Solving which trilemma? The many interpretations of equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (3):282-307 (2017)
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Abstract

According to the trilemma claim, we cannot have all three of equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice. In response to the trilemma, John Rawls famously sacrificed equality by introducing incentives. In contrast, GA Cohen and others argued that we can, in fact, have all three provided that individuals are properly motivated by an egalitarian ethos. The incentives debate, then, concerns the plausibility of the ethos solution versus the plausibility of the incentives solution. Considerable ink has been spilled on both sides of the debate. Yet, in this essay, I argue that we cannot have this debate until we clarify the terms. Once we clarify the terms, however, we might discover that there is no debate to be had. This is because, depending on how equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice are interpreted, there might not be a trilemma in the first place. Specifically, I use a small but crucial distinction in how equality, the egalitarian ethos, and Pareto are assessed – what I call the internal/external distinction – to disentangle the various paths each solution – the ethos or incentives – could take. I conclude that both solutions have gained illicit plausibility by virtue of not keeping the distinction straight.

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Kristi A. Olson
Bowdoin College

References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.
A theory of justice.John Rawls - 1999 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. A. Cohen - 2008 - Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.

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