In recent years there has been substantial support for heart rate variability biofeedback (HRVB) as a treatment for a variety of disorders and for performance enhancement ( Gevirtz, 2013 ). Since conditions as widely varied as asthma and depression seem to respond to this form of cardiorespiratory feedback training, the issue of possible mechanisms becomes more salient. The most supported possible mechanism is the strengthening of homeostasis in the baroreceptor ( Vaschillo et al., 2002 ; Lehrer et al., 2003 (...) ). Recently, the effect on the vagal afferent pathway to the frontal cortical areas has been proposed. In this article, we review these and other possible mechanisms that might explain the positive effects of HRVB. (shrink)

Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We propose (...) that a person remembers that p (at t) if and only if the thought or conviction that p comes from memory (at t) when, in fact, it is true that p. (shrink)

Mathematics educators suggest that students of all ages need to participate in productive forms of mathematical argument (NCTM, 2000). Accordingly, we developed two complementary frameworks for analyzing the emergence of mathematical argumentation in one second‐grade classroom. Children attempted to resolve contesting claims about the “space covered” by three different‐looking rectangles of equal area measure. Our first analysis renders the topology of the semantic structure of the classroom conversation as a directed graph. The graph affords clear “at a glance” visualization of (...) how various senses of mathematics—as imagined, as performed, and as historically rooted—were interrelated. The graph represents the emergence and intercoordination between conceptual and procedural knowledge in the ebb and flow of classroom conversation. The graph has not just descriptive, but also predictive power: Interconnectedness among the nodes of the graph representing the first 40 min of conversation predicted the structure of recall in the final ten minutes by children who had played little overt role in the conversation up to that point. The second, complementary framework draws upon Goffman's expanded repertoire of roles in speech to demonstrate how the teacher orchestrated this classroom conversation to establish coherent argument. In this second analysis, we establish how the teacher mediated between the everyday talk of her students and the discourse of mathematics. Her revoicing of student talk created interstices for identity and participation in the formation of the argument. Together, the two forms of analysis illuminate the emergence of mathematical argument at two levels: as collective structure and concurrently, as individual activity. (shrink)

It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to reply to such a distinguished critic as Richard Fumerton and to clarify both my position and why I am reluctant to accept the alternative account of direct awareness Fumerton offers to us. Here are my replies. First of all, Fumerton says that the problem of representation is the problem of accounting for the security from error of self-presenting states. That is not the problem of representation I was concerned with in (...) my paper, though what I said had some relevance to that problem. What I said is the following. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MEISTER ECKHART AND THE NEOPLATONIC HERITAGE: THE THINKER'S WAY TO GOD RICHARD Wooos, O.P. Loyola University of Ohioago Ohicago, Illinois IN BOTH HIS LIFE rand preaching, Meister Eokrhart's " way" was pre-eminently.a spirituality of the mind. The srpeoulat:ive inqui.rires.and p:roibings thaJt animate his iSChD'l-·arly woliks 1also f!:>iervrude his sermons ·and treatisies, while a pastoral, homiletic inrberrtion iieciproca:1ly permeates the scholarly.worrks, particularly in regard to.the Meister'1s fascination with rthe (...) Woil1d. Heinrich Deni:fle, 1who disonviered and first commented upon Eckhart's Laitin writings in the 1880s, concluded that the Meister faclmd the clarity of conception and precision of expression characteristic of the great scholastic figmes who preoeded him, partiou1ady Albert the Grea:t 1and 'lihomas Aquinrus.1 B:ut more reoent Eckhart scholars have increasingly •argued that Denifle's oonoern to :ve£ute uncritically inflated characteriz,ations of Eckhart's philosophloa:l genius, notrubly that of Wilhelm Preger,.led him to undel'V'alue and indeed misrepvesen:t •the Meister's ireal goal a;nd bme achievement. Indeed, tto the modern critical eye, aided :by a oontury 1 "Eckhart ein unklarer Denker war, der sich der Consequenzen seiner Lehrer resp. seiner ausdruckweise nicht bewusst war. Gerade bei den schwierigen Lehrpunkten, wo Klarheit und Scharfe der Begriffe und des Ausdrucks mehr als je geboten ist, tritt dies zu Tage. Gerade in den entscheidenden Momenten verlasst ihn die Klarheit.... Eckhart besass aber nicht die geistige Begabung iiber die Scholastik hinauszugeben und doch innerhalb der Granzen der Wahrheit zu bleiben." "Meister Eckharts lateinische Schriften, und die Grundanschauung seiner Lehre," in A.rahiv fii,r Literatur unCl Kirchengeschichte Cles Mittelalters, ed. H. Denifie and Franz Ehrle (Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, 1956), vol. 2, pp. 482, 521. 609 610 RICHARD WOODS, O.P. of ]urbher di:s:cioverieis 1rund study, " the scholastic Eckhart is an original.and spooulaxbivie til:rintker, 1and not only a spirit's itineriary fa~om.aJJJd ha:ck to its eternail. Sourioe-4hie Ohristian NoopLatonic schema th.at Eckhart im.heri'bed room St. Albert tb!e Greait rund, 1behind him, Hugh and Richa;rid of St. Victo:r, Thomas Ga1lus, John Sarraoenus, John Soottus Eriugena, Diornysiius the Areop1aigibe, P!l.'odus, and, penultimrutely, Pilotinus!himself. For thls gre:art theoa Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke: Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, 11 Vols. to date (Stuttgart and Berlin: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1958-). German sermons will be identified hereafter by their number in the Deutsche Werke and, for English translation, by the corresponding page number in the Walshe edition. 9 " Eine Koiner Handscrift mit lateinischen Eckhart-Exzerpten," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 31 (1961) : 204-12. In volume three of his edition, Walshe includes a translation of a fragment of one of Eckhart's sermons discovered by Prof. Kurt Ruh in 1967 and published in the Zeitschrift fii,r deutohes Aitertum 111 (1982) : 219-25. See ed. cit., pp. 131-35. ECKHART AND NEOPLATONISM 618 ~ogical tradition, liecently examined in some detail iby John Macquarrie alllld Andrew Louth, stretches hack evoo £artlier to tbie Oappadocian Fraithe'I"s, Origien, Philo, :and at the source, Pilato.in Smee the 1app1e1amance of Eoklhamt'1s more aoadiemic Laltin wiorrks, op;inion has heen divided as 1 00 their importance :velative ibo the more familiar German sermons iand tT1eatises for understarndmg the Meister~s authentic tooching. Some recent commenibato 'l.1s 1 sti1l 1:Jend to favor the lattier aJ.moot enti'11ely, even wihile acknOW11edging t:hie impo'11tooce of the forn11er; some favor the Latin.11 Critical opinion :seems 'bo have turned in the direction of remphrusizing the importalllice of both.the Latin and the German :works in 01der 1bo unders:tand the whole Eckhartthe teacher and the p:veacheT.12 But to understand to what extent Ed.mart ias,a tlheologian, philosopher, arrd mystic was indebted to Obrisltian Nooplatmrism it is raliso n:ecess1acy to see him in the oonteJct of his,w;orks, his method, and his scholarly and apostolic career. The Scholar and His Temper While Echltart had ra ik!een phi1osorphica1 temperament, he did not 1rus,a rule compose racrudemic 1weatises. Ratiher, he scatltJeTed... (shrink)

Mit diesem Buch führt Richard Egger in das komplexe Thema Ethik ein: in die Theorie der Menschlichkeit. Er richtet sich damit an Menschen, die Verantwortung für andere tragen – sei es als Vorgesetzte, als Ärztin oder Wissenschaftler, Mutter oder Vater, Lehrer oder in vielen anderen Rollen. Anhand von Beispielen aus unterschiedlichen Lebensbereichen zeigt Egger auf, welche Rolle Vernunft und Gefühl, aber auch unsere Gerechtigkeitsvorstellung für ethisches Handeln spielen. Sein Fazit: Menschlich handeln kann nur, wer einen Sinn für Fairness (...) und Gleichwertigkeit, persönliche Verpflichtung und moralische Integrität entwickelt. Eine solche Haltung durchdringt den ganzen Menschen und macht Verantwortungsträger erst zu wirklichen Leadern. Egger stützt sich dabei auf die Fragen und Argumente, Regeln und Instrumente aus der Geschichte der Ethik, aber auch auf seine langjährige Erfahrung als Berater von Menschen. Der Autor schreibt philosophisch fundiert und gleichzeitig fesselnd und verständlich. Der Inhalt Die Welt: Warum wir Ethik brauchen Regeln: Wie Ethik funktioniert Sie: Was Ethik aus Ihnen macht Natur: Wie Ethik sich ins Ganze fügt. (shrink)

The position Lehrer defends in this paper is an original and subtle attempt to penetrate some of the most fundamental issues with which serious epistemologists and philosophers of mind are concerned. Lehrer’s focus is the notion of a self-presenting state, a state that can be “apprehended through itself.” In these brief comments I’ll focus only on some of Lehrer’s claims. I’ll begin with what Lehrer calls the problems of representation and subjectivity for the doctrine that there (...) exist self-presenting sates. In an attempt to enlist Hume as an ally against the doctrine of exemplarization, I’ll make one very brief historical observation about Hume and representation. I’ll then close with my primary concern about the concept of exemplarization, a concern rooted in the need to make a distinction between representation that is conventional and representation that is not. (shrink)

To be justified, a belief must be ‘based’ on its grounds. For an externalist, being based on grounds is being ‘caused’ by these grounds (by a non‐deviant route). For an internalist (normally), a belief is said to be based on basic beliefs. But then, the believer would need to believe that his belief is caused and/or rendered probable by the basic beliefs; and then maybe actual causing is not even necessary. Further, basic beliefs need to be understood rather as basic (...) propositions that come to the believer with different degrees of prior probability, which measure their initial strengths—only some of these are sufficiently strong to form beliefs. Some actual basic propositions are, for _a priori_ reasons, not rightly basic (e.g. because they are beliefs in a logically impossible proposition). But in general (following the Principle of Credulity), a basic proposition, of whatever strength, is (to that strength) rightly basic. (shrink)

This paper examines the four counterexamples offered by Lehrer and Richard in 'Remembering Without Knowing'. The analysis which Lehrer and Richard's purported counterexamples attempt to discredit is that remembering p requires knowing that p and believing that p. The counterexamples are considered individually and all are rejected as counterexamples to knowing as a necessary condition of remembering.

K. Lehrer and J. Richard’s analysis of remembering that p is shown to be deficient, particularly because it fails to treat factual memory as an epistemic concept. Adding a requirement concerning the subject’s past justification accommodates instances of factual memory without factual knowledge, helps explain the role of justification in remembering that p, and strengthens the analysis against certain counterexamples. The paper includes an assessment of A. Cusmariu;s definition of impure memory.

Richard Rorty hat maßgeblich zur Renaissance der amerikanischen Philosophie des Pragmatismus beigetragen und er ist der bedeutendste Neopragmatist. Rorty war der akademische Lehrer unter anderem von Cornel West und Robert Brandom. Dieser ist inzwischen mit seinem eigenständigen Projekt einer „normativen Pragmatik“ (Brandom 2000) zum bekanntesten Sprachpragmatisten der Gegenwart avanciert. Rorty hat sich explizit gegen das Entstehen einer Schule des Rortyanismus (u. a. Rorty 2006, S. 56–57) ausgesprochen. Dieser Wunsch hat sich bisher erfüllt. Zugleich ist eine Folgegeneration von NeopragmatistInnen (...) von ihm stark beeinflusst worden (u. a. Nancy Fraser, Huw Price, Bjørn Ramberg, Jeffrey Stout). Außerdem hat sich die Rorty-Forschung erstaunlich schnell nach seinem Ableben in Gestalt der Richard Rorty Society institutionalisiert. Sie boomt gegenwärtig geradezu, wie eine Welle an Neuerscheinungen zeigt. Rortys kosmopolitisches Denken wird weltweit rezipiert. Allein Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity wurde inzwischen in mehr als zwei Dutzend Sprachen übersetzt. (shrink)

Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith (...) Lehrer, Richard Moran, Frederick F. Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve. (shrink)

This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of his predecessors. In short, the (...) book deserves to become a classic....There is a great deal of interest in the book besides these basic matters [forumlating rules of acceptance]. Some of the most interesting chapters are those that examine the implications of such rules. The discussions of probability, generalization, and various forms of inference are brilliant and enlightening. Indeed, the problems and methods elaborated by Professor Levi in his book serve as a new foundation for the study of inductive inference."--Keith Lehrer, Nous"Levi's book is an extremely interesting report on 'tentative and speculative first steps' toward a decision-theoretic approach to inductive inference....Professor Levi is to be congratulated on his ingenious development and application of this approach...."--Richard C. Jeffrey, The Journal of Philosophy. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, (...) we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

One thing that would profit both the frustrated readers of Sellars and Sellars himself would be a careful attempt to explicate and evaluate critically the many interrelated theses stated and defended by Sellars. But, so far as I know, there has been little work of this kind done. I know only of two fine reviews by Keith Lehrer and Gilbert Harman, and a very helpful expository article by Richard Bernstein that deal directly and in some detail with Sellars' (...) work. This is not to mention, however, the many philosophers, including myself, who have been influenced by his work. What I believe would be most helpful at this point would be a critique of some central thesis in Sellars' work, that is, an attempt to raise objections to this thesis and to refute the replies that can be anticipated, based upon other of Sellars' claims. This is what I shall try to do in this paper. My hope is that it will further the understanding of his complex philosophy, and help carry forward discussion of the philosophical issues involved. (shrink)

This collection of contemporary essays by prominent contemporary thinkers on the topics of determinism and free agency concentrates primarily on two areas: the compatibility problem and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. There are also essays on the related fields of determinism and action theory. The book is unique in that it contains up-to-date summaries of the life-work of five influential philosophers: John Earman, Ted Honderich, Keith Lehrer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen. There are also contributions by other familiar (...) and distinguished authors, including Richard Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, and John Perry, as well as important rising philosophers. While most of the articles are written from a Western, analytic perspective, the volume includes a paper that addresses Buddhist perspectives on freedom of the will. With an opening essay written by the editors -- "Freedom and Determinism: A Framework" -- that sets the terms of the discussion, the book provides a remarkably comprehensive set of articles that are of value to a wide audience, from students of philosophy to scholars. (shrink)

Über das Wesen des Gelehrten, und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit (1805) von Johann Gottlieb Fichte -- Vorrede -- Erste Vorlesgun: Plan des Ganzen -- Zweite Vorlesung: Nähere Bestimmung des Begriffs der göttlichen Idee -- Dritte Vorlesung: Vom angehenden Gelehrten überhaupt; insbesondere vom Talente und Fleisse -- Vierte Vorlesung: Von der Rechtschaffenheit im Studiren -- Fünfte Vorlesung: Wie die Rechtschaffenheit des Studirenden sich äussere -- Sechste Vorlesung: Ueber die akademische Freiheit -- Siebente Vorlesung: Vom vollendeten Gelehrten im Allgemeinen -- (...) Achte Vorlesung: Vom Regenten -- Neunte Vorlesung: Vom mündlichen Gelehrte=Lehrer -- Zehnte Vorlesung: Vom Schriftsteller -- Menschliche Bildung und göttliche Idee. Über Struktur und Gedankengang von Fichtes Erlanger Vorlesungen Über das Wesen des Gelehrten / Annette Sell -- Über das Wesen des Gelehrten im Kontext der Wissenschaftslehre / C. Jeffery Kinlaw -- Fichte on Bestimmung and Wesen des Gelehrten / Angelica Nuzzo -- Fichte's Über das Wesen des Gelehrten, or the educated man as the salt of the Earth / Tom Rockmore -- Werkzeuge? Zur Herrschaft der Gelehrten im Kontext des Fichteschen Spätwerks / Franziskus von Heereman -- J.G. Fichtes Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und die Bestimmung des magister bei Thomas von Aquin / Wilhelm Metz -- Wie sich der Philosoph bei Descartes und Fichte zu sich selbst verhält / Elisabeth Kessler -- The ghosts of Kantian philosophy in Fichte's Über das Wesen des Gelehrten / Richard Velkley -- Reinhold über die Bildung eines neuen Menschen / Ernst-Otto Onnasch -- Die innerliche Verknüpfung von "objektiver Wissenschaft" und "subjektiver Bildung". Wilhelm von Humboldts Universitätsidee - mit einem Ausblick auf sein Kritik an Fichtes Überlegungen zum Gelehrten und zur Universität / Holger Zaborowski -- Die Todesangst als die Vermittlung zur absoluten Idee / Paul Cobben -- Fichte and Schelling / Michael Vater -- Fichtes Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und Heidegger / Alfred Denker. (shrink)

Angeregt durch das Studium der wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten von Ludwig Boltzmann (1822–1888) und Walther Nernst (1864–1941) entschied sich Stern für das Studium der Physikalischen Chemie. An der Universität Breslau belegte er Vorlesungen bei Otto Sackur (1880–1914) und Richard Abegg (1869–1919). Als seine wissenschaftlichen Lehrer benennt er im Anhang zu seiner Dissertation [STERN1912] berühmte Hochschullehrer wie Richard Abegg (1869–1919), Adolf von Baeyer (1835–1917), Leo Graetz (1856–1941), Adolf Kneser (1862–1930), Otto Lummer (1860–1915), Ernst Pringsheim (1859–1917), Heinrich Biltz (1865– 1943), den (...) Nobelpreisträger Eduard Buchner (1860–1917) und Jacob Rosanes (1842–1922). Während seiner kurzen Studienzeit in München hat er auch bei Arnold Sommerfeld (1868–1951) eine Vorlesung gehört. Er führt Sommerfeld aber nicht als seinen Lehrer auf, da er, wie Stern zugibt (Interview Zürich 1961), kaum etwas in Sommerfelds Vorlesungen verstanden hätte [JOST1961]. (shrink)

What is the history of philosophy? What exactly is this the history of and how is that history to be understood in relationship to philosophy itself? Can philosophy's history, on any of a number of diverse descriptions, ever be said in its own right to constitute a unique and genuine source of philosophical wisdom or insight? George Lucas sweeps aside the constraints of traditional methodological and cultural boundaries to reflect broadly on a variety of answers to these questions, as posed (...) by many of the major philosophical figures of the past century. Inviting a re-consideration of the work of scholars as diverse as Alasdair MacIntyre, Leo Strauss, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Danto, Martha Nussbaum, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor, Keith Lehrer and Jerome Schneewind, Lucas ranges widely over the history of philosophy itself in search of original, probing answers to these profound and perennial issues. (shrink)

What do we mean when we say we "know" something? What is this knowledge and how do we come by it? What exactly counts as an object of knowledge? And on what basis do we defend our claims to know against thosethe skepticswho deny that knowledge is possible or that our criteria for knowing can ever be satisfied? These questions and many others are addressed in this fascinating collection of essays by leading philosophers, who discuss the nature, meaning, and extent (...) of human knowledge. Included are works by Robert Almeder, William P. Alston, Robert P. Amico, Roderick M. Chisholm, Edmund L. Gettier, Richard Feldman, Peter D. Klein, Keith Lehrer, Kenneth G. Lucey, John Pollock, and others. Several essays are original to this collection and break new ground on such issues as the Problem of the Criterion. (shrink)

Theoria , the international Swedish philosophy journal, was founded in 1935. Its contributors in the first 75 years include the major Swedish philosophers from this period and in addition a long list of international philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, C. D. Broad, Ernst Cassirer, Hector Neri Castañeda, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, R. M. Hare, Carl G. Hempel, Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Henry E. Kyburg, Keith Lehrer, Isaac Levi, David Lewis, Gerald MacCallum, Richard Montague, Otto Neurath, (...) Arthur N. Prior, W. V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Sosa, Robert C. Stalnaker, P. F. Strawson, Patrick Suppes, Johan van Benthem, Georg Henrik von Wright and many others. Hempel's confirmation paradoxes, Ross's deontic paradox, Montague's universal grammar and Lindström's theorem are among the contributions to philosophy that were first published in Theoria. (shrink)

This collection of contemporary essays by prominent contemporary thinkers on the topics of determinism and free agency concentrates primarily on two areas: the compatibility problem and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. There are also essays on the related fields of determinism and action theory. The book is unique in that it contains up-to-date summaries of the life-work of five influential philosophers: John Earman, Ted Honderich, Keith Lehrer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen. There are also contributions by other familiar (...) and distinguished authors, including Richard Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, and John Perry, as well as important rising philosophers. While most of the articles are written from a Western, analytic perspective, the volume includes a paper that addresses Buddhist perspectives on freedom of the will. With an opening essay written by the editors -- "Freedom and Determinism: A Framework" -- that sets the terms of the discussion, the book provides a remarkably comprehensive set of articles that are of value to a wide audience, from students of philosophy to scholars. (shrink)

This collection of contemporary essays by prominent contemporary thinkers on the topics of determinism and free agency concentrates primarily on two areas: the compatibility problem and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. There are also essays on the related fields of determinism and action theory. The book is unique in that it contains up-to-date summaries of the life-work of five influential philosophers: John Earman, Ted Honderich, Keith Lehrer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen. There are also contributions by other familiar (...) and distinguished authors, including Richard Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, and John Perry, as well as important rising philosophers. While most of the articles are written from a Western, analytic perspective, the volume includes a paper that addresses Buddhist perspectives on freedom of the will. With an opening essay written by the editors -- "Freedom and Determinism: A Framework" -- that sets the terms of the discussion, the book provides a remarkably comprehensive set of articles that are of value to a wide audience, from students of philosophy to scholars. (shrink)

Papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December, 1968 and revised in the light of discussion at the symposium for publication. The contributors hold different views about the role played by induction in theories of knowledge and rational belief but many of the papers are conciliatory, reflecting no doubt a good deal of helpful communication at the symposium. For example, Frederic Schick's clearly written and informative lead article considers subjectivist, (...) empiricist, and pragmatist theories of rational belief, arguing that they are compatible theories relevant to different types of issues. Marshall Swain follows with an article which presents a general framework within which rules of rational acceptance can be constructed. An exchange between Isaac Levi and Richard Jeffrey shows that advocates of theories of acceptance and theories of partial belief may be defending complementary and not mutually exclusive theories. In the remaining three essays Henry Kyburg Jr., Gilbert Harman, and Keith Lehrer defend their own distinctive views about the nature of inductive inference and rational belief. Kyburg traces difficulties in some theories to the acceptance of the principle of conjunction which he rejects. Harman and Lehrer both see the relation of inductive inference to explanation as crucial to understanding the former and they develop theories along different lines which make use of this relation. A long and useful bibliography was prepared for the symposium by Ralph L. Slaght and revised for publication in the volume.--R. H. K. (shrink)

On an individualist view of testimonial justification, a subject’s belief based on testimony is justified ultimately on the basis of nontestimonial beliefs alone. The prevailing version of individualism has been inductive individualism, according to which the nontestimonial basis for a testimonial belief is an inductively based belief in the reliability of the testifier. Here I consider an alternative to inductive individualism, which I call the parity account. This is the view, endorsed in various forms by Allan Gibbard, Richard Foley (...) and Keith Lehrer, that my testimonial beliefs have epistemic standing because there is a cognitive parity between me and others. I may trust the beliefs of others because I may trust my own beliefs. I focus on an argument central to Lehrer’s account: I am worthy of my trust in what I believe; others are as worthy of my trust in what they believe as I am in what I believe; so others are worthy of my trust in what they believe. I examine whether this argument can justify my testimonial beliefs. If the parity account is to succeed, the premises of the argument need support. I criticize diverse ways of supporting the premises suggested by Lehrer and by remarks of Foley. I conclude that the parity argument cannot account for the justification of all my testimonial beliefs. It is at best an adjunct argument that depends for its force on prior justified testimonial beliefs.Author Keywords: Testimony; Justification; Parity; Trust; Individualism; Skepticism. (shrink)

Zwar wurde den Nonkonformisten 1689 religiöse Toleranz zugesichert, doch wurden sie von den Universitäten in Oxford und Cambridge ausgeschlossen. Daher rührt die Bedeutung ihrer eigenen Akademien, von denen einige eine allgemeinere Form der höheren Bildung anboten, andere dagegen speziell die Kandidaten für geistliche Ämter unterichteten. Die Mehrheit der hier besprochenen Theologen waren akademische Lehrer.Die nonkormistischen Theologen schrieben über viele Themen. Abgesehen von der Bibel lasen sie kontinentaleuropäische Theologen, Puritaner und auch Locke. Was die Moralphilosophie angeht, waren sie sich bewußt, (...) daß sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit sowohl dem moralischen Gesetz als auch der göttlichen Offenbarung zu widmen hatten, und einige von ihnen bezogen geradezu fanatische Gegenpositionen zu Hobbes. Während manche von Zeit zu Zeit an das moralische Gefühl appellierten, zogen andere einen rationalen Intuitionismus vor. In den Schriften der meisten zeigt sich ein gewisser Eklektizismus. In der Praxis der liberaleren Theologen wurde die Ethik mehr und mehr von der Dogmatik geschieden, obwohl die Autoren Gott nie gänzlich aus ihren Gedanken verbannten. Demgegenüber bietet John Gill, Puritaner in Gedanken wie in der Methode, ein konservatives Gegenbeispiel und illustriert die Verzögerung auf intellektuellem Gebiet.Die Beiträge zur Moralphilosophie von Isaac Watts, Henry Grove, John Taylor, Thomas Amory, Samuel Bourn III, Richard Price und Thomas Belsham werden vorgestellt, und die Positionen dieser Autoren, ebenso wie die Position von Joseph Priestley, zur Freiheit - Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Freiheit des Gewissens und Freiheit des Gottesdienstes - werden untersucht.Themen, die für eine weitere Diskussion fruchtbar wären, werden vorgestellt. Außerdem werden abschließend einige kurze Betrachtungen zu den Versuchen einiger heutiger Philosophen angestellt, den Graben zwischen Moralphilosophie und Theologie, der seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert immer größer wird, zu schließen..Zwar wurde den Nonkonformisten 1689 religiöse Toleranz zugesichert, doch wurden sie von den Universitäten in Oxford und Cambridge ausgeschlossen. Daher rührt die Bedeutung ihrer eigenen Akademien, von denen einige eine allgemeinere Form der höheren Bildung anboten, andere dagegen speziell die Kandidaten für geistliche Ämter unterichteten. Die Mehrheit der hier besprochenen Theologen waren akademische Lehrer.Die nonkormistischen Theologen schrieben über viele Themen. Abgesehen von der Bibel lasen sie kontinentaleuropäische Theologen, Puritaner und auch Locke. Was die Moralphilosophie angeht, waren sie sich bewußt, daß sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit sowohl dem moralischen Gesetz als auch der göttlichen Offenbarung zu widmen hatten, und einige von ihnen bezogen geradezu fanatische Gegenpositionen zu Hobbes. Während manche von Zeit zu Zeit an das moralische Gefühl appellierten, zogen andere einen rationalen Intuitionismus vor. In den Schriften der meisten zeigt sich ein gewisser Eklektizismus. In der Praxis der liberaleren Theologen wurde die Ethik mehr und mehr von der Dogmatik geschieden, obwohl die Autoren Gott nie gänzlich aus ihren Gedanken verbannten. Demgegenüber bietet John Gill, Puritaner in Gedanken wie in der Methode, ein konservatives Gegenbeispiel und illustriert die Verzögerung auf intellektuellem Gebiet.Die Beiträge zur Moralphilosophie von Isaac Watts, Henry Grove, John Taylor, Thomas Amory, Samuel Bourn III, Richard Price und Thomas Belsham werden vorgestellt, und die Positionen dieser Autoren, ebenso wie die Position von Joseph Priestley, zur Freiheit - Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Freiheit des Gewissens und Freiheit des Gottesdienstes - werden untersucht.Themen, die für eine weitere Diskussion fruchtbar wären, werden vorgestellt. Außerdem werden abschließend einige kurze Betrachtungen zu den Versuchen einiger heutiger Philosophen angestellt, den Graben zwischen Moralphilosophie und Theologie, der seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert immer größer wird, zu schließen. (shrink)

In a critical study of some recent action theory Professor James Tomberlin [7] makes some insightful and suggestive remarks concerning the by now well known problem of "Smith and the airplane" formulated by Keith Lehrer and Richard Taylor [3]. While these remarks do significantly advance our knowledge of the nature of the problem, I would like to try to show why the strategy they indicate does not lead to a solution that represents any improvement on the one developed (...) in [1], [8] and [2].The problem of Smith and the airplane is posed by the following apparent inconsistency. Suppose it is now shortly before 3:30 and Smith is at a country airport. The 3:30 plane is the only possible means whereby Smith can arrive at the city at 4:00. There is nothing to prevent Smith from leaving on the 3:30 plane, but he in fact does not do so: Then each of the following statements are true. (shrink)

The previous chapter ended with the keystone loop of acceptance, preference, and reasoning. This chapter is devoted to a theory of knowledge based on that loop within an evaluation system. The evaluation system is a system of acceptances and preferences including acceptances concerning preferences and preferences concerning acceptances. This evaluation system consisting of acceptances and preferences is the basis of knowledge and wisdom.

Keith Lehrer has been publishing on free will and compatiblism since 1960. Our concern here is to present an account of the development on his work on the subject.

In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination (...) and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer’s new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer’s concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation. (shrink)

CONSENSUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES Various atomistic and individualistic theories of knowledge, language, ethics and politics have dominated philosophical ...

The recently offered, Purported counter-Examples to justified, True belief analyses of knowledge are looked at with some care and all found to be either incoherent or inconclusive. It is argued that justified, True belief analyses are based on sound insight into the concept of knowledge. The distinction between having been justified in claiming to know something and actually having known it is used in an effort to get the discussion of knowledge back on the right track.

In this collection of essays, Lehrer argues that freedom, rationality, consensus, and knowledge depend on "metamental" operations--thoughts about thoughts--and are impossible without them. Metamental operations provide for our optionality, plasticity, and most of all, for the evaluation and control of lower-level information. The human mind, he argues, is essentially a metamind.

A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, which (...) we call doxastic ascent, and defend such a theory. Our defense appeals to the work of Reid and contemporary cognitive psychology in order to account for the psychological reality of higher level evaluations. (shrink)