The hard problem of consciousness is fundamentally a problem of geometry. We demonstrate this through a mathematical analysis of color perception, focusing on magenta—a phenomenal color with no corresponding wavelength in the electromagnetic spectrum. Using comparative data from human and bee vision, we show that magenta represents consciousness performing a one-point compactification on the open linear spectrum, transforming it into a closed phenomenal circle. This topological closure is species-specific in its endpoints but universal in its structure: every (...) visual system must solve the problem of organizing a bounded segment of the infinite electromagnetic spectrum into a complete chromatic space. We formalize this using split-complex manifolds, where color space exhibits a mixed metric signature combining circular (complex) geometry for hue with hyperbolic geometry for brightness. The existence of "impossible colors"—phenomenal states accessible only through physiological disruption, lying outside the spindle of physically realizable colors—demonstrates that phenomenal color space necessarily transcends the boundaries of physical possibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic (...) minds, they would either have to embrace representationalism or turn to semantic nihilism, which is, as I argue, an unstable and unattractive position. Hence, I conclude, their book does not offer an alternative to representation- alism. At the same time, it reminds us that representational talk in cognitive science cannot be taken for granted and that information is different from men- tal representation. Although this claim is not new, Hutto and Myin defend it forcefully and elegantly. (shrink)

The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods. The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. Once we have specified the neural or computational mechanism that performs the function of verbal report, for example, the bulk of our work (...) in explaining reportability is over. Baars theory of cognitive accessibility addresses many aspects of human cognition and shows promise as a theory of awareness, the functional correlate of conscious experience, but an explanation of experience itself is not on offer. The key is the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience. (shrink)

Sandra Harding here develops further the themes first addressed in her widely influential book, The Science Question in Feminism, and conducts a compelling analysis of feminist theories on the philosophical problem of how we know what we ...

Chalmers introduced the hard problem of consciousness as a profound gap between experience and physical concepts. Philosophical theories were based on different interpretations concerning the qualia/concept gap, such as interactive dualism (Descartes), as well as mono aspect or dual aspect monism. From a bio-psychological perspective, the gap can be explained by the different activity of two mental functions realizing a mental representation of extra-mental reality. The function of elementary sensation requires active sense organs, which create an uninterrupted physical (...) chain from extra-mental reality to the brain and reflect the present. The function of categorizing reflection no longer needs sense organs, so that the physical chain to extra-mental reality is interrupted and now reflects the past. Whereas elementary sensation is an open system, categorizing reflection remains a closed system, separated from extra-mental reality. This creates the potentiality/reality gap, since prediction from the closed to the open system remains always uncertain. Elementary sensation is associated to specific qualia for each sense organ. Chalmers also attributed qualia to thoughts, with more neutral thought qualia. Thus at the qualia level, there is also an important gap, but now between specific sense qualia and neutral thought qualia. Since all physical concepts are simultaneously linked to neutral thought qualia, the hard problem might be explained by a qualia/qualia gap instead of a qualia/concept gap. The mental function of categorizing reflection induces the change from sense qualia to thought qualia by a categorization process. The specific sense qualia mosaic of an apple is reduced to physical concepts with neutral qualia by progressive categorization first to fruit, then to food, to chemicals and finally to calories. This might explain the gap felt in the hard problem, since specific sense qualia are completely different from neutral thought qualia, so that the hard problem could already be encountered at the qualia level. Since the gap of the hard problem is due to the interaction of different mental functions, it is compatible with a philosophical monism. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) (...) and then reconstruct and analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology. (shrink)

Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i.e. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. Chalmers (Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem.” Against this, I argue that work on the meta-problem will likely fail to make the hard problem (...) any easier. For each of the main stances on the hard problem can provide an account of problem reports, and we have no way of deciding which of these accounts gives the correct explanation of an individual’s problem reports without presupposing a stance on the hard problem. We thus cannot determine which of the available solutions to the meta-problem is correct without having already solved the hard problem. (shrink)

For the past 40 years, philosophers have generally assumed that a key to understanding mental representation is to develop a naturalistic theory of representational content. This has led to an outlook where the importance of content has been heavily inflated, while the significance of the representational vehicles has been somewhat downplayed. However, the success of this enterprise has been thwarted by a number of mysterious and allegedly non-naturalizable, irreducible dimensions of representational content. The challenge of addressing these difficulties has come (...) to be known as the “hard problem of content” (Hutto & Myin, 2012), and many think it makes an account of representation in the brain impossible. In this essay, I argue that much of this is misguided and based upon the wrong set of priorities. If we focus on the functionality of representational vehicles (as recommended by teleosemanticists) and remind ourselves of the quirks associated with many functional entities, we can see that the allegedly mysterious and intractable aspects of content are really just mundane features associated with many everyday functional kinds. We can also see they have little to do with content and more to do with representation function. Moreover, we can begin to see that our explanatory priorities are backwards: instead of expecting a theory of content to be the key to understanding how a brain state can function as a representation, we should instead expect a theory of neural representation function to serve as the key to understanding how content occurs naturally. (shrink)

A problem of the many Fs arises in cases where intuitively there is precisely one F (in the region you are talking about), but when you look closely you find many candidates for being that F, each one apparently as well-qualified as the next. Imagine an apparently solitary cloud in an otherwise blue sky. Look closer, and you'll see lots of water vapor molecules, with no one collection of them more eligible than the others to count as the cloud. (...) Many things are like this when you look closely enough. The problem arises for mundane things like rocks, houses and coins. It also arises for entities that present special philosophical challenges, like persons and experiencers. In this essay, I present a new argument that the problem of the many experiencers is an especially hard problem of the many, and property dualism—the view that properties that there is something it is like to instantiate are irreducible—may be the best way to solve it. (shrink)

Worries about scientific objectivity seem never-ending. Social critics and philosophers of science have argued that invocations of objectivity are often little more than attempts to boost the status of a claim, while calls for value neutrality may be used to suppress otherwise valid dissenting positions. Objectivity is used sometimes to advance democratic agendas, at other times to block them; sometimes for increasing the growth of knowledge, at others to resist it. Sandra Harding is not ready to throw out objectivity quite (...) yet. For all of its problems, she contends that objectivity is too powerful a concept simply to abandon. In Objectivity and Diversity, Harding calls for a science that is both more epistemically adequate and socially just, a science that would ask: How are the lives of the most economically and politically vulnerable groups affected by a particular piece of research? Do they have a say in whether and how the research is done? Should empirically reliable systems of indigenous knowledge count as "real science"? Ultimately, Harding argues for a shift from the ideal of a neutral, disinterested science to one that prizes fairness and responsibility. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is commonly framed as a gap between physical processes and phenomenal experience: even a complete functional account of the brain appears to leave unanswered why those processes are accompanied by “what-it-is-like” character. This paper argues that the apparent gap arises from an inverted explanatory order. Phenomenal character is treated as primary, while the structural precondition for subjecthood is left implicit. I propose that identity—understood as constraint-maintained invariance across perturbation—is prior to experience. A system (...) must first constitute itself as a stable, self-maintaining unit before the question of what it is like to be that unit can arise. Phenomenal character is then analyzed as a regime property of recursively stabilized identity. On this view, the hard problem does not disappear but relocates: from a metaphysical divide between matter and mind to a structural transition within dynamical organization. (shrink)

In the past few years, the subject of AI rights—the thesis that AIs, robots, and other artefacts (hereafter, simply ‘AIs’) ought to be included in the sphere of moral concern—has started to receive serious attention from scholars. In this paper, I argue that the AI rights research program is beset by an epistemic problem that threatens to impede its progress—namely, a lack of a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: the problem of explaining why certain (...) brain states give rise to experience. To motivate this claim, I consider three ways in which to ground AI rights—namely: superintelligence, empathy, and a capacity for consciousness. I argue that appeals to superintelligence and empathy are problematic, and that consciousness should be our central focus, as in the case of animal rights. However, I also argue that AI rights is disanalogous from animal rights in an important respect: animal rights can proceed without a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness. Not so with AI rights, I argue. There we cannot make the same kinds of assumptions that we do about animal consciousness, since we still do not understand why brain states give rise to conscious mental states in humans. (shrink)

Metanormativists hold that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought, in some morally authoritative sense, to act. Many metanormativists aim to generalize expected utility theory for normative uncertainty. Such accounts face the “easy problem of intertheoretic comparisons”: the worry that distinct theories’ assessments of choiceworthiness are incomparable. The easy problem may well be resolvable, but another problem looms: while some moral theories assign cardinal degrees of choiceworthiness, other theories’ choiceworthiness assignments are merely ordinal. Expected choiceworthiness over such (...) theories is undefined. Call this the “hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons.” This paper argues that to solve the hard problem, we should model moral theories with imprecise choiceworthiness. Imprecise choiceworthiness assignments can model incomplete cardinal information about choiceworthiness, with precise cardinal choiceworthiness and merely ordinal choiceworthiness as limiting cases. Generalizing familiar decision theories for imprecise choiceworthiness to the case of moral uncertainty generates puzzles, however: natural generalizations seem to require reifying parts of the model that don’t correspond to anything in normative reality. I discuss three ways of addressing this problem: by demystifying the reified elements by using them as promiscuously as possible; by constructing alternative decision theories that don’t require the troublesome elements; and by employing an alternative model of metanormative decision problems, and of moral uncertainty generally. (shrink)

Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness argues that despite the worries of explanatory pessimists, consciousness can be fully explained in “easy” scientific terms. The widespread intuition that consciousness poses a hard problem is plausibly based on how consciousness appears to us in first-person access. The book offers a debunking argument to undercut the justificatory link between the first-person appearances and our hard problem intuitions. -/- The key step in the debunking argument involves (...) the development and defense of an empirical model of first-person access: Automated Compression Theory (ACT). ACT holds that first-person access to consciousness is accomplished by automated accessing of compressed sensory information. Because of the distorting nature of this compressed access, it seems to subjects that consciousness possesses “exceptional” properties—properties leading to the hard problem—even though no such properties are present. If there are no exceptional properties to explain, then an explanation in easy terms can fully account for conscious experience. The book presents a range of empirical evidence for ACT and concludes that the burden of proof is now on the pessimists to show why we shouldn’t be optimistic about explaining consciousness. (shrink)

The problem of theory choice and model selection is hard but still important when useful truths are underdetermined, perhaps not by all kinds of data but by the kinds of data we can have access to ethically or practicably—even if we have an infinity of such data. This article addresses a crucial instance of that problem: the problem of inferring causal structures from nonexperimental, nontemporal data without assuming the so-called causal Faithfulness condition or the like. A (...) new account of epistemic evaluation is developed to solve that problem and justify a standard practice of causal inference in data science. (shrink)

Radical Enactive Cognition challenges teleosemantic representationalism while proposing a naturalistic, content-free account of basic intentionality – “Ur-intentionality” – based solely on teleofunctional resources such as information-as-covariance and natural selection, a view known as Teleosemiotics. This paper argues that this appropriation is insufficient to ground content-free intentionality. Two problems for functional information-as-covariance are identified: the Determinacy Problem and the Distality Problem. Furthermore, teleofunctionalism fails to prevent Ur-intentionality from collapsing into a form of stimulus-response behaviorism, which Radical Enactivism itself deems (...) non-cognitive. An enactive stimulus-response account is developed to show that teleofunctional mechanisms can explain adaptive behavior without invoking intentionality. The paper concludes that these issues pose a serious and previously overlooked challenge to non-representational, selectionist theories of cognition – the Hard Problem of Intentionality – and points to possible ways to deal with the problem. (shrink)

In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for (...) the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is necessarily in explicable in terms of the structure and function of mental states. Unfortunately the debate has not moved on because the majority of materialists feel the pull of the at least one of, what we call, the ‘key’ intuitions that supposedly support dualism and the existence of a Hard Phenomenon and so try to accommodate them rather than denying them. Although this a possible response to the intuitions it tends to mask the fact that there is in fact no argument for the existence of a Hard Phenomenon. So we end up participating in our own hornswoggling :402–408, 1996) and chasing our tails trying to answer a question we should in fact ignore. We have no reason to think there is a Hard Problem of consciousness because we have no reason to think the Hard Phenomenon exists. (shrink)

The philosophical study of consciousness is chock full of thought experiments: John Searle’s Chinese Room, David Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombies, Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room, and Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ among others. Many of these experiments and the endless discussions that follow them are predicated on what Chalmers famously referred as the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness: for him, it is ‘easy’ to figure out how the brain is capable of perception, information integration, attention, reporting (...) on mental states, etc, even though this is far from being accomplished at the moment. What is ‘hard’, claims the man of the p-zombies, is to account for phenomenal experience, or what philosophers usually call ‘qualia’: the ‘what is it like’, first-person quality of consciousness. (shrink)

As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.

Complex moral trade-offs are a basic feature of human life: for example, confronted with scarce medical resources, doctors must frequently choose who amongst equally deserving candidates receives medical treatment. But choosing what to do in moral trade-offs is no longer a ‘humans-only’ task, but often falls to AI agents. In this article, we report findings from a series of experiments (N=1029) intended to establish whether agent-type (Human vs. AI) matters for what should be done in moral trade-offs. We find that, (...) relative to a human decision-maker, participants more often judge that AI agents should opt for fairness at the expense of maximizing utility. In our discussion, we explain how the reported differences (we call them agent-type ‘value forks’) matters for the study of moral value alignment, and we hypothesize what could explain these value forks. We close by reflecting on limits of our results and indicate avenues of further research. (shrink)

Several leading moral philosophers have recently proposed a soft version of moral realism, according to which moral facts—though it is reasonable to postulate them—cannot metaphysically explain other facts (Dworkin 2011; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). However, soft moral realism is faced with what I call the “Hard Problem”, namely, the problem of how this soft version of moral metaphysics could accommodate moral knowledge. This paper reconstructs three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on behalf of the (...) soft realist: the autonomy approach, the intuitionist approach, and the third-factor approach. I then argue that none of them is successful. (shrink)

According to standard versions of reason-responsiveness agents are fit to be held responsible for a failure to act as reasons require when they had the capacity to act in that way, there were no excuses available to hinder the exercise of that capacity, and still they failed to exercise it. But this analysis suggests that such a failure has to be a fluke that is due to sheer chance or an unknown glitch. And in that case there is no obvious (...) reason to blame the agent for the failure. This chapter seeks to recast the reason-responsiveness approach so that it can deal with this crucial problem. (shrink)

If consciousness is "the hard problem" in mind science -- explaining how the amazing private world of consciousness emerges from neuronal activity -- then "the really hard problem," writes Owen Flanagan in this provocative book, is explaining how meaning is possible in the material world. How can we make sense of the magic and mystery of life naturalistically, without an appeal to the supernatural? How do we say truthful and enchanting things about being human if we (...) accept the fact that we are finite material beings living in a material world, or, in Flanagan's description, short-lived pieces of organized cells and tissue? Flanagan's answer is both naturalistic and enchanting. We all wish to live in a meaningful way, to live a life that really matters, to flourish, to achieve _eudaimonia_ -- to be a "happy spirit." Flanagan calls his "empirical-normative" inquiry into the nature, causes, and conditions of human flourishing _eudaimonics_. _Eudaimonics_, systematic philosophical investigation that is continuous with science, is the naturalist's response to those who say that science has robbed the world of the meaning that fantastical, wishful stories once provided. Flanagan draws on philosophy, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and psychology, as well as on transformative mindfulness and self-cultivation practices that come from such nontheistic spiritual traditions as Buddhism, Confucianism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism, in his quest. He gathers from these disciplines knowledge that will help us understand the nature, causes, and constituents of well-being and advance human flourishing. _Eudaimonics_ can help us find out how to make a difference, how to contribute to the accumulation of good effects -- how to live a meaningful life. (shrink)

Purpose: The main purpose of this article is to show that the paradigm of viewing the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness in analytic philosophy makes it a pseudo-problem rather than a ‘hard problem’. The objectives of this research included showing the reasons for the authors’ thesis, demonstrating the irreducibility of consciousness as a special layer of reality, and proposing a way to overcome these difficulties. Design/methodology/approach: In this article, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is (...) viewed from the standpoints of the transcendental-phenomenological and dialectical approaches and is analyzed through the prism of the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty. Findings: It is shown that the way of formulating the ‘hard problem’ in the analytical philosophical tradition inevitably makes it a pseudo-problem. At the same time, with the consistent realization of the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty, the antinomy of solutions to the problems of consciousness is eliminated, which opens up a way to a productive solution of problems related to the interpretation of consciousness both in natural sciences and in philosophy. Originality/value : This research reveals the methodological potential of applying the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty to the problems that arise in modern philosophy in connection with the achievements of natural sciences. (shrink)

Where the old objectivity question asked, Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects? One response to this question is the strong objectivity program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing (...) our ability to block might makes right in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness, first articulated by David Chalmers in 1995, has remained one of philosophy's most intractable puzzles. Despite decades of intensive research and theoretical development, no existing framework has successfully bridged the explanatory gap between objective physical processes and subjective conscious experience. This thesis presents a revolutionary new approach called "Experiential Realism" that dissolves rather than solves the hard problem by reconceptualizing the fundamental nature of reality itself. -/- Experiential Realism proposes that experience, (...) not matter or mind, constitutes the fundamental ontological category from which both physical and mental descriptions are complementary abstractions. This framework avoids the traditional physical/mental dichotomy that creates the explanatory gap, instead positing that what we call "physical processes" are mathematical descriptions of experiential relationships, while "mental phenomena" are higher-order patterns of experiential integration. -/- The theory makes several testable predictions about consciousness and neural integration, provides a unified foundation for all sciences, and successfully addresses the major objections that have plagued competing theories. Unlike physicalism, it explains subjective experience without reduction; unlike dualism, it maintains causal efficacy and scientific unity; unlike panpsychism, it solves the combination problem through a novel account of experiential integration. -/- This work demonstrates that the hard problem arises from false philosophical assumptions rather than genuine metaphysical mysteries, and that consciousness can be understood as a natural phenomenon within a properly conceived scientific worldview. The implications extend beyond philosophy of mind to neuroscience, artificial intelligence, ethics, and our fundamental understanding of reality itself. (shrink)

Offers managers new tools to deal with the tough problems businesses face today. Reveals how analyzing the ethical dimensions of problems actually offers competitive advantages. Offers illustrative case examples from internally recognized companies showing that high ethics and high profits go hand in hand--and identifies the factors responsible for these companies' success.

Though widely discussed, the hard problem of consciousness (‘the hard problem’ hereafter) is surprisingly difficult to pin down. In fact, one may see that not just a couple of plausible conceptions of the problem exist but rather four do. After providing some background for the hard problem, I present and clarify these four conceptions of it. I close by providing some key considerations for and against each of the four conceptions without passing final (...) judgment on any of them. Ultimately, though, we do need to come to a resolution in so far as one is possible. (shrink)

The world is its own best model (Brooks, 1989)! Or at least it is for Brooks’ behavior-based robots. Robots such as Herbert, whose task consisted in stealing empty soda cans from offices and Baxter, whose task was to interact with human beings in a factory environment, prove that complex behavior can be achieved without any inner representation of the world. If we believe Hutto and Myin (2013), we human beings are not too different from Herbert or Baxter. Our behavior can (...) be explained without assuming that we mentally represent our world. In this paper, I want to show evidence against this claim based on empirical data. Although certain aspects of our behavior can be understood without assuming internal representation of the world, most of our actions and how we store interactions with the world strongly suggest internal representation. This claim will be based on the following empirical evidence: non-linguistically based spreading activation (Barr et al., 2014), object recognition (Banich & Compton, 2018), agnosia (Banich & Compton, 2018) and visual reconstruction (UC Berkeley, 2011). I will, furthermore, extend this theory and argue for human beings being different in knowledge acquisition to behavior-based robots due to the nature of our memory. While behavior-based robots do not need to represent the world, we human beings have to represent the world in a specific manner to be able to interact with the world. The knowledge we acquire is mainly based on our inner representation of the world. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to consciousness (Chalmers 1995). Regardless of many attempts to solve the problem, there is still no commonly agreed solution. It is thus very likely that some radically new ideas are required if we are to make any progress. In this paper we turn to quantum theory to find out whether it has anything to offer in our attempts to understand (...) the place of mind and conscious experience in nature. In particular we will be focusing on the ontological interpretation of quantum theory proposed by Bohm and Hiley (1987, 1993), its further development by Hiley (Hiley and Callaghan 2012; Hiley, Dennis and de Gosson 2021), and its philosophical interpretation by Pylkkänen (2007, 2020). The ontological interpretation makes the radical proposal that quantum reality includes a new type of potential energy which contains active information. This proposal, if correct, constitutes a major change in our notion of matter. We are used to having in physics only mechanical concepts, such as position, momentum and force. Our intuition that it is not possible to understand how and why physical processes can give rise to consciousness is partly the result of our assuming that physical processes (including neurophysiological processes) are always mechanical. If, however, we are willing to change our view of physical reality by allowing non-mechanical, organic and holistic concepts such as active information to play a fundamental role, this, we argue, makes it possible to understand the relationship between physical and mental processes in a new way. It might even be a step toward solving the hard problem. (shrink)

This article argues that the contemporary debate surrounding the hard problem of consciousness confirms Lev Shestov’s structural critique of rationalist philosophy. First, it shows that the hard problem should not be understood as a merely recent technical difficulty within analytic philosophy, but as a new configuration of a much older conflict between rational explanation and lived experience—a conflict Shestov articulated through the opposition between the “tree of knowledge” and the “tree of life.” Second, it contends that (...) contemporary responses to the knowledge argument, especially eliminativist tendencies within physicalism, bring into sharp relief the tensions Shestov diagnosed in systems governed by the demand for necessity and explanatory closure. Far from offering a technical solution, Shestov provides a philosophical framework that illuminates the metaphysical stakes of current debates over consciousness and challenges the assumption that reality must be exhaustively subsumed under a unified theory of everything. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness has resisted solution for over three decades, with existing theories failing to bridge the explanatory gap between objective physical processes and subjective experience. This thesis presents Processual Experiential Realism (PER), a novel metaphysical framework that dissolves the hard problem through mathematical precision and empirical testability. Unlike previous approaches, PER makes experience itself fundamental while avoiding the ambiguities that have plagued earlier theories. -/- PER introduces Primary Experiential Processes (PEPs) as the basic (...) constituents of reality, characterized by temporal extension, qualitative valence vectors, selective integration functions, and causal projection capabilities. Consciousness emerges when Integration Complexity IC(S) = H(S) × C(S) × T(S) exceeds a critical threshold θc, where H represents Shannon entropy, C measures connectivity, and T quantifies temporal coherence. -/- The framework addresses critical weaknesses in existing theories: it provides precise operational definitions that eliminate conceptual ambiguity, maintains explanatory differentiation without category collapse, offers falsifiable empirical predictions, and solves the causal exclusion problem through a unified ontology. PER distinguishes itself from neutral monism by specifying the nature of fundamental reality, from panpsychism by locating consciousness in integration rather than fundamental particles, and from process philosophy by providing mathematical formalization and testability criteria. -/- Empirical predictions include specific correlations between neural connectivity measures and consciousness levels, testable interventions using optogenetics and brain stimulation, and novel architectures for artificial consciousness. The theory generates immediate research programs in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and quantum mechanics while providing practical applications for clinical diagnosis, AI development, and ethical frameworks. -/- This work demonstrates that consciousness can be understood scientifically through a properly formulated metaphysical foundation that takes experience seriously while maintaining rigorous empirical standards. The implications extend beyond consciousness studies to fundamental questions about the nature of reality, causation, and the unity of science. (shrink)

Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem provides a rich source of reflection on the question of meaning and ethics within the context of philosophical naturalism. I affirm the title's claim that the quest to find meaning in a purely physical universe is indeed a hard problem by addressing three issues: Flanagan's claim that there can be a scientific/empirical theory of ethics (eudaimonics), that ethics requires moral glue, and whether, in the end, Flanagan solves the hard (...) problem. I suggest that he does not, although he provides much that is of importance and useful for further reflection along the way. (shrink)

OPINION IS DIVIDED as to whether the "qualitative characters" or "qualia" of conscious sensory experiences such as color perceptions and pain sensations genuinely constitute a major obstacle to the success or tenability of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. Do the enormous complexities of human brain activity--conceived more or less as we now conceive it--alone suffice to account for our conscious sensory experiences, and thereby show how the experiences are nothing over and above the brain activities, or must there be some (...) further kind of thing, if we are to account for the existence of our kind of consciousness? This issue, representing perhaps the most profound division of opinion in contemporary philosophy of mind, cannot possibly reach a genuine resolution in the absence of a satisfactory answer to a question which has suffered astonishing neglect in the extensive debate on this issue: What exactly is the qualitative character of a conscious sensory experience? What exactly is it about color perception, for example, that makes it so distinctive in a "qualitative" respect, allegedly making trouble for contemporary theories of mind? (shrink)

This paper describes semantic communication as an arbitrary loss function. I reject the logical approach to semantic information theory described by Carnap, Bar-Hillel and Floridi, which assumes that semantic information is a logical function of Shannon information mixed with categorical objects. Instead, I follow Hirotugu Akaike’s maximum entropy approach to model semantic communication as a choice of loss. The semantic relationship between a thing and a message about the thing is modelled as the loss of information that results in the (...) impression contained in the message, so that the semantic meaning of a bear’s footprint is the difference between the actual bear and its footprint. Experience has a critical function in semantic meaning because a bear footprint can only be meaningful if we have some experience with an actual bear. The more direct our experience, the more vivid the footprint will appear. In this model, what is important is not the logic of the categories represented by the information but the loss of information that reduces our experiences of reality to functional communication. The hard problem of semantic communication arises because real objects and events do not come with categorical labels attached, so the choice of loss is necessarily imperfect and illogical. (shrink)

Two decades in, whether we are making any progress towards solving, or even explaining away, what David Chalmers calls the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness is as controversial as ever. This paper aims to argue that there are, in actual fact, two explanatory targets associated with the hard problem. Moreover, this in turn has repercussions for how we assess the explanatory merits of any proposed solution to the problem. The paper ends with a brief exposition of (...) how the present distinction goes beyond similar ones already made by respondents to Joseph Levine's explanatory gap. (shrink)

I examine several leading neuronal accounts of binding and conclude that, while those neuronal accounts might be necessary in some important senses (e.g., when it comes to error minimization), they fail to provide satisfying solutions to the hard problems of unified experience. I then present a new, testable hypothesis called emergent subject dualism to account for the unity of experience across modalities of the brain.

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the "mind" side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be (...) considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self . A "master template" of these various phenomena, culled from over one-hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the "mind" side of the brain-mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the "hard problem," or how the mind-side can be integrated with the brain-side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content (...) as an ensemble of reasons against naturalistic accounts of content. In a nutshell, it states that covariance relations—even though they are naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do not constitute content. The authors exploit this move in order to promote their preferred radical enactivist and anti-representationalist option, according to which, basic minds—the lower stratum of cognition—do not involve content. Although it is controversial to argue that the Hard Problem of Content effectively dismisses naturalistic theories of representation, a central aspect of it—the idea that information as covariance does not suffice to explain content—finds support among the defenders of classical cognitive representationalism, such as Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with the acknowledgment this remark about covariance is a point already made by Sellars in his criticism of the Myth of the Given—has a number of interesting implications. Not only is it of interest for the debates about representationalism in cognitive science, where it can be understood as an anticipatory move, but it also offers some clues and insights for reconsidering some issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts of representation that is often assumed in cognitive science, a distinction between two types of relevant normativities, and a reconsideration of the naturalism involved in such explanations. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness concerns the challenge of explaining how and why physical brain processes give rise to rich qualitative and subjective experiences. In this paper, I introduce an empirical account of aesthetic experience developed by neuroaesthetics researchers that characterizes aesthetic experiences as sensory hedonic valuations. I argue that this neuroscientific account of aesthetic experience, given its qualitative and evaluative character, mirrors or is fungible with the properties typically attributed to phenomenal consciousness. Accordingly, the hard (...) class='Hi'>problem of consciousness can also be framed as the hard problem of aesthetic experiences (or sensory hedonic valuations). However, I ultimately argue that once phenomenal consciousness is aligned with this neuroscientific account of aesthetic experience (or sensory hedonic valuations), the hard problem of consciousness dissolves into a tractable easy problem. I defend this position on the grounds that the neuroaesthetic framework provides empirically grounded hypotheses concerning both how qualitative experiences arise and why they occur in the first place. (shrink)

Might the seat of conscious experience exist in 'prototime', a conjectured aspatial, quasi-temporal reality out of which space-time emerges? Schneider and Bailey argue that if space-time is emergent, this might help us to understand the place of consciousness in the physical world. Although I agree that their hypothesis suggests a possible solution to the 'hard problem' of consciousness — the challenge of explaining how consciousness arises from particles and processes that are themselves non-conscious — I argue that a (...) timeless rather than prototemporal reality may offer a similar explanatory role. I also consider whether the lesson we should draw from the possibility of emergent space-time is not that consciousness may be a fundamental element of prototime, as Schneider and Bailey see it, but rather that the apparent incomprehensibility of one phenomenon's emergence from another should not lead us to conclude that such emergence is impossible. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: In his keynote paper David Chalmers defines ‘the hard problem’ by posing certain ‘Why’ questions about consciousness? Such questions must be posed within an appropriate setting. The way of science is to try to deduce the answer to many such questions from a few well defined assumptions. Much about nature can be explained in terms of the principles of classical mechanics. The assumptions, in this explanatory scheme, are that the world is composed exclusively of particles and (...) fields governed by specified mathematical laws that refer neither to any individual person, nor to anyone’s experiences. These physical laws are supposed to be such that particles and fields, acting in concert, can form causally efficacious real functional entities such as driveshafts and propellers. Similarly, surges of electrical and mechanical activity in appropriately designed material substrates, composed of particles and fields acting in concert, could implement, in the world of matter, complex functional structures and long sequences of logical operations. Thus it is conceivable that all of our behaviour, and all of the internal processing that occurs in our bodies and brains could be deduced, at least in principle, from the principles of classical mechanics and appropriate boundary conditions. -/- Contents: 1. Introduction: Philosophical Setting 2. Quantum Model of the Mind/Brain 3. Person and Self 4. Meeting Baars's Criteria for Consciousness 5. Qualia 6. Free-Will. (shrink)

This note calls attention to the fact that efficient causes – the sort of cause that changes something or makes something happen – can play no constitutive role in the immediate, cognitively conscious relation between cognitive subject and a cognit-ive object. It notes that: (1) it is a necessary condition for an efficient causal relation that it alter its relata; and (2) it is a necessary condition for a conscious cognitive relat-ion that it does not alter its relata. This has (...) important implication for the theories of knowledge and consciousness, the “Hard Problem,” and related puzzles. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of determining the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and the brain. The problem is hard because there are strong independent arguments, respectively, pushing toward and against the view that consciousness is entirely physical. Physicalism is an elegant view of reality which seems to be the best metaphysics of science and is supported by the causal closure argument concerning the causal role of mentality in the physical world. Yet it (...) seems that a complete scientific account of consciousness, which would explain why it arises and allow anyone with enough scientific knowledge to infer all of its features, is impossible. Russellian physicalism has been proposed as a way out of this impasse. This view posits nonmental categorical properties which are both left out of science and which are necessary to ground consciousness and, in this way, seems to satisfy the motivations of both physicalists and nonphysicalists. If Russellian physicalism is coherent and can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, then the hard problem is solved, since nonphysicalist options could be taken off the table in favor of only considering Russellian physicalism (which satisfies nonphysicalist intuitions) or some sort of physicalist error theory (which explains why nonphysicalist intuitions are misguided). Here, I will defend this position and argue that Russellian physicalism can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, including intuitions underlying standard antiphysicalist epistemic arguments and intuitions underlying the “no-gap” argument concerning indeterminacy of consciousness. I will also argue that other nonphysicalist intuitions are not philosophically serious. (shrink)

SummaryPhilosophic questions about the adequacy of our prevailing Western conceptions of rationality have emerged from the growing recognition that one cannot simply “add women” as objects of knowledge to the existing bodies of our social and natural knowledge. Recent research in psychology and in moral development theory suggests that our understandings of the rationality of human activity are distorted and obscured by systematically identifying as universally desireable, as Human goals, conceptions of the self, others, and the appropriate relationships between the (...) two which are distinctively masculine. The essay suggests some implications of these research findings for the ways philosophers think about “the problems of philosophy”, moral theory, the role of formality and abstractness, and the “rational reconstructions” of the history of science.RésuméDes questions philosophiques se sont posées, a propos de ľadéquation de nos conceptions occidentales courantes de la rationalité, du fait de la reconnaissance qu'on ne peut pas simplement ajouter les femmes comme objets de connaissance aux corpus existants de notre connais‐sance sociale et naturelle. Des recherches récentes en psychologie et en théorie du développement moral suggèrent que notre comprèhension de la rationalité de ľactivité humaine est déformee et obscurcie par une identification systématique, comme universellement désirables, comme buts de ľhumanité, des conceptions de soi, des autres et des relations entre les deux qui sont distincte‐ment masculines. Cet essai suggère quelques applications de ces resultats de recherche quant à la maniere dont les philosophes pensent les problèmes de la philosophies la morale, le rôle du formel et de ľabstrait et les reconstuctions rationnelles de ľhistoire de la science.ZusammenfassungPhilosophische Fragen ïber die Angemessenheit unserer vorherrschenden Auffassungen von Rationalität im Westen sind durch die wachsende Einsicht entstanden, dass man nicht einfach Frauen als Objekte dem bestehenden Korpus unserer Sozial‐ und Naturwissenschaften hinzufügen kann. Neuere Forschungen in Psychologie und Theorien der moralischen Entwicklung legen nahe, dass unser Verstandnis der Rationalität von menschlichen Handlungen dadurch verzerrl und verdunkelt wird, dass systematische Auffassungen vom Selbst, den andern und den unter ihnen angebrachten Beziehungen als allgemein wünschbare Ziele anerkannt werden, die spezi‐fisch männlich sind. Es werden einige Implikationen dieser Forschungen t'iir die Art, wie Philoso‐phen über die Probleme der Philosophie denken, aufgezeigt – u.a. in bezug auf die Theorie der Moral, die Rolle der Formalisierung und Abstraktion, und die rationalen Rekonstruktionen der Geschichte der Wissenschaft. (shrink)