The contemporary physical description of the universe reflects the inanimate world only. Broadening this description by including life may limit the application of well?established physical laws and may find new forces of the universe governing living organizations. This may also require adoption of some new assumptions and methodological principles, such as a broader principle of uncertainty, and recognition of the fact that humans? ability to manifest biofield communication is distributed very unevenly in the population. Based on available body of (...) scientific literature it is suggested that at this time, before the theoretical basis of the biofield is developed, it is important to conduct a broad experimental study of highly psi?gifted individuals in order to accumulate scientific knowledge of humans? ability to interact with matter, i.e., known physical fields and living organisms by intent. One can expect that current studies of organisms? genomes and attempts to utilize stem cells in medicine will call for the recognition of the biofield and its operative control function in organisms. However, developing a from?the?top?down view on the organism by the suggested approach will shorten this process and it deserves appropriate investment of social resources. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the distinction between "negative" and "positive" duties. Special attention will be given to certain criticism raised against this distinction by Michael Tooley.

Medical rules of eligibility permit severely injured Iraqi and Afghan nationals to receive care in Coalition medical facilities only if bed space is available and their injuries result directly from Coalition fire. The first rule favors Coalition soldiers over host-nation nationals and contradicts the principle of impartial, needs-based medical care. To justify preferential care for compatriots, wartime medicine invokes associative obligations of care that favor friends, family, and comrades-in-arms. Associative obligations have little place in peacetime medical care but significantly affect (...) wartime medicine. The second rule suggests liability for collateral harm that is unsupported by international law and military ethics. Absent liability, there are pragmatic reasons to offer medical care to injured local civilians if it quells resentment and cements support for Coalition forces. In contrast to peacetime medicine, military necessity and associative obligations outweigh distributive principles based on medical need during war. (shrink)

Medical rules of eligibility permit severely injured Iraqi and Afghan nationals to receive care in Coalition medical facilities only if bed space is available and their injuries result directly from Coalition fire. The first rule favors Coalition soldiers over host-nation nationals and contradicts the principle of impartial, needs-based medical care. To justify preferential care for compatriots, wartime medicine invokes associative obligations of care that favor friends, family, and comrades-in-arms. Associative obligations have little place in peacetime medical care but significantly affect (...) wartime medicine. The second rule suggests liability for collateral harm that is unsupported by international law and military ethics. Absent liability, there are pragmatic reasons to offer medical care to injured local civilians if it quells resentment and cements support for Coalition forces. In contrast to peacetime medicine, military necessity and associative obligations outweigh distributive principles based on medical need during war. (shrink)

To explore how cultural beliefs are reflected in different popular views of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for human leukocyte antigen match (popularly known as “savior siblings”), we compare the reception and interpretations, in Germany and Israel, of the novel/film My Sister’s Keeper. Qualitative analysis of reviews, commentaries and posts is used to classify and compare normative assessments of PGD for HLA and how they reproduce, negotiate or oppose the national policy and its underlying cultural and ethical premises. Four major themes emanated (...) from the comparison: loss of self-determination and autonomy; loss of dignity through instrumentalization; eugenics and euthanasia; and saving life. In both countries, most commentaries represented a dominant position, with a few negotiated positions. We also highlight the decoding of a relatively less explored bioethical aspect of My Sister’s Keeper’s narrative, namely the meaning of euthanasia. We conclude by discussing how the findings relate to attempts of providing cultural explanations for the regulation of HLA-PGD. (shrink)

Our daily experience, dominated by the corporate clock that so many of us contort ourselves to fit inside, is destroying us. It wasn't built for people, it was built for profit. This is a book that tears open the seams of reality as we know it-the way we experience time itself-and rearranges it, reimagining a world not centered around work, the office clock, or the profit motive. Explaining how we got to the point where time became money, Odell offers us (...) new models to live by--inspired by pre-industrial cultures, ecological, and geological time--that make a more humane, more hopeful way of living seem possible. In this dazzling, subversive, and deeply hopeful reframing of time, Jenny Odell takes us on a journey through other temporal habitats. As planet-bound animals, we live inside shortening and lengthening days, alongside gardens growing, birds migrating, and cliffs eroding. The stretchy quality of waiting and desire, the way the present may suddenly feel marbled with childhood memory, the slow but sure procession of a pregnancy, or the time it takes to heal from injuries--physical or emotional. Odell urges us to become stewards of these different rhythms of life, to imagine a life, identity, and source of meaning outside of the world of work and profit, and to understand that the trajectory of our lives--or the life of the planet--is not a foregone conclusion. In that sense, "saving" time-recovering its fundamentally irreducible and inventive nature-could also mean that time saves us. (shrink)

Acting Now to End World Poverty Peter Singer. were our own, and we cannot deny that the suffering and death are bad. The second premise is also very difficult to reject, because it leaves us some wiggle room when it comes to situations in.

Gregor Samsa awakes to find himself transformed into a gigantic bug. The creature’s inchoate flailing leads Gregor’s sister to conclude that Gregor is no more, having been replaced by a brute beast lacking any vestige of human understanding. Sadly, real cases of brain injury and disease can lead to psychological metamorphoses so profound that we cannot easily think that the survivor is the person we knew. I argue that there can be cases in which statements like, “It’s just not Gregor (...) anymore,” are not merely figures of speech. With this in mind, I consider three possible results of saving a biological life: (1) ordinary cases where saving the life will save the person, with strong duties to save the life; (2) cases where the intervention needed to save the life will replace the person, with strong duties not to save the life; (3) cases in which it is indeterminate whether the person will be saved or replaced. How should we think about indeterminate cases? Impersonal ethical considerations miss the point, while standard person-affecting considerations are inapplicable. I suggest turning attention away from survival towards a richer focus on what I call “personal concern.” I show how considerations of personal concern, unlike those of self-interest, need not be tied to survival and how this allows personal concern to provide a basis for ethically substantive discussion of cases where saving a life might result in losing the patient. (shrink)

After initially emerging in China, the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak has advanced rapidly. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recently declared it a pandemic, with Europe becoming its new epicentre. Italy has so far been the most severely hit European country and demand for critical care in the northern region currently exceeds its supply. This raises significant ethical concerns, among which is the allocation of scarce resources. Professionals are considering the prioritisation of patients most likely to survive over those with remote (...) chances, and this news has triggered an intense debate about the right of every individual to access healthcare. The proposed analysis suggests that the national emergency framework in which prioritisation criteria are currently enforced should not lead us to perceive scarce resources allocation as something new. From an ethical perspective, the novelty of the current emergency is not grounded in the devastating effects of scarce resources allocation, which is rife in recent and present clinical practice. Rather, it has to do with the extraordinarily high number of people who find themselves personally affected by the implications of scarce resources allocation and who suddenly realise that the principle of ‘equals should be treated equally’ may no longer be applicable. Along with the need to allocate appropriate additional financial resources to support the healthcare system, and thus to mitigate the scarcity of resources, the analysis insists on the relevance of a medical ethics perspective that does not place the burden of care and choice solely on physicians. (shrink)

Many writers have followed Peter Singer in drawing an analogy between assisting needy people at a distance and saving someone’s life directly. Arguments based on this analogy can take either a subsumptive or a non-subsumptive form. Such arguments face a serious methodological challenge.

The Holocaust takes on a riveting immediacy in these true stories of the everyday, understated heroism that saved thousands of Jews from annihilation at the hands of the Third Reich. Combining personal interviews with contemporary and vintage photographs, To Save a Life pairs the stories of a handful of rescuers with those of people they saved. Ellen Land-Weber creates a moving, multidimensional picture of the evasive strategies and heartstopping close calls that filled the years of the Holocaust for both (...) rescuers and rescued. In paperback for the first time, the rescues narrate their growing awareness of the tightening circle of Nazi terror, their experiences in hiding, often being shunted from one safehouse to another, and their hair's-breadth separation from friends and family who did not escape. Promotional Information: Life-saving acts of heroism by ordinary people in the face of Nazi tyranny. (shrink)

The pandemic of COVID-19 has arrested the life of 7.8 million people living on this earth. However, some people are more vulnerable to the risk of this deadly virus. The frailty of senior citizens put them at the top of this list. The past 6 months have not only presented a threat to their physical health but to mental health also. Although lockdown was necessary to check the spread of the coronavirus it culminated in an exponential rise in the (...) problems of loneliness, anxiety, fear, helplessness, and depression. The present paper reviews the role of social networking sites, apps, and other digital platforms in saving and enriching the lives of the elderly, especially those who spent the lockdown alone and were devoid of a regular support system due to unavailability of transport and administrative restrictions on the movement of people. It also analyzes the efficiency of the virtual world in reducing their anxiety of being alone by connecting them with others and also make them feel empowered. The review is based on the online data collected about the insurgence in the percentage of elderly people using such platforms, recent studies analyzing the effects of the COVID 19 pandemic on senior citizens. Besides this personal telephonic discussions were conducted with some elderly people who spent their lockdown alone in their homes. The study was primarily focused on three objectives. Firstly it attempts to understand the ways in which senior citizens made use of social networking sites and various digital platforms for managing life better. Secondly, it analyses the process of adopting technology, and finally, it examined the width and depth of the impact technology created in their life and also the permanence of this change. The analysis clearly suggests an increase in the digital life of elderly people. The process moved in distinct stages from utter confusion to relative ease in using technology, thereby significantly reducing the loneliness, and bringing relatively stable change in the way they lead their life. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced clinicians, policy-makers and the public to wrestle with stark choices about who should receive potentially life-saving interventions such as ventilators, ICU beds and dialysis machines if demand overwhelms capacity. Many allocation schemes face the question of whether to consider age. We offer two underdiscussed arguments for prioritising younger patients in allocation policies, which are grounded in prudence and fairness rather than purely in maximising benefits: prioritising one’s younger self for lifesaving treatments is prudent (...) from an individual perspective, and prioritising younger patients works to narrow health disparities by giving priority to patients at risk of dying earlier in life, who are more likely to be subject to systemic disadvantage. We then identify some confusions in recent arguments against considering age. (shrink)

Fanaticism is the view that, for every finite good x and every positive probability p, there is a finite good y such that getting y with probability p is better than getting x for sure. I develop a neglected argument for a form of fanaticism limited to life saving scenarios. I explain how my argument is compatible with some forms of small-probability discounting, imprecise probabilism, risk-aversion and aggregation scepticism. I also try to respond to theoretical problems that fanatical (...) arguments encounter in cases that involve infinitely many possible people. I also suggest why, even if fanaticism is true, we might often be warranted in our intuitive reluctance to accept fanatical conclusions. (shrink)

In this book, Mark Johnston argues that God needs to be saved not only from the distortions of the "undergraduate atheists" (Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris) but, more importantly, from the idolatrous tendencies of religion itself. Each monotheistic religion has its characteristic ways of domesticating True Divinity, of taming God's demands so that they do not radically threaten our self-love and false righteousness. Turning the monotheistic critique of idolatry on the monotheisms themselves, Johnston shows that much in these (...) traditions must be condemned as false and spiritually debilitating. A central claim of the book is that supernaturalism is idolatry. If this is right, everything changes; we cannot place our salvation in jeopardy by tying it essentially to the supernatural cosmologies of the ancient Near East. Remarkably, Johnston rehabilitates the ideas of the Fall and of salvation within a naturalistic framework; he then presents a conception of God that both resists idolatry and is wholly consistent with the deliverances of the natural sciences. Princeton University Press is publishing Saving God in conjunction with Johnston's forthcoming book Surviving Death, which takes up the crux of supernaturalist belief, namely, the belief in life after death. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that reproductive genetic manipulation technologies like mitochondrial replacement and germline CRISPR modifications cannot be said to save anyone’s life because, counterfactually, no one would suffer more or die sooner absent the intervention. The present article argues that, on the contrary, reproductive genetic manipulations may be life-saving (and, from this, have therapeutic value) under an appropriate population health perspective. As such, popular reports of reproductive genetic manipulations potentially saving lives or preventing disease (...) are not necessarily mistaken, though such terminology still requires further empirical validation. (shrink)

A large part of the debate around the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment of anorexia nervosa sufferers centers on the issue of competence. Whether or not the anorexic should be allowed to refuse life-saving treatment does not depend solely or primarily on competence. It also depends on whether the anorexic’s suffering is bearable or tractable, and on the degree of involvement of the family in the therapeutic process. Anorexics could be competent to refuse lifesaving treatment (Giordano 2008). (...) However, the anorexic’s refusal of life-saving treatment should not be respected purely because it is a competent decision. In fact, anorexia has two characteristics that weaken the strength of the principle .. (shrink)

The author recounts the dramatic life of Warsaw’s population during the uprising against the Germans. After miraculously escaping death in a mass execution,Czarkowski teamed up with several other men and lived the hard life of a refugee among the city’s ruins. He and his companions continuously risked death, both from the hands of Nazi execution squads as well as in the buildings, methodically demolished by the occupant as the city was razed to the ground in revenge for the (...) insurgency. (shrink)

The proposals of Wasserman et al. (2026) amount to a (seismic) contention that much of the law relating to the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment should be abandoned, and that...

Holmes Rolston III has long been recognized as the “father of environmental ethics.” Internationally renowned for the synthesis he has found in evolutionary biology and Christianity, Rolston has followed an immensely interesting life course. In this compelling biography, Rolston’s story is traced from childhood to the present, detailing the process by which he has come to hone his profound philosophies. Culled from countless interviews with Rolston himself, along with his family and colleagues, this biography is both an engaging (...) class='Hi'>life story and a compendium of Rolston’s thoughts on the value of nature, resource management, aesthetics, international development, and the relationship of culture to nature, wilderness, and natural theology. (shrink)

Consider a case of a patient receiving life-supporting treatment. With appropriate care the patient could be kept alive for several years. Yet his latest prognosis also indicates that his mental abilities will deteriorate significantly and that ultimately he will become incapable of understanding what happens around and to him. Despite his illness, the patient has been eager to live. However, he finds the prospect that he is now faced with devastating. He undergoes an unconscious process that results in his (...) finding himself with a preference to die. Consequently, he requests his doctor to stop the treatment that she is providing. Other things being equal, standard medical ethics and the legislations of most Western countries allow the doctor to adhere to the patient’s request if it is autonomous. While its origins can be traced back to at least J.S. Mill’s work on women’s rights, unconscious alteration of one’s preferences in light of the options available for one has figured, for example, in recent discussion on female oppression and social choice theory. Yet the topic has not received attention in the debate on voluntary euthanasia. The inattention is unfortunate because the central problem with such adaptation has been taken to be that it undermines personal autonomy. This motivates the main question examined in this chapter, i.e. the problem of whether a request for euthanasia based on an adaptive preference is autonomous. (shrink)

“In When Your Life Is On Fire Erik Kolbell listens, provokes, and most of all, shares with us the enduring lessons and insights of life and faith as realized by a diverse population of thoughtful people. It’s a town hall of the soul.” -- Tom Brokaw If your life was on fire, what would be the one thing you save? Psychotherapist and former pastor Erik Kolbell asks that question of 13 remarkable and unique individuals, and the answers (...) may surprise you. Provided by celebrities such as Jane Pauley and Alan Alda, artists such as Regina Carter and Tao Porchon Lynch, and ordinary people put into extraordinary situations like Don Lange and Brenda Berkman, these reflections will help all of us consider what it is that we value most in life. His goal, Kolbell says, is not to examine the worth of each of these things. “What matters is that for all of the sham and artifice that can make cynics of us all, there are things, solid things, that compel us onward.”. (shrink)

In his book, Liberalism as a Way of Life, acknowledging the fact that today, many people in a liberal society do not have any other comprehensive doctrines than liberalism, and thus calling for putting aside later Rawls’s cautious project that is focused on an account of liberal citizen only, Alexandre Lefebvre tries to offer an account of how to be a liberal person by constructing a liberal comprehensive doctrine and a soulcraft for such a person. He criticizes the ‘classical (...) liberals’ and try to offer a set of truly liberal virtues. But they may not be sufficiently motivational and adequate, and his liberal soulcraft may be too egalitarian. In contrast, I call for a fuller return to the liberal tradition. We should promote some ‘thicker’ and ‘harder’ virtues, in addition to what Lefebvre does. We should also acknowledge the fact that only a few can become fully virtuous, and they should be given more power to rule. This meritocratic government should (and can) also play a paternalistic role of promoting virtues among its citizens, within liberal boundaries. Such a meritocracy may save liberalism from the threat of democracy and equality. (shrink)

Health care systems across the world are unable to afford the best treatment for all patients in all situations. Choices have to be made. One key ethical issue that arises for health authorities is whether the principle of the “rule of rescue” should be adopted or rejected. According to this principle more funding should be available in order to save lives of identifiable, compared with unidentifiable, individuals. Six reasons for giving such priority to identifiable individuals are considered. All are rejected. (...) It is concluded that the principle of the rule of rescue should not be used in determining the allocation of health resources. (shrink)

In this essay, I survey egalitarian and utilitarian approaches to the distribution of scarce life-saving medical resources. In my view, the major criterion for the distribution of scarce life-saving medical resources should be life expectancy: we should distribute life so as to maximize life-years. In Section II, I discuss the life-year maximization approach and situate it within utilitarian theory.

In this issue of the journal “Lee Elder”,1 a pseudonymous dissident Jehovah's Witness , previously an Elder of that faith and still a JW, joins the indefatigable Dr Muramoto2–5 in arguing that even by their own religious beliefs based on biblical scriptures JWs are not required to refuse potentially life-saving blood transfusions. Just as the “official” JW hierarchy has accepted that biblical scriptures do not forbid the transfusion or injection of blood fractions so too JW theology logically can (...) and should permit the transfusion of whole blood when this is medically required.Few doctors would argue that they should override the adequately autonomous decisions of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions even if they are likely to die as a result of such transfusions. However, there is a case to be made for doctors asking such patients to reflect on their potentially fatal refusal of blood and for drawing to these patients' attention the reasoning of members of their own faith that justifies acceptance of potentially life-saving blood transfusions. What is that case? Simply that doctors' primary professional duty to try to benefit the health of their patients entails trying to save their patients' lives when and if doing so will benefit their patients' health. Of course this is not an absolute duty overriding all other duties; in particular if patients who are adequately autonomous to do so refuse such life-prolonging treatment doctors must generally accept such refusal, however sadly. This editorial endorses that view in the case of adequately autonomous legally competent JWs. (In another paper in this issue of the journal Professor Shimon Glick argues that ethics committees should be empowered—as they now are in Israel—to override even competent refusals of life-prolonging treatment where the committee judges that …. (shrink)

This case raises a number of complex ethical, legal, and practical issues, some of which cannot be resolved by a research ethics consultation. Sam is an adolescent who has end stage manifestations...

This paper points out an ambiguity in Cass Sunstein’s recent work concerning whose lives and interests are to be promoted by libertarian paternalism, and argues that this ambiguity stems from a lack of clarity regarding how we should understand the relevance of the heuristics and biases literature for democratic theory. The paper attempts to extract from Sunstein’s work an account of how we should go about identifying biases in social choices. It argues that Sunstein’s view on this issue has changed (...) over the years, and identifies a trend in his thinking moving away from libertarian paternalism and toward libertarian welfarism. (shrink)

Ever since Savage represented acts by reference to their consequences, it has remained unclear how this conceptual move and its implications for evaluating acts may be reconciled with what is treated as people's acts in everyday talk and in our societies' legal practices. The present contribution, first, comments on applied and theoretical debates to emphasize the systematic relevance of Savage's move. It then focuses on the purportedly causal element in the term "consequence." A simple case shows how the idea that (...) choices are causally connected to their consequences meets with problems. Possible consequentialist reactions are discussed. (shrink)

Saving Animals, a study of three different kinds of animal sanctuaries, is the first major ethnography to describe how sanctuaries “unmake” the notion of animals as property that reduces them to “bare life.” The study relies on numerous engaging narratives about rescue animals, their mutual interactions, and their interactions with the people who care for them—narratives that illustrate how the sentience and subjectivity of animals provide a firm ground for the author's ethical considerations. An animal sanctuary is ideally (...) an intentional community of cocitizens whose pragmatic and symbolic value resides in its ability to lay the foundation for a broad challenge to all violent practices of exploitation “targeted at a range of different others.” The patient, incremental work of sanctuaries has implications not only for the future of human-animal relations but more broadly for the future of humans on the planet. The ultimate vision of sanctuaries is a world outside that mirrors the world inside, a pantopia where there will be no “others,” only “us.”. (shrink)

Suppose you find yourself in a situation in which you can either save both A and B or save only C. A, B and C are relevantly similar—all are strangers to you, none is more deserving of life than any other, none is responsible for being in a life-threatening situation, and so on. John Taurek argued that when deciding what to do in such a situation, you should flip a coin, thereby giving each of A, B and C (...) a 50% chance of survival. Only by doing this can we treat each person with the appropriate degree of respect. Taurek seemed to be employing the Equal Greatest Chance principle (EGC), according to which, when deciding whom to save, one must give each person the greatest possible chance of survival consistent with everyone else having the same chance. An obvious alternative is the Save the Greater Number principle (SGN). I describe an example that shows that EGC is false. I show that the example also demonstrates the falsity of other related views, including Jens Timmermann’s “Individualist Lottery Principle.” I conclude that SGN is true. And I extend the argument to other kinds of cases, showing that which person should be saved may depend on whether some additional well-being may be gained for someone in the process. (shrink)

In the last decade, the humanities have been shrinking in number of students, percent of faculty, and in number of degrees awarded. Humanities students also earn lower salaries than their STEM-prepared peers. At the same time, the health humanities have been in ascendance over the last fifteen years. The number of majors, minors and certificates has increased 266% in that time frame, attracting large numbers of students and preparing future patients, lay caregivers, and health care providers to interact with a (...) complicated and dehumanized medical system. In 1982, British philosopher and educator Stephen Toulmin declared that medicine saved philosophy from irrelevance and possibly extinction. I propose that the health humanities can serve a similar function to stave off the decline of the broader humanities. The health humanities can model an applied approach for the broader humanities to attract student interest; develop students’ capacity for critical reading, writing and reflection about health and medicine in society, practice, and their own lives and inoculate all students against the influence of medicine, whether through preparing pre-health students to navigate the hidden medical curriculum or preparing future patients to navigate the health care system. (shrink)

Many writers have followed Peter Singer in drawing an analogy between assisting needy people at a distance and saving someone’s life directly. Arguments based on this analogy can take either a subsumptive or a non-subsumptive form. Such arguments face a serious methodological challenge.

This chapter situates John Rawls’ just savings principle in a discussion about how much a nation-state should save. The main question addressed is whether this principle is a viable alternative to the dominant utilitarian theory of optimal growth. Rawls certainly gives savings a different aim (i.e., to create and maintain just institutions) and introduces additional permissibility conditions on reaching this goal (i.e., the necessary burdens should be fairly shared between generations). He thereby gives rise to the field of research now (...) known as intergenerational justice. To assess the relative merits of the just savings principle, however, more details are needed; and this chapter aims to supply some of them. First, the principle of just savings is given a more determinate form whereby it is understood as a two-stage combination of a priority principle at the stage of institutional development and a difference principle at the maintenance stage. Second, some of its practical bearings are explored (i.e., its implications for real-life savings decisions). Among other things, the idea that the principle leads to a steady-state economy is problematized, and its relevance to concrete problems, such as climate change and the design of pension schemes, is assessed. (shrink)

This study was aimed at examining the impacts of the Sharing economy on the individual and community Quality of Life and wellbeing by looking at their associated influencing factors using Village Savings and Loans Associations as a model of sharing economy in Malawi. An online community-based cross-sectional study design was conducted from November 2020 through January 2021. In the survey, 402 Village Savings and Loans Associations members from the Mzuzu City area participated, recruited using snowball and respondent-driven sampling techniques. (...) The sample size was computed using a single population proportion using the Yamane formula. Descriptive statistics and ordinal logistic regression model techniques were also employed. Additionally, we used the Chi-Square test, two-way ANOVA, and Ordinal regression model to determine statistical associations between socioeconomic data and QOL and wellbeing variables with a 5% level of significance. On the aspect of community wellbeing, the findings of our study indicated that income provided members with options to live a better QOL and wellbeing within the community by either facilitating payment for better education, eating healthier foods, acquiring assets, etc. Further, the absence of discrimination provided a platform for voice, inclusion, and social trust, enhancing freedom of expression. We also found that education facilitated better earnings and knowledge of public health-related issues. As for the contribution to the sharing economy, our study has emphasized the role played by trust in enhancing sharing economy. We recommend and encourage people to join these VSLAs so as to improve their QOL and wellbeing. However, there is a need to replicate the study on a larger scale to validate our study findings for effective policy formulation and implementation geared to improving the overall quality of people’s lives. Based on these findings, we further recommend that authorities reinstate programs like National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2016–2020 and Savings and Loan Groups Best Practice Guidelines 2016–2017 that could further enhance the future of VSLAs, which are vital for QOL and community wellbeing of the people in developing countries like Malawi. (shrink)

Although both the Jewish and Christian traditions permit and even valorize self‐sacrificial death for the sake of God, and for other people, they diverge on the issue of self‐sacrificial death for the sake of a single individual. The Jewish tradition prohibits such self‐sacrifice on the basis of the principles that God owns the body and that one cannot exchange one's life for another's. Christian ethics, in contrast, permits sacrificing one's life to save a single person based on the (...) model of Christ's self‐sacrificial love. This ethical disagreement exposes a fundamental theological disagreement between the two traditions concerning what constitutes the imago Dei. (shrink)

This time, McGirr shares his love of philosophy, looking at the works of twenty eminent thinkers across history. The book goes back to Pythagoras and comes forward to the contemporary Australian Frank Jackson; back to Mungo Woman and forward to Martha Nussbaum, by way of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. It is animated by two related questions: from where do we draw a sense of life's purpose, and how can philosophy make life better? It ranges widely across subjects: (...) from solitude to community, language to order, experience to ecstasy, the idea of good to that of a good idea. McGirr's approach is warm and inviting. Drawing on many years' experience teaching philosophy to teenagers, he shares stories from his life and discusses how philosophers have shed light on them. Ideas to Save Your Life is often funny, but it is serious about philosophy. It makes the impenetrable accessible, the indescribable palpable, and invites you to change the way you see the world. (shrink)

Conservative ethical systems, particularly organized religions, are frequently at odds with the means, if not the goals of the new reproductive technologies. Among the most problematic measures adopted in recent years to allow childless women to raise genetically related offspring is surrogate motherhood. Traditional Jewish law, or Halakha, notwithstanding this reluctance, is, nevertheless, more likely than many others to find reasons to justify the practice, given its well-known stance viz procreation and its leniency regarding the new reproductive technologies. In the (...) following article, we ask whether Halakha, which allows abortion to save the life of a mother, would sanction the employment of a surrogacy arrangement in the case where pregnancy threats her life, in order to save the fetus as well. (shrink)

In the distribution of resources, persons must be respected, or so many philosophers contend. Unfortunately, they often leave it unclear why a certain allocation would respect persons, while another would not. In this paper, we explore what it means to respect persons in the distribution of scarce, life-saving resources. We begin by presenting two kinds of cases. In different age cases, we have a drug that we must use either to save a young person who would live for (...) many more years or an old person who would only live for a few. In different numbers cases, we must save either one person or many persons from certain death. We argue that two familiar accounts of respect for persons―an equal worth account, suggested by Jeff McMahan, and a Kantian account, inspired by the Formula of Humanity―have implausible implications in such cases. We develop a new, “three-tiered” account: one that, we claim, generates results in such cases that accord better with many people’s considered judgments than those produced by its rivals. (shrink)