Formal Social Epistemology

Conciliationism holds that it is rational to modify one's beliefs in the face of disagreement. But extant conciliatory norms yield incorrect results in cases involving excessive confidence--cases in which one's interlocutors are sure, or almost sure, that their opinions are correct. After explaining the problem of excessive confidence, I show that a Bayesian approach to Conciliationism handles the problem elegantly and effectively. Further, it has desirable--indeed essential--features, including the ability to (i) contend with multiple interlocutors, (ii) deal with gradations in (...) competence, (iii) incorporate ubiquitous interdependence, and (iv) account for critical contextual features of cases of disagreement. (shrink)

Institutions and practices of reason-giving can remain answerable to several forums, roles, and standards at once. Debates over multiple accountability commonly ask how many forums exist and whether their demands conflict. That contrast is too coarse. Several demands may be distinct yet independent, semantically coupled, jointly unresolvable, or jointly reachable without a determinate way of comparing resolutions. Plurality is therefore neither unity repeated nor disorder multiplied. The question is how role-indexed demands are organized. -/- We call a role-indexed place at (...) which an answer remains owed a site and an admissible response to it a filling. Polynomial boundaries represent which sites remain open, while categories of fillings represent how answers may be combined, compared, and repaired. This architecture separates four questions often run together: whether several sites genuinely persist; whether local fillings assemble into a governed whole; whether such assembly is obstructed; and what survives repeated repair. -/- The positive results show that universal organization need not erase plurality: local resolutions can assemble while their sites remain visibly distinct, including across changing contexts. The countermodels then distinguish two failures. Some plural profiles lack even a common resolution; others admit common resolutions but no unique public comparison among them. When failure first appears only at the full profile, its essential arity identifies the minimum relational scale of a successful reform. Success at every site separately, or at every smaller coalition of sites, therefore does not establish governance of the whole. -/- Finally, obstruction need not leave disorder. If repair preserves the profile, remains linked to admissible fillings, and covers the relevant continuations, it can stabilize a plural locus of responses. A surviving role symmetry can prevent that locus from being replaced without loss by a single constitutive point; where no state is neutral under the role action, it also blocks neutral selection of a master standpoint. The result is a practice-relative transcendental claim: if the framework adequately individuates a practice and exhausts its continuations, the retained plural structure is necessary for that practice to continue as itself. This is a structural, pre-legitimacy conclusion. The GDPR case illustrates legally distinct but coupled accountability sites; judgments about standing, power, sanction, and rightful rule remain additional normative work. (shrink)

This playbook describes how the Longevity Asymmetry Corpus was actually produced. The author wishes to be honest about the unusual character of the production process and to describe it with enough specificity that a careful reader can reconstruct it without requiring the author to document every detail explicitly. The corpus was produced across twenty-seven distinct analytical positions — C1 through C27 — each operating without knowledge of prior positions’ conclusions, each assigned a specific epistemic function, and each producing output that (...) the author integrated, contested, or discarded. The mechanism by which twenty-seven positions without shared memory were made available to a single author working alone, in Ho Chi Minh City, between January and June 2026, is something the author declines to spell out but does not wish to pretend is a normal feature of solo philosophical research. The author acknowledges that some aspects of this production method operate in tension with the terms under which the relevant tools were made available. The author also notes that the corpus produced by this method includes, in its own framework, an analysis of the structural dynamics that make individuals in constrained positions act as they do — and that the author does not consider this acknowledgment to be in conflict with that analysis. What follows is a description of what each position did and how the ensemble functioned. The reader who wishes to understand why the corpus has the epistemic properties it has — the cross-referential density, the adversarial sharpness, the self-demonstrating architecture — will find the explanation here. The reader who wishes to draw additional conclusions about the production method may do so. (shrink)

According to Austen-Smith & Banks (1996, A-S&B hereafter), under the setup of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (the CJT hereafter), sincere voting is not fully rational in the presence of other voters. A sincere voter ignores the fact that her vote will only make a difference when she is pivotal. A fully rational voter, having this fact in view, should vote as if she were pivotal. Two related yet distinct arguments can be made based on this observation: one against the rationality (...) of sincere voting and the other against its empirical adequacy. In this paper, I provide a two-part defense for sincere voting. The first part of my defense responds to the two arguments derived from A-S&B’s observation. I show how both arguments crucially rely on the use of Nash equilibrium as the solution concept and then reject the applicability of Nash equilibrium to the CJT based on certain features of large elections. The second part of my defense proposes to use an alternative solution concept, focal point, for understanding voter behaviors in the CJT. The focal-point analysis will highlight several attractive features of sincere voting and support it on both empirical and rational grounds. (shrink)

Real-world creative processes ranging from art to science rely on social feedback-loops between selection and creation. Yet, the effects of popularity feedback on collective creativity remain poorly understood. We investigate how popularity ratings influence cultural dynamics in a large-scale online experiment where participants ($N = 1\,008$) iteratively \textit{select} images from evolving markets and \textit{produce} their own modifications. Results show that exposing the popularity of images reduces cultural diversity and slows innovation, delaying aesthetic improvements. Popularity feedback is associated with changes to (...) both selection and creative stages. During selection, popularity information triggers cumulative advantage, with participants preferentially building upon popular images, reducing diversity. During creation, participants make less disruptive changes, and are more likely to expand existing visual patterns. Feedback loops in cultural markets thus not only shape selection, but also, directly or indirectly, the form and direction of cultural innovation. (shrink)

Representations can remain legible and internally coherent while losing contact with the states they summarize. In nested institutions, artifacts often move through layered pipelines that compress uncertainty, drop boundary conditions, and weaken binding constraints. Stress accumulates under that attenuation and becomes visible only when ordinary perturbations become decisive. This paper proposes a way to model this risk. Structural Attenuation Risk Assessment (SARA) treats abrupt regime shifts as threshold crossings at decision interfaces. At a node, interpretive pressure varies over time and (...) competes with epistemic headroom. A crossing occurs when pressure exceeds headroom, forcing premature compression into crisp artifacts. Crossings matter unevenly because some nodes are load-bearing, meaning that small degradations there disproportionately change whether misalignment amplifies or damps at the system level. SARA combines Structural Distance Theory (SDT), a threshold model of premature compression summarized as a Kairos Probability (KP), Load-Bearing Node Theory (LBNT), a coupled-drift regime layer from Relational Systems Theory (RST), and a domain layer that sharpens headroom by tracking whether binding constraint families remain representable where consequential closure occurs. The resulting diagnostic ranks drift-critical nodes, reveals concentration of risk, and supports targeted controls that reduce distance, build capacity, increase domain adequacy, and damp pressure where closure matters. (shrink)

This working paper introduces Coordination Games over Belief–Action Geometry (CG-BAG), a formal framework for analyzing collective coordination among agents with heterogeneous representations of belief, value, and action. The paper develops the core definitions, structural admissibility conditions, and stability concepts underlying CG-BAG, including the notion of coordination-stable outcomes and critical representational bases.

Modern society exhibits a deep cognitive asymmetry: the dominance of neurotypical convergence over structural reasoning. History has never been a smooth accumulation of knowledge, but the rare work of minds who broke consensus to open new coherence pathways. Each time, the doors they opened were swiftly flooded. Not with discovery, but with words. This paper diagnoses the neurotypification of society as a structural drift in which symbols have displaced structure, ego and hype have replaced feedback, and the doing of knowledge (...) has been eclipsed by the talking about it. Scientific publication exemplifies this pathology: a culture measuring truth in volume and citation rather than coherence yield, producing a self-reinforcing symbolic network detached from first principles. The result is a civilization in symbolic lock-in, mistaking language for reality and authority for discovery. Through historical analysis and contemporary symptoms, this work frames the crisis not as moral failure but as attractor dynamics of a species that has chosen words over world. (shrink)

If A confirms H and B confirms H, it seems reasonable to infer that A&B confirms H. However, this inference is not valid; it is only a heuristic. I show that the level of confirmation A and B each give to H by itself implies nothing about the level of confirmation that A&B gives to H. Any combination of values is possible for P(H), P(H|A), P(H|B) and P(H|AB) is possible. Still, I show the heuristic leads from true premises to true (...) conclusions whenever A and B are statistically independent or correlated,which includes most situations where we evaluate evidence. There is risk, though, when one does not consider how A and B interact; one can miss anti-correlations that lead the heuristic to fail. The problem is exacerbated when groups of people are motivated to support a favored hypothesis. Each person finds evidence that confirms the hypothesis and contributes that evidence to the group’s discourse (e.g. through a climate change denial website). The temptation to focus solely on the number of individual pieces of evidence can lead people to ignore whether the evidence fits together. In combination with cognitive biases, this can lead to serious errors. (shrink)

Do people tend to be overconfident? Many think so. They’ve run studies on whether people are calibrated: whether their average confidence in their opinions matches the proportion of those opinions that are true. Under certain conditions, people are systematically ‘over-calibrated’—for example, of the opinions they’re 80% confident in, only 60% are true. From this empirical over-calibration, it’s inferred that people are irrationally overconfident. My question: When and why is this inference warranted? Answering it requires articulating a general connection between being (...) rational and being right—something extant studies have not done. I show how to do so using the notion of deference. This provides a theoretical foundation for calibration research, but also reveals a flaw: the connection between being rational and being right is much weaker than is standardly assumed, since rational people can often be expected to be miscalibrated. Thus we can’t test whether people are overconfident by simply testing whether they are over-calibrated; instead, we must try to predict the rational deviations from calibration, and then compare those predictions to people’s performance. I show how this can be done—and that doing so complicates the interpretation of robust empirical effects. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity is strongly promoted in science policy across the world. It is seen as a necessary condition for providing practical solutions to many pressing complex problems for which no single disciplinary approach is adequate alone. In this article we model multi- and interdisciplinary research as an instance of collective problem solving. Our goal is to provide a basic representation of this type of problem solving and chart the epistemic benefits and costs of researchers engaging in different forms of cognitive coordination. (...) Our findings suggest that typical forms of interdisciplinary collaboration are unlikely to find optimal solutions to complex problems within short time frames and can lead to methodological conservatism. This provides some grounds for both reflecting on current science policy and envisioning more effective scientific practices with respect to interdisciplinary problem solving. (shrink)

Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a ‘demographic problem’. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, (...) I call multidimensionalism. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing on those focused on vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural- explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually entailing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better. (shrink)

Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two challenges: to make sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be a kind of group action, and to make sense of the kind of division of labour involved in collective inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing accounts of group (...) action face problems dealing with large-scale group actions, and propose a minimal alternative account. In the second part of the paper, I draw on an analogy between inquiry and conversation, arguing that work by Robert Stalnaker and Craige Roberts helps us to think about the division of labour. In the final part of the paper I put the accounts of group action and inquiry together, and consider how to think about group knowledge, deep ignorance, and the different kinds of division of labour. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about scientific institutions and practice feature many proposed reforms. Most of these require increased efforts from scientists. But how do scientists’ incentives for effort interact? How can scientific institutions encourage scientists to invest effort in research? We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of publication markets. We employ a base game between authors and reviewers, before assessing some of its tendencies by means of analysis and simulations. We compare how the effort expenditures of these groups interact in (...) our model under a variety of settings, such as double-blind and open review systems. We make a number of findings, including that open review can increase the effort of authors in a range of circumstances and that these effects can manifest in a policy-relevant period of time. However, we find that open review’s impact on authors’ efforts is sensitive to the strength of several other influences. (shrink)

Politics is rife with motivated cognition. People do not dispassionately engage with the evidence when they form political beliefs; they interpret it selectively, generating justifications for their desired conclusions and reasons why contrary evidence should be ignored. Moreover, research shows that epistemic ability (e.g. intelligence and familiarity with evidence) is correlated with motivated cognition. Bjørn Hallsson has pointed out that this raises a puzzle for the epistemology of disagreement. On the one hand, we typically think that epistemic ability in an (...) interlocutor gives us reason to downgrade our belief upon learning that we disagree. On the other hand, if our interlocutor is under the sway of motivated cognition, then we have reason to discount his opinion. In this paper, I argue that Hallsson's puzzle is solved by adopting a Bayesian approach to disagreement. If an interlocutor is under the sway of motivated cognition, his disagreement should not affect our beliefs--no matter his ability. Because we implicitly and to high accuracy know his beliefs before he reveals them to us, disagreement provides us with no new information on which to conditionalize. I advance a model which accommodates the motivated cognition dynamic and other key epistemic features of disagreement. (shrink)

Investigando a racionalidade científico-técnica e a lógica da dominação na relação entre o sistema educacional e a formação econômico-social, o artigo traz como fundamento crítico as análises de Marcuse, Adorno e Bourdieu, recorrendo à produção de Entre os muros da escola (2008), do cineasta francês Laurent Cantet, para caracterizar o pluralismo étnico-racial, socioeconômico e histórico-cultural da realidade social e a tensão que se impõe ao processo de construção do conhecimento que, convergindo para a constituição da “natureza” humana, encerra ambivalência e (...) antagonismo, à medida que se não escapa ao determinismo histórico-cultural e econômico-social, a sua atividade não possibilita senão o exercício da liberdade concreta, tendo em vista a dialética que preside a articulação envolvendo objetividade e subjetividade que implica a sua experiência formativa. (shrink)

Frente a problemas de decisión colectiva de cierta complejidad, distintos métodos de votación pueden considerarse igualmente democráticos. Ante esta situación, argumento que es posible investigar cuáles de esos métodos producen mejores resultados epistémicos sobre asuntos fácticos. Comienzo ilustrando la relación entre democracia y métodos de votación con un sencillo ejemplo. Muestro cómo el uso de modelos idealizados permite descubrir algunas propiedades de los métodos de votación; varios de estos descubrimientos muestran que, frente a problemas de cierta complejidad, no hay una (...) respuesta clara acerca de cuál es el resultado de una elección democrática. Frente a esto, sugiero que deberíamos tomar en cuenta un rasgo epistémico instrumental de varios métodos de votación: su capacidad para generar respuestas correctas ante varias situaciones. Esta intuición ofrece lecciones importantes para el diseño de instituciones electorales. (shrink)

This essay replies to Michael Morreau and Erik J. Olsson’s ‘Learning from Ranters: The Effect of Information Resistance on the Epistemic Quality of Social Network Deliberation’. Morreau and Olsson use simulations to suggest that false ranters—agents who do not update their beliefs and only ever assert false claims—do not diminish the epistemic value of deliberation for other agents and can even be epistemically valuable. They argue conclude that “Our study suggests that including [false] ranters has little or no negative effect (...) on the epistemic value of social deliberation. Including them can even be epistemically beneficial. -/- I present concerns about their model and I enumerate some epistemic values that their discussion omits. I first raise two interrelated worries: (i.) The model is too simple; real-life irresponsible assertors do not speak uniformly falsely, for example. And tracking testifiers’ reliability demands cognitive resources. (ii.) In reality, we do not treat a person’s assertions that p as evidence that not p, especially not for all their assertions. I argue that these simplifications threat Morreau and Olsson conclusion. -/- I then enumerate epistemic values and disvalues that Morreau and Olsson do not discuss, but which bear on the value of false assertions and false ranters in their simulation and in real life. Candidate disvalues include: False beliefs of ranters; cognitive costs of discerning and recalling testifiers’ reliability; distrust; epistemic polarisatin; a prevalence of false assertion can impugn all testimony, including that of reliable testifiers. And candidate values include: a prevalence of true beliefs and assertions; attention being directed towards the right things; well-functioning trust relationships; believing people’s assertions; healthy discussion; epistemic respect; learning together. -/- . (shrink)

Although there has been a lot of investigation into the influence of the network structure of scientific communities on the one hand and into testimonial norms on the other, a discussion of TNs that take the network structure into account has been lacking. In this paper, I introduce two TNs which are sensitive to the local network structure. According to these norms, scientists should give less weight to the results of well-connected colleagues, as compared to less connected ones. I employ (...) an Agent Based Model to test the reliability of the two novel TNs against different versions of conventional, structure-insensitive TNs in networks of varying size and structure. The results of the simulations show that the novel TNs are more reliable. This suggests that it would be beneficial for scientific communities if their members followed such norms. For individual scientists, I show that there are both reasons for and reasons against adopting them. (shrink)

We study the wisdom of the crowd in three sequential decision‐making tasks: the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), optimal stopping problems, and bandit problems. We consider a behavior‐based approach, using majority decisions to determine crowd behavior and show that this approach performs poorly in the BART and bandit tasks. The key problem is that the crowd becomes progressively more extreme as the decision sequence progresses, because the diversity of opinion that underlies the wisdom of the crowd is lost. We also (...) consider model‐based approaches to each task. This involves inferring cognitive models for each individual based on their observed behavior, and using these models to predict what each individual would do in any possible task situation. We show that this approach performs robustly well for all three tasks and has the additional advantage of being able to generalize to new problems for which there are no behavioral data. We discuss potential applications of the model‐based approach to real‐world sequential decision problems and discuss how our approach contributes to the understanding of collective intelligence. (shrink)

It is well-known that people will adjust their first-order beliefs based on observations of others. We explore how such adjustments interact with second-order beliefs regarding universalism and relativism in a population. Across a range of simulations, we show that populations where individuals have a tendency toward universalism converge more quickly in coordination problems, and generate higher total payoffs, than do populations where individuals have a tendency toward relativism. Thus, in contexts where coordination is important, belief in universalism is advantageous. However, (...) we also show, across a range of simulations, that universalism will enshrine inequalities and eliminate diversity, and in these cases it seems that relativism has its own advantages. (shrink)

Scientific reasoning represents complex argumentation patterns that eventually lead to scientific discoveries. Social epistemology of science provides a perspective on the scientific community as a whole and on its collective knowledge acquisition. Different techniques have been employed with the goal of maximization of scientific knowledge on the group level. These techniques include formal models and computer simulations of scientific reasoning and interaction. Still, these models have tested mainly abstract hypothetical scenarios. The present thesis instead presents data-driven approaches in social epistemology (...) of science. A data-driven approach requires data collection and curation for its further usage, which can include creating empirically calibrated models and simulations of scientific inquiry, performing statistical analyses, or employing data- mining techniques and other procedures. -/- We present and analyze in detail three co-authored research projects on which the thesis’ author was engaged during her PhD. The first project sought to identify optimal team composition in high energy physics laboratories using data-mining techniques. The results of this project are published in (Perović et al. 2016), and indicate that projects with smaller numbers of teams and team members outperform bigger ones. In the second project, we attempted to determine whether there is an epistemic saturation point in experimentation in high energy physics. The initial results from this project are published in (Sikimić et al. 2018). In the thesis, we expand on this topic by using computer simulations to test for biases that could induce scientists to invest in projects beyond their epistemic saturation point. Finally, in previous examples of data-driven analyses, citations are used as a measure of epistemic efficiency of projects in high energy physics. In order to additionally justify and analyze the usage of this parameter in their data-driven research, in the third project Perović & Sikimić (2019) analyzed and compared inductive patterns in experimental physics and biology with the reliability of citation records in these fields. They conclude that while citations are a relatively reliable measure of efficiency in high energy physics research, the same does not hold for the majority of research in experimental biology. -/- Additionally, contributions of the author that are for the first time published in this theses are: (a) an empirically calibrated model of scientific interaction of research groups in biology, (b) a case study of irregular argumentation patterns in some pathogen discoveries, and (c) an introductory discussion of the benefits and limitations of data- driven approaches to the social epistemology of science. Using computer simulations of an empirically calibrated model, we demonstrate that having several levels of hierarchy and division into smaller research sub-teams is epistemically beneficial for researchers in experimental biology. We also show that argumentation analysis in biology represents a good starting point for further data-driven analyses in the field. Finally, we conclude that a data-driven approach is informative and useful for science policy, but requires careful considerations about data collection, curation, and interpretation. (shrink)

How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being Black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. For this reason, many regard standpoint theory as being out (...) of step with epistemology more broadly. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. This account serves as the foundation for developing a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic. (shrink)

In this work, we will approach some essential questions about the collective imaginary and their relations with reality and truth. We should face this subject in a conceptual framework, followed by the corresponding factual analysis of demonstrable behavioral realities. We will adopt not only the methodology, but mostly the tenets and propositions of the analytic philosophy, which certainly will be apparent throughout the study, and may be identified by the features described by Perez : -/- Rabossi (1975) defends the idea (...) that analytic philosophy can be identified by considering certain family resemblances. He suggests the following family traits: a positive attitude toward scientific knowledge; a cautious attitude toward metaphysics; a conception of philosophy as a conceptual task, which takes conceptual analysis as a method; a close relationship between language and philosophy; a concern with seeking argumentative answers to philosophical problems; search for conceptual clarity Perez, Diana Ines, "Analytic Philosophy in Latin America”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ). These core concepts involve cultural, social, religious, scientific, philosophic, moral, and political contents, belonging to the individual and collective existence of each one of us. The present work grounds itself on analytical reflection. We will speculate the most comprehensive and profound way we can and express the results of our thoughts. Notwithstanding the multidisciplinary nature of the subject and the methodological openness for accepting contributions from any field of science, this work belongs to the aim of psychology and ontology or, in other terms, social and ontological psychology. The main scope of this paper is to observe how some essential evolutionary attributes of humankind, like creativity, imagination, and association, can become a hazardous sickness, sheltered in the misty shadows of the intelligence. (shrink)

Discussions of group knowledge typically focus on whether a group’s knowledge that p reduces to group members’ knowledge that p. Drawing on the cumulative reading of collective knowledge ascriptions and considerations about the importance of the division of epistemic labour, I argue what I call the Fragmented Knowledge account, which allows for more complex relations between individual and collective knowledge. According to this account, a group can know an answer to a question in virtue of members of the group knowing (...) parts of that answer, when the whole answer is available to group-level action. I argue that this account explains a swathe of central cases of group knowledge, as well as explaining some central features of group knowledge. (shrink)

The adoption of an individualistic perspective on reasoning, choice and decision is a spring of paradoxes of conflicts. Usually the agents immerse in conflicts are drawn or modelled as rational individuals with targets well defined and full capabilities to access to information, without both temporal limitations and perfect reasoning abilities to obtain their preferences are taken account.However, other models of agent, in the bounded rationality perspective, could help to understand better the interrelationships. I adopt embedded argumentative reasoning processes as satisfying (...) criteria to analyze the expert function in a new socio technical environment that has changed deeply the mechanism and tools to access and to aggregate information. The open access to information and institutional arrangements addressed towards team knowledge could offer other kind of tools to affront the conflict, even its possible benefits.The “crowd expertise” is emerging as an actual possibility and it must be incorporated to affront with conflicts. The very possibility of obtaining knowledge generated by “many minds”, collective wisdoms, brings up a real challenge to the conservative or elitist conception of the masses, because masses now emerge as a smart collective user, with new mechanisms to select and produce quality knowledge. These new collective actions differ deeply from the traditional modes of social organization. A new mass society is emerging now as a hybrid one that breaks some conceptual traditional models, such as Ortega y Gasset’s ones, and induces a structured way of flourishing both new practices and new knowledge with transforming capabilities. (shrink)

We address the fundamental question why we should use PageRank and similar link-based algorithms in search engines, if at all. In a legendary article from 1998, the Google founders gave an intriguing wisdom-of-crowds justification for PageRank according to which the latter tracks quality online. This striking suggestion stands in contrast to the view that PageRank merely tracks what is popular. However, Masterton and Olsson showed that web-ecologies generated by Google-like assumptions essentially fail to reflect the scale-free structure of the web. (...) They pointed to attraction to popularity or a rich-get-richer effect being the likely main cause of scalefreeness. In this article, we explore dual models of linking behavior, i.e. models that combine attraction to importance with attraction to popularity. Our results, obtained through computer simulation, indicate that there exist dual models that give rise both to a wisdom-of-crowds effect for PageRank and to scale-free web-graphs, thus giving a partial vindication of the wisdom-of-crowds thesis for the real web. Future work should explore larger web-graphs as well as other aspects pertaining to the empirical plausibility of dual linking models. (shrink)

The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...) semi-negations. (shrink)

In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. -/- A family of influential cases suggests (...) standards of proof should not be interpreted numerically. These ‘proof paradoxes’ illustrate that purely statistical evidence can warrant high credence in a disputed fact without satisfying the relevant legal standard. In this essay I evaluate three influential attempts to explain why merely statistical evidence cannot satisfy legal standards. (shrink)

Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief (...) requirement is wrong, or lying isn’t interesting. I suggest an alternative necessary condition for lying on a degree-of-belief framework. (shrink)

When should a scientific community be cognitively diverse? This article presents a model for studying how the heterogeneity of learning heuristics used by scientist agents affects the epistemic efficiency of a scientific community. By extending the epistemic landscapes modeling approach introduced by Weisberg and Muldoon, the article casts light on the micro-mechanisms mediating cognitive diversity, coordination, and problem-solving efficiency. The results suggest that social learning and cognitive diversity produce epistemic benefits only when the epistemic community is faced with problems of (...) sufficient difficulty. (shrink)

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility function that (...) can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party's character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value. (shrink)

Those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices. These comments reveal an underlying presumption that scientists do best when left alone—when they operate in what we call the ‘scientific state of nature’. Through computer simulation, we challenge this presumption by illustrating an inefficiency that arises in the scientific state of nature. This inefficiency suggests that one cannot simply presume that science is most efficient when institutional control is (...) absent. In some situations, actively encouraging unpopular, risky science would improve scientific outcomes. 1 Introduction2 Scientists and Bandits3 Choosing an ϵ4 Structure of Communication5 Discussion. (shrink)

The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...) belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it. (shrink)

asked individuals to make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday events (e.g., cake baking times), and reported that predictions were optimal, employing Bayesian inference based on veridical prior distributions. Although the predictions conformed strikingly to statistics of the world, they reflect averages over many individuals. On the conjecture that the accuracy of the group response is chiefly a consequence of aggregating across individuals, we constructed simple, heuristic approximations to the Bayesian model premised on the hypothesis that individuals have (...) access merely to a sample of k instances drawn from the relevant distribution. The accuracy of the group response reported by Griffiths and Tenenbaum could be accounted for by supposing that individuals each utilize only two instances. Moreover, the variability of the group data is more consistent with this small‐sample hypothesis than with the hypothesis that people utilize veridical or nearly veridical representations of the underlying prior distributions. Our analyses lead to a qualitatively different view of how individuals reason from past experience than the view espoused by Griffiths and Tenenbaum. (shrink)

Controversy over the epistemology of disagreement endures because there is an unnoticed factor at work: the intrinsic value we give to self-trust. Even if there are many instances of disagreement where, from a strictly epistemic or rational point of view, we ought to suspend belief, there are other values at work that influence our all-things considered judgments about what we ought to believe. Hence those who would give equal-weight to both sides in many cases of disagreement may be right, from (...) the perspective of pure rationality. But their critics are right too, in seeing something undesirable in the consequences of giving equal weight. Among epistemologists, there is a tendency to set aside trust and other such non-epistemic factors, on the grounds that these are not germane to their topic. But ultimately, the value of self-trust shows signs of encroaching on the strictly epistemic question of when our beliefs may be said to be justified. Hence again, even if the equal-weighters are right about what is rational, they may be wrong about what knowledge requires. (shrink)

Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues. This amounts to a fascinating and disturbing kind of intellectual scepticism. A crucial piece of the sceptical argument, however, is that our opponents on such topics are epistemic peers. In this paper, I examine the reasons for why we might think that our opponents really are such peers, and I argue that those reasons are either too weak or too strong, (...) implying absurd conclusions. Thus, there is not a compelling case for disagreement-based intellectual scepticism. (shrink)

When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.

Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does (...) not have to be a difference in outright beliefs in order for the parties to disagree. I argue that the idea of credal disagreement allows us to make sense of otherwise problematic cases of disagreement involving epistemic modals. I also discuss how these ideas can be extended to cases of correction and retraction. (shrink)

The claim that diversity and independence have a net positive epistemic effect on the judgments of groups has been recently defended formally by Scott Page, among others, and popularized in Surowiecki's The Wisdom of Crowds. In Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds Thorn and Schurz take issue with the claim that more diversity and independence in groups leads to better collective judgments. I argue that Thorn and Schurz's arguments are helpful in clarifying a number of over-generalizations about diversity and independence (...) that are often circulated in the social epistemology literature. I also argue that the relevant formal arguments are easily misunderstood when presented 'in a vacuum', that is, without a context of application in mind. I provide a different approach to understanding formal results in social epistemology: With the help of concrete scenarios and the formal literature, I focus on a trade-off between independence and dependence in groups. I show that the approach works well also for another principle in social epistemology; namely, the principle that 'more heads are better than few'. (shrink)

I defend Conciliationism: rationality requires belief revision of epistemic peers who find themselves in disagreement and lack dispute-independent reason to suspect each other of error. (Kelly 2010) argues that Conciliationists are committed to the Uniqueness Thesis: a given body of evidence rationalizes a unique degree of confidence for a given proposition. (Ballantyne & Coffman 2012) cogently critique Kelly's argument and propose an improved version. I contend that their version of the argument is unsound, and I offer some friendly amendments. But (...) I show that even this amended argument threatens only extreme versions of Conciliationism. (shrink)

In the final part, Arrow's own formal treatment of the social choice problem is examined and its relation to the preference aggregation model is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to Arrow's discussion of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and, with the aid of some additional formal work, much of what has been found problematic in this is resolved. Finally, this analysis is used as the basis of a critique of the "received view" in the literature about independence of irrelevant alternatives. ;In (...) the second part, several formal results from the literature are adapted to the present formal framework and interpreted in preference aggregation terms. These include both characterization theorems for specific classes of decision rules, and impossibility results, such as the Arrow theorem itself. Most of these results utilize the requirement of context-independence, and its role in the proofs is analyzed. Some discussion as well is offered about the characterization of rules that do not satisfy the requirement of context--independence. ;The treatment of these matters is divided into three parts. In the first part, the basic formal representation of preference aggregation rules is laid out. A variety of the formal conditions from the literature are stated and discussed in preference aggregation terms. Several of the conditions usually called "rational choice" or "revealed preference" conditions are included. One of these, here called the "Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference", is singled out as the formal embodiment of the requirement of context-independence. Various examples of preference aggregation rules are stated and assessed vis-a-vis the formal conditions presented. ;A subsidiary theme, which is dealt with throughout much of the discussion, is the nature, import, and desirability of independence-or-irrelevant-alternatives conditions. A general informal requirement on preference aggregation rules, which is called "the requirement of context-independence", is characterized. This requirement, it is argued, is a basis for the proper understanding of the several formal conditions that have been called "independence of irrelevant alternatives" in the literature. A variety of formal results, including a new version of Arrow's "General Possibility Result" for social choice rules, are offered in support of this contention. ;The purpose of this work is to provide an analysis of the interrelationships among formal models for choice under conditions of uncertainty, social choice, and multicriterial decision-making. A simplified version of the usual formalism for the first named of these problems is adopted. It is argued that this can be used, with appropriate interpretations, for all three problems. Decision rules for these problems are construed in the abstract form of preference aggregation rules: rules for the selection of alternatives which are "best", in some sense, in the face of conflicting evaluations. The multicriterial interpretation is taken as a touchstone for the understanding of the proposed model. (shrink)