Simulation Argument

This paper outlines how a potential new interpretation of quantum mechanics—the Many-Interacting Simulations (MIS) interpretation—may explain why our world has many of the bizarre quantum features it does. §1 provides an overview of what has been termed the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Simulation Hypothesis, showing how it explains general features of quantum phenomena. §2 then examines dead reckoning, a framework utilized to ensure ‘believable’ simulated worlds for P2P networked games. §3 details how dead reckoning in P2P games reproduces—and hence, computationally explains—properties broadly (...) analogous to (§3.1) quantum mechanical standing waves, (§3.2) Gaussian wave packets, (§3.3) the double-slit experiment, and (§3.4) the ‘Wigner’s friend’ thought experiment. §4 then details how, if this explanation is correct, then traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics each contain elements of truth. §5 concludes that quantum phenomena may be the ‘glitches in the Matrix’ that many have suggested would be evidence that we live in a computer simulation. (shrink)

Those who believe suitably programmed computers could enjoy conscious experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility that their own experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation. It would be a mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical possibility: for as Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer technology were to continue at close to present rates, there would be a strong probability that we are each living in a computer simulation. (...) The first part of this paper is devoted to broadening the scope of the argument: even if computers cannot sustain consciousness (as many dualists and materialists believe), there may still be a strong likelihood that we are living simulated lives. The implications of this result are the focus of the second part of the paper. The topics discussed include: the Doomsday argument, scepticism, the different modes of virtual life, transcendental idealism, the Problem of Evil, and simulation ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an analysis of the Simulation Argument as formulated by Nick Bostrom (2003). We begin by outlining the argument, with particular attention to its disjunctive structure. We then proceed to reconstruct the argument by making explicit several of its underlying assumptions. Furthermore, we supplement the original argument with several elements that we regard as pertinent premises. Finally, we attend to the completion of the argument, paying special attention to the decision tree that underpins it. Having completed (...) the argument by supplying the missing assumptions and decision-tree components, we derive a conclusion that diverges significantly from that of the original formulation. (shrink)

Nous proposons dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation, décrit par Nick Bostrom (2003). Nous décrivons tout d’abord l’argument de la Simulation, en mettant l’accent sur sa structure disjonctive. Nous nous attachons ensuite à compléter l’argument, en restituant plusieurs hypothèses sous-jacentes. Nous ajoutant également à l’argument original plusieurs éléments, dont nous considérons qu’ils constituent autant d’hypothèses pertinentes. Enfin, nous nous attachons à compléter l’argument et en particulier l’arbre de décision qui le sous-tend. Une fois l’argument complété, à (...) l’aide des hypothèses et des éléments de l’arbre de décision manquants, nous en tirons la conclusion, qui est tout à fait différente de celle de l’argument original. (shrink)

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation. Outlined here is a method for programming relativistic mass, space and time at the Planck level as applicable for use in Planck Universe-as-a-Simulation Hypothesis. For the virtual universe the model uses a 4-axis hyper-sphere that expands in incremental steps (the simulation clock-rate). Virtual particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass point-state are mapped within this hyper-sphere, the oscillation driven (...) by this expansion. Particles are assigned an N-S axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled along by the expansion, thus an independent particle motion may be dispensed with. Only in the mass point-state do particles have fixed hyper-sphere co-ordinates. The rate of expansion translates to the speed of light and so in terms of the hyper-sphere co-ordinates all particles (and objects) travel at the speed of light, time (as the clock-rate) and velocity (as the rate of expansion) are therefore constant, however photons, as the means of information exchange, are restricted to lateral movement across the hyper-sphere thus giving the appearance of a 3-D space. Lorentz formulas are used to translate between this 3-D space and the hyper-sphere co-ordinates, relativity resembling the mathematics of perspective. (shrink)

The electron is found at discrete energy levels within the atom, transition between these levels is considered to involve a `jump' rather than via a continuous motion. If we simulate the transition in the H atom as a series of individual steps, with each step the frequency of the electron, we can map a semi-continuous transition (from n=1 to n=2 requires about 1887860 steps, transition period a function of the photon wavelength). Plotting the electron from n=1 to ionization traces a (...) hyperbolic spiral, the significance being that at specific spiral angles, the angle components cancel returning an integer value for the radius (360°=4r, 360+120°=9r, 360+180°=16r, 360+216°=25r ... 720°). If we set initial radius r = Bohr radius, then we can use the spiral perimeter to calculate the transition frequencies at these angles. As these spiral angles correlate the energy level Bohr radii directly with pi, we may ask if quantization of the atom has a geometrical origin. Furthermore, the closer the vicinity of the electron to the proton, the greater the divergence from the idealized value suggesting the electron maybe causing a distortion within the proton internal structure. (shrink)

Wepresent a geometric reformulation of Planck units and fundamental constants based on an integer-valued unit-number map θ and a small set of dimensionless gen erators. Physical quantities are represented by dimensionless geometric objects con structed from (π,Ω) and a dimensionless fine-structure parameter α, while local unit systems (e.g. SI) enter only through two dimensioned scalars (r,v) that translate the geometry into conventional units. The framework yields a unified table of con stants expressible in the form xθipyq with i = π2Ω15, (...) x = Ωv/r2, and y = πr17/v8, where cancellation rules enforce dimensionless invariants (units = 1, scalars = 1) for selected ratios. An exhaustive integer-space search over admissible unit-number assignments, subject to dimensional homogeneity, a dimensionless electron invari ant ψ, and quark bookkeeping constraints, collapses onto a unique equivalence class characterized by the base-15 rail 3M +2T = −15 (up to lattice shifts), selecting the canonical representative M = 15, T = −30. We evaluate agreement with CODATA 2014 means using a tolerance-based coincidence model (not CODATA uncertainties) and report strong joint improbabilities for the dimensionless-combination suite, the dimensioned-constant suite, and electron-parameter reconstruction. Finally, we in terpret these results through a Minimum Description Length lens: the framework acts as a compact generator that compresses many apparently independent numer ical facts into a small set of structural constraints. (shrink)

This overview presents a summary of a 7-article series proposing a geometric framework for physics. Based on the Simulation Hypothesis, the model suggests that the universe operates on a computationally efficient geometric substrate defined by a single fundamental constant — the fine-structure constant α — and the mathematical constants π and e. We demonstrate that complex physical phenomena, from gravitational orbits to atomic structure and quark confinement, emerge naturally from simple geometric rules on an expanding 4D hypersphere. We argue that (...) this reduction of free parameters represents a minimization of Kolmogorov Complexity, suggesting this geometric code is a likely candidate for the underlying “source code” of physical reality. (shrink)

Outlined here is a simulation hypothesis approach that uses an expanding (the simulation clock-rate measured in units of Planck time) 4-axis hyper-sphere and mathematical particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass (unit of Planck mass per unit of Planck time) point-state. Particles are assigned a spin axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled by this (hyper-sphere pilot wave) expansion, thus all particles travel at, and only at, the velocity of expansion (the origin of $c$), (...) however only the particle point-state has definable co-ordinates within the hyper-sphere. Photons are the mechanism of information exchange, as they lack a mass state they can only travel laterally (in hypersphere co-ordinate terms) between particles and so this hypersphere expansion cannot be directly observed, relativity then becomes the mathematics of perspective translating between the absolute (hypersphere) and the relative motion (3D space) co-ordinate systems. A discrete `pixel' lattice geometry is assigned as the gravitational space. Units of $\hbar c$ `physically' link particles into orbital pairs. As these are direct particle to particle links, a gravitational force between macro objects is not required, the gravitational orbit as the sum of these individual orbiting pairs. A 14.6 billion year old hyper-sphere (the sum of Planck black-hole units) has similar parameters to the cosmic microwave background. The Casimir force is a measure of the background radiation density. (shrink)

An orbital simulation program is described that uses a geometrical approach to modeling gravitational and atomic orbits at the Planck scale. Orbiting objects A, B, C... are sub-divided into points, each point representing 1 unit of Planck mass, for example, a 1kg satellite would divide into 1kg/Planck mass = 45940509 points. Each point in object A then forms a rotating orbital pair with every corresponding point in objects B, C... resulting in a universe-wide, n-body network of rotating point-to-point orbital pairs. (...) Each orbital pair rotates 1 unit of Planck length per unit of Planck time at velocity c in hypersphere space co-ordinates, the results are then summed and averaged to give the new co-ordinates, the program then repeats. When these rotations are mapped over time on a 2-D plane (representing 3D space), objects A, B, C... appear to be orbiting each other. The basic simulation uses the fine structure constant alpha as an orbital constant to simulate gravitational orbit parameters. As each orbital comprises only 2 points, 1 at each orbital pole, information regarding the objects A, B, C... ; momentum, size, center of mass, barycenter etc ... is not required, instead only the start (x, y, z) co-ordinates of each point are defined. Each point, by having a mass of Planck mass, is itself a construct of multiple particles, and so we can also form individual particle to particle orbital pairs. The simulation uses only geometry, no dimensioned constants (G, h, c ...) are required, although the results can be measured in Planck units for comparison. Points are physically linked together by a unit of momentum (a graviton), the rationale for this is described in a subsequent article on atomic orbitals. (shrink)

Embedded within the mathematical electron formula $\psi = 4\pi^2q^3$ are geometrical objects with attributes of the Planck units. The object M = 1 is a unit of mass, T = $\pi$ a unit of time, P = $\Omega$ as momentum. The fine structure constant alpha and $\Omega$ (formed from pi and e) combine into a geometrical AL = $q = (2^6 3\pi^2\Omega^5/\alpha)$. This $q$ has the units for a magnetic monopole (ampere-meter) giving the electron a $q^3$ internal structure that suggests (...) quarks could be related to monopoles. We expand upon this constructing a quark model entirely from the geometrical objects; Ampere, length L and time T (themselves constructs of $\alpha, \pi$, e). We find solutions with ($D = AL$, charge $-\frac{1}{3}e$) and up ($U = AV$, charge $+\frac{2}{3}e$). The unit relationship rules between these objects permit a DDD electron but the positron would have to be a DUU, the same configuration as the proton, which could explain the matter-antimatter asymmetry, universe neutrality and why the electron proton charge magnitudes are the same. We then investigate how a DDD configuration could have a spin-1/2. (shrink)

Political parties strive to understand their electorates, and focus groups are a vital tool in these efforts. AI-enhanced simulation technologies (AESTs) enable synthetic focus groups in a fraction of the time (and cost), raising the question of when and how such simulated evidence can be used in campaign research. This paper develops a decision matrix to help party strategists match research needs to appropriate simulation technologies and to identify when to escalate to hybrid or fully human focus groups. The matrix (...) combines three dimensions: strategic purpose, deployment risk, and empirical grounding of the simulation tool. Strategic purpose is the decisive dimension, as it determines what kind of evidence the focus group is meant to produce: observing how political meanings and identities emerge through interaction (Mode 1) or testing and refining campaign messages (Mode 2). The matrix shows that, given documented failure modes such as sycophancy, persona drift, and the suppression of minority viewpoints, AESTs cannot replace human interaction in Mode 1 at any risk level. Within Mode 2, suitability depends instead on deployment risk and on the empirical grounding. Yet even here, we caution that routine reliance on AESTs may erode the qualitative craft on which sound judgment depends. (shrink)

According to the most common interpretation of the simulation argument, we are very likely to live in an ancestor simulation. It is interesting to ask if some families of simulations are more likely than others inside the space of all simulations. We argue that a natural probability measure is given by computational complexity: easier simulations are more likely to be run. Remarkably this allows us to extract experimental predictions from the fact that we live in a simulation. For instance we (...) show that it is very likely that humanity will not achieve interstellar travel and that humanity will not meet other intelligent species in the universe, in turn explaining the Fermi's Paradox. On the opposite side, experimental falsification of any of these predictions would constitute evidence against our reality being a simulation. (shrink)

Both patched versions of the Bostrom/Kulczycki simulation argument contain serious objective errors, discovered while attempting to formalize them in predicate logic. The English glosses of both versions involve badly misleading meanings of vague magnitude terms, which their impressiveness benefits from. We fix the errors, prove optimal versions of the arguments, and argue that both are much less impressive than they originally appeared. Finally, we provide a guide for readers to evaluate the simulation argument for themselves, using well-justified settings of the (...) argument parameters that have simple, accurate statements in English, which are easier to understand and critique than the statements in the original paper. (shrink)

Are we living in a computer simulation? Some philosophers say it's very likely we are. Some philosophers say that even if we're not in a simulation, we could never know for sure. In this short piece I would like to respond to a more practical question: that is, whatever the case may be, ontologically or epistemically, how do we actually escape (or break) a simulation? I propose a rather simple and sure-fire way to escape a computer simulation—whether we're in one (...) or not. I also connect my solution to the Fermi Paradox. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom's simulation argument holds that, under certain conditions, it is highly probable that we are living in a computer simulation. This paper argues that this probabilistic inference fails to establish the rational grounds for the near-certainty it purports to justify. Three independent failures are identified, operating at distinct levels: physical constraints, structural incompatibility, and diagnostic inversion. The thermodynamic limits on computation — in particular Landauer's Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics — impose fundamental constraints on the number of (...) simulations that can be simultaneously active, undermining the statistical dominance required by Bostrom. Additionally, the argument is shown to depend on the conjunction of three conditions: (R1) creators with sufficiently humanoid psychology to be motivated to run Ancestor-Simulations; (R2) capacity to run an astronomically large number of simulations; and (R3) operation within some form of computational physics. Formal analysis shows that no consistent configuration exists in which all three conditions can be simultaneously satisfied, rendering the intended probabilistic inference structurally untenable. Finally, it is argued that Bostrom commits a diagnostic inversion by treating technological capacity as a statistical multiplier for the probability of being simulated. This paper demonstrates that such capacity should instead be interpreted as ontological evidence regarding one's position in the hierarchy of realities: the greater the capacity to simulate, the less likely one is to be simulated. (shrink)

Bostrom's simulation argument presents a trilemma: either almost no human-level civilizations reach a posthuman stage, or almost no posthuman civilizations run ancestor-simulations, or almost everyone with experiences like ours is living in a simulation. This paper grants the trilemma's formal apparatus in full and shows that Bostrom's conclusion — that we ourselves are probably simulated — does not follow from it. The formula behind the trilemma computes over a reference class with two subgroups: originating civilizations, and the simulations their descendants (...) produce. The formula's own specification places us in the originating subgroup. To reach his conclusion, Bostrom performs a separate inference, from we will create simulations to we are simulated — from what we can make to what we are. I call this the capability-inversion fallacy. The paper identifies the inference, shows Bostrom committing it throughout his text, diagnoses the features of his formulation that concealed it for two decades, and shows that the standard defenses of the argument commit it afresh. The simulation hypothesis remains a logical possibility. Bostrom's argument provides no evidence for it. (shrink)

The goal of the article is to explore what is the most probable type of simulation in which humanity lives (if any) and how this affects simulation termination risks. We firstly explore the question of what kind of simulation in which humanity is most likely located based on pure theoretical reasoning. We suggest a new patch to the classical simulation argument, showing that we are likely simulated not by our own descendants, but by alien civilizations. Based on this, we provide (...) classification of different possible simulations and we find that simpler, less expensive and one-person-centered simulations, resurrectional simulations, or simulations of the first artificial general intelligence’s (AGI’s) origin (singularity simulations) should dominate. Also, simulations which simulate the 21st century and global catastrophic risks are probable. We then explore whether the simulation could collapse or be terminated. Most simulations must be terminated after they model the singularity or after they model a global catastrophe before the singularity. Undeniably observed glitches, but not philosophical speculations could result in simulation termination. The simulation could collapse if it is overwhelmed by glitches. The Doomsday Argument in simulations implies termination soon. We conclude that all types of the most probable simulations except resurrectional simulations are prone to termination risks in a relatively short time frame of hundreds of years or less from now. (shrink)

So the Fine-tuning Argument goes, because it is so unlikely for the physical constants of the laws of nature to have taken the values that they in fact take, we should significantly raise our credence that God exists. Simulation Arguments argue that our world might be (or, in stronger versions, that it probably is) a mere computer simulation. This paper argues that, in light of a Simulation Argument with a particularly weak conclusion, fine-tuning reasoning instead motivates atheists to believe that (...) we live in a computer simulation. (shrink)

Using Platonic metaphysics, the paper offers eight arguments for the benevolence of the simulator of our world, assuming that it is a simulation. In part, the paper proceeds negatively by showing problems with the hypothesis of a malevolent simulator. First, simulant is to simulator as part to whole, so it is in the interests of the simulator to be just and wise toward the simulant. Second, the simulation hypothesis implies the possibility of religious technology, unless the simulator is virtuous and (...) therefore above manipulation. Third, if the simulator is malevolent then ethics becomes incoherent, given that piety is a virtue. Fourth, unless the simulator is benevolent then no simulant is, since everything done by a simulant is done in cooperation with the simulator. Fifth, the simulator is impassible to simulants, but evil involves passivity. Sixth, the simulator is the singular cause of the world, but evil involves the accidental collision of causes. Seventh, the simulator is eternal with respect to the world, and evil cannot exist in the eternal. Eight, simulating requires knowledge of the forms, but like is known to like, so a malevolent simulator could not create an intelligible world. (shrink)

Preston Greene (2020) argues that we should not conduct simulation investigations because of the risk that we might be terminated if our world is a simulation designed to research various counterfactuals about the world of the simulators. In response, we propose a sequence of arguments, most of which have the form of an "even if” response to anyone unmoved by our previous arguments. It runs thus: (i) if simulation is possible, then simulators are as likely to care about simulating simulations (...) as they are likely to care about simulating basement (i.e. non-simulated) worlds. But (ii) even if simulations are interested only in simulating basement worlds the discovery that we are in a simulation will have little or no impact on the evolution of ordinary events. But (iii) even if discovering that we are in a simulation impacts the evolution of ordinary events, the effects of seeming to do so could also happen in a basement world, and might be the subject of interesting counterfactuals in the basement world Finally, (iv) there is little reason to think that there is a catastrophic effect from successful simulation probes, and no argument from the precautionary principle can be used to leverage the negligible credence one ought have in this. Thus, if we do develop a simulation probe, then let’s do it. (shrink)

The suggestion that we might live in a giant computer simulation seems plausible in large part because the hypothetical sophistication of the hypothetical simulation can be increased to meet almost any objection. From an engineering standpoint, the technological increases required by this strategy may not always be feasible. Proceeding nevertheless from an idealization, David Chalmers argues that the virtual objects and worlds displayed in perfect and permanent computer simulations could be regarded as real because, on those terms (perfection and permanence), (...) our own world could just as well be virtual. I counter that real reality, or RR, possesses (at least) five features that no VR simulation could ever reproduce: RR involves genuinely causal regularities, it is older than any machine, it will outlast any machine, it supports living bodies in ways that cannot be replaced, and thus belongs to an entirely different category than artifacts. These differences are especially robust, since they all grant the possibility of present-moment indistinguishability while halting any collapse or blurring of the virtual/real distinction. (shrink)

Some philosophers regard it as a serious possibility that we now exist within a simulation. That this hypothesis is somewhat probable has been defended extensively by Nick Bostrom. Notably, Bostrom does not defend the conclusion that we inhabit a simulation, but rather the disjunctive conclusion that the human species is very likely to die out before reaching a ‘posthuman stage’, that posthuman civilizations are extremely unlikely to run significant numbers of simulations, or that we almost certainly inhabit a simulation. Bostrom (...) argues that there is no basis for strongly favouring one of these alternatives over its counterparts. The upshot is that it is fairly probable that we inhabit a simulation. I argue that posthuman civilizations are likely to be unwilling to run significant numbers of simulations, thereby undermining the case for assigning a somewhat high probability to the hypothesis that we live in a simulation. (shrink)

In Reality+, David Chalmers suggests that it wouldn't be too bad if we lived in a computer simulation. I argue on the contrary that if we live in a simulation, we ought to attach a significant conditional credence to its being a small or brief simulation. Our existence and the existence of many of the people and things we care about would then unfortunately depend on contingencies difficult to assess and beyond our control. Furthermore, all the badness of the world (...) would appear to reflect the gods’ intentional cruelty or callous disregard. A large, stable rock is a more dependable and less axiologically troubling fundamental ground for reality. (shrink)

This report explores interactions between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. It offers a tour of the surrounding theoretical terrain and brings together disparate literatures that bear on the topic.

The simulation argument acquires increased popularity in scientific and intellectual circles. Usually, it is approached from a perspective that examines the validity of the argument from the perspective of whether it can or cannot be accepted. Here I will accept that the argument is valid and that indeed we live in a simulation, and then argue that on this basis the future of humanity is a rather pessimistic one. The concern and eventually realization that we live in a simulation coincides (...) with our cultural evolution as a species and with our intellectual advancement as humanity. Depending on how well-perfected this simulation that we live in is, it mirrors either a “game over” or a “frozen screen” stage, to borrow from the terminology of video games. In these cases, this calls for the intervention of the simulator that either needs to reset its simulation or to eliminate the factor that has caused the malfunction. (shrink)

Historically, the hypothesis that our world is a computer simulation has struck many as just another improbable-but-possible “skeptical hypothesis” about the nature of reality. Recently, however, the simulation hypothesis has received significant attention from philosophers, physicists, and the popular press. This is due to the discovery of an epistemic dependency: If we believe that our civilization will one day run many simulations concerning its ancestry, then we should believe that we are probably in an ancestor simulation right now. This essay (...) examines a troubling but underexplored feature of the ancestor-simulation hypothesis: the termination risk posed by both ancestor-simulation technology and experimental probes into whether our world is an ancestor simulation. This essay evaluates the termination risk by using extrapolations from current computing practices and simulation technology. The conclusions, while provisional, have great implications for debates concerning the fundamental nature of reality and the safety of contemporary physics. (shrink)

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality, including the earth and the universe, is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation, and as such our reality is an illusion. In this essay I describe a method for programming mass, length, time and charge (MLTA) as geometrical objects derived from the formula for a virtual electron; $f_e = 4\pi^2r^3$ ($r = 2^6 3 \pi^2 \alpha \Omega^5$) where the fine structure constant $\alpha$ = 137.03599... and $\Omega$ = 2.00713494... (...) are mathematical constants and the MLTA geometries are; M = (1), T = ($2\pi$), L = ($2\pi^2\Omega^2$), A = ($4\pi \Omega)^3/\alpha$. As objects they are independent of any set of units and also of any numbering system, terrestrial or alien. As the geometries are interrelated according to $f_e$, we can replace designations such as ($kg, m, s, A$) with a rule set; mass = $u^{15}$, length = $u^{-13}$, time = $u^{-30}$, ampere = $u^{3}$. The formula $f_e$ is unit-less ($u^0$) and combines these geometries in the following ratio M$^9$T$^{11}$/L$^{15}$ and (AL)$^3$/T, as such these ratio are unit-less. To translate MLTA to their respective SI Planck units requires an additional 2 unit-dependent scalars. We may thereby derive the CODATA 2014 physical constants via the 2 (fixed) mathematical constants ($\alpha, \Omega$), 2 dimensioned scalars and the rule set $u$. As all constants can be defined geometrically, the least precise constants ($G, h, e, m_e, k_B$...) can also be solved via the most precise ($c, \mu_0, R_\infty, \alpha$), numerical precision then limited by the precision of the fine structure constant $\alpha$. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis proposes that all of reality is an artificial simulation. In this article I describe a simulation model that derives Planck level units as geometrical forms from a virtual (dimensionless) electron formula $f_e$ that is constructed from 2 unit-less mathematical constants; the fine structure constant $\alpha$ and $\Omega$ = 2.00713494... ($f_e = 4\pi^2r^3, r = 2^6 3 \pi^2 \alpha \Omega^5$). The mass, space, time, charge units are embedded in $f_e$ according to these ratio; ${M^9T^{11}/L^{15}} = (AL)^3/T$ (units = (...) 1), giving mass M=1, time T=$2\pi$, length L=$2\pi^2\Omega^2$, ampere A = $(4\pi \Omega)^3/\alpha$. We can thus for example create as much mass M as we wish but with the proviso that we create an equivalent space L and time T to balance the above. The 5 SI units $kg, m, s, A, K$ are derived from a single unit u = sqrt(velocity/mass) that also defines the relationships between the SI units; kg = $u^{15}$, m = $u^{-13}$, s = $u^{-30}$, A = $u^{3}$, $k_B = u^{29}$. To convert MLTA from the above $\alpha, \Omega$ geometries to their respective SI Planck unit numerical values (and thus solve the dimensioned physical constants $G, h, e, c, m_e, k_B$) requires an additional 2 unit-dependent scalars. Results are consistent with CODATA 2014. The rationale for the virtual electron was derived using the sqrt of momentum P and a black-hole electron model as a function of magnetic-monopoles AL (ampere-meters) and time T. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (or ‘designer’). If this is (...) correct, then the fine-tuning argument is a weak argument for the existence of God. (shrink)

This chapter develops the issue of external world skepticism in a stunning new direction, suggesting that virtual reality science fiction thought experiments depict science fact. The author has authored an influential argument that we are, in fact, in a computer simulation. He observes that assuming that a civilization survives long enough to be technologically sophisticated, it would likely be very interested in running simulations of entire worlds. The core of the simulation argument shows that we should accept as true at (...) least one of the following three propositions: the chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small; almost no technologically mature civilisations are interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours; and a person is almost certainly in a simulation. (shrink)

Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully-conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior-probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti-simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti-simulation arguments herein use more robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no (...) Principles of Indifference, abide better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday arguments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stronger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can refrain from embracing either. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom’s recently patched ‘‘simulation argument’’ (Bostrom in Philos Q 53:243–255, 2003; Bos- trom and Kulczycki in Analysis 71:54–61, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we ‘‘live’’ now in an ‘‘ancestor simulation’’—that is as a simulation of a period prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our own—‘‘post-human’’—becomes able to simulate such a state of affairs as ours. As such simulations under consid- eration resemble ‘‘brains in vats’’ (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, the (...) paper begins by reviewing objections to BIV-type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore the motivating rationale behind current work in the development of psychologically realistic social simula- tions. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in a computational medium are confronted through review of current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are repro- duced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, i.e., political voice, predictive planning, and consciousness. The paper then argues that simulations afford a unique potential to secure a post-human future, and may be nec- essary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own to achieve and to maintain a post-human situation. Long-s- tanding philosophical interest in tools of this nature for Aristotle’s ‘‘statesman’’ and more recently for E.O. Wilson in the 1990s is observed. Self-extinction-level threats from State and individual levels of organization are compared, and a likely dependence on large-scale psychologically realistic simulations to get past self-extinction-level threats is projected. In the end, Bostrom’s basic argument for the conviction that we exist now in a simulation is reaffirmed. (shrink)

N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the (...) computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies. (shrink)

Paul Franceschi | : Je présente dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation selon le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique, fondée sur le problème de la classe de référence. Je décris tout d’abord l’argument de la Simulation de manière détaillée. J’identifie ensuite la classe de référence et j’applique successivement l’argument à trois classes de référence distinctes : les simulations conscientes de leur propre nature de simulation, les simulations imparfaites et les simulations à immersion. Finalement, je montre (...) qu’il existe trois niveaux de conclusion dans l’argument de la Simulation, selon la classe de référence choisie, qui engendrent des conclusions finales d’une nature très différente. | : I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing in detail Bostrom’s Simulation Argument. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to three different reference classes : aware-simulations, imperfect simulations and immersion-simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature. (shrink)

Two luminaries of 20th century astrophysics were Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington. Both took seriously the view that there is more to reality than the physical universe and more to consciousness than simply brain activity. In his Science and the Unseen World Eddington speculated about a spiritual world and that "conscious is not wholly, nor even primarily a device for receiving sense impressions." Jeans also speculated on the existence of a universal mind and a non-mechanical reality, writing in (...) his The Mysterious Universe "the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine." In his book QED Feynman discusses the situation of photons being partially transmitted and partially reflected by a sheet of glass: reflection amounting to four percent. In other words one out of every 25 photons will be reflected on average, and this holds true even for a "one at a time" flux. The four percent cannot be explained by statistical differences of the photons nor by random variations in the glass. Something is "telling" every 25th photon on average that it should be reflected back instead of being transmitted. Other quantum experiments lead to similar paradoxes. To explain how a single photon in the two-slit experiment can "know" whether there is one slit or two, Hawking and Mlodonow write: In the double-slit experiment Feynman's ideas mean the particles take paths that thread through the first slit, back out though the second slit, and then through the first again; paths that visit the restaurant that serves that great curried shrimp, and then circle Jupiter a few times before heading home; even paths that go across the universe and back. This, in Feynman's view, explains how the particle acquires the information about which slits are openŠ. It is hard to imagine a more absurd physical explanation. We can think of no way to hardwire the behavior of photons in the glass reflection or the two-slit experiments into a physical law. On the other hand, writing a software algorithm that would yield the desired result is really simple. A digital reality whose laws are software is an idea that has started to gain traction in large part thanks to an influential paper in Philosophical Quarterly by Oxford professor Nick Bostrom. Writing in the New York Times John Tierney had this to say: Until I talked to Nick Bostrom, a philosopher at Oxford University it never occurred to me that our universe might be somebody else's hobby. But now it seems quite possible. In fact, if you accept a pretty reasonable assumption of Dr. Bostrom's, it is almost a mathematical certainty that we are living in someone else's computer simulation. An alternate view is that there exists a great consciousness whose mind is the hardware, and whose thoughts are the software creating a virtual universe in which we as beings of consciousness live. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims about (...) the physical limits of computation and yet lack good evidence for claims about our own physical constitution. I then show that two ways of modifying the argument so as to remove the need for this presupposition fail to preserve the original conclusion. Finally, I argue that, while there are unusual circumstances in which Bostrom’s selective scepticism might be reasonable, we do not currently find ourselves in such circumstances. There is no good reason to uphold the selective scepticism the Simulation Argument presupposes. There is thus no good reason to believe its conclusion. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis claims that the whole observable universe, including us, is a computer simulation implemented by technologically advanced beings for an unknown purpose. The simulation argument (as I reconstruct it) is an argument for this hypothesis with moderately plausible premises. I develop two lines of objection to the simulation argument. The first takes the form of a structurally similar argument for a conflicting conclusion, the claim that I am a so-called freak observer, formed spontaneously in a quantum or thermodynamic (...) fluctuation rather than through ordinary processes of evolution and growth. The second rejects the basic line of reasoning of both arguments: the sort of evidence they cite is not capable of supporting either the claim that I am a simulant or the claim that I am a freak observer. The evidence that simulants or freak observers exist is not a reason to think that I am one of them. (shrink)

The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument share certain structural features, and hence are often discussed together. Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in the first case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. Indeed, the two arguments do have some structural similarities. But there (...) are also significant disanalogies between the two arguments, and I argue that these disanalogies mean that the Simulation Argument succeeds and the Doomsday Argument fails. (shrink)

This special interactive interdisciplinary issue of JCS on the singularity and the future relationship of humanity and AI is the first of two issues centered on David Chalmers’ 2010 JCS article ‘The Singularity, a Philosophical Analysis’. These issues include more than 20 solicited commentaries to which Chalmers responds. To quote Chalmers: "One might think that the singularity would be of great interest to Academic philosophers, cognitive scientists, and artificial intelligence researchers. In practice, this has not been the case. Good was (...) an eminent academic, but his article was largely unappreciated at the time. The subsequent discussion of the singularity has largely taken place in non-academic circles, including Internet forums, popular media and books, and workshops organized by the independent Singularity Institute. Perhaps the highly speculative flavour of the singularity idea has been responsible for academic resistance to it. I think this resistance is a shame, as the singularity idea is clearly an important one. The argument for a singularity is one that we should take seriously. And the questions surrounding the singularity are of enormous practical and philosophical concern". It is fair to say that Chalmers is the first to provide a detailed comprehensive philosophical analysis of the idea of the singularity that brings into focus not only questions about the nature of intelligence and the prospects for an intelligence explosion but also important philosophical questions about consciousness, identity and the relationship between facts and values. (shrink)

This article reports on a newly discovered bug in the original simulation argument. Two different ways of patching the argument are proposed, each of which preserves the original conclusion.

Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (SA) has many intriguing theological implications. We work out some of them here. We show how the SA can be used to develop novel versions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments. We then develop some of the affinities between Bostrom's naturalistic theogony and more traditional theological topics. We look at the resurrection of the body and at theodicy. We conclude with some reflections on the relations between the SA and Neoplatonism (friendly) and between the SA and (...) theism (less friendly). (shrink)

Anthony Brueckner, in a recent article, proffers ‘a new way of thinking about Bostrom's Simulation Argument’. His comments, however, misconstrue the argument; and some words of explanation are in order.The Simulation Argument purports to show, given some plausible assumptions, that at least one of three propositions is true. Roughly stated, these propositions are: almost all civilizations at our current level of development go extinct before reaching technological maturity; there is a strong convergence among technologically mature civilizations such that almost all (...) of them lose interest in creating ancestor-simulations; almost all people with our sorts of experiences live in computer simulations. I also argue that conditional on you should assign a very high credence to the proposition that you live in a computer simulation. However, pace Brueckner, I do not argue that we should believe that we are in simulation. 1 In fact, I believe that we are probably not simulated. The Simulation Argument purports to show only that, as well as, at least one of – is true; but it does not tell us which one.Brueckner also writes: " It is worth noting that one reason why Bostrom thinks that the number of Sims [computer-generated minds with experiences similar to those typical of normal, embodied humans living in a Sim-free early 21 st century world] will vastly outstrip the number of humans is that Sims ‘will run their … ". (shrink)

This article explores the Simulated Universe argument with particular reference to Nick Bostrom’s formulation. After providing an exposition of the argument, I address two problems and conclude that we reject the possibility that we exist in a simulation.

Following on from Nick Bostrom's discussion of the Doomsday argument, Alasdair Richmond considers how anthropic reasoning can lead from Doomsday to some odd conclusions about computation and our place in reality.

This paper attempts three tasks in relation to Carter and Leslie's Doomsday Argument. First, it criticises Timothy Chambers' 'Ussherian Corollary', a striking but unsuccessful objection to standard Doomsday arguments. Second, it reformulates the Ussherian Corollary as an objection to Bradley Monton's variant Doomsday and Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. Finally, it tries to diagnose the epistemic/metaphysical problems facing Doomsday-related arguments.1.