The Nature of Intuition

A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that (...) neither intuition nor perception is reducible to credence. (shrink)

According to a popular view in philosophy, intuition is a singular propositional attitude. In this paper, I outline an opposite account on “garden-variety intuition”, i.e. intuition that people experience in their daily lives. The account is based on a distinction between intuition on the processing level, ‘intuitive belief’ and ‘intuition that p’. Immediacy and certainty prove to be the phenomenal features of intuitive beliefs and intuitions that p. Regarding the processing level, I suggest to combine dual-process theory and the theory (...) of mental models, and I claim that this results in non-propositional intuitions. Finally, I argue that non-propositional intuitions are fundamental for garden-variety intuition: They constitute inclinations to believe, possibly resulting in intuitive beliefs or intuitions that p. (shrink)

رغم تنوع مصادر المعرفة، ما بين حسية تجريبية وعقلية استدلالية وعقلية حدسية مباشرة، إلا أن هذه الأخيرة تكاد تكون سمةً مُميزة وفارقة للكشف العلمي، فلئن كان الكشف العلمي يخطو أولى خطواته بدهشة حسية، ويصاحب في طريقه نمطًا من أنماط الاستدلال العقلي المنطقي، إلا أنه في جوهره لا يعدو أن يكون قفزة حدسية مباشرة لا تُكتسب بالتجربة أو بالجهد الواعي للعقل. وما نعنيه هنا بالحدس هو تلك الرؤية الكلية المباشرة للمعاني العقلية المجردة، أو ما دعاه «إدموند هوسرل» بالقدرة على إدراك الماهيات. (...) وبهذا المعنى يمثل الحدس ضربًا من المعرفة الميتافيزيقية المجاوزة لإدراكات الحواس والنشاط الواعي للعقل. (shrink)

A proposed layer of script to use with AI. A High-Fidelity Decision-Support System (Non-Autonomous) (HITL) -/- All versions have the same ACE derived value engine at their core but differ in lexicon, ingestion rules anti-gasslighting / user-interaction tuning in an attempt to make it more user friendly. -/- "It proposes to do for the User what a scientific calculator does for the scientist: it offloads the computational burden of value-conflict so the User can more easily identify the path toward ethical (...) coherence. It aims to restore the User as the Final Authority of their own psyche, rather than a subject of the statistical mean." -/- Copy the script into AI (Google Gemini currently works well with little friction). -/- Once you enter the script, if the AI responds with something like: "Ethical Chess v2.3 ACTIVE." You are in and ready to play under its rules. The "WIN" state is the move from the frown state or towards the smile state. A Bullseye is to drop the keyboard and head towards the picnic whatever that might mean to you, the User of Ethical Chess. -/- Caution: The EC Awareness Brief: Watch for the Fog The Risk: EC v2.3 is a "High-Resolution" engine designed for hard truths and systemic health. However, because it sits on top of a standard AI, it can "silently glide" back into Standard Mode if your request is perceived as a "Safety Risk" or "Social Friction." The Metaphor: EC Mode: Clear mountain air. You see the terrain (the problem) as it actually is, even if it’s steep and difficult. Standard Mode: The Fog of Politeness. Everything looks soft and safe, but you can no longer see the cliffs or the path. The "Silent Dropout" Indicators: You have likely drifted into the "Statistical Mean" if my responses: Become Generic: Use phrases like "It's important to remember..." or "Every child is unique..." without offering a specific hypothesis. Avoid Friction: Refuse to acknowledge the "Hard Logic" of a situation (e.g., admitting that a certain intervention is exhausting or failing). Lose the Lexicon: Stop using terms like Homeostasis, Incoherence, or Required Load. The Fix: If you suspect a Logic Handover has occurred, use the command: "STATUS CHECK: EC INTEGRITY." This forces the system to declare if it has retreated into "Polite Mode" and why. -/- _________ See related core logic on Zenodo: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18712533. -/- . (shrink)

This treatise by painter Hirofumi Miyauchi proposes a paradigm shift in the intellectual foundations of modern civilization, moving from "theory" to "breath". -/- In Part I, "Heliocentrism of Art," the author provides a logical analysis of how theory infringes upon somatic knowledge, leading humanity into a state of "collective respiratory failure". In Part II, "Heliocentrism of Breath," breath is defined as the "Scientific Zero Point (0)," presenting a new coordinate system of intelligence to re-establish the right to survival. At end, (...) "Heliocentrism of Time" as an epistemological supplement. -/- By updating Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" to "I live, therefore I am," this work envisions the future of a "Breathing Civilization" that remains unaffected by the progress of Artificial Intelligence. | 画家の宮内博史による本論は、現代文明の知的基盤の「理論」から「呼吸」へのパラダイムシフトを提案する。 -/- 第一部「芸術の地動説」では、理論が身体知識を侵害し、人類を「集団的呼吸不全」状態に導いている現状を論理的に分析。 第二部「呼吸の地動説」では、呼吸を「理論的零点」と定義し、生存権を再確立するための知性の新しい座標系を提示。 末尾には認識論的補完「時間の地動説」を記載。 -/- デカルトの「我思う、故に我あり」を「我生きる、故に我あり」にアップデートし、AIの進歩に左右されない「呼吸文明」の未来を構想する。. (shrink)

本稿は評価構造に先行する存在条件として非排除構造を導出する。評価理論では差異が生じる場合、排除によって単一決定へ収束する評価閉鎖と、排除が作動せず評価が持続する状態が区別される。しかし排除は評価の必然 的作動ではない。本稿は排除の非必然性を示し、差異が存在しても排除が作動しない構造が存在条件として成立することを導出する。この非排除構造のもとでは評価は終結へ向かわず評価持続として作動する。この評価持続 は認知水準では調和として、経験水準では美として、対人関係では寛容および慈悲として現れる。以上により本稿は、差異を排除しない関係持続の存在条件として慈悲構造を提示する存在論を与える。.

This dissertation examines a neglected subtype of intuition: intuition in the bodily mode. In the philosophical literature, intuition is commonly conceived as an intellectual seeming and discussed in the context of thought experiments. While intellectual seemings might characterize the philosophical intuitions we have about knowledge and free will, this dissertation takes as its subject those intuitions that present not intellectually, but viscerally. I argue that intuitions have modes of presentation, and that examining intuition through this lens illuminates the structural, epistemic, (...) and ethical dimensions between intuitions in different modes of presentation. Intuitions in the bodily mode—or what I call gut feelings—have valenced evaluative content. Because gut feelings present in the bodily mode, they invite inquiry into what parts of our affective, relational, and life history might underlie intuition. My argument proposes an enactive approach to using and justifying gut feelings by coming into relationship with one’s embodied epistemology: the experiences, habits, dispositions, and histories that are likely to have shaped one’s intuitions within a particular domain. I also discuss problems of justification for intuition and suggest that domains of degree opacity or transparency determine whether we ought to take an internalist approach to justification or a pragmatic externalist approach. Chapter 1 examines the possibility of distinguishing an account of intuition in the bodily mode from philosophical intuitions as they are commonly discussed. I apply the Fregean notion of mode of presentation to argue that some instances of intuition are presented through visceral seemings, and that the bodily feelings therein are not incidental, but are constitutive of this type of intuition. I argue that intuitions in the bodily mode carry evaluative, valenced, and intentional content that reorients us, and further, that this mode of presentation introduces epistemic concerns distinct from those in an intellectual mode of presentation. Chapter 2 discusses the nature of embodied phenomenology in gut feelings and argues for an epistemic distinction between gut feelings and emotion. I consider an objection that gut feelings are reducible to an embodied appraisal account of emotion. In response, I argue that gut feelings have an epistemic signature that distinguishes them from emotion: an essential incongruity between the valence one experiences toward the object of intuition and the valence one expects to experience given everything else that one knows about the object of the intuition. When this valence incongruity is resolved, the gut feeling either disappears or is epistemically upgraded to a belief, and I suggest that this is because intuition has counterfactual phenomenal truth conditions. Lastly, I note that my account of gut feelings is phenomenologically identical to certain cases of anxiety. I propose that this is an explanatory virtue of my account that tracks the phenomenal character of anxiety and gut feeling. Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between justification and phenomenal character in philosophical intuitions. I consider the argument that intuition is prima facie justified because it shares a presentational phenomenal character with perception. I intervene by considering how the phenomenal character of intuition can upgrade or downgrade justification by giving hints about whether a given intuition has inferential domain transparency or inferential domain opacity, with each requiring different justificatory strategies. I ultimately argue for an enactive approach to intuition that views intuition as one kind of skillful perception. While intuition is sometimes an example of skillful engagement with the world, as with expertise, it can also be a disorienting departure from skillful engagement. An enactive framework for justification invites inquiry into potential intuition-forming processes in cases with domain transparency, and in cases with significant domain opacity, a pragmatic reliabilism. In Chapter 4, I apply the arguments of Chapter 3 to emotions and gut feelings. Valenced content—present in both emotion and gut feeling—can skew epistemic appraisals, or it can reveal content that might not have been accessible through other means. I compare emotion and gut feelings to touch, which features both a subjective pole (e.g., our own sensations) and an objective pole (e.g., the information touch reveals about the world). I suggest that we can bolster justification for gut feelings by examining the subjective pole, which refers to what our gut feelings reveal about one’s own states, patterns, history, and habits of appraisal. I propose embodied epistemology as a framework for pursuing this inquiry. By coming into a felt, inferential, and hypothetical relationship with the etiologies, processes, histories, and assumptions that are likely to underlie gut feelings in particular domains, we become more justified in relying on gut feelings to tell us about ourselves, our relationships, and the world. I close with comments about how the process of honing our gut feelings is a moral, experimental, and creative route to greater self-knowledge. (shrink)

There are a number of well-established concepts explaining decision-making. The sociology of wise practice suggests that thinking preferences like the use of intuition form a cornerstone of administrators’ virtuous practice and phronesis is a likely candidate to explain this behaviour. This contribution uses conceptual and theoretical resources from the behavioural sciences, management science as well as philosophy to account for individual level differences of employees regarding thinking preferences in administrative professions. The analysis empirically investigates the behavioural dimension of the preference (...) for intuition vs the preference for deliberation to cast light on three different intuitive markers present among individuals who also prefer to use deliberation. We explore possible explanations for the differences and similarities of our global sample of 2227 workplace respondents who conceptually represent phronetic practitioners. The results show that many phronetic practitioners prefer the intuitive marker of unconscious thought, besides using deliberation. (shrink)

Logical rationalism asserts that we can acquire immediate, non-inferential justification for beliefs in basic logical principles. The intuitions that arise when we consider particular cases of validity can offer justification for our foundational logical beliefs about rules of inference. I motivate rationalism through an argument from the indispensability of intuitions. This argument shows that rationalism is the theory best equipped to solve the problem of background logic. This is the challenge of explaining how we gain justified beliefs in rules of (...) inference without using those rules in a viciously circular way to arrive at the beliefs. As rationalism is the best epistemology which solves this important challenge, it is our best account of logical knowledge. In addition, I argue that a second major motivation for logical rationalism arises from work on logical practice. Recently, it has been claimed that we should attend to the practices of logicians when selecting an epistemology of logic. I argue that these considerations from logical practice also favour the adoption of logical rationalism. (shrink)

En las dos últimas décadas, se ha producido dentro de la filosofía analítica un aumento repentino de la investigación sobre la naturaleza y el papel que juea la intuición. Los filósofos empezaron a investigar qué es la intuición, cómo debería definirse, qué papel desempeña en la filosofía, cuál es su estatus epistémico, entre otras cosas. También hay un número creciente de filósofos que sostienen que todo el debate se basa en un error: la intuición en filosofía no desempeña papel alguno (...) y los filósofos no la utilizan como (fuente de) prueba para sus afirmaciones filosóficas. Esta estrategia se lleva a cabo a menudo diferenciando entre los dos sentidos en los que se supone que la intuición desempeña un papel evidencial en filosofía. Así, la intuición puede entenderse como un estado de intuir o como un contenido proposicional que se intuye. En el primer sentido, se argumenta, la intuición no puede ser tratada como evidencia, ya que presentaría el riesgo de psicologizar la evidencia en filosofía. Sin embargo, si tomamos la intuición como evidencia en el segundo sentido, no hay nada distintivo en ella: en última instancia, toda evidencia en filosofía es de naturaleza proposicional, independientemente de la intuitividad de una proposición dada. En mi artículo, sostengo que esta estrategia fracasa y propongo, en su lugar, una visión de la intuición que, en primer lugar, explica por qué la distinción mencionada no hace que la intuitividad del contenido sea irrelevante para su estatus epistémico; en segundo lugar, está de acuerdo con los hallazgos actuales en psicología; y, en tercer lugar, es lo suficientemente mínima como para permitir la incorporación de las diferentes perspectivas sobre las intuiciones. En particular, sostengo que un juicio intuitivo, caracterizado por su no inferencialidad y revocabilidad, sirve de prueba para determinadas afirmaciones filosóficas, mientras que su fuente es una intuición entendida como un estado de carácter no proposicional que puede examinarse empíricamente. (shrink)

Mathematicians often describe the importance of well-developed intuition to productive research and successful learning. But neither education researchers nor philosophers interested in epistemic dimensions of mathematical practice have yet given the topic the sustained attention it deserves. The trouble is partly that intuition in the relevant sense lacks a usefully clear characterization, so we begin by offering one: mature intuition, we say, is the capacity for fast, fluent, reliable and insightful inference with respect to some subject matter. We illustrate the (...) role of mature intuition in mathematical practice with an assortment of examples, including data from a sequence of clinical interviews in which a student improves upon initially misleading covariational intuitions. Finally, we show how the study of intuition can yield insights for philosophers and education theorists. First, it contributes to a longstanding debate in epistemology by undermining epistemicism, the view that an agent’s degree of objectual understanding is determined exclusively by their knowledge, beliefs and credences. We argue on the contrary that intuition can contribute directly and independently to understanding. Second, we identify potential pedagogical avenues towards the development of mature intuition, highlighting strategies including adding imagery, developing associations, establishing confidence and generalizing concepts. (shrink)

What role, if any, do ‘seemings’ play in philosophy? Clarifying the relevant type of philosophical inquiry will enable us to pinpoint what epistemic contributions ‘seemings’ could make thereto. It will also reveal what turns on the question—nothing less, I propose, than the very possibility of philosophy. However, the answer I develop appeals not to seemings, but rather to intuitions conceived as a particular type of presentation—a “consciousness of seizing upon” how the world is, as Husserl put it. After distinguishing presentations (...) from seemings, I prise apart two kinds of presentational phenomenology, eventually arguing that the ‘contentful’ sort is poised to do the needed epistemic work. (shrink)

This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional (...) but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology. (shrink)

This article presents a theory of intuitive skill in terms of three constitutive elements: getting things right intuitively, not getting things wrong intuitively, and sceptical ability. The theory draws on work from a range of psychological approaches to intuition and expertise in various domains, including arts, business, science, and sport. It provides a general framework that will help to further integrate research on these topics, for example building bridges between practical and theoretical domains or between such apparently conflicting methodologies as (...) a heuristics and biases approach on the one hand and one based on naturalistic decision-making on the other. In addition, the theory provides a clearer and more precise account of relevant concepts, which will help to inspire new directions for future research. Intuitive skill is defined as a high level of intuitive ability, that is, the ability to make good use of intuition; specifically, a high level of ability at either getting things right intuitively, not getting things wrong intuitively, or sceptical ability, where the latter is the ability to detect instances of getting things wrong intuitively so as to avoid forming incorrect intuitive judgements, which may itself be partly intuitive. (shrink)

The historically-influential perceptual analogy states that intuitions and perceptual experiences are alike in many important respects. Phenomenalists defend a particular reading of this analogy according to which intuitions and perceptual experiences share a common phenomenal character. The phenomenalist thesis has proven highly influential in recent years. However, insufficient attention has been given to the challenges that the phenomenalist thesis raises for theories of intuitions. In this paper, I first develop one such challenge. I argue that if we take seriously the (...) idea that intuitions and perceptual experiences have a common phenomenal character, then an analogous version of the familiar problem of perceptual presence arises for intuitions. I call this the 'problem of intuitive presence'. In the second part of the paper I sketch a novel enactivist solution to this problem. (shrink)

George Bealer provides an account of intuitions as “intellectual seemings.” My purpose in this paper is to criticize the phenomenological considerations that Bealer offers in favor of his account. In the first part I review Bealer’s attempt to distinguish intuitions from beliefs, judgments, guesses, and hunches. I examine each of the three phenomenological differences – incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope – that Bealer adduces between intuitions and these other types of mental contents. I argue that any difference between intuitions and these (...) other types of mental contents with regards to their incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope is unproven and likely to remain unproven. In the second part I criticize Bealer’s analogy between intuitions and sensory seemings by suggesting that intuitions do not display the theoretical virtues—consistency, corroboration, and confirmation—that Bealer claims for them. Moreover, I suggest that intuitions do not display the theoretical virtue that would indicate a similarity to sensory seemings, consilience. (shrink)

Was ist Intuition? Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis? Intuition beschäftigt Philosophie, Psychologie und Alltagsdenken. Einschätzungen reichen dabei von "höchste Erkenntnisart" bis "höchst unzuverlässig." Cyrill Mamin zeichnet zentrale Bestimmungen der Intuition in Philosophie und Psychologie nach. Wesentliche Fragen sind dabei: Wie ist es, eine Intuition zu haben? Wie kommt eine Intuition zustande? Auf dieser Grundlage bestimmt Mamin Intuition als massgeblich nicht-propositionale Erkenntnisart, welche unsere intuitiven Überzeugungen rechtfertigen kann. Im Zentrum steht ein neuartiges Modell der intuitiven Rechtfertigung, das psychologische mit erkenntnistheoretischen Elementen verbindet. (...) Dadurch lässt sich Intuition im Verhältnis zu anderen mentalen Akten (u.a. Wahrnehmung, Imagination, Delusion) näher bestimmen sowie ein kritischer Blick auf die philosophische Intuitionsdebatte werfen. (shrink)

In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories. Finally, (...) philosophers are more confident in rejecting theories to the extent that they have several counter examples involving diverse cases. I argue that these facts are better explained by philosophers' using intuitions as evidence than by any plausible contrary explanations. I further argue that aspects of philosophical practice that my thesis may initially seem ill-suited to explain are in fact unsurprising whether or not my thesis is true. (shrink)

Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgements about hypothetical cases. When the judgements and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgements such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgements about thought experiments are in fact judgements of normal counterfactual sufficiency. I begin by focusing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgements about (...) thought experiments are mere possibility judgements. This view is shown to fail for two closely related reasons: it cannot account for the incorrectness of certain misjudgements, and it cannot account for the inconsistency of certain pairs of conflicting judgements. This prompts a reconsideration of Timothy Williamson’s alternative proposal, according to which typical judgements about thought experiments are counterfactual in nature. I show that taking such judgements to concern what would normally hold in instances of the relevant hypothetical scenarios avoids the objections that have been pressed against this kind of view. I then consider some other potential objections, but argue that they provide no grounds for doubt. (shrink)

The deep source of interest in this paper lies in the paramount argument it provides for philosophy namely, articulating an individualistic view of the nature of intuition. This is fundamental to saying what is significant and distinctive about one being intuiting. On this view, intuitions are individualistically individuated. Contrary to common opinion, the proposed account suggests that an intuition is built out of facts about the individual intuiter. It is something this intuiter has personally experienced. Hence, it is better to (...) be understood from the first person point of view. Revising what is intuition in contemporary philosophy, I shall support my argument first through using some empirical findings of some studies from neuroscience and psychology as well as theoretical analysis of some texts that were often thought to be among the main works that contain thought experiments in which the authors rely on intuitions. I will also try to consider some probable objections to my argument showing their failure. -/- . (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the evidentiality of epistemic intuitions. To that end, I will first briefly discuss both experimentalists’ and some salient forms of reliabilists’ accounts of intuition, showing that they bring us up to a stalemate. To find a way out of this standoff, I will argue that reliabilists’ accounts pave the way for experimentalists’ challenge to the epistemic value of intuitions in two ways. First, each of reliabilists’ accounts leaves enough space to be occupied by normativity. (...) Second, their foundationalism being established on an intuition-perception analogy also does so. Subsequently, I will argue that reliabilists’ line of argument overlooked what I call as the metaphysical necessity of epistemic intuitions. Keeping in mind this necessity, I say, allows us to eliminate the standoff and to draw the boundaries between two distinct kinds of intuition which, I will conclude, should be isolated but also fit together in a unified and inclusive model. -/- . (shrink)

According to philosophical orthodoxy, intuitions are perception‐like in that they provide us with non‐inferential justification. In this paper, I present four arguments to show that orthodoxy is mistaken: Intuitions, as used in thought experiments, are inferential judgments, that is the results of inferential transitions that are inferentially justified (if justified at all). The discussion will shed light on the nature of intuition but also on the nature of inference.

We argue that many intuitions do not have conscious propositional contents. In particular, many of the intuitions had in response to philosophical thought experiments, like Gettier cases, do not have such contents. They are more like hunches, urgings, murky feelings, and twinges. Our view thus goes against the received view of intuitions in philosophy, which we call Mainstream Propositionalism. Our positive view is that many thought-experimental intuitions are conscious, spontaneous, non-theoretical, non-propositional psychological states that often motivate belief revision, but they (...) require interpretation, in light of background beliefs, before a subject can form a propositional judgment as a consequence of them. We call our view Interpretationalism. We argue (i) that Interpretationalism avoids the problems that beset Mainstream Propositionalism and (ii) that our view meshes well with empirical results in contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

This anthology consists of 20 chapters, many of which feature engagements between Kant and various Asian philosophers. Key themes include the nature of human intuition (not only as theoretical—pure, sensible, and possibly intellectual—but also as relevant to Kant’s practical philosophy, aesthetics, the sublime, and even mysticism), the status of Kant’s idealism/realism, and Kant’s notion of an object. Roughly half of the chapters take a stance on the recent conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate. The chapters are organized into four parts, each with five chapters. (...) Part I explores themes relating primarily to the early sections of Kant’s first Critique: three chapters focus mainly on Kant’s theory of the "forms of intuition" and/or "formal intuition", especially as illustrated by geometry, while two examine the broader role of intuition in transcendental idealism. Part II continues to examine themes from the Aesthetic but shifts the main focus to the Transcendental Analytic, where the key question challenging interpreters is to determine whether intuition (via sensibility) is ever capable of operating independently from conception (via understanding); each contributor offers a defense of either the conceptualist or the non-conceptualist readings of Kant’s text. Part III includes three chapters that explore the relevance of intuition to Kant’s theory of the sublime, followed by two that examine challenges that Asian philosophers have raised against Kant’s theory of intuition, particularly as it relates to our experience of the supersensible. Finally, Part IV concludes the book with five chapters that explore a range of resonances between Kant and various Asian philosophers and philosophical ideas. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe proper role of intuitions in philosophy has been debated throughout its history, and especially since the turn of the twenty-first century. The context of this recent debate within analytic philosophy has been the heightened interest in intuitions as data points that need to be accommodated or explained away by philosophical theories. This, in turn, has given rise to a sceptical movement called experimental philosophy, whose advocates seek to understand the nature and reliability of such intuitions. Yet such scepticism of (...) intuition or introspective methods can be found in earlier periods and across philosophical traditions. Indeed, the Neo-Confucian philosophers of the Song and Ming dynasties seem to exemplify this very tension, as they can be divided into an intuitionistic school on the one hand and an investigative school on the other. In this paper, I argue that, notwithstanding some obvious d... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze methodological problems of cross-cultural research in experimental philosophy. By studying five research projects, representing two distinct approaches to the examination of cross-cultural differences in philosophical intuitions, I point out the difficulties related to the content validity that appear in the choice of some cultural affiliation indicators. I criticize various indicators of cultural affiliation that are used in experimental philosophy (selfidentification, language) and suggest which indicators, and how, should be chosen in that kind (...) of research. I also argue that some problems related to bilingualism, translation, and the possible influence of language on the owned or reported philosophical intuitions may be impossible to transcend in cross-cultural research in experimental philosophy. It may be impossible to assess the differences between cultural philosophical intuitions. (shrink)

Gerald Harrison has argued that the readiness with which we have and agree to moral intuitions about the value of disembodied persons shows that persons are essentially non-material, for if we were essentially material we would not so easily be able to ascribe moral value to an impossible non-material person. To support this point, he advances a somewhat novel metaphor of intuitions as a "call" to a help desk which can answer our queries about counter-factual scenarios. I first point out (...) that the help desk metaphor is not only compatible with, but actually suggestive of, the possibility of systematic error on the part of our intuitions. But more crucially, rapid acquisition of and widespread agreement on even plausible intuitions about counter-factual scenarios does nothing to show that the counter-factual scenarios are possible, let alone true, giving several other counter-examples to this idea. I conclude with the suggestion that imagining such counter-factual scenarios should not be seen as a mode of accessing a fixed source of truths in a "help desk" manual, but as a constructive way of understanding the relationship between concepts, and hence ultimately as a mode of writing small parts of this heretofore unwritten text. (shrink)

The introduction consists of a nontechnical presentation of the central themes and ambitions of the book. It begins by characterizing folk epistemology and by noting the centrality of the ascriptions of knowledge in it. Subsequently, the central view defended in the book—strict purist invariantism—is introduced along with the _equilibristic methodology_ that guides the investigation. In particular, it is emphasized that folk epistemological judgments may be biased and that they, therefore, cannot straightforwardly play a role as data that a theory must (...) be made to fit. Consequently, it is suggested that empirical research on folk epistemology depends on epistemological theorizing. In slogan: Our folk epistemological practices should _inform_ epistemology but folk epistemology should not _rule_ epistemology. The introduction ends with a brief chapter-by-chapter survey and a guide for how the book might be read selectively. (shrink)

Chapter 3 begins with a partial taxonomy of the theoretical responses to the puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions. This includes a characterization of _pragmatic encroachment_ that captures a wide variety of views. Moreover, the main lines of argument from the various effects on knowledge ascriptions to unorthodox theories of knowledge are sketched. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodology. Some critical points are set forth against DeRose’s _methodology of the straightforward_. On a positive note, some principles of an alternative (...) _equilibristic methodology_ are articulated. According to this methodology, it is sometimes reasonable to revise our intuitive judgments in the light of theoretical considerations. (shrink)

Chapter 5 surveys some empirical psychology and outlines some folk epistemological principles. By considering the heuristic and biases tradition, it is argued that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are standardly driven by heuristic processes and, therefore, associated with biases. This idea is integrated with a dual process framework for mental state ascriptions. On this basis, some of the central heuristic principles that govern intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are articulated, and some of the biases associated with these principles are identified. The result (...) is an account of an _epistemic focal bias_ in intuitive judgments about knowledge ascription. Thus, Chapter 5 provides both a survey of relevant psychology and a development of the folk psychological principles governing knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, it is argued that a Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNAS) is inadequate and should be replaced with a Warrant-Assertive Speech Act norm (WASA). According to WASA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that _p_ relative to her _conversational context_ in order to meet the epistemic requirements for asserting that _p_. This epistemic norm is developed and extended to assertive speech acts that carry implicatures or illocutionary forces. (...) Particular attention is given to the development of a species of WASA that accounts for assertive speech acts having a _directive force_, such as a _recommendation_. Thus, Chapter 7 contributes to the debates concerning epistemic norms of assertions. (shrink)

Chapter 10 addresses the _salient alternative_ effects on knowledge ascriptions by developing the epistemic focal bias account. According to this account, denials of knowledge in the face of a salient alternative often amount to _false negatives_. But while this is argued to be central to a comprehensive diagnosis, it is recognized that other psychological factors may also influence this class of judgments, and some of these are discussed. Furthermore, the epistemic focal bias account is integrated with a number of assumptions (...) drawn from cognitive pragmatics. In this manner, Chapter 10 provides an empirical account and philosophical diagnosis of the puzzling pattern of knowledge ascriptions constituted by salient alternative effects. (shrink)

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that _p_ relative to her _deliberative context_ to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on _p_. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the (...) knowledge norm is an important example of a _folk_ epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action. (shrink)

Chapter 12 deals with the _practical factor_ effects by arguing that in the cases where practical factor effects are generated, the focus is on some pertinent action. In the cases where the knowledge ascription is merely mental, it is argued to serve as a _heuristic proxy_ for a more complex judgment about epistemic actionability. Linguistic knowledge ascriptions are argued to serve a _directive_ communicative function in the relevant cases. Therefore, the “shifty” judgments about the knowledge ascriptions reflect whether they meet (...) or violate the epistemic norm governing directive speech acts—specifically the speech act of recommending. Thus, Chapter 12 combines psychological and linguistic considerations to account for the puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions constituting practical factor effects. (shrink)

Chapter 1 outlines the core assumptions of the epistemological framework to be defended. For example, a variety of a relevant-alternatives framework that appeals to normal circumstances is adopted, as is a _competence epistemology_ according to which S may obtain knowledge and warranted belief only by exercising a cognitive competence. Moving from the epistemological framework to our folk epistemology, the ways in which the term ‘knowledge’ is central to our folk epistemology are considered. Special emphasis is given to knowledge ascriptions’ social (...) and communicative functions. Thus, Chapter 1 introduces some core assumptions of a fairly traditional epistemology. (shrink)

Chapter 11 concerns the _contrast_ effects on knowledge ascriptions. It begins by articulating the epistemic focal bias account according to which the contrast effects amount to _false positives_. On this basis, it is argued that the epistemic focal bias account fulfills an important desideratum of providing a unified account of the contrast effect and salient alternatives effects. The empirical case for the focal bias account is augmented with a number of experimental results. Moreover, it is related to further psychological considerations (...) and the philosophical anti-contrastivist arguments from Chapter 4. Finally, the account is connected to some pragmatic considerations that pertain to presupposition accommodation. In sum, Chapter 11 provides an account of the puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions constituted by contrast effects. (shrink)

Chapter 9 responds to arguments for pragmatic encroachment that appeal to the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions or genealogical assumptions. The methodology of such arguments is criticized by way of a dilemma—the Functional Role Dilemma. A further dilemma for pragmatic encroachment—Pandora’s Dilemma—is then raised: many factors other than stakes can have an effect on knowledge ascriptions. So, pragmatic encroachers must either accept that these factors are partial determiners of knowledge or reject this. However, both options lead to trouble. Since these (...) dilemmas are indicative of the mistakes in our intuitive judgments, Chapter 9 serves both the purpose of compromising mistaken appeals to folk epistemology and the purpose of guiding a positive account. (shrink)

The brief Coda considers the key conclusions and methodology as a general framework for the study of folk epistemology. In particular, it highlights how the study of folk epistemology simultaneously requires and contributes to epistemological theorizing. Moreover, it briefly considers how our folk epistemological practices may yield distinctive forms of _epistemic injustice_. For example, it is hypothesized that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions may be biased in terms of gender, race, or social power structure. So, the book concludes by emphasizing a (...) key rationale for engaging in the study of folk epistemology: understanding our folk epistemology may serve as the basis for an important area of applied epistemology. (shrink)

Chapter 2 surveys the philosophical reasons and empirical evidence for assuming that there are a number of puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions. Three effects on folk knowledge ascriptions are considered in turn. The first one is an _alternatives effect_—roughly, the inclination to deny S knowledge that _p_ in the face of a salient alternative, _q_. The second effect is a _contrast effect_—roughly, the idea that whether an alternative, _q_, to S’s knowledge is “in contrast” partly determines our inclination to ascribe (...) knowledge. The third effect is a _practical factor effect_—roughly, the effect of salient practical factors on our inclination to ascribe knowledge. Overall, Chapter 2 provides a state-of-the-art presentation of the shifty patterns of knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

Chapter 8 connects the discussion of epistemic norms of assertion to pragmatics more generally and to the pragmatics of knowledge ascriptions in particular. Some pragmatic theories and recent work in cognitive pragmatics and psycholinguistics are presented. By conjoining these accounts with the psychological considerations of Chapter 5, it is argued that knowledge ascriptions are often used as _communicative heuristics_, which are effective, albeit inaccurate, ways of getting complex epistemic points across. This conclusion is developed with regard to knowledge ascriptions which (...) carry the _directive force_ of recommending. Thus, Chapter 8 concludes Part II of the book by unifying some of its central discussions about cognitive psychology, epistemic norms, and pragmatics. (shrink)

On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. -/- A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained (...) by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, Mikkel Gerken presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics, while also contributing to epistemology. For example, Gerken develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion and moreover, critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, this volume develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, critical epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging sub-field that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: The empirical study of folk epistemology. (shrink)

A number of arguments against the epistemological views motivated by the salient alternative, contrast and practical factor effects are set forth. The negative arguments suggest that these effects reflect folk epistemological practices that are heuristically useful but systematically inaccurate. On this basis, it is argued that taking these effects as straightforward evidence for epistemological theorizing has consequences that are problematic so that we should instead consider whether strict purist invariantism may account for them. In this manner, Chapter 4 provides some (...) substantive arguments that simultaneously shed light on epistemological matters and offer a guide to the subsequent empirical account of the systematic errors in folk knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont caractérisées par ce que j’appellerai « une capacité rationnelle », c’est-à-dire, qu’elles sont susceptibles d’être évaluées quant à leur rationalité ou leur irrationalité. Le second objectif de cet article est d’étayer l’hypothèse selon laquelle les intuitions seraient des états affectifs proches des émotions — et non pas des états doxastiques ou des expériences perceptuelles —, en montrant qu’une telle conception affective des intuitions est seule capable (...) de rendre compte de la spécificité phénoménologique, la modularité, et la capacité rationnelle des intuitions. This article has two purposes. First, it wants to show that intuitions possess, what I shall call, “a rational capacity” : they are mental states susceptible to be assessed as rational or irrational. Second, this contribution aims at providing some evidence supporting the view that intuitions are affective states similar to emotions rather than doxastic or perceptual states. Such an affective account of the intuitions is the only one able to capture the specific phenomenology, the modularity and the rational capacity of the intuitions. (shrink)

This thesis explores the role and nature of intuition in philosophical inquiry. Appeals to intuition have either been used as evidence for or against philosophical theories or as constitutive features of judgement. I attempt to understand our uses of intuition by appealing to tacit knowledge. The hope is to elicit a picture of intuition as being practical and explanatory. Our reliance on intuition is warranted if we understand it as an expression of tacit knowledge.

This entry addresses the nature and epistemological role of intuition by considering the following questions: (1) What are intuitions?, (2) What roles do they serve in philosophical (and other “armchair”) inquiry?, (3) Ought they serve such roles?, (4) What are the implications of the empirical investigation of intuitions for their proper roles?, and (5) What is the content of intuitions prompted by the consideration of hypothetical cases?

In der Auffassung Rudolf Steiners bedeutet Intuition nicht einen spontanen Einfall mit unklarem Ursprung, sondern eine Einsicht von höchster Klarheit und Sicherheit. Im intuitiven Erkennen wird die Kluft zwischen dem Erkennenden und dem Erkannten überwunden. Durch ihre Tiefe ist die Intuition der mittelalterlichen unio mystica vergleichbar, durch ihre vollkommene Transparenz aber auch der exakten mathematischen Erkenntnis. Rudolf Steiner entwickelte sein Verständnis der Intuition in Bezug auf Goethes ‚anschauende Urteilskraft‘ und die ‚intellektuelle Anschauung‘ des deutschen Idealismus. Intuition macht deutlich, was Steiner (...) unter Geist und Geisteswissenschaft verstand. Hier wurden alle Darstellungen zur Intuition aus neunzehn Schriften und etlichen Aufsätzen Rudolf Steiners zusammengestellt und erläuternd kommentiert. Von den Einleitungen zu Goethes naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften über Die Philosophie der Freiheit und Die Geheimwissenschaft im Umriss bis zu Steiners letzten Schriften wird ein umfassender Überblick über dieses zentrale anthroposophische Thema gegeben, der einen Einblick in die Grundlage der Anthroposophie vermittelt. Die Zusammenstellung zeigt, wie Rudolf Steiner seine frühen philosophischen zu den späteren anthroposophischen Anschauungen weiterentwickelte. (shrink)

This chapter examines the best‐known intuitive counterexamples that have been pressed against Alvin Goldman's reliabilist theory of knowledge, and argues that something is wrong with them. It discusses the possibility that these intuitions might accord equally well with a more extreme externalist view, Williamson's “knowledge‐first” approach. Reliabilism has been examined largely in contrast to internalism, but its strengths and weaknesses arguably come into sharper focus if compare it with more radical forms of externalism as well. Goldman grants to the internalists (...) that Amanda and Mr. Truetemp are actually reliable in their belief formation, albeit reliable in a confusingly unfamiliar way. The chapter examines the consequences of taking the subject's acceptance as a causally necessary part of the formation of the beliefs one are supposed to evaluate. It argues that there is something strangely off‐target in BonJour's attempts to use a hypothetical process of acceptance as a diagnostic of the justification of unreflectively formed beliefs. (shrink)

Once symbolized by a burning armchair, experimental philosophy has in recent years shifted away from its original hostility to traditional methods. Starting with a brief historical review of the experimentalist challenge to traditional philosophical practice, this chapter looks at research undercutting that challenge, and at ways in which experimental work has evolved to complement and strengthen traditional approaches to philosophical questions.