Racism and Sexism

Members of marginalized communities are often accused of being "too sensitive" when subjected to supposedly harmless acts of microaggression. This paper explores a simulated society consisting of marginalized and non-marginalized agents who interact and may, based on their individually held convictions, commit acts of microaggressions. Agents witnessing a microaggression might condone, ignore or condemn such microaggressions, thus potentially influencing a perpetrator's conviction. A prototype model has been implemented in NetLogo, and possible applications are briefly discussed.

Intersectionality broadly refers to the idea that gender, race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, migration, disability, and other axes of oppression and social identity are not separate but intersect and operate together. Rooted in Black feminism and popularized by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw since 1989, intersectionality has become a cornerstone of feminist scholarship. Despite its wide use across disciplines, however, the term has also sparked debate, and its definition and implications remain far from agreed upon. Debates about intersectionality have raised questions such (...) as: What does it mean to say that oppressions “intersect”? Does this imply that we cannot speak of sexism apart from racism, class exploitation, or other forms of oppression? Can we theorize “women’s” oppression when Black, Latina, Asian, and white women experience different realities? And how can we build solidarity across these intersectional differences? This annotated bibliography introduces key resources for understanding how the notion of intersectionality originated, evolved, and continues to be debated. General Overviews lists resources that provide a general understanding of intersectionality for students, educators, and researchers. Early Roots includes both recent works tracing intersectionality to earlier Black feminist thought and those foundational texts themselves. Critical Engagements surveys major critiques and responses to intersectionality, and Conceptualization and Application features works that refine or employ the concept in theory and practice. As many scholars note, intersectionality is a work in progress—an evolving framework continually reshaped as feminists practice intersectionality in their scholarship and activism. This article is likewise a living document, expanding alongside ongoing feminist and anti-oppression projects. (shrink)

As a Korean migrant woman in the US academy, I was marginalized at the intersection of race, gender, language, and migration status; my commitment to intersectional feminism grew directly from that experience. But returning to South Korea has changed the map of my privilege: I am now part of the racial-ethnic majority, a native speaker, and a professor with institutional standing. Gender marginalization remains real, but the xenophobic racism I faced in the US is no longer directed at me. What, (...) then, grounds my responsibility to challenge intersecting oppressions in a world where I am no longer their primary target? Drawing on María Lugones’s concept of world-traveling, I conceptualize this experience through what I call “shifting positionality”: the way one’s relation of privilege and marginalization changes as one moves between worlds. I examine three models for grounding the responsibility of world-travelers like myself. The Shared Struggle Model, drawing on Chandra Talpade Mohanty, grounds responsibility in shared marginalization across contexts. The Culpability Model, drawing on Ee Ling Quah, grounds it in our implication in sustaining unjust systems. Both models offer important insights, but each faces decisive objections: the former erases privilege and contextual differences, while the latter conflates implication with culpability and risks blaming marginalized subjects for navigating structural constraints. I then defend a modified version of Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model, arguing that our participation in social-structural processes that produce oppressive outcomes grounds our responsibility to address intersecting oppressions—across shifts in positionality, whether we are on the more marginalized or more privileged side. This account speaks not only to my particular trajectory but to world-travelers with shifting positionality more broadly, extending the intersectional feminist framework to account for how the intersection of privilege and marginalization changes as one moves across worlds. (shrink)

This review engages with Ee Ling Quah's Fire Dragon Feminism: Asian Migrant Women's Tales of Migration, Coloniality and Racial Capitalism (2025), a timely contribution that theorises 'fire dragon feminism' through the lived experiences of Asian migrant women in the Australian academy. Quah examines their shifting positions of privilege and vulnerability within global racial capitalism, colonialism and neoliberalism, analysing how racialised myths condition migrant women's lives and how myths embedded in corporate equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI) programs further shape their experiences. (...) In this review, I highlight how Quah's framework captures the structural dimensions of emotions such as burnout, hypervigilance and isolation in the white-dominant academy. While appreciating Quah's critique of binaries that portray Asian migrant women as either helpless victims or self-sufficient agents, I raise concerns about her use of 'culpability' to describe migrant women's complicity in oppressive systems. Drawing on Marilyn Frye's and Sukaina Hirji's accounts of 'double binds' and Iris Marion Young's 'social connection' model of responsibility, I argue that Asian migrant women are responsible for structural injustice without being blameworthy. By distinguishing implication and complicity from culpability and blameworthiness, I suggest a more adequate framework for understanding the collective responsibilities fire dragon feminism calls us to embrace. (shrink)

Review of a solid and argumentative book that explains what "social justice" is (and "wokism" and related topics).

This paper reconsiders Tommie Shelby's (2016) analysis of procreation in poor black communities. I identify three conceptual frames within which Shelby situates his analysis—feminization, choice-as-control, and moralization. I argue that these frames should be rejected on conceptual, empirical, and moral grounds. As I show, this framing engenders a flawed understanding of poor black women's procreative lives. I propose an alternative framework for reconceiving the relationship between poverty and procreative justice, one oriented around reproductive flourishing instead of reproductive responsibility. More generally, (...) the paper develops a methodological challenge for nonideal moral and political philosophy, especially concerning the obligations of the oppressed. Specifically, I argue that in the absence of descriptive and conceptual accountability, the moral gaze of the philosopher risks preserving, rather than destabilizing, oppressive ideologies. (shrink)

Irony? Yes! Black people in Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime · In the first note to On National Characters, Kant writes that these are reasonably correct drawings based on archetypes, which only stand out in a large group and therefore cannot offend anyone. He apologises twice, and probably thought he could get away with it. However, in some of these images in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, we also seem (...) to recognise a real person, Kant, as he approvingly reproduces anti-Black racism: «The negroes of Africa have from nature no feeling which transcends the childish level», or «this chap was quite black from the head to the feet, a clear proof that what he said was stupid» – to name just two. In my essay, I look at them in their aboriginal setting, thereby finding numerous indications, that Kant systematically ironised the two passages about Black people. By abstracting from the character of the human species, the «have from nature no» is already methodically limited, and Kant explicitly suspects indignation behind Rousseau’s analogous saying, «that a woman never becomes anything more than a big child». What «perhaps deserved to be considered» is not considered, following the definition of prejudice. The proof, which cannot be proof, echoes in concentrated form Montesquieu’s famous mockery of slaveholder rhetoric, a point rarely mentioned. If we restore the appropriate ironic framing to these 260-year-old depictions, we might very well view the Kant of 1764 through a different lens. (shrink)

In Faces of Inequality: A Theory of Wrongful Discrimination, Sophia Moreau embarks on a classic philosophical journey. It’s what philosophers nowadays call an explanatory project. The goal of explanatory projects is to deepen our understanding of wrongful actions and what they share in common. In this review essay, I argue that Moreau’s book embodies a valuable explanatory project and contribution to discrimination theory that ought to be on the radar of lawyers, legal theorists, and philosophers. After sketching the book’s arguments, (...) I explain why they are so refreshing. The remainder of the essay proceeds in a more critical mode. First, I argue that book’s explanatory aspirations fall short, and I sketch a framework for a more radically pluralistic theory of wrongful discrimination. This framework has the power to embrace Moreau’s compelling view that discrimination wrongs people by failing to treat them as equals while also recognizing a rich array of other discriminatory wrongs found in lived experience. Second, I argue that Faces of Inequality will disappoint readers looking for a truly inclusive account of wrongful discrimination. I end by emphasizing the book’s contribution to political philosophy and its ambition to provide a truly liberatory theory of what we owe to each other as moral and political equals. (shrink)

Recently, Jennifer Saul (“Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump”, 2017; “Racist and Sexist Figleaves”, 2021) has explored the use of what she calls “figleaves” in the discourse on race and gender. Following Saul, a figleaf is an utterance that, for some portion of the audience, blocks the conclusion that some other utterance, R, or the person who uttered R is racist or sexist. Such racial and gender figleaves are pernicious, says Saul, because, (...) among other things, they can shift the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable to think or say. This paper expands on Saul’s picture in a threefold way: It is first argued that appeals to statistics can function as figleaves. It is then argued that—as far as figleaves go—there is reason to believe that statistics-as-figleaves are especially pernicious. Finally, the paper explores some strategies for counterspeech. (shrink)

The gray area of sexual violations generally refers to ambiguous sexual experiences that are not readily distinguishable from rape or sex. Such experiences are describable as ambiguous or complex in a way that, to some, seems to defy existent categories of sexual experiences. This leads some feminists to approach the gray area as a puzzle that must be resolved either by understanding it as a new category, or by upholding existing rape categorization. Rather than dispelling the gray-area ambiguity by resolving (...) conceptual puzzles, I assign the gray-area ambiguity a positive analytical role by attending to it in a historical and dialectical light. By tracing histories of feminist antirape discourse, I elaborate a way of understanding the “gray area” of sexual violations, articulating it as a historical condition affecting the interpretive possibilities of our sexual experiences. Such an approach underscores the potential of the gray area to inaugurate feminist critique in virtue of its status as a historically specific yet ambiguous horizon where our experiences can contradictorily seem not-like rape, but not-like sex. (shrink)

Critics across the political spectrum have worried that ordinary uses of words like 'racist', 'sexist', and 'homophobic' are becoming conceptually inflated, meaning that these expressions are getting used so widely that they lose their nuance and, thereby, their moral force. However, the charge of conceptual inflation, as well as responses to it, are standardly made without any systematic investigation of how 'racist' and other expressions condemning oppression are actually used in ordinary language. Once we examine large linguistic corpora to see (...) how these expressions are actually used, we find that English speakers have a rich linguistic repertoire for qualifying the degree to which and dimensions along which something is racist, sexist, homophobic, and so on. These facts about ordinary usage undermine the charge of conceptual inflation. Without awareness of facts about ordinary usage, theorists risk making linguistic prescriptions that are unnecessary or counterproductive. (shrink)

What is objectionable about “blacking up” or other comparable acts of imagining involving unethical attitudes? Can such imaginings be wrong, even if there are no harmful consequences and imaginers are not meant to apply these attitudes beyond the fiction? In this article, we argue that blackface—and imagining in general—can be ethically flawed in virtue of being oppressive, in virtue of either its content or what imaginers do with it, where both depend on how the imagined attitudes interact with the imagining’s (...) context. We explain and demonstrate this using speech act theory alongside a detailed case study of blackface. (shrink)

In “Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory,” I propose that stereotyping someone—even if you manage to keep your thoughts hidden and don’t act on them—can constitute a form of discrimination (2021b). What, Alex Madva asks, are the practical implications of this claim? Even if I am correct that stereotyping constitutes a form of discriminatory treatment, it’s still possible that people should keep on speaking and acting as if “discrimination” refers exclusively to behaviors and policies. He invites me to (...) explore the “potential payoffs and perils” of referring to thoughts and perceptions as discriminatory, especially as they relate to legal practice and social-scientific inquiry (2021, 46). (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in implicit bias. Driving this concern is the thesis, apparently established by tests such as the IAT, that people who hold egalitarian explicit attitudes and beliefs, are often influenced by implicit mental processes that operate independently from, and are largely insensitive to, their explicit attitudes. We argue that implicit bias testing in social and empirical psychology does not, and without a fundamental shift in focus could not, establish this startling thesis. We suggest (...) that implicit bias research has been conducted in light of inadequate theories of racism and sexism. As a result, such testing has not sufficiently controlled for subjects’ prejudiced explicit beliefs and emotions, and has not ruled out the possibility that explicit prejudice best explains test subjects’ discriminatory associations and behavior. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

Structural gaslighting arises when conceptual work functions to obscure the non-accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm they produce and license. This paper examines the role that structural gaslighting plays in white feminist methodology and epistemology using Fricker’s (2007) discussion of hermeneutical injustice as an illustration. Fricker’s work produces structural gaslighting through several methods: i) the outright denial of the role that structural oppression plays in producing interpretive harm, ii) the use of single-axis conceptual resources to (...) understand intersectional oppression, and iii) the failure to recognize the legacy of women of color’s epistemic resistance work surrounding the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. I argue that Fricker’s whitewashed discussion of epistemic resistance to sexual harassment in the United States is a form of structural gaslighting that fails to treat women of color as knowers and exemplifies the strategic forgetting that is a central methodological tactic of white feminism. (shrink)

Calls for civility have been on the rise recently, as have presumptions that civility is both an academic virtue and a prerequisite for rational engagement and discussion among those who disagree. One imperative of epistemic decolonization is to unmask the ways that familiar conceptual resources are produced within and function to uphold a settler colonial epistemological framework. I argue that rhetorical deployments of ‘civility’ uphold settler colonialism by obscuring the systematic production of state violence against marginalized populations and Indigenous peoples, (...) relying on the colonial conceptual framework of ‘civilized’ vs ‘savage’, and excusing death-promoting rhetoric under the guise of liberal disagreement. (shrink)

We expect a lot from strangers, for instance, that the valet guy doesn’t steal our wheels, that the babysitter doesn’t abduct our children, and that the barista at Starbucks doesn’t poison our white chocolate mocha. But romantic relationships, friendships, parent-child relationships, and other varieties of intimate relationships introduce a whole new dimension to what we expect and demand of each other. It’s against the backdrop of our intimate relationships that we sign prenups, make custody agreements, write wills, and open joint (...) bank accounts. But most of our interactions in intimate settings are shaped not by contractual agreements but by our preferences, core values, and prior expectations about how other people should behave. No wonder people embark on relationships with clashing concepts of what count as oversights, slights, betrayals, and unforgivable sins. Our differing expectations, preferences, and core values create ample opportunities for misunderstandings to arise and wreak havoc. It is not surprising, then, that antagonistic emotions, such as disrespect, resentment, hate, and contempt, are commonplace in intimate settings. But, as we will see, they are not equally toxic. Our intimate relationships can survive the torments of hate and resentment, but they crumple under the weight of disrespect and contempt. (shrink)

Hatred: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion The first in-depth philosophical analysis of personal hate and group hate, Hate: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion explores how personal hatred can foster domestic violence and emotional abuse, how hate-proneness is a main contributor to the aggressive tendencies of borderlines, narcissists and psychopaths, how seemingly ordinary people embark on some of history's worst hate crimes, and how cohesive groups, subjected to spontaneous forces of group polarization, can develop extremist viewpoints of the sort that motivate (...) hate crimes, mass shootings, and terrorism. The book's first part explores hate in intimate relationships, looking for an answer to the question of why our intimate relationships can survive hate and resentment, but not disrespect or contempt. Berit "Brit" Brogaard shows that where contempt creates an irreparable power imbalance, hate is tied to fear, which our brains may reinterpret as thrill, attraction and excitement. But this can also make hate a dangerous emotion that convinces people to hang onto abusive relationships. When tied to vengeance and the dark triad of personality, hate is not only dangerous but also dehumanizing. Vengeance and the dark personalities are not essential to hate, however. Without them, hate can have more admirable ends. The book's second part explores the polarizing forces that can bias cohesive groups of like-minded individuals and contribute to what is effectively a hate crisis. Drawing on history, politics, legal theory, philosophy, and psychology, Brogaard shows how cultural myths about femininity, ethnic groups, and the land of opportunity perpetuate misogyny, white supremacy and anti-Semitism. But, she argues, politicians and policymakers have it in their power to address the hate crisis through legislation that preserves the original incentive behind the first-amendment right to free speech. (shrink)

In common parlance, “contempt” is often subsumed under “hate.” When we speak of group hate, hate groups, hate crimes, hate speech, hate campaigns, and hate mail, this is the sense of “hate” we have in mind. We can call this the “wide sense” of hate. This chapter offers an analysis of hate and contempt as complex emotions that have other emotions as proper parts. Contempt, it is argued, is composed of disgust and condemnation, which is a strong form of disrespect (...) for or disapproval of a person for her failings overall or as engaged in a particular pursuit. Hate, in its narrow sense, is composed of resentment (or indignation), condemnation, and apprehension. Along the way, it is shown that disrespect is the component that unites what the author calls the “antagonistic emotions.” The latter include anger, resentment, indignation, envy, blame, contempt, and hate. (shrink)

Hate and contempt are emotions. But hate- and contempt-proneness are personality traits, traits that are particularly common in borderlines, narcissists, and psychopaths, but also in far-right extremists and others who hate people on account of their group membership. Although both hate and contempt are sometimes morally defensible, the failure of people with hate- and contempt-proneness to adapt to situational factors make them prone to display hatred in ways that are morally inappropriate. This raises the question of whether hate- and contempt-prone (...) people are responsible for their morally indefensible behaviors and to what extent they choose to act maliciously. This chapter argues that the malicious acts of hate- and contempt-prone people are grounded in their defective moral character but that they are nonetheless responsible for their abhorrent acts. (shrink)

In its new guidelines to help psychologists address male violence, sexism, and misogyny, the American Psychological Association suggests that misogyny stems from the masculinity ideology our culture adheres to. While the masculinity dogma is part of what inspires men to hate women, two other ideologies are needed to explain the misogyny incarnate in contemporary culture: doctrines here called “the feminine ideal” and “the myth of female filth.” It’s imprinted into the minds of little girls that they need to live up (...) to society’s standards of femininity. Women who deviate from traditional gender norms become the targets of misogynistic hatred. The flipside of the feminine ideal is that women’s implicit association with bodily “stuff,” manipulation, and irrationality makes all women prone to misogynistic contempt. Along the way, this chapter shows how sexism differs from hateful and contemptuous misogyny, and why women who belong to multiple marginalized or stigmatized groups are particularly prone to misogynistic attacks. (shrink)

Far-right supporters paint a rosy image of the luxurious lifestyle of the 1950s white middle-class families or the Southern family living in peaceful agrarian communities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In each imagined society traditional white American families lead satisfying, stress-free lives, which they built through honest hard work. The traditional values they embraced offered clear guidance on how to move up in society through hard work and willpower, unburdened by people of color, asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, homeless, or (...) other “inferior free-riders.” This American Phantasy lies at the core of the nefarious ideology that underpins white nationalism in America today and makes far-right extremists look down on non-whites with dehumanizing contempt and explode in hateful fits of rage when they don’t acknowledge their “proper place” in society. The newfound confidence of far-right extremists is partially due to the fact that the president refuses to condemn their hate crimes, but also to the ease of recruiting new members among hard-working people who tire in their struggle against the tide and young people who are increasingly likely to harbor vulnerable dark personalities, making them so thirsty for accolade that extremists specializing in ego-stroking have a good chance of recruiting them. (shrink)

In his landmark essay “Freedom and Resentment,” the philosopher Peter Strawson coined the term “reactive attitude” to refer to our emotional reactions to wrongdoing or acts of goodwill in the context of social relationships, such as your resentment toward a person who wronged you or gratitude toward a person who did you a favor. These emotional reactions, Strawson argued, are beneficial because they serve to uphold the standards of our moral community. Strawson didn’t take an official stance on whether hatred (...) can perform a similar beneficial role. But subsequently, a number of thinkers have argued that it serves no worthwhile purpose. In terms of safeguarding our moral ideals, we are better off without it. Hate is frowned upon because of its close ties to vengeance. Vengeful hate is dehumanizing. But, this chapter argues, vengeance is not essential to hate. Without it, hate can be a gateway to moral vision. (shrink)

This chapter grapples with the nature of group hate and collective hate. Group hate is hate targeted at groups or individuals because of their group membership. Collective hate is hate that a group has toward a common target or that group members have toward a target on behalf of their group. Collective hate is a special case of collective intentionality, the capacity of minds to be jointly directed toward objects, people, values, or goals. Collective hatred requires a joint commitment to (...) hate or to act as if one hates a person or group. After fleshing out the concepts of group hate and collective hate, the chapter looks at the role of propaganda, fake news, and group polarization in securing a joint commitment to hate certain groups or people who belong to those groups. (shrink)

There is a strong sentiment in the general population that we need to put an end to the hate crisis in our society. Politicians and policymakers have it in their power to prevent this crisis from escalating further by regulating not only (physical) hate crimes but also hate speech. This has already been done in many European countries, where hate speech typically is considered a form of group libel that defames members of the targeted group. Law professor Jeremy Waldron has (...) offered an argument for this perspective on hate speech. Hate speech, he argues, is criminal group libel. This chapter argues that Waldron’s argument doesn’t accomplish what he says it does, because most hate speech doesn’t make, or imply, any factual claim and therefore fails to be defamatory. The chapter then offers an argument for curtailing hate speech that is premised on the political philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ notion of communicative rationality. Finally, other solutions to the hate crisis are considered. (shrink)

What is the status of research on implicit bias? In light of meta‐analyses revealing ostensibly low average correlations between implicit measures and behavior, as well as various other psychometric concerns, criticism has become ubiquitous. We argue that while there are significant challenges and ample room for improvement, research on the causes, psychological properties, and behavioral effects of implicit bias continues to deserve a role in the sciences of the mind as well as in efforts to understand, and ultimately combat, discrimination (...) and inequality. (shrink)

What can we do—and what should we do—to fight against bias? This final chapter introduces empirically-tested interventions for combating implicit (and explicit) bias and promoting a fairer world, from small daily-life debiasing tricks to larger structural interventions. Along the way, this chapter raises a range of moral, political, and strategic questions about these interventions. This chapter further stresses the importance of admitting that we don’t have all the answers. We should be humble about how much we still don’t know and (...) dedicate efforts to gathering as much knowledge as possible. Even so, we know enough now to start making a difference, and this chapter ultimately aims to chip away at the gap between our abstract commitments to treat people fairly and our lived habits and experiences, which continue to be shaped by implicit and explicit prejudices and stereotypes about race, gender, and other social categories. (shrink)

Various sexist and racist beliefs ascribe certain negative qualities to people of a given sex or race. Epistemic allies are people who think that in normal circumstances rationality requires the rejection of such sexist and racist beliefs upon learning of many counter-instances, i.e. members of these groups who lack the target negative quality. Accordingly, epistemic allies think that those who give up their sexist or racist beliefs in such circumstances are rationally responding to their evidence, while those who do not (...) are irrational in failing to respond to their evidence by giving up their belief. This is a common view among philosophers and non-philosophers. But epistemic allies face three problems. First, sexist and racist beliefs often involve generic propositions. These sorts of propositions are notoriously resilient in the face of counter-instances since the truth of generic propositions is typically compatible with the existence of many counter-instances. Second, background beliefs can enable one to explain away counter-instances to one’s beliefs. So even when counter-instances might otherwise constitute strong evidence against the truth of the generic, the ability to explain the counter-instances away with relevant background beliefs can make it rational to retain one’s belief in the generic despite the existence of many counter-instances. The final problem is that the kinds of judgements epistemic allies want to make about the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs upon encountering many counter-instances is at odds with the judgements that we are inclined to make in seemingly parallel cases about the rationality of non-sexist and non-racist generic beliefs. Thus epistemic allies may end up having to give up on plausible normative supervenience principles. All together, these problems pose a significant prima facie challenge to epistemic allies. In what follows I explain how a Bayesian approach to the relation between evidence and belief can neatly untie these knots. The basic story is one of defeat: Bayesianism explains when one is required to become increasingly confident in chance propositions, and confidence in chance propositions can make belief in corresponding generics irrational. (shrink)

The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of (...) the idealized rational self leads philosophers to underestimate the influence of implicit bias on their own judgments and prevents them from enacting the reforms necessary to minimize the effects of implicit bias on institutional decision-making procedures. I consider recent experiments in social psychology that suggest that an increased sense of one’s own objectivity leads to greater reliance on bias in hiring scenarios, and I hypothesize how these results might be applied to philosophers’ evaluative judgments. I discuss ways that the idealized rational self is susceptible to broader critiques of ideal theory, and I consider some of the ways that the picture functions as a tool of active ignorance and color-evasive racism. (shrink)

At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, (...) and Stereotype Threat,” and “Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.” The first part contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and “dual process” models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second part contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. (shrink)

The dominant view in the philosophical literature contends that internalized oppression, especially that experienced in virtue of one's womanhood, reduces one's sense of agency. Here, I extend these arguments and suggest a more nuanced account. In particular, I argue that internalized oppression can cause a person to conceive of herself as a deviant agent as well as a reduced one. This self-conception is also damaging to one's moral identity and creates challenges that are not captured by merely analyzing a reduced (...) sense of agency. To help illustrate this claim, I consider experiences of people of color who internalize stereotypes regarding criminality and moral deviance. With these examples in mind, I show that internalized prejudices regarding criminality can cause people of color to view themselves as outlaws in the moral community, that is, as wrongdoers. This conclusion helps give voice to some of the challenges that women of color who experience multiple sorts of internalized prejudices often face. To conclude, I discuss one strategy for empowerment that women of color have used when confronted with multiple forms of internalized oppression. (shrink)

One of the significant problems for philosophy’s development into a more diverse discipline is the familiar sharp reduction in the proportion of women and students of color after initial, introductory-level courses. This contributes to a lack in the breadth of perspective and experience that both upper-level students and faculty bring to philosophy, which in turn undermines the strength of the discipline as a whole. Much of the transformation of philosophy must necessarily happen at the departmental, and even university, level; but (...) there are, nonetheless, a number of strategies available to individual teachers of philosophy to help to retain marginalized students—from the composition of course syllabi and assignment choices, to increased awareness of challenges within the discipline to students’ success and embracing error as a learning tool. This variety of pedagogical tools provides a means to help to make philosophy more broadly inclusive. (shrink)

In his 1934 essay, “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Levinas raises important questions about the subject’s relation to nature and to history. His account of the ethical significance of paternity, maternity, and fraternity in texts such as Totality and Infinity and Otherwise Than Being suggest powerful new ways to understand the meaning of kinship, beyond the abstractions of Western liberalism. How does this analysis of race and kinship translate into the context of the Transatlantic slave trade, which not only (...) stole Africans from their families and communities, but also imposed upon them a single “fictive” kinship relation to the master? What if the problem of racialization is not only a matter of being “chained” to one’s identity through (presumed) blood ties, but also being violently separated from one’s kin? What does it mean for the concepts of ethical and political fraternity if the only father recognized by law and society as legitimate is the slave master? Or if the bodies of slave women are exploited, not only for productive labor, but also for the reproductive labor that makes more slaves for the master? If kinship is a way of making sense of the relation between past, present and future generations, then what does a radical disruption of existing kinship relations, and the imposition of one fictive, absolute and unilateral kinship relation, do to the social meaning of time and of history in a particular community? In this paper, I reflect on the significance of fecundity and kinship in the context of US slavery, both in order in order to situate my analysis in the particular history of my own present community, and as a way of demonstrating the significance of a more determinate social analysis for Levinas’ ethics of singularity and politics of universal justice. (shrink)

Previous studies suggested that emotions can be correctly interpreted from facial expressions in the absence of conscious awareness of the face. Our goal was to explore whether subordinate information about a face’s gender and race could also become available without awareness of the face. Participants classified the race or the gender of unfamiliar faces that were ambiguous with regard to these dimensions. The ambiguous faces were preceded by face-images that unequivocally represented gender and race, rendered consciously invisible by simultaneous continuous-flash-suppression. (...) The classification of ambiguous faces was biased away from the category of the adaptor only when it was consciously visible. The duration of subjective visibility correlated with the aftereffect strength. Moreover, face identity was consequential only if consciously perceived. These results suggest that while conscious awareness is not needed for basic level categorization, it is needed for subordinate categorization. Emotional information might be unique in this respect. (shrink)

Adriana Ayers studies the evolution of kotex advertising, focusing specifically on the way in which African American women were figured into changing advertisers’ conceptions of womanhood. The article analyzes images featured in various women’s magazines to examine how ideas surrounding menstruation were packaged and sold to women.

The hermeneutic resources necessary for understanding Indigenous women’s lives in Latin America have been obscured by the tools of Western feminist philosophical practices and their travel in North-South contexts. Not only have ongoing practices of European colonization disrupted pre-colonial ways of knowing, but colonial lineages create contemporary public policies, institutions, and political structures that reify and solidify colonial epistemologies as the only legitimate forms of knowledge. I argue that understanding this foreclosure of Amerindian linguistic communities’ ability to collectively engage in (...) interpretive processes of culture and be heard and understood as coherent is an essential background condition to conceiving and theorizing the multiplicity of social oppressions and their intersections in contemporary Latin American contexts. Further, the work of disrupting and disobeying colonial interpretive frameworks has long been practiced by Indigenous women in Latin America, whose testimonies and expressions have been made sub-audible by design in colonial systems of meaning-making. This is part of the extensive legacy of the long quillwork of communal alphabets of survival. (shrink)

This article goes behind stereotypes of Muslim veiling to ask after the representational structure underlying these images. I examine the public debate leading to the 2004 French law banning conspicuous religious signs in schools and French colonial attitudes to veiling in Algeria, in conjunction with discourses on the veil that have arisen in other western contexts. My argument is that western perceptions and representations of veiled Muslim women are not simply about Muslim women themselves. Rather than representing Muslim women, these (...) images fulfill a different function: they provide the negative mirror in which western constructions of identity and gender can be positively reflected. It is by means of the projection of gender oppression onto Islam, and its naturalization to the bodies of veiled women, that such mirroring takes place. This constitutes, I argue, a form of racialization. Drawing on the work of Fanon, Merleau-Ponty and Alcoff, I offer a phenomenological analysis of this racializing vision. What is at stake is a form of cultural racism that functions in the guise of anti-sexist and feminist liberatory discourse, at once posing a dilemma to feminists and concealing its racializing logic. (shrink)

Argues that the War on Drugs and policies that deny convicted felons equal access to employment, housing, education and public benefits create a permanent under-caste based largely on race. Reprint. 12,500 first printing.

I here respond to several points in Faucher and Machery’s vigorous and informative critique of my volitional account of racism (VAR). First, although the authors deem it a form of "implicit racial bias," a mere tendency to associate black people with "negative" concepts falls short of racial "bias" or prejudice in the relevant sense. Second, such an associative disposition need not even be morally objectionable. Third, even for more substantial forms of implicit racial bias such as race-based fear or disgust, (...) Faucher and Machery offer no account or explanation of when we should consider these racist, in whom, in what respect(s), or why. So, findings of implicit racial bias pose no clear objection to VAR. Fourth, because VAR allows not only racial hate, but also callous indifference, disdain, and other forms of racially driven disregard, to be racist,VAR is not "psychologically monist." Fifth, as VAR allows racist attitudes to be immoral in more than one way, offending against both the moral virtues of benevolence and justice, VAR is not "morally monist" either. I also reveal problems with some of Faucher and Machery’s other claims: Faucher and Machery take too narrow a conception of the types of psychology that can contribute to understanding racism; the internal complexity of hatred, which they approvingly mention, is irrelevant to VAR’s truth and undermines part of their criticism of VAR; whether some forms of racial bias are "racial ills" is irrelevant to VAR, which only analyzes racism; over-attention to implicit racial bias may cloak or exacerbate some of our society’s racial ills, or even constitute a new one. I conclude by noting that Faucher and Machery are not just critics of VAR but also allies of VAR in important controversies against those who insist racism lies primarily in social structures and institutions. (shrink)

Two widespread strategies of resisting racism are the following. The first one is to deny the existence of races and thus block even the possibility of racist claims. The second one is to grant that races exist but insist that racial differences do not imply value differences. The aim of this paper is to outline a strategy of resisting racism that is weaker than the first but stronger than the second strategy: even if we accept that races exist, we can (...) still deny that there are projectible racial differences. And this is enough to block the possibility of racist claims without appealing to the slippery topic of value differences. I use some considerations from philosophy of biology in order to argue for this claim. (shrink)

An analysis of 'racism' in terms of disrespect. This article argues against the views that racism should be understood in reductive ways as, variously, an attitude of ill-will (Jorge Garcia), a cognitive object such as ideology (Tommie Shelby), a behavior (Michael Philips), or some disjunctive hybrid (Lawrence Blum). In fact, it argues that racism should be conceptually released from having any one location. The disrespect analysis favored here can accommodate a variety of important desiderata for a theory of racism.

Carrie Chapman Catt's engagement of race remains controversial. This article argues that there are two elements to Catt's career-long use of evolutionary arguments to map questions of sex and race. For Catt, evolutionary change instantiated (macroevolutionary) progress, but this progress depended on sex and race as linked categories of (microevolutionary) differentiation. In her arguments, the sexes always participate together in the same trajectory of evolutionary progress. Race, however, is a contingent category: different races can, but also may not, participate together (...) in the progress narrative. Women of color thus had a doubly contingent position in her rhetoric. (shrink)

This essay analyzes a shift in racialized regimes of visual signification in French metropolitan culture during the long eighteenth century. The author explores two symbolically central figures—the dismembered black slave and the black rapist/lover who is “duly punished”—by undertaking an intertextual reading of two sets of illustrations of Voltaire's Candide (1759) designed by Moreau le Jeune. Separated by the French and Haitian Revolutions, Moreau's two sets of Candide illustrations (1787 and 1803) register an important shift in the French cultural imaginary. (...) The figure of the maimed black male slave was put directly in circulation in French visual culture during the eighteenth century. In contrast, interracial sexuality remained “unrepresentable” in French visual culture throughout the century. By the time Haiti declared its independence (1804), this taboo was contravened by Moreau's metaphorical substitution of the figure of the monkey in 1803 to picture the black male as a bestial rapist. (shrink)