Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199(3–4):8701–8740, 2021) and Steel and Bartha (Risk Analysis 43(2):260–268, 2023) argue that we should understand the precautionary principle as the injunction to maximise lexical utilities. They show that the lexical utility model has important pragmatic advantages. Moreover, the model has the theoretical advantage of satisfying all axioms of expected utility theory except continuity. In this paper I raise a trilemma for any attempt at modelling the precautionary principle with lexical utilities: it permits choice cycles or (...) leads to paralysis or implies that the smallest value difference that is possible in a context has extreme axiological implications. (shrink)

Epistemic systems—distributed configurations of human agents, algorithms, data infrastructures, and institutions that collectively generate, filter, and revise knowledge claims—exhibit persistent tensions among three capacities: registration (the entry of counterevidence into the formal record), traceability (the ability to locate errors to their specific sources), and receptivity (the capacity to sustain heterodox claims and implement corrective actions). This paper introduces the Correction Trilemma as a diagnostic heuristic for identifying such tensions and guiding institutional reflection. Under realistic constraints—bounded rationality, finite resources, and (...) functional interdependence—efforts to strengthen any two of these capacities often impose costs on the third. The term "trilemma" is used to denote this recurring pattern of trade offs, not an impossibility theorem. The framework provides a conceptual vocabulary and three pathological patterns (Corrective Chaos, Elite Dogmatism, Analytical Paralysis) that help diagnose which dimension is systematically sacrificed. We illustrate the heuristic through case studies drawn from psychology's replication crisis, AI based medical diagnosis, and climate modeling intercomparisons (CMIP), showing how trade offs can be managed but not eliminated. The framework is offered as a complement to existing philosophical and metascience work—a common language for analyzing correction dynamics, anticipating unintended consequences of reforms, and designing more self aware epistemic systems. (shrink)

Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199(3–4):8701–8740, 2021) and Steel and Bartha (Risk Analysis 43(2):260–268, 2023) argue that we should understand the precautionary principle as the injunction to maximise lexical utilities. They show that the lexical utility model has important pragmatic advantages. Moreover, the model has the theoretical advantage of satisfying all axioms of expected utility theory except continuity. In this paper I raise a trilemma for any attempt at modelling the precautionary principle with lexical utilities: it permits choice cycles or (...) leads to paralysis or implies that the smallest value difference that is possible in a context has extreme axiological implications. (shrink)

Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses reasons for accepting and rejecting each (...) of the three claims. By developing a substantive notion of modes of presentation as constituting nonconceptual content, she argues that the trilemma is best resolved by giving up (C3). In doing so, she discusses the nature of mental content and its relation to bodily skills and conceptual capacities as well as the notion of conceptual and nonconceptual content. (shrink)

According to the trilemma claim, we cannot have all three of equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice. In response to the trilemma, John Rawls famously sacrificed equality by introducing incentives. In contrast, GA Cohen and others argued that we can, in fact, have all three provided that individuals are properly motivated by an egalitarian ethos. The incentives debate, then, concerns the plausibility of the ethos solution versus the plausibility of the incentives solution. Considerable ink has been spilled (...) on both sides of the debate. Yet, in this essay, I argue that we cannot have this debate until we clarify the terms. Once we clarify the terms, however, we might discover that there is no debate to be had. This is because, depending on how equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice are interpreted, there might not be a trilemma in the first place. Specifically, I use a small but crucial distinction in how equality, the egalitarian ethos, and Pareto are assessed – what I call the internal/external distinction – to disentangle the various paths each solution – the ethos or incentives – could take. I conclude that both solutions have gained illicit plausibility by virtue of not keeping the distinction straight. (shrink)

This short review raises a trilemma for Chris Voparil’s reading of Richard Rorty. Voparil must deny one of three things. He must deny that Rorty affirmed a Jamesian approach to metaethics; he must deny that Rorty affirmed a version of Peircean realism; or, he must deny that Rorty treated all domains of discourse roughly the same. Because Rorty is quite clear in his commitment to the first and third theses and far less clear in affirming Peircean realism, I argue (...) that Voparil is forced to give up attributing realism to Rorty or must simply concede that his version of Rorty is incoherent. (shrink)

Singularitarianism is a view that is grounded in certain claims about the technological singularity. In this paper, I identify a trilemma that confronts singularitarianism. This trilemma may be characterized in terms of the following horns: the concept of a technological singularity having a literal sense, the concept of a technological singularity having a metaphorical sense, and the concept of a technological singularity having neither a literal nor a metaphorical sense (i.e., its being nonsensical). I will outline the unpalatable (...) consequences that are associated with each of these three horns of the trilemma. I will also anticipate a few argumentative moves on behalf of singularitarianism and suggest why these moves may be insufficient. I will conclude by arguing that we have good philosophical grounds to defend an eliminativism about the concept of the technological singularity. (shrink)

Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science‐based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized (...) metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science‐based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science‐based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science‐independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics. (shrink)

The present paper makes the following points. The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. Not (...) unlike Zeno, Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim, but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues.. Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus. (shrink)

In this article, we consider several responses to Wittgenstein’s private language argument (PLA) beginning with A.J. Ayer’s “Robinson Crusoe” thought experiment from his 1954 symposium with Rush Rhees. While I’ll claim that Ayer’s response is unsound and doesn’t imperil a properly understood version of the PLA, it does point towards more enduring concerns. Even if private language is impossible, the PLA may not preclude the possibility of “solitary” speakers –isolated individuals who are the sole speakers of languages they develop, even (...) though others could later learn these languages. I present an analysis of these problems as a trilemma for defenders of the PLA and offer a response that suggests some ways to defuse it. (shrink)

Authors critical of corporate power focus almost exclusively on one solution: bringing it under democratic control. However important this is, there are at least two other options, which are rarely discussed: reducing powerful firms’ size and influence, or accepting corporate power as a necessary evil. This article provides a comparative perspective for evaluating all three options. It argues that the trade-offs we face in responding to corporate power have a trilemmatic structure. The pure strategies of accepting powerful firms, breaking them (...) up, or rendering them more accountable are each incompatible with one of three important values: power balance, economies of scale, and minimizing agency costs, respectively. While the latter two concepts are purely economic and efficiency-based, the value of power balance can be grounded in a variety of reasons. Different normative interpretations of power balance are discussed, along with their implications for policy choices within the trilemma. (shrink)

Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental (...) existence. Recently, Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine’s tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call ‘dynamic absolutism’. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine’s trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable. (shrink)

A principal aim of the branch of ethics called ‘population theory’ or ‘population ethics’ is to find a plausible welfarist axiology, capable of comparing total outcomes with respect to value. This has proved an exceedingly difficult task. In this paper I shall state and discuss two ‘trilemmas’, or choices between three unappealing alternatives, which the population ethicist must face. The first trilemma is not new. It originates with Derek Parfit's well-known ‘Mere Addition Paradox’, and was first explicitly stated by (...) Yew-Kwang Ng. I shall argue that one horn of this trilemma is less unattractive than Parfit and others have claimed. The second trilemma, which is a kind of mirror image of the first, appears hitherto to have gone unnoticed. Apart from attempting to resolve the two trilemmas, I shall suggest certain features which I believe a plausible welfarist axiology should possess. The details of this projected axiology will, however, be left open. (shrink)

In der Erkenntnistheorie führt das von Hans Albert so genannte Münchhausen-Trilemma an die Grenzen von Begründungen und Rechtfertigungen. Da diese immer in einen infiniten Regress, Zirkel oder Abbruch münden, ist absolut sicheres, letztbegründetes Wissen nicht möglich. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Erkenntnistheorie zeigen jedoch, dass sich die Rechtfertigungen unserer Überzeugungen vielleicht doch tiefer fundieren lassen als bislang gedacht, und dass die Erkenntnisgrenzen erweitert und im Hinblick auf skeptische Argumente genauer bestimmt werden können, wenn der epistemologische Internalismus eingeschränkt werden muss. Die (...) Kosmologie und Metaphysik stoßen aufgrund des Münchhausen-Trilemmas ebenfalls an Grenzen. Dies lässt sich an zwei besonders brisanten Fragen kritisch illustrieren (auch wenn die zahlreichen Antwortversuche und Argumente hier nicht im Detail dargestellt werden können): Wie kam es zum Urknall? Und warum ist etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts? Dabei markiert das Münchhausen-Trilemma nicht nur die explanatorischen Probleme, sondern auch die physikalischen und metaphysischen Möglichkeiten: Der infinite Regress entspricht einem ewigen Kosmos (mit womöglich unendlich vielen Urknall-Ereignissen ohne einen allerersten) beziehungsweise einer unaufhörlichen Kontingenz; der Abbruch entspricht einem absoluten Anfang beziehungsweise einem fundamentalen, unhintergehbaren, womöglich metaphysisch notwendigen Prinzip oder einem unerklärlichen Zufall; und der Zirkel entspricht einem kosmologischen Zeitschleifen-Modell beziehungsweise spekulativen metaphysischen Selbstfundierungsprinzipien. Einerseits sind diese Alternativen letztlich alle unbefriedigend, andererseits stellt die undogmatische epistemische Bescheidenheit, die daraus resultieren sollte, zugleich eine wichtige Einsicht dar, die die beste Voraussetzung ist für weitere Forschungen und somit für einen Fortschritt in der wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Erkundung unserer Welt und unserer Wissensgrenzen. (shrink)

Recent discussions of acquaintance typically assume three claims: (i) acquaintance is a form of knowledge of qualitative character, (ii) acquaintance constitutes phenomenal consciousness, and (iii) necessarily, mental qualities are phenomenally conscious. This paper argues that, although each claim is independently attractive, together they generate a trilemma. Drawing on a general anti-triviality constraint on first-order empirical knowledge, I argue that if acquaintance both constitutes consciousness and is directed at necessarily conscious qualities, then the object of acquaintance becomes metaphysically dependent on (...) the epistemic relation itself. In that case, acquaintance fails to disclose an independently existing object and thereby its epistemic significance is trivialized. Acquaintance theorists can retain any two of these commitments but not all three. I map the resulting logical space, sketch the principal costs of abandoning each limb of the triad, and call on acquaintance theorists to take a principled stand on which limb of the triad they are willing to abandon or revise. (shrink)

Much of the recent literature on higher-order evidence has revolved around the following three theses. First, one’s credence in any given proposition _p_ should rationally reflect one’s evidence _e_ bearing on the truth of _p_. Second, one’s credence in any given higher-order proposition _p′_ (concerning the evidential relation between _e_ and _p_) should rationally reflect one’s evidence _e′_ bearing on the truth of _p′_. Third, it is epistemically irrational to have a high credence in _p_ based on _e_, while having (...) a high credence that _e_ does not support _p_, or that one’s processing of _e_ is somehow faulty (_The Non-Akrasia Requirement)_. All three theses are prima facie plausible, yet they jointly lead to inconsistencies. This is what might be called _The Akratic Trilemma_. This chapter assesses two recent responses to The Akratic Trilemma (Titelbaum 2015; Lasonen-Aarnio 2014), argues that both responses fail, and offers a novel way out of the Trilemma.​Keywords. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Wilfrid Sellars argued that Kant’s account of the conceptual structures involved in experience can be given a linguistic turn so as to provide an analytic account of the resources a language must have in order to be the bearer of empirical knowledge. In this paper I examine the methodological aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy that Sellars took to be fundamental to influential themes in his own philosophy. My first aim here is to clarify and argue for the plausibility of (...) what I claim is Sellars’ interpretation of Kant’s ‘analytic’ transcendental method in the first Critique, based ultimately on non-trivial analytic truths concerning the concept of an object of our possible experience. Kant’s ‘transcendental proofs’ thereby avoid a certain methodological trilemma confronting the candidate premises of any such proof, taken from Sellars’ 1970s undergraduate exam question on Kant. In part II of the essay I conclude by highlighting in general terms how Kant’s method, as interpreted in the analytic manner explained in part I, was adapted by Sellars to produce some of the more influential aspects of his own philosophy, expressed in terms of what he contends is their sustainable reformulation in light of the so-called linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy. (shrink)

The Continuum Hypothesis seems to be a counterexample to David Chalmers’s A Priori Scrutability thesis, according to which there is a compact class of truths from which all truths are a priori scrutable. Chalmers’s three-part answer to this problem runs as follows: either the Continuum Hypothesis is indeterminate; or adding a new axiom will settle the issue; or, if these two options do not work, we should add the Continuum Hypothesis to the scrutability base. I argue that Chalmers’s answer is (...) unsatisfactory: the first horn of the trilemma can be interpreted in several ways, and either it departs from common mathematical practice and rests on weak analogies, or it shares the same problems with two other horns; the second horn does not provide good reasons to believe that from a fixed system of axioms all truths about our world are scrutable; the third horn of the trilemma renders Chalmers’s project empty. (shrink)

Critics have long dismissed paternalistic choice architecture as conceptually muddled at best and oxymoronic at worst. In this article, I argue that this criticism remains true despite recent replies to the contrary. Further, I suggest that a similar conceptual criticism also applies to non-paternalistic choice architecture. This is due to a three-way tension between the effectiveness, avoidability, and distinctiveness of each nudge. To illustrate this tension, I provide a novel explanation of the mechanics of nudging and a taxonomy of these (...) interventions. I then argue that choice architects who defend the distinctiveness of nudging according to how it guides our behaviour via our unreflective intuitive reasoning encounter a trilemma because the distinctiveness of nudging hinges on interventions being both avoidable and effective. Choice architects cannot achieve this aim without harnessing both our automatic and reflective systems of thought in tandem. However, this diminishes the distinctive character of nudging by bringing it closer to other traditional policy interventions. This establishes the choice architect’s trilemma: a nudge is likely to be either ineffective, effective via some morally unacceptable means, or effective in a manner that is conceptually indistinct from other evidence-based policy interventions. (shrink)

This paper addresses the foundations of Teleological Individualism, the view that organisms, even non-sentient organisms, are goal-oriented systems while biological collectives, such as ecosystems or conspecific groups, are mere assemblages of organisms. Typical defenses of Teleological Individualism ground the teleological organization of organisms in the workings of natural selection. This paper shows that grounding teleological organization in natural selection is antithetical to Teleological Individualism because such views assume a view about the units of selection on which it is only individual (...) organisms that are units of selection. However, none of the Conventionalist, Reductionist, or Multi-Level Realist theories serve to justify such an assumption. Thus, Teleological Individualism cannot be grounded in natural selection. (shrink)

There are three attractive principles that are held by many desert theorists. (1) Character-Desert Principle: A person’s character is a ground of moral desert. (2) Limited Responsibility for Character Principle: Persons are not fully morally responsible for their character. (3) Moral Responsibility Principle: If something grounds moral desert in a person, then she is fully morally responsible for it. Each of these principles is backed by some strong intuitions or arguments. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the (...) Moral Responsibility Principle. This principle is not supported by an analysis of act-based desert. This rejection is in line with the observation that desert is affected by a number of factors that are outside of an individual’s control, e.g., degree of autonomy and desire content. It also fits with an explanation of desert in terms of fittingness. (shrink)

This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and (...) infinitism. (shrink)

According to Agrippa's trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are (...) rationally unjustifiable. (shrink)

This article aims to question the value of impartiality in environmental ethics by highlighting a problem internal to the bioethics approach known as sentiocentrism. The principle that all beings with the same degree of consciousness should receive the same moral treatment would lead to a trilemma, i.e., the need to choose among three morally unacceptable choices. I argue those problems are related to the premise, shared by Utilitarianism and rights-centered theories, that impartiality is the constitutive feature of the moral (...) point of view. In the last part of my article, I discuss how this problem points to some advantages of a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics. (shrink)

While the contemporary problem of the criterion raises similar epistemological issues as Agrippa’s Trilemma in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, the consideration of such epistemological questions has served two different purposes. On one hand, there is the purely practical purpose of Pyrrhonism, in which such questions are a means to reach suspension of judgment, and on the other hand, there is the theoretical purpose of contemporary epistemologists, in which these issues raise theoretical problems that drive the search for theoretical resolution. In (...) classical India, similar issues arise in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī, but it is not entirely clear what Nāgārjuna’s purpose is. Contrary to the theoretical interpretations of several recent scholars such as Jan Westerhoff according to which Nāgārjuna is proffering a contextualist epistemological theory, I argue that Nāgārjuna as well as the later Madhyamaka Candrakīrti, much like Pyrrhonian skeptics, employed concerns about epistemic criteria in service of purely practical purposes. There is no positive epistemological theory to be found in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī and Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā; furthermore a putative thesis of universal emptiness is self-undermining, a conclusion which itself can be seen as part of a therapeutic program. Nonetheless, the historical persistence of these epistemological issues shows that they ought to continue to be areas of theoretical inquiry for epistemologists today. I end with reflections on the wider relevance of my conclusions, particularly with regard to demonstrating the value of philosophy. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument is the main inference-to-the-best-explanation kind of argument for scientific realism, and the pessimistic induction is considered a main, if not the main, challenge for a NMA-based scientific realism. Doppelt advocates a new kind of inference-to-the-best-explanation supported scientific realism that he labels Best Theory Realism. If successful in replacing standard selective realism as the best version of scientific realism, BTR would be particularly good since it is not committed to the partial truth of past theories and thereby it (...) is immune to the antirealist strategy of finding cases of past, predictively successful theories with predictively essential components not retained by later theories. The goal of this paper is to raise doubts about Doppelt’s attempt and argue that, other benefits of his proposal notwithstanding, it fails. In section 1 I summarize the main tenets of standard, retentive selective realism relevant for the present discussion. In section 2 I show that Doppelt’s main arguments against retentive selective realism do not work. In section 3, I argue that the way BTR faces the challenge posed by the historical record that motivates PI is unsatisfactory and puts Doppelt into a fatal trilemma: either he is committed to two claims that are untenable together; or endorses an extremely implausible form of present-science chauvinism; or unjustifiably discriminates explanation against prediction in historical record. The conclusion is that BTR falls short of substituting standard retentive selective realism as the most plausible realist position, and that thereby the cases of past successful theories with predictively essential parts not retained by posterior theories are still a real problem for a plausible realist position. (shrink)

It is common to base an inferential semantics on a social, normative pragmatics, thus conceiving meaning as consisting in certain normative relations (Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom). This position faces a trilemma, which is of wider application, concerning all normative statements: (1) Normative statements are true or false. Regarding a certain normative statement as true does not imply that it is true, not even if a whole community takes the statement in question to be true (cognitivism). (2) There are no normative (...) entities in the world that make normative statements true (naturalism). (3) It is not possible to deduce normative statements from descriptive statements (naturalistic fallacy). Each of these principles is well grounded considered in isolation, but their conjunction is inconsistent. We have to give up one of these principles. I shall argue in favour of abandoning (3) and outline a naturalistic account of the normative relations that constitute meaning in an inferentialist perspective, while preserving the objectivity of meaning. (shrink)

Das Begründungs- oder Münchhausen-Trilemma spielt bei wissenschaftstheoretischen Positionsbeschreibungen häufig eine bedeutende Rolle. Gleichwohl sind Präzisierungen des darin behaupteten Sachverhalts bislang ausgeblieben. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird der Versuch einer formalen Rekonstruktion zum Anlaβ genommen, einen verallgemeinerten Baum- und Zirkularitätsbegriff vorzustellen.

This dissertation examines how we should respond to situations in which a person acts profoundly imprudently. We can, e.g., imagine the motorcyclist who prefers to drive without insurance and without a helmet. How should we, or the policy-makers, counter such imprudent activities performed by others? One option is that we do nothing, meaning that we do not interfere with other people’s imprudent behaviour, at the same time refraining from providing assistance in cases where the risk of the activities materialises. A (...) second option is to provide unconditional assistance to the person in need by taxing everyone. A third option is that we regulate the risky activity prior to the accident (e.g. by forcing the person to take out insurance, imposing security measures, or perhaps banning the activity in question). No matter what we choose, our choice seems to compromise at least one of the following moral considerations: i) satisfying sufficiency, ii) avoiding paternalism, or iii) internalising the costs associated with the risky activities (so that the persons performing the activities carry the relevant costs). For the same reason, it has been pointed out that together the three considerations constitute a trilemma, the so-called ‘imprudence trilemma.’ The dissertation argues that we should accept paternalism when people act so imprudently that they risk suffering serious, absolute deprivation as a result (i.e. in cases of relevance to the trilemma). That is not to say that we should always interfere when a person acts profoundly imprudently. The paternalistic view defended is that it is a good and relevant (but not necessarily decisive) reason in favour of interfering with a person’s voluntary choices that such interference will promote the person’s interests or well-being. Pace the anti-paternalistic view, I argue that such reasons should be included in the assessment of policies and actions that interfere with people’ liberty or autonomy. (shrink)

This chapter provides a geometrical map of global legal thought from the discussions of Habermasian, Luhmannian, and Dworkinian approaches. In this inquiry, it suggests that the three patterns have different normative preferences on ordering the same social space. With the coordinate system of global legal method, this chapter shows that these normative preferences are mutually irreconcilable and that the search for a single right answer of global legal method is a tilting at windmills. This futility of a single, unified theoretical (...) approach is what I call the Plurality Trilemma. (shrink)

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a (...) definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for the location of immanent universals, the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it makes extended simples impossible. (shrink)

I discuss the trilemma that consists of the following three principles being inconsistent: 1. The Common Principle: if one distribution, A, necessarily brings a higher total sum of personal value that is distributed in a more egalitarian way than another distribution, B, A is more valuable than B. 2. (Weak) ex-ante Pareto: if one uncertain distribution, A, is more valuable than another uncertain distribution, B, for each patient, A is more valuable than B. 3. Pluralism about attitudes to risk (...) (Pluralism): the personal value of a prospect is a weighted sum of the values of the prospect’s outcomes, but the weight each outcome gets might be different from the probability the prospect assigns to the outcome. (shrink)

Here I will explore through a literature review three important but different ways in which skepticism has been developed. The first is that of the Gettier problem and its potentially skeptical implications for knowledge. The second is Agrippa’s Trilemma, in which the non-skeptic ostensibly struggles to develop a satisfactory account of epistemic justification. Third and lastly, there are brain-in-a-vat scenarios, as one attempts to meet the skeptic’s challenge of having knowledge of the external world. I conclude that the above (...) are important challenges while still maintaining that the non-skeptic has formulated responses worth our consideration. (shrink)

Over the last years, both in the popular press, policy and business circles and in academia, people call for corporations to orient their behavior towards ‘purpose’. This is meant as a move away from shareholder value maximization as the lodestar for corporate action. But purpose-advocates are torn between two directions in thinking about corporate governance: towards corporate governance on behalf of stakeholders by an independent board, and towards corporate governance by stakeholders through a responsive board. The paper’s aim is to (...) enlighten this choice by placing it in a trilemma with a third option: corporate governance on behalf of shareholders. This corporate governance trilemma shows us which trade-offs are at stake in making choices between the relevant values: the minimization of externalities, collective decision-making costs and agency costs. It discusses the various trade-offs in the trilemma. Finally, the paper argues that corporate purpose is best served by a balance between board independence and responsiveness. (shrink)

Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that explains (...) success in the practice of meaning something by an utterance. I will argue that Davidson’s objections to the sceptical problem and solution are misplaced as they rely on a misconstrual of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view. I will also argue that Davidson’s alternative solution to the sceptical problem is implausible, since it fails to block the route to the sceptical problem. I will then offer a problematic trilemma for Davidson. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...) regress and, plausibly, to skepticism. The article argues that the third alternative, accepting basic knowledge but rejecting easy knowledge, entails closure failure. This is obviously the case for deductive bootstrapping, but, notably, the problem also arises for inductive bootstrapping. Hence, the set of problems related to the easy knowledge problem has the structure of a trilemma. We are forced to accept easy knowledge, closure failure, or skepticism. (shrink)

Many believe that, _ceteris paribus_, neurointerventions on convicted criminals that render reoffending less likely are morally more problematic than comparable indirect interventions, such as compulsory attendance at anger management classes. One justification for this view appeals to the putative fact that persons have moral ownership over themselves—their bodies and minds—and that neurointerventions violate or infringe this right. Suppose, however, that the mind is extended outside the skull and spreads into the external world. Because the most important object one owns, inasmuch (...) as one owns oneself, is one’s mind and because claims to original ownership over things outside one’s body are much less plausible than the self-ownership thesis, the extended mind thesis weakens the attraction of the latter thesis. Because the extended mind thesis is true, self-ownership-based arguments for the relevant moral asymmetry are not sound. Admittedly, there are objections to neurointerventions not based on self-ownership, but these are less attractive, often based on contingent empirical facts, and, in some cases, might also be weakened by the extended mind thesis. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to global legal thought. It argues that economic globalization and digitalization have induced significant insecurity about the future of human social organization. While traditional international law as a system based on the consent of national states is in the process of rapid adaptation to its new social preconditions, a variety of transnational regulatory levels compete for legal authority. In this process of change, there is more need than ever to guide the theoretical understanding because (...) academic concepts have a crucial influence on the emerging practice of global law. This book highlights which choices are available and argues that global law requires taking a stand in mutually irreconcilable choices. (shrink)

This paper will examine the Küng-Armstrong trilemma against Class Nominalism. We will see that combining Class Nominalism and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) can provide us with a sophisticated version of Class Nominalism, namely ZF-Class Nominalism, which successfully addresses the objection and leads to a moderate version of ineffabilism about the putative set-membership relation.

The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief is (...) supported by an infinite series of supporting reasons. This paper argues that showing this makes problems for the infinitist. The finite minds problem that prevents completion of an infinite series is well documented. This paper examines alternative attempts to provide evidence of infinity that the infinitist might take, whether by using a notion of justification without infinite reasons or by altering the notion of evidence. It concludes that both of these fail and consequently infinitism is unable to offer a solution to Agrippa’s trilemma. (shrink)

It is generally acknowledged that most accounts of distributive justice face a trilemma pertaining to agents who are badly off, or risk becoming so, due to their own imprudent behavior: If we a) leave such agents to their own devices, some might perish, which is harsh (Harshness). If we b) force such agents to buy insurance, for their own good (or ban certain risky activities), we act paternalistically (Paternalism). If we c) secure sufficiency for such agents by taxing everyone, (...) we exploit the prudent (Exploitation). This paper discusses how luck egalitarianism should handle this trilemma. The view defended is that luck egalitarianism should avoid Harshness and Paternalism, and accept Exploitation, by incorporating a sufficientarian constraint. The paper further shows how this can be done without violating core luck egalitarian commitments. Lastly, the paper asks whether securing sufficiency for the imprudent really amounts to exploitation as such, and whether it is, in any case, unfair. (shrink)

According to one reading of the thesis of Humean Supervenience, most famously defended by David Lewis, certain ‘fundamental’ (non-modal) facts entail all there is but do not supervene on less fundamental facts. However, in this paper I prove that it follows from Lewis' possible world semantics for counterfactuals, in particular his Centring condition, that all non-modal facts supervene on counterfactuals. Humeans could respond to this result by either giving up Centring or abandoning the idea that the most fundamental facts do (...) not supervene on less fundamental facts. I argue that either response should in general be acceptable to Humeans: the first since there is nothing particularly Humean about Centring; the latter since Humeans should, independently of the result I present, be sceptical that the supervenience of one fact upon another by itself says anything about ‘fundamentality’. (shrink)