Abstract

In this introductory chapter, Douglas sets the scene for the argument to come by introducing and motivating the thought that we possess a moral right against mental interference and by explaining why this putative right warrants greater attention than it has so far received. Douglas first offers a hypothetical case to introduce and motivate the view that we each possess a moral right against bodily interference. He then employs a variant of the case to motivate the parallel thought that we also possess a moral right against mental interference. The plausibility of this thought already gives us good reason to further elucidate the right and the arguments for and against it, but Douglas proceeds to offer two further reasons to do so. The first reason is that the mind is highly vulnerable to interference, suggesting that, if we do possess a right against mental interference, it might be rather frequently infringed. The second reason is that there have been recent moves to recognise a legal right against mental interference, or something close to it, and whether these moves are advisable may well depend on whether we possess a corresponding moral right. The chapter ends with a brief plan of the remainder of the book.