Abusing Trust

Dissertation, The New School for Social Research (2025)
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Abstract

Epistemic trust involves a catch-22. We have to trust others in order to acquire knowledge, but we need knowledge in order to know who to trust. Part of our vulnerability is that we may not realize the extent of our dependence on others to make sense of things. I argue for a holistic conception of epistemic responsibility by examining the roles that different sources of information have on our understanding of the world. Instead of grounding epistemic responsibility in individual virtue or testimonial promises, I argue that what makes a source epistemically accountable is discretionary control over information to which audiences are vulnerable. To explain the apparent credibility of implausible views, we must include a network of sources who corroborate a claim. I distinguish responsible and irresponsible networks by their openness to criticism and self-examination about the plausibility of their views. I conclude that given the holistic account of epistemic responsibility that I develop, even conduits like social media companies can be held epistemically responsible for the distrust and confusion that they promote.

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2025-09-20

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Cayla Clinkenbeard
Georgia Institute of Technology

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