Abstract

Science advising committees are an integral part of many public policies and, therefore, affect the political legitimacy of such policies. The role of science advising in the policymaking process is complicated by the fact that science and science policy advising are value-laden. Thus, an account of what values are appropriate for use in science policy advising is needed so that the final advice helps ensure that public policies are politically legitimate. One leading approach to solving this problem is using a deliberative democracy account of political legitimacy. In this paper, I build on existing objections by Soazig Le Bihan ( 2024 ) and Kristina Rolin ( 2021 ) and argue that this approach is underspecified and fails to adequately prevent the marginalization of knowledge and values of oppressed and minority groups in the science policy advising process. I explore how a different account of political legitimacy, public reason, addresses the problem of value-laden science policy advising. I then argue that Lori Watson and Christie Hartley’s () feminist account of public reason provides more detailed criteria for appropriate value influence in science policy advising, thereby better preventing marginalization. Specifically, their account requires the absence of domination and the provision of the social conditions necessary for recognition respect. Finally, I argue that these two criteria of feminist public reason can be achieved in practice if science policy advising committees adopt a combination of Helen Longino’s ( 1990, 2002 ) critical contextual empiricism and Sandra Harding’s ( 2015 ) strong objectivity.