Transcendental Arguments

Starting with Kant’s undeveloped proposal of a “negative science,” the author describes how philosophy may be developed and strengthened by means of a systematic approach that seeks to identify and eliminate a widespread but seldom recognized form of systemic and propagating conceptual error. ¶¶¶¶¶ The paper builds upon the author’s book, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND MEANING (Studies in Theory and Behavior, 2021). ¶¶¶¶¶ The author’s purpose is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize the boundaries of (...) what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. By realizing these objectives, the boundaries of possible meaning are determined. (shrink)

Error theory is usually presented as a negative doctrine: a discourse purports to represent some domain of fact, but the relevant facts, properties, powers, or objects are absent. The accompanying explaining-away argument then explains why the discourse nevertheless seems compelling. We argue that the mature form of that package has a transcendental structure: a practice or discourse requires certain appearances in order to function, while those appearances do not disclose the entities or properties they seem to disclose. -/- The resulting (...) macro is a deflationary transcendental argument. Given a public practice and a family of invariants—practical authority, accountability, public stability, motivational grip, or interpersonal intelligibility—the error theorist identifies an appearance as minimally required to reconstruct the practice, but blocks the stronger inference from the required appearance to the apparent object. Error theory plus explaining away is weak transcendental deduction of appearance without strong constitutive entitlement. Moral error theory supplies the central case; free-will illusionism and deflationary accounts of selfhood are treated as adjacent cases. We then diagnose the major failure modes: mere genealogy, covert dependence on the target facts, selectivity, self-defeat, companions-in-guilt pressure, and unresolved conservation. (shrink)

The Standing of the Foundation: The Cut, Its Price, and Its Testing Grounds Every chain of justification ends in infinite regress, circularity, or a cut (Albert's Münchhausen trilemma). This paper closes a metaphysical system — grounded in freedom as signed origination and in constitutive vulnerability — by making explicit the epistemological standing of its own foundation. The foundation is a declared cut at the interval: the structure of suspension, evaluation, and signature as a first-person datum, exercised in every act of (...) sense including its own denial. Since a cut cannot be demonstrated, the paper develops the alternative: negative vindication in three verifiable layers — inescapability in use, survival of the known catalogue of objections, and price advantage over rival cuts. A comparative audit shows that the theological cut (causa sui) pays in mystery, inference, and covert faith; the materialist cut, likewise inferred, cannot account for the act of its own defence; the cut at the interval pays a single declared price — its indemonstrability — and is the only foundation exercised rather than concluded. The paper then records the examination and rejection of an event-causal libertarian alternative (Kane-style indeterminacy crossed with reflexive appropriation), which is set aside on three grounds: empirical vulnerability, relocation rather than resolution of the luck objection, and the availability of its genuine insight — signing as a self-including act — without indeterministic commitments. Finally, the paper distinguishes foundation from testing grounds (theodicy, ethics, the determinism–AI debate), consolidates the map of answered and open objections, and states what the foundation does not assert: ultimate free will, a solution to the hard problem, or the refutation of determinism as cosmology. A foundation that knows itself to be a cut can carry a system without pretending to touch bottom. (shrink)

The Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) claims that finite agents cannot have warrant without God as the necessary precondition of intelligibility. This paper argues that TAG fails as a transcendental argument on three independent grounds: its necessity claim is circular rather than demonstrated, its explanatory foundation generates argumentative circularity, and its impossibility claim exceeds what any finite agent can epistemically access. A fourth observation proves more fundamental than all three: TAG relies on the very epistemic structures the PIE Syllogism—Perception-Inquiry-Experimentation, hereafter (...) PIE—identifies as necessary, specifically awareness and coherence, to formulate its own argument. PIE is not merely TAG’s counterexample. PIE is TAG’s epistemological precondition. The paper remains metaphysically neutral throughout and makes no claim about God’s existence. (shrink)

This paper investigates the necessary functional architecture underlying complex cognitive states such as belief, desire, hope, and fear, specifically those characterized as Meaningful Propositional Attitudes About Something Not Itself (MPAASNI). MPAASNI are defined as states possessing directed propositional content, susceptibility to systematic processing, and an internal stance conferring functional significance within a system. We identify three fundamental functional capacities required for such states: Reference (R), providing directed content; Inference (I), providing systematic processing and relation of contents; and Preference (P), providing (...) the internal stance, weighting, and functional significance. The core contribution of this paper is the articulation and defense of the Trialectics, defined as the specific functional mode of operation characterized by systematic and constitutive mutual conditioning among R, I, and P. Through rigorous, descriptive conceptual analysis, we argue that this Trialectic functioning—this deep functional integration where each capacity's state and operation conditions and is conditioned by the others—is not merely one possible arrangement but constitutes a necessary condition for the possibility of any system exhibiting MPAASNI. The necessity is demonstrated by showing that the functional integration inherently required by the definition of MPAASNI logically entails the mutual conditioning described by the Trialectics. This framework, derived non-empirically, applies to attitudes directed towards both tangible and non-tangible domains and posits a fundamental structure necessary for intentionality, rationality, and other sophisticated cognitive phenomena dependent on meaningful propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and AI lack a unified model to explain how systems form meaningful propositional attitudes—states like belief, desire, and intention. This work introduces and defends the Trialectics framework as a response to this theoretical gap. We propose that any system capable of forming meaningful propositional attitudes—that is, internal states with truth-evaluable, compositionally structured content that can be rationally evaluated and guide goal-directed behavior—must instantiate three interdependent functional capacities: Reference (R), the ability to establish semantic links; Inference (...) (I), the capacity to process and transform content systematically; and Preference (P), the function of internal evaluation and goal-orientation. The central thesis is that these capacities are not modular but mutually conditioning: meaningful content arises only from their dynamic entanglement, where reference shapes and is shaped by inference and preference, and so on. By embedding evaluation (P) within the cognitive loop, Trialectics offers a naturalized solution to the problem of normativity in reasoning and reconciles representational requirements with enactivist critiques by defining reference functionally rather than metaphysically. The framework’s utility is demonstrated by showing how it implicitly structures existing cognitive architectures (e.g., BDI, Active Inference) and provides a powerful diagnostic and design tool for AI, particularly concerning alignment, generalization, and interpretability. Ultimately, Trialectics posits a fundamental architectural condition for any system—biological or artificial—to achieve the flexible, offline, and rationally evaluable propositional attitudes characteristic of sophisticated intelligence. (shrink)

What must be the case for real relation between distinct beings to be possible? Familiar answers fail to hold distinction and relation together: reduction collapses beings into their relations, dissolution denies distinct beings prior to relation, and withdrawal secures distinctness only by removing beings from relation. These views share an unexamined premise, namely that genuine presence in relation and inexhaustible actuality are incompatible, so that whatever a being holds in reserve must be subtracted from its presence. Against this, the paper (...) defends a transcendental thesis: intrinsic, non-relational distinction is the condition of relation, not its product. Relation cannot constitute the distinctness of its own terms; attempts to do so either regress, become circular, or concede primitiveness, which is intrinsic distinction under another name. Once intrinsic distinction and real relation are both admitted, further commitments such as non-exhaustive presence, manifestation, and participation without collapse follow as articulations of a single primitive rather than independent posits. The dependence is asymmetric: relational ontologies presuppose the distinction they deny, whereas distinction presupposes no relation. This requirement generalizes to determinacy itself, where articulation presupposes distinguishability that cannot be relationally constituted. A final section argues that contemporary field ontology exhibits the same structure, though the argument is independent of physics. (shrink)

This paper argues for a structural constraint on normative authority. In every regimented normative practice – elementary logic (Carroll's regress), mathematics (the gap between ⊢ and ⊨), semantics (Tarski's undefinability theorem), the metaphysics of characterization (Priest’s modal restriction of the Meinongian characterization principle), philosophy of language (Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein on rule-following), critical-rationalist epistemology (Albert's Münchhausen trilemma), empirical epistemology (Sellars’s myth of the Given), moral philosophy (Plato's Euthyphro dilemma), judicial practice (the separation between legislation and adjudication), and the theory of (...) argument (Toulmin's warrant/backing separation) – correctness is governed by an authority distinct from the rules that generate commitments. The paper argues that the same separation is required for moral judgment, and for the same structural reason: no evaluative role can both issue commitments and supply the correctness-conditions that govern them. Any role that purports to do so permits only application-level error and collapses correctness into internal coherence; where the separation collapses, what remains is rule-following, not judgment. The result is negative in form and conditional in standing, and the paper’s work is to show how little the conditional concedes. The derivation rests on one synthetic premise: that moral judgment requires the intelligibility of framework-level error – error not in the application of a standard but in the standard’s own authority. That premise is discharged, not assumed, against every theory that remains within the discourse of judgment. It is earned immanently against constitutivism and every theory of graded normative agency, which cannot abandon it without abandoning the well-constituted/defective distinction their projects exist to draw; and it is earned, by a vocabulary argument, against any theory whose discourse deploys normative error or responsibility in their non-redundant use – since to call a standard itself mistaken, or to hold an agent answerable beyond the registration of deviation, is already to attribute the availability the premise names. The premise is thereby reclassified: neither analytic nor optional, it is a constitutive condition of the discourse of judgment, deniable only by exiting that discourse. The exit – descriptivism about morality conjoined with non-descriptivism about description – is exactly one position wide and is left open on principle, since an argument that compelled even those outside the practice would claim the unconditional standing the theorem denies to every role, its own included – a consistency the closing block of the formal appendix states as a result, identifying the exit-standpoint as the sole admissible witness of framework-level error for the argument’s own constitutive standard, so that the residue the argument cannot discharge is a witness it structurally requires; its price is fixed: not the rejection of a thesis but the forfeiture of the vocabulary of judgment, error, defective agency, and responsibility at once. The global widening of the exit – the surrender of correctness everywhere – is blocked retortively: the surrender must be asserted, and assertion is governed. The paper distinguishes weak, strong, and modal non-derivability between evaluative roles, and shows that only the modal form isolates the independence judgment requires while remaining compatible with monistic first-order morality – and, because the condition demands independence from the commitments under assessment rather than from minds, the result remains neutral between realism and anti-realism. The contribution is diagnostic before it is taxonomic: the contemporary debate has located the self-grounding of normativity at the level of moral content – its metaphysical sourcehood, or its plurality – whereas the collapse occurs at the level of evaluative authority, where neither grounding content nor multiplying it has any purchase. Three appendices regiment the result: a modal-logical theorem isolates the synthetic content of the derivation in a single clause, with a pair of twin probes – a countermodel and a counter-reading – establishing that the conditions so isolated are necessary for judgment without being convertible into sufficient ones – neither in that vocabulary nor, by a robustness proposition, in any definitional extension of it – and a transmission proposition recording that the clause is carried by the vocabulary’s use rather than assumed alongside it; the same appendix then states the result as a programme – the theorem a lower bound in the determination vocabulary, the inexpressibility a proof that the vocabulary affords no upper bound, and the sufficiency side reachable only by adjoining answerability as a primitive governed by postulates that are explained rather than derived, each further degree of sufficiency carrying a stated price; a companion apparatus separates the modal architecture of authority from the operational capacity that realizes it, so that an architecture may be self-authorizing even where its institutions function flawlessly. The third catalogues the diagnostic reach of the result across the metaethical literature. The diagnosis applies across the contemporary metaethical landscape. Kantian and Humean constructivism, the shmagency literature, Darwall's second-personal standpoint, Scanlon's contractualism, Rawlsian coherentism, and Wedgwood's conceptual-role realism each instantiate, in distinct registers, a single-role architecture in which one evaluative role both issues commitments and fixes the standpoint from which their correctness is determined. The same configuration recurs at the level of meaning, concepts, and intentionality (Ginsborg, Liebesman, Hattiangadi). Appeals to inescapability, intersubjective accountability, constitutive role, or coherence are diagnosed as attempts to relocate, rather than discharge, the underlying problem. Raz's service conception of authority is identified as a structural exception that builds modal non-derivability directly into the conditions of legitimate authority. The result is necessary but not sufficient for a complete account of moral judgment – a map of the architecture judgment requires, not a derivation of moral correctness. It imposes architectural constraints on any account that purports to preserve judgment rather than mere coherent rule-following, bears on the broader project of construing the structural relations among core normative concepts, and leaves the field of substantive monistic theories fully open. (shrink)

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...) must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences. (shrink)

This is a précis of M. Oreste Fiocco's Time and the World: Every Thing and Then Some (OUP, 2024). The précis is published as part of a book symposium that includes critical papers by Michael Della Rocca, Fatima Amijee, Sara Bernstein and Ned Markosian, as well as a paper by Fiocco responding to his critics.

In Time and the World, I undertake a wholly critical metaphysics, one that provides an account of the world – this all-encompassing array of whatnot – and what a thing (i.e., an entity, an existent, a being) is without making any assumption whatsoever about the world. Such an undertaking requires a novel method, original inquiry, which begins by confronting all this, the world, as merely the impetus to inquiry. The execution of a wholly critical metaphysics yields insight into literally everything (...) and the basic structure in reality. If a theory does not comport with what a thing is or the structure in reality revealed by an apt ontology that involves no bias, no limiting perspective, no misleading presupposition, that theory is irredeemably misguided. Hence, original inquiry can illuminate all inquiry. My critics question the feasibility of original inquiry, the wholly critical method I adopt, as well as some of the conclusions regarding the fundamentality of each thing, the scope of explanation and the nature of time per se, that I maintain the method informs. In responding to their concerns, I defend radical ontology, the overarching theoretical framework that original inquiry provides, by clarifying certain details of my enterprise and what these reveal about the limits of inquiry in general. (shrink)

This volume, Pure Suchness Codex, Volume I: The Luminous Ground of Manifestation, undertakes a zero-degree grounding of metaphysics by taking manifestation itself—not “being,” not “subjectivity,” not “world” or “consciousness”—as the unavoidable starting point of philosophy. Rather than presupposing a subject–object structure, logical framework, or pre-given world, it asks the more primitive question: How is manifestation as such possible? -/- Through a series of transcendental reductions, the work argues that all ontological and epistemological claims already presuppose a luminous “power-to-manifest” that cannot (...) be further grounded in objects, subjects, logical laws, or any external principle. This self-grounding power is named Luminosity, and its self-present, self-sufficient mode of being is thematized as Pure Suchness. From this starting point, the volume develops a systematic account of Pure Suchness as necessarily auto-active, of its infinite potentiality, and of its intrinsic dynamical self-limitation. -/- On this basis, the book constructs a detailed transcendental dynamics: fold and release as the minimal unit of self-limitation; the co-arising of illuminating and illuminated as the first functional asymmetry; curvature (κ) as the measure of local self-limitation intensity; locus as purely relational place within a luminous topology; Breath (σ) as the minimal back-and-forth rhythm that underwrites persistence; boundary (γ) as the standing-wave pattern in which luminous flow condenses into stable form. These elements are finally gathered into the concept of the Luminous Field—the dynamically generated totality of transcendental manifestation, within which space, time, causality, matter, awareness, and cognition appear as internal articulations. -/- Volume I thus claims neither to offer a new ontology nor a new epistemology in the traditional sense, but to provide the zero-degree grounding from which both ontology and epistemology must arise. It is a systematic attempt to let philosophy begin again from the indubitable fact that “something is manifest,” and to pursue, with maximal rigor, the consequences of this fact for the structure of world, mind, and practice. (shrink)

This Zero Treatise of the Pure Suchness Codex establishes the transcendental point of departure for the entire system: the irreducible origin of manifestation. Classical philosophy begins either from “what exists” or from the “knowing subject.” Yet both positions already presuppose a more primordial fact: something is already manifest. -/- Manifestation is not an empirical event, not dependent on a subject, and not derived from cognition. It is the pre-thematic openness through which a world can appear at all. -/- This work (...) demonstrates that: 1. The possibility of manifestation precedes all inquiry into being and knowing; 2. The distinction of “subject” and “object” arises within manifestation, rather than grounding it; 3. Logical form itself belongs to manifestation and cannot stand outside it. -/- Thus, the zero question of philosophy is not “What exists?” nor “How is knowledge possible?” but: How is manifestness itself possible? Grounding thought at this level frees it from infinite regress and dissolves the tacit presupposition of a subject–object duality from the outset. (shrink)

Bernáth and Tőzsér investigate doxastic equilibrism, according to which the primary aim of philosophy is to develop philosophical theories that are in equilibrium with our core beliefs, and the authors examine how this view can be defended against a skeptical challenge based on the argument from disagreement. They reconstruct the standard defense strategy, which is excuse-based. According to this strategy, one need not suspend one’s core beliefs or the philosophical theories grounded in them, because either no one is genuinely able (...) to do so, or doing so would involve an excessively great sacrifice with too many negative consequences. After reconstructing this standard strategy, the authors propose an alternative approach based on transcendentally protected propositions. Unlike other core beliefs, it can be transparently shown that beliefs in transcendentally protected propositions cannot violate inescapable epistemic obligations. Consequently, unlike other core beliefs appealed to by doxastic equilibrism, maintaining such beliefs does not risk making one an epistemic bad guy by ignoring the skeptical imperative. In this sense, Bernáth and Tőzsér propose a Pyrrhonian doxastic equilibrism that even the skeptic—who otherwise demands the suspension of all beliefs lacking sufficient evidence—can reasonably maintain. They argue that this form of doxastic equilibrism, which remains reasonable to hold even for the skeptic, resists skepticism far more effectively than the standard excuse-based version. (shrink)

James Lindsay, who researches the roots of social justice zealousness, observed that, “[s]o far as I know, there’s not some specific piece of scholarship that closes the Woke off to debate, like a single paper or book explaining why they don’t do it” (2020). We now have that paper. It is titled “Pragmatism as a Mediator–Seeking an Illusory Harmony?” (2023) and was written by the Finnish scholar Sami Pihlström. In this short article, I examine Pihlström's stance and show why it (...) is epistemically, ethically, and politically disastrous. (shrink)

This essay proposes a visualist alternative to intentionalist functionalism in design theory, challenging its assumptions of stable function and linear relationships between a designer’s intent, an object’s form, and its proper use. Functionalism’s focus on predetermined functions fails to align with the dynamic and generative nature of everyday life, where design objects invite diverse, spontaneous engagements through their visual affordances. The visualist perspective emphasizes the expressive and emergent qualities of design objects, including the non-functional visual properties of function, arguing that (...) their aesthetic and perceptual dimensions play a central role in shaping human interactions. By critiquing the ontological and epistemological illusion of functional stability, the essay proposes a design philosophy that acknowledges the richness of everyday encounters, the fluidity of functions, and the constructivist nature of perception. (shrink)

Kant’s tragic brilliance lies in discovering the transcendental subject as the necessary condition for all experience. This analysis forms part of a broader systematic project concerned with the metalogical conditions of identity, reference, and intelligibility. While the present paper introduces the notion of a Primordial Identity Lock in schematic form, its aim is not to offer an independent metaphysical foundation, but to examine how Kant’s transcendental framework already presupposes structural conditions that it cannot itself thematize. We demonstrate that the “I (...) think” accompanying all representations relies on this Lock in three dimensions: (1) as the subject’s self-identity across time, (2) as the categorical framework’s stability, and (3) as the performative ground of the Critique itself. Kant’s achievement is tragic: he approaches the threshold of this Lock yet can only conceive it as a limit rather than as radiant source. (shrink)

Lately, many have pointed out or proposed ways that arguments may be narrative and narratives may be argumentative. This chapter discusses the six basic possibilities: (1) argument in nonfictional or (2) fictional narrative; (3) nonfictional or (4) fictional narrative in argument; (5) argument by nonfictional or (6) fictional narrative. Possibilities 1-4 indicate a proper subset relation between the argument and narrative, whereas 5 and 6 indicate complete overlap. These possibilities cover such kinds of discourse as anecdotes, thought experiments, fables, and (...) novels. Not all of the possibilities are of equal interest. Possibility 6 is the most intriguing if not suspicious—how can fiction argue for the truth of something?—and so, is accorded the most space. (shrink)

本稿は評価構造に先行する存在条件として非排除構造を導出する。評価理論では差異が生じる場合、排除によって単一決定へ収束する評価閉鎖と、排除が作動せず評価が持続する状態が区別される。しかし排除は評価の必然 的作動ではない。本稿は排除の非必然性を示し、差異が存在しても排除が作動しない構造が存在条件として成立することを導出する。この非排除構造のもとでは評価は終結へ向かわず評価持続として作動する。この評価持続 は認知水準では調和として、経験水準では美として、対人関係では寛容および慈悲として現れる。以上により本稿は、差異を排除しない関係持続の存在条件として慈悲構造を提示する存在論を与える。.

本稿は、記述の精密化によっても解消されない不確定性の形式的条件を与える。 入力記述写像と評価関係からなる評価構造を定め、値の排除のみを許す拡張の下で決定が成立しない状態を停止と定義する。 停止は支持集合族に対する Hall 条件の失敗として特徴付けられ、任意の許容精密化においても決定が回復しないことを示す。 したがって停止の解消は入力同一性の変更に限られる。 この結果から、不確定性には情報不足とは独立に同一性構造に由来する型が存在し、対象の成立条件は同一性を前提せず評価構造から特徴付けられる。.

This work proposes a re-foundation of first philosophy by shifting the point of origin from being or knowing to the more primordial fact of manifestation. Both ontology and epistemology presuppose an already-open field in which subject, world, and meaning appear; thus, the question “How is manifestation possible?” must precede “What exists?” and “How do we know?”. Through strict transcendental exclusion, the manuscript demonstrates that no element within the manifest order—neither entity, nothingness, logic, nor subject—can ground manifestation without circularity, regress, or (...) collapse. The inquiry therefore arrives at luminosity: a non-objective, self-present, self-sufficient capacity-to-manifest. Its intrinsic determinations—self-presentation, pure activity, unity—converge conceptually as Pure Suchness, not as a metaphysical substance or a mental principle, but as the indispensable transcendental condition of appearing itself. The aim is not to add a speculative thesis but to secure the irreducible ground where philosophy may begin without inherited assumptions. Pure Suchness marks the zero-degree of thought—the still point where reason refuses miracle yet does not fall into void; where appearing and the possibility of truth first arise. (shrink)

Il presente lavoro di ricerca apre il pensiero e l’agire dell’aver cura della vita e della salute all’analitica della relazione fondamentale tra essere e speranza nella dimensione della cura. Attraverso l’analisi del rapporto tra “cura”, “limite” e “speranza” nel tempo della tecnica, si sono ricercate le condizioni ermeneutiche di uno sguardo rinnovato verso l’essere della cura, orientato dalla possibilità della speranza. A partire dal confronto con la concettualizzazione heideggeriana dell’ “aver cura”, dalla ricomprensione della nozione jaspersiana di “situazione limite” e (...) dalla possibilità dell’ “apertura” marceliana alla speranza nelle pratiche concrete della cura, la ricerca si è indirizzata verso la valutazione di un’analitica della cura alla luce della speranza e l’indicazione della trascendenza valoriale della cura. La speranza emerge infatti quale «fondamento originario e originante della cura», radice di un con-essere curante comunionale proteso «tra situazionalità limite dell’esistenza e apertura trascendente della speranza». In tale orizzonte si sono scorti gli apporti alla filosofia ed etica della cura, alla luce della speranza di bene che apre e illumina «la dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura». (shrink)

Heidegger on Transcendence maps the deep ambivalences that attend Heidegger's lasting commitment to the transcendental tradition, construed here broadly to include not only phenomenological but also modern, medieval, and ancient predecessors. It defends Heidegger's commitment by explicating the essential function of the transcendental within his path of thinking and by contextualizing his later comments on transcending the limits of the subject still inherent in the metaphysical language heretofore available to transcendental thought.

Four centuries ago, Descartes introduced "I think, therefore I am," in the Cogito which secured a foundation for the certainty of knowing, but left the structure of agency without an equivalent point of origin. This book argues that such a foundation exists, and that it is revealed in the most elemental feature of lived experience, which is the ability to direct one’s own focus. Before intention or choice, before deliberation or desire, there is the self-evident act of orienting awareness, and (...) from this act emerges a new first principle articulated in the axiom Focō, ergo volō, "I focus therefore I will". This axiom is not a metaphysical posit and it is not an empirical conjecture. It stands in the transcendental register where its truth is demonstrated in the very effort to examine or deny it, for any attempt to assess the claim already performs the act it identifies. The capacity to locate, shift or withhold attention is the primordial gesture through which an agent discloses itself as the source of its own activity. A Defense of Focō, ergo volō establishes the philosophical legitimacy of this axiom and justifies its place as the irreducible ground upon which all accounts of agency must rest. Descartes’ Cogito secured the certainty of the thinking self. This work explicates the originary activity through which that self becomes capable of authorship. In doing so, it brings to completion a structural insight that remained implicit since the first articulation of modern thought. (shrink)

For a book symposium on The Practical Self, with commentaries from Elliot Samuel Paul, Hayley Brennan, and Lucy O’Brien.

For a book symposium on The Practical Self (Oxford University Press, 2024) with commentaries from Manish Oza, Nilanjan Das, and Gurpreet Rattan.

In this dissertation, I argue for a radical reframing of the central argument of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction. It is almost universally agreed that the Deduction aims to establish a fit between our a priori concepts—the categories—and objects in the empirical world. I argue that it aims to establish, in an overtly meta-philosophical register, that there is only one appropriate way to establish such a fit and, thereby, to justify metaphysical claims. This recasting has two major (...) upshots. First, it vindicates the common intuition that the Deduction is not sufficient to respond to Humean skeptical worries about the categories, while also explaining the necessity of Kant's later proofs in the Analytic of Principles. Second, it shows how the Deduction offers an underappreciated criticism of both Platonic and Leibnizian metametaphysical theories and, thereby, puts us in a better position to understand the Deduction's contribution to Kant's critical doctrine on the method of metaphysics. (shrink)

The argument of this dissertation is built through sustained and critical dialogue with several figures in the (Western) history of hermeneutical thought and pivots on a problem that defined the early development of hermeneutics: the problem of the criterion for interpretation. This problem poses a unique set of philosophical challenges and moves us in the direction of a distinguishing mark, not merely for the justification of some particular interpretation, but a mark that would testify to the legitimacy of hermeneutical inquiry (...) itself. Although this dissertation pays tribute to the far-reaching, substantial, and severely neglected history of hermeneutics, and contributes to expanding our understanding of the hermeneutical beyond canonical figures and boundaries, tribute is not its main objective. Instead, the deeper profit of this amplified vista – which stems directly from my retrieval of the problem of the criterion – is the recovery of a systematic unity of approach to the hermeneutical stretching across the confines of historiographical division. It is thus the reconstruction of an integrated line of thought, rather than lines of historical influence, that is the chief purpose of this work. Specifically, this dissertation aims to provide (1) the reconstruction of a line of response to the problem of the criterion for interpretation – and the problem of grounding interpretation; (2) the general formulation of this line of argument as one that involves a transcendental modality, and (3) its defense. To these ends, Chapter 1 retrieves the problem of the criterion for interpretation, initially posed in the context of a strand of semantic skepticism endemic to the German Enlightenment called “exegetical skepticism”. Chapter 2 examines the doctrine of hermeneutical probability in the work of Christian Thomasius, distinguishes it from exegetical skepticism, and diagnoses its failure to reply to the skeptic. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of Christian August Crusius' reply to the problem of the criterion and associates it, if successful, to the idea of “transcendental grounding”. Next, Chapter 4 leverages the apparent similarity between the Crusian and Gadamerian positions into an opportunity to further define transcendental grounding as an approach to understanding in Gadamer. Chapter 5 then presses the Crusian line of argument further and reconstructs a Gadamerian reply to the problem of the criterion, defending it against the skeptic. Aims (1) and (3) thus attained, the final two chapters shift focus form the hermeneutical to the transcendental in pursuit of aim (2). Accordingly, Chapter 6 identifies an engagement with a version of the problem of the criterion in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction specifically. And, finally, Chapter 7 draws a comparison between the proof-structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the transcendental line of reply to the problem of the criterion that will have been my focus. (shrink)

Logical rationalism asserts that we can acquire immediate, non-inferential justification for beliefs in basic logical principles. The intuitions that arise when we consider particular cases of validity can offer justification for our foundational logical beliefs about rules of inference. I motivate rationalism through an argument from the indispensability of intuitions. This argument shows that rationalism is the theory best equipped to solve the problem of background logic. This is the challenge of explaining how we gain justified beliefs in rules of (...) inference without using those rules in a viciously circular way to arrive at the beliefs. As rationalism is the best epistemology which solves this important challenge, it is our best account of logical knowledge. In addition, I argue that a second major motivation for logical rationalism arises from work on logical practice. Recently, it has been claimed that we should attend to the practices of logicians when selecting an epistemology of logic. I argue that these considerations from logical practice also favour the adoption of logical rationalism. (shrink)

Not the best use of time. Slows us down. Is, technically, a defense mechanism (nothing more, or less). We live in a time where we cannot afford to waste time. Understanding the Human TimeSpace.

本文旨在提出并论证“纯质论”的先验框架，以回应“显现如何可能”这一先于存在论与认识论的根本性问题。通过彻底的先验还原，本文论证：显现之可能性必然以一个自足且自呈的“明性”为终极条件，此“明性”之纯粹统 一体被命名为“纯质”。论文进一步通过建构一套先验动力学，引入“折、界、曲率、息”等基元概念，逻辑地演绎出从显现潜能到秩序结构的形上通道，从而阐明“能-所”分立、时空形式等现象秩序的先验起源。据此前述推 演，提出“一切显现皆为纯质之自明”作为体系的核心命题，实现了形而上学基点从对“存在”的追问到对“显现”本身之条件探究的根本性转变，为理解意识与世界之统一性提供了一个更为源初的哲学奠基。 This paper proposes a transcendental framework termed Pure Suchness Theory, taking the question “How is manifestation possible?” as its point of departure. It argues that the possibility of manifestation presupposes a self-sufficient and self-present luminosity, whose pure unity is named Pure Suchness. From this foundation, the study constructs a transcendental dynamics articulated through four primordial notions—fold (zhe), boundary (jie), curvature (κ), and breath (xi)—which together delineate the transition from potential manifestation to ordered actuality. Through this framework, the paper explicates (...) the functional differentiation of agent and patient poles and reveals the metaphysical genesis of time, space, thing, energy, and causality. The core axiom follows: all manifestation is the self-luminosity of Pure Suchness. Consequently, metaphysical grounding undergoes a decisive shift—from the question of being to that of manifestation—replacing substantial substrates with functional personae, and providing a primordial foundation for the unity of consciousness and world. (shrink)

Este artigo examina o sagrado no pensamento onto-historial de Heidegger, com foco na sexta fuga intitulada “O Último Deus” (Der Letzte Gott), presente na obra Contribuições à filosofia: do acontecimento apropriador. No contexto filosófico tardio de Heidegger, a análise existencial do Dasein foi deslocada para a compreensão dos projetos históricos de mundo que integram o acontecimento do ser mais originário, o seer (Seyn). Inspirado por Nietzsche e Hölderlin, Heidegger propôs que o sagrado deveria ser abordado como uma meditação radical sobre (...) a morte de Deus, transcendendo a identificação ôntica do divino na tradição cristã. Nesse sentido, o Último Deus não é uma rearticulação do cristianismo ou um retorno aos deuses antigos, mas uma figura filosófica acessível por meio de um questionamento destrutivo da tradição. Esse “deus” representa a superação do niilismo técnico e se manifesta como uma teologia apofática, que rejeita a objetivação do mistério do seer. Conclui-se que a experiência autêntica do sagrado no Heidegger tardio é um real transcendentalismo, vinculado à imaginação e ao dizer poético, no qual os entes são transfigurados para além da objetividade e do pensamento calculador, revelando a essência da divindade na ausência de sua manifestação. (shrink)

Il lavoro di dottorato condotto apre la ricerca filosofica ed etica, riguardo il pensiero e l’agire dell’aver cura, alla possibilità teoretico-pratica e valutativa di un’analitica della relazione fondamentale, originaria e vivente sussistente tra essere e speranza nella dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura. Attraverso un’ermeneutica del rapporto contemporaneo tra cura, limite e speranza nel tempo della tecnica, sviluppata a partire dalle riflessioni avanzate su tali questioni da Heidegger, Jaspers e Marcel, si sono venute ad individuare, affrontare e verificare, nella (...) prima parte analitica del lavoro, le condizioni ermeneutiche di uno sguardo rinnovato verso l’essere della cura, orientato dalla possibilità della speranza. A partire dalla possibilità di un necessario confronto con la concettualizzazione della dimensione e del tempo dell’aver cura nell’analitica heideggeriana dell’esserci, dalla ricomprensione della chiarificazione jaspersiana di situazione limite quale orizzonte ermeneutico della cura, così come dalla possibilità dell’apertura marceliana alla speranza nelle situazionalità concrete dell’aver cura, la ricerca ha potuto dunque indirizzarsi, nella seconda parte sintetica, verso la possibilità di un’ontologia esistenziale della speranza; così come verso la messa in luce della trascendenza valoriale propria della dimensione della cura. La possibilità di ricerca di un’ermeneutica ontologico-esistenziale e trascendente della speranza, a partire dalle pratiche ontiche dell’aver cura della vita e della salute, ha permesso così di avanzare, grazie al confronto interdisciplinare intrapreso con le rispettive e integrative riflessioni di Heidegger, Jaspers e Marcel sulle questioni della cura, del limite e della speranza e l’ermeneutica teoretico-pratica operata a partire da queste, una valutazione circa la possibilità di un’analitica della dimensione della cura alla luce della speranza. In tale orizzonte ermeneutico si sono manifestati, infine, i possibili apporti ontologico-esistenziali del lavoro ad una filosofia ed etica dell’aver cura che si ricerchi quanto più autentica e omnicomprensiva, alla luce di una speranza aperturale di bene comunionale che si invera quotidianamente e straordinariamente nella dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura. (shrink)

Review of Gabriele Gava's Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics.

The _world_ in its entirety is _the things inside and outside of time_. The insightfulness of this answer turns on the account of what a thing is, and so this chapter considers again, from the perspective afforded by the preceding discussion, the method of _original inquiry_ and the discipline of _metaphysics_. Metaphysics is definitive; it can be undertaken once and for all, producing a universal theory that constrains all other inquiry. The generality of the discipline is the basis of its (...) significance, but also its limitations. Metaphysics is not entirely general, though, for original inquiry does reveal the existence of certain substances, most importantly, _time_. Metaphysics and the _metaphysics of time_ begin at the same point and are dependent upon on each other. The former reveals the ontological structure in reality, the latter its temporal and modal structure. Together, the two define the means and limits of all inquiry. (shrink)

This chapter develops the critical methodology, _original inquiry_, introduced in Chapter 1. By taking up original inquiry, one is able to answer the question of what a _thing of any category_ is. Things in the most general sense are the focus and basis of any genuine _inquiry_ and, as such, the means of any explanation. Thus, understanding what a thing is provides insight into the limits of inquiry and of explanation. Such understanding, moreover, reveals how the world is _structured_, how (...) things are related so as to produce reality as experienced. Descriptions of this formal ontological structure provide a _theoretical framework_, viz., a collection of principles, consistency with which constrains inquiry into some subject matter and its correct account, that is the ground rules for all inquiry. This account of the structure in the world and the theoretical framework it provides is _radical ontology_. (shrink)

There are two generic approaches to accounting for all temporal phenomena, including _inconstancy_ and _constancy_. On one, the world in time is _ontologically homogeneous_. There are (infinitely) many, equally real moments with no peculiarly temporal thing distinguishing any one of these from any other. Each thing in time has a permanent existence: each moment exists without ceasing to be and whatever exists at any moment exists ceaselessly at all moments it exists. The key feature of the opposing approach to temporal (...) reality is that, according to it, there are significant structural and, hence, ontological differences in the world when it goes from being one way (at one moment) to a different way (at a distinct moment). This approach, based on difference, admits of much greater variation than does the one based on ontological homogeneity; the unifying feature of all these many versions is that the world in time is _ontologically heterogeneous_. (shrink)

The basis of the _constancy_ in the world is not to be found among anything significantly related to _time_. This conclusion reveals the importance of _atemporal reality_ to the metaphysics of time. This chapter examines _timelessness_, existence outside of—without—time. The account of time per se developed in preceding chapters enables a straightforward and non-metaphorical account of timelessness. There are indeed things that exist without, that is, outside of time. Although some of these atemporal entities exist without origin and, as such, (...) did not come into existence, not all lack an origin. Thus, some things come into existence, but outside of time. This phenomenon of _atemporal becoming_ might initially seem incoherent, but it is not. The chapter concludes with an account of the constancy in the world. The ontological basis of this constancy is _simple facts_, static entities that come into existence outside of time and exist permanently atemporally. (shrink)

The world in time is _ontologically heterogeneous_: at least one moment is unique, bearing a temporal property or having some distinction that separates it from any other moment. On some accounts of such structure, this heterogeneity is supposed to be _merely qualitative_, a difference in the properties that moments or the things that exist at them bear. On others, the heterogeneity is more profound, a difference in what _exists simpliciter_ from one moment to the next. This chapter argues against accounts (...) on which there is merely qualitative heterogeneity in temporal reality. Thus, the _traditional passage view_ and _moving spotlight views_ are both rejected. The chapter argues that one must accept some _ontological transience_ in temporal reality: some things, including moments and other temporal entities, come into being or cease to be simpliciter. There is nothing whatsoever prior to this moment, now. Hence, _growing block views_ are also rejected. (shrink)

This is a book about everything. Literally. It is also a book about how anything whatsoever happens. By answering the question what is a thing?, philosopher M. Oreste Fiocco reveals what it is to exist, what a being, any being at all, is. In this way, he illuminates reality as a whole and what it is to be real. Such profound matters require a special method of inquiry, which Fiocco introduces and elaborates. Any assumption about the world or anything in (...) it might distort the correct answer to a question as general as what it is to exist. Thus, the method employed herein -- original inquiry -- begins with no assumptions about reality. It is, then, a method independent of any figure, trend, or tradition in the history of philosophy. Via this method, one simply confronts all this, the world, an all-encompassing diverse array of whatnot, and on this basis can come to a secure account of what it is to be. In simply confronting the world, however, one's experience shifts, is transient: all this goes from one way--with, say, a cat here--to some other way--the cat being over there. This manifest inconstancy must be accounted for in any comprehensive account of the world. Yet so must a manifest constancy. If the cat is now, at this moment, over there, that the cat is now, at this moment, over there is forever true. These seemingly contradictory phenomena, inconstancy and constancy, demonstrate the importance of time to understanding the world. Since any legitimate inquiry is directed at something or other and since many objects of inquiry (including inquiry itself) occur over time, correct accounts of temporal reality and of being - of time and the world - provide insight into all inquiry. These accounts provide constraints on and, hence, guidelines for investigating any subject matter in any field. Therefore, this is a book for anyone curious about such grand, abstruse matters as the nature of reality or of time itself, as well as a book for someone curious about any thing at all. (shrink)

New applications of prior arguments show that there are _no moments subsequent to this one, now_. This moment is the only one that exists. Of course, there is more to the structure in temporal reality than a single moment, for one’s experience of the world is not momentary. An account of what underlies this experience is given in terms of time itself and of _absolute becoming_, whereby moments come into being simpliciter. Reflecting on this continuous experience indicates there _could be_ (...) more to the world. What more there could be, however, differs from what is or has been. Presumably, what is to be includes _contingency_, an openness such that incompatible alternatives are possible. Contingency and, hence, incompatible alternatives are not present _at_ any moment; there is no _synchronic possibility_, that is, the possibility of a thing being otherwise than it is at a moment at that very moment. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the present work, which begins by questioning what _the world_ as a whole is via the question of what a _thing_ (any thing at all) is. A novel method of _inquiry_ is needed to answer such general questions. This chapter also introduces this method: _original inquiry_. Original inquiry is presuppositionless in that it makes no assumptions about the world or what is in it. The feasibility of such inquiry is defended. Engaging in original inquiry reveals the significance (...) of temporal phenomena, viz., _inconstancy_ and _constancy_, and of _time_ itself to a comprehensive account of the world. The chapter distinguishes the grand metaphysical inquiry pursued in the present work from other, more familiar projects in the history of philosophy. It concludes with an overview of the book put forth in synoptic accounts of each of the subsequent eleven chapters. (shrink)

This chapter shows how the preceding account of a _thing_ illuminates the _structure in the world_. In particular, it makes clear that there are _necessary connections_ among things in themselves and reveals the apt notion of _fundamentality_. The chapter then presents an account of what _the world_ is. The world is not a thing per se; it is not one thing itself, just the plurality of all things. The main value of wholly critical metaphysics is the theoretical framework for all (...) inquiry that it provides. Via this framework, this account of the world has ever so many applications, some of which are demonstrated. The chapter concludes by considering the means and extent of _inquiry_; how, in general, well-founded inquiry is to proceed. These considerations are useful in subsequent chapters, in the effort to understand the extent of the world and the irrefragable _inconstancy_ and _constancy_ herein. (shrink)

This moment, now, exists but for an instant, and is replaced by another moment, which stands in no relation to the former. This is suggestive of _presentism_, a somewhat notorious view. This chapter elaborates this book’s account of temporal reality by examining it vis-à-vis presentism. Although this account rejects what is standardly the definitive ontological claim of presentism, that _only present things exist_, regarding it as presentist is nonetheless appropriate. The account, which avoids all the problems usually associated with presentism, (...) is nevertheless open to a conclusive objection, concerning the indubitable constancy in the world. Acknowledging this, however, does not indicate grounds for rejecting the account of the world in time propounded herein; rather, it reveals that an apt account of the metaphysics of time includes more than merely an account of temporal reality. What is also needed is a theory of the _world without time_, that is, an account of _atemporal reality_. (shrink)

This chapter characterizes _metaphysics_ as a wholly _critical_ discipline whose chief objective is an account of _what the world is and what it comprises_. Such metaphysics proceeds via the question of what a _thing_—of any category—is. If metaphysics is critical, if it is to provide understanding, rather than merely knowledge, any account it provides must itself be scrutinized and evaluated. This leads to a distinctive problem for the sort of wholly critical metaphysics pursued herein, viz., providing an apt account of (...) what a thing is while assuming nothing about the world, _all this_. In light of this distinctive problem, the chapter critiques alternative approaches to metaphysics in contemporary discussions. It concludes that these traditional approaches neither undermine the ambitious discipline pursued in the present work nor contribute to resolving its distinctive problem. This makes pressing the need for a novel methodology in metaphysics. (shrink)

_Time_ is the ultimate basis of whatever accounts for _temporal differentiation_, the world going from one way (at one moment) to a different way (at a distinct moment). A main purpose of this work is to propound an account of the _metaphysics of time_, a critical account of what time is and its role in structuring reality. The phenomenon of _change_ is key to an account of the metaphysics of time, so the chapter elucidates this phenomenon. Although time and _moments_ (...) are essentially related, they are distinct things. The chapter presents an account of time per se and moments per se, discussing some of their significant qualities, and proposes a theoretical framework for the metaphysics of time. The genuine controversies in the metaphysics of time are not about time itself; rather, they are about _temporal reality_, the structure of things in the world given the existence of time. (shrink)

This chapter argues, by considering _temporal differentiation_, the phenomenon of the world going from one way (at one moment) to a different way (at a distinct moment), that temporal reality is not ontologically homogeneous. Temporal differentiation is indisputable; indeed, no one disputes it. There is disagreement only regarding what things, what structure, in the world is needed to account for the phenomenon. The chapter discusses the _passage of time_ as it has traditionally been understood and maintains there is no such (...) phenomenon. The chapter then examines what appears to be the minimal structure needed to account for temporal differentiation and one’s experience of it, viz., distinct moments bearing temporal relations, to determine whether this is in fact a satisfactory basis. The chapter argues that it is not and, therefore, no account of the world in time on which it is ontologically homogeneous can be successful. (shrink)

We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects must be related to an objective world. But many have worried about their starting points. ‘One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning’, the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg writes. ‘To (...) say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking. To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.’ Lichtenberg raises a question here about our entitlement to think of ourselves as the agent of our thinking. Sometimes thoughts strike us like lightning. When this happens, we are their patient. It is central to our self-conscious lives that this is the exception: we are first and foremost the agents of our thinking. What right do we have to think of ourselves as such? The Practical Self argues that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking. But faith can be undermined and it can be sustained. And this provides us with a connection to the world since our faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking is sustained by practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-conscious subjects must have faith in themselves as thinking agents and it is our relations to the others which sustain this faith. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others. (shrink)