable as a way of mediating the limitations of majority rule and securing the organizational foundations of democratic deliberation. (shrink)

In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues.

In the one-for-one business model, a purchaser of, for example, a pair of shoes simultaneously purchases a pair of shoes for a child in need. This model, popularized by TOMS shoe company in 2006, has been remarkably successful. The driving force behind the success is most likely the emotional appeal of the one-for-one idea. The TOMS model has been criticized, however—not just for being less effective than advertised, but for arguably doing more harm than good. Whether or not this latter (...) charge is true, the TOMS story serves as an illustrative starting point for an exploration of the ways in which commonsense thinking about charity and philanthropy is often wrong. Examining these criticisms will set the stage for an examination of the influential “effective altruism” movement and invite the reader to think more deeply about different ways of doing good in the world. (shrink)

In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents. Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence. Richard Miller proposed one such option, which has several advantages over Singer’s principle. In particular, because it concerns ourdispositionsrather than operating over every possible occasion for beneficence, it avoids problems of (...) iterative demands. However, I argue that Miller’s principle is inadequate, because 1) it seems too weak, 2) it appears to be ambiguous and 3) it can give unduly harsh verdicts on unlucky moral agents. (shrink)

Moral extremists argue for highly demanding duties of beneficence on the ground that accepting a more moderate position commits us to denying the common-sense moral intuition elicited by easy rescue cases. I argue that a moderate duty of beneficence is consistent with this intuition in light of what I call aggregationism, the view that the large aggregate cost of performing many low-cost acts of beneficence is relevant to what moral agents may do in cases where they face multiple low-cost occasions (...) to rescue. After demonstrating how the debate between moderates and extremists turns on the truth of aggregationism, I defend aggregationism against the challenge that it is inconsistent with respecting the separateness of persons. (shrink)

It has been argued in some recent work that there are many cases in which individuals are subject toconditional obligationsto give to more effective rather than less effective charities, despite not being unconditionally obligated to give. These conditional obligations, it has been suggested, can allow effective altruists (EAs) to make the central claims about the ethics of charitable giving that characterize the movement without taking any particular position on morality's demandingness. I argue that the range of cases involving charitable giving (...) in which individuals are subject to conditional effectiveness obligations is in fact quite narrow. Because of this, I claim, EAs must endorse the view that well off people have at least fairly demanding unconditional obligations. (shrink)

The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy. Edited by Woodruff Paul.

Moral extremists argue for a demanding duty of poverty relief by leveraging powerful intuitions about our duties to rescue those close at hand. I clear the way for a less demanding duty by arguing that this argumentative strategy commits the extremist to a conception of our duty in the face of global poverty that is deeply at odds with our convictions about how we may discharge that duty. These convictions reveal that global poverty and easy rescue cases give rise to (...) duties of different kinds: whereas duties of rescue are ultimately explicable by appeal to moral claims to assistance, duties of poverty relief are not. The extremist’s most compelling argumentative strategy is therefore not viable—he may not straightforwardly appeal to facts about the demandingness of duties of rescue in arguing for demanding duties of poverty relief. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Dietz argues that what I have called the ‘institutional critique of effective altruism’ is best understood as grounded in the claim that ‘EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics, neglecting the importance of our collective obligations’. In this reply, I argue that Dietz’s view does not represent a plausible interpretation of the institutional critiques offered by others, primarily because, unlike Dietz, they appear to believe that their critiques provide reasons to (...) reject the EA view about the content of our individual obligations. I also argue that EA’s identity as a social movement provides grounds for denying Dietz’s claim that it is objectionably incomplete. (shrink)

In this chapter, Mark Budolfson and Dean Spears analyse the marginal effect of philanthropic donations. The core of their analysis is the observation that marginal good done per dollar donated is a product (in the mathematical sense) of several factors: change in good done per change in activity level of the charity in question, change in activity per change in the charity’s budget size, and change in budget size per change in the individual’s donation to the charity in question. They (...) then discuss the “hidden zero problem” that some of the terms in the equation (in particular, the last term) might be “hidden zeros” that prevent donations from doing any good—or worse, imply that they do harm—even if the charity is at the top of effective altruism rankings based on the other factors. (shrink)

Locke’s property rights are now usually understood to be both fundamental and strictly negative. Fundamental because they are thought to be basic constraints on what we may do, unconstrained by anything deeper. Negative because they are thought to only protect a property holder against the claims of others. Here, I argue that this widespread interpretation is mistaken. For Locke, property rights are constrained by the deeper ‘fundamental law of nature,’ which involves positive obligations to those in need and confines the (...) right to excess property within circumstances where it is not needed to preserve human life. (shrink)

Larry Temkin draws on the work of Angus Deaton to argue that countries with poor governance sometimes rely on charitable giving and foreign aid in ways that enable them to avoid relying on their own citizens; this can cause them to be unresponsive to their citizens’ needs and thus prevent the long-term alleviation of poverty and other social problems. I argue that the implications of this “lack of government responsiveness argument” (or LOGRA) are both broader and narrower than they might (...) first appear. I explore how LOGRA applies more broadly to certain types of charitable giving in developed countries, with a focus on medical crowdfunding. I then highlight how LOGRA does not apply to charitable giving aimed at alleviating the suffering of the absolutely politically marginalized, or those especially vulnerable people to whom governments are never responsive. (shrink)

Effective altruism is purportedly ecumenical towards different moral views, charitable causes, and evidentiary methods. I argue that effective altruists’ criticisms of purportedly less effective charities are inconsistent with their commitment to ecumenicity. Individuals may justifiably support charities other than those recommended by effective altruism. If effective altruists take their commitment to ecumenicity seriously, they will have to revise their criticisms of many of these charities.

In the article, ‘Being Good in a World of Need: Some Empirical Worries and an Uncomfortable Philosophical Possibility,’ Larry Temkin presents some concerns about the possible impact of international aid on the poorest people in the world, suggesting that the nature of the duties of beneficence of the global rich to the global poor are much more murky than some people have made out. -/- In this article, I’ll respond to Temkin from the perspective of effective altruism—one of the targets (...) he attacks. I’ll argue that Temkin’s critique has little empirical justification, given the conclusions he wants to reach, and is therefore impotent. (shrink)

Effective Altruism encourages affluent people to make significant donations to improve the wellbeing of the world’s poor, using quantified and observational methods to identify the most efficient charities. Critics argue that EA is inattentive to the systemic causes of poverty and underestimates the effectiveness of individual contributions to systemic change. EA claims to be open to systemic change but suggests that systemic critiques, such as the socialist critique of capitalism, are unhelpfully vague and serve primarily as hypocritical rationalizations of continued (...) affluence. I reformulate the systemic change objection, rebut the charges of vagueness and bad faith and argue that charity may not be worth doing at all from a purely altruistic perspective. In order to take systemic change seriously, EA must repudiate its narrowly empiricist approach, embrace holistic, interpretive social analysis and make inevitably controversial judgments about the complex dynamics of collective action. These kinds of evidence and judgment cannot be empirically verified but are essential to taking systemic change seriously. EA is thereby forced to sacrifice its a-political approach to altruism. I also highlight the importance of quotidian, extra-political contributions to perpetuating or changing harmful social practices. Radical efforts to resist, subvert and reconstruct harmful social practices, such as those involved in economic decision-making, could be just as effective and demanding as charity. But such efforts may be incompatible with extensive philanthropy, because they can require people to retain some level of affluence for strategic reasons but to repudiate both the acquisition of significant wealth and charity as is currently organized. The wealth and status of some critics of charity may indeed be incompatible with effectively contributing to social change, but the altruistic merits of charity are neither as obvious nor as easily demonstrated as EA believes. (shrink)

In recent years, the effective altruism movement has generated much discussion about the ways in which we can most effectively improve the lives of the global poor, and pursue other morally important goals. One of the most common criticisms of the movement is that it has unjustifiably neglected issues related to institutional change that could address the root causes of poverty, and instead focused its attention on encouraging individuals to direct resources to organizations that directly aid people living in poverty. (...) In this article, I discuss and assess this ‘institutional critique’. I argue that if we understand the core commitments of effective altruism in a way that is suggested by much of the work of its proponents, and also independently plausible, there is no way to understand the institutional critique such that it represents a view that is both independently plausible and inconsistent with the core commitments of effective altruism. (shrink)

Some of the challenges in Sanders et al. (this issue) can be aptly illustrated by means of charity nudges, that is, nudges designed to increase charitable donations. These nudges raise many ethical questions. First, Oxfam’s triptychs with suggested donations are designed to increase giving. If successful, do our actions match ex ante or ex post preferences? Does this make a difference to the autonomy of the donor? Second, the Behavioural Insights Team conducted experiments using social networks to nudge people to (...) give more. Do these appeals steer clear of exploiting power relations? Do they respect boundaries of privacy? Third, in an online campaign by Kiva, donors are asked to contribute directly to personalized initiatives. In many cases, the initiative has already been funded and donor money is funnelled to a new cause. Is such a “pre-disbursal” arrangement truthful and true to purpose as a social business model? (shrink)

The scarcity of donor organs for transplantation purposes is now a widely known fact. The number of people on transplant waiting lists regularly far exceeds the number of available organs. This situation has led to decades of recurring discussions about how this shortage could be addressed. The undersupply results in situations within the Eurotransplant network as well as on national levels where patients often wait for years, enduring significant losses in quality of life, or never receive an organ allocation at (...) all. On a global scale, the shortage also contributes significantly to illegal organ trafficking, exposing vulnerable populations in poorer countries to considerable and often opaque risks. ----- Die Knappheit an Spenderorganen für Transplantationszwecke ist mittlerweile ein allgemein bekanntes Faktum. Auf der Warteliste für Transplantationen stehen regelmäßig sehr viel mehr Menschen als Organe verfügbar werden. Dieser Umstand führt seit Jahrzehnten immer wieder zu Diskussionen darüber, auf welche Weise dem Mangel entgegengetreten werden könnte. Die Unterversorgung führt sowohl im Eurotransplant-Verbund als auch auf jeweils nationaler Ebene zu Situationen, in denen Patienten teils jahrelang unter beträchtlichen Verlusten von Lebensqualität auf ein Organ warten oder eine Zuteilung erst gar nicht mehr erleben. Auf globaler Ebene führt der Mangel darüber hinaus in signifikantem Umfang zu illegalem Organhandel und setzt vulnerable Bevölkerungsgruppen in ärmeren Ländern teils beträchtlichen und intransparenten Risiken aus. (shrink)

It seems that you can be in a position to rescue people in mortal danger and yet have no obligation to do so, because of the sacrifice to you that this would involve. At the same time, if you do save anyone, then you must not leave anyone to die whom it would cost you no additional sacrifice to save. On the basis of these claims, Theron Pummer and Joe Horton have recently defended a ‘conditional obligation of effective altruism’, which (...) requires one to give to the most cost-effective charity if one is going to make a charitable donation at all, all other things equal. Appealing to a distinction between 'thoroughgoing' and 'half-hearted' non-consequentialism, I argue that their inferences don’t go through, and moreover that this sort of argument in general is unlikely to work as a way to defend effective altruism. (shrink)

Contemporary republicans have adopted a less-than-charitable attitude toward private beneficence, especially when it is directed to the poor, worrying that rich patrons may be in a position to exercise arbitrary power over their impoverished clients. These concerns have led them to support impartial public provision by way of state welfare programs, including an unconditional basic income (UBI). In contrast to this administrative model of public welfare, I will propose a competitive model in which the state regulates and subsidizes a decentralized (...) and nonstatist provision of support for the poor. This model will fix the historically objectionable features of private provision by having the state prevent collusion among private charities, deliver information to recipients about alternative sources of assistance, and give substantial grants to charities as well as tax incentives and vouchers to donors. I will contend that such an approach would do a better job of minimizing domination of the poor than traditional welfare states and may prove more politically feasible than a UBI, at least in the near term in certain national contexts. (shrink)

When it comes to the duty of beneficence, a formidable class of moderate positions holds that morally significant considerations emerge when one's actions are seen as part of a larger series. Agglomeration, according to these moderates, limits the demands of beneficence, thereby avoiding the extremely demanding view forcefully defended by Peter Singer. This idea has much appeal. What morality can demand of people is, it seems, appropriately modulated by how much they have already done or will do. Here we examine (...) a number of recent proposals that appeal to agglomeration. None of them, we argue, succeeds. (shrink)

W artykule została podjęta próba zrekonstruowania znaczenia cnót umiarkowania i rozsądku dla powstania ruchu filozoficzno-społecznego: Efektywnego Altruizmu i praktyki życia efektywnych altruistów w oparciu o publikacje jego kluczowych przedstawicieli: Petera Singera i Williama MacAskilla. W pierwszej części artykułu krótko referuję genezę i filozoficzne podstawy Efektywnego Altruizmu. Następnie staram się określić rolę rozsądku i umiarkowania w teoretycznych rozważaniach nad efektywnym altruizmem oraz w praktyce życia osób utożsamiających się z ruchem, w odniesieniu do rozumienia tych cnót zaprezentowanego przez Arystotelesa. Przedstawione rozumowanie wspiera (...) tezę, że cnoty te mają kluczowe znaczenie dla praktyki codziennego życia efektywnych altruistów. Ostatnia część koncentruje się wokół spostrzeżenia, że Efektywny Altruizm może być w pewnym sensie alternatywą dla postawy konsumpcjonistycznej i przyczynić się do rehabilitacji tytułowych cnót w życiu publicznym. (shrink)

Un ghid pentru şi despre rotarieni, Rotary International, cluburile Rotary, şi programele finanţate de Rotary International. Principalul obiectiv pentru Rotary este să servească – în comunitate, la locul de muncă, peste tot în lume. Cei 1,2 milioane de rotarieni constituiţi în peste 34.000 cluburi în aproape toate ţările din lume sunt dedicaţi cu toţii idealului de a servi mai presus de sine înşişi. Cluburile Rotary sunt accesibile pentru persoane din toate culturile şi etniile, şi nu sunt afiliate cu nicio organizaţie (...) politică sau religioasă. Familia rotarienilor se extinde peste rotarieni ca persoane fizice şi cluburi Rotary, incluzând şi alte persoane care au ca scop să servească, aducându-şi contribuţia la activitatea organizaţiei. Grupuri, precum Rotaract, Interact, şi Rotary Community Corps, servesc alături de cluburile care sponsorizează, folosindu-şi diversele aptitudini pentru a îmbunătăţi calitatea vieţii în comunităţile lor Suntem 1,2 milioane de vecini, prieteni, și lideri ai comunităților, care activează împreună pentru a crea schimbări pozitive, durabile, în comunitățile noastre și în întreaga lume. Ocupaţiile, culturile şi ţările noastre diferite ne oferă o perspectivă unică. Pasiunea noastră comună pentru a servi ne ajută să ducem la bun sfârşit realizări remarcabile. (shrink)