Vientiso, tapatybę laike išlaikančio asmens samprata yra kertinė baudžiamosios teisės teorijai ir praktikai. Dereko Parfito reduktyvistiniu požiūriu į asmenį grįsta moralės filosofija meta iššūkį tokiai sampratai. Straipsnyje išskiriamos ir aptariamos dvi Parfito nuasmeninimo formos – reduktyvistinė asmens samprata bei veiksmų ir patirčių nuasmeninimas. Remiantis kritine literatūra, analizuojančia reduktyvistinės laipsniuojamos tapatybės reikšmę baudžiamajai teisei, bei šios sampratos pritaikymu nūdienėje baudžiamosios teisės filosofijoje, argumentuojama už tai, kad pagrindinės baudžiamosios teisės teorijos gali ją integruoti neatsisakydamos savo pamatinių principų. Parfito nuasmeninimu grįstas pelnytos bausmės (...) galimybės paneigimas atmetamas kaip nenuoseklus. Galiausiai, parodoma, kad augantis neurointervencijų potencialas pakeisti asmenį, suporuotas su Parfito nuasmeninimu, keltų rimtas moralines dilemas kai kurioms utilitaristinėms teorijoms, įskaitant ir požiūrį, kuriam pats Parfitas išreiškia pritarimą. (shrink)

The author claims that coercive neurointerventions on offenders violate requirements of respect. He explores this idea with reference to Ian Carter’s notion of ‘opacity respect’; that is, the idea that a form of opacity that Carter calls ‘evaluative abstinence’ is a necessary feature of respect. He argues that opacity is a necessary part of relating to one another as equals. This is not to say that we should pursue ignorance, or even pretend it. As the author interprets it, it (...) is rather the claim that the respect structurally necessary to some inherently valuable form of human relations sometimes requires that we do not acknowledge what we see, or could see. The demands of that way of relating to one another are therefore violated when we inquire into the interventions that would be necessary to alter someone’s behaviour for the better, and when we deploy the knowledge thus gained in subjecting them to a programme of behaviour modification. (shrink)

According to some philosophers, a necessary condition of morally permissible punishment is that it communicates deserved censure for the offender’s wrongdoing. The author calls this the Communicative Condition of punishment. The chapter considers whether the use of mandatory crime-preventing neurointerventions is compatible with the Communicative Condition. The author argues that it is not. If we accept the Communicative Condition, it follows that it is impermissible to administer mandatory neurointerventions on offenders as punishment. The author then considers whether it (...) is permissible to offer an offender a neurointervention as a replacement for incarceration or in exchange for a shorter sentence. He notes that this could meet the Communicative Condition, although, somewhat oddly, only in cases where the neurointerventions have harmful effects. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that even if we hold that at least some paternalistic behaviour is impermissible when directed towards innocent persons, in certain cases, the same behaviour is permissible when directed towards criminal offenders. I also defend the claim that in some cases it is morally preferable to behave paternalistically towards offenders as an alternative to traditional methods of punishment. I propose that the reason paternalistic behaviour is sometimes permissible towards an offender is the same reason that inflicting (...) intentional harm on an offender is permissible – namely, that it is sometimes a morally justified method of punishing an offender for his wrongdoing. (shrink)

How should we punish criminal offenders? One prima facie attractive punishment is administering a mandatory neurointervention—interventions that exert a physical, chemical or biological effect on the brain in order to diminish the likelihood of some forms of criminal offending. While testosterone-lowering drugs have long been used in European and US jurisdictions on sex offenders, it has been suggested that advances in neuroscience raise the possibility of treating a broader range of offenders in the future. Neurointerventions could be a cheaper, (...) and more effective method of punishment. They could also be more humane. Nevertheless, in this paper we provide an argument against the use of mandatory neurointerventions on offenders. We argue that neurointerventions inflict a significant harm on an offender that render them a morally objectionable form of punishment in a respect that incarceration is not. Namely, it constitutes an objectionable interference with the offender’s mental states. However, it might be thought that incarceration also involves an equally objectionable interference with the offender’s mental states. We show that even if it were the case that the offender is harmed to the same extent in the same respect, it does not follow that the harms are morally equivalent. We argue that if one holds that intended harm is more difficult to justify than harm that is unintended but merely foreseen, this means neurointerventions could be morally objectionable in a significant respect that incarceration is not. (shrink)

Traditional means of crime prevention, such as incarceration and psychological rehabilitation, are frequently ineffective. This collection considers how crime preventing neurointerventions could present a more humane alternative but, on the other hand, how neuroscientific developments and interventions may threaten fundamental human values.

The idea of a ‘right to mental integrity’, sometimes referred to as a ‘right against mental interference,’ is a relatively new concept in bioethics, making its way into debates about neurotechnological advances and the establishment of ‘neurorights.’ In this paper, we interrogate the idea of a right to mental integrity. First, we argue that some experts define the right to mental integrity so broadly that rights violations become ubiquitous, thereby trivialising some of the very harms the concept is meant to (...) address. Second, rights-based framing results in an overemphasis on the normative importance of consent, implying that neurointerventions are permissible in cases where people consent to have their mental states influenced or read off, a confidence in consent that we argue is misguided. Third, the concept often collapses the ethics of brain inputs and brain outputs, potentially resulting in a loss of important conceptual nuance. Finally, we argue that the concept of a right to mental integrity is superfluous—what is wrong with most violations of mental integrity can be explained by existing concepts such as autonomy, manipulation, privacy, bodily rights, surveillance, harm and exploitation of vulnerabilities. We conclude that bioethicists and policy-makers ought to either make use of these concepts rather than arguing for the existence of a new right, or they need to avoid making rights violations ubiquitous by settling on a narrower and more rigorous definition of the right. (shrink)

This chapter explores the intersections between free will skepticism, the emerging concept of neurorights, and the ethical implications of coercive nonconsensual moral neuroenhancements. Free will skepticism in general, and hard incompatibilism in particular, questions whether individuals have alternative possibilities and ultimate control—in the degrees required for free will and moral responsibility—in a deterministic or indeterministic universe. Then, upon the denial of free will, some might suggest that implementing coercive neurointerventions to prevent and correct deviant antisocial behavior is necessary or (...) desirable. This discussion is crucial to neurorights, which aim to protect cognitive liberty and consent. However, this chapter argues that neurorights, as currently conceived, are inadequate and could be less protective and more regressive in terms of human rights. Therefore, a skeptical or a hard incompatibilist approach to free will should reconsider the debate on moral enhancements and neurorights, advocating for more humane perspectives aligned with penal neuroabolitionism, which advocates for the gradual abolition of criminal law and retributive punishment, while respecting human dignity, freedom of thought, bodily integrity, autonomy, and consent. This chapter rethinks future public criminal policies and radically challenges the way in which we currently fail to do justice. (shrink)

This article critically analyzes proposals for the use of coercive medical interventions with neurotechnologies in criminal justice systems for moral enhancement purposes, considering their ethical and legal implications. It argues that although neurotechnologies could hypothetically improve certain aspects of the moral behavior of individuals involved in criminal proceedings, their non-consensual use raises significant dilemmas for the rights of defendants. After outlining the historical development of these proposals and the real-life capabilities of neurotechnologies, it is shown that their effects are limited, (...) contextual, and potentially risky. The article reviews so-called neurorights as regulatory responses, noting that, as excessively relative rights, they could weaken existing protections and unduly expand the State's punitive power. The article concludes that the strongest defense against the idea of coercive neurointerventions lies in strengthening the absolute protection of human dignity and freedom of thought, as well as legally enforcing the protection of informed consent and bodily and mental integrity within the current human rights framework, without the need to create new lists of relative and problematic rights. (shrink)

The target article by Birks and Buyx (2018) contributes to an (as yet) strikingly undifferentiated debate on the coercive use of neurointerventions or neurocorrectives for rehabilitative purposes i...

Among the worrisome aspects of neuroscience is that the increasing knowledge about neuronal and mental processes as well as new tools to intervene into brains and minds in order to modify thoughts and behavior can be used for manipulative purposes. This chapter addresses the responsibility of persons for actions resulting from severe manipulations. In a rich philosophical debate it is widely held that manipulated agents are not responsible. By contrast, the law rarely excuses defendants even when their motives for action (...) were severely influenced from outside. We compare these diverging lines of reasoning and argue against recognition of a “brainwashing defense”. The wide guarantee of personal freedom in liberal constitutional orders is viable and defensible only if persons can be expected to abide by the law. When persons disappoint normative expectations, a reactive response has to (counterfactually) reinforce the validity and stability of the norm. This is one of the rationales for the ascription of responsibility and punishment. A history-oriented approach of responsibility that would excuse persons because of manipulative influences, as favored by many philosophers and by unexamined moral intuitions, focuses too narrowly on purely subjective aspects such as authenticity, and therewith, just like many current discussions of responsibility and neuroscience, tends to lose sight of the functions of responsibility within the social and normative structures in which it is embedded. (shrink)

The promise of neurobiological interventions that afford improving pro-social behavior is particularly interesting for criminal justice systems. After all, rehabilitation of offenders is one of their central objectives. This raises the question of whether states can deploy such means to rehabilitate offenders against the latters’ will, as part of—or instead of—punishment. Some advocates of compulsory treatments of offenders consider them more humane (and effective) than current forms of hard treatment such as incarceration. This chapter critically engages with suggestions to treat (...) legally competent offenders for rehabilitative purposes against their will by emphasizing two aspects. First, strong human rights of offenders—summarily the right to mental self-determination—oppose mandatory interventions into criminogenic psychological states or processes. These human rights are not (yet) recognized in every jurisdiction, but emerge from general liberal and democratic principles that most western jurisdictions endorse. Secondly, the case for mandatory rehabilitation is weaker than it may appear at first glance, because it is anything but clear that and why the penological aim of rehabilitation justifies severe interferences of offenders’ rights. In any case, it seems that states could attain their legitimate forward-looking aims—preventing recidivism—by less restrictive means such as incapacitation. Thus, compulsory rehabilitation may only be justified in exceptional cases. Rather, offenders should be offered a choice between neurorehabilitation and detention. (shrink)

A natural approach to justifying the coercive administration of morally enhancing neurointerventions is to appeal to a principle of moral paternalism. This chapter outlines the factors that need to be taken into account in order for a principle of moral paternalism to morally justify coercively administering neurointerventions. First, the author argues that the moral paternalist must take special care to ensure that the interventions will improve moral character. Second, she outlines the potential costs that the moral paternalist needs (...) to address before a moral paternalistic interference is justified. The author argues that whilst the moral paternalistic administration of a neurointervention may have more kinds of cost to consider than other forms of moral paternalistic interference, this does not mean that such interventions cannot be justified under the principle. (shrink)

This chapter sets the scene for the subsequent philosophical discussions by surveying a number of biological interventions that have been used, or might in the future be used, for the purposes of crime prevention. These interventions are pharmaceutical interventions intended to suppress libido, treat substance abuse or attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), or modulate serotonin activity; nutritional interventions; and electrical and magnetic brain stimulation. Where applicable, we briefly comment on the historical use of these interventions, and in each case we discuss (...) the evidence that they are effective, or might become so with further refinement. The chapter concludes with a comment on some potentially significant differences between the varieties of intervention that we canvass. (shrink)

Do we have a duty to use moral neurointerventions to correct deficits in our moral psychology? On their surface, these technologies appear to pose worrisome risks to valuable dimensions of the self, and these risks could conceivably weigh against any prima facie moral duty we have to use these technologies. Focquaert and Schermer :139–151, 2015) argue that neurointerventions pose special risks to the self because they operate passively on the subject’s brain, without her active participation, unlike ‘active’ interventions. (...) Some neurointerventions, however, appear to be relatively unproblematic, and some appear to preserve the agent’s sense of self precisely because they operate passively. In this paper, I propose three conditions that need to be met for a medical intervention to be considered low-risk, and I say that these conditions cut across the active/passive divide. A low-risk intervention must: pass pre-clinical and clinical trials, fare well in post-clinical studies, and be subject to regulations protecting informed consent. If an intervention passes these tests, its risks do not provide strong countervailing reasons against our prima facie duty to undergo the intervention. (shrink)

Is the political community morally permitted to use neurointerventions to improve the moral conduct of children? Putting aside difficult questions concerning the institutionalization of moral enhancement, the authors address this question, first, by arguing that is not, in itself, always morally impermissible for the community to impose neurointerventions on adults. Although certain ideals, such as the ideal of individual autonomy, limit the permissible employment of neurointerventions, they do not generate a moral constraint that always forbids their use. (...) Thereafter, they argue that because young children lack certain moral capacities that adults possess, the moral limits that pertain to the use of neurointerventions to improve their moral behaviour are, in principle, less restrictive than they are for adults. (shrink)

Neurointerventions—interventions that physically or chemically modulate brain states—are sometimes imposed on criminal offenders for the purposes of diminishing the risk that they will recidivate, or, more generally, of facilitating their rehabilitation. One objection to the nonconsensual implementation of such interventions holds that this expresses a disrespectful message, and is thus impermissible. In this paper, we respond to this objection, focusing on the most developed version of it—that presented by Elizabeth Shaw. We consider a variety of messages that might be (...) expressed by nonconsensual neurointerventions. Depending on the message, we argue either that such interventions do not invariably express this message, that expressing this message is not invariably disrespectful, or that the appeal to disrespect is redundant. (shrink)

Soon it may be possible to promote the rehabilitation of criminal offenders through _neurointerventions_ (interventions which exert direct physical, chemical or biological effects on the brain). Some jurisdictions already utilise neurointerventions to diminish the risk of sexual or drug-related reoffending. And investigation is underway into several other neurointerventions that might also have rehabilitative applications within criminal justice—for example, pharmacotherapy to reduce aggression or impulsivity. Ethical debate on the use of neurointerventions to facilitate rehabilitation—henceforth ‘neurorehabilitation’—has proceeded on two (...) assumptions: that we have instrumental reasons for employing neurorehabilitation (e.g. because it helps protect the public from crime); and that its permissibility depends upon whether its use unjustifiably infringes offenders’ rights. This paper defends a different, hitherto neglected thought. I argue we have rights-based reasons to offer neurorehabilitation to offenders—in other words, that offenders have a _moral right_ to neurorehabilitation. I identify three considerations which support a moral right to conventional rehabilitative interventions—(1) as a countermeasure to the debilitating side-effects of punishment; (2) as a derivative right of the right to hope for renewed liberty; and (3) as compensation for structural injustice. I argue these considerations extend to support a moral right to neurorehabilitation in the following instance: when neurorehabilitation would be part of the _most effective_ package for facilitating rehabilitation, and can be carried out at reasonable cost. I then defend my argument against potential objections, including the objection that neurorehabilitation is a bad option for offenders to have and the charge of over-medicalisation. (shrink)

In this chapter, Douglas draws out some of the implications of his account of the right against mental interference. He first identifies some types of mental influence that are unlikely to infringe the right: influences that consist in reporting reasons, implicitly drawing attention to reasons, or creating new reasons. He then identifies some other types of mental influence that are likely infringe the right: most notably, nonconsensual neurointerventions. Finally, he discusses some hard cases—cases in which either the implications of (...) his account are unclear, or it is unclear whether the implications are plausible: salience-based nudges, conditioning-based interventions, and deception, including via subliminal imagery. He suggests that conditioning-based influences and influences employing subliminal imagery could plausibly infringe the right. (shrink)

In this introductory chapter, Douglas sets the scene for the argument to come by introducing and motivating the thought that we possess a moral right against mental interference and by explaining why this putative right warrants greater attention than it has so far received. Douglas first offers a hypothetical case to introduce and motivate the view that we each possess a moral right against bodily interference. He then employs a variant of the case to motivate the parallel thought that we (...) also possess a moral right against mental interference. The plausibility of this thought already gives us good reason to further elucidate the right and the arguments for and against it, but Douglas proceeds to offer two further reasons to do so. The first reason is that the mind is highly vulnerable to interference, suggesting that, if we do possess a right against mental interference, it might be rather frequently infringed. The second reason is that there have been recent moves to recognise a legal right against mental interference, or something close to it, and whether these moves are advisable may well depend on whether we possess a corresponding moral right. The chapter ends with a brief plan of the remainder of the book. (shrink)

Crime-preventing neurointerventions (CPNs) are increasingly being used or advocated for crime prevention. There is increasing use of testosterone-lowering agents to prevent recidivism in sexual offenders, and strong political and scientific interest in developing pharmaceutical treatments for psychopathy and anti-social behaviour. Recent developments suggest that we may ultimately have at our disposal a range of drugs capable of suppressing violent aggression, and it is not difficult to imagine possible applications of such drugs in crime prevention. But should neurointerventions be (...) used in crime prevention, and may the state ever permissibly impose CPNs as part of the criminal justice process? It is widely thought that preventing recidivism is one of the aims of criminal justice, yet existing means of pursuing this aim are often poorly effective, restrictive of basic freedoms, and harmful. Incarceration, for example, tends to be disruptive of personal relationships and careers, detrimental to physical and mental health, highly restrictive of freedom of movement and association, and rarely more than modestly effective at preventing recidivism. Neurointerventions hold the promise of preventing recidivism in ways that are more effective and more humane, but the use of CPNs in criminal justice raises several ethical concerns. CPNs could be highly intrusive and may threaten fundamental human values, such as bodily integrity and freedom of thought, and humanity has a track record of misguided, harmful, and unwarrantedly coercive use of neurotechnological ‘solutions’ to criminality. This collection brings together original contributions from emerging scholars and internationally renowned moral and political philosophers to address these issues. (shrink)

Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointerventions; if Schmidt’s (...) and Levy’s defences succeed, then some nonconsensual neurointerventions neither harness irrationality, nor subvert rationality, nor fail to give reasons. This, I claim, poses a challenge both to opponents of nonconsensual neurointerventions, and to defenders of nudging. (shrink)

Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually. This chapter raises a puzzle for attempts to explain their objectionability. It first seeks to show that the objectionability of such interventions must be explained at least in part by reference to the sort of mental interference that they involve. It then argues that it is difficult to furnish an explanation of this sort. The difficulty is that (...) these interventions seem no more objectionable, in terms of the kind of mental interference that they involve, than certain forms of environmental influence that many would regard as morally innocuous. The argument proceeds by comparing a particular neurointervention with a comparable environmental intervention. The author argues, first, that the two dominant explanations for the objectionability of the neurointervention apply equally to the environmental intervention, and second, that the descriptive difference between the environmental intervention and the neurointervention that most plausibly grounds the putative moral difference in fact fails to do so. The author concludes by presenting a trilemma that falls out of the argument. (shrink)

In this issue, Elizabeth Shaw and Gulzaar Barn offer a number of replies to my arguments in ‘Criminal Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity’, Journal of Ethics. In this article I respond to some of their criticisms.

It is widely accepted that we each possess a right against interference with our body. In this book, Thomas Douglas argues that we each also possess an analogous right against interference with our mind. Douglas offers two arguments in favour of the view that we possess this right. The first appeals to intuitions regarding cases. Douglas describes a series of cases in which one individual influences the mind of another in a seemingly wrongful way, and argues that we can best (...) account for the wrongfulness of these influences by invoking a right against mental interference. The second argument appeals to the notion of self-ownership. According to this argument, our ownership of ourselves implies ownership of our minds, which in turn implies a right against interference with our minds. Douglas then turns to the task of defining the scope of the right against mental interference. On the view he develops, the right against mental interference protects us against some actions that alter our mental states via processes that are insensitive to the reasons that bear on the alteration. The interventions that most obviously infringe the right are ‘nonconsensual neurointerventions’—interventions that alter a person’s mental states by physically modulating their brain states—and are performed without the target’s consent. But Douglas argues that some psychological forms of influence can infringe the right too. Examples include the use of subliminal imagery and conditioning-based interventions, such as the use of loot boxes in computer games. (shrink)

This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits, motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s contention (...) that there is a moral imperative to pursue the development of moral desirability neuroenhancements, (ii) Thomas Douglas’ claim that voluntarily undergoing moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally permissible, and (iii) David DeGrazia’s claim that moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally desirable. The chapter discusses a number of concerns that have been raised regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements, including concerns that they would restrict freedom, would produce only a superficial kind of moral improvement, would rely on technologies that are liable to be misused, and would frequently misfire, resulting in moral deterioration rather than moral improvement. (shrink)

Birks and Buyx (2018) claim that, at least in the foreseeable future, nonconsensual neurointerventions will almost certainly suppress some valuable mental states and will thereby impose an objectionable harm to mental integrity—a harm that it is pro tanto wrong to impose. Of course, incarceration also interferes with valuable mental states, so might seem to be objectionable in the same way. However, Birks and Buyx block this result by maintaining that the negative mental effects of incarceration are merely foreseen, whereas (...) those of neurointerventions are intended. We dispute Birks and Buyx’s characterization of the descriptive difference between these effects. In both cases, the negative effects are caused, not constituted, by the act in question. (shrink)

Moral enhancement refers to the possibility of making individuals and societies better from a moral standpoint. A fierce debate has emerged about the ethical aspects of moral enhancement, notably because steering moral enhancement in a particular direction involves choosing amongst a wide array of competing options, and these options entail deciding which moral theory or attributes of the moral agent would benefit from enhancement. Furthermore, the ability and effectiveness of different neurotechnologies to enhance morality have not been carefully examined. In (...) this paper, we assess the practical feasibility of moral enhancement neurotechnologies. We reviewed the literature on neuroscience and cognitive science models of moral judgment and analyzed their implications for the specific target of intervention in moral enhancement. We also reviewed and compared evidence on available neurotechnologies that could serve as tools of moral enhancement. We conclude that the predictions of rationalist, emotivist, and dual process models are at odds with evidence, while different intuitionist models of moral judgment are more likely to be aligned with it. Furthermore, the project of moral enhancement is not feasible in the near future as it rests on the use of neurointerventions, which have no moral enhancement effects or, worse, negative effects. (shrink)

In this chapter, we introduce the notion of “moral neuroenhancement,” offering a novel definition as well as spelling out three conditions under which we expect that such neuroenhancement would be most likely to be permissible (or even desirable). Furthermore, we draw a distinction between first-order moral capacities, which we suggest are less promising targets for neurointervention, and second-order moral capacities, which we suggest are more promising. We conclude by discussing concerns that moral neuroenhancement might restrict freedom or otherwise “misfire,” and (...) argue that these concerns are not as damning as they may seem at first. (shrink)

In “Punishing Intentions and Neurointerventions”, Birks and Buyx (2018) provide a novel argument on why the use of mandatory neurointerventions on convicted criminals is morally objectionable “in a...

This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure (...) people all find themselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. Few people seem to believe that special protections should be introduced to protect contemporary Neo-Luddites from such pressures. That being said, the author acknowledges that separate factors, when present, can indeed render indirect coercion to enhance problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, the chapter stresses that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Sex offenders are sometimes offered or required to undergo pharmacological interventions intended to diminish their sex drive (anti-libidinal interventions or ALIs). In this paper, we argue that much of the debate regarding the moral permissibility of ALIs has been founded on an inaccurate assumption regarding their intended purpose—namely, that ALIs are intended solely to realise medical purposes, not correctional goals. This assumption has made it plausible to assert that ALIs may only permissibly be administered to offenders with their valid consent, (...) in line with the approach taken to most other interventions with a medical aim. However, we argue that, contrary to this assumption, the state's intention in relation to at least some ALIs is, at least in part, to achieve correctional objectives. We evaluate two legal regimes for ALI provision—section 645 of the California Penal Code and the mental health regime in England and Wales. In each case, we identify the state's implicit purpose in imposing ALIs and argue that the Californian and English regimes both serve as counterexamples to the view that ALIs are intended solely for medical purposes. While the moral implications of our argument are not straightforward, it raises the question whether consent is required for permissible imposition of ALIs, and more generally, whether the moral permissibility of crime-preventing interventions using medical means should be assessed against the standards of medical ethics or against those of criminal justice ethics. (shrink)

Anti-libidinal interventions (ALIs) are a type of crime-preventing neurointervention (CPN) already in use in many jurisdictions. This chapter examines different types of legal regimes under which ALIs might be provided to sex offenders. The types of legal regimes examined are dedicated statutes that directly provide for ALI use, consensual ALI provision under general medical law principles, mental health legislation providing for ALI use (exemplified by the mental health regime in England and Wales), and European human rights law as it pertains (...) to ALI provision. The chapter considers what we might learn from ALIs in respect of likely or possible arrangements for the provision of other CPNs, and draws attention to some ethical issues raised by each of these types of regime, worth keeping in mind when considering arrangements for CPN provision. (shrink)

Neurological interventions are sometimes used to prevent criminal behavior. For instance, in some jurisdictions, sex offenders can be compelled to undergo treatment designed to reduce sexual desire. As David Birks and Thomas Douglas observe in their introduction to this volume, “chemical castration” may be just the tip of the iceberg. As neuroscience advances, it could reveal many other ways to control criminality. For instance, pharmacological treatments may help combat violent behavior or drug abuse. Such “crime-preventing neurointerventions” have been controversial. (...) On the one hand, proponents argue that CPNs could be both more effective and more humane than incarceration. On the other, critics argue that coercively imposed CPNs violate individual rights and that society has a poor track record of using medical interventions for social control. The nineteen original essays in this book comprehensively cover and effectively advance the moral debate over the appropriate use of CPNs. (shrink)

An important concern sometimes voiced in the neuroethical literature is that swift and radical changes to the parts of a person’s mental life essential for sustaining his/her numerical identity can result in the person ceasing to exist—in other words, that these changes may disrupt psychological continuity. Taking neurointerventions used for rehabilitative purposes as a point of departure, this short paper argues that the same radical alterations of criminal offenders’ psychological features which under certain conditions would result in a disruption (...) of numerical identity can be achieved without these having any effect on numerical identity. Thus, someone interested in making radical alterations to offenders’ psychology can avoid the charge that this would kill the offenders, while still achieving a radical transformation of them. The paper suggests that this possibility makes the question of what kinds of qualitive alterations to offenders’ identity are morally permissible pressing, but then briefly highlights some challenges for arguments against making radical qualitative identity alterations to offenders. No data are available. (shrink)

It is widely believed that informed consent must be obtained from a patient for it to be morally permissible to administer to him/her a medical intervention. The same has been argued for the use of neurointerventions administered to criminal offenders. Arguments in favour of a consent requirement for neurointerventions can take two forms. First, according to absolutist views, neurointerventions should never be administered without an offender’s informed consent. However, I argue that these views are ultimately unpersuasive. The (...) second, and more plausible, form defences of the consent requirement may take are more moderate in that they accept the use of neurointerventions in some (rare) cases, but not in (most) others. Based on common rationales for consent in medical interventions, I discuss whether four moderate approaches in defence of the informed consent requirement for medical interventions succeed in establishing that informed consent must be obtained from offenders prior to administering neurointerventions to them. I offer novel critical perspectives on approaches that have already received some attention in the literature (ie, bodily integrity and harm), and I critically discuss other approaches to defending informed consent in a medical context that have not yet received due attention (ie, self-ownership and trust). Ultimately, I argue that it is not obvious that any of these considerations support a requirement of offenders’ informed consent to neurointerventions. Lastly, however, I suggest that there is at least one overlooked fact as regards how courts currently employ mandatory neurointerventions, which may support such a requirement. (shrink)

The view that acting morally is ultimately a question of treating others with respect has had a profound influence on moral and legal philosophy. Not surprisingly, then, some scholars forcefully argue that the modes of punishment that the states mete out to offenders should not be disrespectful, and, furthermore, it has been argued that obliging offenders to receive neurological treatment is incompatible with showing them their due respect. In this paper, I examine three contemporary accounts of what showing respect for (...) offenders in our sentencing practices would amount to: that it involves not interfering with offenders’ capacities for rationality and autonomy, that it should not undermine offenders’ prospect of reform, and that it amounts to treating offenders as if opaque. I then critically discuss whether any of these accounts plausibly imply that mandating neurointerventions to some offenders is necessarily morally wrong. I argue that they do not. (shrink)

An important question regarding the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice systems relates to the ethics of offering neurointerventions in exchange for a sentence reduction or as a condition of parole – what has been termed the neurocorrective offer. In this paper, we suggest that neurocorrective offers may sometimes involve manipulative pressure. That is, in some cases these offers will involve a pressure to comply with the manipulators’ (i.e., the state’s) bidding that does not rise to the level (...) of coercion, but which cannot be considered an instance of persuasion. We then suggest that offenders may fall victim to this pressure due to general facts about human psychology and their situational vulnerability. We end the paper by identifying three reasons for thinking it prima facie morally wrong for the state to make neurocorrective offers involving manipulative pressure even if such offers do not undermine offenders’ consent to the offer. Specifically, we suggest that such offers are plausibly pro tanto harmful to some offenders and that they sometimes disrespect their autonomy and rationality. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should (...) remain a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should (...) remain a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

Ethicists have for the past 20 years debated the possibility of using neurointerventions to improve intelligence and even moral capacities, and thereby create a safer society. Contributing to a recent debate concerning neurointerventions in criminal rehabilitation, Nicole Vincent and Elizabeth Shaw have separately discussed the possibility of responsibility enhancement. In their ethical analyses, enhancing a convict’s capacity responsibility may be permissible. Both Vincent and Shaw consider self-control to be one of the constituent mental capacities of capacity responsibility. In (...) this paper, we critically examine the promise of improving convicts’ capacity responsibility by neuroenhancements of self-control to see whether the special characteristics of the inmate population make a difference in the analyses. As improving self-control by means of neurointerventions seems plausible, we then ask whether it is or could be a justified measure in court rulings. We conclude that, even if there are cases in which neurointerventions were warranted in the context of the stated goals of the criminal court, i.e., decreasing recidivism and rehabilitating the offenders to the society, due to the range of individual variability in the constitution of self-control, the prescription of specific neurointerventions of self-control falls outside the scope of legitimate court rulings. (shrink)

In this article, I explore select case studies of Parkinson patients treated with deep brain stimulation in light of the notions of alienation and authenticity. While the literature on DBS has so far neglected the issues of authenticity and alienation, I argue that interpreting these cases in terms of these concepts raises new issues for not only the philosophical discussion of neuro-ethics of DBS, but also for the psychological and medical approach to patients under DBS. In particular, I suggest that (...) the experience of alienation and authenticity varies from patient to patient with DBS. For some, alienation can be brought about by neurointerventions because patients no longer feel like themselves. But, on the other hand, it seems alienation can also be cured by DBS as other patients experience their state of mind as authentic under treatment and retrospectively regard their former lives without stimulation as alienated. I argue that we must do further research on the relevance of authenticity and alienation to patients treated with DBS in order to gain a deeper philosophical understanding, and to develop the best evaluative criterion for the behavior of DBS patients. (shrink)

This chapter provides a philosophical analysis of the use of chemical castration as a treatment or punishment for aggravated sexual crimes. Its aim is to strip chemical castration of its various associated problems (like its history, exemplified by the Turing case). Even its philosophical analysis is limited in scope, simply attempting to answer the question: Is the use of chemical castration on perpetrators of aggravated sexual crimes a violation of their moral rights? The author concludes that there is not a (...) compelling reason for thinking that the use of chemical castration in these circumstances is a rights violation. Certainly, the pertinent bodily rights do not belong to a category that is non-forfeitable—as might have been supposed, just because chemical castration affects people sexually. Furthermore, it is not easy to explain why the method by which chemical castration changes an individual’s desires is more intrusive or morally problematic than the ways that many stimuli might change our desires. (shrink)

Every day, millions of people use mobile phones, play video games and surf the Internet. It is thus important to determine how technologies like these change what people think and how they behave. This is a central issue in the study of persuasive technologies. ‘Persuasive technologies’—henceforth ‘PTs’—are digital technologies, such as mobile apps, video games and virtual reality systems, that are deployed for the explicit purpose of changing attitudes and/or behaviours, without using coercion, deception or extreme forms of psychological manipulation (...) (such as hypnosis or indoctrination), and without exerting a direct (not psychologically mediated) physical effect on the brain. Typically PTs employ strategies such as prompting, information provision and encouragement... (shrink)

Medical interventions are usually categorized as “invasive” when they involve piercing the skin or inserting an object into the body. However, the findings of Bluhm and collaborators (2023) (hencef...