Observation-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge

The current generation of therapeutic Large Language Models (LLMs) operates under a deeply flawed paradigm. We argue that this “Oracle” model is a deceptive fiction, where a user interacts with a fictitious “conscious robot” presented as a therapeutic oracle. This creates a funhouse mirror for the user’s psyche, reflecting their fears back at them, amplified and distorted. This paper critiques this flawed paradigm and proposes a fundamental shift towards a “Scheherazade” model. Grounded in the principles of Narrative Therapy [6], this (...) new paradigm re-imagines the AI as a creative partner that helps users postpone the finality of a problem-saturated story by co-creating new narratives of survival and resilience. We introduce Luciano Floridi’s concept of Distant Writing as the ideal mechanism for this interaction, empowering users to become directors of their own stories. This new paradigm corrects the epistemic error of the old model by making the co-creation of fiction explicit and therapeutic. It is a vision for an AI that functions not as a flawed oracle, but as a wise, literary partner in the art of living. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the existence of the substantial self and argue against those, like Hume, who deny its reality.

According to some views of consciousness, when I experience the taste of mango, I also have an inner awareness of that mango-taste experience. What is this inner awareness? A common way to characterize a mental state type is in terms of its characteristic content and attitude. This is what I propose to do in this paper. I argue (a) that conscious experiences constitute the characteristic content of inner awareness, and (b) that the characteristic attitude of inner awareness is that of (...) representing-as-occurring-now-in-me this content. (shrink)

According to the perceptual theory of introspection, introspection is a kind of perception of our mental life. To evaluate the perceptual theory’s plausibility, we obviously need to know what entitles a mental phenomenon to the qualification “perceptual.” I start by arguing that this task is complicated by the fact that we really have two notions of the perceptual: a functional notion and a phenomenological notion. The heart of the chapter is an argument that even if we have no reason to (...) think that introspection is a kind of perception in the functional sense, we do have strong reasons to think it is a kind of perception in the phenomenological sense. In the phenomenological sense, I argue, two features are central to a phenomenon’s status as perceptual: its involving direct awareness of the perceived, and its taking a distinctively perceptual attitude toward it. The bulk of the chapter consists in (i) an argument from inference to the best explanation for the thesis that introspection involves direct awareness of the introspected, and (ii) a more direct argument that introspection involves an attitude almost identical to the attitude distinctive of sensory perception. The chapter then closes with responses to some of the standard objections to the perceptual theory. (shrink)

In contemporary literature, the author most responsible for putting the rationalist account of introspection on the agenda was Sydney Shoemaker, who defended a version of it in a series of papers published mostly in 1980s and 1990s. While Shoemaker’s account is attractive in several ways, it also confronts a variety of difficulties. This chapter contrasts Shoemaker’s version of the rationalist approach with a different one that, while in the spirit of what he says, avoids its problems. The central difference is (...) that, on the alternative view, introspective belief is primarily understood as a manifestation of a rational disposition, and not, as in Shoemaker’s view, something necessitated in part by the property of being rational. (shrink)

This volume presents new perspectives on transparency-theoretic approaches to self-knowledge. It addresses many under-explored dimensions of transparency theories and considers their wider implications for epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. It is natural to think that self-knowledge is gained through introspection, whereby we somehow peer inward and detect our mental states. However, so-called transparency theories emphasize our capacity to peer outward at the world, hence beyond our minds, in the pursuit of self-knowledge. For all their popularity in recent decades, transparency (...) theories have also met with myriad challenges. The chapters in this volume seek to forge new ground in debates about the role of transparency in self-knowledge. Some chapters deepen our understanding of key themes at the heart of transparency theories, such as the ways in which transparent self-knowledge is properly 'first-personal' or 'non-alienated'. Other chapters extend transparency theory to different kinds of mental states and phenomena such as memory, actions, social groups, credences, projection, second-order sincerity, and Moore's Paradox. New Perspectives on Transparency and Self-Knowledge will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. (shrink)

In Chapter 5 of Transparency and Reflection, Matthew Boyle examines an “anti-Egoist” challenge to my reflective knowledge that I am thinking, which says all I really know is that thinking is occurring. Boyle replies that I know something more, namely that a subject is thinking. Even so, he concedes that traditional Egoists like Descartes go too far in claiming reflective knowledge that an object is thinking. However, these comments argue that there is no stable middle ground between Cartesian Egoism and (...) Anti-Egoism. If I know that I am thinking, then I know that an object is thinking. (shrink)

Introspection is often conceptualized as a “purely inner” activity, whereby the introspector temporarily breaks their coupling with the external world to focus on their “inner world”. We offer a substantially different picture of introspection. Inspired by radically embodied cognitive science, we argue that introspective processes delivering substantial self-knowledge consist of embodied, world-involving activities wherein the introspector remains coupled with the world in specific, controlled ways. Our argument unfolds as follows: after a brief introduction (Sect. 1), we provide a minimal account (...) of introspection (Sect. 2) followed by a brief introduction to radically embodied views of the mind (Sect. 3). Then, in Sect. 4, we present in detail a case of radical embodied introspection (Sect. 4.1); we argue that that case is indeed a case of introspection (Sect. 4.2), and finally we defend our claim from some foreseeable objections (Sect. 4.3). In Sect. 5 we offer other examples, showing that radically embodied introspection is a widespread and varied phenomenon. Lastly, Sect. 6 concludes the paper sketching some morals to be drawn from our examples. The appendix briefly situates our view in the broader epistemological landscape. (shrink)

This chapter looks at the relation between Alex Byrne’s transparency theory and other accounts of self-knowledge. It argues that Byrne’s theory competes most clearly with other epistemic theories of self-knowledge such as Rylean skepticism or inner sense theories. Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge such as those proposed by Sydney Shoemaker are more easily compatible with transparency theories. Shoemaker’s argument for the necessity of self-knowledge in the process of rationally adjusting our beliefs and desires leaves open the question of how this self-knowledge (...) can be acquired. A transparency account complements Shoemaker’s argument by giving an answer to just this question. Shoemaker’s further argument about how a subject with normal cognitive and conceptual capacities could reason from first-order to second-order beliefs has certain structural similarities with Byrne’s theory. It could be seen as giving a more detailed explanation of why the transparency method is justified. Finally, as regards constitutivist accounts such as Crispin Wright’s and Tom Stoneham’s, this chapter argues that they are in need of being complemented by some theory that explains how it is that second-order beliefs are generally coherently integrated with the rest of a person’s mind. Again, a transparency theory such as Byrne’s provides just such an explanation. (shrink)

Maja Spener develops a greatly useful conceptual framework aimed at dissolving widespread ambiguities that have affected the debate around introspection’s reliability since its incipience. One application of this framework is to address the “problem of self-observation.” Roughly, the problem is that, whenever one tries to “observe” one’s conscious experience by focusing one’s attention on it, the very act of observation alters the experience it is supposed to target. Spener argues that the problem of self-observation is primarily a problem of scientific (...) inquiry, concerning the legitimacy of self-observation as scientific method, and that it should be addressed as such. To complement Spener’s treatment of the problem, however, I think that we also need a detailed analysis of the kind and extent of the experiential effects of self-observation as mode of introspective access—i.e., of inner attention. In this commentary, I offer a preliminary sketch of what seems to me a promising way to move forward in this direction. (shrink)

This paper begins with a problem stemming from Hume regarding credences about credences. Suppose one has a credence of .95 in p, and suppose one assesses the credence to be such. But suppose one’s second-order credence in this assessment is less than 1. Then, by a standard conditionalization rule, one’s credence in p becomes less than .95. Moreover, such “erosion” can iterate by considering one’s, third-, fourth-, fifth-order credences, etc. (In light of this, some have rejected higher-order credences; however, it (...) is argued that Lewis’ “Principal Principle” forbids this.) The paper then offers a partial solution by describing circumstances under which a person has reason to assign credence 1 to a first-order credence. The solution takes the form of a “transparency” view of self-knowledge from Parent (2017, chapter 8). Briefly, it is argued that when one “reflex-like” utters a sentence “The probability of p is n”, then as a matter of psychological law, the utterance is an expression of one’s own judgment. The Principal Principle then necessitates that one’s credence in p is n, assuming one is being rational. Thus, upon perceiving such an utterance, one can thereby have a reason to assign a second-order credence of 1. (shrink)

Information and, thus, intelligence, is dependent on the Conservation of a Circle, which is, technically, the only dynamic in Nature. Forcing humans, now that it is exposed, to re-think, and, eventually, repurpose, the finance, technology, and psychology, humans use to create the 'personal' (and, often, artificial) experience called 'reality.'.

Why you don’t need quantum physics to understand the Universe (and everything in it).

This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the (...) documented ASoSs had unique neurophenomenological profiles, where several aspects or components of Selfhood (measured neurophysiologically and phenomenologically) are affected and expressed differently, but still in agreement with the neurophysiological three-dimensional construct model of the complex experiential Selfhood proposed in our earlier work (Fingelkurts et al. in Conscious Cogn, 2020). (shrink)

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry between (...) a subject who has never had a certain phenomenal state and one who has. I also consider two theoretical objections to my claim: an objection from disunity and an objection from mysteriousness. I show that these objections can be answered and that introspective knowledge by acquaintance being sui generis remains a live option on the table. (shrink)

What happens when we are uncertain about what we want, feel or whish for? How should we understand uncertainty in introspection? This paper reconstructs and critically assess two answers to this question frequently found in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein: indecision and self-deception (Hacker 1990, 2012; Glock 1995, 1996). Such approaches seek to explain uncertainty in introspection in a way which is completely distinct from uncertainty about the ‘outer world’. I argue that in doing so these readings fail to account (...) for the substantial role the intellect seems to play in the process of resolving such uncertainties. I then attempt to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks connecting psychological vocabulary, behaviour and public criteria (e. g. PI 2009: 580) provide alternative ways for thinking about uncertainty in introspection which allow for a substantial role of the intellect. (shrink)

Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...) argue that not only are these explanations of self-knowledge implausible, but Davidson himself has already rejected them. Thus, neither can be attributed to Davidson as his suggested account of self-knowledge. I will then introduce and support what I take to be Davidson’s official and independent account of self-knowledge, that is, his “Transcendental Explanation”. I will defend this view against certain potential objections and finally against the objections made by William Child. (shrink)

Alex Byrne (2005; 2011a; 2011b; 2018) has argued that we can gain self-knowledge of our current mental states through the use of a transparency method. A transparency method provides an extrospective rather than introspective route to self-knowledge. For example, one comes to know whether one believes P not by thinking about oneself but by considering the world-directed question of whether P is true. According to Byrne, this psychological process consists in drawing inferences from world-directed propositions to mind-directed conclusions. In this (...) article, I consider whether this ‘Inferential Transparency Method’ can provide us with the self-knowledge that some philosophers have thought we require in order to “critically reason” (Burge 1996), and I conclude that it cannot provide such self-knowledge. The force of this objection depends on how much stock we should place in our status as critical reasoners. However, I conclude by suggesting a more general worry for Byrne’s account. (shrink)

Duality explains everything. Language unnecessary, and, actually, superfluous.

'Pi' in mathematics is the technical term for 'mind' in philosophy. This creates Intelligent anarchy. Or, in more conventional 'language' the whole idea that there is only 'one' person in, what humans label, 'the universe.' This means, technically, then, there are always 'two' people in any 'universe.' Where all of these terms (words) are meaningless, because the conservation of a circle controls, again, what humans label, 'reality.' (Self, anti-self, other-self, relative self.) Again, meaning, every human (any unit) (in any discipline) (...) (including, and, especially, language) is the same human, automatically, in its own 'universe.' Intelligent. Anarchist. (Circular-linear relationship between any X and-or X) (X and-or Y) (X and-or X'). (shrink)

Este artículo revisa, de manera esquemática, cuatro diferentes estrategias para solucionar el problema del autoconocimiento, entendido como el problema de la compatibilidad del acceso a la vez peculiar y privilegiado que tenemos a la propia mente. La estrategia escéptica se ejemplifica por Gilbert Ryle y Peter Carruthers, la constitutivista por Dorit Bar-On y Crispin Wright, la racionalista por Sydney Shoemaker y la epistémica por Descartes, David Armstrong, Donald Davidson y Alex Byrne. En cada caso se examina brevemente si la estrategia (...) logra solucionar el problema del autoconocimiento y si es plausible en sí. Se concluye que la teoría de la transparencia de Byrne es la más convincente entre las examinadas y se señalan algunas áreas de ella que requieren una exploración más detallada. (shrink)

Le but principal de cet article est de défendre Putnam contre McDowell – ou du moins de défendre certaines thèses et certains arguments du premier dans Raison, vérité et histoire contre certaines objections du second dans son influent article « Putnam on Mind and Meaning. Puisque par la suite Putnam s’est pour l’essentiel rangé aux positions de McDowell en adoptant le « réalisme naturel », il s’agit aussi de défendre Putnam contre lui-même. L'article se focalise sur l’échange entre Putnam et (...) McDowell dans les textes susmentionnés, et plus spécifiquement sur un débat qui peut au premier abord sembler étroit, mais qui soulève en fait des enjeux importants concernant la nature de la pensée : le débat sur les objets de l’introspection. (shrink)

The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory’s advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory’s introduction. I review the most important developments during this time period regarding the two (...) criteria: whether the theory’s six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory’s predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful. (shrink)

Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) show the several conceptual limits that new materialism and postmodern subject models have for psychological theory and research. The present study continues in this discussion and argues that the applicability of the ideas of quantum-inspired new materialism depends on the theoretical perspectives that we consider for analysis: be it the first-person perspective referring to the subjective experience of a human subject, or the third-person perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer. While (...) the arguments of new materialism are in accordance with the analysis of the act of observation performed by an external observer, some problems arise when trying to theoretically approach the first-person subjective experience of a human subject. For example, new materialism fails to explain why human minds can maintain the awareness of a subject’s identity throughout their lives and to recall the memories about their past personal experiences. (shrink)

Addiction to observation.... There is a circular-linear relationship between observer and observation proving 'pi' is the only observer (a circle is the background state for everything) (making observation possible).

Articulating a thought can be astoundingly easy. We generally have no trouble expressing complex ideas that we have never considered before, though not always. Articulating a thought can also be extremely hard. Our difficulties in articulating thoughts pervade many aspects of philosophical inquiry, as well as many ordinary situations. While we may overcome some of the challenges through education and practice, we cannot do away with them altogether. And the hardest thoughts to articulate often come to us unbidden: as we (...) neither assemble them from other thoughts nor get them from any source of external information. They can come from us freely and spontaneously, and frequently we articulate them in order to find out what they are. In many cases, we would not bother articulating our thoughts if we already had this knowledge--yet, when we find the right words, we can often instantly tell that they express our thought. How do we manage to recognize the formulations of our thoughts, in the absence of prior knowledge of what we are thinking? And why is it that producing a public language formulation contributes in any way to the deeply private undertaking of coming to know our own thoughts? In Articulating a Thought, Eli Alshanetsky considers how we make our thoughts clear to ourselves in the process of putting them into words and examines the paradox of those difficult cases where we do not already know what we are struggling to articulate. (shrink)

On the proposed solution to the puzzle, we recognize the correct formulations of our thoughts by relying on our implicit knowledge of what we are thinking. After discussing an analogous puzzle in the case of basic perceptual classification and constructing a model of implicit knowledge for the simpler case of color recognition, the chapter extends the model to the trickier case of thought. On this model, our implicit knowledge of an item consists in its stored _signature_—the invariant aspect of experience (...) that its instances share. On the proposed solution, the process that mediates between implicit and explicit knowledge is not itself wholly sub-personal. Instead, it is best understood as straddling the personal/sub-personal divide. A deeper source of the puzzle that emerges from this chapter’s discussion of our involvement in articulation lies in the conflation between two types of freedom (or control) that we may have over a response. (shrink)

This chapter looks closely at another important aspect of the articulation process: the kind of _reasoning_ that we engage in when we articulate a thought. Although we often articulate our thoughts without engaging in any reasoning, a certain kind of reasoning does sometimes play an ancillary role in our assessment of a formulation. In articulating a thought, we are often cognizant of various attitudes that we have in reaction to it. The thought may seem true or false, hopeful or alarming, (...) frivolous or serious, and so on. We reject formulations that do not support such attitudes in any way. This chapter shows that these attitudes pass through a kind of “normative filter”, or a rapid normative evaluation, and goes some way toward understanding the character of this evaluation using the previous account of implicit knowledge. Understanding how we reason with unarticulated thoughts can enhance our understanding of reasoning, more generally. (shrink)

After rejecting deflationism, the central further question is whether our rejections and acceptances of words, in the articulation process, are based on reasons. Reasons-theorists say “yes” and look for some mental state that gives us a reason for accepting/rejecting a formulation. One kind of reasons-theorist argues that our reasons come from some _knowledge_ we have of our thought. Another kind of reasons-theorist argues that our reasons come from _feelings_ that result from sub-personally matching our thought with our words. Contra the (...) reasons-theorists, this chapter maintains that we cannot make sense of the bulk of our responses in the articulation process by assimilating them into the reasons framework. Resolving the puzzle calls for an alternative model of rational control—one that may be implicated in learning and numerous other epistemologically central activities, ranging from basic perceptual categorization to sophisticated mathematical discovery. (shrink)

In articulating our thoughts, our attention rarely goes to the formulation itself. What we evaluate are not sounds or inscriptions but ways in which other competent users of our language would interpret them. But how do we arrive at words that would elicit precisely the needed interpretation? And why does the other person enter into the picture at all? Why do we need to know what some other person would think we think, and realize that that is, in fact, what (...) we think, to know what we ourselves think? Why do we take the other person’s response into account in trying to come to know our private thoughts? Although these questions span several different areas of philosophy, their most natural home is the subject of self-knowledge. This chapter sketches the territory of the subject from a distinctive perspective and indicates the place of the book’s project in it. (shrink)

Deflationists seek to reinterpret the puzzle cases so that the puzzle never arises. On this type of view, what we do in the difficult cases of articulation does not consist in articulating thoughts already in place, but rather in using language to form new thoughts. A _moderate deflationist_ draws an analogy between what we do in these cases and the elaboration of a plan, whose detailed implementation we work out later, as we go. A _radical deflationist_ denies that we search (...) for any fixed type of formulation at all, arguing that our acceptance of a formulation is either a free choice or a consequence of reaching a natural stopping point in our thinking. Examining a wide range of deflationary views helps bring out many of the key features of the puzzle cases and map out the variety of ways in which we can think in words. (shrink)

Once we are done articulating the thought, we can easily articulate it again, using different words with the same meaning. But the thought may become difficult to articulate again, with time. In many such cases (for example, during teaching, job interviews, and exams), our knowledge of the thought does not dissipate altogether, but switches back to an implicit format. We can regain our explicit knowledge by engaging in an effortful process of recollection. The memory process shares the key features of (...) the process of articulation and lends itself to a variant of the initial puzzle. Placing the memory puzzle alongside analogous puzzles in the case of thought and perception brings out the general form of the puzzle that pertains to our knowledge of all foundational facts. Our knowledge of such facts, in all these cases, could be underwritten by our possession of certain bits of implicit knowledge. (shrink)

The chapter introduces a new puzzle—albeit one that is reminiscent of Meno’s famous puzzle about investigation. The puzzle that Plato formulates challenges the possibility of inquiry in general, whereas this puzzle concerns the special case of inquiry into our thoughts. Our puzzle is that, in the difficult cases of articulation, coming to know what we are thinking seems to require knowing the words that capture our thoughts; yet, at the same time, having the latter knowledge itself seems to require already (...) knowing what we are thinking. After characterizing the cases that give rise to the puzzle and honing its presentation, the chapter addresses several lines of response to it, including the worry that the puzzle simply reduces to Meno’s original paradox and the worry that it does not constitute a genuine philosophical paradox at all. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I call (...) them, respectively, reflective introspection and primitive introspection. The purpose of this paper is to argue that primitive introspection is a psychologically real phenomenon. I first introduce the distinction and provide some preliminary motivation to accept it (§1). After some set-up considerations (§2), I present my central argument for the existence of a non-classificatory kind of introspective state (§3), what I call the ‘argument from phenomenal-concept acquisition’. Finally, I briefly present some reasons why my distinction may be important for various philosophical debates (§4). (shrink)

The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mind by turning one’s capacity to know other minds onto oneself. Previously, researchers mostly debated whether the theory receives the most support from the results of empirical research. They have given much less attention to the question whether the theory is the simplest of the available alternatives. I argue that the question of simplicity should be considered in light of the well-established theories surrounding the ISA theory. I claim (...) that the ISA theory then proves to be the simplest. I reply to objections to this claim related to recent developments in this area of research: the emergence of a unified transparency theory of self-knowledge and the relative establishment of the predictive processing theory. (shrink)

Various problems of self-knowledge are introduced, along with the important notions of transparency, privileged access, and peculiar access. Accounts of self-knowledge are classified according to whether they are _economical, inferential, detectivist_, or _unified_. Roughly: economical accounts repurpose other epistemic capacities; inferential accounts say self-knowledge is acquired by inference; detectivist accounts say the explanation of self-knowledge involves causal mechanisms; and unified accounts give the same basic epistemological story for all mental states. The account to be defended later has all four features. (...) The chapter concludes by reviewing the history of self-knowledge considered as a philosophical problem. Self-knowledge from Descartes onwards was generally taken for granted, unlike our knowledge of the external world, which was thought deeply problematic. This gets things completely back to front. (shrink)

This chapter extends the transparent epistemology of belief and knowledge given in Chapter 5, first to perception and then to sensation. It turns out that these two topics are very closely related. According to a widespread view, to have a bodily sensation—a headache, a tickle in one’s throat, an itch on one’s neck—is to perceive something occurring in one’s body. The chapter argues that this perceptual theory of sensation is correct. The epistemology of one’s bodily sensations thus becomes a special (...) case of the epistemology of one’s perceptions, and the basic transparency account for perception applies. As one might expect, there are some complications. (shrink)

This chapter further extends the transparency approach to memory, imagination, and thought. The kind of memory that is chiefly treated is _episodic_ memory which, it turns out, is closely connected to the other two topics. Imagery is the key to a transparent epistemology of memory, and also to imagination and thought. That completes the defense of this book’s theory of self-knowledge. The theory needs controversial claims, most notably the idea that knowledge can be obtained by reasoning from inadequate evidence, or (...) from no evidence at all, and that perception and imagery constitutively involve belief. Those controversial claims were backed by independent argument, but are hardly beyond dispute. The ambition has simply been to establish the transparency account as a leading hypothesis, deserving of further examination. (shrink)

According to the _inner-sense theory_, one finds out about one’s own mind by deploying a (quasi-)perceptual mechanism, or “internal scanner.” The theory defended in TS&K is not a version of the inner-sense theory, but there are commonalities. This chapter examines eight leading objections to the inner-sense theory, and argues that they leave it pretty much unscathed. However, as explained at the end, there are some residual puzzles. Although the inner-sense theory offers a nice explanation of _peculiar_ access, it offers none (...) at all of _privileged_ access. Further, it gives no explanation of why Shoemakerian “self-blindness” does not actually occur. This motivates an examination of some leading alternatives. (shrink)

So far, a transparent epistemology has been given for belief and perception. Assuming that is correct, this chapter begins by arguing that transparency must apply across the board, thus giving a “general theory” of self-knowledge. The chapter then sketches the needed extensions for desire, intention, and emotion (using the specific example of disgust). The three proposed rules for desire, intention, and disgust explain privileged and peculiar access in the usual style. Privileged access is explained because one tries to follow these (...) rules, then (minor qualifications aside) one will arrive at a true belief about one’s desire, intention, or feeling of disgust. And peculiar access is explained because the methods only work, or only work in full generality, in one’s own case. The rules are also detectivist, and plausibly economical. (shrink)

In _The World Without, the Mind Within_, André Gallois points out that the inference from ‘_p_’ to ‘I believe that _p_’ is neither deductively valid nor inductively strong. This is (a version of) the puzzle of transparency—how can such an inference yield knowledge? This chapter examines the puzzle in depth, as it arises for belief, perception, and sensation. Gallois’s own solution to the puzzle is criticized, as are those offered by Richard Moran and Fred Dretske. The puzzle of transparency in (...) the special case of sensations is also discussed, as is the puzzle’s connection with the problem of other minds as discussed by Kripke in _Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language_, and with Hume’s remarks on the self in the _Treatise_. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to solve the puzzle of transparency for belief. The notion of an epistemic rule is introduced, and the proposed solution is that knowledge of one’s beliefs may be (and typically is) obtained by following the epistemic rule: Bel If _p_, believe that you believe that _p_. This is an inferential theory of knowledge of what we believe; it can be extended to an inferential theory of knowledge of what we know. The theory is also _economical_ and _detectivist_, (...) and is argued to give a satisfactory explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. The chapter concludes by examining a variety of objections. (shrink)

You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment.

Chapter 2 argued that the failings of the inner-sense theory are often more apparent than real. In any event, recent approaches to self-knowledge are usually advertised as taking a radically different route. This chapter surveys and criticizes three prominent examples, due to Davidson, Moran, and Bar-On. They illustrate how radically different accounts of self-knowledge can be, despite having some overlapping themes. All three philosophers emphasize the linguistic expression of self-knowledge. Moran and Bar-On both think the main problems are in important (...) respects not epistemological. Davidson and Moran concentrate on the propositional attitudes, belief in particular, and suggest that another approach entirely will be required for knowledge of one’s sensations. (shrink)

How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...) rational agency—our ability to conform our attitudes to our reasons, and to commit ourselves to those attitudes through avowals. This paper has two goals. The first is exegetical: to identify agentialism's defining thesis and precisely formulate the agentialist challenge to empiricism. The second goal is to defend empiricism from the agentialist challenge. I propose a way to understand the role of agency in reasoning and avowals, one that does justice to what is distinctive about these phenomena yet is compatible with empiricism about self-knowledge. (shrink)

There is a growing literature in philosophy dealing with the phenomenon of inner speech, that is, the activity of speaking to oneself in one’s mind. This paper highlights a feature of inner speech which has not yet been noticed in this literature: that there is something distinctive that it is like to make a sincere assertion in inner speech. The paper then traces out two implications of this observation. The first relates to the question of how we should characterise inner (...) speech; the second relates to the question of how inner speech may play a role in self-attributions of belief. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of self-knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self-knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self-knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is developmentally interconnected with and dependent on resources already used for acquiring knowledge of other people's beliefs, which is inferential in nature. But when these resources are applied to oneself, one attains and subsequently frequently uses a method for (...) acquiring knowledge of beliefs that is non-inferential in nature. The paper argues that this account is preferable to some of the most common empirically motivated theories of self-knowledge of beliefs and explains the origin of the widely discussed phenomenon that our own beliefs are often transparent to us in that we can determine whether we believe that p simply by settling whether p is the case. (shrink)

Given that all Buddhists give universal scope to the no-self view, accounts of personal identity in Buddhism cannot rest on egological conceptions of self-consciousness. Without a conception of consciousness as the property, function, or dimension of an enduring subject or self, how, then, do mental states acquire their first-personal character? What it is that in virtue of which mental states exhibit a basic or minimal sense of self? These questions are at the heart of a long debate about the nature (...) and character of consciousness and self-consciousness. This paper traces the genealogy of key concepts of consciousness and personal identity in Buddhism, their role in articulating specific accounts of self-knowledge, and their relevance to contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of mind about the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. (shrink)