Original accounts of feminist standpoint theory emphasize its fundamentally critical stance toward situated knowledge (Smith 1974; Hartsock 1983; Collins 1986). The function of a critical standpoint is not to carelessly accept the beliefs of marginalized people, but instead to interpret those beliefs in light of thoroughgoing and pervasive ideological distortions. Some formulations of standpoint theory capture this critical function in the achievement thesis. It claims that a standpoint is not obtained automatically but must be achieved through a struggle (...) against a dominant ideology. Contrary to the standard acceptance of the achievement thesis, Bright has recently argued that the requirement of achievement can warrant the dogmatic exclusion of some perspectives from becoming standpoints. In turn, he advances an account of standpoint theory which abandons the achievement thesis. Against Bright’s non-achievement account of standpoint theory, I argue that doing away with the achievement thesis abandons standpoint theory’s original aim of being critical of the social structures which construct and legitimize situated knowledge. Further, I argue that Bright’s concern with the possible dogmatism of the achievement thesis is better addressed by a commitment to the classic account of standpoint theory rather than a revision of it. (shrink)

A great deal of contemporary epistemology is driven by a kind of _moral panic_ over the worry that there are no “pure” epistemic practices, perspectives, or standards detachable from the social situation of knowers. Kukla argues that we cannot do epistemology without fundamental, central attention to social identities, power relations, and the social institutions and structures within which epistemic practices happen. But this result is of no threat to our usable notions of objectivity, justification, and the like. The quest for (...) purity is unnecessary. We should recognize it as a product of ideology and become comfortable with situatedness as an everyday phenomenon. Kukla ends by arguing that a proper _naturalized, non-ideal epistemolog_y—one more continuous with the empirical sciences—will treat situatedness not as something spooky or epistemologically threatening, but just as an empirical fact about our epistemic practices. (shrink)

This article delves into the multifaceted nature of pedagogy, examining its role as both a practical pursuit and an academic discipline concerned with education and upbringing. Positioned within the context of modernity, the overarching objective of pedagogy is framed as the cultivation of a free subject in communities of free people, emphasizing emancipation and participation. A key challenge is navigating the tension between purposes and facts, a core issue in human science pedagogy (Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik). The authors propose a contextualized approach (...) to knowledge, introducing the concept of ‘situated knowledge’, emphasizing its directional aspect (‘purpose’) and the need for an understanding of the present reality (‘facts’). They highlight the significance of this approach in practice, in collective practice-development and in research. Situated knowledge is not certain knowledge, but the process of creating situated knowledge serves as an invitation to self-activity, encouraging the exercise and development of pedagogical tact. (shrink)

The increasing body of knowledge in fields like animal ethology, biology, and technology has not necessarily led to the improvement of animal welfare. On the contrary, it has enabled humans to exploit animals more functionally and on increasing scales of magnitude. Building on approaches that stem from posthumanism and critical animal studies, we argue that instead of aiming for more general production of scientific knowledge, what is needed to counter exploitation and oppression is an increased sensitivity towards animals (...) that arises from local, partial, and ‘situated knowledges’. In the first part of this paper we articulate an argument that proposes how such knowledges can arise from the practice of game design as a form of ‘doing multispecies philosophy’. The second part of this work expands this notion with an understanding of design as a practice of configuring and prefiguring situations in which we can enter in a relationship of response and attention with other ‘selves’, in other words, with entities that are alive. To explore the practical consequences of this framework, in the third part of this paper we discuss a game design project that involves some unexpected designerly negotiations with a colony of black ants. We conclude that our wider perspective concerning notions of knowledge, design, and selves could elicit changes in our empathy towards other beings and help us develop new ideas and knowledges that favour less anthropocentric futures. (shrink)

This papers starts from the observation that in a world of pathologising and ableist autism science, identifying as autistic has meant battling between the necessity of putting words on lived experience and the risk of contributing to self-pathologising through problematic metaphors or frameworks. Following the contribution to feminist epistemology offered by Donna Haraway, I ponder the “science question in autism” and ask to what kinds of situated knowledge autistics can actually pretend. To do so, I use the theory (...) of Monotropism and its reception. First, I show how the theory of Monotropism constitutes a case of situated knowledge of autism and could pretend to a higher form of objectivity. Then, I show that its production, diffusion, and reception rely on non-innocent metaphors of nonhuman movement, mostly taken from physics and plant life, starting with the very term “tropism”, which tends to assimilate autistic cognition to the physicochemical reaction of plants to their environments. Finally, I show how, in the age of a hegemony of reductionist science and of renewed binary debates opposing free will and biological determinism, the theory of Monotropism is sometimes taken up in a form that fuels a self-pathologising of autistic individuals. In turn, I call for more accountability and reflexivity in the production and diffusion of autistic situated knowledges. (shrink)

In the process of challenging epistemological assumptions that preclude relationships between knowers and the objects of knowing, feminist epistemologists Lorraine Code and Donna Haraway also can be interpreted as troubling forms of argumentation predicated on positivist-derived logic. Against the latter, Christopher Tindale promotes a rhetorical model of argument that appears able to better engage epistemologies of situated knowledges. I detail key features of the latter from Code, especially, and compare and contrast them with relevant parts of Tindale’s discussion of (...) context on the rhetorical model, and I suggest ways that his work could be expanded to accommodate rhetorical implications of situated knowledges. (shrink)

The present article approaches, from the point of view of research practices, the debate on how to consider knowledge in terms of the objectivity/subjectivity pair, especially when the topics studied involve the researcher directly. Specifically, the article will focus on situated knowledge, arguing for rigorous but non-neutral objectivity and for the legitimacy of producing scientific knowledge from the perspective of those involved in the issues studied. El presente artículo tiene por objetivo llevar al campo de las (...) prácticas de investigación el debate respecto a cómo considerar al conocimiento en las claves objetividad/subjetividad, más aún cuando las temáticas a trabajar implican directamente al investigador. En particular, se centrará en el planteamiento de los conocimientos situados, donde junto con fundamentar una objetividad rigurosa pero no neutral, se afirma la legitimidad de producir conocimiento científico desde quienes están implicados en las problemáticas estudiadas. (shrink)

We have developed an approach to implementing a system for managing situated knowledge for complex instruments. Our aim is to develop a system that guides a user through the steps for operating complex scientific instruments. A user manual is often inadequate support for a community of users, so direct communication with an expert is often required. One reason for this is that not all of the author’s expert knowledge was included in the manual, thus limiting the contents (...) to explicit knowledge. This is a main concern of modern knowledge management practitioners who are attempting to design systems that consider both explicit and tacit knowledge. The key is to distribute explicit knowledge through interaction with the real world so that users can develop tacit knowledge as well as acquire explicit knowledge. We describe technical difficulties related to referencing the real world, which is required for interaction, and describe a novel approach to building a low-cost three-dimensional pointer for obtaining the required knowledge, which constitutes our preliminary result. (shrink)

Modem cognitive situation is characterized by principal changes in relations between reflective and nonreflective items. A nonreflective element becomes the source of contents’ renovation in the sphere of knowledge. The special role in constructive activity of consciousness is given to the variants of interpretation and experiments with reality. Key words: epistemology, cognitive imation, knowledge, reflective and nonreflcclive consciousness.

The article analyzes the significance of situated knowledges for going beyond dominating conceptual dichotomies that a) establish status quo dialectics, b) proliferate homogenization of the Global Northern experienced materialities, and c) conceal and suppress alternate affectual body-environment experiences and materializations. With the example of postsocialist ontogenealogies, the article analyzes the potential blind spots when failing to consider both sides of a status quo dialectic in their interconnectedness. To conclude, the article suggests the potential of situated knowledges as a (...) vehicle for future environmental ethicalities. (shrink)

This final chapter explains how an intersectional theory of truth contributes to an epistemology on which some socially and politically situated groups objectively have knowledge and others are objectively in the grip of ignorance due to the function of the oppressive regime of truth. It explains the sense in which political activism and political struggle in solidarity with a group is the only realistic way to gain knowledge of that group’s location in social space, how power operates (...) there, and what is required to establish a more just society with respect to that group’s experiences. These concepts are shown to be compatible with the traditional analytic epistemologist’s concepts of objective truth, justification, and knowledge. Here I explore how a range of epistemic assets can be situated, including knowledge of word meanings, evidence, information, ideology critique, and science. (shrink)

In this paper I give an overview of a perspectival realist ontology. I discuss the role of situated knowledge and multiculturalism in perspectival ontology and offer a working definition of ‘phenomena’ as the minimal unit of such ontological commitment. I clarify how the view differs from Kuhn’s view, and highlight some of its implications for how to think of scientific knowledge as a multicultural and cosmopolitan inquiry.

In this paper, I analyze how recent calls to internationalize publication behavior affect research practices at an automotive engineering department in Germany. Automotive engineering is a field with traditionally rather scarce publication activity and strong connections to industry. Substantial authority to define suitable research problems and ways of organizing knowledge production on a daily basis was therefore reserved for local academic elites as well as corporate partners. However, as engineers are increasingly expected to prove their performance through publishing in (...) international peer-reviewed journals, the judgment as to what should be considered “interesting” or “robust” research is partly relegated to a gradually globalizing community of academic peers. This generates a variety of tensions with established ways of coordinating epistemic work at the department studied here. For example, the thematic interests of journals tend to exert a disruptive centrifugal pull in the context of an otherwise highly modular research culture, and possibilities to publish in international venues are unequally distributed across individual research projects. But while department members agree that there is a lack of fit between current practices and new expectations towards their publishing behavior, their opinions about the conclusions that should be drawn differ significantly. Some researchers argue that profound organizational changes are necessary to foster the academic rigor of German engineering research. Others believe that evaluation criteria should simply be adapted. This situation is arguably characteristic for research areas with a traditionally strong orientation to local stakeholders, and it suggests a need for more deliberative, participatory approaches to research evaluation in such fields. (shrink)

The article dwells upon social constructionist critique of the ideal of scientific objectivity. It is shown that a number of researchers tend to replace the universal principle of objectivity that is used in science with the concept of “situated knowledge”. This concept argues that each knowledge belongs to a certain local social group and can be considered only in a narrow sociocultural context. The supporters of the “situated knowledge” concept assume that this approach should be (...) considered as “strong objectivity” that consists in the acknowledgment of the impossibility of the existence of neutral unbiased researcher in the scientific cognition and, consequently, the impossibility of acquiring true knowledge or even building a scientific theory. Instead they suggest to give a “vote” for each of these social groups to voice their own scientific statements that will be considered as equivalent, thus realizing the democratic principle. The article demonstrates the complications of this position and shows that it does not only lead to the loss of possibility to speak of science as universal cultural institute but also to the loss of mutual understanding and the possibility of dialogue between different social groups: each group instead of using the objectivity principle and striving to seek common knowledge, will insist on the paramount value of its own local “situated” knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to further assess and develop feminist standpoint theory by introducing the notion of the `situated imagination' as constituting an important part of this theory as well as that of `situated knowledge'. The article argues that the faculty of the imagination constructs as well as transforms, challenges and supersedes both existing knowledge and social reality. However, like knowledge, it is crucial to theorize the imagination as situated, that is, as (...) shaped and conditioned (although not determined) by social positioning. (shrink)

Most of the phenomena described in this book have arisen as a result of various crises, disasters, threats, and forms of violence (such as wars, refugee crises, and political regimes, but also devastating practices of the anthropogenic drive and environmental pollution). Others are a form of response to new political, social and cultural changes that we are experiencing due to the rapid development of technology or progressive economic stratification. The research perspective proposed in Postcollectivity draws on the authors' approaches, combining (...) academic and theoretical discourse with social engagement and artistic practice with critical thought. Contributors are: Harshavardhan Bhat, Stephen Dersley, Adela Goldbard, Carly E. Gray, Agnieszka Jelewska, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., Michał Krawczak, Grant Leuning, Ania Malinowska, Anna Nacher, Andrzej W. Nowak, Julian Reid, Pepe Rojo, Sarena Sabine, Jens Schröter, Jan Stasieńko and Brett Zehner. (shrink)

This paper presents an approach to managing knowledge specific to a particular location for complex instruments. The goal is to improve the knowledge communication between experts and end-users of scientific instruments. We propose a computational framework that integrates augmented reality and augmented virtuality as interface for manipulating knowledge. The augmented virtuality-based interface can be produced and distributed without extra costs. It allows knowledge dissemination at a larger scale. The prominent feature of our model is that the (...) knowledge representation is independent from those interfaces. A preliminary version of our framework has been implemented and deployed in customers’ environments. (shrink)

In the highly contentious abortion arena, the new oral abortifacient technology RU486 is one among many actors. This article offers an arena analysis of the heterogeneous constructions of RU486 by various actors, including scientists, pharmaceutical compa nies, medical groups, antiabortion groups, women's health movement groups, and others who have produced situated knowledges. Conceptually, we find not only that the identity of the nonhuman actor-RU486 -is unstable and multiple but also that, in practice, there are other implicated actors—the downstream users (...) and consumers of the technology. If we try to follow all the actors, we find a fuller and more historicized arena, and, ironically, we too can be construed as implicated actors in it. (shrink)

Postphenomenology, in a complementary role with other science studies disciplines, remains within the trajectory of those theories which reject early modern epistemology and metaphysics, including rejection of ‘subject’–‘object’ distinctions, and holds, instead, to an inter-relational, co-constitutive ontology. Here the critiques which sometimes echo vestiges of such early modern epistemology are counter-challenged.

This paper explores the differences and similarities between Foucault’s genealogical method and feminist standpoint theories. Both approaches rely on the marginalized position of subjugated knowledges to challenge dominant regimes of power. However, standpoint theory and Foucauldian genealogical critique engage with the interrelatedness of power, knowledge, and resistance on a different level. Standpoint theories take a situated, first-person perspective to further knowledge claims which are based on situated knowledge claims. Foucauldian genealogy, on the other hand, delves (...) into subjugated knowledge claims from an outsider or third-person perspective, mobilizing subjugated forms of knowledge to genealogically critique dominant regimes of power-knowledge. Despite this difference, this paper suggests that both approaches are invested in problematizing dominant regimes of power-knowledge by looking at subversive and marginalized knowledge practices that contest dominant regimes of power and knowledge. (shrink)

The text attempts to understand the development of collaborative audiovisual knowledge practices in anthropology as situated and diffractive knowledge (Haraway, Barad, Smith). By considering specific stages in the history of collaborative and participatory projects, the article argues that collaborative filmmaking is not only a decentering of one-sided authorship and one-sided modes of representation, but also a media-specific form of knowledge that is bound to and embedded in social contexts. Through the example of colonial film, the article (...) describes stations of demarcation and attempts to decolonize film. Current film experiments with marginalized groups have their origins in “shared anthropologies” (Rouch) and have further developed this approach through more consistent forms of Fourth Cinema and power sharing with Indigenous communities. Film is thus also able to depict amateur knowledge practices within collaborative research projects. (shrink)

This paper explores the epistemological affordances of Islamic ethics as alternative knowledge within intercultural education. Despite the calls for epistemological plurality in intercultural education that centre epistemologies of the South, educators may find it hard to reaffirm their situated knowledges and practices because they may have been overwhelmed by the wide endorsements of the mainstream literature. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 25 EFL teachers, this study aims to (a) unpack educators’ perspectives around the adoption of alternative knowledges anchored (...) in local epistemologies and sensibilities, (b) foreground educators’ epistemic positioning around alternative knowledges and how they are perceived as sites for cognitive and pedagogical renewal to account for local particularities and conditions and (c) examine inter-epistemic tensions within educators’ reasoning in terms of how they navigate (in)congruencies between the mainstream and Islamic philosophy at the conceptual, pedagogical and practical levels. Findings reveal that educators acknowledge the legitimacy of Islamic ethics and their epistemological/pedagogical significance in intercultural education. However, some factors may problematize educators’ attempts at making use of Islamic ethics including the additional burden of reflecting alternative knowledges while attending to contextual factors (class size, the course’s orientation, exams, time constraints, etc.) and the lack of sufficient training in intercultural education. (shrink)

In academic and political spaces, as well as in the dominant culture in the United States, sex workers are granted little authority, and their lived experiences are not privileged as a form of valuable knowledge. As feminist scholars, we seek to counter this pattern by highlighting the situated knowledges and agency of sex workers in the United States. To do so, we share the words of sex workers through I-poems. I-poems are a form of poetic inquiry and a (...) method for qualitative research analysis. As a form of found poetry, these poems are constructed using only the words of the participants. Unlike prior scholars, we use focus groups that capture conversation about people involved in street-based sex work rather than individual interviews. By centering the participants’ own words, we hope to moderate our influence as researchers on the presentation of data. (shrink)

The paper highlights the contemporary discussions on the concept of objectivity in feminist epistemology, in which it is taken in its historical development. Following the works of S. Harding, L. Code, D. Haraway, L. Daston. J. Tannoch-Bland and others the author focuses mainly on one of the topics in feminist epistemology, namely the problematic of the so called "situated knowledge" as related to the objectivity of knowledge. The paper also gives a brief outline of the transformation of (...) "aperspective objectivity" and its becoming a "perspective objectivity", which is closely related to the conception of a situated knowledge as the basis of the feminist standpoint theory. Attention is paid also to the concept of "strong objectivity", in which the ontological importance of the objectivity is stressed and the empirical-realistic core of the standpoint epistemology preserved. (shrink)

Central to scholarly discussions within the field of feminist epistemology is the question of a researcher’s positionality and the subsequent impact on knowledge production. In particular, Donna Haraway’s elaboration of ‘situated knowledge’ has been highly influential. As an epistemological principle, this concept emphasizes the researcher’s embodied location within the research context. Yet the question remains, how does one apply this principle within the concrete practices of knowledge production? In a research project based on Norwegian transnational adoptees’ (...) identity work, the author, being an immigrant, was situated as an ‘outsider within’. How does this positionality influence knowledge production? The concept of ‘outsider within’ comes from standpoint epistemology and has been taken up within black feminist thought to authorize knowledge about dominant society produced from a position of marginality. However as a concrete situatedness, can an ‘outsider within’ position also be used to think about the production of situated knowledge? This article offers an exploration of these questions. The author argues that one way to put feminist situated knowledge to use within an empirical study is through the conceptualization of ‘outsider within’ as a situated interactive space instead of a fixed standpoint. (shrink)

This paper addresses a number of issues concerning both the status of phenomenology in the work of one of its classical expositors, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the general relation between theoretical models and evidence in phenomenological accounts. In so doing, I will attempt to explain Merleau-Ponty's departure from classical transcendental accounts in Husserl's thought and why Merleau-Ponty increasingly elaborated on them through aesthetic rationality. The result is a phenomenology that no longer understands itself as foundational and no longer understands itself in (...) the strict opposition of intuition and concept. Rather both emerge from an operative experience generated in the exchange between situated embodied knowing and historical knowledge. (shrink)

This essay forges links between Popperians and feminists by considering the connections between Donna Haraway's “situated knowledge” and Karl R. Popper's “situational logic.” It is concerned with the political commitments behind methodological issues, with the degree to which there can be a Popperian contribution to the feminist vision of a successor science, and with ways of dealing with, while not resolving, the political differences between socialist feminists and libertarian Popperians.

Resumen: Este ensayo tiene como propósito fundamentar teóricamente el carácter situado del conocimiento de la vida cotidiana. Como punto de partida, apoyándonos en la noción de “forma de vida” de Ludwig Wittgenstein, postulamos que nuestras decisiones son, fundamentalmente, usos prácticos de sistemas de reglas históricamente construidas y, por consiguiente, irreductibles a procedimientos algorítmicos de evaluación racional costo-beneficio. Posteriormente, para abordar la cuestión sobre las condiciones que hacen posible la incorporación subjetiva de estas reglas y, con ello, nuestro sentido práctico, recuperamos (...) algunos planteamientos de las tesis del “trasfondo” de John Searle y habitus de Pierre Bourdieu. Luego de esta discusión, a partir de la perspectiva de los conocimientos situados de Donna Haraway, proponemos que la conformación de dicho sentido es siempre parcial, esto es, sujeto a prácticas articulatorias encarnadas. Finalmente, tras exponer sucintamente los principales aspectos críticos de las tesis “trasfondo” y habitus, argumentamos que la perspectiva de los conocimientos situados representa una alternativa plausible para fundamentar teórica y metodológicamente una nueva aproximación al conocimiento de la vida cotidiana.: This essay argues for a situated character of knowledge of everyday life. As a starting point, relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of “form of life”, we propose that our decisions are fundamentally practical uses of historically constructed rules systems and, therefore, those are irreducible to algorithmic procedures of rational cost-benefit evaluation. Later, to address the question of the conditions that make possible the subjective incorporation of these rules and, with it, our practical sense, we recover some approaches from the “background” thesis of John Searle and habitus by Pierre Bourdieu. After this discussion, from Donna Haraway's perspective of situated knowledge, we propose that the conformation of that sense is always partial; that is, related to embodied articulatory practices. Finally, we argue that the perspective of situated knowledge represents a plausible alternative to theoretically and methodologically support an approach to knowledge of everyday life. (shrink)

We track and analyze the re-situation of scientific knowledge in the field of human population genomics ancestry studies. We understand re-situation as a process of accommodating the direct or indirect transfer of objects of knowledge from one site/situation to other sites/situations. Our take on the concept borrows from Mary S. Morgan’s work on facts traveling while expanding it to include other objects of knowledge such as models, data, software, findings, and visualizations. We structure a specific case study (...) by tracking the re-situation of these objects between three research projects studying human population diversity reported in three articles in Science, Genome Research and PLoS Genetics between 2002 and 2005. We characterize these three engagements as a unit of analysis, a “skirmish,” in order to compare: the divergence of interests in how life-scientists answer similar research questions and to track the challenging transformation of workflows in research laboratories as these scientific objects are re-situated individually or in bundles. Our analysis of the case study shows that an accurate understanding of re-situation requires tracking the whole bundle of objects in a project because they interact in particular key ways. The absence or dismissal of these interactions opens the door to unforeseen trade-offs, misunderstandings and misrepresentations about research design and workflow and what these say about the questions asked and the findings produced. (shrink)

The concept of knowledge, more than any other, has invited truth-functional analysis. In saying of a person that he knows that p, we are, according to many philosophers, saying no more and no less than three or four distinct things. In spite of setbacks suffered by the “traditional” analysis, the belief remains strong that there is a definitive answer to the question “What is knowledge?” in truth-functional terms. Yet the word ‘know’, like most others having to do with (...) human beings, is used for a variety of purposes in a variety of situations. It would be surprising if all these uses could be captured in a single formula. (shrink)

Knowledge production is not free of political connotations. The researcher defines and moulds the research situation in which she will be gathering the data. Simultaneously, she will be also condit...

Recontextualized Knowledge aims to analyze the communicative situations involved in the popularization of scientific knowledge: their settings, audiences, and the adaptive process of recontextualization in science communication. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this publication brings together essays from rhetoric, linguistics, and psychology as well as political and education sciences to serve as an in-depth exploration of today's communicative situations in science communication.

This volume attempts a critical historical consideration of the varying colonial situations in which (and from which) ethnographic knowledge essential to anthropology has been produced. The essays cover regions from Oceania, Southeast Asia and southern Africa to North and South America.

(1997). The situated social scientist: Reflexivity and perspective in the sociology of knowledge. Social Epistemology: Vol. 11, New Directions in the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 193-202.

We track and analyze the re-situation of scientific knowledge in the field of human population genomics ancestry studies. We understand re-situation as a process of accommodating the direct or indirect transfer of objects of knowledge from one site/situation to (one or many) other sites/situations. Our take on the concept borrows from Mary S. Morgan’s work on facts traveling while expanding it to include other objects of knowledge such as models, data, software, findings, and visualizations. We structure a (...) specific case study by tracking the re-situation of these objects between three research projects studying human population diversity reported in three articles in Science, Genome Research and PLoS Genetics between 2002 and 2005. We characterize these three engagements as a unit of analysis, a “skirmish,” in order to compare: (a) the divergence of interests in how life-scientists answer similar research questions and (b) to track the challenging transformation of workflows in research laboratories as these scientific objects are re-situated individually or in bundles. Our analysis of the case study shows that an accurate understanding of re-situation requires tracking the whole bundle of objects in a project because they interact in particular key ways. The absence or dismissal of these interactions opens the door to unforeseen trade-offs, misunderstandings and misrepresentations about research design(s) and workflow(s) and what these say about the questions asked and the findings produced. (shrink)

AbstrakAng kasalukuyang daloy ng dekolonisasyon ng narsing ay nananatiling masmaigting na hinuhubog ng mga pananaw mula sa Pandaigdigang Hilaga. Bilang pakikiisa sa tinig mula sa Pandaigdigang Timog na aktibong nagsusulong ng pagsentro ng mga naisantabing sistemang kaalaman sa larangan ng narsing, inihahain ng kritikal na sanaysay na ito ang Narsolohiyang Pilipino bilang isang dekolonyal na paradigma ng pagdadalumat sa narsing na nakaugat sa mga epistemolohiya at pamumuhay ng mga Pilipino. Itinatampok sa papel na ito ang Pluriverse of Nursologies (PoN) bilang (...) pilosopikal na salalayan, at nagsusulong ito ng plurisentrisismo sa siyentipikong kaalaman sa narsing. Sinisimulan ng sanaysay ang pagtalakay sa PoN bilang pundasyong pilosopikal, kasunod ang mga pangunahing katuwiran para sa pormalisasyon ng Narsolohiyang Pilipino. Inilalarawan din dito ang Narsolohiyang Pilipino bilang isang dekolonyal at tentatibong paradigma ng pagdadalumat narsing, na may dalawang pangunahing pilosopikal na mithiin: pagbaklas at pag‐ugnay. Sa huli, inilalahad ng akdang ito ang isang maikling halimbawa ng narsolohikal na pagsusuri gamit ang lokal na konsepto ng pakikiramdam, at inilalatag ang mga posibilidad at hamon sa pagsusulong ng Narsolohiyang Pilipino. (shrink)

Humans transform their environment in order to regulate their own affect. One way to do so is to avoid situations that come with negative rather than positive affect. This selection might not solel...

Over the years I’ve written many papers defending an idiosyncratic version of interest-relative epistemology. This book collects and updates the views I’ve expressed over those papers. -/- Interest-relative epistemologies all start in roughly the same way. A big part of what makes knowledge important is that it rationalises action. But for almost anything we purportedly know, there is some action that it wouldn’t rationalise. I know what I had for breakfast, but I wouldn’t take a bet at billion to (...) one odds about it. Knowledge has practical limits. The first idiosyncratic feature of my version of interest-relative epistemology is how those limits are identified. Other interest-relative philosophers typically say that the limits have to do with stakes; in high stakes situations knowledge goes away. That’s no part of my view. I think knowledge goes away in long odds situations. High stakes situations are almost always are long odds situations, for reasons to do with the declining marginal utility of money. But the converse isn’t true. On my view, knowledge often goes away in cases where it is trivial to check before action. This idea, that interests matter in long odds cases, and not just in high stakes cases, is the main constant in what I’ve written on interest-relativity over the years. -/- But there are three other respects in which the view I’m going to set out and defend in this book is very different from the view I set out in older papers. -/- I used to identify the practical limits on knowledge with cases where relying on the purported knowledge would get the wrong answer. I focused, that is, on the outputs of inquiry. Knowledge goes away if relying on it would lead one to make a mistake. I now think I was looking at the wrong end of inquiry. Knowledge goes away if the thinker starts conducting an inquiry where the purported knowledge is an inappropriate starting point, and inappropriate for the special reason that it might be false. Now one way we can tell that something is a bad starting point is that starting there will mean we end up at the wrong place. But it’s not the only way. Sometimes a bad starting point will lead to the right conclusion for the wrong reasons. As the Nyāya philosophers argued, rational inquiry starts with knowledge. If it would be irrational to start this inquiry with a particular belief, that belief isn’t knowledge. -/- Not all inquiries are practical inquiries, but many are. And practical inquiries are usually going to be at the center of attention in this book. But what is someone trying to figure out when they conduct a practical inquiry? I used to think that they were trying to figure out which option maximised expected utility, and to a first approximation identified knowledge with those things one could conditionalise on without changing the option that maximised expected utility. As noted in the previous paragraph, I no longer think that we can identify knowledge with what doesn’t change our verdicts. But more importantly, I no longer think that expected utility maximisation is as central to practical inquiry as I once did. There are some theoretical reasons from game theory that raise some doubts about expected utility maximisation. Weak dominance reasoning is part of our theory of rational choice, and can’t be modelled as expected utility maximisation. Perhaps some kinds of equilibrium seeking are parts of practical inquiry, and can’t be modelled as expected utility maximisation. But there are also very practical reasons to think that practical inquiry doesn’t aim at expected utility maximisation. When there are a lot of very similar options - think about selecting a can from a supermarket shelf - and it’s more trouble than it’s worth to figure out which of them maximises expected utility, it’s best to ignore the differences between them and just pick. As I’ll argue in Chapter 6, this makes a big difference to how interests and knowledge interact. -/- In the version of interest-relativity that I’m defending here, everything in epistemology is interest-relative. Knowledge, rational belief, and evidence are all interest-relative. But they are all interest-relative in slightly different ways. The main aim here is to defend the interest-relativity of knowledge. A common objection to interest-relative theories of knowledge is that they can’t be extended into theories of all the things we care about in epistemology. Here I try to meet that challenge. The way I do so is a little messy. It would be nice if there was some part of epistemology that’s interest-invariant, as I used to think, or if all the interest-relative notions were interest-relative in the same way, as other interest-relative epistemologists argue. For better or worse, that’s not the view I’m defending. Interests matter throughout epistemology, and we just have to go case by case to figure out how and why they matter. (shrink)