Abstract

This chapter introduces the theory of introspection to be defended in the book, the rationalist account. This account is best formulated in terms of the titular introspection principle: if you are in a conscious state, you should believe that you are, other things being equal and given background conditions. With respect to this principle, the rationalist account says, first, that the introspection principle is a principle of rationality, and second, that you have a capacity to introspect if and only if you abide by the principle. The chapter shows how this approach conforms to, and is an application of, a general view of rationality common in the literature; the main difference is that it focuses on how agents should respond to conscious states, rather than how they should respond to beliefs, perceptions, or desires. The chapter compares the introspection principle with other principles of rationality. It also sets out and provides answers to twenty initial questions that might be raised for the rationalist account.