Employee performance plays a crucial role in the productivity of organizations, especially in the hospitality industry in Malaysia. This work performance is influenced by leadership style, and finding the type of leadership style that is suitable to apply to employees is crucial, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Transformational leadership theory is selected for this study in determining leadership styles. There are four dimensions under transformational leadership theory, namely idealized influence, individualized consideration, inspirational motivation and intellectual stimulation. Data (...) were collected online from 400 employees working in the hospitality industry in Malaysia and analyzed using partial least square structure equation modeling. The findings show that only two dimensions of transformational leadership, namely idealized influence and inspirational motivation, have a significant positive influence on employee performance. Implications in the context of human resource management and recommendations to increase employee performance are also discussed. (shrink)

Argues that the normative relation of commitment is routinely overlooked by philosophers, and that investigating it reveals some interesting similarities between the moral and rational domains.

In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal realism defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting (...) modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. (shrink)

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in?On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy?, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite (...) beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason. (shrink)

This book explores the extent to which children engage with morality within their everyday lives.

World Futures, Volume 68, Issue 2, Page 77-81, February-March 2012.

This article draws on three ecofeminist theorists (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Val Plumwood, and Donna Haraway) in order to criticize the dominant model of globalization, which oppresses humans and the natural environment, and propose an alternative globalization grounded in planetary love. Rather than affirming or opposing the globalization, planetary love acknowledges its complicity with the neocolonial tendencies of globalization while aiming toward another globalization, a more just, peaceful, and sustainable globalization. In this context, love is characterized by non-coercive, mutually transformative contact, (...) which opens spaces of respect and responsibility for the unique differences and otherness of planetary subjects (humans and nonhumans). (shrink)

Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction (...) are interpreted as intensional operators. (shrink)

The Quest for Happiness Is a Universal Fact. It is a scientific fact, which means we can measure happiness, we can assess it, and we can devise strategies to make ourselves happy and fulfilled human beings. So says Professor Gad Saad, the author of the sensational bestseller The Parasitic Mind and the irrepressible host of The Saad Truth podcast. In this provocative, entertaining, and life-changing new book, he roams through the scientific studies, culls the wisdom of ancient philosophy (...) and religion, and draws on his extraordinary personal experience as a refugee from war-torn Lebanon turned academic celebrity. (shrink)

Continuous sedation until death (CSD), the act of reducing or removing the consciousness of an incurably ill patient until death, often provokes medical–ethical discussions in the opinion sections of medical and nursing journals. Some argue that CSD is morally equivalent to physician-assisted death (PAD), that it is a form of “slow euthanasia.” A qualitative thematic content analysis of opinion pieces was conducted to describe and classify arguments that support or reject a moral difference between CSD and PAD. Arguments pro and (...) contra a moral difference refer basically to the same ambiguous themes, namely intention, proportionality, withholding artificial nutrition and hydration, and removing consciousness. This demonstrates that the debate is first and foremost a semantic rather than a factual dispute, focusing on the normative framework of CSD. Given the prevalent ambiguity, the debate on CSD appears to be a classical symbolic struggle for moral authority. (shrink)

As ever more advanced digital systems are created, it becomes increasingly likely that some of these systems will be digital minds, i.e. digital subjects of experience. With digital minds comes the risk of digital suffering. The problem of digital suffering is that of mitigating this risk. We argue that the problem of digital suffering is a high stakes moral problem and that formidable epistemic obstacles stand in the way of solving it. We then propose a strategy for solving it: Access (...) Monitor Prevent (AMP). AMP uses a ‘dancing qualia’ argument to link the functional states of certain digital systems to their experiences—this yields epistemic access to digital minds. With that access, we can prevent digital suffering by only creating advanced digital systems that we have such access to, monitoring their functional profiles, and preventing them from entering states with functional markers of suffering. After introducing and motivating AMP, we confront limitations it faces and identify some options for overcoming them. We argue that AMP fits especially well with—and so provides a moral reason to prioritize—one approach to creating such systems: whole brain emulation. We also contend that taking other paths to digital minds would be morally risky. (shrink)

Whether AI systems could be conscious is often thought to turn on whether consciousness is closely linked to biology. Roughly, the thought is: if consciousness is closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is impossible; and if consciousness is not closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is possible—or, at any rate, it’s more likely to be possible. A clearer specification of the kind of link between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness would facilitate (...) inquiry into the prospects for AI consciousness. After motivating desiderata that such a specification should meet, I argue that proposed views about the relationship between consciousness and biology tend not to capture such a crucial link. In addition, I offer a thesis that does capture the link: the biological requirement according to which being conscious at least nomically requires having biological states. (shrink)

Some physical theories predict that almost all brains in the universe are Boltzmann brains, i.e. short-lived disembodied brains that are accidentally assembled as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. Physicists and philosophers of physics widely regard this proliferation as unacceptable, and so take its prediction as a basis for rejecting these theories. But the putatively unacceptable consequences of this prediction follow only given certain philosophical assumptions. This paper develops a strategy for shielding physical theorizing from the threat of Boltzmann (...) brains. The strategy appeals to a form of phenomenal externalism about the physical basis of consciousness. Given that form of phenomenal externalism, the proliferation of Boltzmann brains turns out to be benign. While the strategy faces a psychophysical fine-tuning problem, it both alleviates cosmological fine-tuning concerns that attend physics-based solutions to Boltzmann brain problems and pays explanatory dividends in connection with time’s arrow. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that discovering that our universe is fine-tuned should make us more confident that other universes exist. My defense exploits a distinction between ideal and non-ideal evidential support. I use that distinction in concert with a simple model to disarm the most influential objection—the this-universe objection—to the view that fine-tuning supports the existence of other universes. However, the simple model fails to capture some important features of our epistemic situation with respect to fine-tuning. To capture these (...) features, I introduce a more sophisticated model. I then use the more sophisticated model to show that, even once those complicating factors are taken into account, fine-tuning should boost our confidence in the existence of other universes. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences are non-physical states that exist alongside physical states. Dualism leads to the postulation of psychophysical laws that generate experiences by operating on certain sorts of physical states. What sorts of physical states? To the limited extent that dualists have addressed this question, they have tended to favor a brain-based approach that locates the physical basis of experience in the head. In contrast, this paper develops an argument for a form of dualism on which experience has a (...) physical basis that reaches out into the world. Specifically, the argument uses a puzzle about spatial experience to support a theory I call _tracking dualism_. On tracking dualism, a psychophysical law generates experiences by operating on complex physical states that involve both brain states and tracking relations that they bear to features of the environment. To develop the argument, I discuss tracking dualism alongside its more familiar physicalist counterpart, the tracking intentionalist theory associated with Dretske, Lycan, and Tye. I conclude by outlining a tracking dualist research agenda. (shrink)

This paper provides a contemporary introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are studied within the emerging field of digital minds research. We explore the potential for AI systems to have mental states. Questions that we address include whether AI systems can be phenomenally conscious and whether they can have propositional attitudes such as belief and desire. We also consider how digital minds might persist through time in a manner akin to how humans have personal (...) identity through time. Along the way, we highlight methodological issues raised by these questions and examine how these questions relate to traditional issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. We conclude by highlighting issues in this area that are ripe for further investigation. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as (...) a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call delegatory dualism—experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states. (shrink)

On some cosmological models, we’re cosmically early: we arrived roughly 14 billion years after the Big Bang in a universe that will evidently remain conducive to the emergence of intelligent observers for trillions of years. Why are we so early? I’ll survey two broad classes of responses: large-world responses that turn on reality being much larger than on standard single-universe hypotheses and small-world responses that are compatible with the world being no larger than such hypotheses take it to be. One (...) upshot will be that cosmic earliness suggests a diverse range of large-world explanations. In contrast, it turns out to be difficult to account for cosmic earliness while steering clear of large-world commitments. I conclude with some reflections on why our time of arrival seems thoroughly entangled with our world’s size. (shrink)

Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. I favour an interactionist dualist version of realizationism on which experiences are non-physical states that non-redundantly cause problem judgments. This view is subject to the challenges of specifying laws that would enable experiences to cause problem judgments and of explaining why (...) it's not a lucky coincidence that experiences' causal and rational powers converge on problem judgments. I propose a strategy for solving the meta-problem and meeting these challenges. According to it, a fundamental teleological law operates on normative features of experiences in ways that bias experiences towards causing effects that they rationalize, including problem judgments. I conclude by applying the strategy to other luck-avoidance challenges. (shrink)

Experiences tend to be followed by states for which they provide normative reasons. Such harmonious correlations cry out for explanation. Theories that answer or diminish these cries thereby achieve an advantage over theories that do neither. I argue that the main lines of response to these cries that are available to biological theorists—theorists who hold (roughly) that conscious subjects are generally biological entities—are problematic. And I argue that panpsychism—which holds (roughly) that conscious subjects are ubiquitous in nature—provides an attractive response (...) to these explanatory cries. Taken together, these considerations underwrite a kind of ‘psychophysical fine-tuning’ argument in support of panpsychism, one that is reminiscent of cosmological fine-tuning arguments in favor of multiverse hypotheses. (shrink)

Many philosophers and scientists take cosmological fine-tuning—roughly the fact that our universe would have been devoid of life if it had had slightly different cosmological parameters—to point to the existence of a designer or multiverse. Planetary fine-tuning—roughly the fact that our planet would have been devoid of life if it had slightly different intrinsic characteristics or relations to other objects in the solar system—points to the existence of many planets. It may seem that since astronomy independently confirms the existence of (...) many planets, planetary fine-tuning is of less philosophical interest than cosmological fine-tuning. This paper shows that any such appearance is illusory by defending four arguments for the conclusion that our planetary fine-tuning evidence supports the existence of a multiverse. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness seems fragmented: phenomenal states seem to belong to many families, where members of each family just resemble members of that family. This paper argues that phenomenal fragmentation poses a neglected problem for consciousness fundamentalism. Consciousness fundamentalism holds that some phenomenal states are fundamental and that they ground any non-fundamental phenomenal states. While consciousness fundamentalism is not a familiar view, it encompasses familiar forms of dualism, panpsychism, and idealism. Roughly, the problem is: on consciousness fundamentalism, phenomenal fragmentation leads to (...) a radical and highly objectionable expansion of our fundamental ontology. After developing the phenomenal fragmentation problem, I survey candidate solutions and illustrate how the problem offers a fruitful constraint on theorizing about consciousness for consciousness fundamentalists. (shrink)

To defend the physical reducibility of phenomenology in our world, reductive physicalists have long guarded the realm of metaphysical possibility: for decades now, they have relentlessly endeavored to prevent zombies (physical duplicates of actual conscious individuals) from entering modal space. In contrast, reductive physicalists have tended to adopt an open modal borders policy towards aliens, i.e. individuals with phenomenal properties foreign to our world. On the face of it, aliens—and, even aliens with physically irreducible phenomenology—pose no threat: after all, reductive (...) physicalism says nothing about the nature of uninstantiated phenomenal properties. However, I argue that an alien threat looms. The trouble, for reductive physicalists, is that upon granting aliens entry into modal space, phenomenal commonalities between aliens and actual individuals arise and resist physical reduction at our world. This is the alien phenomenology problem. It could be solved by restricting access to modal space. Or by limiting what aliens can do once inside. However, these solutions harbor hidden costs for reductive physicalists, ones they should not be eager to pay. A better bargain, I suggest, would be for reductive physicalists to retreat to quasi-reductive physicalism, a form of grounding physicalism on which only some instantiated phenomenal properties are physically reducible. For reductive physicalists, this fallback position has much to offer. It enjoys reductive physicalism’s motivations. It reconciles the physical reducibility of some phenomenology in our world with the possibility of aliens. And it enables an alien-assisted defense against zombies. (shrink)

Dualism holds that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing (...) out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy. (shrink)

In this article I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward earlier events: other things equal, we should prefer for good events to occur earlier and disprefer for bad events to occur earlier. The argument contends that we should accord at least some credence—if only a small one—to a theoretical package featuring the growing block theory of time and that this package generates a presumptive bias toward earlier events. Rival theoretical packages are considered. Under reasonable allocations of (...) credence to them, the presumptive bias escapes defeat. The argument has several corollaries: other things equal, we should be biased toward the past over the future, the further past over the nearer past, and the nearer future over the further future. (shrink)

This paper introduces and clarifies an intuitive yet neglected hypothesis: the attention-welfare link, according to which (roughly) the degree of attention directed towards valenced experiences modulates the degree to which these experiences are good or bad for their subject. We show that the link is supported by reflection on cases and that it is best understood in terms of phenomenal attention rather than functional attention. To conclude, we describe three applications of the link: first, it provides grounds for rejecting popular (...) sentientist views of welfare; second, it sheds light on how to understand the resonance constraint; and third, it points towards a previously-unappreciated path to individuals with super-human welfare capacity. (shrink)

Respect for Autonomy has been a mainstay of medical ethics since its enshrinement as one of the four principles of biomedical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress’ in the late 1970s. This paper traces the development of this modern concept from Antiquity to the present day, paying attention to its Enlightenment origins in Kant and Rousseau. The rapid C20th developments of bioethics and RFA are then considered in the context of the post-war period and American socio-political thought. The validity and utility (...) of the RFA are discussed in light of this philosophical-historical account. It is concluded that it is not necessary to embrace an ethic of autonomy in order to guard patients from coercion or paternalism, and that, on the contrary, the dominance of autonomy threatens to undermine those very things which have helped doctors come to view and respect their patients as persons. (shrink)

Interactionists hold that minds are non-physical objects that interact with brains. The neural discernment problem for interactionism is that of explaining how non-physical minds produce behavior and cognition by exercising different causal powers over physiologically similar neurons. This paper sharpens the neural discernment problem and proposes two interactionist models of mind-brain interaction that solve it. One model avoids overdetermination while the other respects the causal closure of the physical domain.

This paper argues for granular permissivism, roughly the view that evidence is sometimes permissive between doxastic attitudes at different levels of grain. The argument identifies three sources of rational slack between granularly differing doxastic states: doxastic tidiness, safety, and evidential responsiveness. After arguing for granular permissivism and contrasting it with a more familiar, Jamesian form of permissivism, I show how granular permissivism offers an escape from some arguments against permissivism. I conclude by drawing out implications from granular permissivism for questions (...) about the value of rationality and rational constraints on deference. (shrink)

A causal argument for physicalism is widely held to pose a problem for dualism. This view has an unobvious presupposition, namely that the causal closure of the physical has a special sort of ground. The requisite sort of ground must distinguish the causal argument for physicalism from many defective causal arguments. On behalf of physicalists, I develop an account of the ground for the causal closure of the physical, thereby putting the causal argument for physicalism back in the business of (...) causally problematizing dualism. One consequence of my account is that physicalists can pose a causal problem for dualism using a much weaker closure premise than is generally assumed. (shrink)

This report explores interactions between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. It offers a tour of the surrounding theoretical terrain and brings together disparate literatures that bear on the topic.

Recent declarations of the end of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom, especially since the Covid-19 pandemic, are underpinned by diffuse and unstructured understandings of the neoliberal state. We argue that state intervention is both necessary and unavoidable under neoliberalism. This article shows that the ‘market-based’ reforms and the ‘rollback of the state’ that overtly characterise neoliberalism are heavily reliant upon public policy and entail an ongoing role for state intervention both over time and across economic sectors. Using sectoral case studies (...) of housing and water from within the United Kingdom, we demonstrate, through a tight analytical framing of both financialisation and commodification, the variegated though crucial role of the neoliberal state in restructuring provision to facilitate financialised accumulation and their transformations in response to the contradictions, dysfunctions and limitations of neoliberalised social reproduction. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 374-377.

Florence Ashley has argued that requiring patients with gender dysphoria to undergo an assessment and referral from a mental health professional before undergoing hormone replacement therapy (HRT) is unethical and may represent an unconscious hostility towards transgender people. We respond, first, by showing that Ashley has conflated the self-reporting of symptoms with self-diagnosis, and that this is not consistent with the standard model of informed consent to medical treatment. Second, we note that the model of informed consent involved in cosmetic (...) surgery resembles the model Ashley defends, and that psychological assessment and referral is recognised as an important aspect of such a model. Third, we suggest that the increased prevalence of psychiatric morbidity in the transgender population arguably supports the requirement of assessment and referral from a mental health professional prior to undergoing HRT. (shrink)

Why "cultivating contingency" is essential to being free, including an argument for public bodies selected via sortition (random selection).

Gauge invariance of a manifestly covariant relativistic quantum theory with evolution according to an invariant time τ implies the existence of five gauge compensation fields, which we shall call pre-Maxwell fields. A Lagrangian which generates the equations of motion for the matter field (coinciding with the Schrödinger type quantum evolution equation) as well as equations, on a five-dimensional manifold, for the gauge fields, is written. It is shown that τ integration of the equations for the pre-Maxwell fields results in the (...) usual Maxwell equations with conserved current source. The analog of the O (3, 1) symmetry of the usual Maxwell theory is found to be O (3, 2) or O (4, 1), depending on the space-time Fourier spectrum of the field. We argue that the structure that is relevant to the description of radiation in interaction with matter evolving in a timelike sense is that of O (3, 2). The noncovariant form of the field equations is given; there are two fields of electric type and one (divergenceless) magnetic type field. The Noether currents are studied, and some remarks are made on second quantization. (shrink)

I explore two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality: spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. Roughly, spatial functionalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties are those playing a certain causal role in producing spatial experience while spatial presentationalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties include those presented in spatial experience. I argue that each view, in its own way, leads to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism: whereas spatial functionalism leads to primitivism about phenomenal representation, spatial presentationalism (...) leads to primitivism about spatial properties. I conclude by discussing how to adjudicate between spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. (shrink)

Though not myself a physicalist, I develop a new argument against antiphysicalist positions that are motivated by zombie arguments. I first identify four general features of phenomenal states that are candidates for non-physical types; these are used to generate different types of zombie. I distinguish two antiphysicalist positions: strict dualism, which posits exactly one general non-physical type, and pluralism, which posits more than one such type. It turns out that zombie arguments threaten strict dualism and some pluralist positions as much (...) as they threaten physicalism—indeed, more so, since such positions need zombies to motivate them as alternatives to physicalism—and that the only pluralist position that escapes zombie arguments has a radically inflated ontology. (shrink)

This paper argues that healthcare aims at the good of health, that this pursuit of the good necessitates conscience, and that conscience is required in every practical judgement, including clinical...

Debate persists over the place of conscience in medicine. Some argue for the complete exclusion of conscientious objection, while others claim an absolute right of refusal. This paper proposes that claims of conscientious objection can and should be permitted if they concern kinds of actions which fall outside of the normative standard of medicine, which is the pursuit of health. Medical practice which meets this criterion we call medicine qua medicine. If conscientious refusal concerns something consonant with the health-restoring aims (...) of medicine, it entails a desertion of professional duty. If, however, it relates to something other than medicine qua medicine, it can rightly be refused. It thus becomes possible to test instances of conscientious objection to determine their validity, and thereby conserve both the principle of conscientious objection and define its scope. This test of conscience prevents arbitrary discrimination, and preserves doctors’ agency. It is a theoretical razor rooted in the pra... (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences and physical states are distinct in that neither sort of state is identical with or grounded in the other. Cognitive phenomenal realism holds that cognitive experiences are irreducible to sensory experiences. While dualism and cognitive phenomenal realism are logically orthogonal and usually discussed separately, I argue that dualism’s plausibility is sensitive to whether cognitive phenomenal realism is true. In particular, I argue that if cognitive phenomenal realism is true, then it bolsters the case for dualism via (...) a cognitive knowledge argument that has several advantages over the standard sensory knowledge argument. (shrink)

In her paper ‘Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection’, Minerva rightly identifies cosmetic surgery as an interesting test case for the question of conscientious objection in medicine. Her treatment of this important subject, however, seems problematic. It is argued that Minerva's suggestion that a doctor has a prima facie duty to satisfy patient preferences even against his better clinical judgment, which we call Patient Preference Absolutism, must be regarded with scepticism. This is because it overlooks an important distinction regarding autonomy's meaning (...) and place in clinical practice, and it makes obsolete the important concepts of expert clinical judgment and beneficence. Finally, we discuss two ideas which emerge from consideration of cosmetic surgery in relation to conscientious objection. These are the possible analogy between clinical judgment and conscientious objection, and the possible role the goals of medicine can play in defining the scope of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Räsänen has attempted to make a moral case for permitting some people to change their legal age: if someone considers that their chronological age does not correspond to their emotional age or biological age, and they face age-based discrimination as a result, they may change the legal record of their age. This response considers some of the problems with Räsänen’s paper, including its reliance on equivocation. It concludes that what is billed as a moral argument turns out to be a (...) conflicted case for deception which relies on a nihilistic outlook on reality. (shrink)

The form of things is not their essence, but only their presentation, a deadly shorthand which necessarily erases significant differences and so should be used with the utmost care and discretion.

Wallenhorst and Saad's contribution rereads the figure of the "wise woman" in "Fate and Character" far more ambivalently than as a simple charlatan who reproduces the judgments of the dominant order. While Benjamin casts her divinations as complicit with a naturalized regime of fate, Wallenhorst and Saad argue that her "simple technique" can also unsettle fatalism and issue "momentarily anti-dialectical" imperatives in a manner that opens up spaces of collective agency and the pleasure of avengement. Reframing her through (...) associations with midwifery, militancy, and rupture, they propose that the wise woman's destructive judgments may catalyze fatelessness—transforming guilt into rage and enabling moments of political or psychic breaks with an order which is not to be accepted as given. (shrink)

The chief motivation for epiphenomenalist dualism is its promise to solve dualism’s causal exclusion problem without inducing causal overdetermination or violations of the causal closure of the physical. This paper argues that epiphenomenalist dualism is itself susceptible to an exclusion problem. The problem exploits symmetries of determination and influence generated by a wide class of physical theories. Further, I argue that there is an interference effect between solving epiphenomenalist dualism's exclusion problem and using epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the (...) causal exclusion problem. What emerges is an overlooked, empirically-motivated challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism. (shrink)

Plant production is diverse in the Asir region, and there are many methods of analysis. Perhaps factor analysis is one of the most important statistical methods through which productive power can be measured in various geographical regions. In this study, factor analysis was used to measure the developments of plant production in the agricultural sector in the Asir region, Saudi Arabia. The factor analysis showed the presence of three main factors that together explained about %86.55 of the total variation in (...) the development of plant production in the governorates of the Asir region. The study showed three mathematical algorithms that can measure the development of plant production in the Asir region according to the three main factors: First factor equation λ1=44.250%=-0.521*X_1 0.810*X_2+0.78*X_3+0.842*X_4+0.755*X_5 Second factor equation λ2=24.960%-0.228*X_1+0.352*X_2+0.936*X_3-0.226*X_4-0.380*X_5 The third factor equation λ3=17.344%0.796*X_1+0.291*X_2+0.104*X_3+0.339*X_4-0.153*X_5 -The study classified the governorates of the Asir region, based on the results of the analysis, into three groups, according to negative and positive 0.933-0.975 and includes Bisha - Abha - Ahad Rafaida - Khamis Mushait - in Al-Furn - Al-Barak, while the second group represents the category of 0.897-0.548 and includes the governorates of Mahayel, Asir - Tanmomah - Al-Namas - Tathleeth. The third group includes the category of 0.255--0234 and includes the governorates Sarat Ubaidah - Al-Majadra and Bariq - Tareeb - Dhahran Al-Janoub and Al-Harajah - Rijal Almaa. (shrink)

Hoping to bring some objectivity to the debate, Ben-Moshe has argued that conscientious objection in medicine should be accommodated based on its concordance with the ‘impartial spectator’, a metaphor for conscience drawn from the writings of Adam Smith. This response finds fault with this account on two fronts: first, that its claim to objectivity is unsubstantiated; second, that it implicitly relies on moral absolutes, despite claiming that conscience is a social construct, thereby calling its coherence and claims into question. Briefly, (...) a traditional account of conscience is then described, before ending with a related thesis for future discussion. (shrink)