In their provocative 1988 paper, Fodor and Pylyshyn issued a formidable challenge to connectionists, i.e. to provide a non‐classical explanation of the empirical phenomenon of systematicity in cognitive agents. Since the appearance of F&P's challenge, a number of connectionist systems have emerged which prima facie meet this challenge. However, Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) advance an argument, based upon a general principle of nomological necessity, to show that one of these systems (Smolensky's) could not satisfy the Fodor‐Pylyshyn challenge. Yet, if Fodor (...) and McLaughlin's analysis is correct, it is doubtful whether any existing connectionist system would fare better than Smolensky's. In the view of Fodor and McLaughlin, humans and classical architectures display systematicity as a matter of nomological necessity (necessity by virtue of natural law), but connectionist architectures do not. However, I argue that the Fodor‐Pylyshyn‐McLaughlin appeal to nomological necessity is untenable. There is a sense in which neither classical nor connectionist architectures possess nomological (or‘nomic’) necessity. However, the sense in which classical architectures do possess nomic necessity applies equally well to at least some connectionist architectures. Representational constituents can have causal efficacy within both classical and connectionist architectures. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Truth-conditions are systematically determined when they are the output of an algorithmic procedure that takes as input a set of semantic and contextual features. Truth-conditional sceptics have cast doubts on the thesis that truth-conditions are systematic in this sense. Against this form of scepticism, Schoubye and Stokke : 759–793) and Dobler : 451–474.) have provided systematic analyses of utterance truth-conditions. My aim is to argue that these theories are not immune to the kind of objections raised by (...) truth-conditional sceptics. In particular, I argue that the use of Questions Under Discussion and ways of being is problematic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives. Edited by FRANCIS SCHUSSLER FIORENZA and JOHN P. GALVIN. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991. Vol. 1: Pp. xv+ 336. Vol. 2: Pp. xv+ 384. $21.95 each; $39.95 set. Not too long ago a fellow Dominican who wanted to do some personal updating and retooling in theology asked me to recommend to him some hooks in Catholic systematics which would show him the lay (...) of the land in contemporary theology. I was happy to be able to apprise him of the two volumes under review. Most of the essayists do not explore new territory or establish new beachheads (nor was this their task) hut instead skillfully sketch the revised maps of terra cognita and graciously occupy already conquered lands, sometimes repeating their own creative work published elsewhere. Without doubt the majority of the Catholic theological guild who belong to the College Theology Society or the Catholic Theological Society of America would recognize in the overall thrust and import of these articles a broad harmony with the main themes and general methodology of contemporary Catholic theology, while they would also acknowledge in the articles' various emphases and organizational techniques the legitimate pluralistic expressions of that theology. In e:ffect, the authors offer, in a balanced and evenhanded way, albeit from their own individual perspectives (hence the subtitle), a rich distillation and compact presentation of the state of contemporary Catholic theology as it is probably taught by the majority of professors in North America. The editors see the volumes as opening up the diverse theological perspectives within Roman Catholic systematic theology, hut as the list of authors reveals, these perspectives actually cluster within the moderate center-to-left-of-center spectrum of contemporary Catholic theology : Systematic Theology: Tasks and Methods (Fiorenza); Faith and Revelation (Avery Dulles) ; Approaching the Christian Understanding.of God (David Tracy) ; The Trinitarian Mystery of God (Catherine Mowry LaCugna); Creation (Anne M. Clifford); Jesus Christ (Galvin); Church (Michael A. Fahey); Sin and Grace (Roger Haight); Saints and Mary (Elizabeth A. Johnson) ; Sacraments in General, Baptism and Confirmation, Penance, Anointing of the Sick (Regis A. Duffy); Eucharist, Order (David N. Power); Marriage (Fiorenza); Eschatology (Monika K. Hellwig). The traditional topics in the traditional order reveal that the volumes 305 306 BOOK REVIEWS are meant to serve as a summary and survey of the major courses of· fered within most Master of Arts and Master of Divinity programs. The intended audience is the beginning student, the student who needs to review the major themes of systematic theology, and the student who needs some updating in contemporary theology. In my opinion, the best articles for the intended audience and purpose are those hy Fior· enza (Systematic Theology), Dulles, Galvin, Haight and Johnson. The editors asked the authors to bear in mind five specific goals: to root their work in Roman Catholic theology; to help recover, in Rahner 's words, " the forgotten truths " of Catholicism, by displaying how historical studies have uncovered heretofore neglected traditions; to make use of current hermeneutical theories and philosophical reflections ; to take into account the ecumenical dimension of theology, while also clarifying the distinctive Roman Catholic position on various topics; and to he attentive to the current stress on praxis. In general, whenever their topic required it, the authors have fulfilled these goals. What has resulted is a combined work deeply grounded in historical understanding which is ecumenically broad while also distinctively Roman Catholic. The articles have tended to retrieve Catholicism's forgotten truths from the church's patristic era, since the dominant tradition until Vatican II was the one defined by the high Middle Ages and Trent. Indicative of this trend is the fact that, among the brief annotated bibliographies appended to each essay, only those by Dulles and Haight contain a work by Thomas Aquinas-and in Dulles's opinion the treatment of faith in the Summa theologiae is " stilil the most authoritative and incisive Catholic treatise on faith" (I :128). Never· theless, the authors are fair in giving medieval theology its rightful place within the Catholic tradition. Instead of offering even the briefest summary of the seventeen individual essays, since the aui:hors' basic introductory treatment of their topics... (shrink)

According to active inference, action is enabled by a top-down modulation of sensory signals. Computational models of this mechanism complement ideomotor theories of action representation. Such theories postulate common neural representations for action and perception, without specifying how action is enabled by such representations. In active inference, motor commands are replaced by proprioceptive predictions. In order to initiate action through such predictions, sensory prediction errors have to be attenuated. This paper argues that such top-down modulation involves systematic misrepresentations. More (...) specifically, the paper first argues for the following conditional claim. If active inference provides an accurate computational description of how action is enabled in the brain, then action is enabled by systematic misrepresentations. Furthermore, it is argued that an inference to the best explanation provides reason for believing the antecedent is true: Firstly, active inference provides a crucial extension to ideomotor theories. Secondly, active inference explains otherwise puzzling phenomena related to sensory attenuation, e.g. in force-matching or self-tickling paradigms. Taken together, these reasons support the claim that action is indeed enabled by systematic misrepresentations. The claim casts doubt on the assumption that representations are systematically beneficial to the extent that they are true: if the argument in this paper is sound, systematically beneficial misrepresentations may lie at the heart of our neural architecture. (shrink)

This paper investigates connectionism's potential to solve the frame problem. The frame problem arises in the context of modelling the human ability to see the relevant consequences of events in a situation. It has been claimed to be unsolvable for classical cognitive science, but easily manageable for connectionism. We will focus on a representational approach to the frame problem which advocates the use of intrinsic representations. We argue that although connectionism's distributed representations may look promising from this perspective, doubts can (...) be raised about the potential of distributed representations to allow large amounts of complexly structured information to be adequately encoded and processed. It is questionable whether connectionist models that are claimed to effectively represent structured information can be scaled up to a realistic extent. We conclude that the frame problem provides a difficulty to connectionism that is no less serious than the obstacle it constitutes for classical cognitive science. (shrink)

Background: New graduate transition into the workforce is challenging and can involve managing ethical tensions. Ethical tensions cause new graduates to doubt their capabilities due to their lack of experience. To support new graduates, we need to know what these ethical tensions are. Objectives: To explore the ethical tensions perceived to occur in practice for new graduate health professionals. Research design: This qualitative systematic review involved a search of five databases (Medline, EMBASE, AMED, CINAHL and Scopus) which resulted (...) in the retrieval of 3554 papers. After the two-phased screening process, eight studies were identified that met the inclusion criteria and had rich data on the review question. Articles were read several times, critically appraised and analysed through thematic analysis. Ethical considerations: No ethical approval was required for the systematic review. The review was conducted following well-established reporting guidelines enabling transparency and rigour. Findings: Studies originated from Australia, United States, Iran and China. One study included speech pathologists and seven were with nurses. Four themes included the following: (1) enduring an unknown workplace culture that generates uncertainty without support for new graduates; (2) being vulnerable because of distress from bullying, exclusion and being a scapegoat; (3) constraining systems and institutional restrictions that cause dilemmas; and (4) experiencing disillusionment from lost ideals about ethical practice. Discussion: This review has brought to light the vulnerability of new graduates to negative workplace culture and collegial incivility. In addition, new graduates are subjected to ethical tensions created by institutional constraints which can create dilemmas and uncertainties through practice that does not align with what they anticipated. Conclusion: Understanding ethical tensions experienced by new graduates enables provision of informed support. There needs to be considerable cultural change for orientation and socialisation of new graduates to enable them to learn and manage ethical tensions. (shrink)

A key assumption fuelling optimism about the progress of large language models (LLMs) in accurately and comprehensively modelling the world is that the truth is systematic: true statements about the world form a whole that is not just consistent, in that it contains no contradictions, but coherent, in that the truths are inferentially interlinked. This holds out the prospect that LLMs might in principle rely on that systematicity to fill in gaps and correct inaccuracies in the training data: consistency (...) and coherence promise to facilitate progress towards comprehensiveness in an LLM’s representation of the world. However, philosophers have identified compelling reasons to doubt that the truth is systematic across all domains of thought, arguing that in normative domains, in particular, the truth is largely asystematic. I argue that insofar as the truth in normative domains is asystematic, this renders it correspondingly harder for LLMs to make progress, because they cannot then leverage the systematicity of truth. And the less LLMs can rely on the systematicity of truth, the less we can rely on them to do our practical deliberation for us, because the very asystematicity of normative domains requires human agency to play a greater role in practical thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REFLECTIONS ON PANNENBERG'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 1 PAUL D. MOLNAR St. John's University Jamaica, New York RADING PANNENBERG leaves no doubt that one is encountering an intellectual giant. His thought is clear, systematic, comprehensive, and fact-filled. In many respects this book is exciting; topics are introduced and developed with details from scripture, from obscure and renowned Protestant theologians, from Aquinas, Augustine, Origen, Duns Scotus, Barth, Jiingel, Moltmann, (...) Rahner, and many others until Pannenberg 's own position is clarified and fully developed. Its six chapters explore : 1) how truth is the foundation of systematic theology; 2) how the concept of God relates to this truth (natural theology) ; 3) how the reality of God is understood in relation to other religions; 4) how to understand revelation; 5) the trinity; and 6) the unity and attributes of God. This last lengthy chapter (337-448) presents a very challenging description of God's attributes arguing that " the trinitarian life of God in his economy of salvation proves to be the true infinity of his omnipotence " (415). Hence the doctrine of the trinity makes it possible to speak correctly about God's immanence and transcendence without falling into pantheism, dualism, modalism, or subordinationism. This book is essential reading for any serious student of theology. Because of its complexity and difficulty, however, we shall focus on the relation of theology and philosophy and briefly explore the roles of experience and faith, natural theology, the 1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids : William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991). 501 502 PAUL D. MOLNAR trinity, revelation, God's being and act, and the person and work of Jesus, with a view toward seeing how Pannenberg's philosophy affects his theology. In spite of his view that Rahner may succumb to " subjectivism " through a consensus theory of truth ( 14, n.22), many of Pannenberg's ideas, e.g., that "Nonthematic knowledge of God" is real and " part of our original situation " ( 115), and that, in the context of modern secularism, the word " God " still reminds us that "the wholeness of human existence has become an unanswered question" (71), would resonate positively with a Rahnerian method. And while he believes Barth did not succeed in grounding the doctrine of the trinity in revelation (327, 296), he contends that Rahner made progress with his thesis of identity, even though by allowing the Father to remain transcendent, he did not go far enough and should have seen that the Father " has made himself dependent upon the course of history " (329, emphasis mine). While Pannenberg deliberately intends to emphasize God's freedom and to avoid subjectivism (36ff., 127ff., 376-7, 391, 419), as when he argues that dogmaticians do not decide what is true, but only God decides (56), fundamental problems do affiict his approach to theology from the beginning. For example: The natural theology of the philosophers had formulated a criterion for judging whether any God could be seriously considered as the author of the whole cosmos, and Christian theology had to meet this criterion if its claim could be taken seriously that the God who redeems us in Jesus Christ is the Creator of heaven and earth and thus the one true God of all peoples (79). The obvious question which arises here is whether it is philosophy or God the creator, known through faith, who determines the meaning of creation and redemption; problems connected with this assertion arise within each chapter. Even though Pannenberg recognizes the problem of establishing our knowledge of God by negating our limited experience ( 184£., 406), he actually attempts to understand God's being in terms of the limits of creaturely experience when he argues that finite knowledge " is grounded especially in the time-bound nature PANNENBERG'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 503 of the knowledge" (54). Thus all of our statements about God, who is not an object in the world, "rest on anticipations of the totality of the world and therefore on the as yet nonexistent future of its uncompleted history " (55, emphasis mine) ; following Descartes, he writes " We attain a sense of the infinite only by negation of the limit of the finite "; while our direct unthematic... (shrink)

Since its introduction by the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, the place held by ethics in biomedical research has been continuously increasing in importance. The past 30 years have also seen exponential growth in the number of biomedical articles published. A systematic review of the literature is the scientific way of synthesising a plethora of information, by exhaustively searching out and objectively analysing the studies dealing with a given issue. However, the question of ethics in systematic (...) reviews is rarely touched upon. This could lead to some drawbacks, as systematic reviews may contain studies with ethical insufficiencies, may be a possible way to publish unethical research and may also be prone to conflict of interest. Finally, informed consent given for an original study is not necessarily still valid at the systematic review level. There is no doubt that routine ethical assessment in systematic reviews would help to improve the ethical and methodological quality of studies in general. However, ethical issues change so much with time and location, and are so broad in scope and in context that it appears illusory to search for a universal, internationally accepted standard for ethical assessment in systematic reviews. Some simple suggestions could nevertheless be drawn from the present reflection and are discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Can Pellegrino and Thomasma's book, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (1981), rightfully claim to be a step forward towards a systematic philosophy of medicine? We try to answer this question by focusing our comment upon three related aspects of the book, namely (1) the problem of philosophical method(s), (2) the alleged Aristotelian-Thomistic orientation, (3) the view of philosophical anthropology of the authors. It is first argued that it is doubtful whether there is as much philosophical method in the (...) authors' book as their reflections on philosophical method suggest. Second, we argue that if Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is important to the authors, it is not so much because of its methods and content, as because it supplies them with a very convenient framework for didactically ordering and transmitting their views about what they consider to be — philosophically speaking — basic about medicine. Third we argue that the authors' conception of philosophical anthropology bears (in point of method and ontology) more resemblance to the humanistic naturalism of John Dewey, than to any of the European philosophical traditions (Aristotelism, (Neo)Thomism, Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology) listed in support of their philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Taking steps from Wilson’s distinction between strong and weak emergence, in this paper I cast doubts on the prospect of weak emergence. After discussing the relationship between properties set at different levels and supporting different counterfactuals and laws, I discuss one crucial condition for a property to be weakly emergent, one that is usually taken as the primary motivation for emergence, that of being “realization indifferent”. I set an argument aimed at showing that this realization indifference does not accord with (...) systematic relations holding between properties set at the mental level vis-a-vis their realizers. Since it is not possible to have mental properties which are not systematic, mental properties cannot be weakly emergent properties. (shrink)

This paper combines considerations from ethics, medicine and public health policy to articulate and defend a systematic case for mask wearing mandates (MWM). The paper argues for two main claims of general interest in favour of MWM. First, MWM provide a more effective, just and fair way to tackle the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic than policy alternatives such as laissez-faire approaches, mask wearing recommendations and physical distancing measures. And second, the proffered objections against MWM may justify some exemptions for specific (...) categories of individuals, but do not cast doubt on the justifiability of these mandates. Hence, unless some novel decisive objections are put forward against MWM, governments should adopt MWM. (shrink)

Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the (...) logical space of positions. (shrink)

This paper employs the Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology (LYGC) as its analytical framework to conduct a deep critique of the systematic errors made by Yang Lihua, professor in the Department of Philosophy at Peking University, in his interpretation of pre-Qin philosophy. The target of critique is not Yang Lihua's personal scholarly cultivation — his textual mastery in the domain of Confucian Neo-Confucianism is beyond doubt — but rather the fundamental coordinate system upon which his methodology operates: a closed cognitive (...) system that takes Confucian moral psychology (xinxinglun) as its highest arbiter, a system within which the vertical dimension of cosmology has never appeared. The paper proceeds through seven levels of argumentation: First, tracing the structural implantation of Yang Lihua's academic genealogy, revealing how Confucian-centrism completed an unconscious coordinate installation during his formative period, causing all subsequent judgments to unfold within the internal rules of the Confucian coordinate system. Second, critiquing his textual-chronological dissolution of the Laozi's cosmology and his political-technological demotion of wuwei (non-action). Third, exposing his ideological operation of using the label 'more like religion' to eliminate Mohism as a cosmological competitor. Fourth, deconstructing his continuation of the two-thousand-year slander against Yang Zhu's 'self-for-self.' Fifth, analyzing the fundamental cosmological limits of his 'li-monism.' Sixth, applying the Sage Entropy formula (dS/dt = ρᵣ · DAF / ΔCCF) to provide a quantitative diagnosis of his paradigm. Seventh, interrogating whether a self-satisfied professor of philosophy at Peking University is ignorant or shameless, and clarifying his danger — more dangerous than the crude denier is the sophisticated concealer. The core proposition of this paper is: Yang Lihua's methodological deficiency does not lie in peripheral details but in the fact that he has never truly understood the cosmological dimension represented by the proposition 'The Milky Way reflected in the Han River is the Dao.' He has studied Laozi for decades, yet has never looked up to see the Milky Way that Laozi saw from the banks of the Han River. A person who has never looked up to see the Milky Way, however profound his textual mastery, is utterly blind at the cosmological level. This is not a personal attack on Yang Lihua; it is a fundamental critique of a paradigm. When this paradigm occupies the professorial chair of the Department of Philosophy at Peking University, when it mass-replicates itself to tens of thousands of students annually through classrooms and publications, its harm to the cosmological inheritance of Chinese civilization is far more profound than any external critic. (shrink)

Thom Brooks'sHegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Rightpresents a very clear and methodologically self-conscious series of discussions of key topics within Hegel's classic text. As one might expect for a ‘systematic’ reading, the main body of Brooks's text commences with an opening chapter on Hegel's system. Then follow seven chapters, the topics of which are encountered sequentially as one reads through thePhilosophy of Right. Brooks's central claim is that too often Hegel's theories or views (...) on any of these topics are misunderstood because of a tendency to isolate the relevant passages from the encompassing structure of thePhilosophy of Rightitself, and, in turn, from Hegel's system of philosophy as a whole, with its logical underpinnings. Brooks is clearly right in holding that Hegel hadintendedthePhilosophy of Rightto be read against the background of ‘the system’ and the ‘logic’ articulating it —nobody doubts that— but there is a further substantive issue here.Shouldcontemporary readers heed Hegel's advice? Brooks's answer is emphatically in the affirmative, and what results is a series of illuminating discussions in which he makes a case for his own interpretations on the basis of systematic considerations, presented against a range of alternatives taken from the contemporary secondary literature, which is amply covered, often in the extensive endnotes to the book. (shrink)

Purpose - Research examining the role of Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in increasing Competitive Advantage (CA). There are many studies of SHRM and CA, but the role of SHRM is still in doubt and there are various modifications of research variations that test mediating variables and or moderating variables that affect CA, and there are differences in the theoretical basis used in various studies. To address this gap, a literature review of the role of SHRM on CA is (...) presented. Design/methodology/approach – Systematic review protocols and content analysis was used to analyze and synthesize insights from 50 empirical studies obtained from two academic databases: Scopus, Google Scholar. Findings – Significant diversity in previous research on the role of SHRM on CA is summarized in several themes. There are significant limitations in the conceptualization of the influence of SHRM on CA, including along with a narrow focus on geographic, methodological and contextual foci of prior studies. The authors propose a comprehensive framework and extensive gap-specific research directions to aid future research. Research limitations/implications – The SLR is limited in its consideration of empirical studies published in academic journal articles obtained from Scopus, and Google Scholar databases. Social implications – The authors reveal the foundation variables, theories that can be used in future research on the influence of SHRM on SCA. Originality/value – This study enhances and extends the research on SHRM's influence on CA by utilizing the perspectives of various modal and multidisciplinary variables for further investigation. The use of perspectives can further ascertain the role of SHRM on CA. (shrink)

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular (...) practice, from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic Theology. Vol. I: Understanding the Christi.an Faith. By FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989. Pp. xiii + 338. $27.95. Frans Jozef van Beeck has written an excellent first volume of a projected three-volume opus of systematic theology, a book at once erudite and elegant, complicated in articulated structure yet simple in synthetic viewpoint. The (...) work's architectonic themes are: theology as an objective interpretive understanding which occurs within and also extends the "Great Tradition," and which has as its object a real God, not simply theology itself and its practitioners (who increasingly see themselves as merely meta-theologians) ; the explanatory category of encounter/experience as denoting the locus of human contact with the divine; the Greek theological motif of grace as divinization, and the Eastern understanding of Christology's exchange principle, together with the Western emphases on creation's exitus from God and reditus to God, all of which van Beeck uses to illumine a catholic interpretation of what our encounter with the divine involves. In addition, pleasingly sprinkled throughout the book are lapidary phrases such as "[theology's] pursuit of pi.a veritas amounts to vera pietas" (p. 26) and " understanding is... more humane and peaceful than coin and cannon" {p. 33). One may grasp the central insights and concerns of the book by comprehending how well its three titles synopsize and synthesize its basic themes. Its main subtitle shows that it is a systematic theology whose nourishing forms are catholicity and contemporaneity. Section 6 underlines just how systematic van Beeck wants his work to be; it is divided into chapters, numbered sections, and lettered subsections so that its arrangement supports " an internal reference system inde· pendent of pagination" (p. 11). The work is unabashedly catholic in the sense of a universal and ecumenical catholicity which is normative for all theology, comprising as it does both an integrity with the past and an openness to the present and future; it is also forthrightly Catholic in the more "positive " sense of advancing ideas peculiarly evident in Catholicism. In both senses, van Beeck sees a Catholic systematics as respecting the " Great Tradition " and desiring to understand it more deeply and as stressing the organic unity of Christian theology, which 141 142 BOOK REVIEWS current emphases on pluralism and specialization jeopardize. Sections 21-22 discuss the catholicity of theology as a pluriform, hierarchical system of truths and briefly describe some of the current pluralism within theology, concluding that "if systematic theology is to be catholic, it must be an exercise in dialogue, that is to say, in mutual trust" (p. 82). Still, one must find footing somewhere in this age of pluralism, and so section 23 displays the central convictions which will inform the entire opus: worship as fundamental to doctrine; christology and its "exchange principle" as the central focus of Christian theology; the theological importance of fundamental theology as an interpretation of the Christian faith in terms of grace and nature; creation and incarnation, together with the exitus/reditus theme, as determining the shape of the system; Vatican II, especially in its attention to history, as the single most important vantage point from which to offer a catholic and contemporary interpretation of the Christian Tradition; ecumenism as a crucial dimension of the system; Christian doctrine as interpreted by the structural relatedness between worship, conduct, and creed. There is no doubt as to the book's contemporaneity; it is evident on every page. The book's main title is significant since it expresses God as the work's unifying objective reference (section 5) and encounter/experience as the primary way of getting to know this God: " The central reality of the Christian faith... is encounter in ecstatic immediacy " (p. 161). It is extremely difficult to explain, without falling into reductionistic subjectivism, how one can experience God in this life. Enlisting Otto and Rabner against just such a tendency in Schleiermacher, van Beeck defends the objectivity and "otherness" of God within religious experience (section 35 and pp. 258-60). He does not discuss in any detail, however, how experience of God is related to faith and to... (shrink)

This chapter from Michel Serres’s comprehensive study on Leibniz—"The System of Leibniz and its Mathematical Models [Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques]"—examines Leibniz’s epistemological framework. This framework, which Leibniz developed for a large part in his “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas [Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis],” is pitched against Descartes’s "Meditations on First Philosophy [Meditationes de Prima Philosophia]" and the method of systematic doubt developed therein. While Descartes rejects any knowledge with the slightest possibility (...) of falsehood, Leibniz accepts knowledge with even a minimal degree of truth. Leibniz’s approach involves a progressive genesis of truth through a series of filters, each further refining knowledge. This process is intrinsically linked to infinitism and combinatorics, allowing for a gradual differentiation of the distinct from the indistinct. The filters are applied sequentially, with each filter proceeding through its own oppositions, resulting in a spectrum of knowledge ranging from obscure to clear, confused to distinct, inadequate to adequate, and symbolic to intuitive. This framework facilitates pluralism within rationalism that proceeds through evolving or regional truths. The filters overlap, and only the final stage of knowledge is devoid of mixture. Leibniz’s epistemology is non-Cartesian, as it relativizes truth and falsehood at each stage of the filtering process. It also accounts for the limitations of sensory perception, attributing them to the imperfection of the human mind in its current state. (Translated by Martijn Boven). (shrink)

Among scholars, how to interpret and evaluate Kant’s rejection of diabolical evil remains controversial. This article has two aims. First, I will examine all six forms of diabolical evil either discussed by Kant or implicitly contained in his texts, thereby demonstrating the reasons why each of these forms must be rejected within his framework. The conclusion of this text analysis is that the extremity of human evil for Kant is quasi-diabolical Willkür which does evil for the sake of self-assertion. Second, (...) I will offer a moderate defense of Kant’s view of diabolical evil as a whole. On the one hand, the legitimacy of Kant’s rejection of both diabolical Wille and full-fledged diabolical Willkür can be confirmed within his theory of practical freedom. On the other hand, faced with the possibility of ‘occasionally doing evil qua evil’, a critical defense of Kant’s moral psychology can be established, i.e. a defense that casts doubt on the distinguishability between ‘doing evil for the sake of self-assertion’ and ‘doing evil qua evil’. (shrink)

Shaftesbury thought that dogmatism was an epistemic vice that violated the norms of good inquiry by inhibiting the proper exercise of reason. One way that Shaftesbury attempted to defend against dogmatic thought and culture was to recommend that society followed the norms of what he called “polite conversation.” This notion has received a fair amount of scholarship. However, it was not Shaftesbury's only recommendation. The earl accused his contemporaries of being “too lazy and effeminate, and withal a little too cowardly, (...) to dare doubt!” (C 2.108). In so doing, Shaftesbury endorsed doubt. But just what does Shaftesbury mean by this endorsement? What is doubt? Why should we doubt? Under what conditions should we doubt? This article takes seriously Shaftesbury's invocation to doubt and develops an account of doubt that fits systematically within Shaftesbury's social, ethical, epistemic project. Doubt, for Shaftesbury, is an attitude that inoculates against dogmatism much like polite conversation is an activity that inoculates against dogmatic exchange. This article argues that Shaftesbury endorses doubt because it (1) promotes genuine inquiry and (2) motivates polite conversation, which itself tends to produce epistemically good outcomes. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of doubt in the classification of inferential reasons in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, and in the works of his Nyāya rivals Keśavamiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa. As deeply systematic thinkers, larger themes in these philosophers’ metaphysics directly determine the more local issues in epistemology and inferential theory, helping to explain, and show the significance of, the differences in their accounts of inferential reasons. For Keśava, an ontology which includes real universals allows for an externalist, reliabilist epistemology, on (...) which the conditions for a genuine inferential reason can be stated in an absolute manner. For Dharmottara, on the other hand, an ontology in which mentally constructed universals are imposed upon real particulars leads to greater dependency on the cognising agent, such that the triple conditions for the inferential reason are formulated in a cogniser-relative way. These differences lead to a more restrictive list of acceptable reasons on Dharmottara’s part, which excludes cases involving doubt. (shrink)

The physician Herophilus of Chalcedon, who lived and worked in Alexandria in the early third centuryb.c., is best known and justly celebrated for his numerous and ground-breaking anatomical discoveries and advances in such areas as pulse theory. His systematic investigations into the human body led to some of the highest achievements of Hellenistic science, among which the best known is probably his discovery and detailed description of the nervous system and its functions. Yet certain aspects of his thought have (...) seemed difficult to harmonize with the aims and methods of his medical research. One such is his attitude to causality. According to Galen, Herophilus had accepted the existence of causes merely on a hypothetical basis, and indeed had made the striking claim that ‘by nature it is not discoverable whether causes do or do not exist’. Galen associates these views directly with a number of arguments designed to prove that there are no such things as causes, but we are otherwise left with little in the way of context, and different interpretations have unsurprisingly suggested themselves. (shrink)

Because of the many criticisms of the notion of a theory independent observation language, it is useful to look at a few actual examples of scientific data to see what theories might be implicit and in what way. There are several possibilities. The theories could be previously accepted, under active investigation, or of a kind that has never been systematically examined. The present study explores these possibilities in the data of several scientific journal articles. The conclusion is that theories and (...) regularities of all three kinds can be found as antecedent conditions of data statements. Any descriptive account of scientific inference must find room for such presuppositions. (shrink)

Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of “irreparable corruption” is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the “aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors” determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to our (...) sentencing case law,” as the Supreme Court recently put it. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 119 (2016). According to these courts, “it would mean nothing” to ask whether the defendant “deserves mercy beyond a reasonable doubt” or “more-likely-than-not deserves it” because moral questions are not “factual.” Instead, moral determinations are highly subjective “value calls” to which concepts of doubt and certainty do not intelligibly apply. Implicit in these rulings is a controversial view of the nature of moral judgment. This Article traces the contours of the view and argues that it is out of step with the way the broader public thinks about morality and fails to address the issues defendants have raised. Courts should avoid wading into such controversial waters for two reasons. First, the judiciary has historically maintained neutrality on issues of significant public concern. Second, even if moral determinations are not factual, applying a standard of proof to at least some moral decisions at sentencing would change the outcome of the sentencer’s deliberations, and improve the legitimacy of the legal system. For the reasonableness of doubt depends on context; and moral questions—"are you certain the defendant deserves death?”—make salient the stakes relative to which a person should decide what to believe about ordinary empirical matters. On the resulting view, reasonable doubt in the final moral analysis is not just intelligible, but essential for correcting a bias in the structure of the bifurcated criminal trial that systematically disadvantages defendants: the tendency for de-contextualized "factual findings” in the guilt phase to control outcomes at sentencing. (shrink)

The storage hypothesis—as described by Norby—is a descriptive thesis (for it yields systematic predictions of human behaviour across a wide range of situations) that has as a core commitment that degrees of belief are stable, persistent states. It is not clear to me that such a view is widely held in philosophy. If the storage hypothesis is not widely held, then arguments against it become less interesting. But is Norby’s argument against the view compelling in any case? I shall (...) argue that it is not. (shrink)

Excerpt from A Defence of Philosophic Doubt: Being an Essay on the Foundations of Belief What is meant by Ethics I have Shown at length in the Appendix which will be found at the end of the volume. Here it is only necessary to say that it includes, not only what are commonly called moral systems, but also some analogous systems not usually so described. Multitudes of propositions, all professing to em body knowledge belonging to one or other of (...) these departments, are being continually put forward for our acceptance. And as no one believes all of them, so those who profess to act rationally must hold that there are grounds for rejecting the propositions they disbelieve, and for accepting those they believe. The systematic account of. These grounds of belief and disbelief makes up the fourth of the Classes into which possible knowledge is divided, and is here always called Philosophy. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Focusing on Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) - one of the foremost scholars and authorities in the Muslim world who is central to the Islamic intellectual tradition - this book embarks on a study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqin) in his epistemology. The book looks at Ghazali's attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazali, he has often been blamed as the one who single-handedly offered the death-blow to philosophy in (...) the Muslim world. In much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazali is understood to prefer philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, granting Sufism a secondary status. Hence, much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazali as a Sufi or as a philosopher; this book takes a parallel approach, and acknowledges each discipline in its right place. It analyses Ghazali's approach to acquiring certainty, his methodological scepticism, his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (ta'lim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism in his epistemology. Offering a systematic and comprehensive approach to Ghazali's epistemology, this book is a valuable resource for scholars of Islamic philosophy and Sufism in particular, and for educated readers of Islamic studies in general. (shrink)

Clinical research is difficult. It confronts massive heterogeneity in its participants, who are real people bumping around the world in complex ways. Clinical research in psychology is doubly difficult, since it tries systematically to study conditions that are inherently difficult to systematize. In their thoughtful and closely argued article, Truijens et al. emphasize these difficulties, and describe a novel challenge to psychotherapy research: that the support for many evidence-based therapies is weaker than previously recognized because it relies on patient-reported outcome (...) measures that often yield invalid results. Despite the initial plausibility of their position, however, their... (shrink)

In this scholarly study, the author, a professor of theology at the University of Iowa, argues that Tillich's thought sought an answer to the problem posed by the questions: "What certainty is left for thought after men have become conscious that thinking itself is historical? If thinking is historically conditioned, can ontological thought ever achieve objective certainty and can theological thought ever achieve religious certainty?" Scharlemann endeavors to show that Tillich constructed his answer to these questions "with two basic ideas, (...) that of 'correlation' and that of a 'paradoxical reality and presence'." In the introduction the author establishes the critical terms which he will use to carry out his "constructive analysis." The first chapter sketches the historical development leading up to the question Tillich faced. The subsequent chapters present various contexts and aspects of Tillich's answer. In the final chapter the author indicates certain aspects of Tillich's thought which seem to be unclear or incomplete, certain contradictory motifs, an entirely new systematic structure which would retrace the same ground as did Tillich, but on a different and, the author believes, a more adequate analytic basis. This study will be of interest primarily to those who are already familiar with Tillich's thought. It is particularly thorough in its analysis of Tillich's early works. The author is quite conversant with the literature by and about Tillich and provides a useful bibliography.--H. F. (shrink)

Janet Broughton’s Descartes’s Method of Doubt1 is a systematic study of the role of doubt in Descartes’s epistemology. The book has two parts. Part 1 focuses on the development of doubt in the First Meditation, exploring such topics as the motivation behind methodic doubt; the targeted audience; the method’s game-like character (on her view); its relations to ancient skepticism, its reasonableness; the method’s presuppositions relative to commonsense belief; Michael Williams’s recent criticisms of Descartes; and more. Part (...) 2 focuses on how doubt figures in the constructive epistemology of the Meditations—on how Descartes employs doubt as a tool for founding knowledge. I’ll have much more to say about part 2. A careful treatment of the topics of this book has been long overdue. Broughton’s ideas are innovative, engaging, and clearly developed at every stage. The wide-ranging issues addressed remind the reader of why Descartes’s thought is of continuing philosophical interest. Throughout, her interpretation is sensitive to the exegetical concerns of scholars. This rich book deserves the attention of every serious student of Descartes. The present paper is a critical study of part 2—the more ambitious part of this highly ambitious book. I begin with an overview of Broughton’s account. Sections 2–4 contain my analysis. (shrink)

My title advertizes a paradox. The characteristic complaint of the sceptic is that others make assumptions they are not entitled to make. A philosophical sceptic is committed to a systematic refusal to accept such assumptions in the absence of the kind of justification they think is required. A sceptic who, none the less, helps himself to such an assumption, seems to be caught in a paradoxical position. This is the kind of situation in which, it seems, certain eighteenth-century sceptical (...) philosophers were placed in relation to the ‘principle’ of natural order. They did not doubt that there is such a principle, that there is a source or ultimate cause of the order to be found in the universe. And yet, on their own terms, is not the existence of such a principle something we should expect them to have doubted? What I shall try to do in this lecture is to bring out why they did not doubt the existence of such a principle and how serious their failure to do so is for their sceptical position. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic ‘oughts’ that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. I argue that the policy of systematically doubting or disbelieving conspiracy theories would be both a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation, since (...) it leads to the conclusion that history is bunk and the nightly news unbelievable. In fact (of course) the policy is not employed systematically but is only wheeled on to do down theories that the speaker happens to dislike. I develop a deductive argument from hard-to-deny premises that if you are not a ‘conspiracy theorist’ in my anodyne sense of the word then you are an ‘idiot’ in the Greek sense of the word, that is, someone so politically purblind as to have no opinions about either history or public affairs. The conventional wisdom can only be saved (if at all) if ‘conspiracy theory’ is given a slanted definition. I discuss some slanted definitions apparently presupposed by proponents of the conventional wisdom (including, amongst others, Tony Blair) and conclude that even with these definitions the conventional wisdom comes out as deeply unwise. I finish up with a little harmless fun at the expense of David Aaronvitch whose abilities as a rhetorician and a popular historian are not perhaps matched by a corresponding capacity for logical thought. (shrink)

Philosophy in the period immediately after Aristotle is sometimes thought to be marked by the decline of natural philosophy and philosophical disinterest in contemporary achievements in the sciences. But in one area at least, the early third century B.C.E. was a time of productive interaction between such disparate fields as epistemology, physics and geometry. Debates between the sceptics and the dogmatic philosophical schools focus on epistemological problems about the possibility of self-evident appearances, but there is evidence from Euclid's day of (...) a quite different response. The sceptical challenge provoked the development of theories explaining error formation, showing how illusions can be studied systematically and are subject to prediction. Such theories do not legitimate claims about the nature of the underlying entities perceived, but provide justification for forming expectations about future perceptions. While it overtly focuses on purely geometrical considerations, the Euclidean model of optics nonetheless provides support for certain views about the nature of vision and the physics of light. Moreover, by offering a model in which the image received is not thought to be a perspicuous mirroring of the object seen, Euclid may have helped promote a view of perception as something reconstructed from information received, not as a mere form transferred into the eye. The ancient sceptic may indeed have fulfilled his promise to promote inquiry by focusing attention on problems that escape the attention of a hasty theorist. (shrink)

Background Since 2010 the People’s Republic of China has been engaged in an effort to reform its system of organ transplantation by developing a voluntary organ donation and allocation infrastructure. This has required a shift in the procurement of organs sourced from China’s prison and security apparatus to hospital-based voluntary donors declared dead by neurological and/or circulatory criteria. Chinese officials announced that from January 1, 2015, hospital-based donors would be the sole source of organs. This paper examines the availability, transparency, (...) integrity, and consistency of China’s official transplant data. Methods Forensic statistical methods were used to examine key deceased organ donation datasets from 2010 to 2018. Two central-level datasets — published by the China Organ Transplant Response System and the Red Cross Society of China — are tested for evidence of manipulation, including conformance to simple mathematical formulae, arbitrary internal ratios, the presence of anomalous data artefacts, and cross-consistency. Provincial-level data in five regions are tested for coherence, consistency, and plausibility, and individual hospital data in those provinces are examined for consistency with provincial-level data. Results COTRS data conforms almost precisely to a mathematical formula while Central Red Cross data mirrors it, albeit imperfectly. The analysis of both datasets suggests human-directed data manufacture and manipulation. Contradictory, implausible, or anomalous data artefacts were found in five provincial datasets, suggesting that these data may have been manipulated to enforce conformity with central quotas. A number of the distinctive features of China’s current organ procurement and allocation system are discussed, including apparent misclassification of nonvoluntary donors as voluntary. Conclusion A variety of evidence points to what the authors believe can only be plausibly explained by systematic falsification and manipulation of official organ transplant datasets in China. Some apparently nonvoluntary donors also appear to be misclassified as voluntary. This takes place alongside genuine voluntary organ transplant activity, which is often incentivized by large cash payments. These findings are relevant for international interactions with China’s organ transplantation system. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the following questions: What does Michael Dummett demand of a “systematic” theory of meaning, and what understanding of Frege's “level of sense” leads him to conclude that, if Wittgenstein is correct in denying that there is such a level, then no systematic theory of meaning is possible? For Dummett, an understanding of the meaning side of language is not “systematic” if it must hold that a sentence is understood only because it has been (...) previously learned as a whole. To reconstruct how Dummett arrives at Frege's level of “sense” as crucial for a systematic understanding of complexity, we can begin with a hypothetical concrete situation and proceed step by step to rule out what is not meant by “meaning” when we speak of it as being systematically developed. (shrink)

When should I change my mind? What can I believe and what must I doubt? In this new "philosophy of good reasons" Wayne C. Booth exposes five dogmas of modernism that have too often inhibited efforts to answer these questions. Modern dogmas teach that "you cannot reason about values" and that "the job of thought is to doubt whatever can be doubted," and they leave those who accept them crippled in their efforts to think and talk together about (...) whatever concerns them most. They have willed upon us a "befouled rhetorical climate" in which people are driven to two self-destructive extremes—defenders of reason becoming confined to ever narrower notions of logical or experimental proof and defenders of "values" becoming more and more irresponsible in trying to defend the heart, the gut, or the gonads. Booth traces the consequences of modernist assumptions through a wide range of inquiry and action: in politics, art, music, literature, and in personal efforts to find "identity" or a "self." In casting doubt on systematic doubt, the author finds that the dogmas are being questioned in almost every modern discipline. Suggesting that they be replaced with a rhetoric of "systematic assent," Booth discovers a vast, neglected reservoir of "good reasons"—many of them known to classical students of rhetoric, some still to be explored. These "good reasons" are here restored to intellectual respectability, suggesting the possibility of widespread new inquiry, in all fields, into the question, "When _should_ I change my mind?". (shrink)

In Hume's True Scepticism, Donald C. Ainslie offers a highly original, systematic interpretation of Treatise Book 1, part 4, and of much else in the Treatise besides. Along the way, he provides new solutions to two of the main outstanding problems of Hume scholarship: what is the relationship between Hume's skepticism and his commitment to pursuing a naturalistic science of man? And what "very considerable mistake" about personal identity does Hume mean to report in the Appendix? These are fantastic (...) achievements. I congratulate Ainslie on the book, and on the JHP Book Prize, which I am happy to learn he has won.To keep things interesting, these comments will focus on three related topics where I am not yet... (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: One intriguing concept that the author introduces and uses throughout the paper is the idea of an “anticipatory drive,” which is described as explaining the systematic tendency to develop anticipatory capabilities that ultimately support goal-oriented action. Although the idea of a common mechanism that explains a multitude of capabilities can be appreciated, it is unclear if (...) the author uses the term “drive” in a literal or metaphorical sense. Should the evolutionary advantage, the selective “pressure” for anticipatory capacities and representation be considered a drive in the sense of Hull like, for example, the sex drive, or hunger? If this is true, it should be related to some bodily control structure like the other mentioned drives. Another possibility is that the anticipatory drive is an intrinsic motivation, like curiosity, which “pushes” towards certain situations, such as those that are more predictable. If this is true, it should be explained what is the exact nature of such intrinsic motivation. (shrink)

Is Buddhism’s attitude towards accepted forms of knowledge sceptical? Are Pyrrhonian scepticism and classical Buddhist scholasticism related in their respective applications and expressions of doubt? In what way and to what degree is Critical Buddhism an offshoot of modern scepticism? Questions such as these as well as related issues are explored in the present collection, which brings together examinations of systematic doubt in the traditions of Buddhism from a variety of perspectives. What results from the perceptive observations (...) and profound analytical insights of the seven essays is a rich and multi-faceted picture of two families of philosophical systems—scepticism and Buddhism—that seem both akin and at odds, both related and distant at the same time. (shrink)

First Published in 1964, Studies in Metaphilosophy presents and develop the hypothesis about the nature of metaphysical theories. Each study is a fresh attempt to improve our understanding of what a philosophical theory is and what its supporting arguments come to. Author argues that philosophical theories are nothing more substantial than linguistic chimeras and has the important function of pointing up the need for the examination of the whole subject. The volume discusses important themes like concept analysis, systematic (...) class='Hi'>doubt, the method of deduction from fact, logical necessitation, the nature of philosophical analysis, the nature of value, the metaphysical concept of space, Moore and philosophical analysis, the hidden structure of philosophical theories, and the relevance of psychoanalysis to philosophy. This volume will be an essential source for scholars and researchers of philosophy, logic, and metaphysics. (shrink)

How do Humans Think? How should we think? Almost all of philosophy and a great deal else depends in large part on the answers that we provide to such questions. Yet they are almost impossible to deal with in isolation; notions about nature of thought are almost bound to connect with metaphysical notions about where ideas come from, with notions about appropriate arenas for certainty, doubt, and belief, and hence with moral and religious ideas. The Western tradition of thinking (...) about thinking takes shape with Socrates; among the other important strands covered in this book are Descartes’ recipe for discovering truth through systematic doubt, Hume’s notion that all our ideas are copies of sense impressions, Wollstonecraft’s introduction of the perspective of gender into such questions, and Wittgenstein’s claim that much of the traditional terrain of Western philosophy should be thought of as the proper domain only of linguistic assertion, possessing no content beyond the words. With each philosopher and school of thought dealt with, Govier shows how ideas about thinking connect to the other elements of the particular philosophy, and brings to life the social and intellectual context that the ideas spring from. Socrates’ Children is thus not only an investigation of notions of thinking and knowing in Western culture; it is a selective general history of much of Western philosophy, from a unique and fascinating perspective. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is the organized expression of a growing intent among philosophers and scientists to clarify, perhaps unify, the programs, methods and results of the disciplines of philosophy and of science. The examination of fundamental concepts and presuppositions in the light of the positive results of science, systematic doubt of the positive results, and a thorough-going analysis and critique of logic and of language, are typical projects for this joint effort. It is not necessary to be committed (...) to a belief that science and philosophy are or should be one, or else that “never the twain shall meet.” If anything, there is to be expected a wholesome regard for the value of established science in furnishing a foil for philosophy and a check on its old extravagances. This does not mean that even the best-established science may not be subject to most devastating criticism by analysis of its foundations. In fact, despairing of the philosophy of the schools, science has done it largely for itself. The theories of gravitation, atomicity, electro-magnetism, evolution, relativity and quanta have all arisen through drastic revisions of complacent fundamental “truths.”. (shrink)

Occasionally there has appeared in the history of philosophy a thinker who has become aware of the chaotic condition of philosophy and of the intellectual anarchy that exists in all of its branches, and has attempted to remedy the situation. Descartes cast about for a guiding principle, a compass which would show him the way through the treacherous terrain of philosophy. As is well known he devised the method of systematic doubt, by means of which he hoped to (...) discover an axiom on which he could securely erect a system of basic and reassuring beliefs. Leibniz had before his mind the notion of an ideal language which would by calculation solve problems with certainty. With this he thought we “should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as in geometry and analysis.” Descartes' attempt was a failure; and nothing came of Leibniz's ideal, even with the development of modern symbolic logic. Russell's claim that “logic is the essence of philosophy” frightened many philosophers and gave new hope to others; but his claim was as empty as the proverbial political promise. With G. E. Moore we have a further attempt to introduce sobriety and certainty into philosophy and to make fruitful research possible in it. He has made prominent a method for obtaining results in philosophy; and he has also formulated a philosophical platform, i.e., set out a list of Common-sense propositions which he says are known to be true by everyone, philosopher as well as non-philosopher, and are not, therefore, open to debate. The method, which he used extensively and with great skill, is the method of analysing concepts. (shrink)

Metrology is a discipline of expunging impurities. The mid-nineteenth century French physicist Henri-Victor Regnault created a whole new way of doing experiments, attempting to produce standards physically by the "direct method." His immodest ambition to control all disturbing parameters represents a relict in the physical sciences of Romantic hopes for an all-embracing, artistic and aesthetic approach to nature, expressed in the absolute, eternal determination of nature's constants and their numerical relationships. The novelist Gustave Flaubert, whose rejection of metaphysics, love for (...) finest detail, concern for impartial treatment of the human psyche, and perfectionism, made him Regnault's literary complement, likewise hoped for this utopian union of science and art. There is a romantic and a modern ring to their ideals which were not to be achieved by optimism, but by introducing systematic doubt, by thoroughly studying impurities and expunging them. Nature did not speak clearly, but hid behind a multitude of disturbing effects—revealed only by the experimenter's or writer's voluntary restraint and self-denial, a disinterestedness Regnault and Flaubert celebrated as the highest and holiest morality. For them, attention to secondary matters became primary, because they expected them to lead the way to the grail. (shrink)

How do Humans Think? How should we think? Almost all of philosophy and a great deal else depends in large part on the answers that we provide to such questions. Yet they are almost impossible to deal with in isolation; notions about nature of thought are almost bound to connect with metaphysical notions about where ideas come from, with notions about appropriate arenas for certainty, doubt, and belief, and hence with moral and religious ideas. The Western tradition of thinking (...) about thinking takes shape with Socrates; among the other important strands covered in this book are Descartes’ recipe for discovering truth through systematic doubt, Hume’s notion that all our ideas are copies of sense impressions, Wollstonecraft’s introduction of the perspective of gender into such questions, and Wittgenstein’s claim that much of the traditional terrain of Western philosophy should be thought of as the proper domain only of linguistic assertion, possessing no content beyond the words. With each philosopher and school of thought dealt with, Govier shows how ideas about thinking connect to the other elements of the particular philosophy, and brings to life the social and intellectual context that the ideas spring from. _Socrates’ Children_ is thus not only an investigation of notions of thinking and knowing in Western culture; it is a selective general history of much of Western philosophy, from a unique and fascinating perspective. (shrink)

The United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme’s UKCP09 project makes high-resolution projections of the climate out to 2100 by post-processing the outputs of a large-scale global climate model. The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse the methodology used and then urge some caution. Given the acknowledged systematic, shared errors of all current climate models, treating model outputs as decision-relevant projections can be significantly misleading. In extrapolatory situations, such as projections of future climate change, there is little reason (...) to expect that post-processing of model outputs can correct for the consequences of such errors. This casts doubt on our ability, today, to make trustworthy probabilistic projections at high resolution out to the end of the century. (shrink)

Without doubt the Galileo affair is one of the most studied events in the history of Western culture. The past four centuries have produced vast amounts of commentaries, countless interpretations and evaluations advanced by physicists, astronomers, theologians, philosophers, churchmen, historians, and even playwrights. Although the literature on the original affair is enormous, the story of the aftermath, says Finocchiaro, has never been told: “The reflective commentary has never been systematically examined, and the subsequent controversy has never been anchored in (...) the textual sources.”. (shrink)