Quantum Mechanics is a good example of a successful theory. Most of atomic phenomena are described well by quantum mechanics and cases such as Lamb Shift that are not described by quantum mechanics, are described by quantum electrodynamics. Of course, at the nuclear level, because of some complications, it is not clear that we can claim the same confidence. One way of taking these complications and corrections into account seems to be a modification of the standard quantum theory. In this (...) paper and its follow ups we consider a straightforward way of extending quantum theory. Our method is based on a Bohmian approach. We show that this approach has the essential ability for extending quantum theory, and we do this by introducing “non-Bohmian” forms for the quantum potential. (shrink)

Russell (1911/12) argued that perceptual experience grounds a species of non-propositional knowledge, “knowledge by acquaintance,” and in recent years, this account of knowledge has been gaining traction. I defend on its basis a connection between moral and epistemic failure. I argue, first, that insufficient concern for the suffering of others can be explained in terms of an agent’s lack of acquaintance knowledge of another’s suffering, and second, that empathy improves our epistemic situation. Empathic distress approximates acquaintance with another’s suffering, and (...) empathic agents who are motivated to help rather than disengage exhibit an important epistemic virtue: a variety of intellectual courage. A key upshot is that an independently motivated account of the structure and significance of perceptual experience is shown to provide theoretical scaffolding for understanding a famously elusive idea in ethics—namely, that the failure to help others stems from a kind of ignorance of their situation. (shrink)

Taking perceptual experience to consist in a relation of acquaintance with the sensible qualities, I argue that the state of being acquainted with a sensible quality is intrinsically a form of knowledge, and not merely a means to more familiar kinds of knowledge, such as propositional or dispositional knowledge. We should accept the epistemic claim for its explanatory power and theoretical usefulness. That acquaintance is knowledge best explains the intuitive epistemic appeal of ‘Edenic’ counterfactuals involving unmediated perceptual contact with reality (...) (cf. Chalmers, in: Gendler, Hawthorne (eds) Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, 2006). It explains the elusiveness of knowledge gained through new acquaintances. It coheres with the knowledge-like functional role of acquaintance in the special context of evaluative beliefs and evaluative reasoning, where the objects of acquaintance serve as evidence and inferential basis. And, finally, taking acquaintance to be knowledge is theoretically fruitful: it helps vindicate claims about the relationship between knowledge and concern for others we already find intuitive or outright accept. After developing a novel case for the epistemic claim, I respond to two familiar objections against it: namely, (1) that there are no pre-propositional, pre-conceptual cases of perceptual experience that remain epistemically relevant (Sellars in Empiricism and the philosophy of mind, Routledge, 1968, McDowell, in: Lindgard (ed) John McDowell: Experience, norm, and nature, Blackwell, 2008); and (2) that the category of knowledge appears gerrymandered once we add ‘object’ knowledge to the epistemological mix (Farkas, in: Knowles, Raleigh (eds), Acquaintance: new essays, Oxford University Press, 2019). (shrink)

The kind of empathy that is communicated through expressions like “I feel your pain” or “I share your sadness” is important, but peculiar. For it seems to require something perplexing and elusive: sharing another’s experience. It’s not clear how this is possible. We each experience the world from our own point of view, which no one else occupies. It’s also unclear exactly why it is so important that we share others' pains. If you are in pain, then why should it (...) matter, and be a good thing, that I am also in the same pain? Our goal in this paper is to address these questions. Specifically, our goal is to clarify how empathy, in the regimented sense of sharing another’s pain, is possible and why it is important. Central to our account is the concept of being acquainted with—that is, directly aware of—pain. When I feel my own pain, and am acquainted with it, I want the pain to stop, and I’m moved—sometimes compelled—to stop it. My acquaintance with the pain is what reveals that it is no good, to be gotten rid of, and to be avoided in the future. Acquaintance also appears to be implicated in our understanding of, and motivation to relieve, others’ pains. When I say “I feel your pain” I express an awareness of your pain, a direct appreciation of its noxious qualities, and, as with my own pain, an understanding of why it ought to be eased. Explaining how empathy is both possible and important therefore involves clarifying the nature of acquaintance: its limits, epistemic role, and motivational significance. What our analysis reveals is that agents have both epistemic and moral reasons to share other people’s pain because pain-sharing is the source of a species of character-building knowledge that we have no other way of accessing except through direct acquaintance with pain. (shrink)

This Element defends and clarifies the thesis that the legality of a system of rules depends on its moral features. Positivists who deny this dependence struggle to explain: (1) the traditional classification of moral norms as a form of a priori law; (2) judicial reliance on moral norms in legal discovery; (3) persistent theoretical disagreement about intra-systemic, law-determining facts; (4) why radically arbitrary or immoral schemes of social organization represent borderline cases of law; and (5) why law, like other artifacts, (...) can be evaluated in a kind-relative sense (“as law”). Meanwhile, traditional versions of non-positivism overstate the dependence going further than the desiderata warrant. A moderate theory is formulated: law is an artifact whose existence depends on adequately performing an essentially normative function. The theory's justification lies in its explanatory power: a comparison with other “value-driven” artifacts, such as artworks, proves vital for understanding legal language, reasoning, and practice. (shrink)

Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive (...) view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counter-examples. This form of “inclusive” anti-positivism is not just invulnerable to extensional challenges from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many philosophers have found it plausible that sense experience affords a species of nonpropositional awareness and knowledge, what Russell termed “knowledge by acquaintance.” At the same time, a prominent strand in epistemology maintains that knowledge has a distinctive normative profile: it is embedded in justificatory relations, serves as a standard of success for underlying attitudes, grounds regulative norms, and qualifies as a cognitive achievement. Yet it remains unclear how a nonpropositional state of acquaintance, formed without evidential basis and beyond (...) rational control, could fit within this normative structure. I trace the connections between different formulations of what I call “the normativity objection” to Russell's view and offer a unified response. The objection, I argue, rests on an overly passive conception of acquaintance. Once acquaintance is seen as partly constituted by attention—a subject‐level, reasons‐responsive activity—it can satisfy knowledge's normative role by serving as the success condition of a norm‐governed performance. This not only strengthens the Russellian program but also reveals a striking convergence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of epistemic normativity. (shrink)

Laws can be evaluated as better or worse relative to different normative standards. But the standard set by the Rule of Law defines a kind-relative standard of evaluation: features like generality, publicity, and non-retroactivity make the law better as law. This fact about legal evaluation invites a comparison between law and other “goodness-fixing kinds,” where a kind is goodness-fixing if what it is to be a member of the kind fixes a standard for evaluating instances as better or worse. Indeed, (...) for any goodness-fixing kind, K, that sets a standard, S, for evaluating Ks as Ks, we can ask: (1) How does the nature of Ks explain S? (2) Does being a K depend on meeting a minimum threshold of S-relative goodness? In the case of law and its kind-relative standard defined by the Rule-of-Law virtues, these questions lack settled answers. Although Raz (1979, 2019) offers some discussion, I argue that his answers have the surprising upshot of rendering law sui generis relative to other goodness-fixing kinds, and that preserving continuity with other such kinds involves revising the general picture. On the revised picture, law construed as a system of rules is subject to kind-relative evaluation because it is (a) a functional artifact, (b) with an essential function of realizing a limited normative ideal, and (c) its being minimally good at that function—that is, its realization of the relevant normative ideal to some degree—is a condition and ground of law’s existence, since all functional artifacts appear to be subject to such threshold conditions. (shrink)

Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I suggest (...) that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern adjudication. (shrink)

Some kinds can succeed or fail on their own terms. A clock that loses minutes is defective as a clock; a university that abandons teaching and research becomes deficient as a university. Pebbles and numbers, by contrast, are not evaluable in this way. Philosophers often place law in the first category, and some go further still: they claim that unjust law is defective as law. Yet the leading arguments for this claim—appeals to central cases (Finnis 2011), law’s characteristic activities (Murphy (...) 2006), the logic of legal demands (Alexy 2021), or law’s justificatory role (Dworkin 1986)—fail when tested against canonical cases of kind-relative virtue. Their failure reveals a deeper lacuna in legal philosophy: the absence of a general theory of goodness-fixing kinds. I argue that if justice is law’s constitutive virtue, it must be explained using the same functional schemas that ground constitutive standards elsewhere: agentive functions stably intended across contexts; etiological functions that explain emergence and persistence; and systemic functions that locate law’s role within larger social orders. On this reconstruction, whether unjust law is defective “as law” is not a matter of conceptual stipulation or a priori intuition, but an empirical question—one that unsettles familiar readings of Dworkin and Hart, and standard narratives of legal history. (shrink)

As a contemporary neo-Sadraian philosopher, Muhaqeq Isfahani has proposed his own account of the ontological argument for the existence of Allah. This account of the argument is unprecedented and has caught the attention of many contemporary thinkers. There have been proposed five accounts of this argument upon three pivots. First is the concept of necessary being as a mental concept. Second is the concept of necessary being so far as it denotes something beyond the concept. And third is the very (...) reality of necessary being existing by itself in the outside world. Each of the above accounts is open to some criticisms. Prof. Mahdi Ha’iri Yazdi has leveled four criticisms at that account of the argument such as counter-argument, begging the question, the confusion of categorical proposition with non-categorical one. The proponents of ontological argument have raised objections to Ha’iri’s criticisms. Most of those objections are not valid for they stem from the insufficient consideration of the fact that concepts such as “necessary being”, “God”, “partner of Creator” and the like are philosophical secondary intelligible. Accordingly, most of Prof. Ha’iri’s criticisms against Muhaqeq Ishafani are valid and thus the ontological argument fails to prove the existence of Allah. (shrink)

Expressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non-normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non-normative properties are repeatable (...) when it is possible for numerically distinct individuals to share them. Second, I show if the modal truth that stands in need of explanation entails that there are individuals exactly alike in repeatable non-normative respects that cannot normatively differ, then standard expressivist accounts of normative supervenience as a conceptual truth are unsuccessful. Expressivist metasemantics for normative terms, together with constitutive facts about the non-cognitive attitudes essentially involved in normative thought, strongly suggest that repeatable supervenience could not be a conceptual truth. I argue, finally, that although repeatable supervenience bears the marks of a conceptual truth, expressivists should be content to treat it as an ordinary normative truth, and to explain it the same way they explain other normative truths. (shrink)

The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...) competing desires—the parties to such conflicts should decide what to do on the basis of a coin flip. I suggest that Enoch is mistaken in his conception of what it means to be impartial. Once impartiality is properly construed, standing one’s ground in desire-based conflicts, whether or not moral values are at stake in the conflict, is consistent with being impartial. I defend a view on which impartiality can be understood in terms of features of our desiring attitudes. An agent acts impartially in desire-based conflicts whenever she is motivated by a final desire that aims at promoting the wellbeing of persons in a way that is insensitive to the identities of persons and their morally arbitrary features like their gender or skin color. Based on the account, I explain where Enoch’s discussion of the argument goes wrong, as well as why responses to the argument from Enoch’s critics have so far missed the mark. (shrink)

According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a color primitivist cannot accept that an object’s (...) being scarlet grounds its not being chartreuse. The Finean might try to defend these implications, but it generates further problems. Instead, the principle should be rejected. An important upshot is that the principle cannot be relied on, as it has been, to distinguish robust realists from anti-realists about a propositional domain—the principle obscures ways of taking features to be both real and fundamental. (shrink)

Judges decide cases by appeal to rules of general application they deem to be law. If a candidate rule resolves the case and is, ex ante and independently of the judge’s judgment, the law, then the judge has a legal obligation to declare it as such and follow it. That, at any rate, is conventional wisdom. Yet the principle is false – a rule’s being law or the judge’s believing it to be law is neither necessary nor even sufficient for (...) a judge being legally obliged to follow it. The principle’s falsity is especially apparent in so-called hard cases, where the line between legal and non-legal rules is obscure. Moreover, judges have authority to disregard law in hard cases not because moral obligations trump legal obligations. Rather, the law itself circumscribes its own authority. The implications for legal philosophy are significant; for one, a theory of juridical norms can be developed independently of the precise boundaries of legality. (shrink)

Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of “irreparable corruption” is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the “aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors” determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to our (...) sentencing case law,” as the Supreme Court recently put it. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 119 (2016). According to these courts, “it would mean nothing” to ask whether the defendant “deserves mercy beyond a reasonable doubt” or “more-likely-than-not deserves it” because moral questions are not “factual.” Instead, moral determinations are highly subjective “value calls” to which concepts of doubt and certainty do not intelligibly apply. Implicit in these rulings is a controversial view of the nature of moral judgment. This Article traces the contours of the view and argues that it is out of step with the way the broader public thinks about morality and fails to address the issues defendants have raised. Courts should avoid wading into such controversial waters for two reasons. First, the judiciary has historically maintained neutrality on issues of significant public concern. Second, even if moral determinations are not factual, applying a standard of proof to at least some moral decisions at sentencing would change the outcome of the sentencer’s deliberations, and improve the legitimacy of the legal system. For the reasonableness of doubt depends on context; and moral questions—"are you certain the defendant deserves death?”—make salient the stakes relative to which a person should decide what to believe about ordinary empirical matters. On the resulting view, reasonable doubt in the final moral analysis is not just intelligible, but essential for correcting a bias in the structure of the bifurcated criminal trial that systematically disadvantages defendants: the tendency for de-contextualized "factual findings” in the guilt phase to control outcomes at sentencing. (shrink)

Commentary on Crowe's metaethics and his theory of law as a goodness-fixing kind.

ABSTRACTAtiq Rahimi accepted the invitation to present his keynote Ecrire l’exile at the 2018 international workshop ‘Refugees in Literature, Film, Art and Media: Perspective on the Past and Presen...

Very few studies have investigated the movement in stock returns that result due to changes in oil prices. In recent years due to cooling down of China, unveiled oil reserves of Iran, decreasing demand worldwide and discovery of shale gases the world has experienced a large fall in the oil prices. These changes are also affecting performance of manufacturing and other associated companies in countries all over the world. Pakistan has also been affected by these changes in many ways. Especially, (...) the returns on stock markets have been affected a lot by the variations in the oil prices. This paper using monthly data set from years 2014 to 2016 of the non-financial firms operated in Pakistan Stock Exchange, investigates the effect of variation in oil prices on returns on stock. Results from the panel data analysis indicate a negative relationship between the variables. Since, Pakistan is an oil importing, movement in the prices contribute towards affecting the production cost in a positive manner which in turn affects the execution of the enterprises as well as returns of the stocks negatively. (shrink)

Having constituted a new epoch in human history and a new religiouspolitical order, the revealed religions challenged the tradition of Greek philosophy to adjust to, investigate, and make intelligible a religiouspolitical order based on prophecy, revelation, and the divine law. The challenge led certain Arab and Muslim philosophers to reassess the relative distance between the thought of the Greek masters, and the doctrines propagated by the revealed religions, and to make use of such works as Plato's Republic and Laws, rather (...) than Aristotle's Politics, when offering a philosophic account of the new religious–political phenomenon and of such new disciplines as the science of the divine law and the science of revealed theology. Les religions révélées, en inaugurant une ère nouvelle dans l'histoire humaine et un nouvel ordre “religio-politique”, ont constitué un défi pour la tradition de la philosophie grecque. Celle-ci devait s'adapter a un ordre religio-politique fondé sur la prophétie, la révélation et la loi divine, en faire un objet d'investigation et le rendre intelligible. Ce défi conduisit certains philosophes arabes et musulmans à réévaluer la distance qui sépare la pensée des maîtres grecs des doctrines propagées par les religions révelées. Il les conduisit aussi à faire usage d'oeuvres telles que la République et les Lois de Platon, plutôt que la Politique d'Aristote dans leur effort de rendre compte philosophiquement du phénomène religio-politique nouveau et des nouvelles disciplines telles que la science de la loi divine et la science de la théologie révélée. (shrink)

This volume consists of nine essays on the political teaching of such Muslim philosophers as al-Kindi and al-Razi, as well as the more familiar al-Fârâbî, ...

Recently there is an increasing technological development in intelligent tutoring systems. This field has become interesting to many researchers. In this paper, we present an intelligent tutoring system for teaching information security. This intelligent tutoring systems target the students enrolled in Advanced Topics in Information Security in the faculty of Engineering and Information Technology at Al-Azhar University in Gaza. Through which the student will be able to study the course and solve related problems. An evaluation of the intelligent tutoring systems (...) was carried out and the results were promising. (shrink)

In this work, Muhsin Mahdi--widely regarded as the preeminent scholar of Islamic political thought--distills more than four decades of research to offer an authoritative analysis of the work of Alfarabi, the founder of Islamic political philosophy. Mahdi, who also brought to light writings of Alfarabi that had long been presumed lost or were not even known, presents this great thinker as his contemporaries would have seen him: as a philosopher who sought to lay the foundations for a new (...) understanding of revealed religion and its relation to the tradition of political philosophy. Beginning with a survey of Islamic philosophy and a discussion of its historical background, Mahdi considers the interrelated spheres of philosophy, political thought, theology, and jurisprudence of the time. He then turns to Alfarabi's concept of "the virtuous city," and concludes with an in-depth analysis of the trilogy, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. This philosophical engagement with the writings of and about Alfarabi will be essential reading for anyone interested in medieval political philosophy. (shrink)

This paper concerns the recent revival of entity realism. Having been started with the work of Ian Hacking, Nancy Cartwright and Ronald Giere, the project of entity realism has recently been developed by Matthias Egg, Markus Eronen, and Bence Nanay. The paper opens a dialogue among these recent views on entity realism and integrates them into a more advanced view. The result is an epistemological criterion for reality: the property-tokens of a certain type may be taken as real insofar as (...) only they can be materially inferred from the evidence obtained in a variety of independent ways of detection. (shrink)

This paper draws on the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to philosophy of science to develop realist perspectivism, an integration of experimental realism and perspectivism. Specifically, the paper employs the distinction between “manifestation” and “phenomenon” and it advances the view that the evidence of a real entity is “explorable” in order to argue that instrumentally-mediated robust evidence indicates real entities. Furthermore, it underpins the phenomenological notion of the horizonal nature of scientific observation with perspectivism, so accounting for scientific pluralism even in the cases (...) of inconsistent models. Overall, realist perspectivism is proposed as the way to go for (phenomenologically-hermeneutically minded) philosophers of science. (shrink)

Relying on the notion of “overlapping perspectives,” this paper argues that entity realism and perspectivism are complementary. According to entity realism, it is justified to maintain a positive attitude toward the existence of unobservable entities with which multiple experimental interactions are possible. Perspectivism also explains that our beliefs about these entities are bounded by historically contingent theoretical and instrumental perspectives. The argument of the paper is developed through a discussion of Ronald Giere’s versions of realism: entity realism, constructive realism, and (...) perspectival realism. (shrink)

Stance voluntarism holds that the choice between rival stances in philosophical disagreements cannot be compelled by epistemic reasons alone. This paper examines a prominent account of stance voluntarism—developed in Chakravartty (2017), referred to as CSV—assessing whether it fosters progress in philosophical debate, with particular attention to the scientific realism debate. Progress in this debate is possible even when disagreements persist, insofar as the debate can enrich our understanding by bringing to light elements and relations that are overlooked or misrepresented. With (...) this in mind, the paper introduces a notion of usefulness specific to meta-philosophical positions: their capacity to facilitate philosophical activities, such as argumentation, thought experiments, and case study analysis, that advance first-order philosophical debates. The paper thus argues that, on a rigorous reading, CSV leaves little room for the activities that may challenge the stances underlying first-order philosophical positions or drive the emergence of more coherent alternatives. Furthermore, it contends that the relationship between the stances that CSV takes to underlie first-order philosophical positions and the positions actually found in the scientific realism debate remains problematic. The paper also considers a more liberal reading of CSV that allows philosophical activities conducive to progress in first-order debates, suggesting that adopting this reading requires certain revisions. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a macro level analysis of the visibility of philosophy of science in the sciences over the last four decades. Our quantitative analysis of publications and citations of philosophy of science papers, published in 17 main journals representing the discipline, contributes to the longstanding debate on the influence of philosophy of science on the sciences. It reveals the global structure of relationships that philosophy of science maintains with science, technology, engineering and mathematics and social sciences and (...) humanities fields. Explored at the level of disciplines, journals and authors, this analysis of the relations between philosophy of science and a large and diversified array of disciplines allows us to answer several questions: what is the degree of openness of various disciplines to the specialized knowledge produced in philosophy of science? Which STEM and SSH fields and journals have privileged ties with philosophy of science? What are the characteristics, in terms of citation and publication patterns, of authors who get their philosophy of science papers cited outside their field? Complementing existing qualitative inquiries on the influence of specific authors, concepts or topics of philosophy of science, the bibliometric approach proposed in this paper offers a comprehensive portrait of the multiple relationships that links philosophy of science to the sciences. (shrink)

This book considers Wilfrid Sellars' engagement with Kantian philosophy-both theoretical and practical-in his exegetical work in reading Kant as well as in his own systematic development of Kantian philosophy. Despite the spate of new publications on Wilfrid Sellars' role in twentieth-century philosophy, a comprehensive book-length examination of his interpretation of Kant has been conspicuously absent. This volume fills that gap both exegetically and systematically, exploring his engagement in four distinct sections: (1) Logic and History, (2) Sensations and Intuitions, (3) Being (...) and Categories, and (4) Reason, Modality, and Freedom. The chapters within these sections, written by leading experts, explore Sellars' reading of Kant and offer both defenses and critiques. Readers will find in this collection not only a thorough exploration of Sellars' engagement with Kant, but also a rich dialogue between Kant scholars and specialists in Sellars' philosophy. Reading Kant with Sellars will appeal to a wide range of scholars and advanced students from different fields and schools of thought. First and foremost, it is aimed at Kant and Sellars scholars, offering them deeper insights into their respective fields by highlighting the importance of Kant for Sellars and the relevance of Sellars' reading of Kant for Kant scholarship. Those interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, moral and practical philosophy, and logic will also find this book highly relevant. (shrink)

The special theory of relativity holds significant interest for scientific perspectivists. In this paper, I distinguish between two related meanings of “perspectival,” and argue that reference frames are perspectives, provided that perspectival means “being conditional” rather than “being partial.” Frame-dependent properties such as length, time duration, and simultaneity, are not partially measured in a reference frame, but their measurements are conditional on the choice of frame. I also discuss whether the constancy of the speed of light depends on perspectival factors (...) such as the idealized definition of the speed of light in a perfect vacuum and the Einstein synchronization convention. Furthermore, I argue for the view that the constancy of its speed is a robust property of light according to the conditions of currently acceptable experimental setups pertaining to special relativity, and conclude that this view supports perspectivism. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relevance of empirical evidence to real causes. I argue for the claim that instrumentally mediated empirical results are causally dependent on unobservable entities. I develop this idea in the context of discussions on entity realism. As a consequence of my argument, an antirealist version of empiricism, which underlines the significance of empirical evidence but which abstains from real causation, is incoherent.

The law of contracts, at least in its orthodox expression, concerns voluntary, or chosen, legal obligations. When Brody accepts Susan’s offer to sell him a canoe for a set price, the parties’ choices alter their legal rights and duties. Their success at changing the legal landscape depends on a background system of rules that specify when and how contractual acts have legal effects, rules that give the offer and acceptance of a bargain-exchange a central role in generating obligations. Contract law (...) conceived as a body of rules empowering individuals to shape their own rights and responsibilities presents an object of philosophical study. The philosophy of contract includes two broad sets of projects. One set, the focus of the first part of this entry, targets the basic structure and normative justification of the law of contracts. The aim is to subsume a salient body of contract law rules under general principles in order to clarify contract law’s conceptual categories, distinguish it from other areas of law, and specify criteria relevant to its normative appraisal. This kind of philosophical work presupposes detailed knowledge of the law in existing legal regimes, and the entry begins by outlining the common law of contracts. A second set of projects draws on resources from the philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and moral and political philosophy to address debates within contract law. Questions about the nature of meaning and interpretation, intentionality, freedom in contract, and distributive justice drive contemporary legal debates concerning contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement. Philosophical work on these topics has attracted significant commentary which serves as the focus of the second part of this entry. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand the meaning of reality (in science) on the basis of the concepts of persistence and resistance. It first supports the ontological view that reality consists of persistent potentialities, which resist being excluded from existence. A study of the cases of the Higgs boson and the hypothetical Ϝ-particle helps to illustrate how real entities persist and resist. The paper then suggests that, perceptually speaking, the results of ordinary perception or observational processes persistently appear under (...) appropriate conditions, and they resist disappearance even when the appropriate conditions are not completely prepared. Finally, it argues that, epistemologically speaking, a truthful theory resists being falsified and persists across replicable observations and experiments. (shrink)

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his (...) account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. (shrink)

This dissertation is about human knowledge of reality. In particular, it argues that scientific knowledge is bounded by historically available instruments and theories; nevertheless, the use of several independent instruments and theories can provide access to the persistent potentialities of reality. The replicability of scientific observations and experiments allows us to obtain explorable evidence of robust entities and properties. The dissertation includes seven chapters. It also studies three cases – namely, Higgs bosons and hypothetical Ϝ-particles (section 2.4), the Ptolemaic and (...) Kepler model of the planets (section 6.7), and the special theory of relativity (chapter 7). -/- Chapter 1 is the introduction of the dissertation. Chapter 2 clarifies the notion of the real on the basis of two concepts: persistence and resistance. These concepts enable me to explain my ontological belief in the real potentialities of human-independent things and the implications of this view for the perceptual and epistemological levels of discussion. On the basis of the concept of “overlapping perspectives”, chapter 3 argues that entity realism and perspectivism are complementary. That is, an entity that manifests itself through several experimental/observational methods is something real, but our knowledge of its nature is perspectival. Critically studying the recent views of entity realism, chapter 4 extends the discussion of entity realism and provides a criterion for the reality of property tokens. Chapter 5, in contrast, develops the perspectival aspects of my view on the basis of the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to the philosophy of science. This chapter also elaborates my view of empirical evidence, as briefly expressed in sections 2.5 and 4.5. Chapter 6 concerns diachronic theoretical perspectives. It first explains my view of progress, according to which current perspectives are broader than past ones. Second, it argues that the successful explanations and predictions of abandoned theories can be accounted for from our currently acceptable perspectives. The case study of Ptolemaic astronomy supports the argument of this chapter. Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion of the dissertation by applying the central themes of the previous chapters to the case study of special relativity theory. I interpret frame-dependent properties, such as length and time duration, and the constancy of the speed of light according to realist perspectivism. (shrink)

The most important issue in Immanuel Kant’s epistemological system is Synthetic a priori judgments. Some interpreters of Kant have criticized his philosophical system by presenting a psychological interpretation of Kant. Hermann Cohen, a German philosopher, is one of the interpreters of Kant’s epistemological system who, unlike this group, has strictly avoided Kant’s psychological interpretation and has criticized such interpretations by presenting a new and original interpretation of a priori authorship propositions. In his interpretation of Kant, he states three levels or (...) degrees for a priori authorship propositions and refers the third degree to common experience. For this purpose, he starts from “place” and, by reflecting on the meaning of place, reaches three levels or degrees of a priority: 1) place as something that precedes every other sensory thing; 2) place as form; 3) place as a formal condition of the possibility of experience. By using the third-level a priori, Kuhn acquits Kant of the accusations of subjectivism. Kuhn considers the reference for third-order a priori propositions to be the principles of mathematics and the fundamental laws of pure natural science, namely mechanics. He believes that these principles and laws constitute the possibility of experience. This experience, unlike personal experiences, is general and common to all individuals. In his view, the task of philosophy is to arrive at third-order a priori principles by reflecting on this mathematical natural science. Such a science varies in every era and, as a result, the a priori propositions will also be different in every era. (shrink)

Implicit attitudes are the unconscious and automatic evaluations people make about objects, persons, and groups. These attitudes have been the subject of much discussion in the social and cognitive psychology literature of the past three decades. This paper explores whether it is justified to hold that implicit attitudes, seen as theoretical entities posited by empirical psychology, are real. We approach this question by drawing on the realism-antirealism debate in philosophy of science. To this end, we compare implicit attitudes with commonsense (...) belief/desire psychology, which, among other things, deploys explicit attitudes to explain behavior. We argue that the traditional arguments for and against realism about commonsense psychology do not apply to the case of implicit attitudes. However, we mount an alternative argument for realism about implicit attitudes, based on the criteria offered by entity realism, namely modifiability, non-redundancy, and robustness. We show that this framework is nicely applicable to implicit attitudes. However, it does not yet justify our belief in these attitudes. In order to take implicit attitudes as real within this entity realist approach, the reproducibility of each implicit measure as well as the correlation between different measures must be increased. (shrink)

Spinoza is one of the thinkers who has used existential arguments to prove the existence of God. He has presented six different versions of this argument. These arguments have received less attention from researchers. In the following work, these arguments are presented and criticized in a descriptive-analytical manner using library data. As understood by the findings of this research, Spinoza has used the concept of God in three ways in these versions: the concept of God as a concept, the concept (...) of God in terms of indicating something beyond itself, and the subjective existence of the concept of God. Also, these arguments have various criticisms, such as confusion between the first and common conception with regard to the predicate, confusion between the two with regard to the subject, contradiction, begging the question, and lack of attention to the quality of the formation of the concept of God in the mind. The final conclusion of this research is that all these arguments are incomplete for the purpose and are ineffective in proving the reality of God. (shrink)

This paper will offer a systematic reconstruction of al-Ġazālī’s Sceptical Argument in his celebrated Deliverer/Delivered from Going Astray (al-Munqiḏ/al-Munqaḏ min al-Ḍalāl). Based on textual evidence, I will argue that the concept of certainty (yaqīn) in play in this argument is that of the philosophers—most notably Ibn Sīnā—and that it is firmly tied to demonstration (burhān) and hence to the materials of syllogism (mawwād al-qiyās). This will show that contrary to what many scholars believe, this Sceptical Argument is al-Ġazālī’s discovery of (...) a latent sceptical problem in Muslim philosophers’ epistemological theories based on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics that escaped even the agile mind of aš-šayḫ ar-raʾīs Ibn Sīnā. This reconstruction will also shed some light on the widespread assumption that al-Ġazālī anticipates Descartes’s sceptical considerations in the First Meditation. I will argue that not only do the two thinkers use incompatible strategies to reach their respective sceptical conclusions, but both their conclusions and their use of God in refuting them are also essentially non-identical. The conclusion is that the two sceptical arguments are essentially different. (shrink)

In this chapter, Ranaee examines the influence of Kant’s philosophy on Sellars, considering both his exegetical analysis of Kant’s philosophy and areas where Sellars surpasses Kant. The chapter focuses on two key notions in Kantian philosophy: intuition and categories as products of the cognitive faculties of sensibility and understanding. It examines the following: (i) Sellars’s conceptualism regarding Kantian intuitions; (ii) the nonconceptual element he deems necessary for intuition; (iii) the role of imagination and image-models; and (iv) his revisionist interpretation of (...) Kantian categories. (shrink)

Transplant coordinators play a pivotal role in the process of obtaining consent for live or dead donation of organs. The objective of the project is to unveil emotional experiences and ethical conduct of transplant coordinators using a qualitative research methodology. Ten transplant coordinators who have worked for more than 20 years in this job were recruited by using a purposive sampling technique. The transplant coordinators spoke of negative feelings and moral distress with regard to futile care of family members of (...) deceased donors as well as of living donors. Transplant coordinators experience moral distress on a daily basis; being compelled to compromise their integrity causes moral distress and moral residue, hence, training and support should be offered to them. (shrink)

Despite recent noticeable changes in women’s educational opportunities in developing countries such as Iran, there is still much controversy surrounding the common assumption that a direct relationship exists between women’s empowerment and formal literacy. According to the social semiotic method, the present research explores the hidden side of the female educational experience and its relationship with empowerment. In the current study, we conducted 39 interviews and analyzed the collected data using Van Leeuwen’s semiotic approach. The results are based on the (...) analysis of three semiotic sources, all of which are ubiquitous in the daily life of Iranian students: uniforms, queues, and homework. The findings indicate that the emphasis on the ideological aspects of educational experiences, in the form of a ritualistic approach by the educational system’s agents, causes a gradual semantic break between students and educational goals. Such an emphasis also instills an ambiguous and contradictory understanding in the student’s mind, of which the final result is the alienation and internalization of passive patterns of social action. (shrink)

While extensive scholarship has been dedicated to the emotional experiences of transplant patients, little is known about the emotional experiences of transplant co‐ordinators. Semi‐structured face‐to‐face interviews conducted with ten transplant co‐ordinators who have worked for more than 20 years in this job. The transplant co‐ordinators spoke of negative feelings and moral distress with regard to futile care of deceased donor family members as well as of living donors. Transplant co‐ordinators experience intense negative feelings, emotional pain, and moral distress on a (...) daily basis. Transplant co‐ordinators play a pivotal role in the process of obtaining consent for live or dead donation of organ; however, their well‐being and job satisfaction are impaired by contradictions between their moral values and the tasks they are instructed to perform. The study exposes the silent emotional suffering of transplant co‐ordinators; main findings show that the transplant co‐ordinators are torn between contradictory expectations and a gap between values and praxis. It is recommended to offer them training and support for the sake of their retention. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Sellars’ categories differ significantly from Kantian categories in two important ways. Kantian categories are pure and necessary, whereas Sellars’ categories are impure and contingent. This distinction explains why Sellars does not offer a transcendental deduction; such a deduction is only necessary for pure categories since experience cannot be used to prove their objective validity. Contrary to Sellars' intention to align analytic philosophy more closely with Kant, these differences also suggest that his theory of categories represents a (...) regression to Humean principles. (shrink)

This research investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on each of the components of sustainability (environmental, social, and governance) (ESG) in European and American companies. This research uses the maximum available data for a more detailed and comprehensive investigation. The European and American companies (a total of 15,740 company‐years) in 11 categories, including basic materials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, health care, industrials, real estate, technology, telecommunications, and utilities, were categorized and estimated separately in four separate models (...) based on the panel data model. The research results indicate a significant positive relationship between EPU and ESG. If the EPU index increases, the ESG index also increases. Also, the results show that if EPU rises, disclosure quality in the context of ESG‐related issues will improve. Examining the relationship between ESG and EPU can help companies formulate effective and sustainable strategies and decisions and play a key role in achieving ESG goals. Improving transparency and providing more detailed information about measures taken in the field of ESG will give shareholders more confidence in the sustainable performance of companies. (shrink)