Rationality-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge

In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...) think premises together is to attribute those very thoughts to one and the same self. The ability to reason depends on the ability to attribute the thoughts from which one reasons to oneself. Reasoning—at least the sort of reasoning that we do—requires de se thought. (shrink)

Abstract: According to a rationalist theory of introspection, rational agents have a capacity to believe they are in conscious states when they are in them, much as they have the capacity, for example, to avoid obvious contradictions in their beliefs. For the agent to know or believe by introspection, on this view, is for them to exercise that capacity. According to an acquaintance theory of introspection, by contrast, whenever an agent is in a conscious state, the agent is aware of (...) or is acquainted with being in the state, where the background notion of acquaintance is understood to be distinct from sense perception, on the one hand, and belief or knowledge, or the other. For the agent to know or believe by introspection, on this view, is for them to take advantage of the epistemic position they occupy in virtue of being acquainted in this way. These theories are not in conflict; it is possible to hold both an acquaintance theory and a rationalist theory. This paper, however, sets out and recommends a different possibility, namely, that of holding a rationalist theory while rejecting any acquaintance theory. (shrink)

In recent epistemology, introspection principles are commonly rejected. One of the central reasons for this is the adoption of Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments (1996, 2000) and the popularity of the associated epistemic externalist position. This rejection, however, comes with theoretical costs concerning the applications of introspection principles in epistemic and doxastic logic and modeling cooperative behavior. In this paper, I provide a way to solve this dilemma by arguing that the principle KB – expressing one’s privileged knowledge of their beliefs – (...) remains unscathed by Williamson’s argument while saving the important theoretical applications introspective principles are used for. I propose a way of justifying KB and rejecting KK on principled grounds using Byrne’s (Byrne, A. (2005). ‘Introspection.’ Philosophical Topics 33(1), 79–104., Byrne, A. (2018). Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) transparency account of introspection, improving upon a previous attempt by Das and Salow (Das, N. and Salow, B. (2018). ‘Transparency and the KK Principle.’ Noûs 52(1), 3–23.). This defense of KB, unlike many in the literature, is consistent with epistemic externalism and allows one to reject the problematic KK principle and maintain that non-introspective knowledge is guided by Williamson’s margin-for-error principle. (shrink)

Donald Davidson routinely argued that a certain principle of charity necessarily governs our interpretive activities. The principle implies that successful interpretation culminates in at least some understanding of one another, since successfully abiding by the principle not only culminates in correctly and justifiably attributing attitudes to one another but, also, in seeing those attitudes as constituting a subjectively rational point of view. And yet Davidson also argued that interpreters are not generally in the position of needing to interpret their own (...) attitudes. Granting this, how might _self_-understanding generally arise, and what importance might self-understanding hold for us? I argue that non-interpretive self-understanding plays a key role in fortifying our first-person authority against interpersonal challenges, and that we might explain its origins by adapting certain theories from contemporary discussions of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Might artificial intelligence (AI) be highly reliable, now or in the conceivable future, at detecting your current attitudes, such as your beliefs and desires? If so, should people listen to you, or to AI, when trying to know your attitudes? The latter possibility threatens our long-standing practices of regarding each person as the ultimate authority about her attitudes. Disquieting as this threat may seem, I argue that it will not come to pass, at least when it comes to those attitudes (...) that you determine for yourself through your judgements about what is true, desirable, or worthy of pursuit. This is because AI cannot determine your attitudes for you in this way, and because this capacity for attitudinal self-determination grounds your authority over these attitudes. (shrink)

The problem of other minds remains one of the central and most persistent challenges in philosophy of mind, raising the question of how we can reasonably justify the belief that other human beings, apart from ourselves, possess conscious experiences. Traditional explanations, such as analogical reasoning and behaviourist approaches, have attempted to answer this challenge, yet none has fully resolved the scepticism attached to it. In this paper, we introduce a biological perspective designated as The Twin Analogy. This analogy takes its (...) foundation from the case of biological twins who, though separated as distinct beings at birth, share the same organs, body structure, and genetic basis. From this shared biological foundation, it becomes rational to infer that if one twin possesses a mind, the other must also possess one. Such a move provides a biological ground for attributing mindedness beyond the self. The analogy is not intended merely as a thought experiment but as a practical framework for wider debates in philosophy of mind, with implications for artificial intelligence, intersubjectivity, and moral philosophy. (shrink)

A psychological sentence is commonly understood as representing a mental fact. This paper offers an alternative and argues that saying “Someone S is in a mental state M” is saying “There are some circumstances C such that S is in C, and it is rational for anyone in C to behave in a certain way.” To argue for this alternative, the paper appeals to the Sellarsian philosophy of mind but transforms it with a rationality key. Wilfrid Sellars’s view is commonly (...) taken as one of the earliest attempts at today’s so-called Theory Theory view of mentality attributions because Sellars understands our mentality as a theoretical posit. Since the view is unsatisfactory in many ways, the paper argues that (1) we do not have to treat Sellars as a proponent of Theory Theory, and (2) we can appeal to rational relations rather than theories to understand mentality attributions. More specifically, the paper shows how the alternative can be defended for both the phenomenal and intentional types of mentality and how some challenges can be met. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the idea that you can know by introspection not only that you are in a conscious state, but why you are, that is, what inferences or transitions you perform in arriving at it. Nisbett and Wilson argued empirically for a negative answer to this question. The chapter defends an interpretation of their observation on which it entails that most inferences are unconscious, and so are unavailable to introspection. It argues that the rationalist account may accommodate this (...) by assuming that introspectable inferences are conscious, when they are, in a higher-order sense—an assumption consistent with the view that conscious inferences are unusual. (shrink)

This chapter completes the introduction of the rationalist account by contrasting it with the traditional perceptual or inner sense approach to introspection. The chapter summarizes and endorses Shoemaker’s well-known critique of this approach. It points out that rivals to the rationalist account, whether they are versions of inner sense or not, fall into two camps: some accept it but add unnecessary elements; others don’t accept it but are in consequence implausible. The chapter also distinguishes unmediated from mediated introspection and rejects (...) the common idea that there should be multiple theories of introspection. (shrink)

This chapter completes the presentation of the nominal definition by outlining a correlative definition of a conscious state. On this definition, a psychological state is conscious if and only if it has enough of the following features: phenomenal character, awareness, attention, cerebral celebrity, and poise. This inclusive definition (as the chapter calls it) is contrasted with better-known exclusive notions such as phenomenal, higher-order, and access definitions. The chapter argues that the inclusive notion is the one operant in the nominal definition (...) of introspection, but notes that different theories of introspection may adopt exclusive notions if it suits their purposes. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the transparency problem associated with Evans. It defends an interpretation of Evans’s transparency observation on which it entails that, in coming to know by introspection that you are in a psychological state, you attend to the content of the state. It shows that the rationalist account may accommodate this observation if we refine the notion of a conscious state with which the account operates; in particular, if we assume that virtually all introspectable states are access conscious. (...) The chapter contrasts this approach to transparency with alternatives due to Moran and Byrne. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on another well-known approach to introspection, the simple account defended by Smithies, Peacocke, and others. This is founded on (what I call) the truth principle: that merely being in a conscious state puts you in a position to hold the justified belief that you are in the state. The chapter argues that, while the simple account is consistent with the rationalist account, there is no reason to combine them, since the truth principle is implausible and unmotivated. It (...) then argues that despite appearances, the introspection principle does not entail the truth principle, since the former is a wide scope, rather than a narrow scope, rational principle. (shrink)

What is introspection and how is it different from other sources of knowledge such as memory, perception, and inference? This book offers a novel philosophical picture of introspection on which rational subjects are disposed to form beliefs about their own conscious states much as they are disposed to believe the obvious consequences of their beliefs, to form beliefs in response to the way they perceive the world around them, and to act in accordance with their beliefs; to introspect on this (...) picture just is to form beliefs about conscious states in this way. The book sets out this rationalist account in detail, formulating it in terms of a proposed principle of rationality, the introspection principle. It explores several ways to interpret the principle, examines the notion of consciousness on which it relies, discusses its relation to other and better-known principles of rationality, and shows how an approach to introspection based on the principle improves on influential alternatives, such as inner sense, acquaintance, inferentialist, and constitutivist theories. It also applies the rationalist account to thirteen major problems of introspection drawn from a wide analysis of the literatures in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and cognitive science; these include issues of evidence, transparency, diaphanousness, necessity, privileged access, luminosity, negative introspection, externalism, reasoning, revelation, and the self. The overall result is a systematic presentation of a new approach to introspection that greatly illuminates our understanding of consciousness, rationality, and self-knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the evidence problem (aka ‘scepticism about the internal world’) associated with Dretske; the first of the thirteen problems discussed in the rest of the book. The chapter argues that the rationalist account may solve the problem by implementing a distinction between evidence for a belief, on the one hand, and warrant for a belief, on the other. The chapter shows that the underlying issues can be formulated not simply in terms of knowledge but also related notions (...) such as justified belief, being in a position to know, and being in a position to form a justified belief. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the anti-luminosity argument due to Williamson. The chapter draws a distinction between two notions of luminosity: exceptionless luminosity, which is the notion at issue in the anti-luminosity argument, and generic luminosity, which is a weaker notion obtained by treating the quantifier over situations present in the definition of luminosity as a generic quantifier. The chapter shows that the rationalist account is committed only to generic luminosity and so is not in the target range of the anti-luminosity (...) argument. It also applies related considerations to the problem of the speckled hen. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on a central idea in any philosophical discussion of introspection: privileged access. The chapter follows Byrne in distinguishing two theses associated with this idea: the view that introspection is different from perception or inference in some relevant respect (the different from thesis) and the view that introspection is better than perception or inference in some relevant respect (the better than thesis). The chapter explains how the rationalist account endorses the different from thesis but rejects the better than (...) thesis. It also outlines several possibilities of introspective error and ignorance. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the alleged incompatibility between introspective knowledge, on the one hand, and externalism in the philosophy of mind on the other. The chapter sets out the central way to motivate the incompatibility due to McKinsey. According to McKinsey, the conjunction of externalism and the thesis that you can know things by introspection leads to the absurd conclusion that you can know ordinary empirical claims—for example, that there is water in the bathtub—using only introspection supplemented with a priori (...) reasoning. The chapter argues that McKinsey goes wrong in assuming that externalism is a priori and necessary, when in fact it is a posteriori and contingent, since it depends on empirical laws. The chapter also suggests that, unlike some other approaches to introspection, the rationalist account is consistent both with externalism and internalism. (shrink)

This chapter introduces a nominal definition of introspection that articulates what the theories of introspection we will consider are theories of. On this definition, introspection is that distinctive way that we come to know or reasonably believe that we are in psychological states that are conscious. The chapter outlines key elements of this definition (save for the notion of a conscious state, which is discussed in Chapter 2); for example, the definition represents introspection as a source of knowledge different from (...) ordinary perception and inference, and a source of de se psychological knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the most popular approach to introspection in contemporary philosophy, the acquaintance account defended by Nida-Rümelin, Kriegel, Giustina, and others. This says that if you are in a conscious state, you are acquainted in a special way with the state; introspective belief is belief that takes advantage of this sort of acquaintance. The chapter argues that the acquaintance account is implausible on three counts: it places an untenable restriction on the class of psychological states that are introspectable; (...) it violates an attractive epistemic "'ought' implies 'can'" principle; and the arguments for it are unpersuasive. The chapter concludes that, while the acquaintance account is consistent with the rationalist account, there is no reason to combine them, and much reason not to. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the idea that you can know by introspection not only that you are in conscious states, but that you exist. Descartes says you can if you use cogito reasoning. Hume says you can’t. The chapter argues you can agree with both—if the rationalist account is true. The rationalist account vindicates cogito reasoning but can accept Hume’s view if that is interpreted as denying acquaintance with the self. The chapter also rejects the view, defended by Cassam, that (...) introspective knowledge of the self of this sort is objectionably trivial rather than substantial. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the idea that you can know by introspection not only that you are in a conscious state, but what its properties are. A famous thesis in philosophy of mind, known as revelation, is an extreme version of this idea: you can know by introspection the essence of conscious states. The chapter argues that revelation is subject to counterexamples, but weaker more defensible theses could in principle be combined with the rationalist account. The chapter uses these results (...) to reject another famous thesis in philosophy of mind, the illusionism of Kammerer and Frankish. (shrink)

In contemporary literature, the author most responsible for putting the rationalist account of introspection on the agenda was Sydney Shoemaker, who defended a version of it in a series of papers published mostly in 1980s and 1990s. While Shoemaker’s account is attractive in several ways, it also confronts a variety of difficulties. This chapter contrasts Shoemaker’s version of the rationalist approach with a different one that, while in the spirit of what he says, avoids its problems. The central difference is (...) that, on the alternative view, introspective belief is primarily understood as a manifestation of a rational disposition, and not, as in Shoemaker’s view, something necessitated in part by the property of being rational. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on an idea emphasized by Sosa and others: that you can know by introspection not only (e.g.) that you are in pain, but that you’re not. The chapter sets out four strategies for explaining negative introspection (as we may call it) within the rationalist account, endorsing the last. This strategy appeals to second-order states, in particular, the state of being in some total conscious state that does not include pain. It says (roughly) that not only should you (...) believe you are in pain if you are, but you should also believe you are not in pain if you are in this second-order state. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on a third well-known approach, Shoemaker’s constitutivism. While Shoemaker is most responsible for connecting rationality and introspection, his account is different from, and less plausible than, our own. For us, introspective belief is primarily understood as a manifestation of a rational disposition; for Shoemaker, it is primarily understood as something metaphysically necessitated, at least in part, by the property of being rational. Underlying this contrast is a more basic issue: on the rationalist account, the necessary connection between (...) conscious states and introspective beliefs is a species of normative, rather than merely natural or metaphysical, necessity. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the theory of introspection to be defended in the book, the rationalist account. This account is best formulated in terms of the titular introspection principle: if you are in a conscious state, you should believe that you are, other things being equal and given background conditions. With respect to this principle, the rationalist account says, first, that the introspection principle is a principle of rationality, and second, that you have a capacity to introspect if and only if (...) you abide by the principle. The chapter shows how this approach conforms to, and is an application of, a general view of rationality common in the literature; the main difference is that it focuses on how agents should respond to conscious states, rather than how they should respond to beliefs, perceptions, or desires. The chapter compares the introspection principle with other principles of rationality. It also sets out and provides answers to twenty initial questions that might be raised for the rationalist account. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the diaphanousness problem associated with Moore. It defends an interpretation of Moore’s diaphanousness observation on which it entails that, in coming to know by introspection that you are in a psychological state, you do not attend to the state itself. It shows that the rationalist account may accommodate this observation too by assuming that virtually all introspectable states are access conscious. It also argues that well-known objections to diaphanousness misconstrue the notion of the content of a (...) state; it focuses on examples of blur (discussed by Smith, Chalmers, and Gow, among others) and identity crowding (discussed by Block). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the comparison between two approaches usually employed to demonstrate the irrationality of Moore-paradoxical beliefs: (1) the introspectionist strategy, which locates its source in the failure of self-knowledge, and (2) the self-defeat strategy, which appeals to the fact that Moorean sentences cannot be both true and believed. I also introduce two criteria of choice: (1) ‘Generality’, which captures the idea that the proposed explanation should account for the rational unbelievability of all sentences we can intuitively classify (...) as Moorean, and (2) ‘Doxastic Innocence’, which states that the preferred solution should make the weakest possible assumptions about epistemic rationality to meet the generality condition. I then demonstrate that we cannot show that two types of Moore-paradoxical sentences—anti-expertise equivalences and iterated Moorean conjunctions—are irrational given the self-defeat strategy’s implicit commitments vis-à-vis its picture of rationality. The introspectionist can, however, account for the rational unbelievability of these types of sentences by appealing to the “positive introspection” principle BB. I conclude that the introspectionist strategy has better prospects than the self-defeat strategy, as it allows for a more widely generalizable and uniform approach to epistemic and doxastic paradoxes. (shrink)

Andreotta and Winokur provide an overview of “transparency-theoretic” approaches to self-knowledge, drawing largely on the formative influences of Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, and their critical interlocutors. Transparency-theoretic accounts of self-knowledge state that one must, or can, look outward at the world in order to know something about one’s mind (and perhaps other aspects of oneself). Some traditional objections and limitations for transparency-theoretic accounts of self-knowledge are identified. Subsequently a brief overview of the 13 chapters in this volume are provided, each (...) of which scrutinize, clarify, or expand upon key aspects of transparent self-knowledge. (shrink)

This volume presents new perspectives on transparency-theoretic approaches to self-knowledge. It addresses many under-explored dimensions of transparency theories and considers their wider implications for epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. It is natural to think that self-knowledge is gained through introspection, whereby we somehow peer inward and detect our mental states. However, so-called transparency theories emphasize our capacity to peer outward at the world, hence beyond our minds, in the pursuit of self-knowledge. For all their popularity in recent decades, transparency (...) theories have also met with myriad challenges. The chapters in this volume seek to forge new ground in debates about the role of transparency in self-knowledge. Some chapters deepen our understanding of key themes at the heart of transparency theories, such as the ways in which transparent self-knowledge is properly 'first-personal' or 'non-alienated'. Other chapters extend transparency theory to different kinds of mental states and phenomena such as memory, actions, social groups, credences, projection, second-order sincerity, and Moore's Paradox. New Perspectives on Transparency and Self-Knowledge will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. (shrink)

In Chapter 5 of Transparency and Reflection, Matthew Boyle examines an “anti-Egoist” challenge to my reflective knowledge that I am thinking, which says all I really know is that thinking is occurring. Boyle replies that I know something more, namely that a subject is thinking. Even so, he concedes that traditional Egoists like Descartes go too far in claiming reflective knowledge that an object is thinking. However, these comments argue that there is no stable middle ground between Cartesian Egoism and (...) Anti-Egoism. If I know that I am thinking, then I know that an object is thinking. (shrink)

Richard Moran and Matthew Boyle have objected to a variety of accounts of self-knowledge of belief on the grounds that they depict us, in possessing that knowledge, as alienated from our beliefs. The idea of alienation is meant to capture something important about the first-person perspective and to help us rule out competing accounts of self-knowledge. Moran and Boyle’s claim is that standing in a first-personal relation to one’s belief involves both knowing what one believes and occupying the perspective of (...) that belief on the world. This is the Alienation Constraint. The goal of the chapter is to provide a novel argument for it. Drawing on Shoemaker’s idea that it is impossible for a rational and conceptually competent subject to be “self-blind”, it argues that our capacity for self-knowledge must be constitutive of possession of the concept of belief, the Concept Constraint. The chapter argues that the Alienation Constraint follows from the Concept Constraint on an independently plausible understanding of the concept of belief. (shrink)

This chapter looks at the relation between Alex Byrne’s transparency theory and other accounts of self-knowledge. It argues that Byrne’s theory competes most clearly with other epistemic theories of self-knowledge such as Rylean skepticism or inner sense theories. Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge such as those proposed by Sydney Shoemaker are more easily compatible with transparency theories. Shoemaker’s argument for the necessity of self-knowledge in the process of rationally adjusting our beliefs and desires leaves open the question of how this self-knowledge (...) can be acquired. A transparency account complements Shoemaker’s argument by giving an answer to just this question. Shoemaker’s further argument about how a subject with normal cognitive and conceptual capacities could reason from first-order to second-order beliefs has certain structural similarities with Byrne’s theory. It could be seen as giving a more detailed explanation of why the transparency method is justified. Finally, as regards constitutivist accounts such as Crispin Wright’s and Tom Stoneham’s, this chapter argues that they are in need of being complemented by some theory that explains how it is that second-order beliefs are generally coherently integrated with the rest of a person’s mind. Again, a transparency theory such as Byrne’s provides just such an explanation. (shrink)

This paper begins with a problem stemming from Hume regarding credences about credences. Suppose one has a credence of .95 in p, and suppose one assesses the credence to be such. But suppose one’s second-order credence in this assessment is less than 1. Then, by a standard conditionalization rule, one’s credence in p becomes less than .95. Moreover, such “erosion” can iterate by considering one’s, third-, fourth-, fifth-order credences, etc. (In light of this, some have rejected higher-order credences; however, it (...) is argued that Lewis’ “Principal Principle” forbids this.) The paper then offers a partial solution by describing circumstances under which a person has reason to assign credence 1 to a first-order credence. The solution takes the form of a “transparency” view of self-knowledge from Parent (2017, chapter 8). Briefly, it is argued that when one “reflex-like” utters a sentence “The probability of p is n”, then as a matter of psychological law, the utterance is an expression of one’s own judgment. The Principal Principle then necessitates that one’s credence in p is n, assuming one is being rational. Thus, upon perceiving such an utterance, one can thereby have a reason to assign a second-order credence of 1. (shrink)

This dissertation provides an exploration of Moore’s Paradox, which is the philosophical puzzle (noted first by G.E. Moore) posed by sentences of the form “p, but I don’t believe that p” and “p, but I believe that ~p”. Such sentences seem infelicitous to assert and irrational to believe, even though they are meaningful and consistent – therefore, their infelicity or irrationality constitutes a philosophical puzzle and invites theorizing concerning the limits of coherent speech and thought. The dissertation aims to establish (...) theoretical ramifications for solving Moore’s Paradox both as a problem concerning assertion and belief and eventually – suggest one such solution. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

The question of how we can be certain that we have an epistemic justification for our self-knowledge has been among a central debate in philosophy of mind. The basic idea of the immunity to error through misidentification thesis (IEM) in explaining self-knowledge is that certain self-ascriptions of mental states concerning first-person content are not prone to error for the self-conscious ‘I’-thoughts. One of the accounts that supports that claim is agentialism. According to this view, we can have beliefs and intentions (...) about ourselves because we exercise agency over them. However, irrational factors such as emotional interference, inconsistent subject affiliation, and different views on the mind leading to different self-references can call this claim to the subject’s rational agency into question. This paper examines the agentialism, identifies its flaws, and presents two alternative strategies to support a rationalist account of self-knowledge—which is generally weaker than agentialism. It argues that the agential approach to self-knowledge is too demanding on the subject’s consciousness thus a more moderate approach is required to satisfy both first-person authority and the epistemic reliability of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...) be mere epiphenomena, and self-verification and self-defeat lack the broader philosophical import often claimed for them. (shrink)

This paper contributes to a debate that has arisen in the recent self-knowledge literature between agentialists and empiricists. According to agentialists, in order for one to know what one believes, desires, and intends, rational agency needs to be exercised in centrally significant cases. Empiricists disagree: while they acknowledge the importance of rationality in general, they maintain that when it comes to self- knowledge, empirical justification, or warrant, is always sufficient. In what follows, I defend agentialism. I argue that if we (...) could only come to know our judgement-sensitive attitudes in the way described by empiricism, then we would be self-estranged from them when we acquire knowledge of them. We would relate to our own attitudes as if we were watching the movies of our inner lives unfold. Given that this is not the position we typically inhabit, with respect to our judgement-sensitive attitudes, I conclude that empiricism fails. This is the self-estrangement argument against empiricism. I then consider a response that Brie Gertler, an empiricist, offers to the objection that empiricism fatally portrays us ‘mere observers of a passing cognitive show’ (2016, p. 1). I argue that her response is unsuccessful. Hence, we should endorse agentialism. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on Smithies’ views about self-knowledge. Specifically, I examine his case for the striking thesis that rational thinkers will know all their beliefs. I call this the ubiquity of self-knowledge thesis. Smithies’ case for this thesis is an important pillar of his larger project, as it bears on the nature of justification and our ability to fulfill the requirements of rationality. Section 1 outlines Smithies’ argument for the ubiquity of self-knowledge. Section 2 sets the stage for a detailed (...) explication of his view by sketching an initial objection to that argument. Sections 3 and 4 respond to that objection on behalf of Smithies’ account, elucidating the distinctive positions on belief and justification that enable this response. Sections 5-7 raise some questions, namely: whether Smithies’ views about self-knowledge of beliefs provide a genuine competitor to other philosophers’ views on that issue; whether on his account justification is truly accessible to the thinker; how his account explains self-knowledge; and what his account implies about the situation of actual persons, who are not ideally rational. (shrink)

This chapter concerns self-knowledge of our mental states, with a focus on how we know our own beliefs and intentions. It examines the agentialist approach to self-knowledge, which is driven by the idea that believing or intending on the basis of reasons is something that we DO, and hence involves agency. Agentialists maintain that, because beliefs and intentions are exercises of agency, self-knowledge of these attitudes differs fundamentally from self-knowledge of states that we simply undergo, such as sensations. Specifically, agentialists (...) claim that self-knowledge of our attitudes is linked with our identity as rational thinkers, capable of believing and intending on the basis of reasons. This chapter outlines the agentialist approach to self-knowledge, and canvasses and assesses a range of agentialist accounts of how we know our own beliefs and intentions. (shrink)

A familiar puzzle about self-deception concerns how self-deception is possible in light of the paradoxes generated by a plausible way of defining it. A less familiar puzzle concerns how a certain type of self-deception—being self-deceived about one's own intentional mental state—is possible in light of a plausible way of understanding the nature of self-knowledge. According to this understanding, we ordinarily do not infer our mental states from evidence, but then it's puzzling how this sort of self-deception could occur given that (...) self-deception arises from the mistreatment of evidence. This article argues that to accommodate this kind of self-deception we should accept that sometimes ordinary self-knowledge is inferential, but that this idea needn’t be so unappealing. In particular, by showing that such inferential self-knowledge can be both ‘transparent’ and ‘direct’, the article argues that it need not imply having an abnormal, ‘alienated’ relation to the mental state. (shrink)

Many philosophers contend that we often possess “privileged” and “peculiar” self-knowledge of our mental states. Self-knowledge is privileged insofar as it is systematically more secure than the knowledge that others have of one’s mental states, and it is peculiar insofar as it is systematically obtained in a way that is only suited for delivering self-knowledge. Focusing on privileged and peculiar self-knowledge of propositional attitudes like beliefs, I offer an account of its instrumental value. On my account, privileged and peculiar self-knowledge (...) of one’s propositional attitudes enables one to be a more efficient and reliable interpersonal reasoner. (shrink)

Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational requirements to know one's beliefs, and finds that (...) none succeed. (shrink)

According to an influential view that I call agentialism, our capacity to believe and intend directly on the basis of reasons—our rational agency—has a normative significance that distinguishes it from other kinds of agency (Bilgrami 2006, Boyle 2011, Burge 1996, Korsgaard 1996, Moran 2001). Agentialists maintain that insofar as we exercise rational agency, we bear a special kind of responsibility for our beliefs and intentions; and it is only those attitudes that represent the exercise of rational agency that are truly (...) our own. In this paper I challenge these agentialist claims. My argument centers on a case in which a thinker struggles to align her belief to her reasons, and succeeds only by resorting to non-rational methods. Because she relies on non-rational methods, this revision of her belief does not express her rational agency, in the agentialist sense. I argue that this process nevertheless expresses her capacities for rationality and agency; that she is responsible for the belief shaped through this process; and that the revised belief is truly her own. So rational agency is not distinctive in the ways that agentialists contend. (shrink)

Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...) argue that not only are these explanations of self-knowledge implausible, but Davidson himself has already rejected them. Thus, neither can be attributed to Davidson as his suggested account of self-knowledge. I will then introduce and support what I take to be Davidson’s official and independent account of self-knowledge, that is, his “Transcendental Explanation”. I will defend this view against certain potential objections and finally against the objections made by William Child. (shrink)

I argue that inference is a self-conscious act. The account appeals to the ‘being-in-mind-together’ of beliefs. Beliefs that are in mind together are subject to rationally grounded metaphysical necessity. Because one believes p, one can’t or must believe q. But what ultimately explains this sort of necessity? If it is impossible to hold a pair of mental states in mind at once and the impossibility has its source in our understanding of the necessary falsehood of a conjunction, then the subject (...) has knowledge not just of the individual states they’re in but also of their combination. What, then, is the relation between the unity of our beliefs and consciousness of this unity? My answer: the unity of the rational mind consists in the subject’s consciousness of that unity. (shrink)