Race and Science

This paper critically examines the prospects for racial naturalism—the view that racial categories reflect biologically grounded, natural kinds. I distinguish between two main variants: Standard Racial Naturalism (SRN), which depends on discredited essentialist assumptions, and New Racial Naturalism (NRN), which appeals to genetic clustering and geographic ancestry. I argue that SRN is incompatible with modern evolutionary biology and population genetics, while NRN, in attempting to avoid essentialism, fails to preserve any robust notion of natural kindhood. To explain the empirical tractability (...) and institutional durability of race without invoking biological realism, I introduce the concept of a regulatory kind: a socially constructed kind whose classificatory stability is maintained through recursive institutional enforcement. Race, I argue, simulates natural kindhood through epistemic feedback mechanisms embedded in administrative systems, data infrastructures, and policy regimes. This account preserves the metaphysical commitments of constructivist realism while explaining how race appears biologically significant without being a natural kind. It concludes that no existing version of racial naturalism satisfies the empirical, conceptual, or metaphysical conditions required of a coherent scientific taxonomy. (shrink)

If you are a very casual observer of rap music (Kimberley Brownlee???), you probably have this impression: it is all black people and one white boy-man. Assume this impression. What is this one white boy-man doing there and outshining everyone else? Should not Eminem - the one white man in case the perspective of history is very different - think this: it's a black man's industry and I will give them their space? But maybe that is a bad idea: "If (...) no one challenges them, everyone will think they only dominate because of sympathy with what back people have been through: give them their space." But let's compare rap with professional philosophy (if we can maintain coherence)! A casual impression: it's all white men and Carrie Jenkins. Here is a sensible response (Joel Smith's view last year???): "It is obvious that black people, brown people, yellow people, and red people can do this as well. We don’t need someone to challenge us to show this (and an analogous situation obtains in rap music - no need for Eminem to show that a white man can rap well too; just give them their space). Arguments and distinctions: it is not so different from law. There are good black lawyers, good brown lawyers, good yellow lawyers, good red lawyers. Philosophy appears to be open to someone with sufficient talent who tries but it is blatantly not. And only a fool would keep trying to get in." Here is another response (Ann Whittle's view???): "It appears that others can do this, but it has been cleverly set up so that they cannot or would not. Who is going to spend all their time making these distinctions on these topics? As soon as they realize the demands involved, they go and do something else, for example they build a big system. As soon as Professor Miriam Ronzoni realizes the demands of analytic philosophy actually, she gives up promoting Rawls and builds an emotionally-appealing system." This is a response of mine: this network can surely find a minority who achieves what I did in publications and with the philosophical-poetic system too, but they would just leave if they experienced the kind of deterring behaviour I have. (Zsuzsanna Chappell: "My husband is rich; I don't need to do this" Other quotes from Dr. Chappell: "No, you can't do it like this. I have done a course at the LSE." Note: my song title quotes Bob Dylan. How close to Eminem can Carrie Jenkins get? "VERY CLOSE."). (shrink)

The aim of this collection is to create a curated set of key German source texts from the eighteenth-century life sciences devoted to theories of generation, heredity, and race. The criteria for inclusion stem from our sense that there is an argument to be made for connecting three domains of inquiry that have heretofore remained mostly distinct in both their presentation and scholarly analysis: i) life science debates regarding generation and embryogenesis, ii) emerging philosophical and anthropological theories regarding the nature (...) of racial typology, and iii) the role of empire in supplying the ethnographic materials in use as evidence for the various investigations and theories being proposed. The Key Texts volume thus has three sections. The first section is devoted to selections from theorists working to create an account of the processes guiding generation and embryogenetic development. Given that at the time there were few ways to definitively prove that babies received contributions from both parents in their creation, mixed-race children became increasingly valuable sources of evidence for those insisting on joint inheritance. Although this sets up the second section of the volume—since one can trace a clear facet of racial biometric science out of this original set of enquiries—the bulk of section two is devoted to the many different accounts created at the time to understand and delineate racial differences. The third section is focused on ‘race and empire’ in order to situate the scientific texts of the previous sections in their socio-historical context. By including these pieces, it is our aim to remind readers that scientific curiosity over the nature and origin of racial diversity did not develop in a vacuum but indeed existed in full knowledge of the exploitation and dispossession of human beings. The ‘materials’ for this research program were in many cases either directly taken from black and brown human beings caught up in Europe’s colonial projects or were provided by the data gathered during large-scale voyages of exploration. The material basis of this type of research was rarely reflected upon by any of the theorists in sections one and two of the volume, a fact that has led many historians of science to focus on these theories without attention to the socio-historical context; we are deliberately trying to avoid this and indeed to deepen our own readers’ appreciation of the fact. (shrink)

In this paper, I use the theoretical framework introduced by Charles W. Mills in The Racial Contract (1997) to examine certain practices of norming and racing space that Mills does not examine in his work—the norming and the racing of the nano-level, which is populated by pathogens. Specifically, I argue that this theoretical framework allows us to understand how pathogens, and the diseases that they cause, have been racialized throughout history. I focus on two historical cases that illustrate this: the (...) yellow fever epidemics in the Americas (particularly in the US) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the typhus epidemic that struck German-occupied territories in Poland and the Ober Ost during World War I. I then offer some final reflections. (shrink)

As much contemporary work in biology and philosophy has shown, disagreements between biological race realists and biological race anti-realists are primarily normative. Yet despite the well-recognized normative nature of the debate, contemporary versions of biological race realism continue to be built on empirically questionable background assumptions that are centrally motivated by historical ideologies of racial pseudoscience rather than by pragmatic or normative considerations. I consider the case studies of Andreasen’s (2000, 2004) and Spencer’s (2018) arguments, showing how some of their (...) background assumptions stem from pseudoscientific racial ideologies. Even when philosophers and biologists purport to accept the normative nature of the question of race as a genetic population-level category, their views remain susceptible to the influence of said ideologies in ways that may continue to uphold their harmful legacies. The stakes of these positions are significant, as they connect to contemporary issues of racial equity in science and medicine. (shrink)

This chapter aims to be a comprehensive (yet non-exhaustive) overview of the ways the concept of race appears across medical practice - including historical uses, patient–physician interactions, pharmaceutical development, the use of machine learning tools in clinical settings, the recording of medical statistics, the controversial and continued use of race norming in medicine, and the ways in which racism affects patient diagnoses and outcomes. The focus on the ways that the concept is used in medical practice is to illustrate that (...) an anti-realist ontological position (rather than a biological realist or a social constructionist one) is the best way to have a logically consistent position that can accommodate the empirical examples discussed in the chapter. The chapter concludes with a sketch of how to best deal with these issues with an eye toward future developments in medicine. (shrink)

Chapter 2 discusses recent defenses of race as a biological category that draw on advances in genetic clustering. Some have argued that genetic clustering studies have revealed the reality of race. Five problems with a racial interpretation of these studies are discussed: (a) the grain-of-resolution problem, (b) the problem of _clinal_ (smooth) variation, (c) the problem of minor variation, (d) the problem of uneven variation, and (e) the problem of discord between studies. Despite these problems, Quayshawn Spencer and Michael Hardimon—two (...) leading philosophers of race—draw on clustering studies to defend race as a biological category. They both appeal, in different ways, to non-specialist beliefs about race to try to save the category. It is argued that neither approach is successful. (shrink)

In The Race Illusion, Adam Hochman argues that there are no human races, only racialized groups-groups mistakenly believed to be races. He meticulously critiques all of the major defenses of the view that races exist, beginning with biological accounts. While there is some human biological diversity, it is not distributed in a way that would justify racial classification. Hochman shows how modern attempts to revive race as a biological category either trivialize the category or change the topic entirely. -/- Many (...) now believe race to be a 'social construct,' a phrase Hochman criticizes for its ambiguity. The idea of race is a social invention, racial classification is determined by social factors, and racism is a social phenomenon. However, that does not mean that 'race' itself is social. Hochman argues that for social races to exist, they would need to be definable in terms of social properties; yet scholars have been unable to identify the social properties that plausibly make a group a race. -/- After examining ten biological and seven social accounts of race, Hochman develops and defends the view in The Race Illusion that there are no races, only racialized groups. He argues that rejecting 'race' as a category of analysis and replacing it with 'racialized group' is not only the most theoretically sound approach, but also the one best suited to fighting racism. (shrink)

This chapter covers the remaining defenses of race as a biological category. It begins with Philip Kitcher’s interpretation of “races” as inbred lineages, and then covers his later view that race may be real from a pragmatic or practical perspective. Next, it turns to Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan’s claim that “races” are _ecotypes_, or ecologically distinct populations. Finally, it discusses Joshua Glasgow and Jonathan Woodward’s interpretation of race as a _basic kind_, according to which race is not a scientifically (...) valid category, but is still biologically real in a more basic sense. Each of these forms of biological racial realism is analyzed and rejected. It is concluded, through a process of elimination, that there are no human biological races. (shrink)

The first chapter examines three traditional approaches to race as a biological category. According to the first approach, “races” are subspecies. This approach was championed by Charles Darwin. It fails, however, on empirical grounds. No human subspecies can be detected using standard scientific methods. Next, Theodosius Dobzhansky’s influential view of “races” as genetically identifiable geographical populations is analyzed. It is argued that this view (1) radically redefines race, (2) trivializes it, and is (3) superfluous, because we can speak of human (...) populations instead. Finally, the view that “races” are morphological groups is explored. Drawing on research in forensic anthropology, it is argued that if race were defined in this way, there would be hundreds, if not thousands, of races. A _reductio ad absurdum_ argument is run against this morphological interpretation of ‘race’. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes social interpretations of ‘race’, beginning with a discussion of the idea of ‘social constructionism about race’. It argues that the idea of the social construct is too ambiguous to be usefully applied to race. For ‘race’ to be a meaningful category of analysis, we must say something more specific. The chapter proceeds to discuss all of the major forms of social racial realism, according to which race is socially real. These include social kind, conferralist, hybrid, cultural, phenomenological, (...) and technological accounts of race. None of these social interpretations of race are found to be convincing. The _idea_ of race is a social invention, _racism_ is a social fact, and social factors influence racialization, but “race” itself is not socially real. (shrink)

This introduction sets the stage for the rest of the book. It introduces the debate about the nature and reality of race. Biological race may appear to be real, but appearances can be deceiving. Belief in the reality of biological race has been declining since the mid-20th century, yet new defenses of biological racial classification continue to be proposed. This book will analyze and critique all of the major defenses of race as a biological category. Next, the book asks whether (...) race can be legitimately interpreted as real, but social. It is argued that it cannot. Instead, the book defends the view that there are no races, only racialized groups—groups believed to be races. (shrink)

Following the earlier critiques of race as a category of analysis, this final chapter of the book defends an alternative to the category of race. It argues that while there are no races, there are racialized groups: groups _believed_ to be races. This position is called _reconstructionist anti-realism about race_. First, the concepts of ‘racialization’ and ‘racialized group’ are defined in detail and distinguished from concepts such as ‘racial formation’ and ‘race’. Second, it is argued that reconstructionist anti-realism about race (...) is preferable to racial realism on practical and political grounds. Third, the view is defended against a range of critiques. (shrink)

This chapter concludes that race is an illusion, but that racialization is real. The contents of the book are recapped. It is reiterated that race fails as a biological category, and that attempts to save racial classification from a biological perspective weaken and trivialize the idea of race. The arguments against race as a social category are also recapped. The idea of race is a social invention, and racial classification has social effects, but attempts to show that “races” are social (...) groups are unconvincing. Finally, the theoretical and ethical arguments for reconstructionist anti-realism about race are revisited, along with responses to criticisms of the view. (shrink)

Reviving Confucianism with evolutionary and medical conceptual tools in the British Straits Settlements before the Pacific War, the Straits Chinese philosopher, physician, reformer, and revolutionary Lim Boon Keng (1869–1957) pathologized Eurocentrism as a disease under his innovative but also troubling system of medical Confucianism. According to Lim, Eurocentrism was caused by certain (Christian) metaphysical pathogens – speciesism and dualism in human nature – and its pathogenesis involves insensitivity and maladaptation to one’s environment at individual, national, and even ‘racial’ levels. For (...) Lim, the signs and symptoms of individuals, nations, or ‘races’ suffering from Eurocentrism manifest as immoralities and injustices (commonly understood by contemporaneous theorists of evolution as atavism) – such as unjust wars – and degeneration in traits, physical or otherwise – such as indolence. In his attempt to overcome Eurocentrism in fin-de-siècle philosophical theories and practices, Lim’s medical Confucianism presents to us one of the earliest, systematic examples of a comprehensive Anglo-Chinese hybrid philosophy, attempting to tread a thin line between Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism by creating a new centre at imperial peripheries. However, Lim’s problematic, inherited conceptions of race and eugenics also present a cautionary tale of a doctor relying too much on his master’s tools in diagnostics and treatment. (shrink)

Eighteenth-century German writers with broad interests in natural history, and in particular, in the kind of ethnographic reports typically included in travel and expedition narratives, had to be able to access and read the original reports or they had to work with translations. The translators of these reports were, moreover, typically forced more than usual into the role of interpreter. This was especially the case when it came to accounts wherein vocabulary did not exist or was at least not settled, (...) and more importantly where scientific understanding was uncertain or altogether lacking, a situation that could only make the creation of semantic categories all the more significant. With this state of affairs in mind, this essay concentrates on Immanuel Kant’s work to develop a specialised racial vocabulary, and does so in a manner that reveals the importance of Buffon’s account of variation as a resource for Kant, even as Kant sought to position the new vocabulary as an improved template for transforming taxonomy or Naturbeschreibung into a genuine historical science or Naturgeschichte. (shrink)

There has been a recent increase in interest in the place of race in the writings of modern canonical European philosophers (e.g., in Locke, Hume, Kant, and Hegel). However, while it is undoubtedly necessary to undertake such investigations, we should also not stop there, insofar as stopping there does not, in fact, overturn the charge of Eurocentrism or parochialism which has often been leveled against academic philosophy. Because the circle of interlocutors is not being expanded in such an approach, it (...) results in merely asking different questions about the same people (primarily male white European thinkers). Hence the importance of taking into consideration and critically evaluating the response of African philosophers and scientists such as James Africanus Beale Horton (1835 – 1883). (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the processes of racialisation on the example of biomedical research. We argue that applying the concept of racialisation in biomedical research can be much more precise, informative and suitable than currently used categories, such as race and ethnicity. For this purpose, we construct a model of the different processes affecting and co-shaping the racialisation of an individual, and consider these in relation to biomedical research, particularly to studies on hypertension. We finish with a discussion on (...) the potential application of our proposition to institutional guidelines on the use of racial categories in biomedical research. (shrink)

This chapter aims to bring to the fore some of the ontological presuppositions that undergird the concepts of race and racism as they are used in public health. Included are discussions of differing accounts for race in public health, the ways in which racism is understood to be a public health issue, and where future research in public health, as it relates to the concepts of race and racism, is headed.

Craniology – the practice of inferring intelligence differences from the measurement of human skulls – survived the dismissal of phrenology and remained a widely popular research program until the end of the nineteenth century. From the 1970s, historians and sociologists of science extensively focused on the explicit and implicit socio-cultural biases invalidating the evidence and claims that craniology produced. Building on this literature, I reassess the history of craniological practice from a different but complementary perspective that relies on recent developments (...) in the epistemology of measurement. More precisely, I identify two aspects of the measurement culture of nineteenth-century craniologists that are crucial to understand the lack of validity of craniological inference: their neglect of the problem of coordination for their presupposed quantification of intelligence and their narrow view of calibration. Based on my analysis, I claim that these methodological shortcomings amplified the impact of the socio-cultural biases of craniologists, which had a pervasive role in their evidential use of measurement. Finally, my argument shows how the epistemology of measurement perspective can offer useful tools in debates concerning the use of biological evidence to foster social discourse and for analyzing the relationship between theory, evidence, and measurement. (shrink)

Historically, the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR) has been viewed as a reliable source of information given its near century-long work of compiling statistics and reports about race relations and the social conditions affecting different race groups in South Africa. I make the case that the IRR should not be considered a reliable source of information about race groups and their social conditions in contemporary South Africa because of how the IRR misrepresents the views of ordinary South Africans (...) with the intention of influencing policy towards the IRR’s preferred ideological positions. Rather than presenting criticism of their ideological slant, I show how their policy proposals are not supported by their survey data or their interpretation. Furthermore, I argue that their misrepresentation of South Africans’ beliefs is damaging to democratic processes because what the public claims it wants from government has a significant impact on what government’s mandate from its citizenry is thought to be. (shrink)

The three target articles constitute a powerful and persuasive call for actively anti-racist bioethics and biomedicine. All three articles reject race as a biological category. Nevertheless, they share a common commitment to racial classification. At one point, Ruqaiijah Yearby writes that “social race, like biological race, is an illusion created to establish racial hierarchy,” but mostly she writes about “races” as though they were not an illusion, but a reality. In this commentary I critique the racial realism of the target (...) articles. I argue that the biomedical fight against racism is best served by a form of anti-realist reconstructionism about race, which says that there are no races, only racialized groups—groups misunderstood to be races. Note that I do not defend the color blindness that Clarence H. Braddock (2020) persuasively rejects. Because of the role of skin color in racialization and racism, color blindness is a misguided goal. One can reject color blindness, though, without accepting racial realism... (shrink)

A. W. F. Edwards famously named “Lewontin’s fallacy” after Richard Lewontin, the geneticist who showed that most human genetic diversity can be found within any given racialized group. “Lewontin’s fallacy” is the assumption that uncorrelated genetic data would be sufficient to classify genotypes into conventional “racial” groups. In this chapter, I argue that Lewontin does not commit the fallacy named after him, and that it is not a genuine fallacy. Furthermore, I argue that when Edwards assumes that stable classification is (...) all it takes to vindicate racial naturalism, he commits a fallacy of his own: Edwards’ fallacy. The ability to create a classificatory system, and then reliably sort things within that system, is not enough to make that system scientifically respectable. I show that Edwards’ fallacy is rife in debates about the existence of human biological races. (shrink)

Many humanists and social scientists argue—if not assume—that race's centrality in social-scientific research provides an empirical justification for its reality as a constructed kind. In this paper, we first regiment these arguments, and then show that they face significant challenges. Specifically, race-concepts' social-scientific success is compatible with race being neither constructed nor real.

Racial classifications are thought to be useful in biomedical settings because they can suggest medically relevant genetic ancestry and medically relevant social or environmental variables. This is the use of race as a proxy in biomedical settings. In this chapter, I argue that the pragmatic use of racial classifications in these settings can be no more than a stop-gap for variables of biomedical or clinical significance. I argue that the only appropriate use of racial classification in biomedical settings is in (...) the context of accounting for the victims and beneficiaries of racism in health, and in cases where we want to track and intervene in racial inequities or disparities in health irrespective of their history or cause. (shrink)

As belief in the reality of race as a biological category among U.S. anthropologists has fallen, belief in the reality of race as a social category has risen in its place. The view that race simply does not exist—that it is a myth—is treated with suspicion. While racial classification is linked to many of the worst evils of recent history, it is now widely believed to be necessary to fight back against racism. In this article, I argue that race is (...) indeed a biological fiction, but I critique the claim that race is socially real. I defend a form of anti‐realist reconstructionism about race, which says that there are no races, only racialized groups—groups mistakenly believed to be races. I argue that this is the most attractive position about race from a metaphysical perspective, and that it is also the position most conductive to public understanding and social justice. (shrink)

Race theorists have been unable to reach a consensus regarding the basic historical question, “is ‘race’ modern?” I argue that this is partly because the question itself is ambiguous. There is not really one question that race scholars are answering, but at least six. First, is the concept of race modern? Second, is there a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race concepts? Third, are “races” themselves modern? Fourth, are racialized groups modern? Fifth, are the means and (...) methods associated with racialization modern? And sixth, are the meanings attached to racialized traits modern? Because these questions have different answers, the debate about the historical origins of “race” cannot be resolved unless they are distinguished. I will explain the ways in which “race” is and is not modern by answering these questions, thereby offering a resolution to a seemingly intractable problem. (shrink)

The goals and tasks of neuroethics formulated by Farahany and Ramos (2020) link epistemological and methodological issues with ethical and social values. The authors refer simultaneously to the social significance and scientific reliability of the BRAIN Initiative. They openly argue that neuroethics should not only examine neuroscientific research in terms of “a rigorous, reproducible, and representative neuroscience research process” as well as “explore the unique nature of the study of the human brain through accurate and representative models of its function (...) and dysfunction”, but also its responsibilities or social consequences. In our commentary, we would like to concentrate on problem selection, which is shortly noticed by Farahany and Ramos, and by BRAIN Initiative’s Neuroethics Report itself. The document raises an important issue related to problem selection, which is strengthening or perpetuating existing prejudices and biases by choosing a research subject: “scientists are prompted to consider how the questions they choose to study in the laboratory might amplify existing biases.” This leads to several further problems: what constitutes bias?; how biases may be embedded in the selection of research programs?; is it possible to conduct completely unbiased research?; who should be a gatekeeper in the case of research that may amplify biases? We try to notice possible answers to these questions in the context of the research on differences (e.g., cognitive, medical, behavioral) between human populations. (shrink)

Mallon and Kelly claim that hybrid constructionism predicts, at least, that (1) racial representations are stable over time and (2) that racial representations should vary more in mixed-race cultures than in cultures where there is less racial mixing. I argue that hybrid constructionism’s predictions do not obtain and thus hybrid constructionism requires further evidence. I argue that the historical record is inconsistent with hybrid constructionism, and I suggest that humans may not be innately disposed to categorize people by race even (...) though we are likely disposed to categorize people into in and out groups. So, in this paper, I show that there is an evidence set that is inconsistent with hybrid constructionism. (shrink)

The growth in the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry poses a number of challenges for healthcare practice, among a number of other areas of concern. Several companies providing this service send their customers reports including information variously referred to as genetic ethnicity, genetic heritage, biogeographic ancestry, and genetic ancestry. In this article, we argue that such information should not be used in healthcare consultations or to assess health risks. Far from representing a move toward personalized medicine, use of this information poses (...) risks both to patients as individuals and to racialized ethnic groups because of the way it misrepresents human genetic diversity. (shrink)

The biological race debate is at an impasse. Issues surrounding hereditarianism aside, there is little empirical disagreement left between race naturalists and anti-realists about biological race. The disagreement is now primarily semantic. This would seem to uniquely qualify philosophers to contribute to the biological race debate. However, philosophers of race are reluctant to focus on semantics, largely because of their worries about the ‘flight to reference’. In this paper, I show how philosophers can contribute to the debate without taking the (...) flight to reference. Drawing on the theory of reference literature and the history of meaning change in science, I develop some criteria for dealing with cases where there is uncertainty about reference. I then apply these criteria to the biological race debate. All of the criteria I develop for eliminating putative kinds are met in the case of ‘race’ as understood by twentieth century geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky and his contemporary proponents, suggesting that we should eliminate it from our biological ontology. (shrink)

Many scholars and activists seek to eliminate “race”—the word and the concept—from our vocabulary. Their claim is clear: because science has shown that racial essentialism is false and because the idea of race has proved virulent, we should do away with the concept entirely. Michael O. Hardimon criticizes this line of thinking, arguing that we must recognize the real ways in which race exists in order to revise our understanding of its significance. Rethinking Race provides a novel answer to the (...) question “What is race?” Pernicious, traditional racialism maintains that people can be judged and ranked according to innate racial features. Hardimon points out that those who would eliminate race make the mistake of associating the word only with this view. He agrees that this concept should be jettisoned, but draws a distinction with three alternative ideas: first, a stripped-down version of the ordinary concept of race that recognizes minimal physical differences between races but does not consider them significant; second, a scientific understanding of populations with shared lines of descent; and third, an acknowledgment of “socialrace” as a separate construction. Hardimon provides a language for understanding the ways in which races do and do not exist. His account is realistic in recognizing the physical features of races, as well as the existence of races in our social world. But it is deflationary in rejecting the concept of hierarchical or defining racial characteristics. Ultimately, Rethinking Race offers a philosophical basis for repudiating racism without blinding ourselves to reality. (shrink)

The ontology of race is replete with moral, political, and scientific implications. This book chapter surveys proposals about the reality of race, distinguishing among three levels of analysis: biogenomic, biological, and social. The relatively homogeneous structure of human genetic variation casts doubt upon the practice of postulating distinct biogenomic races that might be mapped onto socially recognized race categories.

The current metaphysical race debate is very much focused on the realism question whether races exist. In this paper I argue against the importance of this question. Philosophers, biologists and anthropologists expect that answering this question will tell them something substantive about the metaphysics of racial classifications, and will help them to decide whether it is justified to use racial categories in scientific research and public policy. I argue that there are two reasons why these expectations are not fulfilled. First (...) of all, the realism question about race leads to a very broad philosophical debate about the semantics of general terms and the criteria for real kinds, rather than to a debate about the metaphysics of racial categories specifically. Secondly, there is a type of race realism that is so toothless that it is almost completely uninformative about the metaphysics of race. In response to these worries, I argue that the metaphysical race debate should rather be focused on the question in what way and to what extent ‘racial’ distinctions can ground the epistemic practices of various scientific disciplines. I spell out what I mean by this and go on to demonstrate that trying to answer this question leads to a more fruitful metaphysical debate. (shrink)

The use of the category of race in science remains controversial. During the last few years there has been a lively debate on this topic in the field of a relatively young neuroscience discipline called cultural neuroscience. The main focus of cultural neuroscience is on biocultural conditions of the development of different dimensions of human perceptive activity, both cognitive or emotional. These dimensions are analysed through the comparison of representatives of different social and ethnic groups. In my article, I present (...) arguments supporting these two hypotheses: the other-race effect understood as an individual, distinct effect does not exist. It is rather an exemplification of a much broader phenomenon which I call theunfamiliarity homogeneity effect. It includes not only problems with differentiation and recognition of faces of representatives of other ethnic groups, but also covers similar recognitional difficulties ; The race-based terminology and categories are used in cultural neuroscience research in a vague and inconsistent manner. Such an approach distorts the science both in empirically and conceptually significant respects. The unfamiliarity homogeneity effect is an example of such a situation: narrowing it to the other-race effect makes it difficult to analyse in a wider context crucial for its understanding. (shrink)

Nazi ideology was premised on a belief in the superiority of the Germanic race. However, the idea of a superior Germanic race was not invented by the Nazis. By the beginning of the 20th century this idea had already gained not only popular but also mainstream scientific support in England, Germany, the U.S., Scandinavia, and other parts of the world in which people claimed Germanic origins (p. xiii). Yet how could this idea, which is now recognised as ideology of the (...) most dangerous kind, be given the appearance of scientific legitimacy by some of the leading physical anthropologists of the day? (shrink)

The aim of this article is to develop an argument against metaphysical debates about the existence of human races. I argue that the ontology of race is underdetermined by both empirical and non-empirical evidence due to a plurality of equally permissible candidate meanings of "race." Furthermore, I argue that this underdetermination leads to a deflationist diagnosis according to #hich disputes about the existence of human races are non-substantive verbal disputes. $hile this diagnosis resembles general deflationist strategies in contemporary metaphysics" I (...) show that my argument does not presuppose controversial metametaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

This year’s topic is “Genomics and Philosophy of Race.” Different researchers might work on distinct subsets of the six thematic clusters below, which are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive: (1) Concepts of ‘Race’; (2) Mathematical Modeling of Human History and Population Structure; (3) Data and Technologies of Human Genomics; (4) Biological Reality of Race; (5) Racialized Selves in a Global Context; (6) Pragmatic Consequences of ‘Race Talk’ among Biologists.

The work of Julian Herman Lewis helps to expose the underlying racial organization of laboratory normality in early twentieth-century medicine. In the 1920s and 1930s, Lewis launched a critique of prevailing racial theory, as he established an academic career in pathology at the University of Chicago. As one of the small number of black research physicians at the time, Lewis met barriers to his work that eventually derailed his career. Although his research fell short of its goals, his work continues (...) to provide a key insight into medical laboratory standards as they became institutionalized in Lewis’s field of clinical pathology. By avoiding attributions of race and following prevailing practices of racial exclusion, medical laboratories quietly reasserted social norms in the formation of laboratory normality. An examination of Lewis’s critiques and his research sharpens questions about the development of the concept of “normal” in the human sciences and a related tendency in twentieth-century medicine to conflate difference with pathology. (shrink)

The biology of race has a long and contentious history, particularly in theUnited States. Thus, it should not be surprising that the use of racial and ethnic categories by some biomedical researchers over the past 20 years has occasioned heated debate among historical, sociological, anthropological, bioethical, genetic, biomedical and molecular biological circles. Differences between the genetics of populations have generated vastly more controversy than genetic differences among individuals of a particular population (Fujimura, Duster, and Rajagopalan 2008). Contemporary racial categories are (...) largely inherited from Carl von Linné (Linnaeus) and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, both of whom were dedicated to the .. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes three concepts of "race": bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating (...) the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future. (shrink)

Recent advances in population genetics have made it possible to infer an individual's ancestral origin with a high degree of reliability, giving rise to the new technology called ‘DNA Ancestry Profiling’. Bioethicists have raised concerns over using this technology within a forensic context, many of which stem from issues concerning race. In this article, I offer some reasons why we ought to allow forensic scientists to use DNA Ancestry Profiling to infer the race or ethnicity of perpetrators — on a (...) particular understanding of race or ethnicity — in at least some cases. First, there is reason to think the process will meet our evidential standards in many cases. Second, the technology has serious prospects for improving racial justice. Third, the ethical concerns that have been raised can be addressed. And last, using Forensic DNA Ancestry Profiling to infer race or ethnicity has many benefits over its successor technology known as Molecular Photofitting. I conclude the essay by sketching the empirical work that remains to be done. (shrink)