Abstract

This dissertation examines how we should respond to situations in which a person acts profoundly imprudently. We can, e.g., imagine the motorcyclist who prefers to drive without insurance and without a helmet. How should we, or the policy-makers, counter such imprudent activities performed by others? One option is that we do nothing, meaning that we do not interfere with other people’s imprudent behaviour, at the same time refraining from providing assistance in cases where the risk of the activities materialises. A second option is to provide unconditional assistance to the person in need by taxing everyone. A third option is that we regulate the risky activity prior to the accident (e.g. by forcing the person to take out insurance, imposing security measures, or perhaps banning the activity in question). No matter what we choose, our choice seems to compromise at least one of the following moral considerations: i) satisfying sufficiency, ii) avoiding paternalism, or iii) internalising the costs associated with the risky activities (so that the persons performing the activities carry the relevant costs). For the same reason, it has been pointed out that together the three considerations constitute a trilemma, the so-called ‘imprudence trilemma.’ The dissertation argues that we should accept paternalism when people act so imprudently that they risk suffering serious, absolute deprivation as a result (i.e. in cases of relevance to the trilemma). That is not to say that we should always interfere when a person acts profoundly imprudently. The paternalistic view defended is that it is a good and relevant (but not necessarily decisive) reason in favour of interfering with a person’s voluntary choices that such interference will promote the person’s interests or well-being. Pace the anti-paternalistic view, I argue that such reasons should be included in the assessment of policies and actions that interfere with people’ liberty or autonomy.