Contractualism about Political Authority

This paper presents a structural definition of wokeism as a coercive moral doctrine that suppresses inquiry and reframes dialogue into a mechanism of belief enforcement through guilt and reputational threat. The definition offered is not based on polemic opposition, but on structural necessity. Academic institutions that enforce the behavioral norms of wokeism while refusing to define the doctrine create an epistemic closure loop. In such a system, critique is interpreted as harm, dissent as complicity, and dialogue becomes a performance of (...) moral loyalty rather than a search for truth. The paper proceeds by formally defining wokeism using the classical method of genus and differentia. It then analyzes institutional behavior to determine whether the doctrine, once embedded, behaves as the definition predicts. Through a series of six theorems, the paper shows that wokeism transforms the university from a space of inquiry into a system of enforcement. It insulates itself through semantic denial, collapses constitutional and logical coherence, and converts dissent into guilt without recourse to argument. Objections are addressed not as neutral critiques, but as defensive patterns within the structure itself. The analysis concludes that the institutional adoption of wokeism violates the foundational principles of American higher education. An institution that suppresses critique and enforces belief without accountability has broken the public trust that legitimizes its existence. What remains is not education, but doctrinal control under the appearance of virtue. Keywords: wokeism, epistemic closure, coercive moral doctrine, belief enforcement, academic institutions, philosophical inquiry, structural recursion, dialogue suppression, institutional authoritarianism, moral epistemology. (shrink)

I offer a new style of argument that supports either utilitarianism or instances of the expected equally distributed equivalent version of prioritarianism (EEDE). The central idea is that the value the welfarist assigns to a state of the world should not lie unnecessarily far from the utilities of the individuals who exist at that state. I describe various ways we might measure distance from a candidate value to the individuals' utilities, characterize a family of such measures, and explain which versions (...) of welfarism follow when we use them. For some, it's utilitarianism; for others, it's different instances of EEDE. (shrink)

Distributive justice and political legitimacy are different concepts with different roles. In John Rawls’s justice as fairness, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society. The primary subject of legitimacy, in contrast, is the exercise of political power. Rawls claims that legitimacy is weaker than justice—a law may be legitimate even though it is unjust. Rawls also claims that a conception of legitimacy would be selected in the original position and that the argument for its adoption "is (...) much the same as, and as strong as, the argument for the principles of justice themselves." But if the parties in the original position have much the same reason to adopt a conception of legitimacy as they have to adopt a conception of justice, why is legitimacy less demanding than justice? If principles of justice and legitimacy are selected in the same way and for the same reasons, their requirements should not diverge. I propose a solution to this conflation problem. I argue that principles of political legitimacy should be selected in a special session of the original position that differs in key respects from the general session in which the two principles of justice as fairness are selected. I also suggest that insofar as the principles of legitimacy selected in this session do allow for some latitude of injustice, as is likely, the demands of legitimacy should take lexical priority over any competing demands of justice. (shrink)

Political power is always coercive, and is none more so in domestic politics than the criminal law and its associated power to punish. If this power is to be used in a just way, it must be done in a manner that all members of society can accept. This paper is an attempt to work out some normative parameters for an acceptable theory of punishment by examining its institutional role in a just, liberal state. In doing so, this paper treats (...) punishment theory as a topic in political philosophy, as opposed to moral philosophy. In this way, the account differs from most approaches to a theory of punishment, which are based on what we might call “personal morality.” In this paper, I focus on the role that punishment would play as an institutional part of a state governed by just rules and explore how the features of the institution could be justified to the citizens of the state in question. (shrink)

The police are routinely recognized for displaying heroic virtues associated with combat. I take a contrarian position in this paper. Part I begins with the claim that if bravery is to be prioritized in policing, then bravery should be part of the police’s routine roles and responsibilities. However, bravery is not central to what the police do every day, and, therefore, shouldn’t be prioritized (in recruiting, training, and so on). Conversely, Part II claims that if the virtue of honesty is (...) centrally connected to the police role, then it should be prioritized in policing. Because honesty is deeply connected to the police’s routine roles and responsibilities, it should be prioritized. By turning away from misconceptions about the police, the hope is that we will be in a better position to see both the practical and the moral importance of virtue in policing. (shrink)

The use of deception and dishonesty is widely accepted as a fact of life in policing. This paper thus defends a counterintuitive claim: Good faith is a normative foundation for the police as a political institution. Good faith is a core value of contracts, and policing is contractual in nature both broadly (as a matter of social contract theory) and narrowly (in regard to concrete encounters between law enforcement officers and the public). Given the centrality of good faith to policing, (...) dishonesty and deception on par with fraud are justified only as a narrowly circumscribed investigative tool that is constrained by institutional commitments to the fair distribution of security and the rule of law. The practical upshot is the preclusion of most dishonest and deceptive police tactics on par with fraud, leading to an institution that is less proactive and more reactive. (shrink)

This book advances a novel justification for the idea of "public reason": citizens within diverse societies can realize the ideal of shared political autonomy, despite their adherence to different religious and philosophical views, by deciding fundamental political questions with "public reasons." Public reasons draw upon or are derived from ecumenical political ideas, such as toleration and equal citizenship, and mutually acceptable forms of reasoning, like those of the sciences. This book explains that if citizens share equal political autonomy—and thereby constitute (...) "a civic people"—they will not suffer from alienation or domination and can enjoy relations of civic friendship. Moreover, it contends that the ideal of shared political autonomy cannot be realized by alternative accounts of public justification that eschew any necessary role for public reasons. In addition to explaining how the ideal of political autonomy justifies the idea of public reason, this book presents a new analysis of the relation between public reason and "ideal theory": by engaging in "public reasoning," citizens help create a just society that can secure the free compliance of all. It also explores the distinctive policy implications of the ideal of political autonomy for gender equality, families, children, and education. (shrink)

Why does institutional police brutality continue so brazenly? Criminologists and other social scientists typically theorize about the causes of such violence, but less attention is given to normative questions regarding the demands of justice. Some philosophers have taken a teleological approach, arguing that social institutions such as the police exist to realize collective ends and goods based upon the idea of collective moral responsibility. Others have approached normative questions in policing from a more explicit social-contract perspective, suggesting that legitimacy is (...) derived by adhering to (limited) authority. This article examines methodologies within political philosophy for analyzing police injustice. The methodological inquiry leads to an account of how justice constrains the police through both special (or positional) moral requirements that officers assume voluntarily, as well as general moral requirements in virtue of a polity’s commitment to moral, political and legal values beyond law enforcement and crime reduction. The upshot is a conception of a police role that is constrained by justice from multiple foundational stances. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive examination of the police role from within a broader philosophical context. Contending that the police are in the midst of an identity crisis that exacerbates unjustified law enforcement tactics, Luke William Hunt examines various major conceptions of the police—those seeing them as heroes, warriors, and guardians. The book looks at the police role considering the overarching societal goal of justice and seeks to present a synthetic theory that draws upon history, law, society, psychology, and philosophy. (...) Each major conception of the police role is examined in light of how it affects the pursuit of justice, and how it may be contrary to seeking justice holistically and collectively. The book sets forth a conception of the police role that is consistent with the basic values of a constitutional democracy in the liberal tradition. Hunt’s intent is that clarifying the police role will likewise elucidate any constraints upon policing strategies, including algorithmic strategies such as predictive policing. This book is essential reading for thoughtful policing and legal scholars as well as those interested in political philosophy, political theory, psychology, and related areas. Now more than ever, the nature of the police role is a philosophical topic that is relevant not just to police officials and social scientists, but to everyone. (shrink)

Since John Rawls, public reason theorists have attempted to show how liberal political norms could be acceptable to people with diverse religious and ethical viewpoints. However, these theories overlook the importance of the distinction between acceptability to realistic people and acceptability to viewpoints, which matters because public reason theories are committed to the former, but only deliver the latter, thereby failing to justify liberal norms. Public reason theories therefore face a dilemma: abandon realistic people and lose normative appeal, or retain (...) realism and find a new way to justify liberalism. (shrink)

Essay on police legitimacy through public reason and community policing.

The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state in which they find themselves, and few realize that by remaining they are (...) consenting to the state’s lawful actions. In addition, the various obstacles standing in the way of us leaving the state render our remaining involuntary. Thus, the critics conclude, few if any people can be considered to have consented through their residence. I argue that these objections fail and that the residence theory remains a viable option, at least for those who are not committed incompatibilists. (shrink)

Chapter 6 consists of three case studies that represent three models of surveillance in the liberal polity: (1) rule of law surveillance, (2) direct rule of law departure surveillance, and (3) indirect rule of law departure surveillance. Each of these three models is intended to illustrate the extent to which police surveillance is consistent with the basic liberal tenets discussed in the prior chapters—particularly the rule of law and the police’s use of discretion. US cases are used to help draw (...) out these tenets, but the reach of the cases’ underlying principles extends well beyond their locality. This chapter is especially attuned to the way that technological developments have enhanced the police’s capability to engage in discretionary surveillance. The goal of this chapter—like the underlying goal of the book—is to identify the limits of the police’s power given the basic tenets of the liberal polity. (shrink)

The epilogue pulls together the arguments from the prior chapters by analyzing a scenario involving an informant who engages in “otherwise illegal activity” on behalf of the police. The epilogue then revisits the overlapping conceptions of human dignity that were introduced earlier, reaching the following conclusion: a broadly defined ideal theory of justice in the liberal tradition provides constraints regarding how the state (especially the police) may fulfill its reciprocal duties in society; one of those constraints is a commitment to (...) a conception of persons that includes human dignity. By concluding the book in this way, the goal is to emphasize liberalism’s commitment to a conception of persons that is based upon multiple foundational stances. This helps show how liberal personhood likewise constrains the police’s power from multiple foundational stances. The hope is that, by following this path, there has been something of a retrieval of dignity in policing. (shrink)

Chapter 4 begins the applied part of the book by examining modern law enforcement tactics in light of the theoretical framework from the prior chapters. The chapter explores the extent to which agreements between the police and informants track the structure of legal contracts. The central argument is that the underlying normative principles of the legal doctrine of unconscionability provide weight in determining whether these agreements are justified. In the cases in question, the state leverages its bargaining power over a (...) person to facilitate an agreement in which the person acts in a way that is (otherwise) illegal, as well as in a way that subjects the person to the risk of harm. If these sorts of interactions are unconscionable in the sense that they constitute an affront to liberal principles—including liberal personhood—then they cannot be construed as just even if they achieve a competing state end. (shrink)

This chapter suggests that the state’s power to address injustice is constrained by a priority rule regarding the liberal conception of persons. Although the prior chapter described how a broadly outlined ideal theory includes the pre-political conception of persons as free and equal, this chapter describes how a richer conception of liberal personhood is illuminated through the interplay between ideal theory and the reality of law-breaking with which nonideal theory is concerned. The upshot is that if the elements of the (...) yielded conception of liberal personhood track the principles of a broadly defined ideal theory of justice in the liberal tradition, then the commitment to that conception of the person is foundational to liberalism itself. Any affront to one would be an affront to the other. The chapter develops a tripartite conception of liberal personhood: _reciprocator_ and _moral agent_, which illuminate the third facet of _human dignity_. (shrink)

The goal of this chapter is, first, to set forth a principled method for the evaluation and pursuit of nonideal policies that address injustice and, second, to describe the broad outline of an ideal theory of justice for which those nonideal policies might aim. Building upon work by A. John Simmons, the chapter first embraces a Rawlsian methodology in which nonideal policies must (1) be morally permissible, (2) be politically possible, (3) be effective, and (4) prioritize grievances based upon severity. (...) The chapter then sets forth some of the central components of a broadly defined ideal theory of justice in the liberal tradition, including a pre-political conception of persons as free and equal, a conception of political community as a cooperative scheme in which persons reciprocate, and a commitment to the rule of law in balancing competing claims of liberty where persons do not reciprocate. (shrink)

The introduction situates the book in the present global context while at the same time highlighting specific concerns within the United States. Some of those concerns are based upon the view that liberal states are drifting toward “fascist” policies, from mass surveillance and police militarization to the backlash against ethnic and cultural minorities. With this in mind, the book aims for a general analysis of policing in the liberal tradition that draws upon US jurisprudence for examples of that tradition. This (...) approach is based upon the idea that different liberal societies have deep jurisprudential and political resonances (rooted in, say, John Locke’s philosophy) that connect them philosophically in a very basic way. The result is a multidisciplinary book that develops organically by engaging in discussions about political philosophy, constitutional law, institutional materials and regulations, and the details of police work. (shrink)

There is a growing sense that many liberal states are in the midst of a shift in legal and political norms—a shift that is happening slowly and for a variety of reasons relating to security. The internet and tech booms—paving the way for new forms of electronic surveillance—predated the 9/11 attacks by several years, while the police’s vast use of secret informants and deceptive operations began well before that. On the other hand, the recent uptick in reactionary movements—movements in which (...) the rule of law seems expendable—began many years after 9/11 and continues to this day. One way to describe this book is an examination of the moral limits on modern police practices that flow from the basic legal and political tenets of the liberal tradition. The central argument is that policing in liberal states is constrained by a liberal conception of persons coupled with particular rule of law principles. Part I consists of three chapters that constitute the book’s theoretical foundation, including an overview of the police’s law enforcement role in the liberal polity and a methodology for evaluating that role. Part II consists of three chapters that address applications of the theory, including the police’s use of informants, deceptive operations, and surveillance. The upshot is that policing in liberal societies has become illiberal in light of its response to both internal and external threats to security. The book provides an account of what it might mean to retrieve policing that is consistent with the basic tenets of liberalism and the limits imposed by those tenets. [This is an uncorrected draft of the book's preface and introduction, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.]. (shrink)

Chapter 1 begins with a broad introduction to the police by pursuing the seemingly simple question: What do the police do, and why do they have authority to do it? After sketching several aspects of the police’s law enforcement role—such as the use of deadly force, deception, surveillance, and discretion—the chapter considers the basis of the police’s authority to engage in such acts. Even if everyone agrees that such actions are justified, that does not necessarily answer the question about authority. (...) One way to answer the question is to say that police have authority in virtue of the state’s legitimacy—the moral right to command and be obeyed. After a discussion of reciprocation theories of legitimacy and their relation to the liberal tradition, the chapter closes with a brief examination of alternative approaches that one might take in identifying the limits of the police’s power. (shrink)

Chapter 5 first argues that the subjective test for entrapment is a theoretically and practically untenable method of evaluating sting operations: the test is based upon a decision procedure that gives rise to questions about the metaphysics of counterfactual conditionals, which raise more pressing epistemological, ethical, and political problems. Accordingly, the second goal of this chapter is to examine the limits of sting operations more broadly. This is done by examining the extent to which the police are justified in using (...) discretionary power to break what would otherwise be the law. The chapter concludes by setting forth a theory regarding the limits of such powers—limits that correspond to the limits of executive national security emergency powers in the liberal tradition. The upshot is that any theory of entrapment and sting operations must exist within the broader constraints upon the police’s power to break the law. (shrink)

Americans today are far less likely to trust their institutions, and each other, than in decades past. This collapse in social and political trust arguably fuels our increasingly ferocious ideological conflicts and hardened partisanship. Many believe that our previously high levels of trust and bipartisanship were a pleasant anomaly and that we now live under the historic norm. Seen this way, politics itself is nothing more than a power struggle between groups with irreconcilable aims: contemporary American politics is war because (...) political life as such is war. -/- Must Politics Be War? argues that our shared liberal democratic institutions have the unique capacity to sustain social and political trust between diverse persons. In succinct, convincing prose, Kevin Vallier argues that constitutional rights and democratic governance prevent any one ideology or faith from dominating all others, thereby protecting each person's freedom to live according to her values and principles. Illiberal arrangements, where one group's ideology or faith reigns, turn those who disagree into unwilling subversives, persons with little reason to trust their regime or to be trustworthy in obeying it. Liberal arrangements, in contrast, incentivize trust and trustworthiness because they allow people with diverse and divergent ends to act with conviction. Those with opposing viewpoints become trustworthy because they can obey the rules of their society without acting against their ideals. Therefore, as Vallier illuminates, a liberal society is one at moral peace with a politics that is not war. (shrink)

This chapter explains why moral and political disagreement is pervasive and why there is a need to cooperate with diverse others anyway. It then develops conceptions of trust, social trust, trustworthiness, and moral peace between persons that are required to explain how people who disagree with one another can cooperate. More specifically, the chapter develops an account of social trust as a social relationship that can maintain cooperation between diverse persons while respecting the dignity and worth of all. It also (...) describes a moral peace between diverse persons as a society with a high degree of social trust. Determining which institutions properly sustain moral peace is the aim of the rest of the book. (shrink)

Previous chapters argue that maintaining a system of social trust in the right way requires that our shared moral rules be publicly justified. This chapter argues that coercive laws are required in order to strengthen a system of social trust by properly incentivizing trustworthy behavior in cases where moral sentiments and moral ostracism alone cannot provide strong enough reason to be trustworthy. Legal coercion can often stabilize moral rules that might otherwise collapse and create new moral rules that would not (...) have otherwise existed. So law can be an efficient means of maintaining a system of trust by providing persons with additional incentives to engage in trustworthy behavior. This is how law is publicly justified, and so how the law acquires its moral authority. (shrink)

This chapter argues that only broadly liberal institutions can be publicly justified. Some citizens will have sufficient reason to reject nonliberal rights schemas, as well as the constitutional and legal rules that institutionalize those schemas. But because liberal constitutional rights can be publicly justified to a diverse public, these liberal rights can sustain social trust in the right way. Thus, a society that protects liberal rights establishes moral peace and a politics that is not war. This chapter uses a thin (...) veil of ignorance to locate specific classes of publicly justified primary rights. These rights fall into five classes: rights of agency, associational rights, jurisdictional rights, procedural rights, and international rights. The chapter ends by developing an associated conception of social justice and explains how rights should be built into a publicly justified constitution. (shrink)

This introduction reviews the challenges posed by falling social and political trust and increasing political polarization, especially in the United States. In particular, falling trust and increasing political conflict raises the question of whether political life is invariably a struggle for victory between groups with incompatible goals and principles. The introduction frames the problem in terms of the need to determine which institutional structures can sustain social trust between persons with diverse viewpoints and values. It then outlines the general argument (...) of the book, which is that liberal institutions, political systems marked by extensive, equal constitutional rights and liberties, have the unique capacity to sustain social trust in conflicted times. (shrink)

This chapter explains the great value found in a society where social trust is both high and grounded in the trustworthy behavior of all. It explains how social trust can be freely and respectfully sustained even under conditions of deep viewpoint diversity. Social trust has value in promoting social cooperation, economic development, and relations of love and friendship. But social trust cannot be grounded in recognizing these goods alone, as it must be based in observing the trustworthy behavior of others, (...) and on respect for other persons within a system of trust. Toward this end, the chapter introduces two arguments, the argument from trustworthiness and the argument from accountability, which explain how social trust can be respectfully sustained and why the idea of public justification is essential for sustaining social trust in the right way. (shrink)

The ideas of moral peace, a system of trust, and public justification explain the need for a legal system that corrects and stabilizes moral rules that form the basis for social trust. Legal rules gain authority when they improve upon the system of moral rules. But some of society’s moral commitments merit protection over and above the law by constitutional rules that govern the ratification, reform, and repeal of laws. This chapter develops an account of the most fundamental constraints on (...) justifiable constitutional rules—primary rights. Primary rights are rights that anyone with a rational plan of life would want for herself to pursue her conception of the good and justice, and ones she is willing to extend to others on reciprocal terms. These rights merit moral, legal, and constitutional protection, and begin the process of constitutional choice. (shrink)

This chapter develops a conception of the public justification of the moral rules that are the object of social trust. The goal is to explain how complying with moral rules and abiding by our personal values and commitments are compatible. When this compatibility relation is established, a system of social trust can sustain itself in the right way by driving appropriately trusting and trustworthy behavior, and motivating holding the untrustworthy accountable. When moral rules are publicly justified, that is, justified for (...) each person by her own lights, the compatibility relation obtains and moral rules can then form the basis for trust and trustworthiness and so sustain a social system with a high degree of justified social trust-moral peace. The chapter explains precisely what is to be justified, the kinds of reasons that constitute public justifications, and how public justification is rooted in moral peace and social trust. (shrink)

The previous chapter argued that a publicly justified legal system must identify and protect a scheme of publicly justified primary rights. But even a rights-protecting legal system needs help in realizing its social functions because we sometimes need to ratify, repeal, or reform the law. Toward this end, chapter 6 develops a three-stage model for how to choose constitutional rules that govern the shape of the law. Constitutional rules are publicly justified under three conditions. They must identify and protect a (...) system of primary rights. They must then manage errors in the imposition of law, minimizing the passage of unjustified law and the failure to pass publicly justified law. Finally, constitutional rules must be self-stabilizing in the sense that they can both maintain themselves in existence despite external shocks from self-interested actors and provide assurance of cooperation to those who usually comply with the laws that constitutional rules produce. (shrink)

Very diverse societies pose real problems for Rawlsian models of public reason. This is for two reasons: first, public reason is unable accommodate diverse perspectives in determining a regulative ideal. Second, regulative ideals are unable to respond to social change. While models based on public reason focus on the justification of principles, this book suggests that we need to orient our normative theories more toward discovery and experimentation. The book develops a unique approach to social contract theory that focuses on (...) diverse perspectives. It offers a new moral stance that author Ryan Muldoon calls, "The View From Everywhere," which allows for substantive, fundamental moral disagreement. This stance is used to develop a bargaining model in which agents can cooperate despite seeing different perspectives. Rather than arguing for an ideal contract or particular principles of justice, Muldoon outlines a procedure for iterated revisions to the rules of a social contract. It expands Mill's conception of experiments in living to help form a foundational principle for social contract theory. By embracing this kind of experimentation, we move away from a conception of justice as an end state, and toward a conception of justice as a trajectory. (shrink)

Mainstream political liberalism holds that legal coercion is permissible only if it is based on reasons that all can share, access or accept. But these requirements are subject to well-known problems. I articulate and defend an intelligible reasons requirement as an alternative. An intelligible reason is a reason that all suitably idealized members of the public can see as a reason for the person who offers it according to that person’s own evaluative standards. It thereby permits reasons into public justification (...) that all cannot share, access, or accept, and so contrasts with standard approaches to public justification. The intelligible reasons requirement has two striking implications. First, it severs the connection between public justification and principles of deliberative restraint. Second, it pushes political liberals to appeal to other political processes to publicly justify law, specifically bargaining, adjudication, and social evolution. (shrink)

In most of the introductions to Rawls and contemporary contractarianism, Rawls is seen as the representative of Kantian contractarianism. He is understood as inheriting a contractarian tradition that can be traced back to Kant and which has inspired followers such as Barry and Scanlon. This paper argues that the label does not fit Rawls. While a Kantian contractarian would presuppose a monistic conception of practical reason, Rawls is a hybrid contractarian who presupposes a dual conception. I shall first argue that (...) the way in which a contractarian model is labeled is determined by its conception of practical reason. Then I show that Rawls and Kantian contractarians assume different conceptions of practical reason, and therefore should be seen as belonging to two strands of thought. I further argue that, although Rawls acknowledges his intellectual affiliation with Kant, he cannot be considered a Kantian contractarian in the commonly understood way. In his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls interprets Kant as endorsing a hybrid contractarian model that is similar to his. By understanding Rawls as a hybrid contractarian and not confusing his philosophical project with that of Kantian contractarians, Rawls’s contribution to the history of contractarianism can be better evaluated. (shrink)

In the contemporary philosophical debate, there are two opposing contractualist views. On the one side, Hobbesian contractualisms take moral principles as side-constraints to redress the failures of the interaction among self-interested individuals. On the other, Kantian versions of the social contract ground morality on an impartial and moralized viewpoint. In his recent Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality, Nicholas Southwood proposes a third and novel form of contractualism, with the aim to overcome the “implausibly personal and partial characterization of the (...) moral point of view” of Hobbesian positions, as well as the “excessively substantive conception of practical reason” of Kantian theories.On Southwood’s view, perfectly rational individuals—who see themselves as “simultaneously co-legislator and co-subject among individuals with whom one shares an authority as a fellow deliberative agent” —agree upon a “common code” to live by, which is “a relatively compreh.. (shrink)

Ce bref commentaire a trois objectifs. La première section vise à présenter au lecteur la philosophie matérialiste et atomiste de Hobbes. Dans la seconde section, nous exposons le rôle des désirs dans l’escalade du conflit entre les agents dans l’état de nature. Au terme de cette analyse, le lecteur disposera de quelques clés interprétatives pour aborder les chapitres VI et XIII du Léviathan.

In this article, I review Frederick Neuhouser’s latest book, Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality, while critically assessing the legacy of Rousseau’s ideas on inequality and amour-propre for contemporary political philosophy. I challenge the widely held notion that the account of equality set out in the Social Contract should be read as a remedy to the problems generated by amour-propre, and suggest that we have to turn to Rousseau’s other writings to reconstruct his own political remedies for these problems. I then draw (...) attention to a much neglected dimension of Rousseau’s critique of inequality, which concerns the effect inequality has on our ability to identify with other humans and feel compassion for them. Taken together, these considerations highlight some of the limitations of the dominant Kantian–Rawlsian strand of Rousseau interpretation within contemporary liberal political philosophy. (shrink)

Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in particular? Such questions belong to the ‘problem of the emergence of norms’, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ‘norms against violence’ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence (...) of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate ‘facts’ of ‘unjustified violence’. During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation over the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms prohibiting violence, allowing punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers, and prescribing collective intervention against an aggressor to neutralize the threat represented. These findings prompt me to hypothesize that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latters’ internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for this emergence. Thus, emotions allow us to answer the questions: ‘Why do norms emerge?’ and ‘Why do they have their specific forms?’ In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations. (shrink)

Rawls developed a contractualist theory of social justice and Scanlon attempted to extend the Rawlsian framework to develop a theory of rightness, or morality more generally. I argue that there are some good reasons to adopt a contractualist theory of social justice, but that it is a mistake to adopt a contractualist theory of rightness. I begin by illustrating the major shared features of Scanlon and Rawls’ theories. I then show that the justification for these features in Rawls’ theory, the (...) centrality of cooperative fairness to social justice, cannot be used to defend their use in Scanlon’s. Finally, I argue that Scanlon has not provided an adequate alternative defense of these features, and show that they create problems when contractualists try to explain major features of our common-sense morality. (shrink)

For Rousseau, social contract is a hypothetical one; the paper claims that it is, in contemporary terms, a political thought-experiment (TE). The abductive way of thinking, looking for the best normative pattern in the data, finds its counterpart in the historical abduction in the Second Discourse; the analogy between the two secures the methodological unity of Rousseau’s political philosophy. The proposed reading of the work as a TE shows that it fulfills the necessary requirements put by (hopefully) intuitively acceptable definition (...) of a TE, and fits in the contractarian tradition that has been experimenting with hypothetical arrangements since its start. The reading of The Social Contract as a TE has helped to systematize some of its shortcomings from the wider perspective of methodology of political philosophy. Finally, the political thought experiment (PTE) reading of Rousseau places his central work where it belongs: in the tradition started by Plato’s Republic, continuing with Renaissance and early modern philosophical utopias, culminating in the contractarian social contract TE, and going all the way to the work of Rawls and his present day continuators. We hope that this can contribute to a more positive picture of Rousseau’s work, despite criticism concerning his brusque manner of thought-experimenting. (shrink)

This article examines the extent to which Brian Barry’s contractarian political theory – justice as impartiality – is able to incorporate the interests of animals. Despite the initial optimism that Barry might provide a theory of justice that can provide substantial protection for the interests of animals, it is clear that he offers relatively little. Insofar as animals can be protected within justice as impartiality, they are not being protected as a result of their intrinsic value, but merely as one, (...) non-vital, human set of beliefs included within a conception of the good. As a result, those concerned about the well-being of animals need either to go beyond contractarianism, and look for alternative theories of justice that are more amenable to the inclusion of animals, or to examine the degree to which direct duties can be owed to animals within a moral realm independently of justice. (shrink)

The twin ideas at the heart of the social contract tradition are that persons are naturally free and equal, and that genuine political obligations must in some way be based on the consent of those obligated. The Lockean tradition has held that consent must be in the form of explicit choice; Kantian contractualism has insisted on consent as rational endorsement. In this paper I seek to bring the Kantian and Lockean contract traditions together. Kantian rational justification and actual choice are (...) complementary devices through which our freedom and equality can be reconciled with moral and political authority. We should not think that there is simply one way by which relations of moral and political authority can be reconciled with our status as free and equal. I defend three distinct devices through which freedom and authority may be reconciled: justification to others, social choice and promise. All three are aspects of the ?consent tradition? broadly construed. (shrink)

The paper discusses the foundation and genesis of the political society according to Locke, elaborating why the relationship between the civil society and the government is not defined in contractual terms, but by the notion of “trust”. Rehm argues against the view that Locke supports a liberal proceduralism, stressing that consent for him is indeed the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of legitimate political power: what needs to be added is action in accordance with the law of nature.

In this paper I argue that Rawlsians have largely misunderstood the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, thereby failing to delineate in an appropriate way the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism. My argument rests on two core claims. The first claim is that (i) political liberalism is committed to three theses about the overlapping consensus. The first thesis concerns the subject of the overlapping consensus; the second thesis concerns the function of the overlapping consensus; the (...) third thesis explains how the overlapping consensus can serve its function in accordance with political liberalism’s commitment to epistemic neutrality. The second claim on which my argument relies is empirical: (ii) Rawlsians typically deny at least one of the three theses to which political liberalism is committed. Based on (i) and (ii), I conclude that Rawlsians have hitherto provided unconvincing accounts of the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the same logic that imbues the state with the legitimate authority to punish also imposes restraints on that authority. It suggests that scholarship on punishment puts more emphasis on the political legitimacy of state punishment rather than on the moral question of what is deserved by criminals. It turns to Rousseau's social contract based justification for punishment as a crucial resource in that effort. It begins by closely examining Rousseau's claim that the criminal consents to punishment, (...) and by suggesting that his seemingly absurd and perverse claims are actually defensible. It goes on to clarify two senses in which Rousseau's understanding of consent serves to ground the rights of the guilty. First, it argues that the idea of consent itself legitimizes some punishment but also sets strict limits on when and how the state can punish. Second, it argues that Rousseau's account of welfare rights also sets a limit on when the state may rightfully punish. The final two sections of the chapter consider the role of punishment outside the social contract in Rousseau's theory and suggest an important contrast between Rousseau's and Hobbes's conceptions of punishment. (shrink)

According to many traditional accounts, one important difference between international and domestic law is that international law depends on the consent of the relevant parties (states) in a way that domestic law does not. In recent years this traditional account has been attacked both by philosophers such as Allen Buchanan and by lawyers and legal scholars working on international law. It is now safe to say that the view that consent plays an important foundational role in international law is a (...) contested one, perhaps even a minority position, among lawyers and philosophers. In this paper I defend a limited but important role for actual consent in legitimating international law. While actual consent is not necessary for justifying the enforcement of jus cogens norms, at least when they are narrowly understood, this leaves much of international law unaccounted for. By drawing on a Lockean social contract account, I show how, given the ways that international cooperation is different from cooperation in the domestic sphere, actual consent is both a possible and an appropriate legitimating device for much of international law. (shrink)

In a recent essay Robert Sugden sets out his view that two foundational institutions of the social order, the convention and the social contract (at least in one variant of the latter) are compatible and that therefore it is not self-contradictory to be a Humean and a contractarian at the same time.¹ The proposition, despite appearances, has greater practical importance than most other doctrinal ones tend to do for if widely conceded, it would render current political thought even more woolly (...) than it is already. If so, a critical scrutiny might be of some use. (shrink)