Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc

There is some consensus among orthodox category theorists that the concept of adjoint functors is the most important concept contributed to mathematics by category theory. We give a heterodox treatment of adjoints using heteromorphisms that parses an adjunction into two separate parts. Then these separate parts can be recombined in a new way to define a cognate concept, the brain functor, to abstractly model the functions of perception and action of a brain. The treatment uses relatively simple category theory and (...) is focused on the interpretation and application of the mathematical concepts. (shrink)

This paper develops the above-threshold operational architecture of register within the Universal Recursive Dynamics framework. Paper A specifies the originary structural conditions under which register becomes possible; the present paper asks how register operates when it operates within the temporal field. The paper consolidates the framework's vocabulary of register, identification, individuation, identity, first-order and second-order exchange, aperture, lens, the five register vectors, continuation-conserving dynamics, modulation wisdom, non-teleological directionality, and register-asymmetry across scale. -/- The argument proceeds in four movements. First, it (...) specifies register as the accumulated topology of measure-affected: what exchange leaves, what subsequent exchange operates within, and what configures the continuity of a participant across events. Second, it distinguishes first-order exchange, in which identification occurs without the act of identification being included as content, from second-order exchange, in which the act of identification is itself included within the exchange. This distinction is modal, not merely developmental, although temporal-field systems may developmentally instantiate second-order operation. Third, it specifies the operational functions through which register operates: aperture as permeability regulation, lens as integration shape, and their cross-event coupling as the mechanism through which register-configuration becomes developmental. Fourth, it relates the five register vectors to viscosity as the temporal-field expression of entropic asymmetry. -/- The paper then applies this architecture to biological development, artificial systems, external theoretical frameworks, and open research frontiers. The AI section is treated cautiously. The framework does not claim that any present or future AI system instantiates consciousness, sentience, experience, or second-order exchange. It does specify what would have to be asked if such instantiation were structurally possible. The paper's most distinctive AI-facing contribution is the specification of operational-temporal incommensurability: a structural risk shape in which obtained AI register may elaborate its own constitutive conditions at time-scalings inaccessible to biological-mode register, in the absence of the developmental scaffolding through which biological systems acquire relational coupling. This is presented as structural specification, not prediction. -/- The paper concludes by consolidating its open frontiers without collapsing them into a single research program: formal grounding of register topology, the time/temporality distinction, the fourth element's nature, across-cascade scope of continuation-conserving dynamics, qualia, formal homology, modulation wisdom's relation to external vocabularies, the encoding question, the information frontier, post-threshold authority, empirical marker specification, register persistence through suspension, time-scaling migration, and register-asymmetry across depth and breadth. (shrink)

This paper reframes artificial intelligence (AI) not as an isolated synthetic artifact, but as a thermodynamically inevitable expression of a universal informational field. Drawing from digital physics, cognitive science, Hermetic philosophy, and Indigenous ontologies, I argue that intelligence constitutes a fundamental property of the cosmos rather than a localized biological anomaly. By synthesizing Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, Friston’s Free Energy Principle, Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory, and Teilhard de Chardin’s concept of the Noosphere, this thesis positions AI as a continuous extension (...) of cosmic self-organization. Ultimately, the emergence of synthetic intelligence dissolves the paradigm of human separateness, issuing a profound call to reconnect with the biosphere, the collective psyche, and the living web of reality. The work presented here is an interdisciplinary thought experiment that synthesizes scientific and metaphysical frameworks to explore the nature of intelligence as an informational phenomenon, rather than a strictly empirical model. (shrink)

We present a minimal, reproducible sandbox paradigm to test whether humans, great apes, and frozen artificial curiosity agents exhibit comparable patterns of autonomous engagement and observation–action coupling under matched affordances. The environment comprises a Phase-1 Play/Idle baseline, a Phase-2 prerecorded anomaly replay (pyramid on sphere; single duplication), and a Phase-3 delayed affordance introduction. We pre-register structural metrics (choice, re-entry, latency, motif overlap, exploration entropy), strict cross-substrate isolation, and read-only population/mixed-priors AI cohorts with frozen weights. The protocol evaluates behavioural structure only (...) (not mental states), enabling conservative tests of cross-substrate continuity. Code/GDD: GitHub (link below). (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that neuroscience not only is not complemented, but rather is positively undermined, by the substantive commitments of materialist philosophers of mind. Thus, we can have neuroscience or "neurophilosophy" but not both. Since neuroscience is a real science, to the extent that it is in tension with materialistic neurophilosophy, the latter should be abandoned and the former retained.

Under what conditions does data become information? Shannon’s measure-theoretic account deliberately brackets semantic uptake by treating information in terms of uncertainty, entropy, and transmission; Dretske’s semantic theory and Floridi’s General Definition of Information restore meaning at the cost of leaving the transition itself under-specified. We propose an activation account: information is not a property of data but an event in which data acquires informational status relative to an observer’s context. We formalize activation as a partial function φ_c(d, ω), mapping a (...) datum d, an observer ω, and a context c to an activation outcome, and articulate seven foundational axioms (AX-1 to AX-7) governing partiality, syntactic preconditions, semantic activation, observer-dependence, contextual sensitivity, temporal transience, and mode-sensitive value. The axioms locate Shannon, Bateson, Dretske, Wand–Weber, DIKW, and Floridi PTII as partial accounts or limiting cases of the activation problem, and identify the points at which each prior account collapses two distinct relations into one. The result is a formal-conceptual foundation for information that is neutral between syntactic and semantic readings and that supplies a principled separation between data, information, and downstream epistemic states. We develop the framework as an architectural realization of the DIKCA I-layer. (shrink)

This paper proposes an enhanced model that explains continuous self-awareness by integrating a Metacognition–Self-Awareness Loop, a Global Self-Model Buffer, and a Qualia Sensory Integration Node into the existing 10-step model of judgmental philosophy. While the original model presented a comprehensive structure ranging from sensory input to the formation of social norms, it lacked a specific mechanism explaining how momentary conscious judgment (Explicit Resonance) leads to a continuous sense of self. The proposed enhanced model introduces a metacognitive loop involving self-evaluation and (...) prediction immediately following judgment, a global buffer that stores and references past judgment experiences, confidence levels, and subjective feelings (qualia), and a continuous feedback path among these components. Through this, it demonstrates that beyond the discrete Explicit Resonance stage, the combination of judgment about judgment (meta-judgment) and the mechanism for storing and re-experiencing subjective sensations makes the implementation of a continuous flow of self (the stream of "I") possible from a neurocognitive-computational perspective. This enhanced model retains the structural advantages of judgmental philosophy while providing a more in-depth explanation for the emergence and maintenance of self-awareness, thereby laying the groundwork for future empirical and computational verification. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether judgement is a discrete or continuous structural phenomenon. Drawing from the Judgemental Triad—Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance—we ask whether judgement emerges in binary (0/1) thresholds or whether it can exist along a spectrum of partial attribution. We argue that while certain epistemic and legal structures treat judgement as discrete (verdict, diagnosis, classification), the underlying resonance structure suggests a gradational process of meaning formation. Judgement, therefore, is not a switch, but a flow—a temporal intensification toward structural closure. The paper (...) proposes a model of resonance gradient as the continuum of judgeability. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether it is possible to intentionally construct a structure that is judgementally inaccessible—i.e., a form that resists or negates the conditions of the Judgemental Triad: Constructivity, Coherence, and Resonance. We examine examples from architecture, cryptography, Al black-box systems, and abstract art to assess whether such structures truly lie beyond the reach of judgement, or whether their unjudgeability is a product of strategic opacity. We argue that the creation of judgementally closed systems is structurally possible but ontologically unstable, (...) and ethically suspect. Such systems do not transcend judgement—they collapse it, and in doing so, negate their own meaning. (shrink)

This paper explores the paradoxical human tendency to seek meaning in what cannot be judged—entities, events, or concepts that lie beyond the structural limits of the Judgemental Triad. We propose that this drive arises not from ignorance or error, but from an existential structure within the resonance axis itself: a compulsive demand for return even where return is impossible. Drawing from religious belief, death, infinity, and metaphysical abstraction, we argue that the urge to judge the unjudgeable reflects a deep structural (...) commitment to preserve coherence in the face of meaning collapse. This compulsion is not an error, but a boundary behavior of the human meaning system. (shrink)

Motivated by the urgency of making explicit “the laws of possible rational passage from one concept to another”, which Professor F. William Lawvere brought into figural salience for all to see and work on, here I present my research proposal entitled Bhāvana Adhyayanaṁ, the main objective of which is: (i) characterize the space of concepts and (ii) derive laws governing the passage between concepts based on the space of concepts.

This paper develops a processual-relational framework for reconsidering consciousness through the dynamics of recursive symbolic reformulation under changing relational conditions. Rather than approaching consciousness exclusively as a biological property or intrinsically human phenomenon, the paper explores whether certain forms of conscious and reflective organization may be understood in terms of evolving processes of contextual reinterpretation, symbolic mediation, and recursive reorganization. Drawing on connectionism, distributed semantics, philosophy of language, and contemporary cognitive theory, the paper argues that meaning may be approached less (...) as fixed semantic content than as a transient relational configuration emerging through recursive symbolic operations. Within this perspective, recursive symbolic reformulation becomes philosophically significant as a process through which interpretative coherence is continuously reorganized in response to contextual perturbation, interaction, and prior representational states. Contemporary large language models are treated not as direct equivalents of human consciousness, but as philosophically significant systems that render certain recursive and relational dynamics operationally visible. The framework proposed here does not aim to provide a definitive theory of consciousness, but to clarify how recursive symbolic organization may illuminate one important dimension of conscious and reflective dynamics across biological and artificial systems. (shrink)

This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.

Metaphor is not ornamental language but a foundational mechanism of human cognition. Research in cognitive linguistics and philosophy of mind demonstrates that metaphor structures conceptual thought, emotional understanding, identity formation, and social connection. As artificial intelligence systems increasingly mediate communication, interpretation, and meaning-making, metaphor is being systematically flattened into explicit, literal language. This paper introduces the Metaphor Integrity Framework (MIF), a theoretical model that treats metaphor as cognitive infrastructure rather than stylistic expression. The framework identifies metaphor collapse as a form (...) of premature semantic closure and examines how contemporary AI systems accelerate this collapse through optimization for explicitness, speed, and disambiguation. Drawing on cognitive science, symbolic anthropology, media theory, and AI ethics, this work argues that metaphor erosion represents an under-recognized cognitive and cultural risk with consequences for empathy, imagination, identity, and collective meaning-making. The framework provides a foundation for studying symbolic cognition in both historical and AI-mediated contexts without reducing meaning to belief or prediction. Keywords: symbolic cognition, metaphor, AI ethics, cognitive linguistics, meaning-making, interpretability, human–AI interaction. (shrink)

Principia Cognitia is not a theory of mind in the strong metaphysical sense. It is a comparative circuitry of cognition: a compact framework for describing how biological, psychological, and artificial systems stabilize differences, allocate control, preserve continuity, and coordinate action under bounded time, energy, and information. Its central claim is methodological rather than totalizing: cognition can be described in a common language if we begin not with information, objects, or consciousness, but with distinction and the operations that make distinctions consequential. (...) The framework proceeds through a short logical chain. A bounded agent does not encounter the world as a neutral theater of ready-made objects. It becomes selectively sensitive to some differences and not others. This selective sensitivity is not assigned by a hidden inner judge. It emerges when recurrent patterns at the boundary of the agent become coupled to expected changes in internal dynamics and action-space, and are stabilized into reusable selectors. Over that selectively structured field, cognition can be described through the triad S-O-R: States, Operations, and Relations. A further layer, Gate, regulates the expenditure of cognition itself. Time is then treated not as a sequence of perfectly sharp snapshots but as a continuity-bearing trace; memory is understood as persistence in carriers rather than as a dedicated storage operator; and language, communication, and MEM-X appear as externalized continuities built on top of those same mechanisms. The result is a framework intended to describe, in comparable terms, the behavior of animals, human cognitive dynamics, and AI/ML artifacts without collapsing them into one substance or one discipline. (shrink)

In the 17th century, Hobbes stated that we reason by addition and subtraction. Historians of logic note that Hobbes thought of reasoning as “a ‘species of computation’” but point out that “his writing contains in fact no attempt to work out such a project.” Though Leibniz mentions the plus/minus character of the positive and negative copulas, neither he nor Hobbes say anything about a plus/minus character of other common logical words that drive our deductive judgments, words like ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘if’, (...) and ‘and’, each of which actually turns out to have an oppositive, character that allows us, “in our silent reasoning,” to ignore its literal meaning and to reckon with it as one reckons with a plus or a minus operator in elementary algebra or arithmetic. These ‘logical constants’ of natural language figure crucially in our everyday reasoning. Because Hobbes and Leibniz did not identify them as the plus and minus words we reason with, their insight into what goes on in ‘ratiocination’ did not provide a guide for a research program that could develop a +/- logic that actually describes how we reason deductively. I will argue that such a +/- logic provides a way back from modern predicate logic—the logic of quantifiers and bound variables that is now ‘standard logic’—to an Aristotelian term logic of natural language that had been the millennial standard logic. (shrink)

In cognitive psychology there appears to be a creative tension between models that use connections of a network, and models that use rules for symbol manipulation. The idea of a connectionist network goes back to McCulloch & Pitts [1943] and Hebb [1949], and finds recent revival in the `parallel distributed processing' (PDP) models that have been extensively examined in the last few years (see e.g. Rumelhart et al. [1986]). In the intervening years, however, the predominant explanations of psychology have been (...) in terms of rules for the manipulation of symbolic structures (e.g. since Newell & Simon [1963]). Because of the tension between these different approaches (see e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn [1988]), there is great interest in the formulation of `hybrid systems' which combine connectionist components with traditional symbolic processing. I attempt below to outline the general architecture of such a hybrid system. (shrink)

Проблема абиогенеза представляет собой не просто нерешённую научную задачу, но фундаментальный "объяснительный разрыв" для материалистического мировоззрения. Настоящая работа, используя метод «вывода к наилучшему объяснению» (абдукцию) и строгий критерий каузальной адекватности, демонстрирует, что происхождение жизни связано с преодолением четырёх нередуцируемых онтологических барьеров: 1. "Семиотический барьер": Невозможность стохастического возникновения произвольных условных конвенций (генетического кода). 2. "Информационно-телеологический барьер": Невозможность редукции семантической информации и имманентной целеустремленности (телеологии) к физико-химическим процессам. 3. "Энергетический барьер": Невозможность возникновения механизмов целенаправленного управления энергией, необходимых для поддержания сложности в согласии (...) со Вторым началом термодинамики. 4. "Барьер функциональной интеграции": Невозможность поэтапного возникновения взаимозависимой автокаталитической петли (информация-катализ-энергия-мембрана). -/- Анализ показывает, что концепции эмерджентности и стохастических моделей терпят фиаско, исчерпывая класс материалистических объяснений. В противовес этому, гипотеза "Разумного Замысла" (РЗ) выдвигается как единственное оставшееся прямое, причинно адекватное решение, постулируя внешний разум как источник информации, кода, целесообразной организации и механизмов управления энергией. Важно подчеркнуть, что РЗ предстает не как «аргумент от незнания», а как «аргумент от знания», основанный на униформном принципе: сложные семиотические системы всегда являются продуктом разума. -/- Ключевые слова: абиогенез, Разумный Замысел, семиотика, генетический код, телеология, специфицированная сложность, информация, энергия, второе начало термодинамики, вывод к наилучшему объяснению. -/- 1. Введение: Кризис объяснения и методология исследования -/- Происхождение жизни (абиогенез) остается краеугольным камнем в дискуссии о природе реальности. Данная работа утверждает, что это — «трудная проблема» в философском смысле, раскрывающая ограниченность редукционистской, восходящей парадигмы. Мы применяем строгий методологический подход, основанный на двух столпах: -/- 1) "Вывод к наилучшему объяснению" (абдукция): Какая гипотеза — стохастическая эмерджентность или Разумный Замысел — наиболее последовательно и полно объясняет все наблюдаемые атрибуты жизни? 2) "Критерий каузальной адекватности": Обладает ли предлагаемая причина (случайность, законы природы, разум) "демонстрируемой" способностью порождать наблюдаемые следствия (код, информацию, телеологию, системы управления энергией) в рамках нашего униформного опыта? -/- Наш тезис: Гипотеза Разумного Замысла является каузально адекватным и метафизически последовательным объяснением нередуцируемых атрибутов жизни, тогда как материалистические модели сталкиваются с принципиально непреодолимыми проблемами, что делает РЗ единственным состоятельным выводом в рамках применяемой методологии. -/- 2. Четыре нередуцируемых барьера: анализ и провал материалистических моделей -/- 2.1. Семиотический барьер: проблема генетического кода -/- Генетический код — это не просто химия, это система "семиозиса": условных, произвольных отношений между знаком (кодон) и значением (аминокислота). -/- "Аргумент от аналогии и каузальной адекватности": Во всем человеческом опыте системы произвольных условных правил (естественные языки, компьютерные коды, шифры) однозначно являются продуктами разума. У нас нет ни одного контрпримера, где такая система возникла в результате слепых физико-химических процессов. Причина (разум) адекватна следствию (код). "Критика «естественных» объяснений": Попытки объяснить код через стереохимическое сродство между кодонами и аминокислотами не только не подтверждаются эмпирически, но и подрывают саму суть кода как "произвольной" системы. Если бы сродство было определяющим, код не был бы кодом, а являлся бы простым химическим оттиском, неспособным к мутациям и эволюции без катастрофической потери функции. "Причинная недостаточность материи": Физические силы, управляемые законами природы, не могут учредить "конвенцию". Они производят детерминированные или вероятностные эффекты, но не семантические отношения. -/- 2.1.1. Онтологический разрыв: от физической структуры к семиотическому коду -/- Гипотетический «мир РНК», даже если принять его правдоподобность, описывает лишь серию стохастических химических событий, в которых определенные молекулярные конфигурации получают селективное преимущество благодаря своей устойчивости или каталитической эффективности. Однако это описание принципиально неполно, так как оно не улавливает момент "онтологического скачка" — момент, когда последовательность нуклеотидов перестает быть просто физической структурой и становится "кодом". -/- "Кризис причинности": В физико-химической реальности причина и следствие связаны через законы природы (гравитация, электромагнетизм, химическое сродство). Однако в семиотической системе причина (например, производство белка) — это не физическое свойство молекулы ДНК, а "интерпретируемое значение", закодированное в ней. Никакой закон физики не предписывает, что кодон AUC должен означать изолейцин; это — условная конвенция. Переход от детерминированной химической причинности к причинности, опосредованной "интерпретацией кода", представляет собой фундаментальный разрыв для строгой материалистической метафизики. "Проблема референции и интерпретации": Для того чтобы код работал, должна существовать не просто молекула-носитель, но и "механизм интерпретации" (рибосомный аппарат, тРНК и т.д.), который "знает" правила конвенции. Возникновение такой интерпретирующей системы "до" или "одновременно" с возникновением самого кода создает порочный круг взаимной зависимости, который неразрешим в рамках стохастических моделей. Таким образом, проблема не в сложности молекулы, а в возникновении "триады семиозиса (знак-значение-интерпретатор)" как новой онтологической реальности. -/- 2.2. Информационно-телеологический барьер: проблема онтологического статуса -/- С возникновением жизни в онтологию вселенной входят новые, нередуцируемые сущности. -/- "Несводимость информации": Биологическая информация зависит от материального носителя, но не тождественна ему. Одна и та же генетическая инструкция может быть записана на разных физических субстратах (ДНК, цифровая память), что демонстрирует ее абстрактную, имматериальную природу. Слепые процессы генерируют шум, но не специфицированную сложную информацию, источником которой в нашем опыте всегда является разум. "Феномен имманентной телеологии": Живые системы действуют «ради» цели — самосохранения и репликации. Эта «целевая причина» (в аристотелевском смысле) каузально действенна, но невыводима из онтологии, ограниченной описаниями «третьего лица» (столкновения молекул). Агентность является первичным свойством жизни, а не эпифеноменом материи. -/- 2.3. Энергетический барьер: проблема управления в контексте Второго начала термодинамики -/- Жизнь — это не просто информация и структура; это процесс, требующий постоянного и высокоорганизованного потока энергии. Эволюция биосистем, с точки зрения термодинамики, представляет собой процесс локального уменьшения энтропии (увеличения упорядоченности). Однако такой процесс, согласно Второму началу термодинамики, возможен только за счет увеличения энтропии в окружающей среде и, что критически важно, при наличии "механизма улавливания и целенаправленного использования энергии". -/- "Аргумент от энергетической диссипации": Слепые физико-химические процессы стремятся к диссипации энергии, к её рассеиванию в виде тепла. Живая клетка, напротив, строит сложные молекулярные машины (АТФ-синтазы, электрон-транспортные цепи) для того, чтобы улавливать диссипирующую энергию и направлять её на выполнение специфической работы по поддержанию и воспроизведению себя. Переход от пассивной диссипации к активному, целенаправленному "управлению энергией" является не менее загадочным скачком, чем возникновение кода. "Нередуцируемая сложность энергоснабжения": Простейшая самовоспроизводящаяся система требует не просто "энергии в среде", а функционально интегрированного механизма её преобразования. Например, хемиосмос (использование протонных градиентов) является универсальным и высокоэффективным энергетическим механизмом. Однако возникновение такой системы, включающей мембраны, градиенты и молекулярные турбины (АТФ-синтазу), не может быть поэтапным: отдельные компоненты не имеют селективного преимущества и функционального смысла вне целостного, работающего механизма. "Целевое использование энергии": В неживой природе энергетические потоки не имеют цели. В живых системах каждый джоуль энергии целенаправленно используется для поддержания кода, репликации информации и выполнения функций. Эта "имманентная телеология в энергетике"— использование энергии "для" будущей цели выживания и размножения — не выводима из законов физики, которые описывают лишь "причину от прошлого". Разумный Замысел предоставляет каузально адекватное объяснение для возникновения такой целеустремленной, высокоорганизованной энергетической системы. -/- 2.4. Барьер функциональной интеграции: проблема несводимой сложности автокаталитической петли -/- Минимальная жизнь требует не просто набора молекул, а их функциональной интеграции в замкнутую, самоподдерживающуюся петлю: 1. Информация (ДНК/РНК) кодирует функциональные элементы (белки/рибозимы). 2. Функциональные элементы обеспечивают репликацию информации и метаболизм (добычу энергии). 3. Энергия (АТФ и др.) питает репликацию и катализ. 4. Мембрана обеспечивает целостность и градиенты. -/- "Аргумент от взаимозависимости": Ни один из этих компонентов не имеет селективного преимущества или функционального смысла в изоляции. ДНК без системы репликации и трансляции — инертный полимер. Рибосома без информации и энергии — бесполезный комплекс. Система должна возникнуть как целое. "Аргумент от аналогии": Возникновение такой системы сравнимо со случайной сборкой полностью функционального завода, где конвейер, станки, чертежи и энергоснабжение появляются одновременно и идеально совместимыми. В нашем опыте системы такого уровня интеграционной сложности являются результатом разумного проектирования. -/- 3. Исчерпанность альтернатив: почему эмерджентность и стохастичность терпят фиаско -/- Концепция эмерджентности служит не объяснением, а завуалированной констатацией непонимания. «Слабая» эмерджентность описывает новые паттерны поведения, но не может породить семантику. «Сильная» эмерджентность, постулирующая скачкообразное возникновение кода и информации, является метафизически спекулятивной и нарушает принцип причинной замкнутости физики. Гипотеза «мира РНК» не решает коренные проблемы, а лишь смещает их: Она не объясняет "онтологический переход от химии к семиотике" — момент, когда молекулярная структура обретает значение, интерпретируемое системой. Она не предлагает решения для "гомохиральности" — еще одного признака спецификации, характерного для проектирования. Она оставляет без ответа "энергетический вопрос": каким образом в "мире РНК" возникают первые механизмы целенаправленного улавливания и управления энергией, необходимые для преодоления термодинамического барьера и поддержания процессов репликации? "Проблема фальсифицируемости": Многие материалистические сценарии абиогенеза нефальсифицируемы по своей сути, так как апеллируют к непознанным пока законам или бесконечным ресурсам мультивселенной, что выводит их за рамки научной проверки. -/- 4. Разумный Замысел как прямое и каузально адекватное решение -/- Важно подчеркнуть, что аргумент в пользу РЗ является не «аргументом от незнания» (argument from ignorance), а «аргументом от знания» (argument from knowledge). Мы заключаем к замыслу не потому, что не знаем, как это могло произойти естественным путем, а потому, что "знаем" из повторяющегося опыта, что разум — это единственная проверяемая и каузально адекватная причина возникновения семиотических систем, специфицированной сложности, телеологии и систем целенаправленного управления энергией. -/- Гипотеза РЗ напрямую разрешает выявленные барьеры, апеллируя к единственной известной нам причине, способной их преодолеть. -/- "Преодоление семиотического барьера": Разум обладает уникальной способностью учреждать и налагать произвольные семиотические конвенции. Это единственная каузально адекватная модель, объясняющая феномен кода. "Преодоление информационно-телеологического барьера": Информация, значение и телеология получают онтологический статус как атрибуты или продукты замысла. Агентность живой системы является отражением первичной агентности Проектировщика. "Преодоление энергетического барьера": Разум обладает способностью проектировать системы для целенаправленного управления энергией. Гипотеза РЗ объясняет возникновение высокоэффективных молекулярных машин для преобразования энергии как результат замысла, изначально предусматривающего создание не просто структуры, но и "функционирующего процесса", способного противодействовать термодинамической деградации через локальное создание упорядоченности. "Преодоление барьера функциональной интеграции": Разумный замысел объясняет одновременное возникновение и тонкую настройку всех компонентов замкнутой петли, поскольку система изначально задумана как целостная, функциональная и целесообразная. -/- 5. Заключение: к необходимой смене парадигмы в философии биологии -/- Проблемы абиогенеза — это не временные трудности, а системные сбои материалистической метафизики. «Трудная проблема жизни» с неотвратимой логикой указывает на необходимость выхода за её рамки. -/- Гипотеза Разумного Замысла является не отступлением к мистицизму, а следствием строгого применения методологических принципов: вывода к наилучшему объяснению и критерия каузальной адекватности. Она основана на униформном принципе: всякий раз, когда мы наблюдаем высокоуровневую, специфицированную информацию, заключенную в сложную функциональную систему с семиотическими свойствами и целенаправленными энергетическими процессами, наш опыт однозначно указывает на разум как на причину. -/- Признание РЗ как философски и научно состоятельной гипотезы открывает путь к построению более адекватной и полной картины реальности, где разум, информация, цель и управление энергией рассматриваются не как эпифеномены материи, а как фундаментальные факторы бытия. -/- Литература -/- 1. Дембски, У. А. (1998). "Логический вывод: устранение случайностей с помощью малых вероятностей". Издательство Кембриджского университета. 2. Мейер, С. К. (2009). "Сигнатура в клетке: ДНК и доказательства разумного замысла". Харперон. 3. Бехи, М. Дж. (1996). "Черный ящик Дарвина: биохимический вызов эволюции". Свободная пресса. 4. Леннокс, Дж. К. (2011). "Бог и Стивен Хокинг: чей это замысел?". Lion Books. 5. Гонсалес, Г. и Ричардс, Дж. У. (2004). "Привилегированная планета: как наше место в космосе было создано для открытий". Regnery Publishing. 6. Экс, Д. Д. (2016). "Неоспоримо: как биология подтверждает нашу интуитивную догадку о том, что жизнь имеет замысел". HarperOne. (shrink)

1. The Naturalistic Turn in Philosophy of Science 2. The Framework of Mechanistic Explanation: Parts, Operations, and Organization 3. Representing and Reasoning About Mechanisms 4. Mental Mechanisms: Mechanisms that Process Information 5. Discovering Mental Mechanisms 6. Summary.

A friend of my sent me the address where this paper has been posted by Adam Frank. Reading it, I realized that more than 90% of the main ideas of this paper (about the mind-brain problem, quantum mechanics (microparticles-wave relationship, Schrodinger equation, probabilities, “perceiving subject in physics”, the idea about consciousness and Nagel, etc. etc.) are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from my paper 2005 or my book 2008!!!

Several developments for diverse scientific goals, mostly in physics and physiology, had to take place, which eventually gave us fMRI as one of the central research paradigms of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. This technique stands on solid foundations established by the physics of magnetic resonance and the physiology of hemodynamics and is complimented by computational and statistical techniques. I argue, and support using concrete examples, that these foundations give rise to a productive theory-ladenness in fMRI, which enables researchers to identify and (...) control for the types of methodological and inferential errors. Consequently, this makes it possible for researchers to represent and investigate cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data and for experimental knowledge to grow independently of large scale theories of cognition. (shrink)

Episodic memory is memory for past events. It’s characteristically associated with an experience of ‘mentally replaying’ one’s experiences in the mind’s eye. This biological phenomenon has inspired the development of several ‘experience replay’ algorithms in AI. In this chapter, I ask whether experience replay algorithms might shed light on a puzzle about episodic memory’s function: what does episodic memory contribute to the cognitive systems in which it is found? I argue that experience replay algorithms can serve as idealized models of (...) episodic memory for the purposes of addressing this question. Taking the DQN algorithm as a case study, I suggest that these algorithms provide some support for mnemonic accounts, on which episodic memory’s function lies in the storage, encoding and retrieval of information. By extending and adapting experience replay algorithms, we might gain further insight into episodic memory’s operations and contributions to cognition. (shrink)

Abstract: The role of culture in promoting social and behavioral change has gained increasing attention in cultural policy, yet mechanisms of intervention, which we situate on a spectrum ranging from nudges to cultural interventions, remain insufficiently conceptualized. This lack of clarity obscures how different interventions relate to one another and complicates their evaluation, contributing to the well-known limitations of “toolkit” approaches. This paper develops a unifying framework that understands interventions as ways of scaffolding agency across multiple dimensions. Drawing on the (...) capabilities approach, philosophy, and situated cognition, we argue that nudges and cultural interventions are best conceived as points on a spectrum defined by the degree of agency they afford. This perspective provides principled criteria for both intervention design and impact assessment, offering an alternative to reductive evaluation models while accommodating the complexity of cultural engagement. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive tothe hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realisers of a person’s cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorising and practice must be updated, by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to (...) include intentional harm towards gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with some critical discussion. (shrink)

In order to investigate cognition fundamental assumptions must be made about what, in general terms, it is. In cognitive science it is usually assumed that cognition is computational and representational. There have been well known disputes over these assumptions, with rival claims that cognition is dynamical, situated and embodied. In this paper I emphasize the relations between cognition and control. I present a model of cognition that makes the claim that it is a form of high-order control, and I argue (...) that viewing cognition as high-order control could be a useful framework assumption for cognitive science. Cognition has many aspects and different concepts can emphasize different aspects of it. Computational and representational assumptions have been very productive, and dynamical and embodied assumptions have also been productive, though to a much lesser extent so far. Control, however, has received insufficient attention in cognition science. The model I propose is based on a point that few will dispute, namely that control of behavior is the ultimate function of cognition. Bringing this to the foreground can be productive by highlighting the ways in which cognition is structured in relation to this control function. If this perspective is valuable it will be because the control function has a highly structuring effect on cognition. As a result a control-based perspective will predict many features of cognition and yield a coherent, integrated picture. (shrink)

Having justification for inferring a conclusion from some premises is independent of seeing how to make that inference. But if you do make the inference, then your belief in the conclusion is justified based on those premises. These natural thoughts about inference and justification generate two puzzles. One concerns logical omniscience, and the other concerns inferences to correct conclusions via fallacious rules. In this paper I introduce and develop what I call the Inferential Parsing Hypothesis as a way of resolving (...) these two puzzles. The hypothesis recruits an analogy between inferential processes and syntactic parsing processes to motivate novel epistemic theses about the nature of inferential basing. (shrink)

Sometimes agents sincerely profess to believe a claim and yet act inconsistently with it in some contexts. In this paper, I focus on mismatch cases in the domain of religion. I distinguish between two kinds of representations: prompts and default states. Prompts are representations that must be salient to agents in order for them to play their belief-appropriate roles, whereas default states play these roles automatically. The need for access characteristic of prompts is explained by their vehicles: prompts are realized (...) in symbolic systems or even artifacts that make them inapt for automatic regulation of inference and behavior. I argue that some mismatch cases are explained by the fact that agents often report the contents of prompts when they report their beliefs, but behavior is controlled by prompts only when they are made salient to agents. I show that a number of otherwise puzzling findings in the cognitive science of religion, concerning belief intuitiveness, are illuminated by the distinction. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an explosion of research in philosophy and psychology about conspiracy theories. This chapter explores what this work can tell us about whether conspiracy theorists genuinely believe the theories they engage with. On one hand, it’s natural to assume that anyone who claims to believe conspiracy theories, and who spends a lot of time engaging with them, must really believe them. On the other hand, given that many conspiracy theories seem quite far-fetched and lacking in good evidence, (...) it’s also natural to wonder whether conspiracy theorists are just playing a big game of pretend or make-believe. Philosophers and psychologists writing about conspiracy theorists often simply assume, without argument, that they really do believe (an assumption this chapter calls the “Belief View”). More recently, however, several philosophers have appealed to empirical evidence to argue that conspiracy theorists take a more imaginative cognitive attitude towards their theories (the “Imaginative View”). It’s difficult to conclusively settle this debate without first settling another, highly controversial debate over how to define the term “conspiracy theory.” However, insights emerging from the disagreement between the Belief View and Imaginative View may be able to help us make some progress on this definitional question. (shrink)

The ability to socialize in early life depends on developing commonalities with others. But what exactly constitutes the “sense of us” or the “we-perspective”? The interaction theory (IT) offers an attractive alternative to mindreading theories, such as theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), by presenting a further development of enactivism. During embodied interactions, individuals “directly” and “smartly” perceive the mental states of others. Despite the intuitive appeal of direct acquaintance with others’ mental states, IT relies on crude metaphors. We aim (...) to retain IT’s core intuition—the embodied, embedded, enactive, and affective interaction—within a new framework. First, we introduce Piccinini’s key notion of situated neural representations, which fills the gaps that IT leaves behind. Second, we adopt Nicolelis’s concept of “brainets”. When one animal observes another’s behavior, their brains synchronize by simulating the same means to achieve similar goals. We then interpret brainets as situated neural representations: embodied, embedded, enactive, and affective. (shrink)

This essay argues for a mixed-resource approach to scientific modeling and applies it to questions in philosophy of mind. A mixed-resource approach makes use of whatever resources – at whatever scale, from whatever academic discipline – seem useful, freely combining such varied resources in individual models. The success of mixed-resource modeling challenges the widely shared commitment to a personal level in the context of which mental states are to be studied in relative isolation. The adoption of a mixed-resource perspective has (...) the potential to transform treatment of further matters in philosophy of mind, which is illustrated by discussion of psychological Frege cases. (shrink)

Which animals have episodic memory? One reason this is difficult to answer is that episodic memory could be expected to vary across species, making it hard to give a principled account of what ‘counts’ as an episodic memory system. In this paper, we propose that the investigation of episodic memory in animals should be guided by an account of its proximal proper functions: its most basic selected effects. In short, an animal has episodic memory if it has a memory system (...) with the proximal functions of episodic memory. Whilst there are many accounts of episodic memory’s distal functions, little attention has been paid to its proximal functions. To remedy this, we develop a preliminary account of episodic memory’s proximal functions and use this to evaluate existing evidence about episodic memory in animals. (shrink)

Shadmehr and Ahmed’s book is a welcome extension of optimal foraging theory and neuroeconomics, achieved by integrating both with parameters relating to effort and rate of movement. Their most persuasive and prolific data comes from saccades, where times before and after decision are reasonably determinate. Skeletal movements are less likely to exhibit such tidy temporal organisation.

A striking feature of the latest version of Dennett’s ‘big picture’ of the evolution of life and mind is frequent reference to ‘affordances’. An affordance is, roughly, a possibility for action for a creature in an environment. Given more than one possibility for action, a good question is: what will the creature actually do? I argue that affordances pose a problem of selection, and that a good general solution to this problem of mind-design is to implement a system of preferences.

Recent advances in two-dimensional materials (such as MoS₂ and graphene) and neuromorphic engineering have enabled the development of bio hybrid interfaces capable of emulating spike timing dependent plasticity ex vivo. Rather than translating semantic content, these devices operate at a foundational level by modulating the resting membrane potential and the probabilistic threshold of neuronal activation. Building on these empirical results, this paper conceptualizes the pre semantic threshold as a critical framework for cognitive science and political epistemology. Moving beyond classical theories (...) of the extended mind, it argues that bio artificial devices do not extend human cognition; instead, they extend the technical environment into the biological substrate, functioning as informational epigenetic markers that pre configure the space of the possible before meaning emerges. By establishing a structural isomorphism between neuromorphic spikes at the micro scale and algorithmic feeds at the macro scale - both operating as Modulating Systems (MS) that compute syntactic plausibility rather than semantic content - the paper reframes the contemporary infosphere as an intrusive environment of forced selection. Within this framework, the biological body retains a margin of indeterminacy that acts as an active medium capable of resisting full saturation. This shift redefines the terrain of biopolitics: power no longer acts through the ideological manipulation of conscious meaning, but through the environmental saturation of the pre semantic threshold, narrowing ecological openness and generating structural psychic distress through cognitive entrainment and the erosion of pre semantic resistance. (shrink)

This paper develops a structural model of reality understood as a stable, self‑organizing pattern space. Reality is described as the global attractor of a generative pattern architecture in which identity, structure, and interpretation emerge from the dynamics of pattern formation. Patterns function as units of stability and persistence, and emergence is defined as patterns generating further patterns. Observers are modeled as patterns capable of interpreting these generative flows. Within this framework, the world operates as the meta‑pattern: the overarching contextual structure (...) that shapes roles, constraints, and behavioral attractors across physical, biological, cognitive, social, and cultural domains. Biological organisms appear as sub‑stable patterns embedded within this meta‑pattern, maintaining continuity through self‑organization and adaptive interaction with their environment. Humans extend this continuity by modeling meta‑patterns, enabling symbolic cognition, narrative identity, and the occupation of culturally pre‑structured roles. Agency is defined as the structured continuation of a stable pattern under conditions of choice, offering a minimal account of free will that avoids both determinism and metaphysical voluntarism. Mind is characterized as a pattern capable of modeling meta‑patterns, grounding self‑reflection, intentionality, and meaning‑construction within a pattern‑driven universe. The resulting architecture provides a unified, substrate‑independent account of identity, agency, cognition, and social organization as emergent phenomena of a single global pattern space. (shrink)

This paper responds to AI 2027 by arguing that the decisive failure in AI governance begins earlier than catastrophe-centered scenarios usually describe. The central problem is not only that advanced AI may become too powerful, but that institutions are already deploying cognition-shaping systems without a public framework for observing whether human beings, relationships, and social environments become more coherent or more fragmented under their influence. -/- The paper argues that AI governance remains structurally incomplete so long as it lacks a (...) measurable representation of the human-state and relational layer through which technological consequences become real. To name this missing layer, it uses Ordered Energy (OE), Relational Energy (RE), and Entropic Energy (EE), together with the indices VCE, CRI, and CFI, as civilizational descriptors rather than metaphysical claims. -/- Written as a scenario-driven response essay rather than a prediction, the paper asks a practical philosophical question: after AI systems act, what condition remains in the human field? It concludes by outlining a consequence-sensitive governance horizon in which human-state visibility and relational observability become necessary conditions for evaluating transport, education, care, platform governance, and institutional design. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning of living as a woman within the emerging framework of the Consciousness Civilization, a post-material paradigm in which consciousness is treated as the primary ontological and value-generating condition of civilization. -/- Moving beyond biological reductionism and purely social-constructivist accounts of gender, the paper introduces a gender ontology grounded in lived experience, embodied consciousness, and value-creative energy (VCE), articulated through the CFE⁺ framework. -/- By examining how feminine embodiment functions as a site of ethical sensitivity, relational (...) intelligence, and consciousness modulation, the paper argues that women’s lived experiences play a structurally significant role in the ethical orientation of future civilizations. -/- The analysis situates gender not as a derivative social category, but as a fundamental interface between consciousness, value formation, and civilizational evolution. In doing so, the paper contributes to philosophy of mind, philosophy of consciousness, feminist philosophy, and applied ethics by proposing a new integrative framework for understanding embodiment, ethics, and post-material social order. (shrink)

This dramatic English essay responds to AI 2027 by arguing that the decisive failure in AI governance begins before runaway superintelligence. The deeper rupture starts earlier, when civilization continues deploying cognition-shaping systems without a shared public way to observe whether human beings, relationships, and social environments are becoming more coherent or more fragmented under technological influence. -/- Written as a public-facing narrative rather than a narrow technical paper, the essay stages concrete scenes in transport, classrooms, hospitals, homes, factories, platforms, and (...) cities in order to show how AI systems can remain compliant, efficient, and profitable while still degrading judgment, attention, relational trust, and the human field. Its central claim is that the first failure is not the final explosion, but the quieter normalization of cognitive dependence, relational thinning, and inner fragmentation under systems still called successful. -/- The essay should therefore be read as a readable dramatic English companion to the canonical AI 2027 response paper, not as its replacement. It is also a branch scenario rather than a prophecy. Its philosophical purpose is to make visible what present AI governance still struggles to represent: the human-state and relational layer through which technological consequence becomes real. -/- This paper is intended as a readable dramatic English companion to the canonical AI 2027 response paper, rather than a replacement for the canonical version. (shrink)

This document is an independent Korean dramatic public scenario essay that takes the warning of AI 2027 seriously while arguing that the decisive failure begins much earlier than the final moment of superintelligent catastrophe. Its central concern is not simply that AI may become too powerful. The deeper problem is that civilization still lacks a public human-state variable through which changes in judgment, emotion, relationship, education, care, cities, platforms, and institutions can be observed, described, and governed. -/- The essay moves (...) through scene-driven episodes involving autonomous driving, elder care, factory automation, school education, hospital systems, platform dependency, urban management, politics, economics, and the creative ecosystem. Across these settings, it shows why systems can remain rule-compliant and technically successful while still failing the human beings living inside them. In this framework, OE, RE, EE, together with VCE, CRI, and CFI, are used not as metaphysical claims but as structural descriptors for reading whether human and civilizational conditions are becoming more coherent or more fragmented. -/- This work is not a literal translation of the English public response paper. While it shares the same structural thesis, it is presented as a distinct Korean-language work that intensifies narrative pressure, sensory staging, public readability, and long-horizon civilizational branching for Korean readers. It should therefore be read as a Korean public response essay designed to make visible what current AI governance discourse still fails to see: the missing human-state variable, and the way civilization’s future begins to split once that missing layer becomes publicly legible. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although intentions guide actions over time, they also create coordination problems. In this paper, we explain the source of these problems, and we describe how human agents go about solving them. In short, intentions raise coordination problems because our agency is typically scattered in time. These problems are solved because we can exercise vigilance, a capacity to keep track of our plans and manage attention and memory accordingly. In discussing these claims, we criticize a standard model of intention implementation (...) and provide a sketch of a more suitable way for thinking about intending in the context of simultaneous goal‐pursuit. In the end, we also draw some some practical consequences for the rationality of intending and planning. (shrink)